Point I. On Those Who Are Situated in an Occasion of Sin

628. Definition. - An occasion of sin is generally defined as an external circumstance which, either from its own nature or from the frailty of the man who is found in it, allures or induces to sin. Hence it differs from a danger of sinning, under which designation comes whatever impels to sin, whether it is intrinsic or extrinsic.

Division. A multiple occasion is distinguished, namely: proximate or remote, absolute or relative, voluntary or necessary, present or not present.

1. A proximate occasion is that in which men commonly sin for the most part; but a remote occasion is that in which men commonly do not sin for the most part. - St. Ligorius, no. 452 ¹.

¹ ** Against this definition the VV. (p. 942, no. 140) oppose these words of St. Alphonsus (Apostolic Man, last treatise, no. 1): Certain Authors hold that an occasion is not proximate unless it is one in which a man has fallen almost always or for the most part; but the more common and truer opinion teaches that the proximate occasion is that in which someone has sinned frequently. They then also allege book 6, no. 452.

Reply. The holy Doctor here rejects two definitions; for, as he interprets himself, when he calls one part truer, he does not regard the opposite as probable.

Nevertheless, as regards the first, perhaps there will be someone who doubts whether the holy Doctor sufficiently grasped the sense in which that definition was employed. We have this sense in De Lugo (disputation 14, no. 149), where he writes: Some say that a proximate occasion is defined by Gregory in canon Negotium, On Penance, distinction 5, namely, one which we cannot, or certainly cannot without difficulty, use without sin. This, however, needs moderation. For Pope Leo in canon Qualitas 2 and canon Contrarium 3, On Penance, distinction 5, says that commerce or military service cannot be exercised without sin except with the greatest difficulty; and nevertheless it is certain that a merchant or soldier is not bound to leave these offices; hence in Luke 3 St. John the Baptist did not counsel soldiers to leave military service, but to observe the laws of that state. Others therefore add that a proximate occasion is one which a man, the circumstances being considered, never or almost never uses without sin, as one who keeps a concubine at home. From these things it is sufficiently deduced that account is not taken here of the frequency of falls, from which it would be defined whether this is a proximate occasion for someone; rather, it is asked what circumstances are to be called a proximate occasion, whatever frequency of falls may at length be assigned, so that it can be called truly proximate.

As regards the other definition, the holy Doctor indeed seems to refer the words for the most part to the frequency of falls with respect to the man who is situated in that occasion. But the context of the holy Doctor is not without some difficulty. For in that same place (Apostolic Man, last treatise, no. 1), which the VV. object, St. Alphonsus shortly before thus defines a proximate occasion: A proximate occasion, speaking per se, is that in which men commonly fail for the most part. Hence Gury seems to have taken his definition from St. Alphonsus word for word. How, therefore, is it reconciled that St. Alphonsus appears to reject the definition which he himself hands down in the same place?

Likewise, in another place (book 6, no. 452) the holy Doctor writes: Others define a proximate occasion as one in which the penitent is believed never or rarely to abstain from sin. This definition perhaps seems to be taken in the sense which we reported above from De Lugo. The holy Doctor continues: But this definition does not please; it is better said with Sanchez, Holzmann, De Lugo, Suarez, Collet, Wigandt, Croix, Viva, and Father Segneri that a proximate occasion per se is that in which men commonly sin for the most part. Behold, therefore, the holy Doctor again adopts (it is better said, he says) that definition which he seems to reject elsewhere. How are these things easily reconciled?

And indeed, even in this place, when he defines a proximate occasion per accidens, he says: Either because this man, although not almost always nor more frequently, has nevertheless frequently fallen in that occasion. But now the same difficulty seems to occur here. For here the word frequently, since it is opposed to the word more frequently, intimates that, in order to constitute a proximate occasion, it is not necessary that the man sin in it more often than he does not sin. And since these things are so, how are they now reconciled with the preceding definition, that a proximate occasion is one in which men sin for the most part? For for the most part certainly is not said of those who abstain from sin more often than they sin.

I indeed would not doubt that these passages of the holy Doctor which seem to conflict with one another can be suitably reconciled, especially if the sense in which, as we saw with De Lugo, others define a proximate occasion is kept before the eyes; nevertheless, I find no trace or mention of that sense in the holy Doctor. Yet this is sufficiently manifest: the VV. would consult better for the honor and reverence of the holy Doctor if, before censuring the writings of others, they inquired somewhat more diligently into the doctrine of that same holy Doctor.

2. An absolute occasion, or one per se, is that which of itself induces to sin and accordingly is such with respect to men taken commonly; a relative occasion, or one per accidens, is that which, although it is not an occasion with respect to others, is nevertheless such with respect to someone, his frailty being considered.

3. A voluntary occasion is one which can easily be left; but a necessary occasion is one which cannot be removed physically or morally.

4. A present occasion, or one in esse, is one which someone has with him without actually seeking it, for example, if he keeps a concubine at home or is accustomed to sin with a maidservant; an occasion not present, or one non in esse, is one which someone does not indeed have in actuality but easily finds, such as a tavern in relation to a drunkard, or a mistress in relation to her lover.

629. Principles. - I. Absolution is not to be denied to a penitent situated in a remote occasion, even if he is unwilling to leave it. The reason is: 1. because it does not induce a proximate danger of sinning mortally; 2. because too harsh an obligation would be imposed upon the penitent, since occasions of this kind generally cannot be avoided morally. - St. Ligorius, Apostolic Man, last treatise, no. 2 and following.

II. A penitent who refuses to leave a voluntary proximate occasion of sin is never to be absolved, whether that occasion is proximate per se or per accidens, whether in esse or non in esse. This is evident from proposition 61 condemned by Innocent XI, which reads thus: One who is situated in a proximate occasion which he can and will not leave can sometimes be absolved; indeed, he directly and deliberately seeks it or thrusts himself into it.

III. But absolution cannot be denied on account of that occasion to a penitent who is situated in a necessary proximate occasion, if he is otherwise found disposed and wishes to use the prescribed remedies. The reason is that no one is bound to the impossible, whether physically or morally; and otherwise an occasion of sinning is not of itself a sin, nor does it place a man under a necessity of sinning. - St. Ligorius, no. 453.

630. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Can a penitent who sincerely promises that he will leave a proximate occasion of sinning be absolved before he has left it?

Reply 1. Yes, per se, if it concerns an occasion non in esse, when the penitent, as we suppose, is truly disposed and the danger of breaking his purpose does not appear grave ².

² Some grave danger could threaten from the circumstance of some effort which must necessarily be employed to avoid the occasion, as the Author presently notes. But when this difficulty is absent and the danger seems to threaten solely from human frailty or inconstancy, see the doctrine of Suarez reported above in the note to no. 625.

I said per se, because if the circumstances require some effort, for example, in fleeing some companion, or in not approaching some house in certain circumstances of time, persons, etc., then it will pertain to the prudence of the Confessor to weigh whether it is expedient that the penitent first overcome the difficulty. Reply 2. No, generally speaking, if it concerns a present occasion, or one in esse, which can easily be left immediately. If, however, the penitent gives extraordinary signs of sorrow, so that it can be believed that the danger of inconstancy in his purpose is absent, he can be absolved, especially if a reasonable cause is added, for example, a mark arising from omitting Communion, a solemnity, an indulgence, etc. - According to the mind of St. Alphonsus, the same is to be said if the penitent cannot return to the same Confessor, or at least cannot return except after a long time. For then, says the holy Doctor, he not only can be absolved, but has a right to receive absolution.

631. • QUESTION 2. Can one be absolved who, while situated in a necessary occasion, always relapses in the same manner after employing the remedies?

Reply 1. Perhaps the supposition could be denied ³. For it can scarcely happen that, when the remedies are employed, some correction does not follow if they are proposed opportunely and suitably to the circumstances.

³ At first sight St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 457) seems to deny that this penitent can be absolved. But it is evident from the context that he asserts this with Croix when there is no hope of correction, namely, as Croix says (book 5, no. 261), cited by St. Alphonsus, when someone can in no way bring it about that a formal danger of sinning is not joined to the external occasion, and, in other words, can in no way bring it about that the proximate danger becomes remote. Moreover, this is that hypothesis which the Author deservedly says is to be denied as absurd; for when remedies are suitably suggested and faithfully employed, a relapse could indeed be rendered morally impossible, for example, if, when external sins are at issue, conversation of a man alone with a woman alone is faithfully avoided.

But because St. Alphonsus (loc. cit.), after Croix (loc. cit.), seems to attack Cardinal De Lugo and others alleged there, it is not to be thought that these authors either disputed about that incongruous hypothesis or taught that due disposition is never lacking to a penitent who always relapses in the same manner. Indeed, the same St. Alphonsus (no. 457, at the end) finally returns to the opinion of De Lugo, which he furthermore calls most common, namely, that this penitent can be absolved if he approaches with true sorrow and purpose. Thus De Lugo also says (On Penance, disputation 14, no. 158): Even after that experience of no progress, true sorrow and the required purpose can stand without a will to remove the occasion with so great a loss. Therefore, the penitent can be absolved; for nothing else is required except confession with sorrow and purpose. That true sorrow with the required purpose can stand even then, although the occasion perseveres, the same St. Alphonsus teaches thus (no. 455): The Doctors commonly affirm that the penitent is not bound to leave the occasion if otherwise he would suffer grave harm, provided that meanwhile he is prepared to use the prescribed means.... The reason is that an occasion of sinning is not in itself a sin, nor does it bring a necessity of sinning; wherefore true detestation of sins and a firm purpose of not relapsing and of employing the due remedies can well stand with it. But that sorrow and purpose of this kind can be had even after a preceding experience of inconstancy, St. Alphonsus himself, as we saw above, supposes, and the thing itself cries out. For to what end would you suspend absolution so that the penitent might resist more efficaciously, if you believe a purpose of this kind to be impossible? But go to Cardinal De Lugo himself (disputation 14, nos. 158-159), and those things which St. Alphonsus objected from the vain hypothesis of Croix will appear of no moment.

Reply 2. In the case, the general rule would have to be employed which St. Ligorius ⁴ proposes with the Author of the work entitled Instruction for New Confessors, namely, Francis Giordano, a priest of the Congregation of the Mission, who published his work at Rome in the year 1726, and which was afterward reprinted at Rome in 1841. A rule of this kind is (cited work, part 1, chapter 10, no. 244) that it should be maturely weighed whether, in practice, it is more difficult to remove the occasion than to avoid sin, with the occasion present, or whether it is easier. If it is more difficult to remove the occasion, let it be decided that it is morally impossible to remove it. And this norm, as the Author himself acknowledges, he took from the work of Venerable Paul Segneri entitled The Instructed Confessor (chapter 5), where these things are found: The precept of fleeing the occasion was imposed by natural law to diminish sins, not to increase them. Therefore, when removing the occasion is more difficult in practice than, with the occasion present, effectively avoiding sin, there can be no obligation of removing it; otherwise the danger of doubling the guilt would be increased by those very means which are prescribed by law to destroy it.

⁴ ** The VV. rightly note (p. 605, in the note) that the holy Doctor Alphonsus has nothing about this general rule and did not allege the aforesaid Author for this purpose. **

For the rest, the things said here by Father Gury directly attack the opinion which Claude Croix (against very many, as he himself admits, book 5, no. 261) defends as more likely, and toward which St. Alphonsus also inclines as though truer: namely, that in the case someone is bound to leave the occasion even with the loss of all goods of fortune, reputation, and life. For this he furthermore falsely alleges certain authors cited by John Sanchez, as he says, and Stoz, neither of whom in fact has any of these things.

Indeed, whether with the same Croix you fashion the chimerical hypothesis of a man who can in no way bring it about that the proximate danger ceases, or whether you speak better of one who continually relapses into the same sins because through frailty he sometimes omits the use of the means, it will always be true that this opinion of Croix is neither consonant with reason nor capable of being prudently reduced to practice.

And surely, by the law of nature the penitent is indeed bound to avoid a proximate danger. But since this can be obtained in two ways, namely, either by using suitable means so that the danger becomes remote, as they say, or by removing or fleeing the occasion, the penitent is bound by the law of nature only to one or the other. By what right, therefore, will the Confessor impose this one upon him rather than the other? Can the Confessor, as we saw with De Lugo above in the note to no. 605, command anything other than what is necessary?

Moreover, since it is manifest that that which is judged morally impossible because more difficult to execute can neither be nor ought to be imposed upon the penitent, will it truly be easier to undergo the danger of all one's goods, as Croix says, both of fortune and of reputation and even of life, than to employ some remedies for diminishing the danger of sinning?

Furthermore, if, according to the evident reasoning of Venerable Father Paul Segneri, the Confessor ought to prefer that which removes the penitent further from the danger of sinning, he surely can never choose that in which the penitent is more certain to sin. Therefore the Confessor will never prudently prefer that which must appear less probable of execution. But is it not less probable that the flight from the occasion with so great a danger will be hoped for than the suitable use of means for diminishing the danger? And it is surely marvelous that Croix (loc. cit.) shows that he is moved in no way by the reasoning of Pallavicini, whom he alleges, namely, that if the obligation of avoiding the occasion with so great a danger is imposed, the penitent will ordinarily violate it and will not leave the occasion; hence the imprudent Confessor will attain this alone: that he furnishes a certain occasion for committing still more sins!

For the rest, even if that indiscreet obligation is not imposed, another way is available to the Confessor, since meanwhile he can, where the matter requires, suspend absolution, so that the penitent may be efficaciously moved to employ the suitable means. For, as John Sanchez says (disputation 10, no. 10), judgment must be rendered concerning these as persons having a habit of sinning, not as persons having an occasion, since it does not lie in their choice to avoid it. And if some moral diligence appears in the penitent, the rule of Suarez will avail (On Penance, disputation 32, section 2, no. 4), that absolution is not to be denied to him, even if he relapse again and again, especially if he restrains himself somewhat and gradually diminishes the number of sins; which Navarrus noted, chapter 3, no. 21. Sometimes, however, absolution can be deferred and some greater penance or precaution employed.

It must also be added that, if the Confessor finds the penitent so frail and even inconstant in employing the means that he must judge him less disposed for absolution on account of a defect of efficacious purpose, he will still imprudently exact from so frail, infirm, and weak a man that which is more difficult and morally impossible for him; and much more imprudently will he rigidly and harshly reject him from himself. For thus he will attain this alone: that the despairing penitent is immersed more deeply in sins. On the contrary, charity, kindness, and patience in often receiving and hearing him will obtain at least this: that he is neither wholly abandoned to the devil, nor altogether casts aside the means and prayers, nor has the way cut off by which he can be helped by counsels and exhortations, and that he knows access to reconciliation always lies easily open to him; just as the Doctors advise must be done where they treat of the confessions of a prostitute, a usurer, and others of this kind, who are not sufficiently disposed but have some less efficacious desire of correction or a better life, or only a velleity. Nor surely in the case ought the confessor to forget the opinion by which Suarez (On Religion, treatise 5, book 3, chapter 8, no. 7) concludes concerning this argument: Nor can human infirmities of this kind be cured more efficaciously by man.

** Against this Note and the one immediately preceding, the VV. heap together thirty-four columns (pp. 603-620), or rather fill them with a vast mass of useless things. I said useless, since they scarcely, if at all, touch the hinge of the matter. And the VV. surely held a most convenient way of extricating themselves from the difficulties when they write (p. 620): We omit to refute specifically the intrinsic reasons which Father Ballerini brings forward for his opinion, lest we undertake a superfluous labor; for the preceding explanation of the doctrine which St. Alphonsus holds sufficiently reduces all those reasons to nothing.

But this is altogether false. And surely those intrinsic reasons which are indicated in the Note are contained in these very few points: 1. The penitent is indeed bound by the law of nature to avoid a proximate danger. But since this can be obtained in two ways, namely, either by using suitable means so that the danger becomes remote, or by removing or fleeing the occasion, the penitent is bound by the law of nature only to one or the other. Therefore, the confessor cannot impose this one upon him rather than the other. And the reason is that the Confessor is not a legislator and accordingly, excepting sacramental satisfaction, cannot by command impose upon a penitent anything to which the penitent is not bound by some other law. Moreover, I ask: Does anything occur in the explanation of the doctrine of St. Alphonsus which the VV. set forth beforehand by which this principle might perhaps be overthrown? Indeed, will anyone think that this principle can be shown to be false?

Another principle is this: It is manifest that, of two means by which the end can be obtained, the one which, as more difficult to execute, is judged morally impossible can neither be nor ought to be imposed upon the penitent by the Confessor. But it is more difficult to undergo the danger of all one's goods, as Croix says, both of fortune and of reputation and even of life, than to employ some remedies for diminishing the danger of sinning. Therefore.

There is added a confirmation from the observation of Venerable Father Segneri, which is a certain consequence of the preceding principle. Namely, the Confessor ought to prefer that which removes the penitent further from the danger of sinning, and accordingly can never choose that in which the penitent is more certain to sin. Therefore the confessor will never prudently prefer that which must appear less probable of execution. But the flight from the occasion with so great a danger (of all goods, namely, of fortune, reputation, and even life) is hoped for less probably than the suitable use of means for diminishing the danger. Therefore.

Moreover, in that whole explanation of the doctrine of St. Alphonsus to which the VV. refer the reader, they have not even a word about these things, much less have they attempted to reply to anything. This alone can be seen: that they endeavor (p. 619) to weaken the reasoning brought forward by Venerable Segneri by adducing these words of his, which are read shortly after the text brought forward here: In doubt, always hold to the stricter side, because this, as we have seen, is the more favorable to the penitent. These, as is evident, do not pertain to the matter, because the rule proposed by that same Venerable Author and confirmed above by unshaken reasons in no way concerns doubtful cases. Therefore the VV. in fact reply nothing to the preceding intrinsic reasons, however much they pretend that they have replied; St. Alphonsus never used so wretched an artifice for evading contrary reasons, and we most certainly believe he never would have used it.

Thus, in the explanation of the doctrine of St. Alphonsus which the VV. set forth beforehand through six columns (pp. 608-610), this alone pertains to the matter: that they attempt to show that the hypothesis thus described by Croix (book 5, no. 261) is not chimerical: When someone can in no way bring it about that a formal danger of sinning is not joined to the external occasion, or, in other words, when someone can in no way bring it about that the proximate danger becomes remote. This hypothesis we called absurd in the Note, namely, when remedies are suitably suggested and faithfully employed.

To prove that these things are falsely said, the VV. propose two examples, one of which, however (p. 610), taken from Cardenas, does not pertain to the matter. For Cardenas (part 4, dissertation 40, no. 145) proposes the case of a concubine who, if she resists the lust of her accomplice, will most certainly be expelled by him from the house; and, this having been done, she will perish from hunger. I said that this example does not pertain to the matter; for where is there any place here for employing remedies by which the danger may become remote, when this single choice is given her: either to sin or to be expelled from the house, about to perish from hunger? It is the same, namely, as when Mattathias was given the choice either to eat swine's flesh or to undergo death. And if the hypothesis of Claude Lacroix were ultimately directed to this, surely every controversy would be absent. But Lacroix (loc. cit.) asserts that most weighty Authors stand for the opposite opinion, whom he afterward also calls very many; and at the end he seems also to permit the contrary practice, saying: He who wishes to defend the first, more benign opinion should read the Defense of Gobat. Therefore the hypothesis of Lacroix is altogether another.

And to this clearly pertains the other example which the VV. (p. 608) fashion: namely, of a young man who is not his own master and desperately loves a female relative with whom he is compelled to live in the same house. Having committed several sins with her and being agitated by the stings of conscience, he approaches confession. The Confessor, recognizing that this occasion is necessary, prescribes THE CUSTOMARY REMEDIES for him, especially that he should endeavor to avoid being alone with her. The penitent omits none of the prescribed things and faithfully avoids being alone with her; but he does not avoid the accomplice, who industriously seeks him and by flatteries and solicitations brings him to the point that he again falls miserably and sins, if not by consummated acts, at least by imperfect acts or by consenting interiorly. He returns to the confessor, who does not hesitate to absolve one in no way negligent in employing the remedies. He returns again and yet again, a recidivist in the same manner.

He does not sin except when he is sought and solicited by the accomplice, so that the supposition, always in the same manner, is true in the strictest sense. But at length the confessor... defers absolution for him. The penitent returns, nevertheless again a recidivist in the same manner. From this the VV. conclude: You therefore have in the strictest sense the case which St. Alphonsus proposes, and only two questions remain: 1. Whether in this case there is hope of correction, and 2. What the confessor must do.

Reply. The Confessor, as the VV. say, prescribed the customary remedies. But I ask: why did he omit certain other remedies, indeed less customary, but altogether suitable to the circumstances? The penitent, they say, omits none of the prescribed things and faithfully endeavors to avoid being alone with her; but he does not avoid the accomplice. And below: He does not sin except when he is sought and solicited by the accomplice. But concerning Blessed Thomas it is read that he drove away with a firebrand even the woman who had been introduced to shake his constancy. Why, therefore, did the confessor not persuade the young man that, after first admonishing her in vain even with harsh words, he should at length drive away with a firebrand the wicked woman whom he now thoroughly recognizes as a snare to himself and a fatal cause of eternal damnation? And if he did not have a firebrand at hand, that he should receive her with slaps and kicks? For who does not know that this kind of remedy, if the others do not profit, is most suitably and not rarely employed, and further ought to be employed, both by a man with a wanton woman and by a woman with a wanton man?

But, what is more marvelous, the VV. finally arrive at the opinion which they seem to attack. For after wrongly fashioning that the confessor had employed all the remedies, and further had fallen from every hope of obtaining correction, and finally had seriously declared to the young man that no hope of salvation remained for him unless he left his paternal home, they present the young man himself as so disposed that, solicitous for his eternal salvation, he either leaves his paternal home or, about to attempt the utmost, straining every power and nerve and imploring divine help more fervently than usual and with his whole heart, resists the solicitation of the accomplice and finally emerges victorious in this contest.... Indeed, even if he did not immediately enter into these sound counsels, nevertheless his watchful conscience would not permit him to languish in sins and would not cease to cry out until he had fulfilled one or the other in deed. Thus indeed the VV. (pp. 608-609).

But: 1. From these things it is now plainly gathered that the hypothesis of Croix is therefore chimerical and absurd, concerning a penitent who can in no way bring it about that a formal danger of sinning is not joined to the external occasion, or, in other words, who can in no way bring it about that the proximate danger becomes remote. For in this very case, which they otherwise present so that no hope of correction shines forth, they themselves suppose that the young man, after taking up a more fervent effort, can thus resist the solicitation of the accomplice so that he finally emerges victorious in this contest. Therefore they confess that, even while the present occasion perseveres, the proximate danger can become remote when suitable remedies are employed. Therefore they say contradictory things when they assert both that no hope of correction is present and nevertheless that a change of morals is to be hoped for.

2. Therefore they concede that the aforesaid young man is not necessarily to leave his paternal home, but that one or the other is to be chosen by him: either that with a firmer will he employ suitable means for conquering the temptations, or certainly that he flee from the occasion by leaving his paternal home, if he is unwilling to undertake the care and labor of employing the means. For otherwise, as the VV. very well write (p. 608), it is certain that this penitent can resist the solicitation and does not resist on account of a defect of purpose; for no commands, divine

grace assisting, is impossible for anyone to observe. Therefore, the conclusion against them is that, if purpose is lacking, the cause is to be sought in this: that suitable means are either not suggested and prescribed to him by the confessor, or he himself does not faithfully use them.

Hence there is a consequence against the opinion which Croix prefers. For if the penitent is bound only to one or the other, and satisfies his obligation if he chooses and holds to one of the two ways of escaping the danger of sin, the confessor therefore cannot impose one determined way of the two by command; and much less ought or can he prescribe that way which, since it is more difficult to execute, exposes the penitent, as Segneri said, to a more certain danger of sin.

From these things the reply to the texts of Authors which the VV. heap together through thirteen columns (pp. 610-617) easily discloses itself. Namely, the obligation which they urge of leaving the occasion is to be understood conditionally: namely, when the penitent does not bring himself to employ the suitable and indeed necessary remedies which render the danger remote from proximate.

The VV. complain, and indeed gravely censure (p. 607), that the hypothesis fashioned by Croix is called absurd and chimerical, while the practice consequently proposed by him according to that incongruous hypothesis, namely, of exacting from the penitent that which, according to the words of Segneri, exposes him to a more certain danger of sinning, is called imprudent, indiscreet, and not consonant with reason, when St. Alphonsus also preferred it, whose virtues and consequently prudence have nevertheless already been declared to have attained the heroic degree.

Reply to point 1. The VV. themselves, as we saw above, reject that hypothesis and prove it false while they seem to wish to defend it. As regards point 2, how, first of all, will the VV. prove that the holy Doctor praises that practice when, on account of its difficulty in comparison with the use of other means, it induces the penitent into a more certain danger of sinning? But then this kind of argument manifestly proves too much. Indeed, above (see the Note to no. 627, question 6) we saw, in this matter of prudence, namely, when the question is whether or not absolution is to be deferred for a penitent who has not yet satisfied the obligation of making restitution, that the doctrine of St. Antoninus differs from the doctrine of St. Alphonsus. And since the virtues and further the prudence of each were declared to be in the heroic degree, and indeed St. Antoninus possessed such dexterity in explaining counsels that he was called by the common praise ANTONINUS OF COUNSELS, as the Roman Breviary has, how can these things be reconciled in this manner?