Article — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Article I. On Those in Occasions in General
I. Notion of occasion. An occasion is a person or external thing which creates for a person a danger of sinning.
II. Division of occasion.
- Occasion is distinguished into remote and proximate. Remote is that which creates a light danger; proximate is that which creates a grave danger, that is, such a danger in which someone is certainly, more probably, or probably going to fall. Such are, for example, a tavern for a drunkard, a master for a maidservant seduced by him. For the rest, the presence of a proximate occasion can be gathered both a priori and a posteriori. It is gathered a priori when, considering the enticement of the object and the disposition of the subject, it is at least probable that someone is going to fall. It is gathered a posteriori through experience or frequency of falls, namely if someone in a certain occasion, considering the times in which he was exposed to the occasion, has fallen so frequently that it is probable that, with the occasion present, he is going to fall again (St. Alphonsus, VI, 452).
Many call a proximate occasion that in which someone is certainly, or almost certainly, or very probably going to fall. Hence, in order to gather from experience whether an occasion is proximate, they require that someone always, or almost always, or altogether more frequently, has sinned in it. But that the definition of St. Alphonsus handed down by us is right will be clear from what is to be said, since an occasion is already rightly called proximate when there is of itself an obligation of avoiding it physically. But, as we shall prove, there is of itself an obligation of avoiding even that occasion in which someone is only probably going to fall.
- Proximate occasion is subdivided into:
a) Absolute and relative, according as it creates a danger for people commonly or for a certain person.
b) Continuous and interrupted, according as it occurs habitually or at intervals.
c) Voluntary and necessary. Voluntary is that which can be avoided without grave inconvenience. Necessary is that which either physically cannot be avoided or cannot be avoided without grave inconvenience. But in order that an occasion can be called necessary, an inconvenience is required the graver in proportion as the danger of damnation, the danger of sinning, the sin to be feared, and the scandal to arise from the occasion are greater. Wherefore note two condemned propositions, namely proposition 62 proscribed by Innocent XI: "A proximate occasion of sinning is not to be fled when some useful or honest cause for not fleeing occurs";2 and proposition 41 condemned by Alexander VII: "A concubinary is not to be obliged to cast out the concubine if she would be too useful for the pleasure of the concubinary, commonly regalo, since, with her lacking, he would live life too bitterly, and other banquets would affect the concubinary with great weariness, and another female servant would be too difficult to find."3 Therefore an occasion should not easily be held as necessary. In addition note that the difficulty of renouncing the occasion is commonly exaggerated by penitents (St. Alphonsus, 452, 454).
1 Cf. Ter Haar, De occasionariis et recidivis.
2 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1212.
3 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1141.
III. Obligation of avoiding occasions. First it must be noted that an occasion of sinning can be avoided physically or morally: physically, that is, by removing or abandoning it; morally, that is, by bringing it about in another way that the danger of sinning ceases to persist. Next it must be observed that we are speaking expressly of occasions of sinning gravely. Now:
- There is no obligation of avoiding remote occasions of sinning gravely. The reason is that such an obligation would bring with it an intolerable burden to be borne through one's whole life and continual anxieties; for occasions of this kind continually occur to a person. But it cannot be admitted that a burden of this kind has been imposed on people. Some indeed think that of itself there is a venial obligation; but the argument seems also to exclude that obligation.
- As regards proximate occasions of sinning gravely, these things hold:
a) There is a grave obligation of physically avoiding a voluntary proximate occasion of sinning gravely. The proposition thus stated now seems commonly to be admitted, and it is deduced from proposition 61 condemned by Innocent XI: "One who is in a proximate occasion of sinning, which he can and does not will to omit, indeed directly and deliberately seeks or thrusts himself into it, can sometimes be absolved." Now the words of omitting, seeking, and thrusting oneself into it seem altogether to have to be understood of physical avoidance. Next, the proposition stated is proved by the same argument by which the proposition now to be stated is proved.
b) There is a grave obligation of physically avoiding a voluntary proximate occasion, as it has been defined by us; in other words, there is a grave obligation of physically avoiding also that voluntary occasion in which someone is only probably going to fall. For each person is held to avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally; or to proceed here and now in such a way that he is not probably going to sin gravely. But one who does not physically avoid a voluntary occasion in which he is probably going to fall does not avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally.
The major is clear from the fact that one who does not avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally does not truly and simply turn away from the formal offense of God, nor truly and simply turn away from his own supreme evil.
The minor is proved thus: one who does not physically avoid a voluntary occasion in which he is probably going to fall cannot avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally, except through the help of God, by which the danger here and now ceases to be grave. But one who does not physically avoid a voluntary occasion, that is, an occasion which he can easily avoid, cannot without rashness expect the help of God.
The subsumed minor is proved. The help of God, as gratuitous, cannot legitimately be expected except insofar as it is necessary. But it is in no way necessary where the occasion is voluntary, because this can easily be physically avoided; and once it has been avoided, help for resisting it is no longer required (St. Alphonsus, V, 63; VI, 452). These words of the Council of Trent are added: God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes both to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot, and he helps so that you can.1 Likewise these words of St. Thomas: "Tempting God consists in this, when a man omits to do what he can for escaping dangers, looking only to divine help" (II-II, q. 97, a. 1).
Nor should you object that divine help can be expected, provided it is asked for. For the said help can be expected by one asking only when it is necessary. Indeed, a petition of this kind is not even honest, and therefore it can exercise no influence upon God: the petition of departing from the occasion is honest; the petition of conquering while you remain in the occasion is dishonest.
As regards the doctrine of theologians, I note that most earlier theologians of greater note adhere to the opinion defended, as Ter Haar proves by the testimonies brought forward.2 St. Thomas has these things: "The weak in faith, whose subversion can probably be feared, are to be prohibited from association with unbelievers" (II-II, q. 10, a. 9). St. Alphonsus strenuously defends the same opinion in the places cited, and very many, even those who wrote after St. Alphonsus, defend it, as the praised Ter Haar again shows.3
Corollary. The genuine definition of proximate occasion is this: it is an occasion in which someone is at least probably going to fall. For a proximate occasion is that which there is of itself an obligation of avoiding physically. But from what has been said it follows that there is of itself an obligation of physically avoiding an occasion in which someone is at least probably going to fall.
Objection 1. It does not appear why he truly sins gravely who has an altogether notable probability that in this occasion which he approaches he is not going to sin gravely; for he does not choose a thing which by moral necessity brings sin with it.
Response. It suffices, as follows from the argument brought forward, that someone choose a thing such that, once it is posited, he will probably commit sin.
Objection 2. If from the nature of things or from experience it is clear that probably the sin will be avoided, this is a sign that the danger can be avoided with those ordinary helps of grace which can prudently be expected and asked by any person.
Response. I deny the consequent, since the divine help of which there is discussion cannot prudently be expected and asked in the hypothesis posited, because it is not necessary, as we have said.
Objection 3. Because by hypothesis it is also probable that sin will not follow, one who for a reasonable cause commits himself to such an occasion cannot be accused of rashness and said to will sin.
Response. I deny the consequent, since one who without grave cause exposes himself to a grave danger of a grave evil is deservedly accused of rashness. But since in the hypothesis posited it is also probable that sin will follow, the matter concerns a grave danger of a grave evil, that is, of sinning mortally.
Objection 4. In several texts of authors alleged by Berardi and Ter Haar in their favor, the question is only of probable danger, and it is not established that the authors did not understand a probability to which nothing is opposed, and which therefore would be equivalent to moral certitude.
Response. An interpretation of this kind does not agree with the customary meaning of the words.
Note. If someone without cause enters into a danger, but uses such means as remove the very impulse to sin, he is not to be said to expose himself rashly to danger; rather the danger is now not present. For example, if someone always steals when he is alone in some house, he can go there if people are present.
2 Ter Haar, cited work, nn. 53-55; nn. 63, 64.
3 Ter Haar, cited work, n. 65.
c) There is no obligation of physically avoiding a necessary proximate occasion. For one who for a grave reason exposes himself to a grave danger cannot be accused of rashness, and therefore can rightly hope that, with means having been used, he will acquire divine help by which the proximate occasion ceases to be such. "And thus surgeons are excused if they expose themselves to danger in treating women, when sometimes in the past they have already fallen because of such an occasion. And thus pastors who have experienced the same misery in receiving confessions. Thus also others are excused who cannot abandon their own office, for instance that of clerk, soldier, tavern-keeper, or merchant, without grave detriment" (St. Alphonsus, V, 63; VI, 455). The same must be said of those for whom, on account of a vehement inclination to evil, innumerable things are proximate occasions. They are indeed held to use means of not sinning, but they are not held to avoid all those things; this would be a very grave burden, and by itself alone already excuses.
Question 1. Whether one is bound, even with very grave damage, to abandon the occasion if he continually neglects to use remedies, and therefore continually relapses.
Response. The affirmative answer seems altogether to be given; for each person is held to avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally, or is held here and now to proceed in such a way that he is not probably going to sin gravely (St. Alphonsus, VI, 457). But the person of whom we speak is probably, not to say almost certainly, going to sin formally unless he abandons the occasion. Therefore he is bound to abandon it.
The minor is drawn from the fact that one who has continually neglected the remedies to be used will probably, not to say almost certainly, neglect them again, and therefore will probably sin again.
Objection. The penitent is bound only either to use the means or to avoid the occasion. Therefore the confessor cannot impose on him the obligation of avoiding the occasion.
Response. In the case the penitent is held to choose the means of avoiding the occasion, because he probably, indeed almost certainly, is not going to use the other means. Nor does the confessor impose that obligation on him, but the law of nature does. But let the confessor teach the penitent the obligation; nor of itself should he abstain from admonition for this reason, that the penitent who neglects the means will not use the more difficult means of abandoning the occasion. For, as Ter Haar observes, "often it is easier for a rightly disposed penitent to posit one very difficult and quasi-heroic act, namely to break off a morally necessary occasion, than afterward, when fervor has diminished and temptation has increased, through a long time, perhaps through months and years, daily to use those remedies of vigilance and prayer with constant struggle against his own passions and the snares of enticements."1
Question 2. Whether one is bound, even with very grave damage, to abandon the occasion if, although he uses remedies, he nevertheless always relapses in the same way.
Response. The case will not easily occur, because a penitent who diligently uses the means will commonly be amended little by little. But if it occurs, the affirmative answer must be given, because, as we have just said, each person is held to avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally. But the one of whom we speak is probably, not to say almost certainly, going to sin formally unless he abandons the occasion. There is added that, at least in the hypothesis posited, these words of Christ urge: "If your eye scandalizes you, pluck it out and cast it from you: it is good for you to enter into life with one eye, rather than having two eyes to be cast into the hell of fire."2 (St. Alphonsus, VI, 457). Finally, in the work of Pellizzari De Monialibus, the Sacred Congregation of the Index willed the contrary opinion to be suppressed by decree of April 21, 1693.
1 Ter Haar, De occasionariis et recidivis, n. 176.
2 Matthew 18:9.
IV. Absolution of those in occasions. As regards the absolution of those in occasions, these things especially come to be noted:
- One who is in a proximate, voluntary, and continuous occasion to which he is strongly attached should not be absolved before he has physically or quasi-physically1 abandoned the occasion, unless there is a special reason for granting absolution at once. This is deduced first from the fact that "such a penitent is indisposed for absolution if he asks for it before he removes the occasion" (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 66). Moreover, he is indisposed because he exposes himself to a grave danger of breaking his purpose, that is, of not removing the proximate occasion. St. Alphonsus explains this in this way: "Removal of the occasion is a greatly arduous thing, and does not happen unless one inflicts great force on himself, so that he may be torn away from that occasion to which, because of the past adhesion of his mind, he remains strongly inclined. And therefore, if the occasion is not removed before absolution, the penitent will easily deceive himself after absolution, falsely persuading himself that he will resist temptations; and thus, with the occasion not dismissed, he will certainly return to his vomit" (VI, 454; III, 436). But if the penitent does not notice the danger, of itself he must be admonished by the confessor; and once admonished he becomes indisposed if nevertheless he wills to receive absolution immediately. There is added that the confessor as physician is of himself held to use a means without which the penitent is exposed to grave danger of breaking his purpose (St. Alphonsus, cited place). Finally, theologians by far more commonly admit the proposition stated. Thus, for example, St. Charles Borromeo, St. Thomas of Villanova, St. Francis Xavier, St. Leonard of Port Maurice, Venerable Paul Segneri, Lehmkuhl, Bucceroni, Prummer, and others, whose testimonies Ter Haar brings forward.2
What the special reasons are for departing from the rule, or granting absolution at once, see n. 407.
Objection 1. The opinion of St. Alphonsus rests on a doubtful foundation, namely that he sins gravely who exposes himself only to probable sin.
Response. By referring to the proof of that doctrine and the refutation of those things which are opposed to it (n. 468).
Objection 2. The earlier theologians only counsel, and do not prescribe, the opinion which St. Alphonsus defends.
Response. An interpretation of this kind is opposed to the obvious and clear sense of the testimonies of which there was discussion above.
1 For instance, if the matter concerns a maidservant, by renouncing service, even if she does not depart immediately.
2 Ter Haar, cited work, n. 117 sq.
- One who is in a proximate, voluntary, and continuous occasion should not be absolved before he has used the assigned means, unless there is a special reason for granting absolution at once. The reason is that, considering the very great blandishments of the present occasion and the danger arising from it of neglecting the assigned means, the will of the penitent must be sustained by the remedy of delay. "For I judge," says St. Alphonsus, "that the confessor as physician is bound to apply to his penitent the more opportune remedies, so that he may work his salvation; and I think that no more apt antidote can be administered to one who is in a proximate occasion than delay of absolution. For experience teaches that penitents, after they depart absolved, for the most part neglect to use the prescribed means, and thus they relapse most easily. On the contrary, when absolution is denied to them, they strive more vigilantly to carry out the remedies and to resist temptations, moved indeed by fear lest, when they return to the confessor, they again be dismissed without absolution" (VI, 456). What the special reasons are for departing from the rule or granting absolution at once, see n. 407.
- One who approaches a proximate, voluntary, and interrupted occasion, and returns twice or three times after being absolved without any amendment:
a) If he shows only ordinary signs of disposition, of himself he cannot be absolved; for since he has already several times not avoided the occasion, although he could easily have avoided it, there is deserved doubt about the disposition. He can be absolved under condition if some one of the causes assigned in n. 404 is present.
b) If either of himself or after being admonished by the confessor he shows an extraordinary sign of disposition, he can be held as sufficiently disposed and absolved (St. Alphonsus, VI, 454; Praxis Confessarii, n. 66).
- One in an occasion who is a habituated relapser is to be treated according as was set forth in nn. 461-463, where we spoke about habituated relapsers (St. Alphonsus, VI, 455, 456).
Corollary. Let the confessor not omit to assign to the penitent who is in or approaches a necessary proximate occasion remedies for not sinning; these are:
To diminish the force of the occasion. Not rarely a few words said with strong spirit, a serious threat or reproach, an opening of the mouth to cry out, or reporting the matter to someone who can apply a remedy, suffice so that the perfidious insidiator is cast down in spirit and ceases from every annoyance. Then he ought to avoid being alone with a lone person, flee all familiarity, and as far as can be done even the sight of the accomplice, not speak about him or her, not think about him or her, and similar things. In addition, if the occasion is not presently existing, he ought, insofar as can be done, to shorten his stay in it and quickly finish the necessary business.
To diminish the force of passion by furnishing no encouragement to it through idleness, liberty of the senses, depraved thoughts, depraved reading, intemperance, and so forth; likewise by subjecting it through labor, fasts, and other mortifications, if possible.
To increase spiritual strength by prayer, frequenting of the sacraments, and meditation on eternal truths. Daily, especially in the morning, let him renew the purpose of sinning no more, more profitably before a Crucifix. If the occasion is not presently existing, let him always renew the same purpose before he approaches it.1