357. Definition. Ownership is the legitimate faculty of disposing according to one's choice concerning some thing as one's own, unless the owner is prohibited from elsewhere.

a. To be owner of a thing signifies that the thing is one's own, and has such a connection with its owner that in having it and in its use he ought to be preferred to all others. Therefore, although he must render an account of its use to none of men, nevertheless he must render it to God.¹

b. Of disposing, that is, of possessing, using, selling, exchanging, giving, destroying, etc. According to one's choice: ownership gives to the owner the faculty of disposing of his own thing as it shall please him, without injuring justice; therefore by an arbitrary disposition, for example, by a prodigal donation or destruction of the thing, he can sin against another virtue, say liberality, charity, or piety, but he does not sin against justice. Concerning some thing is to be taken generically, insofar as it signifies corporeal and incorporeal things: for there is ownership not only of corporeal things, such as gold or a field, but also of incorporeal things, such as reputation, honor, right of inheritance. As one's own, so that ownership may be distinguished from a simple right to a thing, which does not give the faculty of disposing of the thing, from mere possession, even legitimate possession, which, for example, gives to a tenant the right of disposing of a thing, but not as his own, and finally from the power of a curator and procurator, who likewise dispose of a thing, but not as their own.

c. In various ways the owner can be impeded from disposing of his own thing according to his choice: alpha. by civil law, as if minors are prohibited from selling their own things; beta. by agreement, as if someone sells another his house with this pact, that it not be converted into an inn; gamma. by the will of a testator, as if someone transmits an estate by legacy to another on this condition, that it cannot be sold.

¹ Cf. Lugo, De iustit., disp. 1, n. 5.

358. Principles of right. From the nature of ownership these principles are deduced and explained, of which there is frequent use in law:

a. A thing cries out for its owner.

This principle exhibits the very right of ownership: for since by force of the right of ownership the thing itself is bound to the owner, it tends to return to the owner when it has escaped from his possession.

b. A thing bears fruit for its owner.

This follows immediately from the notion of ownership: for if the whole substance of a thing pertains to the owner and ought to serve for his advantage, the fruits also begotten from it fall to the owner.

c. A thing perishes for its owner, or more accurately: a thing which perishes by chance perishes for its owner; a thing which perishes by fault perishes for him who committed the fault.

This likewise follows immediately from the nature of ownership: for since the owner by force of ownership possesses a right in the thing itself, when the thing perishes the right in it also naturally perishes. But if the thing perishes by another's fault, the thing itself indeed perishes for the owner, but because he by whose fault it perishes is bound to render to the owner an equivalent price, it is said to perish for him who committed the fault.

d. It is not licit to grow rich from another's thing.

This follows from the second principle: for he who grows rich from another's thing turns the fruits of another's thing to his own utility, which is opposed to justice. But he who grows rich not from another's thing, but on the occasion of another's thing, injures neither another's right nor justice.

359. Divisions of ownership. 1. Ownership is divided into high and low: high ownership is the power which belongs to public authority of establishing concerning the goods of its subjects for the common utility; low ownership is the ownership which private men have in their own things and is called private right.

a. It is clear that high ownership is not ownership of property in the true name (for civil power has no property in the goods of subjects), but in reality is nothing except ownership of jurisdiction or the right of prescribing concerning the goods of citizens those things which the prince has judged expedient for the common good. Therefore the prince can transfer ownership from one to another, restrict the exercise of ownership in various ways, indeed he can even deprive subjects of their goods by the right of expropriation, or rather compel them to abdicate ownership of their goods.

b. A twofold condition is required that supreme power can use this ownership of its own: alpha. that a cause of necessity or of great public utility be present; beta. that, if it can be done, it make the subjects who are deprived of their goods by the right of expropriation unharmed.¹

2. Low ownership is divided into perfect or full and imperfect or semi-full: the former is the power of disposing according to one's choice concerning the substance and the utility of a thing; the latter is the power of disposing either concerning the substance of the thing or concerning its utility.

3. Imperfect ownership is divided into direct or radical ownership, which is power over the substance alone of a thing, and indirect ownership or useful ownership, which is power over the utility alone of a thing, and is defined: the power of receiving utility from another's thing while its substance is preserved. The chief species of indirect ownership are use, usufruct, and servitude.

Note. Recent codes reduce the diverse species of imperfect ownership to servitude, and therefore treat use and usufruct as species of servitude, as will be clear from the things to be said below concerning servitude.

¹ Cf. Van Gestel, l. c., n. 46 s.

360. On use. 1. Use is the right of using another's thing while its substance is preserved.

a. He to whom the use of some thing belongs is called a user, so that he may be distinguished from the proprietor of the same thing.

b. It is one thing to use some thing; it is another thing to enjoy some thing. He who can use a thing can receive for himself and his own from the thing that utility which necessity requires; but he who can enjoy a thing receives by right every utility from the thing which it can offer.

2. To use are usually referred: a. habitation or the right of using some part of another's house; b. gathering wood or the right of gathering wood in another's forest; c. pasture or the right of leading cattle into another's pastures; d. diverse species of loan for use, as the use of a horse, garment, etc.

3. Use, as it is taken here, is a right of using some thing which is not revocable at will. From this use there must be distinguished use revocable at will, of which sort is permission of using some thing, such as religious receive from their superior.

Formerly a sharp dispute arose whether there is true use of a thing when the substance of the thing is consumed by use, as happens in food and drink, or rather whether the use of a thing consumable by its first use contains ownership of it. Religious gave occasion to the question, who (as the Friars Minor) said that they had ownership of no thing, not even the least, but only use. Those who affirmed that the use of a thing which is consumed by use cannot be separated from its ownership argued in this way: he who can dispose concerning the substance of a thing has ownership of it; but he who can use a thing which is consumed by the very use disposes concerning its substance. But those who affirmed that the use of a thing consumable by the very use can be separated from the ownership of the same thing used this distinction: if use is understood as an irrevocable right and independent from the will of the one granting, the use of this thing contains ownership; but if the use of a thing is understood as a right revocable at will and fully dependent on the will of the one granting, the use of this thing does not contain ownership, even if the thing is consumed by the very use.¹

¹ Cf. Holzmann, Theologia moralis, IV, n. 166 ss.; Elbel-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis, II, pr. 5, n. 40 ss.

361. On usufruct. Usufruct is the right of using and enjoying another's thing while its substance is preserved. Usufruct is distinguished as legal and conventional, according as it is had from canonical or civil law, or from contract.

a. He to whom the usufruct of some thing belongs is called a usufructuary or fruituary, so that he may be distinguished from the owner or proprietor of the same thing.

b. Usufruct differs from use in this, that the fruituary has the right not only of using another's thing, but also of receiving the fruits which arise from it. Indeed he has perfect ownership in the fruits, so that he can receive not only the fruits necessary to himself, but all, and alienate them according to his choice.

c. By canonical law beneficiaries have the usufruct of their benefices; by civil law parents have the usufruct from the goods of minor children, and sometimes the husband from certain goods of his wife.

362. On servitude. a. Servitude (Dienstbarkeit) taken actively is the right which someone has, that another's thing may serve him or his own thing; taken passively it is a burden inhering in a thing, by force of which it ought to serve another for some advantage. Thus if a right of passing through another's field belongs to someone, he himself is the subject of active servitude, but the field is the subject of passive servitude.

b. Passive servitude is twofold: one personal, when some thing ought to furnish utility to another person, of which sort are use and usufruct, if they are taken passively; the other real or praedial, if some thing ought to furnish an advantage to another thing, as is the servitude of pasturing a flock in some forest.

c. For constituting a real servitude two things are required, of which one bears the burden and is called serving (the forest), the other receives the utility and is called dominant (the flock).

Note. 1. The law of servitudes is drawn up in modern codes with diligent study; and since it determines rights and conduces to preserving the mutual concord of citizens, it obliges in conscience.¹

2. Since the law of servitudes, especially real servitudes, is very intricate, it often gives occasion for disagreements among neighbors. Let the pastor take care either to forestall or to remove disputes of this kind, and for obtaining this end let him admonish the opposing parties that they should rather yield somewhat from their right than expose goods of fortune and mutual concord to danger.

¹ C. A., Section 472-530; C. G., Section 1018-1093.

363. Fruits of a thing. By the name fruits of a thing is understood everything which arises from the thing. Fruits are divided by reason of origin into spontaneous, industrial, and mixed, and by reason of collection into pending, to be received, and received.

1. a. Those are called spontaneous which the thing produces without special industry of men. Special is said because there will scarcely be a fruitful thing which bears fruits without any industry and labor of man.

Spontaneous fruits are either natural or civil, according as they are produced by nature itself, such as hay of a meadow, wood of a forest, offspring of animals, milk, wool, eggs, etc., or are received by force of a contract or another obligation, such as the price which is acquired for the rental of a house, interest which is acquired for money lent, a pension which is acquired for an office.

b. Those are called industrial which are acquired by the industry and labor of man alone, although by means of some thing or instrument, such as the works of artisans and workers, profit received from trading.

Profit received from simple sale can be considered as a fruit of industry; for that profit received can be called a fruit of industry, it is not required that singular and extraordinary industry have intervened, but true work and industry of the person suffices.

c. Those are called mixed which are produced partly by nature and are owed partly to human industry, such as crops, wine, oil, cheese, butter. And because even natural fruits require some industry, it is sometimes difficult to say whether some fruit ought to be reckoned among natural or mixed fruits.

2. a. Those are called pending which have not been separated from the thing, such as offspring of animals not yet brought forth into light, apples still hanging from the tree, crops not yet harvested.

b. Those are called to be received which the possessor could have received if he had wished, but did not receive, whether by negligence or by fraud.

c. Those are called received which have already been separated from the fruitful thing and collected by the possessor. These again are divided into consumed and extant.

Article Second. On the Object of Ownership

The object of ownership is that of which man can be owner. Those things of which man can be owner are usually called goods, and are distinguished into three kinds: internal, mixed, and external. Among internal goods are reckoned man's life, powers, members, and actions; mixed goods are reputation and honor, which are, as it were, midway between internal and external goods; external goods which fall under man's ownership are sublunar things.

364. On internal goods. 1. Of those internal goods which are not distinct from man himself, such as life, powers, and members, man does not have direct ownership, but only useful ownership, so that he receives every utility from them and is their administrator and guardian.

a. God has given no one the right over his own life and members, but has reserved it to Himself: "See that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me; I will kill and I will make alive."¹ And indeed no one can truly be lord of himself, because lord signifies superiority with respect to him whose lord he is. b. He ought to have the power of using them for obtaining his end, and he cannot be impeded by any man in this use, since in tending to his own end he is independent from any man and fully in his own right.

2. Of those internal goods which are distinct from man, such as actions both natural and supernatural and the goods effected by them, man has full ownership, and therefore can dispose concerning them at will. For since he can use his own faculties as his own, he has ownership both in their operations and in the goods arisen from the operations, which are the fruits of the operations.

¹ Deut. 32:39. Cf. Wis. 16:13 s.

365. On mixed goods. Man has full ownership of reputation and honor: for he has ownership of those goods which are the fruits of his own industry; but reputation and honor are acquired and increased by his own industry. Besides, by the consent of all, acts of ownership concerning reputation and honor belong to man: for by defaming himself he can cast them aside for seeking counsel, and he can condone restitution to a calumniator. Nevertheless this ownership is sometimes restricted by another and higher law.

366. On external goods. It will be said below that man can acquire full ownership in external goods; here it is helpful to set forth the various distinctions of external things of which man can have ownership.

1. Things placed in commerce are those which can be in the ownership of a private person; and things placed outside commerce are those which cannot be in the ownership of a private person. Of this kind are: a. public things of the Church, such as sacred places, temples, cemeteries; b. public things of civil society, such as public roads, squares, public bridges, city walls; c. common things, such as air, light, the sea, of which things the use is common to all, but ownership belongs to none.

2. Things are movable and immovable according as, with their substance preserved, they can be transferred from place to place, such as animals and furniture, or cannot be transferred, such as a house or forest. Some things are movable and immovable from their nature, others from the disposition of law, concerning which the civil codes must be consulted.

Civil law also counts fruits not yet collected and the "stocked estate," that is, those things which are necessary for carrying on domestic economy, among immovable goods in some cases.

3. Fungible things (vertretbare) are those of which one can perform the function of another in payment or restitution, in which therefore attention is given not to the species (that is, to the individual thing), but to the genus (to quantity and quality), such as oil, wine, wheat, money, in which not the substance of the coin but its value is considered. Non-fungible things are those of which one cannot perform the function of another, but which must be handed over in the individual, in which therefore attention is given to the species (that is, to the individual thing), not only to the genus, of which sort are animals, garments, etc.

4. Finally, things consumable by first use and things not consumable by first use: the former in their first natural use are destroyed or changed into another substance, such as bread, wine, wood for burning; the latter are indeed worn by use, but are not corrupted, but endure in their substance after use, such as a garment, house, furniture.

The division of external things into corporeal, which can be touched, such as a house, field, money, and incorporeal, which cannot be touched, such as diverse rights, for example, the right of hunting and the right of fishing, which was of great importance in Roman law, scarcely occurs any longer in recent codes.

367. On the subject itself. By the subject of ownership is understood the person to whom ownership belongs. A twofold person is distinguished who is capable of ownership: a physical person and a moral person.

1. From the law of nature the subject of ownership is every living man, even an infant not yet born and a man perpetually insane.¹

a. The foundation of ownership is rational nature: for through reason man has the power of disposing concerning his own things. Wherefore even infants and the perpetually insane are capable of acquiring ownership and habitually retaining it, but not of exercising ownership; for rational nature without any act of will suffices for acquiring and habitually retaining ownership, but the use of reason is required for the exercise of ownership.

b. After death man does not retain ownership of goods of fortune, although he retains ownership of reputation: for since goods of fortune have been granted by the author of nature to man for sustaining temporal life, the right in goods of fortune is extinguished by death itself.

c. Although every man using reason is capable, by the law of nature, of ownership and its exercise, nevertheless by positive law this capacity is restricted in various ways on account of the common good. These matters must be treated below.

2. Moral persons or societies are also capable of ownership. Any society which has been instituted for an honest end is, by the law of nature, capable of acquiring ownership of temporal things. But by civil law this right is recognized only in those which are constituted by it as juridical persons, namely persons capable of acquiring rights.

a. With respect to ecclesiastical societies, juridical persons are first the universal Church, which by natural and divine right is capable of ownership of temporal goods; then within the ambit of the Church: lesser societies, namely dioceses, parishes, church fabric funds, religious societies, seminaries, hospitals, pious institutes, etc.

b. With respect to profane societies, juridical persons are first the state itself or republic, which, since it is a perfect and independent society, has ownership of its goods by its nature; then within the ambit of the state: provinces, municipalities, colleges, universities, and several other lesser societies which are endowed with the privilege of juridical personality and thence are called privileged societies.

¹ Gal. 4:1. Cf. C. A., Section 22; C. G., Section 1, 1923.

We must speak first of the notion, division, legitimacy, and necessity of ownership, then of the objects of ownership.

1. Titus, Sempronius, and Caius possess a house, of which the lowest part is Titus's, the middle Sempronius's, the upper Caius's. The roofs having been destroyed by the force of hail, a controversy arises among them, and Titus and Sempronius compel Caius to repair it, since he himself is the owner of the upper part of the house. Caius then begins not to repair the roof, but to construct another story, piano; but again Titus and Sempronius rise up against Caius.

Q. 1. What is co-ownership of things, and by what laws is it governed? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 1241, 1242. - To the second. If there are various owners of different parts of the same house, the repair of the great walls, muri maestri, and of the roofs is common, according to the proportion of the value of the story of each owner. The same is true for halls, anditi, gates, wells, cisterns, aqueducts, and other things common to all the owners. But latrines are common, as to repair, according to the proportion of the number of openings, aperture, of immission. The owner of each story is held to repair the pavements on which he walks and the vaults, volte, by which he is covered, and also the ceilings and panels, soffitti, which cover places pertaining to him. - Stairs are to be built by the owner of the story which they serve, according to the value of each story. Wherefore, if the same story is common to several, each is held according to the value of his part. And the repair of those stairs which provide access to the first stories is to be made proportionately by all; but the repair of those which provide access to the higher stories is to be made only by the owners of those stories. - Underground cells, cantine, floors, palchi morti, rooms, soffitte o camere a tetto, are considered as stories of the house. - The same is to be observed for the repair of terraces and roofs. If their use is not common to all, he who has their exclusive use contributes for a fourth part of the expenses, and the other three parts are to be furnished by him and by the other owners according to the value of each part. The owner of the last upper story cannot raise it higher without the consent of the others. He can construct only the coping of the terrace, parapetto, if it harms the others in nothing. C. I. 562-564. Cf. C. G. 664.

Hence it is clear that the repair of the roofs in the case does not pertain to Caius alone, but to Titus, to Sempronius, and to Caius according to the value of each part. But Caius cannot raise his apartments, appartamento, higher without the consent of the others, since this can well harm the others.

2. Amelius constructs a cabinet in the common wall of his house, since that wall is very deep. Likewise he places an aqueduct within it, since that wall is much nearer the public road through which the public water canal passes. Is this by right?

R. A wall between two houses, gardens, or courtyards, cortili, is presumed common, C. I. 546; C. G. 653; C. A. 854. - In a common wall no one can open windows, C. I. 583; C. G. 675, nor build against it an oven or chimney, C. I. 574; C. G. 674, nor make a hollow, incavo, in it, C. I. 557; C. G. 662, nor, generally, do anything which harms the common wall itself or the co-owner; yet it is permitted to insert beams in it. C. I. 551, 552, 558, 573; C. G. 657, 674.

Someone can raise a common wall higher, provided he does this at his own expense, does not harm the co-owner, and repays him damages, if he has brought any upon him; and the latter can compel him to cede to himself a part of the wall superimposed.

And generally the owner of any estate contiguous to a wall can make that wall common to himself, provided he does this over its whole extension, public buildings excepted. C. I. 553-556; C. G. 658-661. Someone can demand the communion even of a wall which has been built within a half-meter. C. I. 571.

Finally, someone can compel the co-owner to repair the common wall at common expense. C. I. 559, 561; C. G. 663.

It is clear from these dispositions of the law that Amelius could have done neither thing without the order of the other co-owner; and if he refuses, the necessary means are to be defined by experts, lest the work harm the rights of the other. C. I. 557; C. G. 662.

3. Sedulus and Sedulius move a dispute between themselves concerning the ownership of trees which are placed on the common boundary of their own fields. Sedulus says they are his, because they are nearer his own field. Sedulius contends they are his, because the hedge in which they are situated is his.

Q. What as to the case?

R. A hedge between two estates is presumed common and is preserved at common expense, unless one estate alone is enclosed by it, or there is a boundary marker, or proof to the contrary. C. I. 568; C. G. 670; C. A. 854. Trees which arise in a common hedge are common; and each of the two owners can always demand that they be cut down. Always, because division of a common thing is never prescribed. Trees arising on the boundary of two estates are presumed common when there is no title or proof to the contrary. Of them there belongs to each a part as great as he has in the land. Trees which mark the limits of fields cannot be cut down except by common consent, or with judicial authority approving. C. 569; C. G. 673; C. A. 421; L. 83, Pro socio.

Therefore the trees placed on the boundary of the two fields of Sedulus and Sedulius are common; namely those which are in the hedges are so in equal parts, although they are nearer Sedulus's estate. Hence the fruits belong to each from the region of each one's estate; trees uprooted or cut or torn away are common and are equally to be divided between the two owners. Wherefore what Sedulus says, that the trees are nearer his own estate, has no value, just as what Sedulius says, that the hedges are his, has no value, unless he proves this positively. For unless this is shown by some title, the hedge is presumed common and the trees situated in it are presumed common.

4. From a certain mountain water is flowing forth most abundantly, which until now was being dissipated, since all the surrounding fields were uncultivated. The owner of one of those fields, deciding to cultivate his field and to establish in it a large workshop, constructed a new course of the water at his own expense, and directed all the water to his own field and workshop. But the other owners of the neighboring fields, seeing this and wishing now also themselves to cultivate their fields and to build other workshops, bring suit concerning the aforesaid derivation of the water.

Q. What as to the case?

Water flowing naturally, and without manufactured works, except that which belongs to public right or to the right of some private person, can be used by him who possesses an estate near its bank, whether for irrigating his own estate or for exercising his own industry; but he must restore the remaining water to its ordinary course, which accordingly cannot be disturbed. And, if the water passes through the estate itself, likewise the owner of the estate can use it, but he also must restore it to its ordinary course when it leaves his estate; and therefore its course can be disturbed on one's own estate. C. I. 543; C. G. 644. Where a controversy arises, the water is to be divided by the judge, equity being preserved, according to the measure of the possessions and at the same time of the utility of agriculture and industry. C. I. 544; C. G. 645. If someone having a right to divert to his own estate the water of a river, torrent, stream, canal, lake, or water deposit must use a manufactured work, he is held to pay the expenses of this, and to repay all damages of other estates. C. I. 613.

It is clear from what has been said that the aforesaid owner altogether exceeded in appropriating all the water to himself and in changing its course, neither of which he could do. Hence by right the other owners of the neighboring fields protest. The water, its natural course having been changed, is to be divided among them according to the ownership of each one's estate, and then that which is left over, when it leaves one's own estate, must be restored to its ordinary course. Namely, just as the owners of lower fields receive the inconveniences, so also they should receive the advantages of waters flowing nearby.

536. • Definition. Dominion is the legitimate faculty of disposing of some thing as one's own ¹.

¹ Some add: "unless it is prohibited by law"; because, for example, the law does not permit pupils and minors the free alienation of their own things.

Division. Dominion is chiefly divided into perfect and imperfect, according as it is the right of disposing both of the thing itself and of its utility, or of only one or the other.

But imperfect dominion is subdivided into direct and indirect or useful, according as it regards the property of the thing alone, or its utility alone.

They also commonly distinguish high and low dominion. The former is said to be the right which the supreme authority has of disposing, sometimes from a most grave cause, of the goods of private persons for the good of the community, as was said above, n. 534. The latter is the dominion of private persons, to which the definition properly belongs.

Moreover high dominion is not dominion properly so called, or it is not true dominion of property, since the republic per se does not have a strict right in the goods of subjects. But that dominion holds a certain middle place between dominion of property and dominion of jurisdiction, and could be called dominion of administration. - Thus Carrière, n. 19 ².

² But here also the concept is plainly obscure. Say more simply that it is a right proper to the republic, so that it may prescribe what is necessary or expedient for the common good.

We must treat: 1. of the object; 2. of the subject; 3. of the acquisition of dominion.

542. • The subject of dominion is the master of some thing, or he whose some thing is. On earth every man and only man is capable of dominion, because every man and only man can know the utility of things and will to apply them to himself if they belong to no one ¹. Nor are little children incapable of dominion, nor madmen themselves; because although they cannot make things their own by occupation, nevertheless they can do so through the acts of another, for example, a tutor ². We must treat specifically of the dominion: 1. of children under paternal power; 2. of wives; 3. of clerics; 4. of authors. But of the dominion of Religious it will be said below in the Treatise on States, where treating of the vow of poverty.

¹ Lugo renders the reason more clearly and effectively thus (De Iust., disp. 3, n. 1): "He alone can have a right who is capable of suffering injury.... But he alone suffers injury who suffers it unwillingly: but he must be unwilling, not indeed through a will by which he wills his thing, but through a will by which he wills to retain a right to the thing itself, or to oblige others not to take it away. But brute animals cannot have such a will, since they cannot know either moral obligation or turpitude; therefore they cannot be unwilling, just as they cannot give license or transfer dominion, for the same reason; because since they do not know moral right, they cannot yield to their right.... Therefore only an intellectual nature, which can know objects of this kind, is capable of having dominion."

² The deeper reason for the capacity of dominion in infants must be sought elsewhere; for that a tutor takes his place is from positive law, and does not furnish the reason for that capacity. Therefore Lugo should be approached, who explains two things on this matter excellently, in his usual way. The first is that from nature itself there is the necessity of dominion or property, which it is wrong to violate; indeed, setting aside every human convention or decree, from nature there are also generally certain modes of acquiring dominion (see De Iust., disp. 6, n. 1-6). The second is that the order of nature itself requires that dominions be able to be transferred to another even without the will of the one acquiring; indeed, that they can be transferred to one who does not yet live: so that human laws which decree concerning these things in reality explain and protect the right of nature.

548. • The goods of a wife are of three kinds, namely:

1. Dotal goods, whose fruits the husband enjoys for sustaining the burdens of marriage.

2. Paraphernal goods (παρὰ φερνὴν, besides the dowry), which the wife has besides the dowry, and which she specially reserves to herself.

3. Common goods, which by the pacts of the spouses or by determination of law are brought into a certain partnership.

Spouses can, before entering marriage, determine the conditions to which their goods are to be subjected, with certain statutes of law being preserved; if they have omitted to do these things, the law will supply.

549. • I. The wife has direct dominion of her dowry, but the husband has usufruct and administration. When the husband has died, she is preferred to all the personal creditors of the husband, and even during life she can juridically reclaim the dowry if she fears that the husband will become unable to restore it. If the dowry consists in money or in other things consumptible by use, full dominion of the dowry is indeed attributed to the husband, but with the obligation of restoring the value, dominion having been transferred for the wife into all the goods of the husband according to the rate or quota of her dowry ¹. - St. Lig., n. 489.

¹ This is valid if the dowry consists in things which are counted by weight, number, or measure, or certainly in appraised things handed over; for then the husband becomes by full right the owner of those things. But if non-appraised species are given as dowry, then the wife alone is mistress of the dowry; but to the husband only two things pertain from the right of dominion, namely vindication of the thing given, and the right of using and enjoying.

II. The wife holds full dominion and administration of paraphernal goods, so that concerning these the husband is able to dispose of nothing against her will. Hence as to these she depends in no way on her husband. - St. Lig., ibid.

III. The property and utility of common goods belong to each spouse; but the administration of the same belongs to the husband alone. But this community of goods can admit various conditions or restrictions, and therefore attention must be paid to the various dispositions of places. - Elbel, n. 69.

Pacts which can be entered into by spouses before marriage constitute three classes, or a threefold regime, namely: 1. the dotal regime; 2. the regime of community; 3. the regime excluding community.

550. • I. Dotal regime. Dotal goods are those which constitute the wife's dowry: the husband has full administration of these and receives the usufruct. But the wife preserves direct dominion alone (art. 1549).

If the dotal goods consist in movable goods, either partly or totally, the husband has perfect dominion of them, and is bound only concerning their value consigned in the contract preceding the marriage (art. 1554).

Dotal goods can in no way be alienated, even with the wife consenting, except certain particular cases excepted by law (art. 1551 and following).

But all goods whatever of the wife, not constituted in the dowry, remain altogether her own, or are held as paraphernal; and the woman also has the administration of them and receives the usufruct (1574, 1576). Yet she cannot alienate immovable goods, nor appear in court for them, without the express consent of the husband, or, if the husband resists, without a sentence of the tribunal of first instance (art. 1576); the same must be said if the wife is entirely separate in goods (art. 1536).

To paraphernal goods also belong those which the wife procures for herself by singular industry or extraordinary labor, with sufficient care of the family estate having been applied, or those which she accumulates by subtracting something from what is granted to her for food, clothing, recreations, etc.; and also those things which have been given to her with the express condition that they not yield to the husband.

551. • II. Regime of community. It has place when spouses establish in the matrimonial contract that certain goods will be common between them ². But community is either legal or conventional, according as it is constituted by law or by the special pact of the contracting parties.

² This perhaps is said less exactly. For even if the spouses do not establish that certain goods will be common, nevertheless, if any other pact is lacking, legal community has place by force of law. See art. 1393 and 1400.

Legal community is formed: 1. from all movable goods which the spouses possessed on the very day the marriage was begun, or which afterward come to them by title of succession or donation; 2. from all fruits and any revenues whatever of immovable goods possessed by the spouses before marriage, or coming to them during marriage; 3. from all immovable goods which have been acquired during the time of marriage from common goods (art. 1401-1402).

Conventional community consists in other pacts of the spouses, by which the legal statutes can be restricted or relaxed. When these are lacking, the community is governed by the disposition of the law alone.

552. • Under the regime of community, the husband alone has the administration and usufruct of the common goods. Indeed he can sell them, exchange them, hand them over in mortgage, even without the wife's consent. Yet he cannot donate immovable goods by gratuitous title, nor movable goods by universal title, or as to their universality, or quota, namely a half, third, or fourth part. But when the community has been dissolved, the goods and burdens are divided into two parts, unless the wife or her heirs prefer to renounce the goods and so exempt themselves from the burdens. Debts are to be paid by each spouse, or by their heirs (art. 1482).

553. • III. Regime excluding community. Spouses constitute this in a twofold way, namely: 1. by declaring that they enter marriage without community; 2. by establishing that, as to goods, each will be entirely separate as to his own. In the former case, the husband receives all revenues of the wife's goods and alone administers all things. But if they are consumed by use, he is bound to return their value. In the latter case, however, the woman has the administration and usufruct of all her goods. But each spouse contributes to the burdens of marriage by special pact; but if no convention exists, the wife must contribute up to a third part of her revenues. Wherefore in this third regime, just as also in the second, some dowry is to be furnished by the wife, by which she may in part assist with the burdens of marriage; but such a dowry can be alienated by the husband.

554. • Resolutions. 1. A wife has a strict right to support from the common goods; therefore she can procure it for herself if the husband refuses, or consents only with very great difficulty.

2. The wife does not sin by subtracting some things for food, clothing, and the other necessities of the family, which husbands often do not take care of, and which would be sought from them in vain. - St. Lig., n. 541.

3. If the husband squanders or wastes goods to the detriment of the family, the wife can hide them and reserve them for the good of the family.

4. The wife does not act unjustly if, without the husband's knowledge, she takes some things for herself which the husband would easily and certainly grant if he were asked; for presumed permission is present, and sometimes a just cause of not asking, lest she be forced to show herself as a maidservant. - Reuter, n. 47.

5. In default of the husband, the wife can spend from the common goods what is necessary for preventing grave damage threatening the family. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 67.

Yet in these and similar things one must act cautiously, lest the reins be loosened for wives, since they are inclined to extend their rights beyond what is equitable.

555. • Questions. Q. 1. Whether a wife can make alms from common goods or from the fruits of her dowry?

Resp. Affirmatively, even if otherwise she has goods of her own, provided this is done according to the custom of other women of the same condition. The reason is that a wife is not a slave, but a companion; therefore she ought to have a certain administration in the house of the husband. Then the husband is deservedly presumed to consent to those things which are done by the wife according to the honorable custom of the region and condition; and if he shows himself unwilling, such dissent is judged irrational, because the husband cannot deprive the wife of a right granted to her by legitimate custom. - Thus commonly with Lugo, St. Lig., n. 340.

556. • Q. 2. Whether a husband is bound to restitution who prodigally or badly spends a notable part of the common goods?

Resp. It is disputed. The first probable opinion affirms. The reason is that although the husband has the administration of the goods, nevertheless the wife has dominion of half of them, and therefore that right is violated if, while she is reasonably unwilling, that part is dissipated by the husband. - Thus Antoine, p. 3, c. 5. - Collet, De Iust., p. 3, c. 4. - Pontas, see Communauté. - Conference of Angers, De Matr. ut contr. civili, q. 2. - Gousset. The second opinion, also probable, denies generally, that is, unless the husband exceeds the limits of the right granted to him by law. The reason is that the wife, from law, has a strict right only to half of the goods which will exist when the community has been dissolved ³; nor is the husband bound to render an account of his administration. Hence although he sins gravely against piety toward his wife and children, nevertheless he does not sin against justice properly so called, which induces the obligation of restitution. But the wife can forestall the dissipation of the goods through the faculty which is granted to her by law, of juridically seeking the separation of goods. - Thus Lacroix, n. 1020, De furto. - Carrière, n. 276.

³ It can indeed seem obscure what this opinion means, and even that it involves contradictory things. For it is supposed that the wife, by force of the community, has a right in half of the things existing; then this right is restricted to half of the things existing when the community is dissolved; and meanwhile a full faculty of disposing of all things is given to the husband, so that he is bound neither to render an account nor to restitution. But to what, then, does that right of the wife finally come, when the husband can so dissipate all things that nothing remains to be divided when the community is dissolved? Besides, speech about a violated office of piety toward the wife and children is introduced wrongly. For the condition of the wife and children is unlike in the case. For while the father is living, there is no strict right for the children in paternal goods; but something else is here supposed concerning the wife as to common goods.

Nevertheless this opinion will not seem so absurd if account is had, which the Author did not declare sufficiently, of the French Code, which certainly the authors of this opinion had before their eyes. Namely, there by the laws sufficient provision is made for the wife, so that of those things which she brings into community she can recover either whatever still exists, or the equivalent, and exact the indemnities decreed by the judge, and this in such a way that she is preferred both to the husband and to the creditors as regards the community itself. But if any restitution is denied in this opinion, this pertains to those things which could remain from the good administration of the revenues. Wherefore the indemnity of the wife is no less consulted here than in that mode of the dotal regime which transfers full dominion of the dotal goods to the husband.

Moreover Croix is alleged here to no purpose (lib. 3, p. 1, n. 1020): for the Authors whom he alleges as absolving the husband from the burden of restitution judge that the goods concerning which there is a question are proper to the husband alone; but those who judge the goods to be common, Croix alleges as imposing the burden of restitution. Therefore Croix would rather fight for the first opinion, not for the second.

But under French Law the husband would exceed the limits of his right, and would certainly be bound to restitution, if he gave some immovable goods by gratuitous title, or the totality or a quota of the movable goods, or if he took the goods of the community for himself.

557. • Q. 3. Whether a wife sins by accepting something from common goods or from the fruits of the dowry for relieving the necessity of parents or children who were received from a first marriage?

Resp. Negatively, if she does not have paraphernal goods, nor the husband wishes to give what is necessary, because by the law of nature the wife is bound to support the aforesaid blood relatives, and the husband ought to consent to this. - Thus St. Lig., n. 542, with others.

Q. 4. Whether the wife is bound to restore goods accepted in this way, when she has come into the husband's inheritance, or when she has recovered her dowry?

44. Since the right of private property is today attacked by many, namely by communists, socialists, and collectivists, we shall: 1. briefly outline the history of these errors; 2. propose the Catholic thesis; 3. solve the principal arguments of adversaries; 4. suggest certain means for preventing socialism.

144. 1. Notion. Children under paternal power are called legitimate, or legitimated,² children who are still under paternal power, and who therefore are neither emancipated nor of age.

¹ Lessius, l.c., n. 7-12; Lugo, disp. V; St. Alphonsus, n. 488; Carriere, n. 226-245; Ball. P., n. 43-50; Marres, l. I, n. 28-39.

² Legitimate are those who have arisen from a marriage contracted according to the laws; legitimated are those who, although not born from a legitimate marriage, nevertheless afterward by the authority of the Prince acquired the rights of legitimate children.

Now they become of age at the age determined by law, i.e., in France when the twenty-first year has been completed. - But they are emancipated either explicitly, by a special juridical act, or implicitly, by contracting marriage.

145. 2. Principles. (A) The right of possessing, which naturally belongs to minors, is restricted by various limits according to various laws, especially with regard to the administration of goods; and rightly so: for although they are capable of dominion as soon as they have acquired the use of reason, they are judged not mature enough to administer their own affairs prudently;¹ moreover certain burdens are incumbent upon them in relation to parents, as is explained in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 972-973.

¹ By Roman law, which the older authors follow, the goods of children were of a fourfold kind: military, which children acquired by reason or occasion of military service; quasi-military, acquired by reason of some public office; profectitious, acquired from the things of the father, or in view of the father; adventitious, which came from elsewhere. Cf. Ball. P., n. 44-45.

146. (B) By French law, (a) children, even minors, retain direct dominion over all goods legitimately coming to them; (b) but they do not have usufruct before the eighteenth year of age, or before they are emancipated; unless there is question of goods acquired by separate industry, - or given under the express condition that neither father nor mother enjoy them, - or coming from a succession in which the parents have been declared unworthy. - Outside these cases, the usufruct yields to the father, or, when he is dead, to the mother if she has not entered a new marriage; this was established by way of compensation for the education of the children; (c) but the administration of goods is in the hands of the parents or tutor, until the children become of age or emancipated.²

² Civil Code, a. 371-396; a. 476-487; a. 730; Planiol, I, n. 2105-2238; Allegre, I, p. 256 sq.; Supplement for France, p. 21*-24*.

147. 3. Corollaries. (A) When there is question of the right which children have in small goods given by parents, attention must be paid to the intention of the parents, whether express or reasonably presumed: (a) if they have been given absolutely, the children have full dominion over them, and can enjoy them for every legitimate use; (b) if for a determined use, e.g., for acquiring books, or carrying out studies, those act unjustly who expend the money received on another use, say on immoderate recreations or pleasures; (c) if the express intention has not been given, it can be discerned from the circumstances, especially from the nature of the thing itself; e.g., if there is question of a thing consumable by first use, it is judged to have been given in an absolute manner; if of a non-consumable thing, e.g., books, clothing, it is judged to have been given for a determined use, and therefore it cannot be sold so that the money may be employed for another use. - When money is given not by parents, but by relatives or friends, it is judged to be given absolutely, unless the contrary is said.

148. (B) When children, laboring either within or outside the paternal house, make profits, these things seem to be established:

(a) If they labor outside the father's house, and acquire something by their own industry, they can retain the profit for themselves, because this is implicitly granted by the parents by the very fact that permission to work outside the paternal house was given to them. - Yet except if they receive food and clothing from the parents: for then, since the father is not bound to support a son having his own goods, expenses of this kind must be compensated; - or if the parents labor under need: for then children ought to relieve their necessities, as is explained in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 972-973.

149. (b) If within the house and from the goods or industry of the father the children gain profit, more probably they have a right to a stipend proportioned to their labor, which they can retain, after expenses for food and other things of this kind have been deducted, and with the obligation remaining of helping needy parents. The reason is that whoever labors has a right to obtaining wages, after expenses made for his sake have been deducted; nor is there any reason why minors should be deprived of this right. - I said more probably, because some think that nothing is strictly owed to minor children who labor at home, since the father can use their labor for administering domestic affairs, by way of compensation for the education given to them.¹ - Yet according to all it is expedient that children be allowed to gain something for themselves, so that they may be incited more efficaciously to labor.

¹ Thus Laymann, l. III, tr. 4, c. 8, n. 11; Antoine, Part III, c. V, quest. 13; Billuart, diss. IV, a. 4. But most theologians, both older and recent, favor our opinion. Since by French civil law, also flourishing in certain other regions, the usufruct of a thing acquired by common industry with the father belongs to the father until the minor son has reached the eighteenth year, he cannot occupy profit of this kind without the explicit or tacit consent of the father.

(c) When among several children some labor at home, and others can labor outside the house and gain something for themselves, it is equitable that the former obtain some stipend, after expenses for food, clothing, etc., have been deducted. - This especially holds if the children are already of age.

150. (d) So that all difficulties may be more easily removed, it is altogether expedient that an agreement be made between father and son when this son begins to gain something either at home or elsewhere; and this agreement must be observed. - If no contract has intervened, in practice it can be discerned from the circumstances, the customs flourishing in the place, and the presumed intention of the parents what the rights of the children are. If some doubt remains, before the fact hidden compensation is by no means to be counseled, by which namely the son would take something secretly from the parents as a reward of labor; - for this is full of dangers, as will be said below; - after the fact, those are not to be compelled to restitution unless they have morally certainly violated the rights of the parents.

1. From the duty of labor flows the right of property or ownership, i. e., the right to acquire, hold, and dispose freely of the material fruits of labor, that is to say, the goods which are the result of man's individual and personal endeavor.

The right to acquire and possess property is by no means, as the Communists and Socialists maintain, a fictitious claim based on robbery and injustice,¹ but corresponds to the natural duty of labor from which it arises, and therefore is a natural right.

¹ Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., Socialism: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Application, tr. and adapted to conditions in the United States by V. Gettelmann, S.J., New York 1904.

Under certain conditions the acquisition of a limited amount of earthly goods even becomes a duty.² The supreme, though not the sole, title of ownership is labor.

² Gen. III, 19; Eccles. V, 17; 2 Thess. III, 10. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 2: “With respect to an external thing, two powers belong to man, one of which is the power of procuring and administering it; and with respect to this it is lawful for man to possess things as his own. It is also necessary for human life for three reasons: first, because each person is more solicitous in procuring something that belongs to him alone than something common to all or to many, since each person, fleeing labor, leaves to another what pertains to the common good, as happens in a multitude of servants; secondly, because human affairs are handled in a more orderly way if the proper care of procuring some particular thing falls upon individuals, whereas there would be confusion if everyone indiscriminately procured everything; thirdly, because by this means a more peaceful condition of men is preserved, while each is content with his own thing. Hence we see that quarrels arise more frequently among those who possess something in common and undivided.” —Father J. Kelleher, in what is probably the best modern treatise on the subject (Private Ownership, Dublin 1911) points out (p. 149) that the classical theologians almost unanimously taught that the division of private property does not depend directly upon the natural law, but is derived from the ius gentium. (Cfr. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 278 sqq.)

Private ownership is a wonderful institution, to which humanity owes the development of trade, commerce, and industry, nay whatever determines the differences between civilized man and the savage. Without it labor would languish because the laborer would no longer be sure of the product of his industry. The surer he feels that he is toiling for himself and his own, rather than for strangers, the greater the persistency and diligence which he will bestow upon his work. Private ownership safeguards the future, as far as this is humanly possible, and without it diligence and thrift would never increase the movable capital that lends so powerful an impetus to production, nor would the constantly renewed and always laborious work of cultivating the soil insure to the earth that increase of fertility without which society would be condemned to endless misery.³

³ Chas. Perm, Les Lois de la Societe Chretienne, 2 vols., Paris 1876, especially Vol. I; F. Walter, Naturrecht und Politik, Bonn 1863, pp. 145 sqq.

Barely touching the traditional arguments as developed, e. g., by St. Thomas, Pope Leo XIII, in his famous Encyclical "Rerum Novarum," bases private ownership on the rational nature of man.

"Every man," he says, "has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation, for the brute has no power of self-direction, but is governed by two main instincts, which keep its powers on the alert, impel it to develop them in a fitting manner, and stimulate and determine it to action without any power of choice. One of these instincts is self-preservation, the other, the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which lie within range; beyond their verge the brute creation cannot go, for beasts are moved to action by their senses only, and in the special direction which these suggest. But with man it is wholly different. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of the animal being, and hence enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal kind, the fruition of things material. But animal nature, however perfect, is far from representing the human being in its completeness, and is in truth but humanity's humble handmaid, made to serve and to obey. It is the mind or reason which is the predominant element in us who are human creatures; it is this which renders a man human, and distinguishes him essentially and generically from the brute. And on this very account —that man alone among the animal creation is endowed with reason —it must be within his right to possess things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings do, but to have and to hold them in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things that perish in the use, but those also which, though they have been reduced to use, continue for further use in after time. This becomes still more clearly evident if man's nature be considered a little more deeply. For man, fathoming by his faculty of reason matters without number, and linking the future with the present, becoming, furthermore, by enlightened forethought, master of his own acts, guides his ways under the eternal law and the power of God, whose providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice not only as to matters that regard his present welfare, but also about those which he deems may be for his advantage in time yet to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the very soil, inasmuch as from the produce of the earth he has to lay by provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; although satisfied to-day, they demand fresh supplies for to-morrow."⁴

⁴ English tr. from The Pope and the People, London 1912, pp. 181 sq. A better tr. in Bolshevism — The Remedy, New Haven, Conn., 1919, pp. 5 sq.

The Pontiff goes on to show that private ownership was established through individual efforts before the existence of the State, and that it is recognized by history, by civil law, and by divine law.⁵

⁵ Cfr. A. C. Breig, Papal Program of Social Reform, Milwaukee 1913, pp. 14 sqq.

It is frequently asserted that the first Christians, especially those at Jerusalem, practiced Communism.⁶ Learned scholars who have investigated the question with great care deny that there was Communism in the primitive Church. The early Christians were allowed to keep their property, and if some of them sold it, they did so voluntarily, for the purpose of assisting the poor.⁷ The most that can be said is that in some sections of the great congregation of Jerusalem there existed a sort of religious community of goods.⁸

⁶ Cfr. Acts II, 44 sq.; IV, 32-37; V, 1-4.

⁷ Cfr. E. Baumgartner, "Der Kommunismus im Urchristentum," in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1909, pp. 625 sqq.

⁸ O. Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum in der altkirchlichen Literatur, Freiburg 1908, pp. 16 sq.

Those Church Fathers who are represented as having preached Communism, did not oppose private ownership, but merely its abuse. The passages quoted from their writings by Socialist authors are largely spurious, and those which are genuine prove nothing more than that God did not distribute temporal goods directly among individual men, but gave the earth with its resources to the race at large for the common use of all, so that no one may claim anything as his own as if he had the right to exclude all others absolutely and for ever from its use.⁹ The Fathers simply wished to express the same truth which St. Thomas in the thirteenth century set forth as follows: "Man may not have exterior things for his own, but as the common property of all, namely in such a way that one readily shares them with others in case of need."¹⁰ There are many Patristic texts which unmistakably assert the right of private ownership.¹¹ Lactantius defends it with great scientific acumen. St. Ambrose, who frequently censures the wealthy, teaches that the condemnation pronounced by Christ does not affect all who have wealth, but only those who abuse it, and adds that every man is allowed perfect freedom in giving alms.¹²

⁹ Cfr. J. Biederlack, S. J., Die soziale Frage, 7th ed., p. 134, n. 1.

¹⁰ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 2: “A man ought not to hold external things as his own, but as common, so that, namely, he may readily share them in the necessity of others.”

¹¹ See G. Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 82 sqq.; A. Vermeersch, S. J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 266 sqq.: V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphiloso- phie, 4th ed., Vol. II, pp. 313 sqq.; J. Seipel, Die wirtschafts-ethischen Lehren der Kirchenvater, Vienna 1907, pp. 49 sqq., 120 sqq., 190 sqq.; J. A. Ryan Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, St. Louis 1913.

¹² St. Ambrose, Expos. Evangel, sec. Luc., 1. V, n. 69: “Although in abundant wealth there are many enticements to sins, nevertheless there are also very many incentives to virtues. Although virtue does not require assistance, and the contribution of a poor man is more praiseworthy than the liberality of a rich man, nevertheless the heavenly sentence condemns by its authority not those who possess riches, but those who do not know how to use them.” (Migne, P. L., XV, 1654).—IDEM, De Nabuthe Iezrael, c. 13, n. 55: “He who has been able to be proved faithful amid riches is truly perfect and worthy of glory.” (P. L., XIV, 748).—IDEM, De Officiis, l. I, c. 30, n. 14: “It is in your power to bestow what you wish.” (P. L., XVI, 66). —On the teaching of St. Ambrose consult O. Schilling, Reichtum und Armut, (see note 8, supra) pp. 134 sqq., and J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, St. Louis 1913, pp. 52-66. "What St. Ambrose teaches is not communism in any correct sense of the word," says Dr. Ryan (op. cit., p. 57 sq.). "It is rather a first principle of the natural law, namely that the earth belongs to all the children of men, and not to a few only. He tells the rich to restore their excessive wealth to the poor, while a communist would order them to turn it over to the community. It is true that he calls these donations of the rich by the name of restitution, but this is because the rich have accumulated so much that the poor have been deprived of their birth-right. Hence, he commands them to give back their unjust gains. Any one who will read the history of the oppression of the poor in Italy in the fourth century, will know that St. Ambrose was right when he told the rich that they had robbed the poor, and were consequently bound to make reparation. The most zealous defender of individual ownership could speak the same way in the same circumstances. What St. Ambrose demands, therefore, is not a return to common property, but a recognition of common rights."

The phrase, "Omnis dives aut iniquus aut iniqui heres,"¹³ which occurs repeatedly in the writings of St. Jerome, has led to his being classed as a Socialist. But the fact that St. Jerome makes this sentiment his own and quotes it with approval, does not prove that he looked upon every property holder as a thief. "Iniquus—from in + aequus—refers literally to a want of equality or want of proportion. Taken figuratively, it has about the same meaning as iniustus, for which it was often used as a synonym by the best authors. Now St. Jerome's style, as well as his own confession, assures us that he was well acquainted with classical Latin. We may safely infer then that he uses this word in the specific sense of iniustus, and not in the more general sense of peccator. This inference is confirmed by his manner of speaking in a sentence where he distinguishes between an impius on the one hand, and an iniquus and a peccator on the other. Even if he meant merely 'wrong doer' when he wrote iniquus, the specific wrong doing referred to must have been an act of injustice, since it was committed in acquiring riches. When a man gets possession by wrong-doing, the greater part of the wrong will fall under the head of injustice, violation of personal rights. St. Jerome, therefore, subscribed to the opinion that every dives was an unjust man, and by dives he meant, not a man of some property, but a man of much property. All the synonyms of dives and its use by the best authors show that it refers to an abundance of goods, and not to mere ownership, as some would have us believe."¹⁴

¹³ This remarkable saying, which seems to have been of pagan origin, was evidently current in St. Jerome's day, for he quotes it in three distinct passages of his writings. For an analysis of these passages see J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 67 sqq.

¹⁴ Ryan, op. cit., pp. 70 sq. Further on in his booklet (p. 74) Dr. Ryan shows that Herbert Spencer spoke in much the same way of the present titles to landed property as St. Jerome did of those of his time. "It can never be pretended that the existing titles to such property are legitimate... Violence, fraud, the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning, these are the sources to which these titles may be traced." The passage occurs in Spencer's Social Statics and was omitted in later editions, but, as Dr. Ryan correctly says, "the question is one of fact, not of opinion." W. S. Lilly declares: "I say, without shadow of doubt, that to much property the saying of Proudhon [namely, that property is theft] is strictly ap- plicable." Charles S. Devas says: "As a matter of fact, much of the wealth of the rich classes in modern Europe has been gathered together, and is still kept up, by dreadful deeds of cruelty, injustice, and fraud." —"Mr. Lilly," comments Dr. Ryan, "is neither a Socialist nor a radical, but above all a pleader for law, while Mr. Devas was an unimaginative student of economics. If men of this character can write thus of titles to property in modern times, is it any wonder that St. Jerome used similar language in his day?" (Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 74 sq.)

The proposition, "No Christian should be engaged in commercial pursuits, and those who persist in them, should be expelled from the Church,"¹⁵ which is frequently ascribed to St. Chrysostom, does not occur in his genuine writings, but in the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum of an Arian writer falsely attributed to the Saint.¹⁶ Certain communistic ideas that occur in the genuine works of St. Chrysostom must be interpreted as the product of a sort of ideal Communism, resembling that of Plato, which marked a reaction against the dominating power of wealth, the materialism and egotism of certain rich people, and the exaggerated esteem in which worldly possessions were generally held at that time and which manifested itself in an insane pursuit of wealth similar to that which we behold all around us to-day. In attacking these flagrant and serious abuses St. Chrysostom occasionally employed expressions which, when read through modern glasses, seem to stamp him as an opponent of the principle of private ownership.¹⁷

¹⁵ “No Christian ought to be a merchant; or, if he wishes to be one, let him be cast out of the Church of God.”

¹⁶ Cfr. F. X. Funk's paper, "Ueber Reichtum und Handel im christlichen Altertum," in his Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen, Paderborn 1917, Vol. III, pp. 150 sqq.

¹⁷ On the teaching of St. Chrysostom, see O. Schilling, Reichtum und Armut, (note 8, supra), p. 123 and J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 1-7; on the teaching of St. Basil, ibid., pp. 7 sqq., 17 sqq.; of St. Gregory of Nyssa, pp. 10 sq.; of Clement of Alexandria, p. 11; of St. Augustine, pp. 12 sq.; of St. Gregory the Great, pp. 15 sq.

2. In all that regards wealth and earthly possessions (bona fortunae) Catholics must be guided by the following principles.

a) Broadly speaking, every man is in duty bound to acquire the means which are necessary to support himself and his dependents and to fulfil the obligations that rest upon him as a member of society. He may, moreover, acquire a superfluity of earthly possessions, but if he does so, he incurs the additional obligation of making good use of his surplus; in other words, he must not acquire or cherish wealth for its own sake, but in order to share it with the needy.¹⁸

¹⁸ Eph. IV, 28; I Tim. VI, 18. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 3.

b) The possession of wealth is no sin in itself, but involves great danger because a rich man is constantly tempted to seek his happiness in this world and to neglect his soul.¹⁹ It is in this sense that Christ speaks of "the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches,”²⁰ and warns His disciples that "a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven."²¹

¹⁹ Cfr. I Tim. VI, 9 sq., 17. — Seneca says (Epist., XVII, 3): “Riches have hindered many from philosophizing; poverty is unencumbered and secure.” And in another place (Ep., XVII, 5): “If you wish to be at leisure for the soul, you must either be poor or like a poor man.” —Cfr. G. Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 43 sqq.

²⁰ Matth. XIII, 22.

²¹ Matth. XIX, 23 sq.; cfr. Mark X, 23 sqq.; Luke XII, 16 sqq.; Jas. V, 1 sqq.

Neither is poverty in itself a virtue, or a source of virtue, though apt to become such. That it is no disgrace to be poor, appears from the example of Christ and His disciples, who were all poor laboring-men. "Jesus saith to him: The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air nests: but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head.”²² “Being rich," says St. Paul, "He [Jesus] became poor for your sakes, that through his poverty you might be rich."²³

²² Matth. VIII, 20; X, 9 sq.

²³ 2 Cor. VIII, 9; IX, 1 sqq.

When poverty is the result of sloth and shiftlessness, it easily leads to immorality and is in itself a sin if it makes a man discontented and covetous of the possessions of others. We read in Sacred Scripture: "Give me neither beggary nor riches: give me only the necessaries of life, lest perhaps being filled, I should be tempted to deny and say: Who is the Lord? or being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name of God."²⁴ Poverty becomes a virtue if borne humbly and with resignation to the will of God. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."²⁵ St. Ambrose explains this text as follows: "Not all the poor are blessed, for poverty is merely a means: both good men and bad may be poor, unless perhaps that poor man is to be considered blessed of whom the prophet says, 'Better is the poor man that walketh in his simplicity than a rich man that is perverse.’²⁶... Blessed the poor man who cried to the Lord and was heard: poor in crime, poor in vice, a poor man in whom the prince of this world finds nothing, who imitates Him who, being rich, was made poor for our sake.²⁷ St. Matthew unfolded the full truth when he said: 'Blessed are the poor in spirit,'²⁸ for he who is poor in spirit does not become puffed up and proud in his conceit."²⁹

²⁴ Prov. XXX, 8-9.—St. Leo the Great says (Serm., 49 [al. 48], c. 1): “There are snares in the abundance of riches and snares in the straits of poverty. The former raise one up to pride; the latter incite one to complaint.” (Migne, P. L., LIV, 302).

²⁵ Matth. V, 3; cfr. Jas. II, 5.

²⁶ Prov. XIX, 1.

²⁷ 2 Cor. VIII, 9.

²⁸ Matth. V, 3.

²⁹ St. Ambrose, Expos. Evangel. in Lucam, l. V, n. 53: “Not all the poor are blessed, for poverty is an intermediate thing: both good and evil men can be poor. Unless perhaps that blessed poor man is to be understood whom the prophet described, saying: ‘A just poor man is better than a lying rich man.’ Blessed is the poor man who cried out and the Lord heard him: poor in crime, poor in vices, a poor man in whom the prince of this world found nothing, an imitator of that Poor Man who, though He was rich, was made poor for us. Hence Matthew disclosed the matter fully, saying: ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit’; for the poor man in spirit is not puffed up and is not exalted in the mind of his flesh.” (Migne, P. L., XV, 1650). —Cfr. A. Winterstein, Die christl. Lehre vom Erdengut, pp. 173 sqq.

"Cheerful poverty is an honorable thing," says Epicurus,³⁰ and Seneca, who quotes this sentiment with approval, adds: "Not he is poor who has little, but he who attempts to gain more by dishonest means."³¹ In another place the great Roman philosopher says: "Great is the man who remains poor [i. e., in spirit] amid riches, but safer is he who does without them."³²

³⁰ “Cheerful poverty is an honorable thing”; quoted by Seneca, Ep., II, 5.

³¹ Ep., II, 6: “Not he who has little, but he who desires more, is poor.”

³² Ep., XX, 10: “Great is he who is poor amid riches, but safer is he who lacks riches.”

c) Those who devote themselves entirely to intellectual or mental labor, have a just claim to such material goods as they require, not merely to satisfy their necessities, but to enable them to live according to their rank or station. St. Paul's dictum that "they who serve at the altar share with the altar,"³³ applies in a wider sense to all who devote themselves to spiritual and intellec- tual labor for the benefit of their fellowmen, and includes pre-eminently the members of contemplative orders. d) As the individual, so also each social group (the family, the Church, the State, etc.) has the right and the duty to acquire property. But the group no less than the individual is exposed to the dangers that arise from wealth. History furnishes abundant examples of the truth of the Apostle's saying: "They that will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the devil, and into many unprofitable and hurtful desires, which drown men into destruction and perdition."³⁴

³³ 1 Cor. IX, 13.

³⁴ 1 Tim. VI, 9; cfr. Ps. XXXIII, 11; Luke XII, 15-21.

Man is not the absolute owner, but rather the steward of his possessions, and as such must give a strict account to God. Material wealth should never be the ultimate aim either of the individual or of society, but should be regarded and employed merely as the basis and foundation of a higher life. "Charge the rich of this world," says St. Paul, "not to be proud, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God, who giveth us abundantly all things to enjoy, to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate to others, to lay up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on the true life."³⁵

³⁵ 1 Tim. VI, 17-19; cfr. Matth. VI, 19-21.

The concentration of great fortunes in the hands of a few is becoming a serious danger, not only to the individual, since, as St. James says, the rich oppress the poor by might,³⁶ but also to society, because so many rich men now-a-days employ their wealth to establish monopolies, obtain excessive profits, defraud their fellowmen, purchase political power, etc. The fact that it is possible under present conditions, for the exceptionally able, the exceptionally cunning, and the exceptionally lucky, to accumulate enormous riches through the clever and unscrupulous utilization of special advantages, natural and otherwise, has given rise to a just demand for the legal limitation of fortunes. Various methods are suggested. The law might directly limit the amount of property to be held by any individual. One of our leading Catholic authorities on social and political science, Dr. John A. Ryan, thinks that if the limit were placed fairly high, say at one hundred thousand dollars, such a law "could scarcely be regarded as an infringement on the right of property. In the case of a family numbering ten members, this would mean one million dollars. All the essential objects of private ownership could be abundantly met out of a sum of one hundred thousand dollars for each person. Moreover, a restriction of this sort need not prevent a man from bestowing unlimited amounts upon charitable, religious, educational, or other benevolent causes."³⁷

³⁶ Jas. II, 6; cfr. Henry H. Klein, Dynastic America and Those Who Own It, New York, 1921; Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth, New York 1900.

³⁷ J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice, New York 1916, pp. 292 sq.; cfr. Hy. H. Klein, Dynastic America, N. Y., 1921, pp. 164 sqq.

On the other hand, "the dangers and obstacles confronting any legal restriction of fortunes are so real as to render the proposal socially inexpedient. It would easily lend itself to grave abuse. Once the community had habituated itself to a direct limitation of any sort, the temptation to lower it in the interest of better distribution and simpler living would become exceedingly powerful. Eventually the right of property might take such an attenuated and uncertain form in the public mind as to discourage labor and initiative, and thus seriously to endanger human welfare. In the second place, the manifold evasions to which the measure would lend itself would make it of very doubtful efficacy."³⁸

³⁸ Ibid., p. 293.

Another suggestion is that the amount of property capable of being received by heirs of any person be limited, say, to one million dollars.³⁹ This would be a restriction of the rights of bequest and succession, which are integral elements of the right of ownership. Is such restriction admissible? The answer to this question, according to the same authority, "depends upon the effects of the measure on human welfare.... A person needs private property not only to provide for his personal wants and those of his family during his life-time, but also to safeguard the welfare of his dependents and to assist other worthy purposes, after he has passed away.... All the necessary and rational ends of bequest and succession could be attained in a society in which no man's heirs could inherit more than one million dollars. Under such an arrangement very few of the children of millionaires would be prevented from getting at least one hundred thousand dollars. That much would be amply sufficient for the essential and reasonable needs of any human being. Indeed, we may go further, and lay down the proposition that the overwhelming majority of persons can lead a more virtuous and reasonable life on the basis of a fortune of one hundred thousand dollars than when burdened with any larger amount. The persons who have the desire and the ability to use a greater sum than this in a rational way are so few that a limitation law need not take them into account. Corporate persons, such as hospitals, churches, schools, and other helpful institutions, should not, as a rule, be restricted as to the amount that they might inherit; for many of them could make a good use of more than the amount that suffices for a natural person."⁴⁰

³⁹ Final Report of the Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, p. 32; H. E. Read, The Abolition of Inheritance, N. Y., 1919; A. Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth, N. Y., 1901, pp. 11 sqq.

⁴⁰ Ryan, Distributive Justice, p. 294.

The limitation of inheritance would, of course, also be liable to abuse, and while its bad effects would probably not be as great as those following a similar abuse with regard to possessions, they are, in Dr. Ryan's opinion, "sufficiently grave and sufficiently probable to suggest that the legal restriction of bequest and succession should not be considered except as a last resort, and when the transmission of great fortunes had become a great and certain public peril."⁴¹

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 295.

An indirect way of limiting large fortunes would be through a progressive tax on incomes and inheritances. This is a more feasible method, though the maximum limit that justice would set to the rate of taxation is not easy to determine. Some years ago Andrew Carnegie⁴² recommended an inheritance tax of fifty per cent on estates amounting to more than one million dollars. While no country has yet reached this high level, the proposal cannot be stigmatized as unjust either to the testator or his heirs, nor can it be proved that it is in any other manner injurious to human welfare. In a general way, all that can be said with confidence concerning the just rates of inheritance taxation is that "the increments of the tax should correspond as closely as possible to the diminishing intensity of the wants which the tax deprives of satisfaction; in the case of each heir a certain fairly high minimum of property should be entirely exempt; on all the highest estates the rate should be uniform, and it should fall a long way short of confis- cation; and the tax should at no point be such as to discourage socially useful activity and enterprise."⁴³

⁴² The Gospel of Wealth, pp. 11 sqq.

⁴³ Ryan, Distributive Justice, p. 300.

It would be still better, perhaps, instead of clipping off wealth from the top, by limiting possession and transmission, to prevent these things by going to the root, i. e., by abolishing the wage system and admitting workingmen to a share in the possession of the means of production. This, too, could best be brought about, not by legal enactment, but by molding public opinion.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ See Social Reconstruction, brochure issued by the four bishops constituting the Administrative Committee of the American Catholic War Council, Washington, D. C., 1919; Cardinal Bourne's Lenten Pastoral for 1918, "The Nation's a Crisis," London, Catholic Social Guild, 1918.

e) We will close this chapter with a few remarks on the duty of distributing superfluous wealth. Here, also, we shall follow Professor Ryan.

It is the fundamental teaching of Christianity that ownership is stewardship and that he who possesses superfluous goods must regard himself as a trustee for the needy. St. Thomas clearly and concisely formulates this principle as follows: "As regards the power of acquiring and dispensing material goods, man may lawfully possess them as his own; as regards their use, however, a man ought not to look upon them as his own, but as common, so that he may readily minister to the needs of others."⁴⁵ This teach- ing is in perfect conformity with reason. Since the goods of the earth were intended by the Creator for the common benefit of all mankind, the possessor of a surplus is reasonably required to use it in such a way that this original purpose of all created goods will be fulfilled. To refuse to do so is to treat one's less fortunate neighbor as something different from and less than oneself, as a creature whose claim upon the common bounty of nature is something less than one's own.

⁴⁵ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 3.

Is this obligation one of charity or of justice? In the case of wealth unjustly acquired it is clearly one of justice. But how about wealth honestly acquired? St. Thomas says: "The goods which a man has in superfluity are due by the natural law to the sustenance of the poor."⁴⁶ This is the official teaching of the Church, for Pope Leo XIII says: "When one has provided sufficiently for one's necessities and the demands of one's state of life, there is a duty to give to the indigent out of what remains. It is a duty not of strict justice, save in case of extreme necessity, but of Christian charity."⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Ibid., art. 7.

⁴⁷ Encyclical "On the Condition of Labor," 15 May, 1891; The Pope and the People, p. 192.

There seems to be a contradiction between this teaching and that of certain Fathers, but the contradiction is apparent rather than real. "The truly important fact of the whole situation," says Dr. Ryan, "is that both the Fathers and the later authorities of the Church regard the task of distributing superfluous goods as one of strict moral obligation, which in serious cases is binding under pain of grievous sin. Whether it falls under the head of justice or under that of charity, is of no great practical importance."⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Distributive Justice, pp. 303 sq., 307 sq.

What portion of his superfluous wealth is a man obliged to distribute among the needy? Dr. Ryan, proceeding from the unanimous teaching of moral theologians that the entire mass of superfluous wealth is morally subject to the call of grave need, and from the principle of the moral law that the goods of the earth should be enjoyed by the inhabitants of the earth in proportion to their essential needs, attempts to answer this question from the standpoint of common welfare. He thinks that, in view of available statistics, the conclusion is inevitable "that the greater part of the superfluous income of the well-to-do and rich would be required to abolish all grave and ordinary need." He adds: "The proposition that men are under moral obligation to give away the greater portion of their superfluous goods or income is, indeed, a 'hard saying’.... No Catholic, however, who knows the traditional teaching of the Church on the right use of wealth, and who considers patiently and seriously the magnitude and the meaning of human distress, will be able to refute the proposition by reasoned arguments. Indeed, no man can logically deny it who admits that men are intrinsically sacred, and essentially equal by nature and in their claims to a reasonable livelihood from the common heritage of the earth. The wants that a man supplies out of his superfluous goods are not necessary for rational existence. For the most part they bring him merely irrational enjoyment, greater social prestige, or increased domination over his fellows. Judged by any reasonable standard, these are surely less important than those needs of the neighbor which are connected with humane living. If any considerable part of the community rejects these propositions, the explanation will be found not in a reasoned theory, but in the conventional assumption that a man may do what he likes with his own. This assumption is adopted without examination, without criticism, without any serious advertence to the great moral facts that ownership is stewardship, and that the Creator intended the earth for the reasonable support of all the children of men."⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 314.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 1 sq. —Theodore Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. II, pp. 126 sqq., Freiburg 1900. —V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, 4th ed., Freiburg 1904, Vol. II, pp. 285 sqq. —IDEM, Das Privateigentum und seine Gegner, 4th ed., Freiburg 1909. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 240 sqq.—Ch. Perin, De la Richesse dans les Societes Chretiennes, 3rd ed., 2 vols., Paris 1881. —F. Walter, Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin und des Socialismus, pp. 266 sqq., Freiburg 1895. —H. Pesch, S.J., Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie, Vol. I, Freiburg 1905, pp. 179 sqq.—Michael Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, Dublin 1917, pp. 113 sqq.—R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, New York 1899, pp. 203 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy: Ethics, Deontology and Natural Law, 4th ed., London 1918, pp. 278 sqq. —J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth, New York 1916, pp. 3 sqq., 291 sqq., 303 sqq. —J. Husslein, S.J., The World Problem: Capital, Labor, and the Church, New York 1918, pp. 232 sqq. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., Innsbruck 1914, pp. 387 sqq. —Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 344 sqq., 350 sqq., New York 1919. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, pp. 499 sqq. —J. Kelleher, Private Ownership, Dublin 1911. —J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 271 sqq., New York 1919.—H. Belloc, The Catholic Church and the Principle of Private Property, London 1920. —J. A. Ryan, The Christian Doctrine of Property, New York 1923.

1. The right of ownership (dominium) is defined as “the permanent and exclusive right of retaining, controlling, and disposing of an object in one’s own interest and according to one’s own wishes.”¹ It is derived from nature itself and protected by the natural law.²

¹ Cfr. M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, p. 113.—J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 533: “Ownership is the legitimate faculty of disposing of some thing as one’s own. Ownership is chiefly divided into perfect and imperfect, according as there is a right to dispose both of the thing itself and of its utility, or only of one of the two. Imperfect ownership, however, is subdivided into direct and indirect, that is, useful, according as it regards solely the ownership of the thing or solely its utility. They also commonly distinguish high and low ownership. The former is ownership improperly so called and is termed the right which the supreme authority has, for the gravest cause and for the good of the community, sometimes to dispose of the goods of private persons with due compensation, insofar as this can be done. The latter is the ownership of private persons, to which the definition properly applies.” Cfr. Pruner, Lehre vom Recht, Vol. I, pp. 248 sqq.

² Leo XIII, Encycl. “Quod apostolici,” Dec. 28, 1878: “The right of property and ownership, proceeding from nature itself, is sanctioned by natural law.”—IDEM, Encycl. “Rerum novarum,” May 15, 1891: “The right to possess things privately as one’s own has been given to man by nature. . . . The right of ownership which we have shown to have been bestowed by nature upon individuals must be transferred to man insofar as he is the head of a family. . . . Therefore, when relief for the people is sought, this must be held above all as a fundamental principle: private possessions must be preserved inviolate.”—IDEM, Encycl. “Graves de communi,” Jan. 18, 1901: “Therefore let nothing be more sacred to it [Christian democracy] than justice; let it command that the right of acquiring and possessing be kept intact.”

All ownership is based on some ground, usually called title. A title is a factor or an event by which a particular owner comes to have a right to his property. There is a variety of such titles, partly original or primary, partly derivative or secondary. An original title of ownership is one by which objects that belong to no one are appropriated, or by which existing private property is increased or improved. A secondary title is one based upon donation or legitimate purchase from a previous owner.

2. The chief original titles of ownership are: occupancy, accretion, and labor.

a) Occupancy (occupatio), the first and most primitive title of private ownership, is defined as the actual appropriation of ownerless objects with the intention to keep them as one’s own. This title of ownership (ius primi occupantis) presupposes that the object in question is by nature fit to become private property (res capax dominii privati). Hence it must not belong either to State or Church, nor be of such a nature that it cannot be occupied, e. g., the sea or air. Secondly, it must be actually ownerless, that is to say, it must never have belonged to anybody (res nullius), or, if it did, have been relinquished by the former owner (res relicta); third, the occupant must have the intention of acquiring the object as his own and of exercising the right of ownership in future. Fourth, the act of occupancy must be such as to convey to others some intimation that proprietary possession has been taken.³ This is usually done by some external act, e. g., in the case of a movable object, keeping it and turning it into something else; in the case of soil or real estate, by the act of cultivating it, fencing it in, setting out plants on it, and so forth.

³ M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 139 sq.—Gury, op. cit., I, n. 558: “Occupancy is the actual taking possession of things which belong to no one. It is a legitimate mode of acquiring ownership, provided that the required conditions are present, namely: 1. That the thing be capable of private ownership and belong to no one; 2. That the occupant wish to make it his own and take possession of it; 3. That no law stand in the way of occupancy. The more frequent practical cases concerning this matter relate to the occupancy of animals.”

The principle that ownerless land in uncivilized countries may be occupied and thereby become private property is recognized by the law of nations.

The most common kinds of occupancy are: hunting (venatio), fishing (piscatio), and discovery (inventio). In civilized countries the right of hunting and fishing is regulated by positive laws and hence may not be exercised ad libitum, or if it is so exercised, entails the duty of making restitution for damage done. Hence the right of occupancy may be exercised:

α) In regard to ownerless objects (res nullius), e. g., wild animals (animalia fera) which have not yet become private property by the laws regulating the chase, or by being enclosed in parks or ponds; in regard to tamed animals (animalia mansuefacta) that have freed themselves from control; in regard to bees and pigeons which have lost their home, but not in regard to domestic animals (animalia domestica). The latter never become ownerless, even when they escape from their masters, except if they go astray, in which case they are to be treated as lost objects.

β) Abandoned objects (res derelictae) are objects which once had an owner, but were given up by him because he no longer cared for them. This category does not include property that has been abandoned because of impending danger, or from which the owner has been separated against his will, e. g., on the occasion of a conflagration or a flood; nor does it include tame animals that have gone astray. Occupation based upon the so-called right of salvage, therefore, is morally inadmissible.

Occupancy is “not of much practical account in modern civilized States, since all the land of the earth is now practically ‘occupied.’ And even such unoccupied territories as still remain, like Central Africa, have been divided in such a way that the right of extension allowed to each competing government is fixed by special treaties or understandings. The only cases in which occupancy is still to be regarded as an operative title are those of finder, fisherman, and hunter. Their rights are . . . decided by special civil enactments in each country.”⁴

⁴ Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 142 sq.—Cfr. Gury, l. c., n. 559–563.—Pruner, Lehre vom Recht, Vol. I, pp. 283 sqq.

All rights, as the very ratio of right demonstrates, when the object is considered, imply some dominion, more or less perfect; and from the dominion of jurisdiction, of which we treated above, there is distinguished the dominion of property, which immediately, although not exclusively, exists and is exercised on account of the utility of the one having it. This alone we consider in this title. Again, with the subject considered, there can be singular dominion, or dominion of one person, or condominium of several.

Division From the Amplitude of Right. Full or perfect dominion is the right of disposing for one's own advantage concerning the substance and utility of a thing. To this is opposed imperfect dominion, which, in Roman law and in several laws derived from it, is distinguished into direct, naked, or also radical dominion, and into useful or indirect dominion. The former excludes the right of perceiving utility and is called direct, because it immediately affects the substance; naked, because it is a title without use and fruit; radical, because it regards the source or root of utilities and fruits. The other embraces utility alone, and is called useful, because it gives the advantages of dominion; indirect, because only by reason of the fruits or utility does it subordinate the fund itself to the owner of the utility. Useful dominion can exist more or less broadly; and thus, when there is question of external things, there exist various rights which are called by various names and are, as it were, drawn off or dismembered from perfect dominion.

In Latin and Germanic law there are numbered, as rights which subsist through themselves, usufruct, use, habitation, servitude, superficies, emphyteusis; as rights which suppose a principal obligation and accede to it: pledge, antichresis, privilege, hypothec.

American and English law by no means ignores many ratios by which fruits or utilities can be separated from the dominion of a thing; but it is not accustomed to use proper names of rights subsisting in a thing (or principal rights).

In English law imperfect dominion is designated by the generic word entail; and it is already judged imperfect on account of a merely nominal dependence on the republic, in which every private proprietor of an immovable thing is judged to be placed. But a multiple estate in immovable things is distinguished (in things real): in fee simple, when the right passes from the one having it to all heirs in perpetuity; in fee tail, when the right passes from the one having it to natural descending heirs in perpetuity; for life, when it is bounded by the life either of the owner, or of another, or even of several; for years, when it exists for a determinate epoch (for a month or for a thousand years); at will, when it can be ended at the discretion of the landlord (lessor) or tenant (occupier); estate on sufferance, when, after the end of the right, the occupier continues, as it were from the tolerance of the owner, to use or enjoy the field. The three former are called freehold estates, when their possessor must furnish nothing unworthy of a free citizen; the others are called less than freehold.

Often, however, the word estate designates property in the full sense; and practically freehold estates do not differ from property.

There is distinguished, moreover, real property, which is in immovable things (things real or realty) conceded for a non-defined time, i.e. in perpetuity or, for example, for life; and personal property, which affects movable things (things personal) or even immovable things but conceded for a defined time. Things real are all immovable things and connected rights: as the right of rent from fields, the right of having a road through another's field; even the dignity of "peer" (peerage), the office of judge.

I. Perfect dominion is the full right of property. Wherefore it permits the owner, with justice alone considered: a) use at will, even that use which accidentally harms one's neighbor, provided that the use is not prohibited by law; b) exclusion of others; c) disposition of the thing. That is, that right is the right of using and abusing exclusively (by which word the faculty of disposing or changing the substance is juridically designated).

Nevertheless this dominion is subject to the high dominion or jurisdiction of perfect society. This, with regard to the common good, can order and moderate the exercise of the right of property: indeed, can deprive a subject of his things, provided: a) that this be done as much as the necessity of promoting the common good requires; b) that the equality of justice be observed, and therefore that the damage inflicted on the subject be compensated from common goods. For, as we have said, that justice, in distributing burdens, easily becomes commutative.

Therefore a law cannot be approved which assigns to a citizen from whom it takes dominion only a ratable part of the value; while, on the contrary, a progress of justice must be acknowledged in the effort by which, after the immense war, they endeavored to distribute among all citizens the peculiar damages inflicted on certain persons on occasion of the war.

II. 1. Usufruct is the right of using and enjoying the things of another, with their substance preserved.

2. The usufructuary can make all fruits his own. Moreover, a fruit is "whatever is accustomed to be born and reborn from a thing." Fruits are some natural, others civil. In a somewhat broader use, under this name there also comes what is regularly extracted from coal-bearing veins, etc.

Natural fruits are truly produced from the thing: either by nature alone, and then they are called simply natural; or with the industry of men joined, and then they are industrial, or rather mixed. For that is properly called industrial which is owed wholly to industry.

Civil fruits do not arise from the body itself of the thing, but consist especially in money which, from a contract concerning the thing, must be paid constantly after individual intervals: say, the annual price of a leased house ².

3. Natural fruits are acquired by perception or separation (these, in the case, are not distinguished); civil fruits are judged to be acquired from day to day, so that, if the usufruct should have an end in the middle of the year, the rent belongs for one half to the owner and to the usufructuary.

Fruits pending at the beginning and at the end of usufruct, say crops mature but not yet cut, by mutual turn belong to the usufructuary and to the owner.

What is understood under the name of fruit can be defined differently in different law. A "treasure," however, is not customarily placed among fruits.

These things can be said generally. Yet various laws must be consulted. Thus English and U.S.A. law abstains from the name usufruct, although it does not ignore the thing, "right to the 'fructus' from property belonging to another." The Code of Germany, on the contrary, treats of usufruct at length, arts. 1030-1089, distinguishing the usufruct of things, of rights, of patrimony.

Must the usufructuary at the beginning of the right compensate expenses made for the fruits which he will collect; can he at the end exact compensation of the expenses of fruits which he does not acquire? Austrian, Canadian Q., and Spanish law concedes expenses of cultivation, while by the law of Latin America, Belgium, France, Holland, Germany, nothing must be paid to him: which, as not very equitable, is also censured by jurists, e.g. by Colin and Capitant, Cours de droit civil francais, I, p. 803.

4. Usufruct of itself cannot be constituted except in things which are not consumed by first use. Nevertheless in other things, say in oil, wine, a quasi-usufruct, or usufruct said more broadly, is admitted. - When it is ended, what must be restored is defined by the Italian Code (art. 483) somewhat otherwise than by the French Code. If things are consumed not by first but by slow use (say garments, furniture), it suffices that the thing be returned in the state in which, without deceit or fault of the usufructuary, they are found when the usufruct is ended (art. 484 Cod. it.).

For more, cf. the civil laws.

¹ Thus C. Gall., art. 578.

² The Code of Germany, omitting these distinctions, rather distinguishes (art. 99) fruits of a thing and fruits of a right; fruits which arise from a thing or right according to its destination, and fruits which must be attributed to some juridical relation.

III. Use and habitation. By Roman law, by canon law (before the Code), and by certain laws today, as the Austrian (arts. 504-508, 521), Belgian, French (arts. 625-635), German (arts. 1000-1003), Italian (arts. 476, 521-530), and that of the Argentine republic (art. 2537), there is designated by the name of use and habitation the real right of inhabiting another's house or of perceiving from another's field a utility circumscribed by the proper necessity and that of the family of the one using or inhabiting. - They can also, with usufruct, be designated by the general name of personal servitudes.

IV. A servitude is a certain real burden inhering in an immovable thing in favor either of another fund or of a definite person. - This is passive servitude, while the right born from it is active servitude.

Division. 1. A personal servitude is that which is constituted for the utility of a definite person; and certain of these, in several laws, we have just seen to be designated by a proper name (usufruct, etc.). A real servitude, or servitude of estates, exists for the utility of an immovable thing. Thus, besides the personal servitude of use, various uses of an immovable thing can be constituted for the utility of another fund (or of its proprietor), and this by law or agreement. Individual uses of this sort will be a certain ratio of real servitude. In a real servitude there is distinguished the servient fund, on which the burden is imposed, and the dominant fund: it is a kind of quality of this latter which cannot exist separately.

3. Real servitude is called urban or rustic, according as it is constituted for the utility of an urban estate, i.e. a building, or does not inhere in buildings. This division is absent from the Italian Code.

It is continuous or non-continuous, according as it has a perpetual cause: servitude of prospect, of aqueduct; or, because it must be exercised by human action, it serves at intervals: servitude of a path.

It is apparent or non-apparent, according as it is manifested by an external sign or not.

It is affirmative, which gives an active right of doing something, e.g. of passing through another's estate; negative, which merely prohibits, e.g. lest another build higher. Observe that a servitude cannot consist in doing, i.e. a servitude obliges no one to a positive act, but merely to tolerating or not doing.

The distinctions made must be attended to in the modes of acquiring, exercising, and extinguishing servitudes.

Legal servitudes are imposed by the law itself so that the right of property, especially among neighbors, may be prudently ordered.

V. In certain laws there is acknowledged, as a distinct right in the thing of another, superficies, by which someone has dominion either of all things (complete superficies), or at least of certain things (incomplete superficies), which are built or planted on another's fund.

In Belgium the right is ruled by the special law of January 10, 1821, which circumscribes the right by fifty years. Concerning that special right the Codes of the Argentine republic, France, and Italy are silent, although the French Code, arts. 552, 553, 661, and Italian Code, arts. 140, 448, 562, do not omit to treat of the dominion of things which exist below the soil or on the surface. That right then gives place to various doubts and controversies, concerning which jurists must be approached. - Concerning superficies the Code of Germany treats in arts. 1012-1027.

VI. Emphyteusis is a right in another's thing, by which someone can fully enjoy that thing, under this law, that he pay something (money or other species) to the owner annually, at least in acknowledgment of dominion. What must be paid is called the canon.

In Italian law, art. 1556, the obligation of improving the fund is placed in the description of emphyteusis, although, with the exception of a few dispositions, arts. 1562, 1563, 1564, full liberty of agreeing concerning mutual rights is conceded. In German law, under the name Erbpacht, as a right of certain States, it is named and admitted by art. 63 of the introductory law of the Code. Certain laws, like the Code of Holland and of Italy, admit that it be constituted in perpetuity; but the law of Italy makes that perpetual right essentially redeemable, once the capital which corresponds to the canon has been paid. In Belgium, by force of the law of January 10, 1824, its minimum time is 27 years, its maximum 99 years. Nor do the laws of the U.S.A. permit a perpetual lease of land; but they define the maximum time in various ways.

The Austrian Code, arts. 1122 ff., distinguishes hereditary lease-hire, for a just price; emphyteusis, for which a canon, far below a just price, is paid; and ground-rent, which is paid by him who enjoys by hereditary title the surface to the owner of the fund who at the same time enjoys those things which are below the soil. Concerning that right several Codes, e.g. that of France, are silent, but the law of June 25, 1902 acknowledges emphyteusis as a right in a thing, and assigns to it a minimum time of 18 years and a maximum of 99 years.

A fief, insofar as it still exists in England and Germany, designates a real, perpetual, and hereditary right in another's fruitful thing, with the added obligation of the feudatary (or vassal) of exhibiting homage and fidelity to the direct lord. By art. 59 of the introductory law of the Code of Germany, the laws of the States concerning fiefs are confirmed.

VII. On accessory rights. 1. General matters. Certain rights exist merely for strengthening the execution of a principal obligation, so that with this they fall: "the accessory follows the principal."

Every debtor obligates his patrimony, i.e. the universality of movable or immovable things of which it consists or will consist. But this obligation impedes no alienation, confers no right in a thing, and offers the same advantage to all creditors.

Nor must special things be said concerning the faculty which the law sometimes concedes of retaining certain things of another until he has satisfied certain debts connected with that thing.

But certain things must be indicated concerning pledge and antichresis, privilege (of exacting), and hypothec.

2. On pledge and hypothec. Pledge designates both the special right which falls to the creditor in the thing pledged, and the very object of that right, and the contract by which it is constituted. But the special right looks to this, that the creditor obtain possession of the thing, which the Code of Germany calls indirect, and then, either by sale or by acquisition of the thing, satisfy himself before other creditors.

By pledge properly so called, the thing is handed over to be possessed by the creditor formally or equivalently. Wherefore, of itself it is not constituted except in movable things and in titles (bearer titles) which represent rights.

Thus it differs from hypothec, by which name we understand the right in another's immovable thing, by which this thing, for the thing principally owed, is specially obligated to the creditor, so that he may be satisfied before others from the price of the thing. Even when the possessor has been changed, the obligated thing remains.

Moreover, a threefold hypothec is distinguished, according to its proximate source, which is law in legal hypothec, decree of the judge in judicial hypothec, agreement in conventional hypothec. Nevertheless, not all laws admit judicial hypothec as formally such.

Concerning conventional hypothec these things especially must be observed: the agreement or constitution, which for the most part must be made by an authentic act or before a notary; publicity, by which care is taken that what is inscribed in the registers can be known by all whom it concerns; the time through which it is preserved: for unless after a defined number of years it is renewed, the inscription is deleted by office, and the creditor at least loses his order; the order of hypothecs, since an immovable thing can be pledged to several creditors. But he who comes first in order, or who is said to have the first hypothec, obtains what is of interest before the others; he who has the second precedes the third, and so on. Finally, in several laws a conventional hypothec must be special, insofar as the obligated goods and the obligations to whose protection they are deputed are accurately defined.

But just as the constitution of a pledge can be so conceived that the dominion itself of the thing is transferred to the creditor until he has obtained payment of the principal debt, so again nothing is opposed to this, that a thing, even movable, without delivery, be affected for the security of some obligation. This can be done, for example, of a credit inscribed in the Code of Debts of the State (grand Livre de la dette publique). And most laws today acknowledge various forms of security of this sort: then, however, they are accustomed to require the solemnity of some inscription in public registers, so that without prejudice to third parties the right can be exercised. Pledge understood in this way scarcely differs from hypothec otherwise than by its object, which is movable.

From common pledge there is also customarily distinguished pledge in a commercial thing, which is constituted with lesser solemnity (e.g. by delivery alone without accompanying writing), and confers a more expeditious right of obtaining payment.

Of itself, the creditor is prohibited from using and enjoying the thing pledged. Nevertheless the contrary can be expressly or tacitly agreed upon, so that the creditor can perceive the utility and fruits first to compensate expenses and interest, then to extinguish the principal debt.

The laws which define the mode by which the creditor can sell or acquire for himself the pledge, and which prohibit certain clauses, endeavor to protect the debtor from abuses, especially those of "usurers."

N. B. Today not only on account of debt or defined obligations of private persons are pledges made and hypothecs conceded, but also several officials, public or private, who have great sums of money to administer, must give security concerning matters which can be imputed to them. This for the most part is done by depositing "titles" in a bank or by a similar pledge; sometimes also by a constituted hypothec, which is called a credit hypothec.

Various Civil Laws Concerning These Rights. 1. Latin law. By Italian law (arts. 1878-1890), French and Belgian law (arts. 2071-2084), Austrian law (arts. 451, 1368), Swiss law (art. 884 c. civ.), Dutch law (art. 1198), pledge cannot be constituted by words alone, but delivery of the thing is necessary; pledge gives the creditor a privilege by force of which, through the sentence of the judge, he either acquires the thing, once he has paid what its value exceeds beyond the debt, or obtains payment before others from the price of sale at auction ¹.

In Italian law, immovable goods, the usufruct of them, emphyteutic rights, titles of obligations of the State can be affected by hypothec (art. 1967). Everywhere today it is required that the hypothec be publicly evident. Wherefore, by Italian, Belgian, and French law it must be inscribed before the official whose name is "keeper of hypothecs." And after a certain time (before 30 years have elapsed in Italy, before 15 years in Belgium, before 10 years in France) it must be renewed.

Among several creditors who have the right of hypothec, those inscribed earlier are preferred to others. In Italian law (art. 2008), provision is made that those who present the document at the same time be placed under one number of inscription. But in Belgian and French law, they are estimated from the day of inscription, so that those who have obtained inscription on the same day are equal in time. In Canadian Q. and Dutch law they receive their order from inscription; except, in Canadian law, the hypothec by which provision is made for premiums which are owed to mutual societies of insurance against fire. The hypothec must be constituted through an authentic instrument (before a notary), and the conventional hypothec is subject to the law of "speciality," i.e. both the credit to which it gives security, and the goods which give security, must be defined individually. The possessor of the burdened fund can alienate it, but cannot make the thing worse to the prejudice of the creditors. To these belongs the right of "following" (droit de suite) the thing affected by hypothec, unless the new owner wishes, by making payment of the debt, to free it from the burden.

Spanish, Lusitanian, and Latin-American law is similar; in the law of the Argentine republic, however, attention must be given to the special law (n. 9661) which instituted agrarian pledge (prenda agraria) in machines and instruments of agriculture, in animals and movables assigned to the cultivation of fields, and also in the fruits of mines. The debtor becomes, as it were, the depositary of the thing pledged in the name of the creditor. That contract can be constituted by authentic or even private writing, but unless it is inscribed in public registers, it has no effects with respect to third parties.

By the Austrian Code pledge is used as a generic word, and pledge of a movable thing (pledge of French law) and pledge of an immovable thing or hypothec are distinguished.

2. Germanic law (arts. 1205-1257) differs scarcely from Latin law concerning pledge and antichresis, except that art. 232 enumerates various modes of giving security; because, in antichresis (Nutzungspfand) no distinction is made of movable and immovable thing. Concerning hypothec, however, these things come to be noted. First, without any relation to some principal debt, an immovable thing can be burdened with the obligation of paying, either once or also, in the manner of rent, periodically, some sum; and indeed in such a way that the written title by which the right is acknowledged belongs to the bearer: thus a predial debt or predial rent is constituted. Cf. arts. 1191-1198 and 1199-1203. That debt has been called abstract hypothec.

But, this omitted, the Code distinguishes Buchhypothek, which is our ordinary hypothec; Briefhypothek, or a hypothec which is not only inscribed in public registers (the registry), but besides must be proved by a certain written instrument, by the cession of which the right itself is yielded or transferred; finally Sicherungshypothek, by which someone makes secure in advance a credit perhaps future (arts. 1181-1190). Therefore a hypothec can be constituted in this way, so that the very sum whose payment it renders secure is not yet defined, but only the maximum beyond which the fund cannot be obligated is defined (art. 1190).

3. In English and U.S.A. law, pawn or pledge, lien, mortgage must be distinguished. Pledge, or pledge, is a contract by which a thing subject to personal dominion (personal property) is handed over to another for the security of an obligation. - Lien gives neither dominion nor possession to the creditor, but binds the thing, especially an immovable thing, to the security of the creditor's right. - Mortgage, by force of common law, transfers to the creditor himself the dominion of the thing or right until satisfaction has been made to the creditor. It can be constituted in personal or real estate (property). Constituted in personal estate it is called chattel mortgage. Delivery of the thing is not necessary. In most federated States of America, mortgage has been reduced by equity to a simple lien. Lien in an immovable thing comes very near to our hypothec.

In England, from the year 1879 there is a special law concerning Pawnbrokers (usurers) which rules loans which do not exceed ten pounds.

¹ In Italian law, akin to pledge is compulsory distraint (pignoramento) by which, at the request of the creditor, the movable thing and also the harvest of a debtor in mora are sold by public authority for extinguishing debts. But distraint confers on no creditor a privilege by which he is preferred to others. In French this is called saisie, and distraint of a harvest is called saisie-brandon.

3. On antichresis. By the name antichresis is designated a pledge whose fruits can be perceived by the creditor. Repudiated by the Austrian Code (art. 1372), which admits only the concession of use (arts. 459 and 1372), it is admitted by the German Code (art. 1213).

As pledge of an immovable thing, antichresis exists in the law of Italy (arts. 1891-1897), France, and Belgium (arts. 2071, 2085-2091), by which the creditor indeed acquires no privilege in the thing itself, but has the right of perceiving fruits, to be imputed first to interest, then to capital.

4. Privilege is a favor of law, founded in the very quality of the credit, by force of which the goods of the debtor, either all or at least certain ones, must serve for extinguishing certain debts (privileged debts) before others, even those which are protected by hypothec.

Therefore it can be general or special. Thus, in Italy, by general privilege in movable things are protected judicial expenses which redound to the common utility of creditors, funeral expenses; expenses for caring for health during the last six months of life; food, and certain fiscal credits. But a special privilege assigns the things which a traveler has brought into an inn for paying expenses made there. Cf. Cod. ital. arts. 1955-1963.

Privilege is constituted by law alone; nor is it estimated by time but by cause: whence, among the privileged, he to whom the law gives greater favor is preferred to the others; and those to whom the law gives equal favor concur equally.

Privileges of this sort occur in every law.

N. B. Except for perfect dominion, which is confused with the thing itself, all rights in a thing, just as they are a certain dismemberment of the right of property, so also are a certain servitude of one's own thing. This servitude is sometimes called by a proper name, use, usufruct, etc.; sometimes by the common name of servitude. Wherefore any right in a thing, if it lacks a proper name, can be called a servitude. Nor do all laws employ the same proper names in number.

Notions and Principle. With the number of those having the right considered, there is distinguished separated or singular dominion, i.e. of one physical or moral person ¹, and the condominium of several over an undivided thing. The common dominion of several, if it has profit or utility as an end commonly intended, pertains to society, concerning which we shall treat below under contracts; with that common intention excluded, there is mere undivided possession.

Then, with the diverse disposition of laws or agreements preserved, individuals can alone exercise juridical acts concerning their own aliquot part; but every act by which the material state of the thing is changed requires the consent of all. Since the regime of condominium is sufficiently impeded, modern laws favor it little.

Wherefore a right is generally acknowledged to individuals of petitioning for division, yet at an opportune hour or without damage to others, and with a contrary obligation induced by agreement preserved. This, however, by Latin law cannot bind the parties in perpetuity, but by one agreement can be established not beyond 5 years by the Code of France (art. 815); not beyond 10 by the civil Code of Switzerland (616-651), of Italy (673-684); not beyond life by the Code of Austria (831, 832). By one agreement, I say: for when the time has elapsed it can be renewed. (The numbers thus appended to laws are articles of the Codes.)

In Italian law the consent of all is not required for establishing various things concerning a common thing, but the assent of those who possess the greatest part of the common thing suffices.

For a grave cause, the judge can, notwithstanding an agreement, permit division.

The Code of Germany does not reject an agreement of perpetual community, but permits it to be rescinded for a grave cause.

Those things which we have said thus far must not be applied to certain accessory communities, such as walls common between two buildings or gardens, or those which flow from the nature of the thing, as if a house is sold and possessed through various stories. Perpetual common possession of a family tomb, of the family archive, is admitted also in France. Cf. concerning Italian law Pacifici-Mazzoni, III, p. 499 ff.; concerning French law Colin and Capitant, I, p. 770 ff.

¹ For a moral person is only one subject of right. Indeed, by ancient Germanic law, several who together possessed an undivided good were not judged singular possessors of an aliquot undivided part, but all were thought to have the whole thing, as it were, after the manner of one. Cf. Duynstee, C. SS. R., Burgerlijk recht en zielzorg, n. 588.

589. • Dominion is a perfect right, acquired through legitimate acts, of disposing at will of some thing and of its utility with the exclusion of others. - It is said:

1° Right (see n. 584).

2° Perfect right (see n. 586. 3°).

3° Acquired through legitimate acts. What those acts are, see below n. 638.

4° Of disposing: this word signifies three rights contained in dominion, namely:

a) The right of retaining or possessing the thing (concerning the notion of possession see n. 662): I say right, because the right of possessing a thing is to be distinguished from actual possession or the physical faculty of using and enjoying a thing; for legitimate possession can be lost while dominion and the right of possessing are preserved. Thus possession of a flooded field, or of a thing lost, or of a thing taken away by force or fraud, is lost, and nevertheless the right of possessing is retained; and this is not lost except from the express, or legitimately presumed, will of the owner.

b) The right of disposing of the thing as one pleases, so that he can change, consume, and alienate the thing; for "we are said to possess that which we have quietly and fully,"² and concerning which "we are able to do what we wish."³

c) The right of vindicating the thing, or reclaiming it, if perhaps, against the owner's will or without his knowledge, it has passed into the hands of others.

5° At will: yet this is not to be understood as if in civil society that right could not or should not sometimes be circumscribed by certain limits, as below, where there will be discussion concerning the dominion of children of a family, wives, etc., we shall see.

6° Of some thing, so that dominion of property may be distinguished from dominion of jurisdiction, which is referred especially to persons.

7° And of its utility: for the right of disposing of the utility of the thing is contained in the right of disposing of the thing itself, above under 4°. 2).

8° With the exclusion of others: therefore the object of dominion is not those things which are never exhausted by use, such as air, light, and the heat of the sun; for exclusion of others from these cannot even be imagined (n. 592).

Note. - Dominion is defined here as dominion taken subjectively and morally; understood objectively and materially, it is the thing itself of which someone is owner.¹

590. Division. - Dominion is principally divided into perfect or full, which in our law is called Fee simple if it is a question of immovables; if of movables, more commonly the complete and absolute ownership; and imperfect or not full, according as it is the right of disposing both of the thing itself and of its utility, or of only one of the two. But imperfect, or not full, is subdivided into direct and indirect or useful, according as it regards only the property of the thing, or only its utility. Thus an owner (the landlord) has direct dominion of an estate which he has leased to another; but the lessee or tenant has indirect or useful dominion.

They also commonly distinguish eminent dominion (the right of eminent domain) and lowly dominion. The former is called the right which supreme authority has of sometimes disposing, from a very grave cause, of the goods of private persons for the good of the community; the latter is the dominion of private persons.

The former properly is dominion only of jurisdiction, since the republic has no dominion of property in the goods of private persons, but only a right of administration, or the right of commanding when and how much from the goods of private persons is to be contributed to the common good. For the republic makes laws by which the dominion of private persons is governed not as supreme and universal owner of the territory, but as supreme administrator of the common good. "All things belong to princes for governing, not for retaining them to themselves," etc. St. Thomas, Quodl. 12. a. 24 ad 1.

That this right belongs to the supreme power is clear from this: that a right to an end necessarily implies the right to those means without which the end cannot be obtained. But the public good sometimes requires that someone be deprived of his thing, for example of a field for constructing a public road, etc.

But in the use of this right, not the utility of private persons, but only public utility is to be considered, nor is it licit to take away from someone what public utility does not require: "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."¹

We must treat 1° of the object; 2° of the subject; 3° of the acquisition of dominion.

159. Full dominion (pleine propriete; volle eigendom) is defined as the real right of perfectly disposing (i.e., of enjoying and disposing) of some thing as one's own for one's own advantage, unto any use not prohibited by law (C.C., a. 544²). It is said:

² In the notions handed down here we indicate the articles of the French Civil Code, which also has force in Belgium. But similar things are found in almost all modern legal systems.

1st. right in a thing or real right, attached to the thing itself, so that it may be distinguished from a mere right to a thing;

2nd. of perfectly disposing, i.e., both of using the emoluments and fruits of the thing, and of disposing of the thing itself as to substance; in one word, it is the right of destining it to all uses, or of alienating, selling, donating, exchanging, using, enjoying, destroying one's thing, or, as the ancients said, of using it up, i.e., of destining it to a use which cannot be renewed, or of using it even to destruction;

3rd. of a thing, namely, of any thing whatever, whether corporeal (field, house) or incorporeal (right, office, benefice, servitude, mortgage), whether movable or immovable, from which an advantage of stipend or honor is perceived;

4th. as one's own, all others being excluded, i.e., in one's own name and authority, and thus it is distinguished from the power of him who holds a thing without ownership, such as a depositary, procurator, curator, usufructuary, or user, who dispose of the thing but not as their own;

5th. for one's own advantage, even if it were nothing other than the exercise of one's own liberty, for example, in a thing to be given gratuitously, and thus it is distinguished from dominion of jurisdiction, which a superior cannot exercise for his own utility but for the common utility;

6th. unto any use not prohibited by law, i.e., by civil law, whose part it is to circumscribe the exercise of right for the common good, and a fortiori by natural or divine law, and similarly by ecclesiastical law, because right cannot be given against a just law; - indeed, neither unto acting against any law or virtue. And yet dominion remains full, because the restrictions of law do not remove one part of dominion, but only impede its exercise; whence he who uses his own thing unjustly against another sins against justice because he injures the right of another, but not because he uses his own thing badly.

160. Corollary. - From the nature of dominion there follow four principles of right which govern dominion:

1. The thing cries out to its owner, or toward its owner.

For a thing legitimately pertaining to an owner is so connected with him that, if it has been separated from him, it always strives to return to him, and thus as it were cries out to its owner. Therefore the owner can reclaim his thing wherever he finds it; and for that reason the possessor is bound to return it as soon as morally possible, unless he proves that he holds it by a just title.

2. The thing fructifies for its owner, because the fruits are an accessory of the thing; but the accessory follows the principal.

Therefore if the thing pertains to the owner, the fruits, insofar as they belong to the thing as cause, pertain to the owner of the thing; but the fruits of the possessing person, or of mere industry, insofar and to the extent that they proceed from the industry of another, pertain to the possessor, not to the owner: for then the thing was only the occasion or condition of the fruit, not its cause.

3. The thing perishes for its owner.

For if the thing pertains to the owner, if it fructifies for the owner, it is also equitable that it perish for the owner, unless it perishes through the fault of another. For when the thing is taken away, and consequently the bond to it which was the foundation of dominion, by that very fact the right in that thing perishes. Yet if the thing subsists virtually or in an equivalent, the foundation of dominion and the right remains, for example, if the possessor has received the price of the thing, or by using it has spared his own goods, or preserves its fruits.

4. No one ought to be enriched from another's thing, as from a cause, with the injury or loss of another; otherwise the thing would not fructify for the owner.

For it is repugnant to natural right that someone become rich from an injury inflicted upon another. Yet it is not repugnant that someone become richer on the occasion of another's thing, if, by using that thing, he produces something by his own industry alone: for this is truly the fruit of his own labor, in no way of the thing which then was not the cause of the fruit but a mere condition.

26. Notions. Children of families are called all children of each sex, whether legitimate or legitimated, who are still constituted under paternal or maternal power. For having greater clarity and avoiding confusions, the following names must be distinguished:

a) An infant, or child, or little one, who has not yet completed the first seven-year period.

b) An impubes, who has not yet arrived at legal puberty, that is, at the 14th year of his age if he is a boy, or at the 12th year of age if she is a girl.⁸⁵

c) A minor or minor-aged person, who (whether impubes or pubes) has not yet attained the age of majority established by canon or civil law. In diverse nations there are diverse statutes concerning the age of majority; thus, for example, in Switzerland the completed 20th year constitutes majority, in Germany and in France it is the completed 21st year. The same is in canon law c. 88, § 1; in Austria it is the 24th year.

d) A major-aged son is not the same as an emancipated son, but as to practice there is a small difference, since an emancipated son does not indeed have the age of majority prescribed by law, but by the authority of a judge has been declared major-aged. Thus, for example, in Switzerland nuptials by that very fact give emancipation;⁸⁶ whence if some girl of 16 years has rightly entered nuptials according to civil law, by that very fact she is emancipated.

e) A legitimate child is he who was born from a valid or at least putative marriage.⁸⁷ Concerning him those things are valid which will be said below concerning the dominion of children of families.

f) But an illegitimate child, who was born from parents not joined in marriage, is not considered to be under the power of the father, but is of his own right. Hence those things which will be said below are not valid concerning him. And indeed an illegitimate child is not bound by so great gratitude toward his parents as a legitimate child; for he must often bear the disgrace of the parents and suffer many other inconveniences. Hence he is rightly considered to be of his own right. Whence German law establishes that an illegitimate child with respect to the mother and her blood-relatives has the same right which a legitimate child has with respect to his own parents; but the right of a parent does not belong to the mother.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Cf. Cod. Iur. can. c. 88, § 2.

⁸⁶ Cod. civ. Helv. a. 14.

⁸⁷ Cod. iur. can. c. 1114.

⁸⁸ "The illegitimate child has, in relation to the mother and the relatives of the mother, the legal standing of a legitimate child" (Cod. civ. Germ. § 1705). "The mother does not have parental power over the illegitimate child" (ibid. § 1707).

27. Distinction Of Goods Which Pertain To Children Of Families. Roman law distinguishes the goods of children as castrensian, quasi-castrensian, adventitious, and profectitious.

Castrensian goods were those which a child of the family acquired by military service.

Quasi-castrensian goods were considered to be those which a child of the family acquired from the toga-wearing service, that is, from public offices, for example from the office of judge, advocate, physician, cleric.

Adventitious goods were those which came to the son from the mother, or from the maternal line, or by some other way, for example donation, inheritance, singular industry and labor; in one word: all those goods which came to the son without respect to the father.

Profectitious goods were considered to be those which came to the son from the father, or in view of the father, or which the son gained by doing business with the father's goods.

Modern civil codes are accustomed to distinguish only goods of two kinds of children of families, namely free goods, concerning which the son can dispose freely, and non-free goods, which pertain to the administration of the father and sometimes also to his usufruct. Which goods are free and which are non-free according to diverse civil codes will be said below.

28. According to Roman law,⁸⁹ the following principles were established by theologians:

1. The son has full dominion of castrensian and quasi-castrensian goods.

2. The son of a family indeed has direct dominion of adventitious goods, but not administration and usufruct; these pertain to the father. Nevertheless certain cases are excepted in law.

3. Of profectitious goods the son has neither direct nor useful dominion, but the whole is the father's.

Concerning the second and third principle, the Corpus iuris civilis establishes:⁹⁰ "It has been sanctioned by us that, if anything from the father's thing comes to him [namely, the son], according to the ancient observance he acquires this whole for the parent. (For what envy is it, that what has proceeded from the occasion of the father should return to him?) But what the son of the family has acquired for himself from another cause, of this he will acquire the usufruct indeed for the father, but the dominion will remain with him, lest what has come to him by his own labors or by prosperous fortune should, by passing to another, proceed mournfully for him."

To anyone considering it, wonder immediately occurs why the son has full dominion in castrensian and quasi-castrensian goods, but not in adventitious goods. Looking only at natural law, there does not seem to be a sufficient reason for establishing such a difference. For why, for example, could a young physician living in the paternal house retain goods acquired through the exercise of medicine (they are quasi-castrensian goods), but his full brother living in the same paternal house, but conducting commerce with goods received gratuitously from an uncle (they are adventitious goods), would be held to give the acquired profit to his father, who has usufruct of that profit? Likewise, if a son receives certain goods from his father and with them makes profit, all these things according to old Roman law belong to the father, as being profectitious goods; but if the same son receives those goods from his mother and with them makes profit, they pertain to him, as being adventitious goods, although the father has administration and usufruct. All these things indeed in present times would be admitted by the faithful only with difficulty, and nevertheless all moral theologians established the principles stated above as obliging in conscience. Therefore no other sufficient reason seems able to be assigned for the moral obligation of those principles except Roman civil law, which at that time was accepted by the Church as sufficiently agreeable to right reason and natural law. Since these things are so, in this matter the same obligation in conscience seems to be attributed to present-day civil codes, since their statutes are likewise sufficiently conformable to right reason, natural law, and the circumstances of places and times. Thus also several modern theologians, for example Aertnys, saying: "Laws which absolutely define property are valid in conscience. Such are, for example, those which establish modes of acquiring dominion through accession, usucaption, invention, etc.; likewise those which attribute property to children of families and authors of books; which concede to the father usufruct in the goods of children and of the wife; and also those which define succession from intestacy beforehand."⁹¹ This at least seems certain: present-day cases concerning the goods of children of families cannot be resolved according to ancient Roman civil law, as is done by certain authors. For the distinction of castrensian, quasi-castrensian, profectitious, and adventitious goods today seems to be of no use. Whence for modern practice only free and non-free goods must be distinguished.

General rules in our times can be had:

1. A major-aged (or emancipated) son does not sin against justice if he retains for himself everything rightly acquired (even by working in the paternal house), after deducting those things which are spent by the parents for his support. Thus is the common opinion.

2. A minor-aged son living and working outside the paternal house does not sin against justice if he retains his own wage. Thus also several modern codes establish, for example, Cod. civ. Helvet. a. 295, Cod. civ. Gall. a. 387.

3. A minor-aged son living in the paternal house but receiving a wage for labor performed outside the house does not sin against justice if he pays the expenses for his own support, but retains the rest for himself. But some modern codes establish that those wages pertain to the parents, for example Cod. civ. Helvet. a. 295.

4. A minor-aged son living and working in the paternal house seems to sin against justice if he secretly takes something from paternal goods which is not necessary for his own suitable support.

5. Against piety all children of families, whether major-aged or minor-aged, sin whenever by the retention of goods they cause an undue burden to their parents.

How children wounding justice must restore to parents, cf. below n. 83.

⁸⁹ Dig. l. 49, 17, 10; C. 12, 36.

⁹⁰ Lib. 2 Institutionum, tit. 9 "Per quas personas."

⁹¹ Suppl. ad VII praec. according to German law, p. IV.

Dominion, taken in general and in a broad sense, signifies any power whatever: sometimes it is used to express especially the power of jurisdiction, and sometimes even the possessed thing itself. But here it is taken in the strict sense for the right of property, and it is usually defined as "the faculty of disposing of some thing as one's own for every use not prohibited by law or agreement." - Cf. Molina, disp. 3, tract. 2. - Lugo, disp. 2, nn. 2 and 3. - Carrière, n. 16.

Dominion is chiefly divided into perfect and imperfect, according as it is the right of disposing both of the thing itself and of its utility, or only of one or the other. - This latter, namely imperfect dominion, is again divided into direct and indirect, which is also called useful, according as it regards only the property of the thing or only its utility.

Here also mention must be made of dominion which they call eminent. This dominion consists in the right which the supreme authority in society has of disposing, sometimes for a most grave cause, of the goods of private persons for the good of the community, e.g., of the field of some citizen for constructing a road. But then just compensation must be given; and concerning this, among us, special provision is made in the Constitution itself; for, Amend. art. 5, at the end, it is said: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." - Hence, since eminent dominion does not confer the right of disposing, but rather the right of buying some thing for the common good, it must be reduced to the power of jurisdiction rather than to the right of property.

I say. Every man, and only man, is capable of dominion. The reason is that, according to St. Thomas, the foundation of dominion is rational nature. And indeed, every man, and only man, can know the utility of things, will to apply them to himself if they belong to no one, and dispose of them thus applied to himself for his own end and his own advantage. Besides, he alone is capable of right or dominion who is capable of injury; but he alone suffers injury who suffers it against his will: however, he must be unwilling not indeed through the will by which he wills his own thing, but through the will by which he wills to retain the right to the thing itself, or to oblige others not to take it away. But brute animals cannot have such a will, since they can know neither moral obligation nor turpitude. Therefore.

Hence neither little children nor the insane themselves are incapable of dominion, as is clear from the practice of all peoples and from the reason just given; for, as was said, dominion is founded in the rational nature of men and its powers, but not in the actual exercise of those powers. Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 66, art. 1. - Lugo, disp. 3, n. 1.

Children of the family here are properly called those who, born from legitimate marriage or legitimated, of whatever sex they may be, are still subject to paternal power. - I said 1st. born from legitimate marriage or legitimated, because concerning the dominion of those who are spurious, judgment must be made only according to the equity of the right of nature, but not according to the special dispositions of the law. - I said 2nd. still subject to paternal power, because since only children not yet emancipated are reputed by law as infants, limitations are given only concerning their dominion, and therefore the question can be raised concerning them alone.

But emancipation can take place either by general law or by privilege and special declaration, and at a diverse age of children of the family, according to the diversity of regions. - Among us, with two or three States excepted, emancipation takes place in the twenty-first year both for males and for females. Cf. Wells, Every Man His Own Lawyer, p. 240.

You Will Ask. What can be the diverse goods of children of the family, and what dominion can they exercise?

Response 1st. From Roman Law the goods of children are: 1st. castrensia, that is, acquired on occasion of military service; 2nd. quasi-castrensia, or acquired from some public office, e.g., of judge, physician, etc.; 3rd. adventitia, which come from inheritance or donation, yet not made by the father or with a view to the father; 4th. profectitia, which the son gains from paternal goods, e.g., by carrying on business with the father's money, or which are given to him with a view to the father. - Moreover, of castrensia or quasi-castrensia goods the son has both dominion of property and usufruct; he also has administration if he has attained puberty. But the property of adventitia belongs to the son, but usufruct and administration to the father; finally profectitia in all respects belong to the father. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 488.

Response 2nd. Since, as Kenrick says, "these distinctions are not in force in the law which we use," the proposed question must be answered by distinguishing between the case in which the child of the family receives goods by title of donation or inheritance, and the case in which he acquires them by virtue of labor or industry. - In the first case, administration belongs to the father, but dominion of property and usufruct to the son. In the other, there is need of a new distinction; for either 1st. the son labors outside the paternal house and is not fed by the father, and then he will be able to make the goods which he gains his own, because he has been dismissed or is reputed dismissed; or 2nd. the son labors in the paternal house or outside it and is fed by the father, and then all things which he gains belong to the father.

But in that last case a threefold exception must be made in favor of the son, namely: 1st. if the father remits from his right, and he is considered to remit if he permits the son to contract marriage; 2nd. if the son by reason of his condition is not held to labor; 3rd. if he has evidently and undoubtedly labored more than the others of the family. - Although this last opinion can sometimes be held in practice, at least after the fact, nevertheless it is not to be taught publicly everywhere on account of the inconveniences which would follow through abuse. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 488 and 544. - Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 12, n. 81. - Kenrick, tract. 10, part. 1, n. 41. - Kent, Comment., vol. 2, nn. 191 and seq.

See Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 8th Edit., Parent and Child. Cf. Right to earnings of the child.

From Roman Law the goods of a wife are of three kinds, namely:

1st. Dotal goods, or goods which the wife already possessed, or which her father conceded to her for contracting marriage: the administration and usufruct of these are in the possession of the husband, but direct dominion is in the possession of the wife.

2nd. Paraphernal goods, or goods which the wife reserved to herself besides the dowry: these belong to her by full right.

3rd. Common goods, or goods which, by agreement had between the spouses or by determination of law, are brought into a certain partnership: of these, both direct and useful dominion belong to both spouses. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 489. - Elbel, n. 69.

But in this region the three aforesaid names are taken otherwise, and the dominion of wives is different in it. For:

1st. "The dotal goods of a wife, according to our customs," says Kenrick, "are the third part of the immovable goods which the husband has possessed during marriage, which therefore he cannot alienate to the prejudice of the wife, unless she herself, questioned separately by a magistrate, has freely consented, and by her signature has renounced her right. If the husband by testament has left certain goods to the wife, that her dowry be excluded, it is in her power to reject them so that she may enjoy her right. Moreover, only during her life does her right remain, and when she has died, it passes to the heirs of the husband." Cf. Kenrick, n. 45. - Bouvier, Law Dictionary, under the word Dower.

2nd. Paraphernal goods among us mean all goods which pertain to the clothing or ornament of a woman, according to her condition, and which she used during marriage: these after the death of the husband belong altogether to the wife. - Cf. Kenrick, n. 42. - Bouvier, Law Dictionary, under the word Paraphernalia. - Wells, Every Man, etc., p. 82.

3rd. Common goods are those which are acquired by husband and wife together by title of purchase or of donation had during marriage. Each spouse possesses these goods as if the two spouses were one person, so that neither can sell them without the consent of the other. Cf. Kenrick, n. 44. - Kent, Comment., vol. 4, part 6, lect. 55. - Bouvier, Law Dictionary, §§ Dower, Husband and Wife.

Question 1. Can a wife give alms from common goods?

Response. Affirmatively, even if otherwise she has her own goods, provided that it is done according to the custom of other women of the same condition. The reason is that a wife is not a servant but a partner; therefore she must have a certain administration in the house of the husband. Besides, the husband is deservedly presumed to consent to those things which are done by the wife according to the respectable custom of condition and region; and if he shows himself unwilling, such dissent is considered irrational, because the husband cannot deprive the wife of a right conceded to her by legitimate custom. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 540. - Kenrick, n. 46.

Question 2. Does a wife sin by giving something from common goods for relieving the necessity of parents or children whom she has had from a prior marriage?

Response. Negatively, if she does not have her own goods, and through this necessary things are not lacking to the husband and his family. The reason is that by the right of nature the wife is held to relieve the aforesaid blood relatives, and therefore the husband is reasonably presumed to consent to this. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 542. - Kenrick, n. 46.

Question 3. Is the wife held to restore goods given in this manner when, the husband having died, she comes into the inheritance of dotal goods, or before his death she has acquired paraphernal goods?

Response. Negatively, if the goods given are of small moment, because then they are held as common alms, which, if they are made moderately, do not carry with themselves the burden of restitution. Indeed, the response must also be negative, at least probably, if the goods withdrawn are of greater moment; because all burdens which, while marriage stands, naturally befall one of the spouses are considered common to the other, and therefore the husband cannot be reasonably unwilling.

The goods of clerics are distinguished into four kinds, namely: 1st. Patrimonial goods, which come from paternal inheritance or from any other profane cause, for instance from donation, succession, etc.; 2nd. Quasi-patrimonial goods, which are also called quasi-ecclesiastical or casual, and these are those which are acquired on occasion and in view of functions, e.g., by celebrating Mass, preaching, etc.; 3rd. Ecclesiastical goods, which are received from benefices of the Church, e.g., from revenues of benefices, etc.; 4th. Parcimonial goods, which a cleric sets aside by living sparingly from the fruits of a benefice, and which he could consume by living honorably.

I say. Clerics have perfect dominion in patrimonial, quasi-patrimonial, and parcimonial goods, so that they can dispose of them at will. The reason is both that that dominion is nowhere found restricted, and that in this all theologians, even the stricter ones, agree.

Although a benefice-holder may have other non-beneficial goods, he can freely use and enjoy benefice fruits which are necessary for his honorable support; but he is held by the obligation of expending superfluous fruits for the poor or for pious causes, with the prescription of can. 239, § 1, n. 19 being saved (Can. 1473).

§ 1. Unless the contrary is proved, those things which are donated to rectors of churches, even of religious, are to be presumed to have been donated to the church.

§ 2. A donation made to the church cannot be repudiated by its rector or Superior without the license of the Ordinary.

§ 3. If a donation has been illegitimately repudiated, on account of the damages which have arisen thence an action is given for restitution in full or for indemnity.

§ 4. A donation made to a church and legitimately accepted by the same cannot be revoked on account of the ungrateful disposition of the Prelate or rector (Can. 1536).

Question 1. Are clerics badly expending the surplus of ecclesiastical goods held to restitution?

Response. Certain strict theologians, such as Collet and Antoine, respond affirmatively, because they say: clerics are only administrators and stewards of ecclesiastical goods. But the opinion denying is probable, because although it is established concerning the precept of giving these superfluous goods, nevertheless it is not established concerning the origin of this obligation, namely whether it proceeds from justice. This opinion is also called probable by St. Alphonsus in his reformed propositions, especially on account of the authority of St. Thomas. Observe moreover that for the gravity of fault in the violation of this ecclesiastical precept there is required a quantity much greater than in theft, namely, according to the truer opinion, about a twentieth part of the superfluous goods. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 185, art. 7. - St. Alphonsus, n. 491; and QQ. Reform., n. 10.

Question 2. Whether the annual pension which is given to our Missionaries from the renting of pews is to be assimilated to ecclesiastical goods?

Response. According to the Constitution Romanos Pontifices, this annual pension is to be held as ecclesiastical goods.

§ 1. Temporal goods, whether corporeal, both immovable and movable, or incorporeal, which belong either to the universal Church and to the Apostolic See or to another moral person in the Church, are ecclesiastical goods (Can. 1497).

I say. Any man from natural right has a right in the fruit of his own ingenuity or industry. For if a thing bears fruit for its owner, a fortiori this must be true concerning internal faculties, since nothing can be more proper to a man. Wherefore the inventor of some art has a strict right that his secret not be stolen and, against his will, divulged to the public; but if this is done, the one causing damage will be held to restitution according to the measure of the injury inflicted. - Cf. Wells, Every Man, etc.; qq. 243 and seq.

Question 1. Does he violate another's right who publishes in type a manuscript work without the consent of the author?

Response. Affirmatively; and the reason is that it is established among all that a manuscript work is not in the public domain, but lies under the dominion of the author. The same must be said of one who would publish in type the public lectures of some professor or the sermon of an orator; for to teach publicly or to preach is not to hand over one's work to another for publishing and selling. - Yet except the case if someone delivers again from the pulpit a sermon already heard as if composed by himself, both because through this he does not properly claim the thing of another for himself, and because he does not necessarily and of itself harm the prior orator. - Cf. Carrière, n. 61.

Question 2. Does he who has published a book in type have the right of preventing anyone from committing it to the press and selling it with damage to the author or to the bookseller to whom the author has transmitted his right?

Response. Affirmatively, by positive right prevailing in most places, just as in these States, provided nevertheless that the conditions or formalities required by law have been fulfilled. But if there is question of natural right, it is controverted, and to some the denying opinion seems probable, because the author has a right in his work as long as it remains his own, namely is not handed over to the community, and thus as it were becomes of common right. Wherefore according to these, if someone in this region committed to type a book published in Europe without the permission of the author, strictly speaking and looking only to the right of nature, he does not seem to be accused of the temporal pecuniary damage which the author would suffer thence. I said 1st. strictly speaking, because by such a manner of acting, if not a right properly so called, public uprightness and natural decency seem to be injured. - I said 2nd. looking only to the right of nature, because if the contrary has been provided through international stipulation, the violator certainly would be held to paying the fine and congruous compensation. I said 3rd. concerning temporal pecuniary damage, for if the same or almost the same book were published under another name, then the true author would be damaged in the goods of reputation, which can never be lawful, and a sin of this kind is designated by a special name among all nations. - Cf. Carrière, ibid. - Kenrick, tract. 10, part. 1, nn. 13 and 14. - Bouvier, Law Dictionary, Ed. 8th. Cf. Copyright, De lege lata among us (March 4, 1909).

Since right taken in the second way, for the faculty of doing something, acquiring, etc., is the foundation of right or of the just, which is the object of justice, many necessary points concerning it occur to be examined, especially concerning dominion, which is its principal species.

Dominion is twofold: one of jurisdiction, which is the power of governing one's subjects; the other of property, which is the faculty of disposing of some thing as one's own for one's own advantage, and it is chiefly of this that we treat here.

Dominion of property again is twofold: one full and perfect, the other not full and imperfect.

Full dominion is the right to the property of a thing and its emoluments. Not full is the right to the property of a thing without the emoluments, and it is called direct dominion, such, e. g., as belongs to the prince with respect to a fief; or the right to the emoluments without the property, and it is called useful dominion, and such belongs to usufructuaries, feudatories, emphyteutae, etc.

Therefore

I say first: Full and perfect dominion of property, as it embraces direct and useful dominion, is rightly defined: "A right in a thing, or the legitimate faculty of disposing of a thing as one's own, for any use not prohibited by law, for one's own advantage." It is gathered from D. Thomas, here q. 66, a. 1, c.

It is said, "for any use not prohibited by law;" because, although dominion by its nature bestows power for any use whatever, this power can nevertheless be impeded by law so that it does not pass into act: as happens with a minor, who before the legitimate age cannot alienate his goods, although he is their true owner; hence, if he were to alienate them, he would not sin against justice.

But the same conditions are required for perfect dominion that are required for right in a thing, namely: the existence of the thing, a legitimate title, and delivery of the thing.

I say secondly: Usufruct is defined: "The right of using and enjoying the things of another, saving their substance." So in the law.

It is said, "of enjoying," that it may be distinguished from simple use.

For he who has simple use can only use the thing, e. g., a horse, a house, a garden, a field, a wood, etc., for his own daily necessity, so that he can neither let, sell, nor gratuitously cede to another either the superfluous fruits or the right he has; whereas he who has usufruct can do all these things, so L. 12, ff. de Usu.

But fruits are reckoned not only in immovables, as hay, crops, shoots, timber trees, bois taillis in an estate (for fruit-bearing trees are not reckoned fruits), but also in movables, as wool, milk, offspring, etc., in a flock. Where note that timber wood, even if cut out of season, is in fruit, just as an olive picked unripe, likewise hay cut unripe. L. 48, ff. de Usufructu. As to harvest and vintage, however, the usufructuary must wait for ripeness.

Note further that, if the usufructuary die before he has gathered the fruits, even if ripe, these are acquired by the owner of the property, and not by the heirs of the usufructuary. So in Instit. de Rerum divisione, § Is vero. The reason is, because as long as they adhere to the estate they are held to be one with it. Hence they belong to the owner of the estate until the usufructuary by gathering them has made them his own.

It is said, "the things of another;" because usufruct is a servitude, which can be constituted only over the things of another. "For no one's own thing serves him, but profits him by right of dominion," as is said in L. 26, ff. de servitute praedior. rustic.

It is said, "saving their substance;" because the usufructuary must reserve the thing intact for the proprietor. Hence usufruct cannot properly be constituted over things that are consumed by a single use, as wine, oil, etc.

I say thirdly: Use is defined by the jurists: "The right of only using the things of another, saving their substance."

It is said the right of only using, and not of enjoying; because, as I have already said, the simple user can only take the fruits of a thing, as vegetables, apples, hay, for his own daily necessity, but he cannot sell or give them away, nor let the thing itself; which the usufructuary can do.

It is said, "saving their substance," because in use, as in usufruct, the thing must be preserved intact for the owner.

From this you have that this definition of use does not belong to things consumable by a single act, as wine, oil, bread, etc.; because by such use the substance of the thing does not remain safe. Hence, if use be taken more generally, as it befits both things consumable by a single act and non-consumable things, it is "the right of using a thing of another."

Concerning this use of things consumable by a single act there was once great controversy, not only among theologians, but also among Pontiffs: whether it should be distinguished from dominion? For whose resolution let there be

Use is distinguished in two ways: one independent and irrevocable at the nod of the grantor, as in a loan; the other dependent and revocable at the nod of the grantor, such as guests have at a banquet laid out, or individual religious at food or drink granted to them by the superior; for these things, whether the banquet, or the food and drink, can be taken away by the owner or superior without injustice as long as they exist.

Irrevocable use is called by Nicholas III, cap. Exiit, de verborum signific. in 6°, and by some theologians "use of right," because it is an absolute and solid right. Revocable use is called use of fact; because the right it imports or supposes is very weak, being dependent on the will of another.

I say: Revocable use in things consumable by one act is distinguished from dominion.

Proof. First. Separation is a manifest proof of real distinction. But revocable use, as in the conclusion, is separable from dominion. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. He who grants to another the faculty of using his thing, while retaining the power of revoking this faculty at his nod and of disposing of his thing to whatever use he wishes, grants the use and retains dominion. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. That he grants the use is evident in itself. That he retains dominion is proved. He is truly lord who can recall his thing to himself at his pleasure, no contract intervening, and dispose of it for any use whatever. Therefore.

Proof. Second. Individual religious have the use of those things that are granted to them for sustenance, revocable by the superior. But they do not have dominion over them, since by vow of poverty they have abdicated the dominion and property of all things²⁴¹ . Therefore. ²⁴¹ This is understood of religious orders that are perfect, in which solemn vows are pronounced.

It is confirmed by the example Nicholas III uses. A father of a family giving a banquet to guests gives them the use of foods revocable at his nod. Yet he does not transfer dominion to them. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Guests are not lords of what is set on the table, nor can they use it for any use whatever, but only for eating, and that so dependently on the will of the father of the family that he would commit no injustice if he took away what he had set out. Therefore.

So with us think Nicholas III, Clement V, and before them Alexander III and Gregory IX, Soto, Navarrus, Sylvius, Lessius, and many others together with the entire school of the Scotists.

You will object: John XXII, Extravag. Ad conditorem, asserts the contrary of our opinion, and says that to say that in such things use can be constituted separately from dominion repugns to right and runs counter to reason. Therefore either he, or the Pontiffs praised above, erred.

I answer. First: suppose we admit that John XXII erred in this part, nothing absurd follows, since it is not a matter of faith or morals, but partly natural, partly civil; and besides he said this not defining as Pontiff, but reasoning as a particular doctor.

It can be answered secondly that John XXII did not err even in this; because he does not take dominion strictly and properly, but broadly and improperly for right however tenuous, or rather for the license of using a thing by consuming it, which since in things consumable by the use itself it is equivalent as to effect to dominion (for the Friars Minor consume food as freely as if they were owners), therefore the Pontiff called this right, though most tenuous and revocable, dominion, namely equivalently and analogically. This solution is intimated by the gloss in Clement., Exivi de Paradiso, § Proinde.

: To every and only intellectual nature, namely God, angel, and man, dominion belongs ²⁴² ; because to every and only intellectual nature belongs the foundation of dominion, namely intellect and will, by which it has the power of disposing of its own acts, and by acts over external things. Hence Genesis, I, 26, God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness, that he may rule over the fishes of the sea and the beasts of the earth: where he attributes to man dominion over beasts and fishes because he is the image of God. Now he is the image of God through intellect and will. ²⁴² Here q. 66, a. 1.

I say secondly: All sublunary things can fall under the dominion of man, inasmuch as he can acquire them for himself and dispose of what is acquired at his nod; but of those things of which he has legitimate title he is de facto lord.

He is also absolutely lord of operations freely exercised through intellect and will, through the external senses and through the locomotive power ²⁴³ ; because such are subject to his free choice. Not so perfectly is he lord of actions naturally exercised through the interior senses and the sensitive appetite; because these sometimes depend on the disposition of a bodily organ, which is not in man's power. But of the actions of the vegetative faculty he is in no way lord, because they are in no wise subject to the command of reason. ²⁴³ Iª 2ae, q. 17, a. 5-9.

I say thirdly: Man is not absolutely and directly lord of his own life and members, but only custodian and user ²⁴⁴ ; God alone is Lord. So doctors everywhere. ²⁴⁴ Here q. 64, a. 5, ad 3.

It is proved. First from Scripture. Deut., XXXII, 39, God says: See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me. I will kill, and I will make to live. And Wisdom, XVI, 13: Thou, Lord, hast power of life and death; that is, thou alone.

Proof by reason. First. Life and body are presupposed to dominion as its foundations. Therefore they are not subject to dominion. — If you say that liberty also is a foundation of dominion, and yet man is its lord, seeing that he can sell it into servitude; I answer that what is sold into servitude is not liberty itself or the power of free choice, which is the foundation of dominion, but only the use; just as man can also sell the use of his own body. — Secondly. By the precept Thou shalt not kill, killing is prohibited, not only of another, but also of oneself, and likewise mutilation. Therefore man cannot dispose at pleasure of life or members, and consequently has no dominion over them. — Thirdly. Dominion is only over those things which we can acquire by our industry; for just as we can acquire them, so we can relinquish them. But we cannot acquire life or members by our own industry. Therefore. — Fourthly. Dominion is only over distinct things. But life and members are not a thing distinct from us. Therefore.

I say thirdly: Neither princes nor the commonwealth have direct dominion over the life and members of citizens, as if they could kill or mutilate citizens at pleasure, but only indirect, inasmuch as the life of certain men is harmful to the public good.

It is evident both from the praised precept: Thou shalt not kill; and because every private person stands to the commonwealth as a member to the body; no one however is lord of his own members, as was said. Therefore.

I say fourthly: Man is lord of his own reputation and honor ²⁴⁵ . It is common against Cajetan, q. 73, a. 2. This dominion however is at times bound up. ²⁴⁵ Here q. 73, a. 4, ad 1.

Proof of the first part. Man acquires reputation by his own labor, or at least the right to it; having once acquired it, by the faculty of choice he governs it, preserves it, or loses it without wrong to anyone, as Augustine did by making his falls manifest. Therefore he is its lord. — The corollary is evident; because all these acts are the principal acts of dominion.

DOMINIUM must first be understood, that we may recognize theft and rapine, which assault dominion.

Now DOMINION is defined in many ways. The best is this: Dominion is the faculty which anyone has of using a thing independently of the will of another, and for his own advantage, in any use permitted by law. It is defined in almost this way by Soto l. IV. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 1. Gregorio de Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 10. p. 1. and others. It is drawn from D. Bonaventure on cap. 6. of our Rule, there: Fratres nihil sibi approprient, where he says dominion signifies the same as ownership of a thing; as ownership is usually distinguished from the bare possession of things. All Theologians and Jurists adhere to this. He examines and expounds this definition in this manner in the Opusculo ad Magistrum innominatum.

He explains THE VERY SAME definition in fact, while handing it on in other places, in the Apologia pauperum, cap. 1. tertia responsionis. See also Soto l. IV. quaest. 1. art. 1. Couar. l. I. var. cap. 15. Valentia quaest. 10. puncto 1. Molina disp. 6. Vasquez p. 2. disp. 169. num. 32. Tanner disputatione 4. quaest. 1. dubio 2.

It is called a Faculty, or proper power, as Soto says. It is said: which anyone has of using a thing for his own advantage, so that the rights of superiors toward inferiors may be excluded, which are not dominions, since they do not regard the advantage of those superiors themselves, but of the inferiors; for superiors do not do those things they establish toward subjects for their own sake, but for those subjects, and on account of the public good.

EXCEPT the dominion of God, which is proper, ordering all things to himself, as to the ultimate end, as the Saintly Doctor discusses in 1. dist. 30. art. unico, quaest. 1. in resol. It is said: in any use permitted by law, so that certain particular dominions may be excluded, which do not extend to all things, for instance to alienating, selling, etc. In almost the same way it is defined by Gerson tract. de potestate Ecclesiae, consider. 13. and tract. de vita spirituali, lect. 3. Conrad quaest. 1. de contract.

HENCE you have also that the description of dominium given by D. Thom. quaest. 67. art. 1. signifies the same, where he says that Dominion consists in the power of using exterior things, as made for man.

From this definition the Saintly Doctor gathers in the aforesaid places that the Friars Minors have no dominion over things, even consumptibles in their use, such as bread, wine, money, etc., which are conferred on them in alms; but only the bare use, as Nicholas III defines in cap. exiit de verb. significatione, in 6. for they cannot use those things independently of their owners; even if they have the use unto consumption, and although those things would not be given to the Friars absolutely by the will of the giver, yet they receive them with a continual dependence on him, until the things be consumed. And in this sense the Friars understood it, and the Pontiff Nicholas declared it, and the Saintly Doctor expounds it, as Valentia notes loc. cit. Sotus de Iust. l. IV. quaest. 1. art. 1. Bannes de dominio, quaest. 1. Bellarminus Tom. 1. l. IV. de summo Pontifice, cap. 14. Azorius lib. XII. cap. ult. Sayrus l. IX. cap. 7. dub. 9. Sanctes on cap. 6. regulae, cum Politio ibi, Suarez Tom. 2. disp. 28. sect. 2. Lessius, l. II. cap. 3. disp. 8. Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 1. dub. 2.

From which the dispute with others is easily settled — those who obstinately maintain that the dominion of these things is in the hands of the Friars, because in things consumed by use, use does not seem capable of being distinguished from dominion. For he who grants the faculty of using bread and wine — what dominion over them does he reserve to himself? So think D. Thom. quaest. 78. art. 1. D. Antonius 4. p. tit. 12. cap. 4. § 4. Caietanus ad loc. cit. D. Thom. Sylvester v. Dominium, quaest. 2. Turrecremata l. II. de potestate Ecclesiae, cap. 122. in fine, where the definition of John XXII is relied upon, in Extrauag. Ad Conditorem, and in Extrauag. Cum inter nonnullos, and in Extrauag. Quia quorundam, where he declares (short of a definition of faith, however) and proves this opinion. He, then, is to be understood thus: that on the part of the givers, the things are given to the Friars entirely; yet he does not on that account want the Friars to be compelled to receive and hold those things independently of their owners, and so he does not attack our state; as Sanctes malignly murmurs at the place cited; for John did not intend to prove in that sense that our opinion is false, as Valentia warns loc. cit. Tannerus disp. 4. quaest. 1. dub. 2. Bellarm. l. IV. de Pontifice, cap. 14.

NEITHER indeed does use suffice for dominion, but independence is required, and the power of using at will in all things, so that things can be sold, alienated, etc. Just as if someone invite some persons to dinner: those things are exhibited under the dominion of the inviter, as long as they last, until they are consumed. So the Saintly Doctor answers to the Rule of the Minors, and I shall say more in question 2.

But if use in these things does not differ from dominion, since Monks, by the chapter ad Monasterium, de statu Monachorum, have no proper particular property, they could not have use of consumptible things, for thus they would be proprietaries; as the saintly man discusses at the place cited.

They have, therefore, use of fact as regards these things, not use of right, as D. Bonav. teaches, and with him Salonius de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 2.

Yet although those giving alms intended to transfer dominion, nevertheless since for dominion the will of the receiver is also necessary, and the Friars Minors do not receive them as owners, it follows that they have no dominion; and in this sense neither does D. Thom. nor the rest protest; nor does John XXII declare the opposite. Moreover this is the apparent controversy of those Pontiffs, which is reduced to concord; whence one would wrongly infer that they declared the opposite; but indeed they agree in our sense, nor had they disputed a matter of faith in the whole Church, but declared a practice for one family only of the Friars.

That dominion is further distinct from use in things consumed by use, S. Bonav. proves on cap. 6. of the Rule, because, as he says with the Lex, ff. de pecul. The garment which the slave uses belongs to the peculium of the Master. And elsewhere he says that what is acquired for the slave is acquired for the master.

In the little work, however, against the Unnamed one, he notes that although those giving alms materially intend to give absolutely to the Friars, yet implicitly they intend to give in such a way that they may licitly receive; for they do not will their perdition, and accordingly, since they themselves can have no dominion independently; neither do the givers intend thus to dispense alms.

As to the use of certain things which are not consumed at first, such as Books, and the utensils of the Sacristy: thus the Saintly Doctor expounds in the little work cited. The Rule does not forbid us to have nothing; for those wishing to preach must have books; those wishing to celebrate, Missals, etc. But the ownership of these things is not ours, but the Pope's, and the Most Eminent Protector ought to have the care of them; the sign of which is that the Friars can neither sell, nor in any other way alienate all these things. But if you obstinately maintain that these things are not the Church's, at last S. Bonav. says: whosever the ownership of these things be, it is not mine, as I declare, and my protector's; But who would be so destitute of mind as to say that I can, against my will, retain possession of a thing, while others yearn with full will for the possessions?

To Our Venerable Brethren, All Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the Catholic World, in Peace and Communion With the Apostolic See.

Venerable Brethren, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

IT is not surprising that the spirit of revolutionary change, which has so long been predominant in the nations of the world, should have passed beyond politics, and made its influence felt in the cognate field of practical economy. The elements of a conflict are unmistakable: the growth of industry, and the surprising discoveries of science; the changed relations of masters and workmen; the enormous fortunes of individuals, and the poverty of the masses; the increased self-reliance and the closer mutual combination of the working population ; and, finally, a general moral deterioration. The momentous seriousness of the present state of things just now fills every mind with painful apprehension ; wise men discuss it; practical men propose schemes ; popular meetings, legislatures, and sovereign princes,—all are occupied with it, and there is nothing which has a deeper hold on public attention.

Therefore, Venerable Brethren, as on former occasions, when it seemed opportune to refute false teaching, We have addressed you in the interest of the Church and of the common weal, and have issued Letters on Political Power, on Human Liberty, on the Christian Constitution of the State, and on similar subjects, so now We have thought it useful to speak on the CONDITION OF LABOR. It is a matter on which We have touched once or twice already. But in this Letter the responsibility of the Apostolic office urges Us to treat the question expressly and at length, in order that there may be no mistake as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for its settlement. The discussion is not easy, nor is it free from danger. It is not easy to define the relative rights and the mutual duties of the wealthy and of the poor, of capital and of labor. And the danger lies in this, that crafty agitators constantly make use of these disputes to pervert men’s judgments and to stir up the people to sedition.

But all agree, and there can be no question whatever, that some remedy must be found, and quickly found, for the misery and wretchedness which press so heavily at this moment on the large majority of the very poor. The ancient workmen’s Guilds were destroyed in the last century, and no other organization took their place. Public institutions and the laws have repudiated the ancient religion. Hence by degrees it has come to pass that Working Men have been given over, isolated and defenceless, to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition. The evil has been increased by rapacious Usury, which, although more than once condemned by the Church, is, nevertheless, under a different form, but with the same guilt, still practised by avaricious and grasping men. And to this must be added the custom of working by contract, and the concentration of so many branches of trade in the hands of a few individuals, so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself.

To remedy these evils the Socialists, working on the poor man’s envy of the rich, endeavor to destroy private property, and maintain that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies. They hold that, by thus transferring property from private persons to the community, the present evil state of things will be set to rights, because each citizen will then have his equal share of whatever there is to enjoy. But their proposals are so clearly futile for all practical purposes, that if they were carried out the working man himself would be among the first to suffer. Moreover they are emphatically unjust, because they would rob the lawful possessor, bring the State into a sphere that is not its own, and cause complete confusion in the community.

It is surely undeniable that, when a man engages in remunerative labor, the very reason and motive of his work is to obtain property, and to hold it as his own private possession. If one man hires out to another his strength or his industry, he does this for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for food and living; he thereby expressly proposes to acquire a full and real right, not only to the remuneration, but also to the disposal of that remuneration as he pleases. Thus, if he lives sparingly, saves money, and invests his savings, for greater security, in land, the land in such a case is only his wages in another form; and, consequently, a working man’s little estate thus purchased should be as completely at his own disposal as the wages he receives for his labor. But it is precisely in this power of disposal that ownership consists, whether the property be land or movable goods. The Socialists, therefore, in endeavoring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community, strike at the interests of every wage-earner, for they deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thus of all hope and possibility of increasing his stock and of bettering his condition in life.

What is of still greater importance, however, is that the remedy they propose is manifestly against justice. For every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation. For the brute has no power of selfdirection, but is governed by two chief instincts, which keep his powers alert, move him to use his strength, and determine him to action without the power of choice. These instincts are self-preservation and the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which are close at hand ; beyond their surroundings the brute creation cannot go, for they are moved to action by sensibility alone, and by the things which sense perceives. But with man it is different indeed. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of animal nature, and therefore he enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal race, the fruition of the things of the body. But animality, however perfect, is far from being the whole of humanity, and is, indeed, humanity’s humble handmaid, made to serve and obey. It is the mind, or the reason, which is the chief thing in us who are human beings ; it is this which makes a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially and completely from the brute. And on this account—viz., that man alone among animals possesses reason—it must be within his right to have things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings have them, but in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things which perish in the using, but also those which, though used, remain for use in the future.

This becomes still more clearly evident if we consider man’s nature a little more deeply. For man, comprehending by the power of his reason things innumerable, and joining the future with the present—being, moreover, the master of his own acts—governs himself by the foresight of his counsel, under the eternal law and the power of God whose Providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice, not only on things which regard his present welfare, but also on those which will be for his advantage in time to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the earth itself; for of the products of the earth he can make provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied to-day, they demand new supplies to-morrow. Nature, therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail, the daily supply of his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.

Nor must we, at this stage, have recourse to the State. Man is older than the State ; and he holds the right of providing for the life of his body prior to the formation of any State. And to say that God has given the earth to the use and enjoyment of the universal human race is not to deny that there can be private property. For God has granted the earth to mankind in general; not in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they please, but rather that no part of it has been assigned to any one in particular, and that the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man’s own industry and the laws of individual peoples. Moreover, the earth, though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all; for there is no one who does not live on what the land brings forth. Those who do not possess the soil, contribute their labor ; so that it may be truly said that all human subsistence is derived either from labor on one’s own land, or from some laborious industry which is paid for either in the produce of the land itself or in that which is exchanged for what the land brings forth.

Here, again, we have another proof that private ownership is according to nature's law. For that which is required for the preservation of life, and for life’s well-being, is produced in great abundance by the earth, but not until man has brought it into cultivation and lavished upon it his care and skill. Now, when man thus spends the industry of his mind and the strength of his body in procuring the fruits of nature, by that act he makes his own that portion of nature's field which he cultivates—that portion on which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his own personality ; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his own, and should have a right to keep it without molestation.

These arguments are so strong and convincing that it seems surprising that certain obsolete opinions should now be revived in opposition to what is here laid down. We are told that it is right for private persons to have the use the soil and the fruits of their land, but that it is unjust for any one to possess as owner either the land on which he has built or the estate which he has cultivated. But those who assert this do not perceive that they are robbing man of what his own labor has produced. For the soil which is tilled and cultivated with toil and skill utterly changes its condition; it was wild before, it is now fruitful, it was barren, and now it brings forth in abundance. That which has thus altered and improved it becomes so truly part of itself as to be in great measure indistinguishable and inseparable from it. Is it just that the fruit of a man’s sweat and labor should be enjoyed by another? As effects follow their cause, so it is just and right that the results of labor should belong to him who has labored.

With reason, therefore, the common opinion of mankind, little affected by the few dissentients who have maintained the opposite view, has found in the study of nature, and in the law of Nature herself, the foundations of the division of property, and has consecrated by the practice of all ages the principle of private ownership, as being preëminently in conformity with human nature, and as conducing, in the most unmistakable manner, to the peace and tranquillity of human life. The same principle is confirmed and enforced by the civil laws,—laws which, as long as they are just, derive their binding force from the law of nature. The authority of the Divine Law adds its sanction, forbidding us, in the gravest terms, even to covet that which is another’s: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife ; nor his house, nor his field, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything which is his.^*

^* Deuteronomy v. 21.

The rights here spoken of, belonging to each individual man, are seen in a much stronger light if they are considered in relation to man’s social and domestic obligations.

In choosing a state of life, it is indisputable that all are at full liberty either to follow the counsel of Jesus Christ as to virginity, or to enter into the bonds of marriage. No human law can abolish the natural and primitive right of marriage, or in any way limit the chief and principal purpose of marriage, ordained by God's authority from the beginning. Increase and multiply.^† Thus we have the Family; the “society” of a man’s own household; a society limited, indeed, in numbers, but a true “ society,” anterior to every kind of State or nation, with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the commonwealth.

^† Genesis i. 28.

That right of property, therefore, which has been proved to belong naturally to individual persons, must also belong to a man in his capacity of head of a family; nay, such a person must possess this right so much the more clearly in proportion as his position multiplies his duties. For it is a most sacred law of nature that a father must provide food and all necessaries for those whom he has begotten; and, similarly, nature dictates that a man’s children, who carry on, as it were, and continue his own personality, should be provided by him with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now, in no other way can a father effect this except by the ownership of profitable property, which he can transmit to his children by inheritance. A family, no less than a State, is, as We have said, a true society, governed by a power within itself, that is to say, by the father. Wherefore, provided the limits be not transgressed which are prescribed by the very purposes for which it exists, the Family has, at least, equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of those things which are needful to its preservation and its just liberty.

We say, at least, equal rights; for since the domestic household is anterior both in idea and in fact to the gathering of men into a commonwealth, the former must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more immediately on nature. If the citizens of a State—that is to say, the Families—on entering into association and fellowship, experienced at the hands of the State hindrance instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of being protected, such association were rather to be repudiated than sought after.

The idea, then, that the civil government should, at its own discretion, penetrate and pervade the family and the household, is a great and pernicious mistake. True, if a family finds itself in great difficulty, utterly friendless, and without prospect of help, it is right that extreme necessity be met by public aid; for each family is a part of the commonwealth. In like manner, if within the walls of the household there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights, the public power must interfere to force each party to give the other what is due; for this is not to rob citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and strengthen them. But the rulers of the State must go no further: nature bids them stop here. Paternal authority can neither be abolished by the State, nor absorbed; for it has the same source as human life itself. “The child belongs to the father,” and is, as it were, the continuation of the father’s personality; and, to speak with strictness, the child takes its place in civil society not in its own right, but in its quality as a member of the family in which it is begotten. And it is for the very reason that “the child belongs to the father,” that, as St. Thomas of Aquin says, “ before it attains the use of free will, it is in the power and care of its parents.”^* The Socialists, therefore, in setting aside the parent and introducing the providence of the State, act against natural justice, and threaten the very existence of family life.

^* St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2æ Q. x. Art. 12.

And such interference is not only unjust, but is quite certain to harass and disturb all classes of citizens, and to subject them to odious and intolerable slavery. It would open the door to envy, to evil-speaking, and to quarrelling ; the sources of wealth would themselves run dry, for no one would have any interest in exerting his talents or his industry; and that ideal equality of which so much is said would, in reality, be the levelling down of all to the same condition of misery and dishonor.

Thus it is clear that the main tenet of Socialism, the community of goods, must be utterly rejected; for it would injure those whom it is intended to benefit, it would be contrary to the natural rights of mankind, and it would introduce confusion and disorder into the commonwealth. Our first and most fundamental principle, therefore, when we undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses, must be the inviolability of private property. This laid down, We go on to show where we must find the remedy that we seek.

We approach the subject with confidence, and in the exercise of the rights which belong to Us. For no practical solution of this question will ever be found without the assistance of Religion and of the Church. It is We who are the chief guardian of Religion, and the chief dispenser of what belongs to the Church, and We must not by silence neglect the duty which lies upon Us. Doubtless this most serious question demands the attention and the efforts of others besides Ourselves—of the rulers of States, of employers of labor, of the wealthy, and of the working population themselves for whom We plead. But We affirm without hesitation, that all the striving of men will be vain if they leave out the Church. It is the Church that proclaims from the Gospel those teachings by which the conflict can be put an end to, or at the least made far less bitter; the Church uses its efforts not only to enlighten the mind, but to direct by its precepts the life and conduct of men; the Church improves and ameliorates the condition of the working man by numerous useful organizations; does its best to enlist the services of all ranks in discussing and endeavoring to meet, in the most practical way, the claims of the working classes; and acts on the decided view that for these purposes recourse should be had, in due measure and degree, to the help of the law and of State authority.

Let it be laid down, in the first place, that humanity must remain as it is. It is impossible to reduce human society to a level. The Socialists may do their utmost, but all striving against nature is vain. There naturally exist among mankind innumerable differences of the most important kind; people differ in capability, in diligence, in health, and in strength; an unequal fortune is a necessary result of inequality in condition. Such inequality is far from being disadvantageous either to individuals or to the community; social and public life can only go on by the help of various kinds of capacity and the playing of many parts; and each man, as a rule, chooses the part which peculiarly suits his case. As regards bodily labor, even had man never fallen from the state of innocence, he would not have been wholly unoccupied ; but that which would then have been his free choice and his delight, became afterwards compulsory, and the painful expiation of his sin. Cursed be the earth in thy work; in thy labor thou shalt eat of it all the days of thy life.^* In like manner, the other pains and hardships of life will have no end or cessation on this earth; for the consequences of sin are bitter and hard to bear, and they must be with man as long as life lasts. To suffer and to endure, therefore, is the lot of humanity; let men try as they may, no strength and no artifice will ever succeed in banishing from human life the ills and troubles which beset it. If any there are who pretend differently—who hold out to a hardpressed people freedom from pain and trouble, undisturbed repose, and constant enjoyment—they cheat the people and impose upon them, and their lying promises will only make the evil worse than before. There is nothing more useful than to look at the world as it really is—and at the same time to look elsewhere for a remedy to its troubles.

^* Genesis iii. 17.

The great mistake that is made in the matter now under consideration, is to possess oneself of the idea that class is naturally hostile to class; that rich and poor are intended by nature to live at war with one another. So irrational and so false is this view, that the exact contrary is the truth. Just as the symmetry of the human body is the result of the disposition of the members of the body, so in a State it is ordained by nature that these two classes should exist in harmony and agreement, and should, as it were, fit into one another, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the body politic. Each requires the other; capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital. Mutual agreement results in pleasantness and good order; perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and outrage. Now, in preventing such strife as this, and in making it impossible, the efficacy of Christianity is marvellous and manifold. First of all, there is nothing more powerful than Religion (of which the Church is the interpreter and guardian) in drawing rich and poor together, by reminding each class of its duties to the other, and especially of the duties of justice. Thus Religion teaches the laboring man and the workman to carry out honestly and well all equitable agreements freely made; never to injure capital, or to outrage the person of an employer; never to employ violence in representing his own cause, or to engage in riot or disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises, and raise foolish hopes which usually end in disaster and in repentance when too late. Religion teaches the rich man and the employer that their work-people are not their slaves; that they must respect in every man his dignity as a man and as a Christian; that labor is nothing to be ashamed of, if we listen to right reason, and to Christian philosophy, but is an honorable employment, enabling a man to sustain his life in an upright and creditable way ; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical power. Thus, again, Religion teaches that, as among the workman’s concerns are Religion herself and things spiritual and mental, the employer is bound to see that he has time for the duties of piety; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions; and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family or to squander his wages. Then, again, the employer must never tax his work-people beyond their strength, nor employ them in work unsuited to their sex or age. His great and principal obligation is to give to every one that which is just. Doubtless before we can decide whether wages are adequate, many things have to be considered; but rich men and masters should remember this—that to exercise pressure for the sake of gain, upon the indigent and the destitute, and to make one’s profit out of the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine. To defraud any one of wages that are his due is a crime which cries to the avenging anger of heaven. Behold the hire of the laborers . . . which by fraud hath been kept back by you, crieth; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.^* Finally, the rich must religiously refrain from cutting down the workman’s earnings, either by force, by fraud, or by usurious dealing ; and with the more reason because the poor man is weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should be sacred in proportion to their scantiness.

^* St. James v. 4.

Were these precepts carefully obeyed and followed, would not strife die out and cease ?

But the Church, with Jesus Christ for its Master and Guide, aims higher still. It lays down precepts yet more perfect, and tries to bind class to class in friendliness and good understanding. The things of this earth cannot be understood or valued rightly without taking into consideration the life to come, the life that will last forever. Exclude the idea of futurity, and the very notion of what is good and right would perish; nay, the whole system of the universe would become a dark and unfathomable mystery. The great truth which we learn from Nature herself is also the grand Christian dogma on which Religion rests as on its base—that when we have done with this present life, then we shall really begin to live. God has not created us for the perishable and transitory things of earth, but for things heavenly and everlasting; He has given us this world as a place of exile, and not as our true country. Money, and the other things which men call good and desirable—we may have them in abundance, or we may want them altogether ; as far as eternal happiness is concerned, it is no matter; the only thing that is important is to use them aright. Jesus Christ, when He redeemed us with plentiful redemption, took not away the pains and sorrows which in such large proportion make up the texture of our mortal life; He transformed them into motives of virtue and occasions of merit: and no man can hope for eternal reward unless he follow in the blood-stained footprints of his Saviour. If we suffer with Him, we shall also reign with Him.^* His labors and His sufferings, accepted by His own free will, have marvellously sweetened all suffering and all labor. And not only by His example, but by His grace and by the hope of everlasting recompense, He has made pain and grief more easy to endure ; for that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory.^†

^* II. Timothy ii. 12.

^† II. Corinthians iv. 17.

Therefore those whom fortune favors are warned that freedom from sorrow, and abundance of earthly riches, are no guarantee of the beatitude that shall never end, but rather the contrary ;^* that the rich should tremble at the threatenings of Jesus Christ—threatenings so strange in the mouth of Our Lord ;^† and that a most strict account must be given to the Supreme Judge for all that we possess. The chiefest and most excellent rule for the right use of money is one which the heathen philosophers indicated, but which the Church has traced out clearly, and has not only made known to men’s minds but has impressed upon their lives. It rests on the principle that it is one thing to have a right to the possession of money, and another to have a right to use money as one pleases. Private ownership, as we have seen, is the natural right of man; and to exercise that right, especially as members of society, is not only lawful, but absolutely necessary. It is lawful, says St. Thomas of Aquin, for a man to hold private property ; and it is also necessary for the carrying on of human life.^‡ But if the question be asked, How must one’s possessions be used? the Church replies without hesitation in the words of the same holy Doctor: Man should not consider his outward possessions as his own, but as common to all, so as to share them without difficulty when others are in need. Whence the Apostle saith, Command the rich of this world... to give with ease, to communicate.§ True, no one is commanded to distribute to others that which is required for his own necessities and those of his household; nor even to give away what is reasonably required to keep up becomingly his condition in life; for no one ought to live unbecomingly.|| But when necessity has been supplied, and one’s position fairly considered, it is a duty to give to the indigent out of that which is over. That which remaineth, give alms.¶ It is a duty, not of justice (except in extreme cases), but of Christian charity —a duty which is not enforced by human law. But the laws and judgments of men must give place to the laws and judgments of Christ the true God, Who in many ways urges on His followers the practice of almsgiving—It is more blessed to give than to receive ;^* and Who will count a kindness done or refused to the poor as done or refused to Himself—as long as you did it to one of My least brethren, you did it to Me.^† Thus to sum up what has been said: Whoever has received from the Divine bounty a large share of blessings, whether they be external and corporeal or gifts of the mind, has received them for the purpose of using them for the perfecting of his own nature, and, at the same time, that he may employ them, as the minister of God’s providence, for the benefit of others. He that hath a talent, says St. Gregory the Great, let him see that he hide it not; he that hath abundance, let him arouse himself to mercy and generosity; he that hath art and skill, let him do his best to share the use and the utility thereof with his neighbor.^‡

^* St. Matthew xix. 23, 24.

^† St. Luke vi. 24, 25.

^‡ 2a 2æ Q. lxvi. Art. 2. § Ibid. Q. lxv. Art. 2. || Ibid. Q. xxxii. Art. 6. ¶ St. Luke xi. 41.

^* Acts xx. 35.

^† St. Matthew xxv. 40.

^‡ St. Gregory the Great. Hom. ix. in Evangel. n. 7.

§ II. Corinthians viii. 9. || St. Mark vi. 3.

¶ St. Matthew v. 3: “Blessed are the poor in spirit.” ** Ibid. xi. 28. “Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you.”

As for those who do not possess the gifts of fortune, they are taught by the Church that in God's sight poverty is no disgrace, and that there is nothing to be ashamed of in seeking one’s bread by labor. This is strengthened by what we see in Christ Himself, Who whereas He was rich, for our sakes became poor ;§ and Who, being the Son of God, and God Himself, chose to seem and to be considered the son of a carpenter—nay, did not disdain to spend a great part of His life as a carpenter Himself. Is not this the carpenter, the Son of Mary?|| From the contemplation of this Divine example it is easy to understand that the true dignity and excellence of man lies in his moral qualities, that is, in virtue; that virtue is the common inheritance of all, equally within the reach of high and low, rich and poor; and that virtue, and virtue alone, wherever found, will be followed by the rewards of everlasting happiness. Nay, God Himself seems to incline more to those who suffer evil; for Jesus Christ calls the poor blessed;¶ He lovingly invites those in labor and grief to come to Him for solace;** and He displays the tenderest charity to the lowly and the oppressed. These reflections cannot fail to keep down the pride of those who are well off, and to cheer the spirit of the afflicted ; to incline the former to generosity and the latter to tranquil resignation. Thus the separation which pride would make tends to disappear, nor will it be difficult to make rich and poor join hands in friendly concord.

But if Christian precepts prevail, the two classes will not only be united in the bonds of friendship, but also in those of brotherly love. For they will understand and feel that all men are the children of the common Father, that is, of God; that all have the same last end, which is God Himself, Who alone can make either men or angels absolutely and perfectly happy; that all and each are redeemed by Jesus Christ and raised to the dignity of children of God, and are thus united in brotherly ties both with each other and with Jesus Christ, the first-born among many brethren; that the blessings of nature and the gifts of grace belong in common to the whole human race, and that to all, except to those who are unworthy, is promised the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven. If sons, heirs also, heirs indeed of God, and co-heirs of Christ.^*

^* Romans viii. 17.

Such is the scheme of duties and of rights which is put forth to the world by the Gospel. Would it not seem that strife must quickly cease were society penetrated with ideas like these ?

But the Church, not content with pointing out the remedy, also applies it. For the Church does its utmost to teach and to train men, and to educate them; and by means of its Bishops and clergy it diffuses its salutary teachings far and wide. It strives to influence the mind and heart so that all may willingly yield themselves to be formed and guided by the commandments of God. It is precisely in this fundamental and principal matter, on which everything depends, that the Church has a power peculiar to itself. The agencies which it employs are given it for the very purpose of reaching the hearts of men, by Jesus Christ Himself, and derive their efficiency from God. They alone can touch the innermost heart and conscience, and bring men to act from a motive of duty, to resist their passions and appetites, to love God and their fellow-men with a love that is unique and supreme, and courageously to break down every barrier which stands in the way of a virtuous life.

On this subject We need only recall, for one moment, the examples written down in history. Of these things there cannot be the shadow of doubt; for instance, that civil society was renovated in every part by the teachings of Christianity ; that in the strength of that renewal the human race was lifted up to better things,—nay, that it was brought back from death to life, and to so excellent a life that nothing more perfect had been known before, or will come to pass in the ages that have yet to be. Of this beneficent transformation, Jesus Christ was at once the first cause and the final purpose; as from Him all came, so to Him all was to be referred. For when, by the light of the Gospel message, the human race came to know the grand mystery of the Incarnation of the Word and the redemption of man, the life of Jesus Christ, God and Man, penetrated every race and nation, and impregnated them with His faith, His precepts, and His laws. And if Society is to be cured now, in no other way can it be cured but by a return to the Christian life and Christian institutions. When a Society is perishing, the true advice to give to those who would restore it is to recall it to the principles from which it sprung; for the purpose and perfection of an association is to aim at and to attain that for which it was formed; and its operation should be put in motion and inspired by the end and object which originally gave it its being. So that to fall away from its primal constitution is disease; to go back to it is recovery. And this may be asserted with the utmost truth both of the State in general and of that body of its citizens—by far the greater number— who sustain life by labor.

Neither must it be supposed that the solicitude of the Church is so occupied with the spiritual concerns of its children as to neglect their interests temporal and earthly. Its desire is that the poor, for example, should rise above poverty and wretchedness, and should better their condition in life; and for this it strives. By the very fact that it calls men to virtue and forms them to its practice, it promotes this in no slight degree. Christian morality, when it is adequately and completely practised, conduces of itself to temporal prosperity, for it merits the blessing of that God Who is the source of all blessings; it powerfully restrains the lust of possession and the lust of pleasure—twin plagues, which too often make a man without self-restraint miserable in the midst of abundance ;^* it makes men supply by economy for the want of means, teaching them to be content with frugal living, and keeping them out of the reach of those vices which eat up not merely small incomes, but large fortunes, and dissipate many a goodly inheritance.

^* “The root of all evils is cupidity.”—I. Tim. vi. 10.

Moreover, the Church intervenes directly in the interest of the poor, by setting on foot and keeping up many things which it sees to be efficacious in the relief of poverty. Here, again, it has always succeeded so well that it has even extorted the praise of its enemies. Such was the ardor of brotherly love among the earliest Christians that numbers of those who were better off deprived themselves of their possessions in order to relieve their brethren; whence neither was there any one needy among them.^† To the order of Deacons, instituted for that very purpose, was committed by the Apostles the charge of the daily distributions; and the Apostle Paul, though burdened with the solicitude of all the churches, hesitated not to undertake laborious journeys in order to carry the alms of the Faithful to the poorer Christians. Tertullian calls these contributions, given voluntarily by Christians in their assemblies, deposits of piety ; because, to cite his words, they were employed in feeding the needy, in burying them, in the support of boys and girls destitute of means and deprived of their parents, in the care of the aged, and in relief of the shipwrecked.^‡

^† Acts iv. 34.

^‡ Apologia Secunda, xxxix.

Thus by degrees came into existence the patrimony which the Church has guarded with religious care as the inheritance of the poor. Nay, to spare them the shame of begging, the common Mother of rich and poor has exerted herself to gather together funds for the support of the needy. The Church has stirred up everywhere the heroism of charity, and has established Congregations of Religious and many other useful institutions for help and mercy, so that there might be hardly any kind of suffering which was not visited and relieved. At the present day there are many who, like the heathen of old, blame and condemn the Church for this beautiful charity. They would substitute in its place a system of State-organized relief. But no human methods will ever supply for the devotion and self-sacrifice of Christian charity. Charity, as a virtue, belongs to the Church; for it is no virtue unless it is drawn from the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ; and he who turns his back on the Church cannot be near to Christ.

It cannot, however, be doubted that to attain the purpose of which We treat, not only the Church but all human means must conspire. All who are concerned in the matter must be of one mind and must act together. It is in this as in the Providence which governs the world: results do not happen save where all the causes co-operate.

Let us now, therefore, inquire what part the State should play in the work of remedy and relief.

By the State We here understand, not the particular form of government which prevails in this or that nation, but the State, as rightly understood ; that is to say, any government conformable in its institutions to right reason and natural law, and to those dictates of the Divine wisdom which We have expounded in the Encyclical on the Christian Constitution of the State. The first duty, therefore, of the rulers of the State should be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the commonwealth, shall be such as to produce of themselves public well-being and private prosperity. This is the proper office of wise statesmanship and the work of the heads of the State. Now a State chiefly prospers and flourishes by morality, by well-regulated family life, by respect for religion and justice, by the moderation and equal distribution of public burdens, by the progress of the arts and of trade, by the abundant yield of the land—by everything which makes the citizens better and happier. Here, then, it is in the power of a ruler to benefit every order of the State, and amongst the rest to promote in the highest degree the interests of the poor, and this by virtue of his office, and without being exposed to any suspicion of undue interference; for it is the province of the commonwealth to consult for the common good. And the more that is done for the working population by the general laws of the country, the less need will there be to seek for particular means to relieve them.

There is another and a deeper consideration which must not be lost sight of. To the State the interests of all are equal, whether high or low. The poor are members of the national community equally with the rich; they are real component parts, living parts, which make up, through the family, the living body; and it need hardly be said that they are by far the majority. It would be irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens and to favor another; and therefore the public administration must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and the comfort of the working people, or else that law of justice will be violated which ordains that each shall have his due. To cite the wise words of St. Thomas of Aquin: As the part and the whole are in a certain sense identical, the part may in some sense claim what belongs to the whole.** Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice—with that justice which is called in the school distributive—towards each and every class.

But although all citizens, without exception, can and ought to contribute to that common good in which individuals share so profitably to themselves, yet it is not to be supposed that all can contribute in the same way and to the same extent. No matter what changes may be made in forms of government, there will always be differences and inequalities of condition in the State: Society cannot exist or be conceived without them. Some there must be who dedicate themselves to the work of the commonwealth, who

• 2a 2æ Q. lxi. Art. 1 ad 2. make the laws, who administer justice, whose advice and authority govern the nation in times of peace, and defend it in war. Such men clearly occupy the foremost place in the State, and should be held in the foremost estimation, for their work touches most nearly and effectively the general interests of the community. Those who labor at a trade or calling do not promote the general welfare in such a fashion as this; but they do in the most important way benefit the nation, though less directly. We have insisted that, since it is the end of Society to make men better, the chief good that Society can be possessed of is Virtue. Nevertheless, in all well-constituted States it is a by no means unimportant matter to provide those bodily and external commodities the use of which is necessary to virtuous action.^* And in the provision of material well-being, the labor of the poor— the exercise of their skill, and the employment of their strength in the culture of the land and the workshops of trade—is most efficacious and altogether indispensable. Indeed, their co-operation in this respect is so important that it may be truly said that it is only by the labor of the working man that States grow rich. Justice, therefore, demands that the interests of the poorer population be carefully watched over by the Administration, so that they who contribute so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits they create—that being housed, clothed, and enabled to support life, they may find their existence less hard and more endurable. It follows that whatever shall appear to be conducive to the well-being of those who work should receive favorable consideration. Let it not be feared that solicitude of this kind will injure any interest; on the contrary, it will be to the advantage of all; for it cannot but be good for the commonwealth to secure from misery those on whom it so largely depends. We have said that the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed free and untrammelled action as far as is consistent with the common good and the interests of others. Nevertheless, rulers should anxiously safeguard the community and all its parts; the community, because the conservation of the community is so emphatically the business of the supreme power, that the safety of the commonwealth is not only the first law, but it is a Government’s whole reason of existence; and the parts, because both philosophy and the Gospel agree in laying down that the object of the administration of the State should be, not the advantage of the ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he rules. The gift of authority is from God, and is, as it were, a participation of the highest of all sovereignties; and it should be exercised as the power of God is exercised— with a fatherly solicitude which not only guides the whole, but reaches to details as well.

^* St. Thomas of Aquin. De Regimine Principum, I. cap. 15.