Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
What is ownership, and of how many kinds? What are usufruct and use?
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Since right taken in the second way, for the faculty of doing something, acquiring, etc., is the foundation of right or of the just, which is the object of justice, many necessary points concerning it occur to be examined, especially concerning dominion, which is its principal species.
Cum ius secundo modo sumptum, pro facultate aliquid faciendi, acquirendi, etc., sit fundamentum iuris seu iusti, quod est obiectum iustitiae, multa de illo seitu necessaria occurrunt discutienda, maxime de dominio, quod est praecipua eius species.
Dominion is twofold: one of jurisdiction, which is the power of governing one's subjects; the other of property, which is the faculty of disposing of some thing as one's own for one's own advantage, and it is chiefly of this that we treat here.
Duplex est dominium: unum iurisdictionis, quod est potestas gubernandi suos subditos; alterum proprietatis, quod est facultas disponendi de aliqua re ut sua in proprium commodum, et de illo hic potissimum agitur.
Dominion of property again is twofold: one full and perfect, the other not full and imperfect.
Dominium proprietatis iterum est duplex: unum plenum et perfectum, aliud non plenum et imperfectum.
Full dominion is the right to the property of a thing and its emoluments. Not full is the right to the property of a thing without the emoluments, and it is called direct dominion, such, e. g., as belongs to the prince with respect to a fief; or the right to the emoluments without the property, and it is called useful dominion, and such belongs to usufructuaries, feudatories, emphyteutae, etc.
Dominium plenum est ius ad rei proprietatem et eius emolumenta. Non plenum est ius ad proprietatem rei absque emolumentis, et dicitur dominium directum, quale, v. g., competit principi respectu feudi; vel ius ad emolumenta absque proprietate, et dicitur dominium utile, et tale competit usufructuariis, feudatariis, emphiteutis, etc.
I say first: Full and perfect dominion of property, as it embraces direct and useful dominion, is rightly defined: "A right in a thing, or the legitimate faculty of disposing of a thing as one's own, for any use not prohibited by law, for one's own advantage." It is gathered from D. Thomas, here q. 66, a. 1, c.
Dico 1° : Dominium proprietatis plenum et perfectum, prout directum et utile complectitur, recte definitur: « Ius in re, seu facultas legitima disponendi de re, tamquam sua, ad quemlibet usum lege non prohibitum, in proprium commodum. » Colligitur ex D. Thoma, hic q. 66, a. 1, c.
It is said, "for any use not prohibited by law;" because, although dominion by its nature bestows power for any use whatever, this power can nevertheless be impeded by law so that it does not pass into act: as happens with a minor, who before the legitimate age cannot alienate his goods, although he is their true owner; hence, if he were to alienate them, he would not sin against justice.
Dicitur, « ad quemlibet usum lege non prohibitum; » quia, licet dominium ex natura sua tribuat potestatem ad qualemcumque usum, potest tamen haec potestas impediri per legem ne exeat in actum: ut fit in pupillo, qui ante legitimam aetatem non potest bona sua alienare, licet sit verus illorum dominus; unde, si alienaret, non peccaret contra iustitiam.
But the same conditions are required for perfect dominion that are required for right in a thing, namely: the existence of the thing, a legitimate title, and delivery of the thing.
Eaedem autem conditiones requiruntur ad perfectum dominium, quae requiruntur ad ius in re, scilicet: existentia rei, legitimus titulus et traditio rei.
I say secondly: Usufruct is defined: "The right of using and enjoying the things of another, saving their substance." So in the law.
Dico 2°: Ususfructus definitur: « Ius utendi fruendique rebus alienis, salva earum substantia. » Ita in iure.
It is said, "of enjoying," that it may be distinguished from simple use.
Dicitur, « fruendi, » ut distinguatur a simplici usu.
For he who has simple use can only use the thing, e. g., a horse, a house, a garden, a field, a wood, etc., for his own daily necessity, so that he can neither let, sell, nor gratuitously cede to another either the superfluous fruits or the right he has; whereas he who has usufruct can do all these things, so L. 12, ff. de Usu.
Qui enim habet simplicem usum, potest tantum uti re, v. g., equo, domo, horto, agro, silva, etc., ad necessitatem propriam et quotidianam, ita ut nec superfluos fructus nec ius quod habet possit alteri locare, vendere, aut gratis cedere; cum is qui usumfructum habet, possit haec omnia facere, ita L. 12, ff. de Usu.
But fruits are reckoned not only in immovables, as hay, crops, shoots, timber trees, bois taillis in an estate (for fruit-bearing trees are not reckoned fruits), but also in movables, as wool, milk, offspring, etc., in a flock. Where note that timber wood, even if cut out of season, is in fruit, just as an olive picked unripe, likewise hay cut unripe. L. 48, ff. de Usufructu. As to harvest and vintage, however, the usufructuary must wait for ripeness.
Fructus autem reputantur non solum in immobilibus, ut in fundo foenum, segetes, virgulta, arbores caeduae, bois taillis (fructiferae enim non reputantur fructus), sed etiam in mobilibus, ut in grege lana, lac, foetus, etc. Ubi nota, silvam caeduam, etiamsi intempestive caesa sit, esse in fructu, sicut olea immatura lecta, item foenum immaturum caesum. L. 48, ff. de Usufructu. Quoad messem vero et vindemiam, expectanda est maturitas usufructuario.
Note further that, if the usufructuary die before he has gathered the fruits, even if ripe, these are acquired by the owner of the property, and not by the heirs of the usufructuary. So in Instit. de Rerum divisione, § Is vero. The reason is, because as long as they adhere to the estate they are held to be one with it. Hence they belong to the owner of the estate until the usufructuary by gathering them has made them his own.
Nota insuper quod, si usufructuarius moriatur antequam collegerit fructus, etiamsi maturos, hi acquirantur domino proprietatis, et non haeredibus fructuarii. Ita in Instit. de Rerum divisione, § Is vero. Ratio est, quia quamdiu adhaerent fundo, censentur unum cum ipso. Unde pertinent ad dominum fundi, donec fructuarius eos colligendo fecerit suos.
It is said, "the things of another;" because usufruct is a servitude, which can be constituted only over the things of another. "For no one's own thing serves him, but profits him by right of dominion," as is said in L. 26, ff. de servitute praedior. rustic.
Dicitur, « rebus alienis; » quia ususfructus est servitus, qua nonnisi in rebus alienis constitui potest. « Nemini enim res sua servit, sed prodest iure dominii, » ut dicitur L. 26, ff. de servitute praedior. rustic.
It is said, "saving their substance;" because the usufructuary must reserve the thing intact for the proprietor. Hence usufruct cannot properly be constituted over things that are consumed by a single use, as wine, oil, etc.
Dicitur, « salva rerum substantia; » quia usufructuarius debet rem integram proprietario reservare. Unde ususfructus non potest proprie constitui in rebus quae unico usu consumuntur, ut in vino, oleo, etc.
I say thirdly: Use is defined by the jurists: "The right of only using the things of another, saving their substance."
Dico 3° : Usus definitur a iuristis: « Ius utendi tantum rebus alienis, salva earum substantia. »
It is said the right of only using, and not of enjoying; because, as I have already said, the simple user can only take the fruits of a thing, as vegetables, apples, hay, for his own daily necessity, but he cannot sell or give them away, nor let the thing itself; which the usufructuary can do.
Dicitur ius utendi tantum, et non fruendi; quia, ut iam dixi, simplex usuarius potest tantum fructus rei, ut olera, poma, foenum, in propriam et quotidianam necessitatem percipere, sed eos non potest vendere seu donare, nec rem ipsam locare; quod potest usufructuarius.
It is said, "saving their substance," because in use, as in usufruct, the thing must be preserved intact for the owner.
Dicitur, « salva rerum substantia, » quia in usu, sicut in usufructu, debet res integra conservari domino.
From this you have that this definition of use does not belong to things consumable by a single act, as wine, oil, bread, etc.; because by such use the substance of the thing does not remain safe. Hence, if use be taken more generally, as it befits both things consumable by a single act and non-consumable things, it is "the right of using a thing of another."
Ex quo habes hanc usus definitionem non competere rebus unico actu consumptibilibus, ut vino, oleo, pani, etc.; quia per talem usum non manet salva rei substantia. Unde, si generalius sumatur usus, prout convenit rebus tam unico actu consumptibilibus, quam non consumptibilibus, est « ius utendi re aliena. »
Concerning this use of things consumable by a single act there was once great controversy, not only among theologians, but also among Pontiffs: whether it should be distinguished from dominion? For whose resolution let there be
Circa hunc usum rerum unico actu consumptibilium magna fuit olim concertatio, non solum inter theologos, sed etiam inter Pontifices: utrum distingueretur a dominio? Pro cuius resolutione sit