Morals of the Church
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Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology

Article Third. On the Subject of Ownership

367.

367. On the subject itself. By the subject of ownership is understood the person to whom ownership belongs. A twofold person is distinguished who is capable of ownership: a physical person and a moral person.

  1. From the law of nature the subject of ownership is every living man, even an infant not yet born and a man perpetually insane.1

a. The foundation of ownership is rational nature: for through reason man has the power of disposing concerning his own things. Wherefore even infants and the perpetually insane are capable of acquiring ownership and habitually retaining it, but not of exercising ownership; for rational nature without any act of will suffices for acquiring and habitually retaining ownership, but the use of reason is required for the exercise of ownership.

b. After death man does not retain ownership of goods of fortune, although he retains ownership of reputation: for since goods of fortune have been granted by the author of nature to man for sustaining temporal life, the right in goods of fortune is extinguished by death itself.

c. Although every man using reason is capable, by the law of nature, of ownership and its exercise, nevertheless by positive law this capacity is restricted in various ways on account of the common good. These matters must be treated below.

  1. Moral persons or societies are also capable of ownership. Any society which has been instituted for an honest end is, by the law of nature, capable of acquiring ownership of temporal things. But by civil law this right is recognized only in those which are constituted by it as juridical persons, namely persons capable of acquiring rights.

a. With respect to ecclesiastical societies, juridical persons are first the universal Church, which by natural and divine right is capable of ownership of temporal goods; then within the ambit of the Church: lesser societies, namely dioceses, parishes, church fabric funds, religious societies, seminaries, hospitals, pious institutes, etc.

b. With respect to profane societies, juridical persons are first the state itself or republic, which, since it is a perfect and independent society, has ownership of its goods by its nature; then within the ambit of the state: provinces, municipalities, colleges, universities, and several other lesser societies which are endowed with the privilege of juridical personality and thence are called privileged societies.

1 Gal. 4:1. Cf. C. A., Section 22; C. G., Section 1, 1923.

Ownership Generally