Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
On the subject and object of ownership in general
: To every and only intellectual nature, namely God, angel, and man, dominion belongs 242 ; because to every and only intellectual nature belongs the foundation of dominion, namely intellect and will, by which it has the power of disposing of its own acts, and by acts over external things. Hence Genesis, I, 26, God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness, that he may rule over the fishes of the sea and the beasts of the earth: where he attributes to man dominion over beasts and fishes because he is the image of God. Now he is the image of God through intellect and will. 242 Here q. 66, a. 1.
: Omni et soli naturae intellectuali, nempe Deo, angelo et homini competit dominium 242 ; quia omni et soli naturae intellectuali competit fundamentum dominii, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, per quae habet potestatem disponendi de suis actibus, et per actus de rebus externis. Unde Genes., I, 26, dixit Deus : Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, ut praesit piscibus maris et bestiis terrae : ubi tribuit homini dominium in bestias et pisces, eo quod sit imago Dei. Est autem imago Dei per intellectum et voluntatem. 242 Hic q. 66, a. 1.
I say secondly: All sublunary things can fall under the dominion of man, inasmuch as he can acquire them for himself and dispose of what is acquired at his nod; but of those things of which he has legitimate title he is de facto lord.
Dico 2° : Omnes res sublunares cadere possunt sub dominio hominis, in quantum potest eas sibi comparare et de comparatis pro nutu disponere; earum vero de facto est dominus quas legitimo titulo possidet.
He is also absolutely lord of operations freely exercised through intellect and will, through the external senses and through the locomotive power 243 ; because such are subject to his free choice. Not so perfectly is he lord of actions naturally exercised through the interior senses and the sensitive appetite; because these sometimes depend on the disposition of a bodily organ, which is not in man's power. But of the actions of the vegetative faculty he is in no way lord, because they are in no wise subject to the command of reason. 243 Iª 2ae, q. 17, a. 5-9.
Est etiam absolute dominus operationum quae libere exercentur per intellectum et voluntatem, per sensus exteriores et per potentiam locomotivam 243 ; quia eiusmodi subduntur libero eius arbitrio. Non ita perfecte est dominus actionum quae naturaliter exercentur per sensus interiores et appetitum sensitivum; quia hae quandoque pendent ex dispositione organi corporalis, quod non est in potestate hominis. Actionum vero facultatis vegetativae nullo modo est dominus, quia nullatenus subduntur imperio rationis. 243 Iª 2ae, q. 17, a. 5-9.
I say thirdly: Man is not absolutely and directly lord of his own life and members, but only custodian and user 244 ; God alone is Lord. So doctors everywhere. 244 Here q. 64, a. 5, ad 3.
Dico 3° : Homo non est absolute et directe dominus vitae suae et membrorum, sed custos tantum et usuarius 244 ; solus vero Deus est Dominus. Ita passim doctores. 244 Hic q. 64, a. 5, ad 3.
It is proved. First from Scripture. Deut., XXXII, 39, God says: See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me. I will kill, and I will make to live. And Wisdom, XVI, 13: Thou, Lord, hast power of life and death; that is, thou alone.
Prob. 1° ex Scriptura. Deut., XXXII, 39, dicit Deus : Videte quod ego sim solus, et non sit alius Deus praeter me. Ego occidam, et ego vivere faciam. Et Sap., XVI, 13 : Tu es, Domine, qui vitae et mortis habes potestatem ; id est, solus.
Proof by reason. First. Life and body are presupposed to dominion as its foundations. Therefore they are not subject to dominion. — If you say that liberty also is a foundation of dominion, and yet man is its lord, seeing that he can sell it into servitude; I answer that what is sold into servitude is not liberty itself or the power of free choice, which is the foundation of dominion, but only the use; just as man can also sell the use of his own body. — Secondly. By the precept Thou shalt not kill, killing is prohibited, not only of another, but also of oneself, and likewise mutilation. Therefore man cannot dispose at pleasure of life or members, and consequently has no dominion over them. — Thirdly. Dominion is only over those things which we can acquire by our industry; for just as we can acquire them, so we can relinquish them. But we cannot acquire life or members by our own industry. Therefore. — Fourthly. Dominion is only over distinct things. But life and members are not a thing distinct from us. Therefore.
Prob. ratione. 1° Vita et corpus presupponuntur ad dominium tamquam eius fundamenta. Ergo non subiacent dominio. — Si dicas, libertatem etiam esse fundamentum dominii, et tamen hominem esse eius dominum, siquidem possit illam vendere per servitutem; resp., per servitutem non vendi ipsam libertatem seu potentiam liberi arbitrii, quae est fundamentum dominii, sed tantum usum ; sicut etiam potest homo vendere usum sui corporis. — 2° Precepto : Non occides, prohibetur occisio, non solum alterius, sed etiam sui ipsius et mutilatio. Ergo homo non potest pro libitu disponere de vita aut membris, et consequenter non habet in ea dominium. — 3° Dominium non est nisi in eas res quas nostra industria possumus acquirere; has enim sicut possumus acquirere, ita et relinquere. Atqui vitam aut membra non possumus propria industria acquirere. Ergo. — 4° Dominium non est nisi in res distinctas. Atqui vita et membra non sunt quid distinctum a nobis. Ergo.
I say thirdly: Neither princes nor the commonwealth have direct dominion over the life and members of citizens, as if they could kill or mutilate citizens at pleasure, but only indirect, inasmuch as the life of certain men is harmful to the public good.
Dico 3° : Nec principes, nec respublica habent dominium directum in vitam et membra civium, quasi pro libitu cives possint occidere aut mutilare, sed indirectum tantum, in quantum quorumdam vita est bono publico noxia.
It is evident both from the praised precept: Thou shalt not kill; and because every private person stands to the commonwealth as a member to the body; no one however is lord of his own members, as was said. Therefore.
Patet, tum ex praecepto laudato : Non occides ; tum quia quisque privatus se habet ad rempublicam sicut membrum ad corpus; nemo autem est dominus membrorum suorum, ut dictum est. Ergo.
I say fourthly: Man is lord of his own reputation and honor 245 . It is common against Cajetan, q. 73, a. 2. This dominion however is at times bound up. 245 Here q. 73, a. 4, ad 1.
Dico 4° : Homo est dominus propriae famae et honoris 245 . Est communis contra Caietanum, q. 73, a. 2. Istud dominium tamen est aliquando ligatum. 245 Hic q. 73, a. 4, ad 1.
Proof of the first part. Man acquires reputation by his own labor, or at least the right to it; having once acquired it, by the faculty of choice he governs it, preserves it, or loses it without wrong to anyone, as Augustine did by making his falls manifest. Therefore he is its lord. — The corollary is evident; because all these acts are the principal acts of dominion.
Prob. prima pars. Homo proprio labore acquirit famam, aut saltem ius ad illam; semel acquisitam per facultatem arbitrii regit, conservat, aut amittit citra cuiusque iniuriam, ut fecit Augustinus lapsus suos manifestando. Ergo est eius dominus. — Patet consectarium ; quia hi omnes actus sunt praecipui actus dominii.
It is confirmed. If man were not lord of his own reputation, he could not forgive or remit its restitution; for no one can remit what is not his own. Yet this is often done, and laudably done. Therefore.
Confirm. Si homo non esset dominus suae famae, non posset eius restitutionem condonare seu remittere; nemo enim potest remittere quod suum non est. Atqui tamen id saepe fit, et laudabiliter fit. Ergo.
Nor does it stand in the way that man can forgive the mutilation of a member, of which nevertheless he is not lord. For, if the member could be restored as reputation can, he could not forgive its restitution. What therefore he forgives is not the restitution of the member, but satisfaction for the injury inflicted and pecuniary restitution for the damage followed.
Nec obstat quod homo possit condonare mutilationem membri, cuius tamen non est dominus. Nam, si membrum posset restitui sicut fama, non posset eius restitutionem condonare. Quod ergo condonat, non est restitutio membri, sed satisfactio pro iniuria illata et restitutio pecuniaria pro damno secuto.
Proof of the second part. Our reputation is sometimes necessary to our neighbor. Therefore then we cannot dispose of it at will, either neglecting or squandering it.
Prob. secunda pars. Fama nostra est aliquando necessaria proximo. Ergo tunc non possumus de ea disponere ad libitum, eam vel negligendo vel prodigendo.
[But our reputation can be necessary to our neighbor in three ways: first, so that the reputation of our neighbor hangs on our reputation, and from our infamy follows his infamy: as from the infamy of a monk follows the infamy of the community, and from the infamy of a father follows the infamy of his household. Secondly, so that our reputation is necessary to our neighbor for rendering to him an office owed him by strict right: thus the reputation of a prelate or parish priest is necessary that he may well govern his subjects. Thirdly, so that our reputation is necessary to our neighbor in order that an office be rendered him which is owed him only out of charity. Whoever in this last case neglects or squanders his reputation sins only against charity. But whoever in the two prior cases does not care for his reputation probably sins against justice, not precisely because he defames himself, but because he harms his neighbor.
[Fama autem nostra tripliciter potest esse proximo necessaria : 1° Sic ut ex fama nostra pendeat fama proximi, et ex infamia nostra sequatur eius infamia : ut ex infamia monachi sequitur infamia communitatis, et ex infamia patris sequitur infamia eius familiae. 2° Sic ut fama nostra sit necessaria proximo ad praestandum ipsi officium quod stricto iure debetur : ut fama praelati aut parochi est necessaria ut bene regat subditos. 3° Sic ut fama nostra sit necessaria proximo, ut ei praestetur officium ex charitate tantum ei debitum. Qui in hoc ultimo casu famam negligit aut prodigit, peccat tantum contra charitatem. Qui vero in duobus prioribus casibus famam non curat, probabiliter peccat contra iustitiam, non praecise quia seipsum infamat, sed quia proximo nocet.
I say fourthly: Man can fall under the dominion of the property of another man.
Dico 4° : Homo potest cadere sub dominium proprietatis alterius hominis.
It is proved. Servitude is prohibited by no law: first, not by natural law; because, as was said, man has useful dominion of his own body. Therefore he can transfer it to another. Secondly, not by divine law, as is evident from the Old Testament, Exod., XXI, 2 seqq.; Levit., XXV, 39 seqq., and from the New, Philem., 10 seqq.; I Petr., II, 18. Thirdly, not by human law, as is evident from various places of both laws, where many things are discussed about slaves. But servitude was introduced by the law of nations; now however, the new law disposing, servitude is no longer admitted among Christians, few places excepted: whence this question has become almost speculative.]
Prob. Servitus nullo iure prohibetur : 1° Non naturali; quia, ut dictum est, homo habet dominium utile sui corporis. Ergo potest illud in alium transferre. 2° Non divino, ut patet ex veteri Testamento, Exod., XXI, 2 seqq.; Levit., XXV, 39 seqq., et ex novo, ad Philem., 10 seqq.; I Petr., II, 18. 3° Non humano, ut patet ex variis utriusque iuris locis, ubi multa de servis disseruntur. Fuit autem introducta servitus iure gentium; sed nunc, iure novo disponente, nulla amplius admittitur servitus inter christianos, paucis locis exceptis : unde haec quaestio fere speculativa facta est.]