The purpose of amendment

261. Definition and necessity. 1. Purpose is the will of not sinning henceforth. It can be twofold: formal and explicit, which is an act distinct from sorrow, by which the penitent determines not to sin any more; virtual and implicit, which is contained in the act of sorrow.

2. For obtaining remission of sins, whether in the sacrament or outside the sacrament, the purpose of not sinning henceforth is required: for purpose belongs equally with contrition to the disposition which is essentially required for obtaining justification.¹

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

262. Qualities of purpose are the qualities which purpose must have so that absolution may be valid. Purpose must be:

1. Firm, that is, the penitent must be so disposed that in reality he wishes to do what he proposes, namely to avoid sins and rather to suffer any evil or lose any good than to offend God gravely; but firmness of purpose does not demand that the purpose afterward actually obtain its effect. For purpose must be firm affectively or as to the present will, but it is not necessary that it be firm effectively or as to the future event, i.e., the will of the penitent must be such that, if the occasion of sinning were offered now, he would certainly not embrace it but immediately reject it, whatever he may be about to do afterward.

a. Therefore a future fall into the same sin is not of itself contrary to firm purpose: for someone can in the morning seriously wish to abstain from sin and in the evening commit the same sin. If nevertheless the penitent, immediately after confession, falls back into the same sin, he gives suspicion that the purpose was not sufficiently firm: for he who seriously establishes something within himself is not immediately forgetful of his purpose.

b. When penitents sometimes say that they greatly fear, indeed are persuaded that they are going to relapse, it must be noted that there is no doubt about this, namely what they will do afterward; nor is fear, lest they fall again, or persuasion that they think they are going to relapse, or any prevision of future sin of itself contrary to firmness of purpose: for these are acts of the intellect, but purpose is in the will; wherefore a true and firm purpose can stand together with these acts. Therefore, as often as a penitent, on account of his known inconstancy or on account of inveterate habit, judges that he is not going to avoid sin, he is not immediately to be judged as lacking due purpose, but the question must be put to him whether he again wishes to sin; if he denies this, he must be warned to trust in the grace of God, to whom what he cannot furnish by the powers of his nature is not impossible.

2. Universal, which extends itself to all mortal sins to be avoided in the future. For this difference exists between sorrow and purpose: sorrow is universal when it extends itself to all sins committed and not yet remitted; on the contrary, purpose is not universal if it does not extend itself to all and each mortal sins possible, even never committed. Hence purpose must always proceed from a universal motive.

a. Nevertheless it is not necessary, indeed frequently it is not advisable, to conceive a special purpose of avoiding the several sins; but a purpose in general, conceived of not sinning any more mortally, suffices. Nevertheless concerning some matters an explicit and special purpose must be required by the confessor, such as concerning the restitution of another's property, the removal of scandal, remission of an offense, avoidance of a proximate occasion, etc.

b. In sorrow conceived from a universal motive there is implicitly contained also a universal purpose, which extends itself to all sins both committed and not committed, to be avoided in the future, because the same motive has force concerning all and each sin.

3. Efficacious, namely one which truly moves the will to employing the means which are necessary for avoiding sins in the future, especially to fleeing proximate occasions, to repairing harms inflicted, to pardoning injuries, etc.: for he who absolutely wills the end must also be moved toward the necessary means; hence it is a sign of actual affection for sin if someone is unwilling to leave an occasion, to restore, to remit an offense, etc.

263. Whether implicit purpose suffices. Virtual purpose, which is always included in true contrition, suffices for obtaining valid absolution, provided the sorrow in which it is implicitly contained proceeds from a universal motive. But if the motive of sorrow were particular, an explicit purpose would plainly be required.

1. From the common opinion of all, virtual purpose can suffice accidentally, namely when the penitent truly grieves concerning sins committed but, not thinking of future life, proposes nothing explicitly; the disputed question is whether explicit purpose is required of itself, or whether even virtual and implicit purpose suffices, namely when the penitent, although he thinks of future life, nevertheless does not elicit the purpose of amendment formally and explicitly.

2. St. Alphonsus, having proposed three opinions about this question (n. 450), finally resolved that opinion which requires explicit purpose, not to lack its probability, and therefore in practice to be followed. Concerning this resolution of the holy doctor, a sharp controversy arose between Fr. Ballerini¹ and the defenders of St. Alphonsus,² which finally had this effect: that the opinion which many theologians hold, that tacit or implicit purpose is sometimes sufficient, even directly and certainly, can no longer be attacked for any reason. Therefore the true opinion must be held, which teaches that for obtaining remission of sins, implicit purpose, which is contained in contrition, whether perfect or imperfect, suffices. And indeed, explicit purpose is not required from the nature of the thing: for for obtaining justification that disposition which includes the will of not sinning suffices; but in any sorrow conceived from a universal motive there is contained the will of not sinning.

Nor is explicit purpose required by positive precept: for the Council of Trent, which promises that it will give exact doctrine concerning the sacrament of penance,³ in canon 4 enumerates only three acts: contrition, confession, and satisfaction, as dispositions of the penitent required for the essence of the sacrament, but says nothing concerning purpose. The same council, in the same chapter 4, describing the dispositions of the penitent, explicitly indeed mentions purpose, but explicitly mentions also other acts, as trust in the divine mercy and the desire of performing the other things; but from these it does not follow that the council prescribes explicit purpose, just as it does not follow that it requires an explicit act of hope. Therefore the council explicitly mentions purpose so that it may declare that for obtaining remission of sins, that sorrow alone suffices which contains a universal purpose. Although, therefore, the faithful are to be urged that they always elicit purpose expressly and explicitly, nevertheless if they have omitted this, supposing sorrow truly universal, they are not to be disturbed about the validity of the confession.

3. Two things must be noted concerning this matter: a. He who truly grieves concerning past sins is so disposed that, if thought of future life should enter his mind, he would also conceive the explicit purpose of not offending God mortally any more: for no one is judged seriously to grieve concerning an offense against God who with deliberation suspends the expressed act of the purpose of avoiding all grave offenses against God in the future. b. Confessors rightly in practice require explicit purpose from penitents: for they must administer the sacrament certainly only according to the disposition of the penitent; but in those who are guilty of mortal sins, the confessor will scarcely ever be certain concerning the disposition unless the purpose of abstaining from sins in the future is manifested to him.

¹ Gury-Ballerini ad n. 462.

² Vindiciae Alphons., pr. 5, q. 6.

³ Cf. sess. 14, proem.

264. Whether acts of faith and hope are required for obtaining justification in the sacrament. Besides sorrow and purpose, no other acts of the penitent are required for obtaining valid absolution, neither by reason of matter nor by reason of disposition. Therefore, although it is to be recommended that the penitent elicit acts of the theological virtues before confession, nevertheless this is not necessary: for it suffices that the acts (of faith and hope) which the Council of Trent enumerates¹ as dispositions of the sinner are present virtually and implicitly.²

¹ Sess. 6, c. 6.

² Suarez, disp. 4, sect. 2, n. 7; Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 91.

265. On sorrow and confession of venials. 1. On sorrow. a. Sorrow concerning venials must have the same qualities which sorrow concerning mortals has, except only universality, since one venial can be remitted without another.

a. Therefore it must be not only true and supernatural, but also sorrow above all things. For if the penitent were so disposed in soul that he would rather choose venial sin than suffer any temporal evil whatever, he would not be disposed to receiving pardon of that sin. But when the ordinary motives of sorrow concerning venials are suitably considered (because they cause the passion of Christ, the displeasure of God, the punishment of purgatory), the penitent will detest sins above all things, because these evils are surely graver than all earthly evils.

b. Therefore it is licit to grieve and to conceive a purpose of amendment only concerning those venials which are accused, without this also being done concerning those which are omitted in confession.

b. He who confesses venials alone is bound under grave obligation to grieve concerning some of them, or at least concerning one, and to conceive a purpose of amendment. Therefore he who knowingly institutes a confession of venials without due sorrow commits grave sacrilege, because he renders the sacrament invalid.

Nevertheless, for receiving valid and fruitful absolution, sorrow concerning sins, whether mortal or venial, already remitted in past life suffices, even if sorrow is not had concerning the venials committed since the last confession, provided those sins already remitted are declared in confession at least in a general way.

c. He who confesses venials often repeated and grieves concerning the frequency of the sin and proposes to diminish it, but does not grieve concerning the single sins which he still intends to indulge now and then, although not so frequently, is still validly and licitly absolved. The same must be said of him who grieves and proposes to amend one graver sin of one species, e.g., intemperance, without extending sorrow and purpose to other lighter sins of the same species.¹

That it can happen that someone grieves concerning the frequency of venials and proposes to amend it without detesting the single sins, and in like manner that someone grieves concerning the graver sins without grieving concerning the lighter, whether of the same or of a diverse species, is clear from this: that the motives of sorrow and purpose are verified more in many sins than in few, more in graver than in lighter sins.

2. On confession. a. It is licit to confess some venials while omitting others: for venials are not necessary matter of confession; moreover, one can be remitted without another.

b. Although it is earnestly to be recommended that he who confesses several venials conceive sorrow and purpose also concerning all of them, nevertheless not to grieve concerning some which he accuses is not a sin, provided he grieves sincerely concerning one or another, so that sufficient matter of absolution is present.

It is indeed not becoming that without a just cause other inept matter be mixed with the valid matter of absolution; nevertheless there can be a manifold sufficient reason why this may be permitted. Nor can it be said that he who confesses a venial sin concerning which he certainly knows that he does not grieve deceives the confessor and therefore sins venially:² for confessors know that penitents declare in confession not all venials of which they accuse themselves as matter of absolution, but several for other reasons.³

Note. To those who ordinarily confess nothing but venials, it can never be sufficiently urged that they conceive sorrow and firm purpose concerning one or another which burdens them more, and that they seriously try to amend it thereafter: for the more universal the purpose concerning venials is, the less efficacious it is. But ordinarily it will be better to abstain from the confession of those things concerning which neither sorrow nor purpose is present.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 60 ff.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 118.

³ Cf. Mazotta, tr. 6, disp. 1, q. 3, c. 1; Lehmkuhl II, n. 221 (n. 393).

We saw in the preceding section that contrition is essentially a turning away with hatred from sin in order to approach to God, and so all true contrition necessarily implies a purpose not to sin again. If the truly contrite sinner thinks of the future, he can scarcely fail to form an explicit purpose of amendment, and some theologians hold that this explicit purpose is necessary, otherwise why should it find a place in the definition of contrition given by the Council of Trent? On account of its importance, it is well that the purpose of amendment should always be explicit, but still as it is virtually contained in all true sorrow for sin, and the fact that the Council explicitly mentions it does not prove that it must necessarily be explicit, the opinion which denies the absolute necessity of an explicit purpose of amendment for the validity of Penance is safe. A Roman council held in 1725 under Benedict XIII issued an instruction explaining how to make one’s confession, and it only insists on an implicit purpose of amendment.

Whether it be explicit or implicit, the purpose of amendment must be sincere, efficacious, and universal.

It must be sincere, with a genuine intention to avoid sin in the future; it will not suffice to make profession of good intentions with the lips, without any real determination to carry them into effect.

It must be efficacious, or the sinner must be prepared to take the necessary means to avoid sin. A mere half wish and half resolve will not do. The sinner must be prepared to do and suffer anything rather than fall into sin again. It would, indeed, be unwise to try one’s own determination by imagining all kinds of terrible temptations to sin to see if the will would remain constant, but at any rate the will must here and now be so rooted in good that, come what may, it is determined not to be moved.

There must also be a firm resolve to avoid all mortal sins for the future, not merely any that may have been confessed, but all others, or else there can be no friendship with God, whom we must love above all things. He cannot love God above all things who is prepared to offend him mortally. The purpose of amendment need not extend to all venial sins, provided that at least there is the sincere intention of avoiding some sin that is confessed, or at any rate of lessening the number of smaller transgressions,

I. Notion. Purpose here is understood as the deliberate will of not sinning in the future. Purpose differs: 1. from a promise strictly so called, by which we intend to contract an obligation of furnishing the promised thing at its proper time, while by purpose we show only the present disposition of the soul for doing or omitting something; 2. from a vow, which is a promise strictly so called made to God. Yet this does not prevent both confessor and penitent from using the words promising and promise, namely in a broad sense, without a new obligation arising from a promise of this kind. Hence also the sinner is said only in a broad sense to have broken or violated his promises.

II. Division. Purpose is twofold, explicit and implicit. Implicit purpose is that which is contained in detestation and sorrow concerning committed sins. For one who truly detests the sin committed implicitly wills to abstain from sin in the future.

III. Necessity of some purpose for receiving the sacrament of Penance is clear from the fact that without purpose there is no contrition, since contrition is defined by the Council of Trent as "sorrow of soul and detestation concerning a committed sin, with the purpose of not sinning for the future."¹

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 4.

IV. Required purpose. An explicit purpose seems to be required¹ in the case in which the sinner grieves only from a particular motive; otherwise there is no universal purpose, not even implicit, for sorrow from a particular motive implicitly contains only a purpose of abstaining from those sins concerning which one grieves. Authors add the case in which the penitent thinks about future life, since in this case it can scarcely happen that one who truly grieves does not elicit an explicit purpose, so that the defect of a formal purpose would show a defect of true sorrow.

Besides the cases alleged, it is disputed what sort of purpose is required. Moreover, most authors hold as morally certain that explicit purpose is not demanded, but that implicit purpose suffices. But St. Alphonsus (VI, 450, question 1) and others deservedly teach that the opinion which teaches that explicit purpose is required is not lacking in probability. To prove this, we first note these things: 1. The question is not settled by an a priori argument, since the whole matter at last depends upon the positive institution of Christ; 2. the Council of Trent - which certainly does not intend to impose an end on this controversy - uses terms which are sufficiently explained in either opinion, so that a strict argument cannot be deduced from it. With these things posited, we reason thus: contrition consists of three elements, namely detestation, sorrow, and purpose, of which the first two regard past life and the third regards future life. Moreover, the first two must be explicit, and implicit ones do not suffice. This admitted, I do not see by what right it is said: the third, which touches future life, certainly does not have to be explicit, but an implicit one suffices. Thus, besides St. Alphonsus, among older authors especially Suarez² and St. Bellarmine,³ and among more recent authors Haine⁴ and Augustinis.⁵

Objection. The Council of Trent teaches that attrition disposes for justification in the sacrament when it "excludes the will of sinning."⁶ But detestation of committed sin, conceived from a universal motive, does this even without an explicit purpose.

Response. The words of Trent certainly signify the same thing as those which occur in its description of contrition: "with the purpose of not sinning for the future."⁷ But by these words the Council - which does not intend to settle the controversy - leaves in the middle whether or not an explicit or implicit purpose or will is required.

For the rest, let confessors commonly stir up penitents to explicit purpose, at least that they may perceive richer fruit from confession; but after the fact, in doubt they rightly presume that a sufficiently explicit purpose was not lacking.

¹ I say "seems" on account of what was said on p. 228, note 1.

² Disputation 20, section 4, nn. 32 and 33.

³ De Poenitentia, book 2, chapters 6 and 7.

⁴ Theologia Moralis, III, p. 242.

⁵ De re sacramentaria, II, p. 253 sq.

⁶ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 4.

⁷ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 4.

V. Properties of purpose. Purpose must be:

1. Firm, that is, of such a kind that the penitent wills not to sin in the future, at least not mortally, for the sake of obtaining any advantage or avoiding any evil. Moreover, firmness of purpose is not opposed by: 1. the fact that someone is not certain that he will not sin any more; 2. the fact that someone gravely fears that he is going to relapse; indeed, 3. of itself and speaking speculatively, even the fact that someone judges certainly that he will sin again is not opposed to it. Namely, the present will of not sinning can be combined not only with fear but even with certainty of relapse or of a change of will. Nevertheless, if the penitent is certain of relapse, in practice it must be feared that he lacks firm purpose, and his will must be strengthened. I said if he is certain, because these and similar expressions commonly signify fear rather than true certainty. Hence if the penitent, otherwise of good will, says: "I do not wish to sin any more, but I foresee that I am going to relapse," the confessor, after strengthening the faint-hearted person's spirit, should commonly impart absolution. But true despair is opposed to firmness of purpose; one who despairs must be disposed so that he may hope (St. Alphonsus, VI, 451).

2. Efficacious, that is, of such a kind that the penitent also wills to employ the means necessary for avoiding sins, for example to remove voluntary proximate occasions.

3. Universal, namely as regards mortal sins, not only as regards those which have been committed, but as regards all. For the Council of Trent demands a purpose "of not sinning for the future"; likewise contrition which "excludes the will of sinning."¹

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 4.

Resolution of Amendment.—The resolution of amendment which true contrition calls for is at least implicit in the hatred of sin, but it is advisable that the penitent expressly resolve to avoid sin in the future. This determination should have the following qualities:

(a) it should be firm, that is, the penitent should make up his mind not to relapse into deliberate sin. Yet, it is not necessary that he feel certain of his perseverance, and his resolve does not cease to be firm, if he foresees that he will fall again, provided he is decided to do the best he can;

(b) it should be efficacious, that is, the penitent must decide to use suitable means to fulfill his good intentions as to reparation for scandal, calumny, and injustice, as to the avoidance of sinful occasions, etc.;

(c) it should be universal, that is, the penitent must resolve at least generically to avoid each and every grave sin in the future. If only free matter (2727) is confessed, the penitent may direct his resolution of amendment to all past mortal sins confessed, or to one of the present venial sins declared, or he may resolve to do better in reference to a certain class of sins (e.g., deliberate sins, faults of speech), or he may resolve to diminish the frequency of his venial sins.

What is purpose and how many kinds are there; what are its qualities and necessity? - Resp. To the first: Purpose is the will not to sin thereafter. It is twofold: 1. explicit or formal, by which someone, thinking about the future, resolves not to sin any more; 2. implicit or virtual, which is included in contrition itself, without the future time being kept before the eyes.

Resp. To the second: Purpose must enjoy a threefold condition; namely it is required that it be firm, efficacious, and universal. 1. Firm: namely, the penitent must have a sincere will not to fall back into sin, notwithstanding any inconvenience or human fear whatever; otherwise he would not wish totally and sincerely to be converted to God. Nevertheless the confessor must not test the mind of the penitent by applying comparisons suited to disturb his imagination. But it must be firm also when it is a question only of venials. L. 451.

2. Efficacious, i.e., the penitent must not only firmly determine that he does not wish to sin any more, but also apply the means necessary for avoiding sin and fleeing proximate occasions, etc. Purpose must be efficacious also as regards venials which are matter of Confession. - But if the penitent immediately and with almost no resistance falls back, it can sometimes offer some indication, or at least suspicion, that he lacked a truly firm purpose; for one who firmly purposes almost does not so easily forget his purpose, but usually perseveres constant at least for some time and applies efforts to resist temptations or occasions of sin, and therefore ordinarily falls with greater difficulty and more rarely. L. 459; Lugo, d. 14, n. 160. Nevertheless the foresight and fear of relapse from past frailty and the inconstancy of the human will in no way impedes a sincere, firm, and efficacious purpose. La-Croix 1733, 1822; Sporer 310; L. 451. - A difficulty occurs practically when a penitent otherwise of good will, but terrified by the difficulty of the matter, says that he cannot promise this or that, lest afterward he break the pledged faith. Let the confessor raise him up by answering that it suffices that now he seriously wills, that he strive, that he pray; for God does not deny grace to one doing what is in him. It suffices, therefore, that the purpose be efficacious affectively, that is, it suffices that the sinner be prepared in soul to apply the necessary means; future amendment in fact is not of the essence of purpose.

3. Universal, or it must extend to all mortal sins, not only those committed, but also those which could be committed. The reason is that full and true conversion to God cannot be given without aversion from any lethal sin whatever. But it is enough "that, with the foulness of sin, the goodness of God, and the danger of damnation, etc., proposed in general, the penitent conceive a general purpose of never again sinning mortally." Suarez, d. 33, s. 2, n. 2; Cajetan, Summ., v. Confessio, ad 12 qualit.; Lugo, d. 7, nn. 199, 238; Laymann, c. 4, n. 8. - Wherefore neither is a special purpose concerning each grave sin to be avoided required, nor indeed is it always expedient. - But as concerns venials, just as universal sorrow is not necessary, so neither is universal purpose. - L. 451; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, a. 1; cf. here 679.

Resp. To the third: Purpose, at least implicit, is altogether necessary for the remission of sin; because purpose is a necessary consequence of contrition, and at least virtually included in it, and this is established from its nature and definition. - But whether even explicit purpose is required is disputed. According to St. Alphonsus, 450, there is a threefold opinion. The first, which certain few hold, affirms absolutely: because, although sorrow necessarily includes purpose, nevertheless an explicit purpose seems to be required by Trent when it says: "with the purpose of not sinning thereafter."

The second opinion, which Cardenas calls morally certain, absolutely denies it. The reason is that sorrow, if it is elicited from a general motive, includes a plainly efficacious purpose. Otherwise, from Trent, when attrition excludes the will to sin, it sufficiently disposes a man for obtaining grace in the sacrament. Elbel 87; Laymann, c. 4, n. 6; Salmant., c. 5, n. 55; Lugo, d. 14, n. 51, who says this opinion is common among the more recent authors. - The third opinion, which St. Alphonsus testifies is called common, teaches that if the penitent thinks about future life, he must formally purpose amendment; otherwise, if the penitent thinks nothing about the future. But if he thinks about the future, all agree that it can scarcely happen that a sincere penitent does not at the same time elicit an explicit and formal purpose. - But St. Alphonsus there interposes his judgment about these things thus: "These last two opinions are indeed more probable; but because the first is not lacking its probability, in practice before the fact the safer opinion is to be followed."

But since, as St. Alphonsus testifies in the cited place, most even of those who are alleged for the first opinion agree "that if in good faith with true sorrow you confessed without formal purpose, you are not bound to repeat the Confession," it is evident that in this conclusion, which alone serves practice, all opinions and finally the suffrage of all doctors agree. But although the holy Doctor says that he "cannot acquiesce in this opinion," nevertheless this is most openly opposed to the doctrine which he himself hands down elsewhere, 505: "Carefully note that penitents are not to be compelled to repeat Confessions unless it is morally certain that they were invalid, as La-Croix, Gobat, etc., rightly say with the common opinion." - To this is added the authority of the Roman Council under Benedict XIII, celebrated in the Lateran Basilica in the year of the universal Jubilee, 1725. Tit. XXXII, c. 3, reads: "Instructions pertaining to the use and worship of the Sacraments of Penance and Eucharist, to be first received by children, brief and clear at the same time, we shall give at the end of this our Council." Moreover, in the Instruction for children about to approach the Sacrament of Penance, which is seen appended at the foot of the same Council, these things are had, part III, p. 303: "Penitent. Does one who confesses without sorrow for sins and without purpose of sinning no more receive pardon? - Confessor. If he does not have at least imperfect sorrow, that is, attrition, with the firm purpose, at least implicit, of never sinning again, certainly, if he confesses, the Confession is not valid, and he does not receive pardon of sins." In these words, both imperfect sorrow or attrition and implicit purpose are manifestly equated together as sufficient. Hence D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 313, asserts that this opinion can today be called certain. And St. Thomas, according to Bellarmine himself, who stands for the third opinion, does not distinguish between implicit and explicit; and entirely rightly, for the efficacy of tacit and express is the same.

The necessity of that explicit purpose, however, is either from some positive precept independently of the nature of justification outside the sacrament and in the sacrament, or dependently upon it. The first cannot be said, for 1. penance, if it is commanded, is commanded only because of justification; 2. St. Alphonsus himself admits that the matter is controversial and doubtful, and that explicit purpose is more probably not required; but a doubtful law does not oblige. Nor indeed can the second be said. For either that explicit purpose is demanded by justification outside the sacrament, or by justification in the sacrament. The first cannot be; for a formal act of charity immediately justifies, without that explicit purpose; therefore contrition perfected by charity also does. The other likewise cannot be; for no greater disposition is required for justification in the sacrament than outside the sacrament. - But it is one thing for Trent, in declaring the nature of contrition, explicitly to commemorate the purpose included in it; it is another thing to commemorate an explicit purpose. It does the former, not the latter. Nor does the latter follow from the former; otherwise other explicit acts also would be required, which Trent explicitly commemorates: of hope, confidence, desire of Confession, desire of satisfaction, etc. Nor indeed does Trent uselessly commemorate explicitly the purpose of not sinning thereafter. For it did this to explain the force and connatural effect of contrition, since otherwise sorrow and contrition can be given which do not contain a universal purpose. Then Trent immediately adds that this contrition was necessary at every time for justification. Contrition justifying at every time does not necessarily comprehend explicit purpose, as is also clear from the example of David, the prodigal son, etc. Cf. also Trent, sess. 6, C. 14. And since, from Trent, even attrition suffices for justification in the sacrament if it excludes the will to sin, contrition certainly suffices if it excludes the same will, without anything else being required. - E. M.

1. Caelestinus, in making his confession, among other things declares that in his last confession, while he had been intent upon eliciting sorrow, he had by no means thought about the purpose of not sinning henceforth, and that he had thus been absolved; wherefore he labors under great anxiety about this absolution. The confessor, having heard this, decides that the confession had in reality been invalid, and therefore that it must be repeated.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. "Caelestinus made a valid confession, at least much more probably, although his purpose was not explicit. Therefore he ought by no means to repeat the confession, because the obligation of repeating is not established. Therefore the confessor erred in declaring that the confession must be repeated." Thus Fr. Gury 419.

But Caelestinus not only much more probably, but with moral certainty, made a valid confession, from the Instruction for children of Benedict XIII, at the end of the Roman Council, Appendix 29, part 3. I. M. 694.

2. Cornelius, laboring under the habit of a base sin, is asked by the confessor whether he firmly resolves no longer to commit these sins of a wicked habit. - I do resolve, says the penitent, but I foresee that I shall certainly violate this purpose. For at other times I have similarly resolved, and I have always unhappily relapsed. So great is the force of habit in me that it entices and drags me away. But do you resolve to guard against a fall? the confessor replies. Yes, father, says Cornelius, but I am certain about a future relapse. The confessor, entangled by responses of this sort, does not know whether he can absolve this penitent. At length he decides to absolve him.

It is asked: 1. What is to be said of a habitual sinner who, soon after absolution, relapses into the accustomed sin? 2. What is to be said to the Case?

R. To the 1st. "The presumption ought to stand against him. Hence it must be presumed that he was indisposed, or lacked a firm purpose, in the last confession. The reason is that a sinner who soon and easily relapses, making no effort to resist temptation, is not considered to have firmly resolved no longer to sin. See Comp. n. 513.

To the 2nd. Cornelius seems to have made an invalid confession, because he who believes that he will certainly relapse, by that very fact argues that he has lacked firmness of purpose. Therefore the confessor acted badly in absolving a penitent of this sort, unless he recognized in him rather a fear of relapse than a defect of purpose." Thus Fr. Gury 422.

Moreover, as to the first question, Fr. Gury himself has the contrary in the cited place of the Compendium. For there he raises the question: "Whether relapsers are to be compelled to repeat preceding confessions?" And he answers: "Negatively, of itself. The reason is that a new fall of itself is not a certain argument that the relapser previously lacked disposition. Yet sometimes from the circumstances it will be possible to judge prudently that a certain relapser confessed invalidly. St. Lig. n. 505." Nor is this resolution of itself changed precisely by the fact that someone relapses soon after absolution. For the fact that someone afterward sins either by act or by purpose does not exclude that previously there was true penance. For the truth of a prior act is never excluded by a subsequent contrary act. For as he truly ran who afterward sits, so he truly repented who afterward sins. St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 10, ad 4. And St. Alphonsus 459 says: "A relapse, although it furnishes some suspicion, nevertheless does not exhibit a certain sign of indisposition. For it can well happen that the penitent truly had a firm will not to relapse, and yet by the force of an evil habit relapsed." These things indeed imply that the holy Doctor suggests that from true preceding penance it can be argued, speaking again of itself, that disposition is not lacking even in the present. And in fact, as the same holy Doctor had premised: "The penitent, on the one hand, is not to be presumed bad, so that he wishes to approach the sacrament indisposed; on the other hand, he is presumed disposed while he confesses his sins, since the spontaneous confession itself is a sign of contrition, unless some positive presumption to the contrary stands in the way." Wherefore the whole matter in practice is to be prudently judged and defined from the circumstances. And that suspicion which repeated relapse into the same sins casts ought to move the confessor, not indeed so that he should decide beforehand that the penitent is indisposed and must be dismissed without absolution, but so that, according to his office, he should inquire more accurately about the present disposition of the penitent, and help him to conceive this disposition, if perhaps he does not have it.

As to the second question, when the case really occurs, the resolution does not seem very difficult in practice. For the whole question is about the sincerity of the sorrow and purpose of Cornelius. If he has sincere sorrow and purpose, beyond doubt his confession is valid. Moreover, when a case of this sort occurs, from all the circumstances of the penitent and of his confession, and from the very manner of the confession, that sincerity of sorrow and purpose easily appears. But considering the Case as it has been proposed, it does not seem that the confession of Cornelius can be affirmed invalid with such facility. For Cornelius responds seriously to the confessor questioning him, and with a certain vehemence and insistence, that he indeed resolves to guard against a fall; and from the response appears his displeasure that at other times also he conceived the same purpose and nevertheless relapsed. Therefore from this an argument cannot be drawn for the invalidity of the confession, but rather for its validity, especially if it is considered that Cornelius after the relapse does not withdraw from the sacraments, but approaches the sacraments; namely, so that at length by the grace of the sacraments he may be efficaciously helped toward amendment; since no other reason can be assigned in the Case why Cornelius confesses again. Nor indeed can an argument for the aforesaid invalidity of the confession be drawn from that foresight of Cornelius concerning a new fall. For this foresight, founded only on his own frailty, can well stand together with present sorrow and purpose resting upon the aid of divine grace. Now indeed, as often as the penitent brings true signs of present sorrow and purpose, so often he can well be absolved, St. Lig., l. 6, n. 459. Nor indeed is the penitent absolved on account of future amendment; if this has thus far disappointed the hope of the penitent and the confessor, perhaps in the future, with divine grace helping, once begun it will no longer cease. "Well," says St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 459, "Lugo teaches, s. 14, n. 166, with Suarez, Sanchez, Reginald, Henriquez, and others commonly, that sufficient disposition is present sorrow and purpose, not future amendment; and thus the penitent can be absolved, although he is judged likely to relapse." But if the confessor, as is fitting, exhorts Cornelius to trust in God, and stirs him to repeat sorrow and purpose, and, dealing with him earnestly, patiently, and gently, more and more strengthens his will, the motives of sorrow having been explained and the due means to be employed having been indicated; if Cornelius consents and signifies his good will, there is surely no reason why the confession of Cornelius should afterward be pronounced invalid. I. M. 694, 809.

459. Principles. - I. A purpose at least implicit is altogether necessary for the remission of sin; because the purpose is a necessary consequence of contrition and is included in it at least virtually, as is evident from its nature and definition.

II. A true purpose must possess three conditions; namely, it is required that it be firm, efficacious, and universal.

1. Firm; namely, the penitent must have a sincere will not to relapse into sin, notwithstanding any inconvenience ¹ or human fear; otherwise he would not wish to be converted to God totally and sincerely. The Confessor, however, ought not to put the mind of the penitent to the test by employing comparisons suited to disturb his imagination ².

¹ It is useful to set down here what the gravest Authors judge that the confessor must be admonished concerning this matter.

Suarez (De Poenitentia, disp. 32, sect. 2, no. 2): The Doctors observe that the Confessor ought not to set before the penitent all the difficulties which can occur in avoiding sins; because he will place him in manifest danger not only of not having an efficacious purpose for the future, but also of sinning anew. It is sufficient, therefore, that, the foulness of sin, the goodness of God, and the danger of damnation, etc., having been proposed IN GENERAL, the penitent conceive a GENERAL purpose never again to sin mortally.

To this pertain those words of Cardinal Cajetan (Summa, V. Confessio, on the twelfth quality): Penitents, however, must not be cast into temptation by an overzealous confessor imprudently investigating whether... he intends to avoid mortal sins above everything avoidable, such as plundering, killing, etc.; for an interrogation of this sort would lead many into temptation.... Let him exhort him to the love of God above all things, and that from love of this kind he ought to grieve over the past and purpose avoidance for the future.... And thus he will kindle the heart of the penitent and will not place him in danger of temptation.

And Cardinal De Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 7, no. 199), recalling a certain weakness of spirit which does not have strength to burst forth into a generous act, adds: This weakness is not a new sin, as is evident in those penitents before whose eyes the Confessor ought not explicitly to place circumstances that are exceedingly difficult, so that concerning them, if they occur, they may explicitly purpose not to sin in them also. And below (ibid., no. 238), speaking of those who ardently pursue honor or bodily pleasure, who, although they have retracted their sins in confession with some remiss sorrow, afterward, when an occasion of honor or pleasure is given, easily relapse because of the vehemence of the affection which they corrected only confusedly and remissly, he adds: Indeed, neither do we dare to set distinctly before them in confession the temptations or dangers of sinning which can occur, so that concerning those things they may distinctly purpose; because we prudently fear that now they would not retract their former sins even confusedly.

Finally, to omit others, Laymann (De Poenitentia, ch. 4, no. 8) has these words: The Confessor does not act rightly if he compels the penitent to a special promise... concerning avoiding this or that sin in the future, except in a rare case, if, for example, the sin is very harmful to the commonwealth, etc.

² Compare what was said above in the note to no. 450, q. 2.

2. Efficacious; that is, the penitent must not only resolve firmly that he does not wish to sin any more, but must also employ the necessary means for avoiding sin and fleeing proximate occasions, etc., etc. - It suffices, however, that the purpose be efficacious affectively; that is, it suffices that the sinner be prepared in mind to employ the necessary means, because future amendment in fact is not of the essence of the purpose ³.

³ By these things the Author warns that the doctrine of those who think that proof from works must be demanded beforehand is not to be admitted; concerning this he afterward expressly discusses in Question I.

3. Universal; or it must extend to all mortal sins, not only those which have been committed, but also those which could be committed. The reason is that a full and true conversion to God cannot be given without aversion from every mortal sin.

But as regards venial sins, for the validity of the Sacrament it is required and suffices that a firm and efficacious purpose be present of avoiding at least one of the venial sins.

460. Questions. - QUESTION 1. For the purpose to be firm, must it also be found constant?

Reply. Negative; at least this is not absolutely necessary. The reason is that the purpose affects the present will, which otherwise is variable by its nature. Hence the weakness of the purpose cannot of itself be inferred from a relapse after confession. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., no. 451; Lugo, disp. 14, no. 166, etc., against some.

I said: at least this is not absolutely necessary. For if the penitent relapses immediately and with almost no resistance, it can sometimes provide some indication, or at least a suspicion, that he lacked a truly firm purpose; for he who purposes firmly generally does not so easily forget his purpose, but is accustomed to persevere constantly for at least some time and to employ efforts to resist temptations or occasions of sin, and consequently ordinarily falls with greater difficulty and more rarely. - Thus St. Lig., no. 459, where he treats of the recidivist; Lugo, disp. 14, no. 160, etc.

232. 1° Universal, that is, extending itself to all mortal sins, not only to those which have been committed, but to any others whatever, as is gathered from Trent saying "with the purpose of not sinning hereafter." - Yet the purpose of avoiding all mortal sins in general suffices, without each being explicitly run through. Hence often the confessor would act imprudently if he demanded from the penitent that he promise to avoid this or that sin in particular, in such or such a difficult circumstance, unless the common good specially requires it, for example, in the case of scandal to be repaired, or the good of a third party, for example, when restitution is necessary, or another grave reason of this kind. Outside these or similar cases, the confessor would act imprudently by demanding a special promise, because the penitent, otherwise sufficiently disposed but still weak, could be terrified by this special difficulty and become indisposed, as we said above (n. 214).

233. 2° Firm, that is, so rooted in the will that the penitent is truly and deliberately prepared to commit no grave sin through fear of any evil or through desire of any good.

(A) To this firmness there is no obstacle from an estimation or fear lest someone in fact fall back into sin: for this disposition is rather an act of the intellect, by which relapse is foreseen, on account of the mutability of the human will, and therefore can exist at the same time with an act of the will by which someone sincerely does not wish to relapse. Penitents, therefore, who are so disposed can be absolved, provided that for the present they sincerely resolve to avoid sin according to their strength, and to trust in the grace of God for the future.

(B) But if a penitent certainly believes that he will relapse, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 451), he lacks a firm purpose; according to Lugo,¹ he can have a firm purpose. With Lehmkuhl (n. 296) and others, we think the distinction must be made in this way: (a) if this persuasion arises only from experienced inconstancy and fragility, and the penitent at the same time trusts in God and wishes to try to avoid sin, he is not for that reason to be judged indisposed; for this persuasion, which often does not differ from a great fear of relapsing, is an act of the intellect foreseeing the future with a certain moral certitude, and can exist with an actual will of fleeing sin. In truth confessors often absolve penitents whom they foresee with moral certitude will relapse, and this foresight, according to all, can be reconciled with the sincere purpose of penitents; why can the same not be said of the foresight itself of the penitent? Whence the sinner is to be exhorted to confidence and prayer; and if he promises to make efforts, he can be absolved.

¹ Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 137; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 161.

(b) But if that persuasion arises from despair, he indeed lacks a firm purpose, because he does not have hope. Nor nevertheless is he to be dismissed at once, but he is to be exhorted to consider again the divine mercy, and also the efficacy of divine grace, by whose help he can overcome all difficulties. "But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able"... "I can do all things in Him who strengthens me."¹ If in truth he conceives confidence in God, and, although he foresees that he will fall, sincerely grieves over his sins and firmly proposes to abstain from them, he can now be absolved.

¹ 1 Cor. 10:13; Phil. 4:13.

234. 3° Efficacious, or having the force of doing what is proposed; now such a purpose can be judged to exist when the penitent sincerely and seriously wills to employ the means for avoiding sin, especially to flee proximate occasions. But it suffices that the purpose be efficacious affectively, so that in soul he is prepared to employ the means; nor is it required that it be efficacious effectively, that is, that sins in fact be avoided. For relapse is not always and of itself a sign of a weak purpose, but more often arises from a change of will; for by nature we are so constituted that easily, when circumstances have changed, we change our counsel; and therefore a firm purpose does not make a man impeccable; thus Peter, who had promised rather to die than to deny Christ, a few hours afterward, from fear of a maidservant, in fact denied Him.

235. 4° But it is controverted whether the purpose must be formal and explicit, or on the contrary a virtual purpose suffices, which is contained in the act of sorrow.

(A) A few affirm that a formal purpose is required, especially because Trent distinguishes this purpose from detestation of sin: now there would have been no necessity of making this distinction, unless the Council had wished to suggest that such a purpose must be explicit. Yet this argument does not hold; for the same Council distinguishes between sorrow and detestation; now, according to all, sorrow implicitly contained in detestation suffices for contrition, without being explicitly elicited.²

² Thus Canus, Relect. de Paenit., p. 1, q. 2, concl. 1, n. 10; Soto, in 4, dist. 15, q. 1, a. 2; Bellarmine, De Paenit., lib. II, cap. 6.

(B) Others more commonly hold that the purpose virtually included in contrition suffices, provided that contrition is conceived from a universal motive;³ for if the motive were not universal, but special to the sins accused by the penitent, perhaps it would not extend to all future sins. - The reason is that Trent, although it explicitly mentioned the purpose in the definition of contrition, nevertheless in no way declared that this purpose must be explicit, but rather taught that attrition suffices if it excludes the will of sinning; but sorrow conceived from a universal motive necessarily excludes every will of sinning, since sin is as hateful in the future as in the present or the past.

³ Suarez, disp. VII, sect. 3, n. 7; Cardenas, p. IV, diss. 2, n. 80, and many others whom Ballerini cites, t. V, n. 97 sq. - St. Alphonsus (n. 450) grants that it is the more probable opinion, but in practice does not permit it to be followed, because the first opinion is probable: now, where validity is at issue, it is not permitted to follow even the more probable opinion.

(C) Others, finally, distinguish:¹ (a) if someone, thinking about the future, does not wish to elicit an explicit act of purpose, this is a sign that his contrition is not sincere, and consequently that he does not even have a virtual purpose; - (b) but if someone sincerely detests sin and yet does not elicit an explicit purpose, because he is not thinking about the future, the sacrament will be valid. - We observe that this third opinion does not differ substantially from the second, since it grants that an explicit purpose does not pertain to the essence of the sacrament.

¹ Holzmann, n. 401.

236. Whence in practice these things seem to be established: (a) before the fact, an explicit purpose is altogether to be counseled, both for the sake of greater security, and so that the fruits of the sacrament may be richer; (b) after the fact, if someone has elicited a sincere act of attrition without thinking about an explicit purpose, he ought not be compelled to repeat his confessions, because most probably his sins have been remitted; now no one can be compelled to accuse again sins most probably dismissed; besides, sins of this kind, if not yet dismissed, will immediately be remitted and the penitent will receive valid absolution, since he is in good faith. - Moreover, it can deservedly be said with Scavini:² "In practice no one ought to be disturbed about this; since it scarcely, and not even scarcely, happens that a truly contrite penitent omits even an explicit purpose, although he does not reflect upon this, which is not necessary."

² Scavini, n. 292.

241. Since contrition is altogether necessary for obtaining the remission of sins, and besides not a few penitents, even among the pious, are accustomed to spend a longer time in searching conscience than in exciting contrition, let preachers carefully and often instruct the faithful that, when they prepare themselves for confession, they not neglect to conceive sorrow and purpose. Moreover let the confessor ask penitents whether they are truly contrite, at least when he doubts concerning their dispositions; and if he finds certain ones unprepared, let him propose to them motives of contrition adapted to their understanding.³

³ St. Alphonsus piously proposes some of these motives in the golden little work Praxis Confessarii, ch. I, § 2, n. 10; for example, the confessor can use these or similar words: "My son, what have you done? You have sinned against God, the highest and infinite good; you have turned your face away from Him, you have despised His friendship and grace; you have crucified Christ, His Son. Come then, because you have offended God, infinite goodness, and His infinitely lovable Son, now repent from your whole heart; detest, above all evils, all the injuries by which you have affected God. Are you not now prepared to suffer all things rather than commit these things hereafter?"

1. DEFINITION. —Genuine contrition, whether perfect or imperfect, must be accompanied by a firm purpose to amend one's life and to avoid future sins (propositum non peccandi de cetero). This truth may be deduced from the very nature of contrition, which, being a detestation of sin as an offense against God, must include both an act of sorrow for past sins (de praeterito) and the resolution not to sin again (de futuro).

The purpose of amendment which is included in contrition may be either explicit (propositum explicitum sive formate) or implicit (propositum implicitum sive virtuale). It is explicit when the penitent expressly thinks of the future and resolves never to sin again; it is implicit if he merely hates sin for fear or love of God, without eliciting a formal act of the will not to sin in fu- ture. A good resolution of the latter kind is called virtual.¹

¹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., II, n. 342: "A purpose is a true will not to sin any more in the future. It is twofold: explicit or formal, by which one, thinking about the future, resolves not to sin any more; and implicit or virtual, which is included in contrition itself without the future time being placed before one’s eyes." —Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 4: “Propositum non peccandi de cetera.... Cessatio a peccato et vitae novae propositum el inchoatio." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 897).

The resolution to avoid sin and its proximate occasions for a supernatural motive is an indispensable condition of the valid reception of Penance. The controverted question whether the Sacrament requires an explicit (formal) resolution, or whether an implicit (virtual) purpose of amendment suffices, may theoretically be decided in favor of the latter opinion, though in praxi it is always better to choose the pars tutior, i. e., to give explicit consideration to the necessity of amending one's life and make a formal resolution to do so. A really contrite penitent will hardly ever fail to make an explicit purpose of amendment.²

² Gury, op. cit., n. 345: "Is an explicit purpose required in contrition? Three opinions are given. The first, more common and very much more probable, denies it, because a purpose with all its efficacy is included in true contrition; therefore an implicit purpose ought to suffice for the validity of the Sacrament, provided sorrow is elicited from a universal motive. The second opinion affirms it, because, although sorrow necessarily includes a purpose, nevertheless an explicit purpose is required by Trent when it says in the definition of contrition: with the purpose of not sinning for the future. The third opinion holds that an explicit purpose is not required if the penitent does not think of the future, as happens with the dying; otherwise, if he attends to the future. In practice the safer opinion is to be followed because of the authority of the theologians who maintain the necessity of an explicit purpose, although speculatively it seems rather improbable. Besides, it very rarely happens that truly contrite penitents omit an explicit purpose." —Cfr. Noldin, Vol. III, pp. 312 sq.

2. PROPERTIES. —The purpose of amendment, being an essential part of contrition, is as necessary for the valid reception of Penance as con- trition itself, and consequently, like the latter, and for the same reasons, must be: a) Universal (propositum universale), i. e., it must comprise all mortal sins which one might possibly commit in future and, in a general way, the lessening of venial sins.³ If none but venial sins form the matter of confession, it is sufficient to resolve to avoid at least one of them, or to diminish the total number.⁴ b) The purpose of amendment must be firm, i. e., the penitent must be determined to suffer any hardship rather than again offend God by a mortal sin.⁵ Distrust of one's strength or fear of relapse do not impair the firmness of purpose which a sinner must have to amend his life. All that is required is that he humbly trust in God and be firmly determined to cooperate with divine grace in fighting temptations.⁶ Actual re- lapse is not always a sign that one's purpose of amendment lacked firmness; for even the strongest resolution may weaken and finally succumb.⁷ But when the relapsed penitent has made no effort, or only the weakest kind of an effort, to amend his life, it may reasonably be presumed that he had no firm purpose of amendment. c) Since the purpose of amendment is essentially an act of the will directed to future performance, it must be efficacious (propositum efficax), that is to say, the penitent must be ready and willing to employ the means necessary and useful for the avoidance of sin, particularly to shun all voluntary proximate occasions ⁸ and to repair to the best of his ability whatever injury he may have done to others.

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 87, art. 1, ad i: "A man established in grace can avoid all mortal sins and each one; he can also avoid each venial sin, but not all. Therefore penance for mortal sins requires that a man purpose to abstain from all and each mortal sin; but for penance for venial sins it is required that he purpose to abstain from individual sins, though not from all, because the weakness of this life does not permit this. Yet he ought to have the purpose of preparing himself to diminish venial sins; otherwise he would be in danger of falling away, since he would abandon the desire of progressing or of removing the impediments to spiritual progress, which are venial sins."

⁴ Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 344, 347.

⁵ Ibid., n. 34: "The penitent must have an entirely determined will not to relapse into sin, notwithstanding any inconvenience or human fear; otherwise he would not will to turn totally and sincerely to God."

⁶ Op. cit., n. 346: "Should the purpose of one who indeed has the intention not to sin but believes he will certainly relapse be judged firm? The reply is negative, because, practically speaking, one who truly wills not to sin can abstain from sin. Therefore, if he believes he can abstain. Therefore, if he believes that he will certainly fall, this indicates weakness of purpose; for divine grace will always be present, with which he ought to hope that he will not relapse. Yet one who fears a fall because of past frailty is not to be judged indisposed. Hence that penitent has a true purpose who, when asked by the confessor about his will not to sin, replies: “I am very frail; I fear a fall, yet I do not now will to fall.” In practice, however, examine the penitent’s character and disposition. For you will not rarely find sinners declaring that they will relapse who fear that their purpose is not sufficiently firm, although they display nothing other than fear of falling and distrust of themselves. Such penitents are to be told that the question is not about what will perhaps probably happen but about the present will regarding the future and about placing supreme confidence in divine help."

⁷ Cfr. Matth. XXVI, 33-35; 69- 75. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 84, art. 10, ad 4: "That someone afterward sins, either in act or purpose, does not exclude the first repentance from having been true; for the truth of a prior act is never excluded by a subsequent contrary act. For just as one who afterward sits truly ran, so one who afterward sins truly repented."

⁸ Cfr. Gury, Camp. Theol. Mor., II, n. 344: "An efficacious purpose: the penitent must not only resolve firmly that he wills not to sin any more, but must also employ effort and all necessary means for avoiding sins and fleeing proximate occasions. It suffices, however, that the purpose be affectively efficacious; that is, it suffices that the sinner be prepared in mind to employ the necessary means, because future avoidance of sin is not of the essence of a purpose." dDe Imit. Christi, I, 19 (Opera Omnia, ed. Pohl, II, 32 sq.). Our translation is that of the "Seraphic Edition," by Father Thaddeus, O.F.M., London 1908, pp. 34 sq.

The purpose of amendment which forms part of contrition is of great importance for the spiritual life because there can be no progress on the way to perfection unless one has a straight purpose and keeps it. Thomas a Kempis says: "According to our resolution the course of our progress shall be; and he who would advance rapidly needeth great diligence. For if a man who maketh a firm resolution often faileth, how will he fare who hath seldom or never any fixed purpose? In many ways, however, we abandon our good resolve; and a slight omission of our exercises seldom passeth without some detriment to our progress. The good resolutions of the just depend not so much on their own wisdom, as on the grace of God, in whom they also ever trust in all their undertakings. For man proposeth, but God disposeth; and 'the way of a man is not His.' " 9 "Good resolutions," says Alban Stolz, "are like blossoms that drop from a tree; they bring no fruit unless a man employs the means necessary to carry them out."

READINGS.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. III, pp. 310 sqq.—Th. Slater, S.J., Manual of Moral Theol, Vol. II, pp. 161 sq —A Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 231 sqq.—A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Past., Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 77 sqq.

— 1. An absolute purpose of not sinning any more, or a purpose so firm that from the present affection it excepts no circumstance or time, is necessary for the remission of every sin, and therefore, for the worthy and fruitful reception of this sacrament, is required about at least some sin or reason of sin accused. For without a firm purpose of this kind, sin is not fully retracted. But sin is not remitted unless retracted.

2. Because it cannot happen that any mortal sin be remitted to a soul defiled by other sins, and firm purpose is necessary not from a superadded precept but from the very nature of the matter, firm purpose about mortal sins must be universal, insofar as it excludes every will or deliberate affection of sinning.

3. Every attrition above all things virtually contains the firm purpose of not committing the sins about which it is had; but attrition conceived from a universal motive virtually contains the firm purpose of not sinning in the future, at least mortally.

Now the purpose included in attrition conceived from a universal motive seems to suffice for fruitful use of the sacrament, so that a formal and explicit purpose is not required. For Trent, s. XIV, c. 4, demands only attrition which "excludes the will of sinning"; and from the nature of the matter, the act of the virtue of Penance regards future things not formally but only consequently, insofar as sincere detestation of sin brings in the will of avoiding sin thereafter. Wherefore the penitential judge does not need an explicitly known purpose in order to be able to judge about prudently administering absolution (cf. Desan, De Paenitentia, c. 11, 3 dub.). This more common opinion can be called morally certain, although not a few, with Bellarmine, l. 2, Paen., c. 6, contradict it. Yet Suarez, for example, Paen., d. 4, s. 3, and D'Ann., III, 313, require a formal purpose in him who thinks about the life to be led in the future and about the danger of relapsing, as a criterion of true penitence.

Therefore one who did not think about making a formal purpose is not at all to be disturbed about past confessions.

But must a formally universal purpose be elicited by him who is sorry for mortal sins from a particular motive alone? Certainly in that attrition a strictly universal purpose is not contained even virtually. But if a particular purpose concerning committed mortal sins is joined with a habitual aversion from every other mortal sin, we do not see what further thing is required, either of itself or from the Council of Trent.

Yet this opinion is that of few; for it Lehmk., II, 399, cites Aversa, Hurtado, Platel; by very many it is plainly rejected as openly false. Cf. Suarez, d. 4, s. 3, n. 5; Lugo, d. 14, n. 51 ff.; St. Alph., l. 6, n. 451, 2°. These judge a positively universal purpose about mortal sins necessary.

Concerning virtual purpose, cf. Ball.-Palm., V, n. 92-99.

— Concerning venial sins, a purpose about the venial sins accused suffices, at least about one of the accused; indeed a purpose of avoiding deliberate venial sins, or indeliberate ones as far as human frailty permits, or of lessening them. For in every purpose conceived in this way there is contained an absolute purpose of avoiding some venial sins.

— On the efficacy of purpose. They are accustomed to add that purpose must be efficacious. That we may treat distinctly of this quality of purpose, a twofold efficacy is to be discerned: one immediate, principiative, which affects the very will of the penitent then when he is converted to God, simply or in a certain respect; the other subsequent, effective, which constancy of execution demonstrates. The former rather connotes the sincerity of purpose; the latter, its virtue.

— I. On principiative efficacy. A will is called efficacious which embraces the means, both negative and positive, necessary for attaining the end. Therefore, in the present cause, it will be the will of applying the necessary means for not sinning in the future. To this belongs flight from the proximate occasion.

What an occasion is and by what obligation it is to be fled, we saw in I, 452-456.

— II. On subsequent efficacy, or efficacy of fact. 1. Relapse into sins, even frequent relapse, demonstrates a changed will, not necessarily a defect of the preceding will. But this one thing is essential: that from the will which the penitent has then when he is absolved, he does not wish to commit sin in any hypothesis.

2. Nor does founded fear, indeed a morally certain foresight of a new grave sin, always argue a defect of purpose. A penitent who asserts such things is to be raised into hope, which he ought to conceive not from his own powers but from the grace of God. Wherefore, provided he now wishes to choose a firm purpose, he is disposed and is to be absolved; but certain precautions against temptations are to be required from him, which he will have to confess to be in his own power.

If it is a question of a vicious custom of blasphemies or imprecations, which easily removes actual deliberation, let the penitent also be taught that he is bound only to this: that he beware of faults which are committed knowingly and strive to amend the depraved habit (cf. St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, art. 10 ad 4).

3. Uniform perseverance in sin, in a certain occasion, can sometimes argue a defect of present disposition. For apt remedies are always at hand by which, with the grace of God, perfect amendment may be prepared. Whether material flight from the occasion itself must be commanded to him who, after applying opportune remedies, relapses in the same way, we saw above, n. 542 and I, 455. Here the confessor has need of great prudence.

354. Definition. Purpose is the will not to sin henceforth. Therefore a mere velleity does not suffice, yet neither is a strict promise or vow of avoiding all sins required. Sometimes, however, the confessor can demand an explicit promise from the penitent if he doubts his sincere purpose.

A twofold purpose is distinguished: one explicit and formal, which is a special act distinct from contrition; the other implicit and virtual, which is contained in every sincere contrition, since by its nature contrition is a detestation not only of past sins but also of future ones.

355. Necessity. At least implicit purpose is required for the validity of the sacrament. It is better, however, if the penitent, thinking about future life, forms an explicit purpose, and one determined in particular.

Implicit purpose is necessarily contained in every true and universal contrition, and therefore it is equally as necessary as contrition for all mortal sins. And so someone has rightly said that two duties lie upon contrition, namely, to detest past sins and to guard against future sins. And indeed by the very fact that someone vehemently and sincerely detests a past act, he has the will to avoid it in the future. For a thing which is clearly known as detestable is by that very fact avoided, because no one can desire evil as evil. Besides this implicit purpose, certain authors¹⁵³ require an explicit and formal purpose because the Council of Trent¹⁵⁴ demands "the purpose of not sinning henceforth"; but this text is not to the point, because it is contained in the very definition of contrition. These are the words: "Contrition, which holds the first place among the aforesaid acts of the penitent, is sorrow of soul and detestation for sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth." Therefore the Council rather teaches the contrary, since it requires nothing other than that purpose which is contained in contrition itself.¹⁵⁵

The true opinion, which is rightly called morally certain by several authors, teaches that for obtaining the remission of sins the purpose which is implicitly contained in contrition, whether perfect or imperfect, suffices. Hence the Council of Trent, enumerating the explicit acts which are necessary for the essence of the sacrament of penance, indeed adduces contrition, confession, and satisfaction, but says nothing concerning an explicit act of purpose. Purpose, therefore, is necessary in the same manner as the acts of faith and hope, which are also implicitly required in the penitent. Moreover, in practice it cannot happen that a penitent struck by sincere contrition and thinking about future life should not elicit an express act of purpose, just as also of faith, since he believes in the mercy and justice of God, and of hope, since he hopes to obtain pardon from God and divine aid for avoiding temptations. Ballerini¹⁵⁶ adduces texts of 73 authors, all of whom teach that implicit purpose suffices for the validity of the sacrament.

¹⁵³ Concina, De sacr. poenit. l. 1, diss. 3, c. 1, q. 8.

¹⁵⁴ Session 14, c. 4, On Penance (Denz., n. 897).

¹⁵⁵ It is useful to note that several authors whom Concina (De sacr. poenit. l. 1, diss. 3, c. 1, q. 8) cites for his opinion in fact teach altogether the contrary, for example, St. Thomas, Cajetan, and others.

¹⁵⁶ In the notes to Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. II, n. 462.

356. Three qualities of purpose are customarily enumerated: firmness, efficacy, universality.

1. Purpose must be firm, at least as to the present affection of the will, although perhaps it may be infirm as to the future event. Firm purpose, therefore, is not the same as constant purpose. Nothing else is required except that the penitent here and now sincerely and firmly purpose that he no longer wishes to sin. Therefore the object of purpose is the actual will, not the future event. Thus "that someone afterward sins ... does not exclude the first penance from having been true."¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, frequent relapse is not rarely an indication of an infirm purpose.

Several authors¹⁵⁸ rightly observe that only a firm purpose of not sinning henceforth is required, but not necessarily the penitent's persuasion that he will no longer sin or will no longer perpetrate this or that sin. For someone can truly sorrow over and detest sin, and truly and absolutely purpose that he will not sin henceforth, although he greatly fears, indeed certainly believes, that because of the experienced inconstancy of his will and his fragility he will fall again. If the penitent thus loses heart, the confessor must dispose him before absolution so that he may hope that, not by his own strength but by the grace of God, he can avoid sins, saying with the Apostle: "I can do all things in Him who strengthens me." But if the penitent cannot or, rather, will not conceive any hope at all of amendment, he now commits the sin of despair and is not worthy of absolution.

2. Purpose must be efficacious as to three things: the penitent must 1. employ the necessary means for avoiding sins, for example, prayer, vigilance, and so forth; 2. avoid the occasion of sinning insofar as he can (what an occasion of sinning is will be stated below, where there will be discussion of those in occasions and recidivists); 3. repair according to his strength the damage which perhaps has arisen to his neighbor from his sins, for example, from the sin of theft. It suffices, however, that the purpose be efficacious affectively, that is, that the penitent here and now have a serious will to execute those things which are necessary for avoiding sins. Let the confessor beware lest he command the penitent something as a strictly necessary means which is in truth only useful.

3. Purpose must be universal, inasmuch as it altogether excludes all mortal sins to be committed. But if the penitent confesses only venial sins or includes in confession only free matter, then nevertheless, just as true contrition is required for the validity of the sacrament, so also a true purpose, which must extend either a) to avoiding all mortal sins, or b) to avoiding one venial sin, or c) to amending a determinate species of sins, for example, sins of the tongue, or d) to avoiding all deliberate venial sins, or at least e) to diminishing the frequency of venial sins.

¹⁵⁷ St. Thomas, S. theol. 3, q. 84, a. 10 ad 4.

¹⁵⁸ For example, Sporer, De poenit. n. 310.

357. Practical admonition. When the faithful frequently confess the same sins, which arise not so much from fragility as from manifest negligence, it is lawful to conjecture, although not to judge with certainty, that they elicit purposes that are too general or not sufficiently vigorous. Therefore they are to be admonished to elicit contrition and purpose with greater diligence. Not rarely penitents also, especially women, spend a long time in the examination of conscience, seek out the smallest faults with the greatest anxiety, and make long confessions, yet are not so solicitous concerning sorrow and firm purpose. They are to be seriously instructed to insist more upon eliciting perfect contrition and establishing a firm and specially determined purpose, omitting the anxious recital of all venial sins. To increase the firmness of purpose, it is also beneficial for penitents to renew it more frequently after confession, for example, every day.

1679. DEFINITION. Purpose, which is the other part of contrition, is the fixed and ratified counsel or decree of the will, not to sin any more

in the future. - It is an act of the virtue of prudence. "Penance," says St. Thomas,¹ "also regards future sin, according as it has something of the act of prudence joined to it... And because of this, he who is contrite sorrows for past sin and guards against future sin."

DIVISION. A TWO-FOLD purpose is distinguished: one explicit or formal, the other implicit or virtual. - The former is had when someone, thinking of future time, expressly enters upon the counsel of not sinning any more; the latter, when someone actually sorrows for his sins without extending his thought to future time; for in such sorrow the will of not sinning any more is already included.

1680. Principles. I. A FORMAL or VIRTUAL purpose of not sinning thereafter is of the essence of the Sacrament of Penance. - This is clear from what was said concerning contrition; for this, in order that it be appretiatively supreme, must exclude every affection for sin and every will of sinning; but this is nothing other than the purpose of not sinning any more in the future; therefore.

It is asked: Whether in the Sacrament of Penance a VIRTUAL or IMPLICIT purpose in sorrow suffices?

Resp. There are three opinions. - The first denies it with Scotus, Cano, Cajetan, etc., because although sorrow necessarily includes purpose, nevertheless Trent seems in fact to require a formal purpose, saying: "with the purpose of not sinning thereafter." - The second, with Lugo, etc., affirms it, namely if sorrow is elicited from a universal motive. This rests likewise on the authority of Trent, saying "that attrition, if it excludes the will of sinning, with hope of pardon, already disposes man to obtain grace in the Sacrament." Finally, the third opinion, which Holzmann holds, distinguishes and says: If the penitent thinks nothing of the future, as is accustomed to happen with the sick near death, an implicit purpose suffices. But otherwise, if he thinks of the future, in which case he must formally propose amendment, because according to Trent each one ought through penance to begin a new life. Thus St. Alphonsus.

"These two last opinions are indeed more probable; but because the first does not lack its probability, in practice before the fact the SAFER is to be followed"; indeed even after the fact, if it is certain that explicit purpose was lacking; for he who certainly committed grave fault is bound to fulfill confession of it, not only probably, but also certainly validly.² (cf. n. 427, Hence 2.) - Yet, says Scavini,³ "in practice no one ought to be disturbed about this; since it scarcely, and not even scarcely, happens that a truly contrite penitent omits even an explicit purpose, although he does not reflect on this, which is not necessary."⁴

1681. II. There are three conditions of a true purpose, namely that it be FIRM, UNIVERSAL, and EFFICACIOUS. - Thus all.

1. The purpose must be FIRM. This imports that the penitent has a will altogether deliberate not to relapse into fault, and is disposed in soul so that he would not wish to admit sin in the future from fear of any evil, or from desire of any good. - Such a disposition is required for true conversion, as is clear; because the will of sinning must be abolished absolutely and for any case whatever.⁵

It is asked: Whether purpose can be firm with FORESEEING of relapse?

Resp. 1. He who fears relapse because of experienced mutability of his will is not therefore to be judged to lack firm purpose; for theologians commonly say that a serious will of not relapsing can stand with fear of a fall from human frailty. - Hence, a confessor would certainly err who refused absolution to a truly disposed penitent because he foresees that he will relapse. But on the contrary:

Resp. 2. He who certainly believes that he will relapse cannot prudently be held as disposed. "I do not deny," says St. Alphonsus⁶ against many, "that, speculatively speaking, firm purpose of the will could well consist with knowledge of relapse; but when someone certainly believes that he will relapse, practically he gives a certain suspicion that the purpose of his will is not sufficiently firm; for it is impossible that someone firmly propose to amend himself, knowing that God does not deny His helping grace to one doing what is in him, and nevertheless, these things notwithstanding, believe certainly that he will return to his sins. Hence Croix rightly says that such a penitent, before he is absolved, must be disposed so that he hopes he will be freed from sins, not through his own powers, but through the help of God." (cf. n. 539.) But to prove the firmness of purpose, "it is not necessary, indeed it is NOT EXPEDIENT, to make particular comparisons, for example: I would rather suffer this or that evil than sin mortally; because they are dangerous. And much less is it expedient to choose hell rather; because according to the present providence of God, since hell is destined for those who are confirmed in sin through eternal hatred toward God, man would incongruously choose hell in order to avoid sin, in which he could not remain without sinning."⁷

2. The purpose must be UNIVERSAL, at least concerning mortal sins. Thus all with St. Thomas.⁸ "Nor are certain authors to be heard who think that, just as particular sorrow is valid, so also particular purpose is valid; for it is answered that particular sorrow is admitted because sorrow regards only sins committed; but particular purpose cannot be admitted, because anyone must be prepared to avoid all mortal sins which he can commit; and therefore Trent, speaking of sorrow, says: 'Sorrow is detestation concerning sin committed'; but speaking of purpose, it says, 'with the purpose of not sinning thereafter.'"

"It was said concerning mortal sins; because with respect to venials, it is certain with St. Thomas that it suffices if the penitent proposes to abstain from some one, saying, for example, I propose not to lie any more, without proposing to abstain from the rest. For the rest, a man can propose to avoid all deliberate venial sins; and as regards indeliberate sins, it suffices to propose to avoid them insofar as human frailty permits, as the same Angelic Doctor says."⁹ (cf. n. 1667, 4.)

3. The purpose must be EFFICACIOUS, that is, have force for doing what is proposed. "Therefore it is necessary that the penitent propose not only to avoid sin, but also to apply the means for avoiding sin, and notably the proximate occasions of sinning, as is commonly taught."¹⁰ But concerning these there will be a longer discourse where the office of the confessor is treated (cf. n. 1821).

Meanwhile let it be noted: 1. "It is not always true that only then is purpose efficacious when that which is proposed is carried out; otherwise, as often as the penitent relapsed, so often would he be bound to repeat confessions; for relapse is not always a sign of an infirm purpose, but often only a sign of a changed will. Thus Peter truly proposed rather to die than deny Christ, and nevertheless at the first voice of the maidservant he denied." Thus St. Alphonsus against the Rigorists.¹¹

2. A defect of true purpose is discerned more from neglect of the means than from multiple relapse; because it is easier to apply remedies than to abstain from sin, on account of the vehement propensity into it from custom.¹² But when relapse into sins is to be held as a morally certain argument of a vicious purpose will be explained below, where Recidivists are treated (n. 1828).

S. Th. III, q. 84, a. 10, ad 4; q. 87, a. 1, ad 1; Suppl., q. 2, a. 4.

486. Principle I. The purpose required for contrition is the deliberate will not to sin for the future. - It is required for the sacrament, according to the Council of Trent, which, handing down the definition of contrition which is part of the sacrament, says that it is "sorrow... with purpose" (sess. 14, c. 4).

That it is necessarily required for the sacrament is clear:

1. From the Council of Trent itself, which places purpose in the definition of contrition; and that it is placed there as an essential part is clear from the parallelism with the place where there is discourse concerning attrition: for there it is said that attrition disposes with the sacrament to justification "if it excludes the will of sinning."

2. From intrinsic reasons: For the remission of sin there is required the true will of detesting, or of turning oneself altogether away from sin and converting oneself to God. But without the purpose of no longer sinning this cannot be done. - On the other hand, if someone truly sorrows over sin above all things, the formal reason of sorrow is that sin under some special aspect is against God. But sin being against God is verified in future sin just as in past sin, with only the accidental difference of time. Therefore.

487. Principle II. An implicit purpose can suffice, nor is an explicit purpose necessarily required. - An explicit and formal purpose is a special act of the will, distinct from sorrow, by which someone determines that he wills to amend his life or abstain from sin; an implicit or virtual purpose is that which is included in sincere contrition, and is really sorrow: for he who from a universal motive seriously sorrows that he has sinned truly implicitly purposes that he will sin no more.

This latter can suffice, nor is an explicit purpose necessarily and from the nature of the thing required, since it is not of the essence of contrition, which even from an implicit and virtual purpose alone suffices for the sacrament, since, as Trent requires, it excludes the will of sinning.¹ Whence 1) an implicit purpose suffices if someone does not think about sins to be avoided in the future; 2) but if he has thought about them, he ought also connaturally to elicit an explicit purpose, otherwise it would be a sign that contrition is not sincere and supreme. Therefore in practice a) before confession penitents are to be exhorted to an explicit purpose, for greater security and certainty concerning their own disposition; b) after confession has been made, if an explicit purpose was not present, they are not to be disturbed.

¹ Cf. Gury-Ballerini, Th. M., II, n. 462.

488. Principle III. Purpose requires four qualities: it must be absolute, firm, efficacious, and universal.

1° By reason of essence it must be absolute, i.e., there must exist here and now an absolute will not to sin again, but to guard against sin thereafter.

Therefore not any simple desire of not sinning suffices, nor a velleity, nor a conditioned will, e.g., I would will not to sin any more if I could, if temptation were not pressing, unless it were so difficult and troublesome to me, etc. Nor does a will not to sin for a time suffice, e.g., I will not sin for a month.

2° By reason of proportion the purpose must be firm, i.e., so rooted in the will that here and now there is present the will not to sin, notwithstanding the fear of any evil whatever or the love of any good whatever; wherefore absolution would have to be denied to one who is not here and now disposed so that generally he would rather suffer every evil and be without any good than again offend God.

It is said: a) Here and now, i.e., by actual will; nor is it required that it so remain in the future, for someone can change his will. Whence a firm purpose of the will does not exclude fear or doubt, nor even some intellectual foresight of future relapse from one's own known inconstancy or fragility, provided that it is not with the absence of all confidence or with despair, or therefore with complete certainty of relapse, but amendment is held as possible with the help of God and is intended.

For purpose does not require a positive judgment that one will sin no more. For purpose is an actual disposition of the will, which is detestative of sin and wills to preserve this detestation. But judgment pertains to the intellect, which, knowing the inconstancy of the will, can foresee that a fall is possible, indeed probable. Whence purpose does not exclude this judgment, but only the judgment of certain relapse and impossible avoidance: for hope is concerning a future possible good.

b) Generally, i.e., in genus or in a confused way, for according to the common opinion of Doctors the confessor must take care not to propose to the penitent in particular evils to be borne or goods to be relinquished. For it can happen, and in reality does happen, that someone generally wills to bear all evils rather than admit sin, who would no longer will this if they were distinctly and vividly proposed in the individual. It is indeed true that this general purpose is remiss and much less perfect than another purpose; nevertheless, according to the common and certain opinion of theologians, it is sufficient, and in reality one who purposes in this way truly wills to avoid sin above all things.²

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, on Penance, n. 458.

The firmness of the purpose does not make it so that the violation of the purpose constitutes a new guilt of itself, as from a violated vow or promise. For purpose is not a vow, because it is not made to God but with respect to oneself; nor is it a promise, because a promise is made to another; and although the purpose is made in some way in service of God, nevertheless it is not a promise made to God.

3° Purpose also, by reason of efficiency, must be efficacious, so that the sinner here and now wills to employ the means necessary for afterward avoiding sin, and especially wills to flee proximate occasions of sinning mortally, to remit offenses, to lay aside hatreds and enmities, and to restore for injuries. The reason is that the intention of the end, if it is true, must move one to seek the necessary means.

Efficacy is required affectively, not effectively. For a) it regards the present will and brings it about that, as long as the purpose remains in the soul, so long the sinner cannot sin again; b) but it is not the efficacy of a future event, insofar as from the fact that the purpose is here and now efficacious it would follow that sin is in fact never again committed thereafter; otherwise it would be enough once to elicit a good purpose so that someone would never sin again. Whence, from the fact that, after having had a purpose, someone has frequently relapsed into the same mortal sin, you will not necessarily infer that he did not have an efficacious purpose. Therefore purpose must be efficacious affectively, and from the fact that it was not effectively efficacious, it cannot be concluded that it was not affectively efficacious (cf. III, q. 84, a. 10, ad 4).

Hence to the question whether purpose must be constant in order to be called efficacious, the response is: per se, negatively, because the human will is mutable. Per se, for if the penitent should relapse at once and with almost no resistance, this will be a motive for suspecting that the penitent lacked a truly efficacious purpose. Generally, one who efficaciously purposes does not so easily forget his purpose, and is accustomed at least for some short time to employ effort and persevere.

4° Finally, purpose by reason of matter must be universal, i.e., it must extend itself to all mortal sins, not only those perpetrated, but whatever ones are to be avoided thereafter.

Nevertheless, 1) it is not required that a special purpose be formed concerning individual sins to be avoided, but a general one concerning all in genus from a universal motive suffices. Nor is it required 2) that it extend itself to venial sins. But if only venial sins are declared, for the validity of the sacrament there is required at least a) a purpose concerning one declared venial sin, namely, concerning avoiding a sin altogether similar in altogether the same circumstances, or concerning all sins, not indeed of the same species, but of altogether the same condition; or b) concerning avoiding a certain kind of venial sins; or c) concerning avoiding the graver ones; or d) concerning avoiding fully deliberate ones; or e) concerning diminishing the number of venial sins (S. Th. III, q. 87, a. 1, ad 1). Purpose can also be had concerning avoiding individual venial sins, or concerning all to be avoided distributively, but not concerning all to be avoided collectively, because we can avoid individual ones, but to avoid all at once is impossible for us.

I say. The purpose of not sinning henceforth, at least implicit, is absolutely necessary for the remission of sin. The reason is that otherwise contrition itself would be illusory; for he does not truly detest sin who has the mind of committing it again. But a true purpose must enjoy a threefold condition; namely it is required that it be firm, efficacious, and universal. Therefore it must be:

1°. Firm, namely the penitent must have a sincere will of not relapsing into sin, notwithstanding any inconvenience or human fear whatever; for otherwise he would not will to be totally and sincerely converted to God. Yet the confessor ought not to test the soul of the penitent by employing comparisons, or by proposing inconveniences and certain particular difficulties suited to disturb his imagination.

2°. Efficacious, that is, the penitent must not only firmly establish that he does not wish to sin further, but must also employ the means necessary for avoiding sin and fleeing proximate occasions, etc. - But it suffices that the purpose be efficacious affectively, that is, it suffices that the sinner be prepared in soul to employ the necessary means; because future amendment in fact is not of the essence of purpose.

3°. Universal, or it must extend to all mortal sins, not only those committed, but also those which could be committed. The reason is that full and true conversion to God cannot be given without aversion from every lethal sin.

Question 1. Whether purpose, in order that it be firm, must besides be found constant? Resp. Negatively, at least absolutely and generally speaking. The reason is that purpose affects the present will, which otherwise from its nature is variable. Hence from relapse after confession, infirmity of purpose cannot be gathered per se. - I said absolutely and generally speaking; for if the penitent relapses immediately and with almost no resistance, it can sometimes offer some indication, or at least suspicion, that he lacked a truly firm purpose; for one who firmly purposes does not so easily forget his purpose, but usually perseveres constant at least for some time, and employs efforts for resisting temptations or occasions of sin, and consequently ordinarily falls with greater difficulty and more rarely. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 451 and 459. Lugo, disp. 14, nn. 160 and seq.

Question 2. Whether the purpose of one who indeed has the mind of not sinning, yet fears and in some way foresees that he will relapse, can be judged firm? Resp. Affirmatively, generally speaking: for fear does not impede a sincere will, when it is thrown in from past fragility and the inconstancy of the human will. Hence that penitent has true purpose who, when the confessor asks about the will of not sinning, responds: I am fragile; I fear a fall; nevertheless I do not now will it. But in practice the disposition of the penitent must be inspected: for you will find not rarely sinners asserting that they are going to relapse, who for this reason doubt that they have a sufficiently firm purpose, and yet show nothing other than fear of relapsing and distrust of themselves. It must be inculcated upon penitents of this kind that the matter is not about those things which perhaps are going to happen, but about the actual will and about confidence to be placed in divine help. Cf. Lacroix, lib. 6, part. 2, n. 1733. - Baller. note (a) p. 344.

Question 3. Whether an explicit purpose is required for receiving the sacrament of Penance rightly? Resp. It is greatly controverted among theologians. The first opinion affirms absolutely; because although sorrow necessarily includes purpose, nevertheless an explicit purpose seems to be required by Trent saying: "with the purpose of not sinning henceforth." The other opinion denies absolutely; because if purpose is truly and properly contained in sorrow, which is altogether certain, nothing further ought to be required; but the words of the Council of Trent, say the patrons of this opinion, do not indicate the necessity of an explicit purpose, but only that sorrow, in order to be true, must contain a firm mind of not sinning henceforth, namely be joined with purpose. Added is the authority of the Roman Council under Benedict XIII, which, in the Instruction for children about to receive the sacrament of Penance, placed at the end of the Decrees, requires only for the value of the sacrament that there be had at least an implicit purpose. This opinion is defended by very many and most excellent theologians, and by some of them is called common, morally certain, or even most true. Finally the third opinion, which St. Alphonsus testifies is called common, teaches that if the penitent thinks about future life, he must formally propose amendment; but otherwise if he thinks nothing of the future. For if he thinks about the future, all agree that it can scarcely happen that the penitent grieves sincerely without at the same time eliciting an explicit and formal purpose.

With these opinions set forth, St. Alphonsus gives his judgment thus: "Those two latter opinions are indeed more probable; but because the first is not without its probability, in practice before the fact it is more safely to be followed." Besides, since, as the same holy Doctor testifies, most even of those who are alleged for the first opinion, although he himself does not acquiesce, agree that if in good faith you have confessed with true sorrow without a formal purpose, you are not bound to repeat the confession, this will already be the one practical conclusion, at once easy and safe: - before the fact let an explicit purpose be elicited, especially if someone is thinking about future life; but after the fact no one is to be troubled. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 450. Salmant. chap. 5, n. 54. - Laymann, chap. 4, n. 6. - Baller. note (a) p. 346; and note (c) p. 347. Lehmkuhl, n. 298.

Question 4. What purpose is required and suffices for the value of the sacrament, where only venial sins are accused? Resp. The same must be said concerning purpose as was said above concerning the sorrow required when only venial sins are accused; and consequently just as it is certain that purpose concerning all venial sins is not required, because these are compatible with the infusion of grace, so it is certain that purpose concerning only one of those things which are accused is required and suffices, whether it is some venial sin committed since the last confession, or whether it is some venial or mortal sin of the past life, and often already accused, even if that accusation is made only according to species, even the lowest species. Indeed not only does this suffice, but it is also expedient that from several venial sins which are accused, some one principal sin be selected, to the detesting and amending of which the soul is applied before the others. - Cf. Sporer, n. 339. - Elbel, nn. 113 and seq.

I. Fr. Dominic Viva in his Treatise on the Propositions of Innocent XI, no. 16: “Hence, since it seems to be morally certain that there is not required in the sacrament of Penance a formal purpose of not sinning henceforth, but that a virtual one suffices, as may be seen in Dicastillo, AND THAT THERE SUFFICES ALSO A SUPERNATURAL ATTRITION FROM THE FEAR OF TEMPORAL PUNISHMENTS, AS TO BE INFLICTED BY GOD THE AVENGER, and other things of this kind — therefore we lawfully follow opinions of this kind, THE MOST LAX, the safer being omitted.”

I. QUESTION I. Ought a penitent to elicit grief for sin with the intention of confessing? ANSWER. De Lugo, Aversa, Tamburini, Gobat, Moya, Sporer, Illsung, and others deny it. But this opinion is to be rejected as less probable. That grief is a sacramental action. Therefore by the intention of the penitent it is to be subjected to the sacramental form. For an intention is necessary not in the minister alone, but also in the penitent. These things nevertheless are not to be discussed metaphysically and subtly, since by the very fact that a man wills to confess and grieves for his sins, his grief in fact bears a respect to the sacrament. As regards this, therefore, the minds of penitents are not to be tormented.

II. QUESTION II. Ought grief to precede confession, or is it enough that it be elicited after confession and before absolution? ANSWER. All affirm that grief ought to precede absolution, since it is its proximate matter. But theologians dispute the other part, namely whether it ought to precede the confession which is called sorrowful. Navarrus, Toletus, Vásquez, Hurtado, Diana, Bonacina, Suárez, de Lugo, Sporer, Gobat, Moya, Tamburini, and others defend that it is enough that it follow the confession and precede absolution. Others maintain the opposite. Sudden and unusual cases being excepted, speaking commonly, it is to me more probable that it ought to precede confession: both because in the sacraments we ought to follow the safer things when the matter is called into controversy; and because by that middle grief the penitent ought to pass from the state of mortal sin and diabolical servitude to the state of the sons of God. That passage, commonly speaking, is not made in an instant, or in a few moments. Account nevertheless is to be had of penitents. For when the just confess, they most easily grieve and are contrite, since they are habitually disposed. On the contrary sinners, laden with a grave bundle, more difficultly conceive this birth of grief. It is the part of confessors to instruct penitents that, before they approach the sacred tribunal, they spend some congruous time in conceiving this grief. Let them propose to them what points they ought to meditate, what considerations to form, that they may excite themselves to conceive this grief: let them be taught that there is need of prayers, by which they may implore help from God, whereby they may be able to be contrite as they ought.

III. That grief ought so to endure that by force of it the penitent be absolved, since that grief is the matter of absolution. Diana relates many who defend that a grief elicited several years before endures, provided it has not been retracted. Which opinion is false and lax. Escobar, Diana, and Arriaga admit an antecedence of long time. Others say that a grief elicited four or six days before, others a month before, suffices. But why do I waste time in heaping up these false opinings? The grief must be morally present. For practice, grief is to be conceived before confession and to be renewed in the confession itself, when absolution is to be imparted.

IV. In the confession of venial sins also this grief is necessary. It is not necessary that grief be conceived for all venial sins, since venial sins are not necessary but free matter: it is enough that grief be conceived for some graver venial sin, and that an express purpose be had of avoiding it, when no necessary matter is subjected to the keys.

V. QUESTION III. What is to be said of the opinion of Fr. Viva asserting that a grief conceived from the motive of temporal loss is enough for Confession? ANSWER. Fr. Dominic Viva in his Treatise on proposition 1 of Innocent XI, no. 26, teaches that a supernatural attrition from the fear of temporal punishments, as to be inflicted by God the avenger, suffices; and concludes: We lawfully follow opinions of this kind which are most probable, the safer being omitted. Who defined that opinions of this kind are most probable? The probabilists? But the Roman See, even granting that they were most probable, commands that in the sacraments, when it is a question of matter and form, we follow the SAFER opinions, the probable being omitted.

VI. Fr. Tamburini, Book 1, Method of Confession, chapter 1, § 4, no. 11, says: “Among the motives of attrition, of which we have spoken at no. 4, although some do not admit another fourth — that is, fear of a temporal evil … fear of infamy, of chains, of sickness, and so forth — nevertheless in a most probable opinion this motive also is sufficient, if evils of this kind be feared as inflicted by God, or to be inflicted.”

VII. This opinion I reckon not only false and lax, but contained in the Innocentian decree. Tamburini there confesses that the Doctors teach the opposite. Therefore the opinion is controverted. Therefore the safer is to be embraced. Tamburini objects: Trent does not define that grief is to be conceived from fear of hell, or of another spiritual or eternal punishment, but adds in general from fear of punishments. Evidently is Tamburini deceived, with the others. The Council says: from fear of hell and of punishments. The proposition is copulative. Why therefore do you dismiss hell, set in the first place, and coupled by a copulative particle with punishments? The punishment owed to mortal sin is eternal. Therefore a sinner ought to grieve for an eternal evil to be inflicted by God. Fear ye not them that kill the body … but rather fear him that can destroy both soul and body in hell. Matthew 10. So the Evangelists, so Trent. Therefore the opinion of Tamburini, Viva, and others is evidently false.

VIII. QUESTION IV. What is to be said of the opinion of Fr. Tamburini teaching that it is not to be inculcated upon a sinner that he grieve for that sin toward which he is affected with a great love? ANSWER. Natural reason itself dictates that that wound should chiefly be cured which lies in ambush more inwardly for the soul. But Fr. Tamburini, Book 1, Method of Confession, chapter 1, § 3, no. 5, writes: “Whence when you advert that your penitent is greatly addicted to some crime, do not inculcate an act of grief concerning that peculiar sin. For a danger will underlie it, lest he detest it from his soul while its special memory is rubbed up again; whereas of detesting it in general and together with the others he will feel either no difficulty or a slight one.”

IX. Beware, O confessors, says Fr. Tamburini, lest you persuade penitents to elicit an act of grief for that fault which they perish for like a beloved mistress, and toward which they are borne impotently: because a danger will underlie it lest they detest it from their soul. Is it therefore not necessary that a sinner should from his soul detest that fault which he follows with a vehement love? It is enough, replies Tamburini, that he should grieve for this greatly beloved fault confused and covered over with the crowd of other crimes. For in this fashion the penitent will easily detest that sin lurking within the multitude of sins: then he will feel no difficulty, or a slight one. On the contrary, if he look upon this beloved fault of his with unveiled face, a danger will underlie it lest he detest it from his soul.

X. Every man is bound by some dominant and reigning passion and appetition. All the Fathers and preachers cry out that Christians should restrain, press down, and subdue this dominant passion, this reigning affection. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, so as to obey the lusts thereof, says St. Paul, Romans 6. In this man avarice dominates, in that lust, in another anger, in another vengeance. Unless each man arm himself with a peculiar grief and fortitude against this raging and reigning beast, it is all over with his salvation. How false therefore, and how lax the aforesaid doctrine is, let each man sit as judge.

XI. QUESTION V. Is a formal and explicit purpose of not sinning thereafter required? ANSWER. Fr. Tamburini in the place cited, § 5, no. 7, subjoins: In the probable opinion of others it is enough that it be implicit, that is, that which is involved in the act itself of detestation or displeasure. This opinion Diana, Gormaz, de Lugo, Vásquez, and many others similarly teach. But it is openly false: for the opposite is taught by St. Thomas, Albert the Great, Durandus, Scotus, Cajetan, Cano, Soto, and Cardinal Bellarmine, who in Book 2 On Penance, chapter 6, writes these things: But to us the common and trodden way of the ancients is always safer and more suitable. It is proved therefore that for contrition there is required an explicit and formal purpose of a better life. Would that all men were willing to tread this way trodden by the ancients. Trent, besides an efficacious and universal grief, in which indeed a virtual purpose is contained, requires a purpose of not sinning thereafter. If a virtual purpose contained in the efficacious grief sufficed, it would be superfluous that the Council should require a purpose besides the efficacious grief. Someone cries out to the contrary: if besides an efficacious and universal grief a purpose were required, there would be not three but four parts of penance. It is an empty sophism. There are three parts of penance. But contrition consists of two things, namely grief for the sin committed and a purpose of not sinning thereafter. It can nevertheless happen that a penitent be so carried away with vehement grief that he think not of the purpose; but if he adverted, he would conceive a most firm resolution of not sinning thereafter. The discourse now is of those things which commonly and everywhere happen, not of some rare and sudden case.

I. That you may be able, Christian reader, to form the true image of that justification which certain younger casuists depict, recall to mind that they teach that for the sacrament a servile attrition conceived from fear of eternal punishment is enough. And here advert a little, that those things which are done from fear are not firm and stable, since fear brings in a certain violence. For those things which we dread we desire to blot out of our mind.

II. Secondly I would have you recall that those Doctors go further, teaching that a fear conceived from dread of hell or of eternal flames is not necessary, but that it is enough that grief be conceived from some temporal evil inflicted, or to be inflicted, by God as a supernatural author — suppose from infamy, from prison, from sickness. Passing then to the purpose, which Trent defined to be necessary, they teach that an express one is not required, but that it is enough that it be implicit, contained in that grief conceived from a temporal evil, as has been said. Hear now what they teach concerning this purpose, and you will straightway form the true image of the new justification brought in by men.

III. The prerogatives, or conditions, of a true purpose are three: first, that it be universal; second, that it be stable, constant, firm; third, that it be efficacious. A confessor nevertheless ought not to propose, nor a penitent to form, these hypotheses: What should I do if a most cruel death were threatened by a tyrant, if a vast patrimony were held out to me, that I should sin again? and so forth. These hypotheses can disturb the minds of some penitents: therefore they are to be abstained from. It is enough that they firmly purpose to abstain from all sins, and that they renew the purpose chiefly against those sins to which they are greatly addicted. It is enough that in general they purpose that they will rather die and lose all their goods than gravely offend God, without its being necessary to descend to this or that most bitter torment. Those three conditions theologians commonly teach to be necessary for a true purpose. Let us hear what very many casuists teach. For readers are not so much to be taught as to be untaught, that they may abstain from, or lay aside, false opinings.

IV. QUESTION I. What is to be said of the opinion which teaches that a purpose suffices for Confession, although the penitent certainly know that he will relapse? ANSWER. Lest they say that I impose upon the casuists, Sporer writes these things, part 3, chapter 1, section 4, no. 310, page 204: “For a man can truly grieve for and detest sin, and truly and absolutely purpose that he will not sin thereafter, or conceive a firm and sufficient purpose of abstaining hereafter; although he greatly fear, or even reckon, nay certainly BELIEVE that on account of the experienced inconstancy of his own will and his own frailty he will relapse anew: that he will not avoid all mortal sins, or this certain kind of sin. Whence if a penitent say: I altogether indeed grieve, and firmly purpose to abstain hereafter; yet meanwhile I KNOW, I shall do it again, I shall fall again, I have already so often experienced it — he is to be ABSOLVED as WELL DISPOSED, a due confirmation and consolation being sent before: because the sense of the words I shall do it again is only indicative, or enunciative on the part of the intellect.”

V. Against the transcribed doctrine St. Augustine cries out, Book 8 of the Confessions, chapter 9: Whence this monstrous thing? The will commands itself, and it is not done what it commands? Therefore it does not command with its whole heart. If that penitent certainly reckons that he will relapse, then he does not hope from God the grace by which he may be able to resist temptation: and if he does not hope, he is unworthy of absolution. Either that penitent is justified through absolution, or not. If you deny it, then the penitent perpetrates a sacrilege. If he is justified, then he in fact has the grace by which he can abstain from sin. Do you deny it? Then you are a Jansenist. Alas, how many Jansenistic propositions are in the Ethics of certain men, where, invincible ignorance being everywhere vaunted and the infirmity of sinners, several mandates of the Decalogue are traduced as impossible! And yet these same men cry out that divine grace is always present to the blind and the hardened. But because this grace is versatile, therefore they teach that a penitent certainly believes that he will relapse. That penitent described by Fr. Sporer is at least sincere, though sacrilegious. He knows that his past Confessions were sacrilegious, from the defect of a true purpose; and therefore, taught by experience, he sincerely confesses that he believes and knows that he will relapse: because he knows that he will not leave his mistress, his usuries, his perjuries, and like crimes. But at the same time penitents know that they will find casuists and confessors from whom they may receive absolution and the sacred Eucharist. Fr. Sporer subjoins: otherwise if the sense were optative. Good heavens! This alone was wanting, that he should wish for sin.

VI. QUESTION II. What is to be said of the censure which Fr. Francolino burns upon Bishop Gennet, because he wills that the purpose be firm and constant? ANSWER. Fr. Francolino in his Roman Clergy, Book 2, column 10, disputation 10, no. 26, page 99 of the last Venice edition, writes these things: “Francis Gennet in his most recent Moral Theology published at Paris in the year 1705. Out of several examples of his MOST RIGID doctrine, whence grave absurdities follow, I shall bring forward one from Vol. IV, tract 6, On the Sacrament of Penance, where, chapter 5, question 9, he teaches that for true contrition in this sacrament there is required as necessary a CONSTANT purpose: he does not say a purpose, but a constant purpose; and that this must be made known to the confessor before he absolve.”

VII. Fr. Francolino besides reproves in the same place Bishop Gennet for asserting that credence is not often to be given to the tears of sinners. Then Fr. Francolino concludes there at no. 27: Who ever heard doctrines so ABSURD, so SEVERE?

VIII. Who ever heard a Catholic writer rising up so openly against the Apostle Paul himself, let alone against Bishop Gennet? For the doctrine of Gennet is the very doctrine of St. Paul saying: For the sorrow that is according to God worketh penance STEADFAST. And again Paul teaches: If so ye continue in the faith, grounded and settled, and immoveable. And St. Paul wills penitents to be constant, stable, and immoveable, and Gennet with him. But Fr. Francolino cries out to the contrary: Who ever heard doctrines so absurd? Did the most holy Apostle Paul teach absurd things?

IX. The doctrine of Francolino Fr. La Croix transcribed, Book 6, part 2, no. 1824. I ask: ought a penitent to have a constant or an inconstant will? If the first, then you teach a most rigid doctrine, says Francolino with Fr. La Croix. Therefore it suffices to have an inconstant will. But who will not openly convict this consequence, adverse to St. Paul, of falsity? Say, reader: would you entrust moneys on loan to those who had a will not constant but inconstant of restoring them?

X. QUESTION III. What is to be said concerning the universal purpose of avoiding all mortal sins? ANSWER. The second condition of the purpose required for confession is a universal will of abstaining from all and each of the mortal sins. This doctrine is certain and manifest, and St. Thomas teaches it, III, q. 87, art. 1, reply 1. Penance, he says, for mortal sins requires that a man purpose to abstain from all and each of the mortal sins. All the ancient theologians teach the same. The contrary opining is maintained by Aversa, Hurtado, Piatelli, and Dicastillo, who calls the former doctrine singular. The opinion of these writers I judge false and contrary to the divine Scriptures. Not enough did Fr. La Croix consult the peril of his readers, writing, Book 6, part 2, no. 898: “It seems MORE PROBABLE that for absolution from mortal sins there is required a universal purpose of guarding hereafter against all mortal sins.” For if it is only more probable, according to him the opposite opinion of Piatelli, Hurtado, and others is still probable; which therefore anyone can follow according to the probabilists. But who would dare to assert that one approaching the sacrament of Penance without a universal purpose of avoiding all mortal sins is justified?

XI. What kind of penance is that which has been devised by these Doctors? There suffices, according to some, a servile grief conceived even from fear of a temporal evil to be inflicted by God. An explicit purpose is not required. It is not required that it be constant. It is not required that it be universal. Is this the penance which Christ and the Evangelists teach?

XII. The third condition of the purpose required for confession is that it be efficacious, that is, that what is purposed be carried into effect, as St. Thomas wisely declares on Psalm 48. A purpose is best manifested by operation. Moreover, that a purpose may be called efficacious, penitents must have a will of abstaining not only from sins, but also from the dangers and occasions which impel to sins.

XIII. QUESTION IV. What occasions ought a penitent to avoid, that his purpose may be called efficacious? ANSWER. There is a twofold kind of occasions. Some remote, which occur almost everywhere; others proximate, which by their own nature, all things regarded, induce to sin: or in which a man constituted either rarely or never abstains from sin. Of these occasions some are free, others necessary. Occasions of the first kind a man freely seeks or retains. Of the second kind are those from which a man cannot withdraw, as sons of a family and others subject to servitude. Besides, one occasion is proximate absolutely, as concubinage, cohabitation with a mistress, and so forth. Another occasion is proximate relatively, as familiar conversation with such a girl or woman: to Titius it will be a proximate occasion, but not to Sempronius.

XIV. QUESTION V. What do very many probabilists teach concerning the purpose of avoiding proximate occasions? ANSWER. I should fill a volume if I wished to recount all the opinions which seem to me false: in passing I shall touch upon a few. First, they teach that women are to be absolved who do not purpose modestly to cover their bared breasts. Second, who do not purpose to moderate superfluous ornament and luxury. Third, who are unwilling to dismiss paints, artificial colours of the face. Fourth, they teach that some servants can serve a concubine, and hold out to her hot foods provoking to venery. Fifth, that they can spread a bed for their master and his mistress without venial fault, and strew it with flowers without mortal. Sixth, that they can conduct a concubine into the house of their master, even if they foresee that they will sin. Seventh, that they can carry little gifts, incitements of base love, to a mistress. Eighth, that it is lawful to let a house to one asking it for fornicating. Ninth, that it is lawful to give a gift to a judge's concubine, that she may intercede with him. There would be no end of writing, if I wished to recount all these paradoxes.

XV. QUESTION VI. What is to be said of the rule which Frs. Sporer, Gobat, Caramuel, and others propose concerning the purpose of avoiding an occasion into which you probably know you will fall? ANSWER. In this matter Probabilism puts forth its strength. These things Fr. Sporer teaches, part 3, chapter 2, section 4, question 2, § 1, no. 314: “For when it is only probable that you will succumb to temptation in such an occasion, it is certainly also PROBABLE that you will not succumb: for there occur grave reasons on account of which a prudent man judges that you will not fall. Certainly, following this his judgment, without the note of rashness, for a reasonable cause you will be able to commit yourself to this occasion — you who certainly would not commit yourself if you knew, or certainly believed, that you would fall. Wherefore a confessor will not judge him to be in a proximate occasion of sinning — for example, of getting drunk, of fornicating, and so forth — who in such a place, being tempted ten times, has succumbed only three or four times; but otherwise if eight or seven times, and has avoided sin only twice or thrice, and come off superior. Wherefore to this man, not to that, unwilling to leave this occasion, absolution will have to be denied. For John Caramuel, Theologia Regularis, disputation 20, no. 1036, wills that absolution be given even to him who was victor as often as he was conquered, Fr. Gobat relating it, case 16, and not contradicting.”

XVI. Animated by this probabilistic doctrine, the lustful, the drunken, and the rest will approach their mistress, the tavern, or another occasion four or three times a day, or in two days, or in three days; twice or thrice they will abstain, twice or thrice they will sin. Nay, that they may be absolved more securely, if they visit their mistress eight times a day, they will sin only once or twice. For then, not only according to Gobat and Caramuel, but also according to other more cautious probabilists, they will be able to be absolved and to be nourished with the eucharistic food. If you inquire of these why those who sin twice or four times in an occasion can be absolved, but not those who sin six times, they answer: So the Doctors teach.

XVII. QUESTION VII. What is a near occasion, and ought a penitent to have a purpose of avoiding it? ANSWER. That is called a near occasion which, the whole complex of circumstances being regarded, gravely allures to fault, so that without great difficulty and caution men are not wont to abstain from fault. These occasions, which by very many are called near, are more often occasions proximate relatively.

XVIII. QUESTION VIII. What is to be said of the opinion of Frs. Sporer, Layman, and others concerning the duty of forsaking near occasions? ANSWER. Fr. Patrick Sporer in the place cited, no. 311, writes these things: “Whence there are to be absolved soldiers, merchants, maidservants, and so forth, to whom from their office, business, house, and so forth, a near danger of sinning threatens, by which they were wont more often to sin; if without great difficulty or notable loss they cannot dismiss it, provided they seriously purpose to avoid sin hereafter. From the common opinion. Layman, chapter 4, no. 9.”

XIX. If they are wont more often to sin, those occasions are, by the common sense of the probabilists, near, and in fact proximate relatively. This doctrine, which, as Fr. Sporer testifies, is common among the probabilist Doctors, is false on a twofold head. For either they are wont more often to sin from the efficacy of the occasion beating upon their frailty: and then it is proximate, and therefore to be forsaken before absolution by the doctrine of the Church: or they are wont more often to sin from malice: and then they are indisposed and unworthy of absolution. Is this that stable and immoveable penance which holy Scripture teaches? It is difficult to forsake occasions. I confess it. What then? What does the Gospel of Christ teach? Prick up your ears, and hear Christ Jesus: Amen I say to you, that a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven. It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven. Matthew 19. And again Mark, chapter 10: How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God! And the disciples were astonished at his words, hearing so much Rigorism. But Christ cries out again — But the disciples, Mark goes on, were astonished at his words. But Jesus again answering, saith to them: Children, how hard is it for them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God! What at last do these oracles bear? If thy eye scandalize thee, pluck it out, and so forth. If thy hand scandalize thee, cut it off. Matthew 5. And again Paul, 1 Thessalonians 5, thunders: From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves. So teach the evangelical Doctors. But the probabilist Doctors teach the opposite. If you had before your eyes these oracles alone of Jesus Christ, and those which I have adduced above, O confessors, O ministers of God, would you not know how to resolve for yourselves, the light of the Scriptures going before, all the controversies which the casuists stir up concerning stable penance, concerning the love of God, concerning a constant purpose, and concerning the forsaking of occasions? Would you not detect the petty opinions of like casuists to be most false and adverse to the Gospel of Christ? Read therefore, I cry again, read the Gospel of Christ, read the word of God: since you together with your penitents are to be judged by God according to the Gospel, and not according to casuist Doctors.

XX. QUESTION IX. What is to be said of the opinion teaching that young men are to be absolved who, while working with women, sin by consent, touches, and copulation, because they do not dwell in the same house? ANSWER. This is the doctrine which Fr. Dominic Viva teaches, question 4, article 5, out of his cited casuists: “Whence Perez, Leander, de Lugo, and others infer that those can be absolved who work or converse with women who do not dwell in the same house: because although sometimes in such an occasion they sin mortally by consent, touches, and even copulation, nevertheless that occasion will be reckoned remote. Since indeed men are not wont from such an occasion ALWAYS, or ALMOST ALWAYS, to sin mortally.” Whether this doctrine be anti-evangelical, let the wise judge: for none is more suited to the fostering of carnal sins between lovers and mistresses, who almost never dwell in the same house, but most frequently come together.

XXI. QUESTION X. What is to be said of the opinion of those who do not require in a sinner for justification express acts of faith and hope? ANSWER. Fr. Dominic Viva writes these things, question 3, article 4, no. 11: “I answer with Leander, Sánchez, Bonacina, Filliucci, and Valentia, against Hurtado, Turrianus, and others, that these express acts are not required: for never have the faithful nor confessors been solicitous about them, as they are solicitous about grief. … Or it suffices that a past act of faith and hope, not retracted, or an act of faith or of hope imbibed in the grief itself.”

XXII. The Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 6, teaches: But they are disposed to that justice itself, when, excited and helped by divine grace, conceiving FAITH from hearing … from the divine fear by which they are struck, they are usefully raised into HOPE, and so forth. More clearly it explains these acts — to believe, to hope, to love — in canon 3, as we have seen above. If those acts imbibed in the grief sufficed, as Leander, Sánchez, Bonacina, Viva, and others contend, they would have been superfluously expressed by the Council. Meditate the genius of these authors, by which they are commonly borne to defining, tempering, and lightening the law, whether of the Scriptures or of the Councils.

XXIII. Again I beg my readers that, void of prejudices and of party zeal, they maturely weigh the whole doctrine of this dissertation, which on the one part I have adduced drawn from the holy Scriptures, from the Council of Trent, and from the Fathers, and on the other part excerpted from the casuist Doctors, defenders of fear-born attrition; that they seriously compare and meditate them, and then bring forth judgment. For all things which I have written, and shall write, I submit with the fullest will to the judgment of the wise and of superiors.

Anna, who recently contracted marriage with Titius, a Protestant, in a Protestant church because she could not obtain from the Bishop a dispensation for a mixed marriage, comes to confession to Caius, a missionary priest in England. Concerning her other sins Anna declares that she is sorry from her heart; concerning the clandestine marriage, however, she is in no way sorry, nor can she be, because she loves her husband so ardently and rejoices in the union. Caius proposes various motives for sorrow, namely that so good a God was offended by marriage with a heretic, grave ecclesiastical laws were despised, and scandal was given to the faithful. At last, with tears, Anna professes that she is sorry for the manner in which the marriage was celebrated; for the marriage itself she neither can nor wills to be sorry, and indeed in the same circumstances she would do the same again. Caius, however, although he has faculties received from the Bishop for validating the marriage, doubts whether Anna is sufficiently disposed to receive absolution. Hence it is asked:

1. What kind of sorrow is required in the sacrament of Penance?

2. What kind of purpose of future amendment is required?

3. What is to be done by Caius?

1. What sort of sorrow is required in the sacrament of Penance?

The sorrow must be true and sincere, supernatural or rooted in faith, universal or it must embrace all the mortal sins that are to be forgiven, and it must be supreme, or the sinner must detest sin more than any other evil, and he must be prepared to do and suffer anything rather than sin again.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 156.

2. What sort of purpose of amendment is required?

The purpose of amendment must be sincere, efficacious, or the sinner must be prepared to take the means necessary to avoid sin in the future, and it must be universal, or extend to all mortal sins at least.²

2 Ibid., 161.

3. The case. Ann had married a Protestant in the Protestant Church and when she came to confession to Caius, she said she could not be sorry for what she had done; indeed she said she would do the same again in the same circumstances. Caius got her to see the malice of her action, and then she said she was sorry for the way in which she had married, but could not feel sorry for the marriage. It is not necessary that she should be sorry that she has the man she loves for her reputed husband, and as far as the past is concerned, it is enough that she is sorry for the way in which she was married against the Church’s laws. But she is still ill disposed for absolution, inasmuch as she says she would do the same again under the same circumstances. Caius must try to put her in better dispositions. In order to do this he may tell her that it will be better not to think of what she would do under the same circumstances, as she will never again be placed in the same circumstances. If she can be got to be really sorry for what was wrong in her action, and to hope that God would give her grace never to yield again, and that she would do all on her side to co-operate with the grace of God, she might be absolved, and then the marriage could be put right. For this it will now be requisite that the parties should contract marriage in the ordinary way before the parish priest or his delegate and two witnesses.