Chapter — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology
III. On Purpose
What is purpose and how many kinds are there; what are its qualities and necessity? - Resp. To the first: Purpose is the will not to sin thereafter. It is twofold: 1. explicit or formal, by which someone, thinking about the future, resolves not to sin any more; 2. implicit or virtual, which is included in contrition itself, without the future time being kept before the eyes.
Resp. To the second: Purpose must enjoy a threefold condition; namely it is required that it be firm, efficacious, and universal. 1. Firm: namely, the penitent must have a sincere will not to fall back into sin, notwithstanding any inconvenience or human fear whatever; otherwise he would not wish totally and sincerely to be converted to God. Nevertheless the confessor must not test the mind of the penitent by applying comparisons suited to disturb his imagination. But it must be firm also when it is a question only of venials. L. 451.
Efficacious, i.e., the penitent must not only firmly determine that he does not wish to sin any more, but also apply the means necessary for avoiding sin and fleeing proximate occasions, etc. Purpose must be efficacious also as regards venials which are matter of Confession. - But if the penitent immediately and with almost no resistance falls back, it can sometimes offer some indication, or at least suspicion, that he lacked a truly firm purpose; for one who firmly purposes almost does not so easily forget his purpose, but usually perseveres constant at least for some time and applies efforts to resist temptations or occasions of sin, and therefore ordinarily falls with greater difficulty and more rarely. L. 459; Lugo, d. 14, n. 160. Nevertheless the foresight and fear of relapse from past frailty and the inconstancy of the human will in no way impedes a sincere, firm, and efficacious purpose. La-Croix 1733, 1822; Sporer 310; L. 451. - A difficulty occurs practically when a penitent otherwise of good will, but terrified by the difficulty of the matter, says that he cannot promise this or that, lest afterward he break the pledged faith. Let the confessor raise him up by answering that it suffices that now he seriously wills, that he strive, that he pray; for God does not deny grace to one doing what is in him. It suffices, therefore, that the purpose be efficacious affectively, that is, it suffices that the sinner be prepared in soul to apply the necessary means; future amendment in fact is not of the essence of purpose.
Universal, or it must extend to all mortal sins, not only those committed, but also those which could be committed. The reason is that full and true conversion to God cannot be given without aversion from any lethal sin whatever. But it is enough "that, with the foulness of sin, the goodness of God, and the danger of damnation, etc., proposed in general, the penitent conceive a general purpose of never again sinning mortally." Suarez, d. 33, s. 2, n. 2; Cajetan, Summ., v. Confessio, ad 12 qualit.; Lugo, d. 7, nn. 199, 238; Laymann, c. 4, n. 8. - Wherefore neither is a special purpose concerning each grave sin to be avoided required, nor indeed is it always expedient. - But as concerns venials, just as universal sorrow is not necessary, so neither is universal purpose. - L. 451; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, a. 1; cf. here 679.
Resp. To the third: Purpose, at least implicit, is altogether necessary for the remission of sin; because purpose is a necessary consequence of contrition, and at least virtually included in it, and this is established from its nature and definition. - But whether even explicit purpose is required is disputed. According to St. Alphonsus, 450, there is a threefold opinion. The first, which certain few hold, affirms absolutely: because, although sorrow necessarily includes purpose, nevertheless an explicit purpose seems to be required by Trent when it says: "with the purpose of not sinning thereafter."
The second opinion, which Cardenas calls morally certain, absolutely denies it. The reason is that sorrow, if it is elicited from a general motive, includes a plainly efficacious purpose. Otherwise, from Trent, when attrition excludes the will to sin, it sufficiently disposes a man for obtaining grace in the sacrament. Elbel 87; Laymann, c. 4, n. 6; Salmant., c. 5, n. 55; Lugo, d. 14, n. 51, who says this opinion is common among the more recent authors. - The third opinion, which St. Alphonsus testifies is called common, teaches that if the penitent thinks about future life, he must formally purpose amendment; otherwise, if the penitent thinks nothing about the future. But if he thinks about the future, all agree that it can scarcely happen that a sincere penitent does not at the same time elicit an explicit and formal purpose. - But St. Alphonsus there interposes his judgment about these things thus: "These last two opinions are indeed more probable; but because the first is not lacking its probability, in practice before the fact the safer opinion is to be followed."
But since, as St. Alphonsus testifies in the cited place, most even of those who are alleged for the first opinion agree "that if in good faith with true sorrow you confessed without formal purpose, you are not bound to repeat the Confession," it is evident that in this conclusion, which alone serves practice, all opinions and finally the suffrage of all doctors agree. But although the holy Doctor says that he "cannot acquiesce in this opinion," nevertheless this is most openly opposed to the doctrine which he himself hands down elsewhere, 505: "Carefully note that penitents are not to be compelled to repeat Confessions unless it is morally certain that they were invalid, as La-Croix, Gobat, etc., rightly say with the common opinion." - To this is added the authority of the Roman Council under Benedict XIII, celebrated in the Lateran Basilica in the year of the universal Jubilee, 1725. Tit. XXXII, c. 3, reads: "Instructions pertaining to the use and worship of the Sacraments of Penance and Eucharist, to be first received by children, brief and clear at the same time, we shall give at the end of this our Council." Moreover, in the Instruction for children about to approach the Sacrament of Penance, which is seen appended at the foot of the same Council, these things are had, part III, p. 303: "Penitent. Does one who confesses without sorrow for sins and without purpose of sinning no more receive pardon? - Confessor. If he does not have at least imperfect sorrow, that is, attrition, with the firm purpose, at least implicit, of never sinning again, certainly, if he confesses, the Confession is not valid, and he does not receive pardon of sins." In these words, both imperfect sorrow or attrition and implicit purpose are manifestly equated together as sufficient. Hence D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 313, asserts that this opinion can today be called certain. And St. Thomas, according to Bellarmine himself, who stands for the third opinion, does not distinguish between implicit and explicit; and entirely rightly, for the efficacy of tacit and express is the same.
The necessity of that explicit purpose, however, is either from some positive precept independently of the nature of justification outside the sacrament and in the sacrament, or dependently upon it. The first cannot be said, for 1. penance, if it is commanded, is commanded only because of justification; 2. St. Alphonsus himself admits that the matter is controversial and doubtful, and that explicit purpose is more probably not required; but a doubtful law does not oblige. Nor indeed can the second be said. For either that explicit purpose is demanded by justification outside the sacrament, or by justification in the sacrament. The first cannot be; for a formal act of charity immediately justifies, without that explicit purpose; therefore contrition perfected by charity also does. The other likewise cannot be; for no greater disposition is required for justification in the sacrament than outside the sacrament. - But it is one thing for Trent, in declaring the nature of contrition, explicitly to commemorate the purpose included in it; it is another thing to commemorate an explicit purpose. It does the former, not the latter. Nor does the latter follow from the former; otherwise other explicit acts also would be required, which Trent explicitly commemorates: of hope, confidence, desire of Confession, desire of satisfaction, etc. Nor indeed does Trent uselessly commemorate explicitly the purpose of not sinning thereafter. For it did this to explain the force and connatural effect of contrition, since otherwise sorrow and contrition can be given which do not contain a universal purpose. Then Trent immediately adds that this contrition was necessary at every time for justification. Contrition justifying at every time does not necessarily comprehend explicit purpose, as is also clear from the example of David, the prodigal son, etc. Cf. also Trent, sess. 6, C. 14. And since, from Trent, even attrition suffices for justification in the sacrament if it excludes the will to sin, contrition certainly suffices if it excludes the same will, without anything else being required. - E. M.