§ II. On Purpose Specifically

I. Notion. Purpose here is understood as the deliberate will of not sinning in the future. Purpose differs: 1. from a promise strictly so called, by which we intend to contract an obligation of furnishing the promised thing at its proper time, while by purpose we show only the present disposition of the soul for doing or omitting something; 2. from a vow, which is a promise strictly so called made to God. Yet this does not prevent both confessor and penitent from using the words promising and promise, namely in a broad sense, without a new obligation arising from a promise of this kind. Hence also the sinner is said only in a broad sense to have broken or violated his promises.

II. Division. Purpose is twofold, explicit and implicit. Implicit purpose is that which is contained in detestation and sorrow concerning committed sins. For one who truly detests the sin committed implicitly wills to abstain from sin in the future.

III. Necessity of some purpose for receiving the sacrament of Penance is clear from the fact that without purpose there is no contrition, since contrition is defined by the Council of Trent as "sorrow of soul and detestation concerning a committed sin, with the purpose of not sinning for the future."¹

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 4.

IV. Required purpose. An explicit purpose seems to be required¹ in the case in which the sinner grieves only from a particular motive; otherwise there is no universal purpose, not even implicit, for sorrow from a particular motive implicitly contains only a purpose of abstaining from those sins concerning which one grieves. Authors add the case in which the penitent thinks about future life, since in this case it can scarcely happen that one who truly grieves does not elicit an explicit purpose, so that the defect of a formal purpose would show a defect of true sorrow.

Besides the cases alleged, it is disputed what sort of purpose is required. Moreover, most authors hold as morally certain that explicit purpose is not demanded, but that implicit purpose suffices. But St. Alphonsus (VI, 450, question 1) and others deservedly teach that the opinion which teaches that explicit purpose is required is not lacking in probability. To prove this, we first note these things: 1. The question is not settled by an a priori argument, since the whole matter at last depends upon the positive institution of Christ; 2. the Council of Trent - which certainly does not intend to impose an end on this controversy - uses terms which are sufficiently explained in either opinion, so that a strict argument cannot be deduced from it. With these things posited, we reason thus: contrition consists of three elements, namely detestation, sorrow, and purpose, of which the first two regard past life and the third regards future life. Moreover, the first two must be explicit, and implicit ones do not suffice. This admitted, I do not see by what right it is said: the third, which touches future life, certainly does not have to be explicit, but an implicit one suffices. Thus, besides St. Alphonsus, among older authors especially Suarez² and St. Bellarmine,³ and among more recent authors Haine⁴ and Augustinis.⁵

Objection. The Council of Trent teaches that attrition disposes for justification in the sacrament when it "excludes the will of sinning."⁶ But detestation of committed sin, conceived from a universal motive, does this even without an explicit purpose.

Response. The words of Trent certainly signify the same thing as those which occur in its description of contrition: "with the purpose of not sinning for the future."⁷ But by these words the Council - which does not intend to settle the controversy - leaves in the middle whether or not an explicit or implicit purpose or will is required.

For the rest, let confessors commonly stir up penitents to explicit purpose, at least that they may perceive richer fruit from confession; but after the fact, in doubt they rightly presume that a sufficiently explicit purpose was not lacking.

¹ I say "seems" on account of what was said on p. 228, note 1.

² Disputation 20, section 4, nn. 32 and 33.

³ De Poenitentia, book 2, chapters 6 and 7.

⁴ Theologia Moralis, III, p. 242.

⁵ De re sacramentaria, II, p. 253 sq.

⁶ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 4.

⁷ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 4.

V. Properties of purpose. Purpose must be:

1. Firm, that is, of such a kind that the penitent wills not to sin in the future, at least not mortally, for the sake of obtaining any advantage or avoiding any evil. Moreover, firmness of purpose is not opposed by: 1. the fact that someone is not certain that he will not sin any more; 2. the fact that someone gravely fears that he is going to relapse; indeed, 3. of itself and speaking speculatively, even the fact that someone judges certainly that he will sin again is not opposed to it. Namely, the present will of not sinning can be combined not only with fear but even with certainty of relapse or of a change of will. Nevertheless, if the penitent is certain of relapse, in practice it must be feared that he lacks firm purpose, and his will must be strengthened. I said if he is certain, because these and similar expressions commonly signify fear rather than true certainty. Hence if the penitent, otherwise of good will, says: "I do not wish to sin any more, but I foresee that I am going to relapse," the confessor, after strengthening the faint-hearted person's spirit, should commonly impart absolution. But true despair is opposed to firmness of purpose; one who despairs must be disposed so that he may hope (St. Alphonsus, VI, 451).

2. Efficacious, that is, of such a kind that the penitent also wills to employ the means necessary for avoiding sins, for example to remove voluntary proximate occasions.

3. Universal, namely as regards mortal sins, not only as regards those which have been committed, but as regards all. For the Council of Trent demands a purpose "of not sinning for the future"; likewise contrition which "excludes the will of sinning."¹

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 4.