§ 2. On Purpose and the Occasion of Sin to Be Fled

— 1. An absolute purpose of not sinning any more, or a purpose so firm that from the present affection it excepts no circumstance or time, is necessary for the remission of every sin, and therefore, for the worthy and fruitful reception of this sacrament, is required about at least some sin or reason of sin accused. For without a firm purpose of this kind, sin is not fully retracted. But sin is not remitted unless retracted.

2. Because it cannot happen that any mortal sin be remitted to a soul defiled by other sins, and firm purpose is necessary not from a superadded precept but from the very nature of the matter, firm purpose about mortal sins must be universal, insofar as it excludes every will or deliberate affection of sinning.

3. Every attrition above all things virtually contains the firm purpose of not committing the sins about which it is had; but attrition conceived from a universal motive virtually contains the firm purpose of not sinning in the future, at least mortally.

Now the purpose included in attrition conceived from a universal motive seems to suffice for fruitful use of the sacrament, so that a formal and explicit purpose is not required. For Trent, s. XIV, c. 4, demands only attrition which "excludes the will of sinning"; and from the nature of the matter, the act of the virtue of Penance regards future things not formally but only consequently, insofar as sincere detestation of sin brings in the will of avoiding sin thereafter. Wherefore the penitential judge does not need an explicitly known purpose in order to be able to judge about prudently administering absolution (cf. Desan, De Paenitentia, c. 11, 3 dub.). This more common opinion can be called morally certain, although not a few, with Bellarmine, l. 2, Paen., c. 6, contradict it. Yet Suarez, for example, Paen., d. 4, s. 3, and D'Ann., III, 313, require a formal purpose in him who thinks about the life to be led in the future and about the danger of relapsing, as a criterion of true penitence.

Therefore one who did not think about making a formal purpose is not at all to be disturbed about past confessions.

But must a formally universal purpose be elicited by him who is sorry for mortal sins from a particular motive alone? Certainly in that attrition a strictly universal purpose is not contained even virtually. But if a particular purpose concerning committed mortal sins is joined with a habitual aversion from every other mortal sin, we do not see what further thing is required, either of itself or from the Council of Trent.

Yet this opinion is that of few; for it Lehmk., II, 399, cites Aversa, Hurtado, Platel; by very many it is plainly rejected as openly false. Cf. Suarez, d. 4, s. 3, n. 5; Lugo, d. 14, n. 51 ff.; St. Alph., l. 6, n. 451, 2°. These judge a positively universal purpose about mortal sins necessary.

Concerning virtual purpose, cf. Ball.-Palm., V, n. 92-99.

— Concerning venial sins, a purpose about the venial sins accused suffices, at least about one of the accused; indeed a purpose of avoiding deliberate venial sins, or indeliberate ones as far as human frailty permits, or of lessening them. For in every purpose conceived in this way there is contained an absolute purpose of avoiding some venial sins.

— On the efficacy of purpose. They are accustomed to add that purpose must be efficacious. That we may treat distinctly of this quality of purpose, a twofold efficacy is to be discerned: one immediate, principiative, which affects the very will of the penitent then when he is converted to God, simply or in a certain respect; the other subsequent, effective, which constancy of execution demonstrates. The former rather connotes the sincerity of purpose; the latter, its virtue.

— I. On principiative efficacy. A will is called efficacious which embraces the means, both negative and positive, necessary for attaining the end. Therefore, in the present cause, it will be the will of applying the necessary means for not sinning in the future. To this belongs flight from the proximate occasion.

What an occasion is and by what obligation it is to be fled, we saw in I, 452-456.

— II. On subsequent efficacy, or efficacy of fact. 1. Relapse into sins, even frequent relapse, demonstrates a changed will, not necessarily a defect of the preceding will. But this one thing is essential: that from the will which the penitent has then when he is absolved, he does not wish to commit sin in any hypothesis.

2. Nor does founded fear, indeed a morally certain foresight of a new grave sin, always argue a defect of purpose. A penitent who asserts such things is to be raised into hope, which he ought to conceive not from his own powers but from the grace of God. Wherefore, provided he now wishes to choose a firm purpose, he is disposed and is to be absolved; but certain precautions against temptations are to be required from him, which he will have to confess to be in his own power.

If it is a question of a vicious custom of blasphemies or imprecations, which easily removes actual deliberation, let the penitent also be taught that he is bound only to this: that he beware of faults which are committed knowingly and strive to amend the depraved habit (cf. St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, art. 10 ad 4).

3. Uniform perseverance in sin, in a certain occasion, can sometimes argue a defect of present disposition. For apt remedies are always at hand by which, with the grace of God, perfect amendment may be prepared. Whether material flight from the occasion itself must be commanded to him who, after applying opportune remedies, relapses in the same way, we saw above, n. 542 and I, 455. Here the confessor has need of great prudence.