Article IV. On Purpose.

261. Definition and necessity. 1. Purpose is the will of not sinning henceforth. It can be twofold: formal and explicit, which is an act distinct from sorrow, by which the penitent determines not to sin any more; virtual and implicit, which is contained in the act of sorrow.

2. For obtaining remission of sins, whether in the sacrament or outside the sacrament, the purpose of not sinning henceforth is required: for purpose belongs equally with contrition to the disposition which is essentially required for obtaining justification.¹

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

262. Qualities of purpose are the qualities which purpose must have so that absolution may be valid. Purpose must be:

1. Firm, that is, the penitent must be so disposed that in reality he wishes to do what he proposes, namely to avoid sins and rather to suffer any evil or lose any good than to offend God gravely; but firmness of purpose does not demand that the purpose afterward actually obtain its effect. For purpose must be firm affectively or as to the present will, but it is not necessary that it be firm effectively or as to the future event, i.e., the will of the penitent must be such that, if the occasion of sinning were offered now, he would certainly not embrace it but immediately reject it, whatever he may be about to do afterward.

a. Therefore a future fall into the same sin is not of itself contrary to firm purpose: for someone can in the morning seriously wish to abstain from sin and in the evening commit the same sin. If nevertheless the penitent, immediately after confession, falls back into the same sin, he gives suspicion that the purpose was not sufficiently firm: for he who seriously establishes something within himself is not immediately forgetful of his purpose.

b. When penitents sometimes say that they greatly fear, indeed are persuaded that they are going to relapse, it must be noted that there is no doubt about this, namely what they will do afterward; nor is fear, lest they fall again, or persuasion that they think they are going to relapse, or any prevision of future sin of itself contrary to firmness of purpose: for these are acts of the intellect, but purpose is in the will; wherefore a true and firm purpose can stand together with these acts. Therefore, as often as a penitent, on account of his known inconstancy or on account of inveterate habit, judges that he is not going to avoid sin, he is not immediately to be judged as lacking due purpose, but the question must be put to him whether he again wishes to sin; if he denies this, he must be warned to trust in the grace of God, to whom what he cannot furnish by the powers of his nature is not impossible.

2. Universal, which extends itself to all mortal sins to be avoided in the future. For this difference exists between sorrow and purpose: sorrow is universal when it extends itself to all sins committed and not yet remitted; on the contrary, purpose is not universal if it does not extend itself to all and each mortal sins possible, even never committed. Hence purpose must always proceed from a universal motive.

a. Nevertheless it is not necessary, indeed frequently it is not advisable, to conceive a special purpose of avoiding the several sins; but a purpose in general, conceived of not sinning any more mortally, suffices. Nevertheless concerning some matters an explicit and special purpose must be required by the confessor, such as concerning the restitution of another's property, the removal of scandal, remission of an offense, avoidance of a proximate occasion, etc.

b. In sorrow conceived from a universal motive there is implicitly contained also a universal purpose, which extends itself to all sins both committed and not committed, to be avoided in the future, because the same motive has force concerning all and each sin.

3. Efficacious, namely one which truly moves the will to employing the means which are necessary for avoiding sins in the future, especially to fleeing proximate occasions, to repairing harms inflicted, to pardoning injuries, etc.: for he who absolutely wills the end must also be moved toward the necessary means; hence it is a sign of actual affection for sin if someone is unwilling to leave an occasion, to restore, to remit an offense, etc.

263. Whether implicit purpose suffices. Virtual purpose, which is always included in true contrition, suffices for obtaining valid absolution, provided the sorrow in which it is implicitly contained proceeds from a universal motive. But if the motive of sorrow were particular, an explicit purpose would plainly be required.

1. From the common opinion of all, virtual purpose can suffice accidentally, namely when the penitent truly grieves concerning sins committed but, not thinking of future life, proposes nothing explicitly; the disputed question is whether explicit purpose is required of itself, or whether even virtual and implicit purpose suffices, namely when the penitent, although he thinks of future life, nevertheless does not elicit the purpose of amendment formally and explicitly.

2. St. Alphonsus, having proposed three opinions about this question (n. 450), finally resolved that opinion which requires explicit purpose, not to lack its probability, and therefore in practice to be followed. Concerning this resolution of the holy doctor, a sharp controversy arose between Fr. Ballerini¹ and the defenders of St. Alphonsus,² which finally had this effect: that the opinion which many theologians hold, that tacit or implicit purpose is sometimes sufficient, even directly and certainly, can no longer be attacked for any reason. Therefore the true opinion must be held, which teaches that for obtaining remission of sins, implicit purpose, which is contained in contrition, whether perfect or imperfect, suffices. And indeed, explicit purpose is not required from the nature of the thing: for for obtaining justification that disposition which includes the will of not sinning suffices; but in any sorrow conceived from a universal motive there is contained the will of not sinning.

Nor is explicit purpose required by positive precept: for the Council of Trent, which promises that it will give exact doctrine concerning the sacrament of penance,³ in canon 4 enumerates only three acts: contrition, confession, and satisfaction, as dispositions of the penitent required for the essence of the sacrament, but says nothing concerning purpose. The same council, in the same chapter 4, describing the dispositions of the penitent, explicitly indeed mentions purpose, but explicitly mentions also other acts, as trust in the divine mercy and the desire of performing the other things; but from these it does not follow that the council prescribes explicit purpose, just as it does not follow that it requires an explicit act of hope. Therefore the council explicitly mentions purpose so that it may declare that for obtaining remission of sins, that sorrow alone suffices which contains a universal purpose. Although, therefore, the faithful are to be urged that they always elicit purpose expressly and explicitly, nevertheless if they have omitted this, supposing sorrow truly universal, they are not to be disturbed about the validity of the confession.

3. Two things must be noted concerning this matter: a. He who truly grieves concerning past sins is so disposed that, if thought of future life should enter his mind, he would also conceive the explicit purpose of not offending God mortally any more: for no one is judged seriously to grieve concerning an offense against God who with deliberation suspends the expressed act of the purpose of avoiding all grave offenses against God in the future. b. Confessors rightly in practice require explicit purpose from penitents: for they must administer the sacrament certainly only according to the disposition of the penitent; but in those who are guilty of mortal sins, the confessor will scarcely ever be certain concerning the disposition unless the purpose of abstaining from sins in the future is manifested to him.

¹ Gury-Ballerini ad n. 462.

² Vindiciae Alphons., pr. 5, q. 6.

³ Cf. sess. 14, proem.

264. Whether acts of faith and hope are required for obtaining justification in the sacrament. Besides sorrow and purpose, no other acts of the penitent are required for obtaining valid absolution, neither by reason of matter nor by reason of disposition. Therefore, although it is to be recommended that the penitent elicit acts of the theological virtues before confession, nevertheless this is not necessary: for it suffices that the acts (of faith and hope) which the Council of Trent enumerates¹ as dispositions of the sinner are present virtually and implicitly.²

¹ Sess. 6, c. 6.

² Suarez, disp. 4, sect. 2, n. 7; Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 91.

265. On sorrow and confession of venials. 1. On sorrow. a. Sorrow concerning venials must have the same qualities which sorrow concerning mortals has, except only universality, since one venial can be remitted without another.

a. Therefore it must be not only true and supernatural, but also sorrow above all things. For if the penitent were so disposed in soul that he would rather choose venial sin than suffer any temporal evil whatever, he would not be disposed to receiving pardon of that sin. But when the ordinary motives of sorrow concerning venials are suitably considered (because they cause the passion of Christ, the displeasure of God, the punishment of purgatory), the penitent will detest sins above all things, because these evils are surely graver than all earthly evils.

b. Therefore it is licit to grieve and to conceive a purpose of amendment only concerning those venials which are accused, without this also being done concerning those which are omitted in confession.

b. He who confesses venials alone is bound under grave obligation to grieve concerning some of them, or at least concerning one, and to conceive a purpose of amendment. Therefore he who knowingly institutes a confession of venials without due sorrow commits grave sacrilege, because he renders the sacrament invalid.

Nevertheless, for receiving valid and fruitful absolution, sorrow concerning sins, whether mortal or venial, already remitted in past life suffices, even if sorrow is not had concerning the venials committed since the last confession, provided those sins already remitted are declared in confession at least in a general way.

c. He who confesses venials often repeated and grieves concerning the frequency of the sin and proposes to diminish it, but does not grieve concerning the single sins which he still intends to indulge now and then, although not so frequently, is still validly and licitly absolved. The same must be said of him who grieves and proposes to amend one graver sin of one species, e.g., intemperance, without extending sorrow and purpose to other lighter sins of the same species.¹

That it can happen that someone grieves concerning the frequency of venials and proposes to amend it without detesting the single sins, and in like manner that someone grieves concerning the graver sins without grieving concerning the lighter, whether of the same or of a diverse species, is clear from this: that the motives of sorrow and purpose are verified more in many sins than in few, more in graver than in lighter sins.

2. On confession. a. It is licit to confess some venials while omitting others: for venials are not necessary matter of confession; moreover, one can be remitted without another.

b. Although it is earnestly to be recommended that he who confesses several venials conceive sorrow and purpose also concerning all of them, nevertheless not to grieve concerning some which he accuses is not a sin, provided he grieves sincerely concerning one or another, so that sufficient matter of absolution is present.

It is indeed not becoming that without a just cause other inept matter be mixed with the valid matter of absolution; nevertheless there can be a manifold sufficient reason why this may be permitted. Nor can it be said that he who confesses a venial sin concerning which he certainly knows that he does not grieve deceives the confessor and therefore sins venially:² for confessors know that penitents declare in confession not all venials of which they accuse themselves as matter of absolution, but several for other reasons.³

Note. To those who ordinarily confess nothing but venials, it can never be sufficiently urged that they conceive sorrow and firm purpose concerning one or another which burdens them more, and that they seriously try to amend it thereafter: for the more universal the purpose concerning venials is, the less efficacious it is. But ordinarily it will be better to abstain from the confession of those things concerning which neither sorrow nor purpose is present.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 60 ff.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 118.

³ Cf. Mazotta, tr. 6, disp. 1, q. 3, c. 1; Lehmkuhl II, n. 221 (n. 393).