The religious state and the obligations it brings

WE learn from the Gospels that, besides the ordinary way of the Commandments to be followed by all who wish to save their souls, our Lord proposed the way of perfection to the select few who wished to follow him more closely.¹1 This way of perfection consists in renouncing the goods of this world and the cares of family life, and following our Lord’s example of perfect obedience to the will of our heavenly Father. From the first ages of the Christian Church there were many who accepted our Lord’s invitation and lived in voluntary poverty and chastity. Comparatively few historical documents of the earliest centuries of the Christian era have survived, but we find traces of a body of ascetics and virgins to whom a place of special honour was assigned in the Church. At first they seem to have lived in the bosom of their families, but soon they fled to the deserts of Egypt, Syria, and Palestine, and for guidance and encouragement put themselves under the rule of some experienced hermit. Nothing was then wanting to the essence of the religious state except vows and a rule. When the counsels of perfection began to be practised under vow cannot be determined exactly; the first formal religious rules are the work of St Basil and St Benedict. Thus in its essence the religious state has been instituted by Jesus Christ, and, as historically evolved under the guidance of his Church, it may be defined as a fixed and stable way of life approved by the Church for the faithful who, under a certain rule and a common way of living, wish to aim at perfection by the observance of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, with the entire surrender of one’s self to God. Thus those who devote themselves to works of piety and charity without vows, or with only private vows, are not in the religious state, nor are they technically called religious. They want the necessary stability. This stability is given by the profession of public vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, the chief of the counsels of the Gospel, by which a person renounces the attractions of this world which draw so many away from God, in order to give himself wholly and entirely without let or hindrance to the love and service of God. The Church has always watched over and fostered the practice of religious life. In the thirteenth century there was danger of the great variety of religious orders causing confusion, and the Fourth Council of the Lateran forbade any new orders to be founded. The practical effect of this law was to prohibit new orders without the approbation of the Holy See. It is still in force as regards orders with solemn vows, which cannot be founded without the special approbation of the Pope. According to the new Code, bishops, but not Vicars Capitular or Vicars General, can found religious congregations with simple vows, but they are forbidden to found them or allow them to be founded without consulting the Holy See. If there is question of founding tertiaries living in common, the leave is also required of the General of the first order to which the tertiaries are to be affiliated (Can. 492).

A religious congregation founded by a bishop may in process of time acquire houses in other dioceses, but it remains diocesan and is wholly subject to the local Ordinaries, according to law, until it obtains a decree of the Holy See in praise of its end and scope, or one of formal approbation.

The end of religious life is perfect union with God, in which man’s perfection consists, and this union the religious disposes himself for by the constant practice of works of sublime charity and of renunciation of all that could be an obstacle to charity. Thus the religious state is the state of perfection; not that religious are supposed to be already perfect, but because perfection of Christian charity is the end aimed at, and suitable means are furnished therein for obtaining that end.

¹ Matt. xix.

The special obligations under which a religious lies follow from the nature of the religious state which we have described. Inasmuch as he devotes himself to the service of God in religion, he must do nothing that would endanger his perseverance or cause him to be dismissed from the order. He is especially bound to observe his vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, which he has voluntarily made to God, and in which the essence of religious life and the chief means of practising perfection consist. He is bound to keep the rule which he takes for his guide in life by the very fact of entering into the order which he has chosen as well as by ecclesiastical law (Can. 593). The obligation imposed by the rule is not the same in all religious orders. In some it binds under sin like the precepts of the superior. The rules of the Dominicans, Jesuits, and of most of the-modern congregations, of themselves, speaking generally, do not bind under sin. Particular precepts are sometimes inserted in the rule, and these of course are to be observed under sin like any other precepts of obedience. Apart from these the rule is rather a guide of conduct in religious life, and an indication as to how the superior should govern his subjects, than a rigid code of law binding under pain of sin. However, divines point out that frequently violations of such a rule will be sinful, not precisely because they are infractions of the rule, but because there will frequently be something defective in them as moral acts. If the silence which the rule prescribes is broken without just cause, the act will be sinful on account of the motive which led to it, the scandal which it causes, and its tendency to loosen the bonds of religious discipline. Formal contempt of the rule, by which a religious refuses to be guided by it, and wishes to show his independence, is mortally sinful, because it is directly contrary to his religious profession.

I. Nature of the obligation. The pursuit of acquiring perfection, or tendency toward perfection, consists in this, that someone: 1st, observes the means which oblige under grave sin; 2nd, does not contemn any means annexed to his state, even if not imposed under grave sin; 3rd, habitually observes the means which do not oblige under grave sin, but nevertheless are annexed to the state by force either of vows, or of rules and constitutions, or of ecclesiastical precept (St. Alphonsus IV, 9-11; cf. St. Thomas 2-2, q. 186, article 9).

II. The existence of the obligation is deduced both from can. 488, 1st (n. 1212) and 593 (n. 1215), and from the fact that a religious "by force of profession is held to advance in some way in the way of perfection. Because by force of profession he is held to will to preserve his state, which is of perfection or of those tending to perfection, although according to itself it is not of precept but of counsel; but this is intrinsically to will to tend toward perfection" (St. Alphonsus IV, 9; cf. St. Thomas 2-2, q. 186, articles 1 and 2).

Corollary I. A religious sins gravely against the obligation of tending toward perfection: 1st, who does not observe a means which obliges under grave sin; 2nd, who from contempt neglects a means annexed to his state, even if it is not imposed under grave sin (St. Thomas 2-2, q. 186, articles 2 and 9; St. Alphonsus IV, 10).

Corollary II. He sins lightly against the obligation of tending toward perfection who habitually neglects means which are annexed to the state, but do not oblige under grave sin (St. Alphonsus IV, 11).

Corollary III. He does not sin against the obligation of tending toward perfection: 1st, who is not yet actually perfect (St. Thomas 2-2, q. 186, article 1, ad 3; St. Alphonsus IV, 9); 2nd, who now and then does not observe a means which is annexed to the state but does not oblige under grave sin; 3rd, who neglects means not annexed to his state (St. Alphonsus IV, 9).

Preliminary Note I. The rules and particular constitutions of individual religions which are not contrary to the canons of this Code retain their force; but those which are opposed to them are abrogated (can. 489).

Preliminary Note II. We speak of rules properly so called, or preceptive rules, but not of those which are merely directive and do not even oblige to penalty.

I. Obligation. All and each religious, Superiors as well as subjects, must not only faithfully and entirely observe the vows which they have pronounced, but also compose their life according to the rules and constitutions of their own religion and thus strive toward the perfection of their state (can. 593).

Whether rules of themselves oblige to the act or to penalty alone depends on the different institutes. Thus in the Order of Friars Minor the rule obliges to the act, under grave or light fault according to the matter subject to it; in the Society of Jesus and the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer and in more recent Congregations,¹ it obliges only to penalty.

Nevertheless even the transgression of a rule which obliges only to penalty is commonly not without fault, either because it disturbs order or otherwise is scandalous, or because it does not proceed from an honorable motive but from laziness, from mere pleasure, etc.; indeed the transgression would also be a grave sin if it were done from formal contempt or had a grave influence toward relaxation of discipline (cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 186, a. 9, ad 1 and 3; St. Alphonsus IV, 10, 41, 42).

¹ Cf. Norms of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, n. 320 (28 June 1901).

II. Interpretation. With regard to interpretation of rules and constitutions, the same norms are valid as for laws taken generally (n. 141). If the matter, all things considered, is strictly doubtful, one must stand for liberty. Moreover, observe:

1. An inconvenience excusing from obligation should not be thought to be present too quickly, considering these things: a) in the state of perfection it is fitting that liberty be restricted; b) in the state of perfection laws have been voluntarily undertaken; therefore sacrifice should be sought rather than avoided.

2. Nor should legitimate desuetude be judged present too quickly. Yet he would err who thought that contrary customs enjoy no favor of law, as though legal or tacit consent were always lacking.

III. Consequences. 1. Local Superiors should take care that at least once a year, on fixed days, their proper constitutions are publicly read (can. 509, § 2, 1st).

2. A Superior is bound to protect the observance of vows and rules, and therefore to correct the defects of subjects, even slight ones; indeed he is bound to this under grave fault "in the case in which the defects are many and such, for example concerning silence, fasts, etc., that they can relax discipline" (St. Alphonsus IV, 13).

"Although each religious may fail in a slight matter by transgressing a slight rule, nevertheless the superior who negligently fails to prevent relaxation of observance when he can do so fails in a grave matter. And therefore he is bound not only to correct defects of subjects which tend to the harm of the whole community, but also to inquire so that he may correct them, as St. Thomas teaches: 'yet without excessive solicitude,' as de Alexandris notes" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

3. Electors of Superiors should consider these things:

a) Those who elect notably less worthy persons sin gravely, namely because relaxation of discipline must be feared; and this is rightly extended to the election of general consultors and of the procurator general, considering their grave influence both on observance and on other grave matters (St. Alphonsus IV, 100, 101; Homo Apostolicus, tract 13, n. 35).

"Observance will with the greatest difficulty flourish if less worthy persons are elected; because less worthy persons easily become tepid and unworthy, or at least less diligently apply themselves to observance, and then from imperfect observance relaxation of the rules easily and quickly follows, with irreparable harm; for experience establishes that where in some religion an abuse has even once crept in, afterwards it is most difficult to avert it. And indeed less diligent prelates, and those who elect such prelates, are certainly the cause of this most grave harm. Would that detriment of this kind, derived from this source in many monasteries, were not often lamented" (St. Alphonsus IV, 101).

b) With regard to major Superiors in religions of men, can. 506, § 1, establishes: Before proceeding to the election of major Superiors in religions of men, all and each from the Chapter must promise by oath that they will elect those whom they have judged according to God to be fit to be elected.

¹ Cf. Raus, De Sacrae obedientiae Virtute et Voto.

I. Exercises of devotion. 1. Superiors should take care that all religious: 1st, each year spend time in spiritual exercises; 2nd, if not legitimately impeded, daily be present at the Sacred Sacrifice, devote themselves to mental prayer, and diligently apply themselves to other offices of piety which are prescribed by the rules and constitutions; 3rd, approach the Sacrament of Penance at least once a week (can. 595, § 1).

2. Superiors should promote among their subjects frequent, even daily, reception of the Most Holy Body of Christ; moreover frequent, indeed even daily, access to the Most Holy Eucharist should be freely open to religious rightly disposed (can. 595, § 2). But if after his last sacramental confession a religious has been a grave scandal to the community or has perpetrated a grave and external fault, until he has again approached the sacrament of penance the Superior can prohibit him from approaching holy communion (can. 595, § 3). But if there are religions of either solemn or simple vows in whose rules or constitutions, or even calendars, communions are found fixed or commanded on certain days, these norms have merely directive force (can. 595, § 4).

II. Religious habit. All religious should wear the habit proper to their religion both inside and outside the house, unless a grave cause excuses, in the judgment of the major Superior or, in urgent necessity, even of the local Superior (can. 596).

III. Papal enclosure. Enclosure is distinguished as twofold: papal or major enclosure, and minor enclosure. Papal enclosure is that which must be observed in houses of regulars, both of men and of women; minor enclosure is that which must be observed in houses of religious congregations. Concerning papal enclosure, accept the following:

1. General matters. a) In canonically constituted houses of regulars, whether of men or of women, even not formed, papal enclosure must be observed (can. 597, § 1). Nevertheless, by force of an apostolic indult, houses of nuns which in fact do not emit solemn vows are exempt from papal enclosure.¹

b) By the law of papal enclosure there is affected the whole house which the regular community inhabits, with the gardens and grounds reserved to the access of religious; excepted, besides the public church with the adjoining sacristy, is also the lodging for visitors, if there is one, and the parlor, which, as far as can be done, should be established near the door of the house (can. 597, § 2).

c) The parts subject to the law of enclosure should be openly indicated; but it will belong to the major Superior or General Chapter according to the constitutions, or, if there is question of a monastery of nuns, to the Bishop, to prescribe accurately the limits of enclosure or to change them for legitimate causes (can. 597, § 3).

d) Enclosure is violated even if someone enters illicitly within the bounds of enclosure by only one step, provided he enters with his whole body (St. Alphonsus IV, 229).

2. Papal enclosure of men. a) Within the enclosure of male regulars women of whatever age, class, or condition are not to be admitted under any pretext (can. 598, § 1).

b) The wives, with their retinue, of those who actually hold the supreme rule of peoples are exempted from this law (can. 598, § 2).²

c) If a house of male regulars has attached to it a boarding school for internal students or another work proper to the religion, at least a separate part of the building, if it can be done, should be reserved for the habitation of religious, subject to the law of enclosure (can. 599, § 1).

d) Even into places outside the enclosure which are reserved for external or internal students or for works proper to the religion, persons of the other sex are not to be admitted except for an equitable cause and with the license of the Superior (can. 599, § 2).

e) Women violating the enclosure of male regulars, and Superiors and others, whoever they may be, introducing or admitting them of whatever age, are punished by an excommunication ipso facto simply reserved to the Apostolic See; and besides, religious introducing or admitting them are deprived of office, if they have one, and of active or passive voice (can. 2342, 2nd).

3. Papal enclosure of women. a) Within the enclosure of nuns no one, of whatever class, condition, sex, or age, is to be admitted without license of the Holy See, except the persons who follow:

alpha) It is licit for the local Ordinary or regular Superior, when visiting a monastery of nuns, or for other Visitors delegated by them, to enter the enclosure only for the cause of inspection, care being taken that at least one cleric or religious man of mature age accompany them (can. 600, 1st).

The discussion concerns a local visitation. A personal visitation ought to be made at the grilles; nor is entrance into the enclosure admitted on the occasion of examining the will, election, clothing, or profession.³

beta) The confessor, or one who acts in his place, can, with due precautions, enter the enclosure to administer the Sacraments to the sick or to assist the dying (can. 600, 2nd).

gamma) Those who actually hold the supreme rule of peoples and their wives with their retinue can enter the enclosure; likewise Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church (can. 600, 3rd).⁴

delta) It belongs to the Abbess, with due precautions used, to permit entrance to physicians, surgeons, and others whose work is necessary, after at least habitual approval has first been obtained from the local Ordinary;⁵ but if necessity is urgent and there is no time to ask approval, this is presumed by law (can. 600, 4th).

b) It is licit for no nun after profession to leave the monastery, even for a short time, under whatever pretext, without a special indult of the Holy See, except in the case of imminent danger of death or another most grave evil (can. 601, § 1).⁶ This danger, if there is time, must be recognized by the local Ordinary (can. 601, § 2). These things also regard novices and postulants (n. 1226; can. 540, § 3).⁷

c) Those violating the enclosure of nuns, of whatever class or condition or sex they may be, by entering their monasteries without legitimate license, and likewise those introducing or admitting them, are punished ipso facto by an excommunication simply reserved to the Apostolic See; but if they are clerics, besides this they are suspended for a time to be determined by the Ordinary according to the gravity of the fault (can. 2342, 1st). Likewise nuns unlawfully leaving enclosure contrary to the prescription of can. 601 incur ipso facto an excommunication simply reserved to the Apostolic See (can. 2342, 3rd); concerning can. 601, see what was said under b.

¹ Pontifical Commission, 1 March 1921, under III (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1921, p. 178).

² Therefore not only queens, but also wives of a president of a republic and wives of a prince actually reigning, provided that either they themselves or their husband actually hold the rule of peoples (Fanfani, n. 234).

³ Instruction on the enclosure of nuns of solemn vows, 6 February 1924, under III, 2nd (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1924, p. 96).

⁴ Cf. note 1.

⁵ Habitual approval is usefully sought once a year.

⁶ Cf. the cited Instruction, under III, 1st.

⁷ Cf. Sacred Congregation of Religious, 7 November 1916.

IV. Minor enclosure. 1. Also in houses of religious Congregations, whether of pontifical or diocesan right, enclosure is to be observed, into which no one of the other sex is to be admitted except those of whom in can. 598, § 2 and can. 600,¹ and others whom the Superiors have judged can be admitted for just and reasonable causes (can. 604, § 1).

2. The prescription of can. 599 is also to be applied to houses of religious Congregations, whether of men or of women (can. 604, § 2).

3. In peculiar circumstances, and when grave causes intervene, the Bishop can fortify this enclosure with censures, unless there is question of an exempt clerical religion; he should always take care that it is rightly observed and that whatever vice creeps into it is corrected (can. 604, § 3).

¹ Cf. n. 1262.

V. Communication with outsiders. 1. All those to whom the custody of enclosure belongs should watch diligently lest, when outsiders visit, discipline be disturbed by useless conversation and the religious spirit suffer detriment (can. 605).

2. Religious Superiors should take care that those things which are prescribed in their own constitutions, either concerning the going out of subjects from the cloisters or concerning outsiders to be received or approached, are accurately observed (can. 606, § 1).

3. Without prejudice to the prescriptions in can. 621-624, it is not permitted to Superiors to allow subjects to live outside a house of their own religion, except for a grave and just cause and for as brief a time as can be done according to the constitutions; but for an absence which exceeds six months, unless the cause of studies intervenes, permission of the Apostolic See is always required (can. 606, § 2).

4. Abbesses and local Ordinaries should watch seriously lest religious women, outside the case of necessity, go outside the house alone (can. 607).

VI. Obligation of choir and Mass. 1. In religions, whether of men or of women, which have the obligation of choir,¹ in individual houses where there are at least four religious bound to choir and actually not legitimately impeded, and even fewer if the constitutions so provide, the divine office must be performed in common daily according to the norm of the constitutions (can. 610, § 1).

2. Likewise Mass corresponding to the office of the day must be celebrated daily according to the rubrics in religions of men and also, as far as can be done, in religions of women (can. 610, § 2).²

3. In the same religions, whether of men or of women, the solemnly professed who have been absent from choir, except lay brothers, must recite the canonical hours privately (can. 610, § 3).

¹ A canonical obligation is understood, which is not had unless solemn vows are in fact emitted.

² A conventual Mass must also be celebrated in houses of religious women having simple vows, who by constitutions approved by the Holy See have the obligation of choir (Pontifical Commission, 20 May 1923).

VII. Communication of letters. All religious, whether men or women, can freely send letters, subject to inspection by no one, to the Holy See and its Legate in the nation, to the Cardinal Protector, to their own major Superiors, to the Superior of the house who is perhaps absent, to the local Ordinary to whom they are subject, and, if there is question of nuns who are under the jurisdiction of regulars, also to the major Superiors of the Order; and from all these the aforesaid religious, men or women, can likewise receive letters to be inspected by no one (can. 611).

VIII. Observance of ecclesiastical decrees. 1. Every Superior must promote among his subjects knowledge and execution of decrees of the Holy See which regard religious (can. 509, § 1).

2. Local Superiors should take care that, at least once a year, on fixed days, the decrees which the Holy See prescribes to be read publicly are publicly read (can. 509, § 2, 1st).

IX. Help to be furnished to Ordinaries and the secular clergy. 1. Superiors should take care that religious subjects designated by them, especially in the diocese in which they live, when their ministry is required by local Ordinaries or parish priests for providing for the people's necessity, willingly furnish it both within and outside their own churches or public oratories, with religious discipline preserved (can. 608, § 1).

2. In turn, local Ordinaries and parish priests should willingly use the work of religious, especially of those living in the diocese, in the sacred ministry and especially in administering the sacrament of penance (can. 608, § 2).

3. Besides the prescription of can. 1345,¹ if the local Ordinary for a public cause indicates the ringing of bells, certain prayers, or sacred solemnities, all religious, even exempt ones, must obey, with the constitutions and privileges of each religion preserved (can. 612).

¹ The cited canon states: It is desirable that in Masses which, with the faithful present, are celebrated on feast days of precept in all churches or public oratories, a brief explanation of the Gospel or of some part of Christian doctrine be made; but if the local Ordinary has prescribed it, having given opportune instructions, not only priests of the secular clergy are held by this law, but also religious, even exempt ones, in their own churches.

The Duties of Persons Engaged to Marry.—We shall speak first of the duty of entering into a nuptial engagement, and next of the duties which engagement imposes.

(a) Per se, there is no obligation for an individual to marry, for the need of marriage is not a personal but a social one, and social duties do not all fall upon each particular person. Each person must take necessary food, for without it the individual perishes, and eating is thus an individual duty; but each person need not be a soldier, or farmer, or builder, or merchant, or married; for it suffices that these offices be fulfilled, one by one individual, another by another. Indeed, if marriage is an impediment to a more urgent good of the common welfare (e.g., perilous public service incompatible with married life), or of private good (e.g., the duty of maintaining parents, the wish to remain single because one feels oneself unsuited for marriage or called to continence), marriage should not be chosen.

(b) Per accidens, there is sometimes a duty of marrying on account of public or private necessity. Thus, if the community is depopulated by race-suicide, the public good should move suitable persons to marry in order to assist the birth rate; for, if those are considered slackers who refuse their service or money in war time when the nation is threatened with death from without, are not those also culpable who will not assist a community threatened with extinction from within? Marriage is also obligatory on those who feel that they are unable to live continently, and will be lost unless they marry (I Cor., vii. 9). In case of seduction, marriage is a form of restitution to the injured girl, but since forced marriages are usually unhappy, the injury should be atoned for in some other way if the seducer does not care for the girl or is not desirable himself (see 1803).

1. Petrus and Paulus dispute between themselves concerning the more recent Institutes of Sisters. Petrus affirms that they are truly religious, as are Dominican nuns and Poor Clares. For nothing else is required for the true essence of the religious state than the profession of religious vows, in an Institute approved by the Church. Paulus, on the contrary, affirms that they are nothing except pious women. For they have often been so called by the Sacred Penitentiary itself, 26 November 1852. Indeed, for very many years the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars did not wish them to be called Religiosae, but Sisters. Moreover, these modern Institutes are wholly lacking solemn vows, without which the essence of the religious state cannot be had. Finally, the Church has never approved these more recent Institutes, but only tolerated them.

Question. 1. What is the Religious State? — 2. What is to be said in the case?

R. To the first. The religious state, considered as to its essence, is: A stable institute of life, approved by the Church for the faithful, who under a certain rule and common manner of living wish to tend to perfection through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, with a handing over of oneself made to God and accepted by Him.

The religious state, namely, taken strictly. For “it must be supposed,” says Suarez, “according to the common usage of the Church, that the religious state, as if by antonomasia and in strict signification, is called the perfect state of monks or regulars, who totally consecrate and hand over themselves to God, by emitting the three vows concerning the three principal counsels, poverty, chastity, and obedience. Nevertheless, in a certain broader or more general meaning, the state of religion comprehends under itself other manners of living, in which men voluntarily offer themselves to divine worship and service, by obligating themselves to some observance of the counsels. And thus it comprehends, not only proper and complete religious, but also continent persons, who by the vow of chastity alone bind themselves specially to God. For thus the interpreters of canon law, in the rubric de Regularibus, teach that the name of religious or regular, taken strictly, signifies him who has professed the three substantial vows in an approved religion; but broadly it comprehends all who by some vow and special manner of living are consecrated to the service of God.” De Rel., tr. 7, bk. 2, c. 1, n. 1; Bouix, de I. Reg., t. 1, p. 47.

A stable institute of life. For firmness or stability pertains to the essence of a state.

Approved by the Church. For it is of the essence of the religious state that it not be prohibited by the Church. And indeed it is of the essence of the religious state that it be a state of perfection. But as soon as it is prohibited, it is no longer a state of perfection, but rather of rebellion. Now there exists a law of the Church prohibiting the beginning and entrance of any religion not approved. Hence, by the very fact that a religious institute has not been approved by the Church, it must be held as prohibited by her, and therefore wholly invalid, namely lacking the essence of the religious state. This approval can be given only by the Apostolic See, as is clear from Canon Law. But today it has been introduced by custom that various Congregations are instituted by the approval of the Bishop alone, which afterwards are praised and approved by the Church, first by a Decree of praise, then by a Decree of approval of the Institute, and by a Decree of approval of the Constitutions; and consequently these Congregations, if the other requisites are not lacking, can be held as containing those things which pertain to the intrinsic essence of the religious state.

To the intrinsic essence; for, in order that there be had the religious state or true religion in the Church, or in order that there be had the religious state according to canonical institution, it is not enough that the Institute be approved by the Church and at the same time the rules or Constitutions of the Institute be approved by the same Church; but it is required that the Institute be approved by the Church, and by that approval be constituted in the state of true religion, or of a religious order. “For if,” says Benedict XIV, Constitution Quamvis iusto, prid. Kal. May 1749, § 13, “for the essence of the truly religious state it is required that a religion or order be established in such a state by confirmation of the Apostolic See, according to the canonical sanctions concerning which in c. un., de Relig. dom., in 6, nor does it suffice to have obtained from the same Apostolic See only approval and confirmation of the rules which some society of men or women has prescribed for itself to observe; if the vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity emitted by the English Virgins according to the form of the rules approved by Clement XI cannot be said to be joined with express or tacit profession in some order approved by the Apostolic See in the state of true religion, as is said above, it clearly appears both that the state of the English Virgins is not the state of true religion, and that the vows which are made by them must be judged at most simple vows, not solemn, according to the paths of the Decretal of Pope Boniface VIII, which alone exists under the title de Voto et voti redempt. in 6.” Cf. ibid., § 14.

Wherefore there is one and another approval of the Church in this matter. There is a certain inferior approval, by which an Institute is approved as an Institute of Clerics or Sisters, as a Pious Society, as a Religious Congregation. There is a fuller and more solemn approval by which an Institute is approved as a Religious Order, as a true Religion.

For the faithful; for religious neither necessarily pertain to the hierarchy of jurisdiction, nor to the hierarchy of order, but are, or can be, simple faithful in the Church, and therefore of either sex.

Under a certain rule; for the manner and grade of observing the evangelical counsels can be various, and this is determined by the rule.

And common manner of living. For although, if only the nature of the religious state is considered, common life does not pertain to its essence, nevertheless today common life is required by the Church, namely under one common head and under one approved rule. Cf. Bouix, pt. 2, s. 1, c. 2, par. 2, prop. 10.

Wish to tend to perfection. There is indeed a twofold state of life. One is of common life, which intends nothing other than the observance of the commandments of God; the other is of perfection, which adds the observance of the counsels. But perfection is in charity. For the perfection of any thing is had from the fact that it attains its proper end. The end of man is God, to whom we are united by charity. Now to exclude those things which are repugnant to charity, namely mortal sins, pertains to the state of common life. But to exclude those things which impede man from adhering totally to God pertains to the state of perfection. The former is proper to essential charity; the latter, to the perfection of charity. Wherefore the perfection of which there is question here is not in essential charity as such, but in a certain peculiar grade of charity which surpasses the common charity of Christians. But this grade does not consist in some one or some transitory acts of charity, even if they are of great or greatest intensity, but in a mind so habitually prepared that man is proximately disposed to act easily and ordinarily according to the precepts and counsels of God, obstacles having been removed, so that he tends totally to God.

Tends. For the state of perfection is twofold: one is the state of perfection acquired; the other of perfection to be acquired. The former is proper to Bishops; the latter to religious. Bouix, pt. 1, s. 1.

Through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. For the state of perfection to be acquired is twofold: one incomplete or begun, the other complete. For the former the three principal evangelical counsels are not required; but some counsel suffices, whether it is one of those three principal ones, or another, for the counsels are very many in number. But for the latter the three evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience are required and suffice. For through these three counsels all impediments of charity are removed, so that the affection of the mind is directed totally to God. But the religious state, strictly so called, is the complete state of perfection to be acquired. Now those counsels to be observed, in order that a state, and therefore stability, be had, must be strengthened by a vow, and that of itself perpetual.

Now, although those three vows must of themselves be perpetual, for this is required by the very nature of a state, nevertheless it is by no means truly required of itself that they be solemn, but it is enough that they be simple. This is openly clear from the Constitutions of Gregory XIII, Quanto fructuosius and Ascendente Domino, where it is established that those who in the Society of Jesus have emitted the three simple vows are true and proper religious.

The solemnity of vows is nothing other than a certain force added to them by the disposition of the Church, of constituting a religious properly and strictly such according to canonical institution, and of making certain acts of the religious concerning the matter of the same vows invalid or at least voidable, and of rendering the vows themselves wholly firm and stable. And that force is absolute, and not merely relative to the time during which the religious, free from the vows, is not dismissed by his superiors. Hence for the solemnity of vows not just any force of producing the aforesaid effects suffices; but that force must be absolute, that is, so perpetual and immutable that neither the religious nor even the religion itself can suspend or remove that force. But it is by no means required that that force cannot be removed by the Roman Pontiff; for that force is of ecclesiastical law, and therefore the Pope can dispense both from the effect of the solemnity of vows, the solemn vows remaining, and from the solemn vows themselves, and indeed validly, although no reasonable cause is present, with which, if it accedes, he will also dispense licitly. Bouix, t., p. 444 ff.; Decree of the Sacred Congregations for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, 31 July 1878; Revue des Sciences Ecclésiastiques, 1879, p. 191.

Wherefore Busembaum very well says, bk. 3, n. 195, that a solemn vow “is that which is accepted as such by the Church. ... But simple is every other one, which does not have such solemnity.” Therefore a solemn vow is a vow which has this annexed force; a simple vow is one which lacks that force. Consequently the solemnity of a vow is an all-embracing dependence and subjection and plenary approval and confirmation of the vow made by the Church herself, or by the Supreme Pontiff, as to the being of the vow, as to its force of constituting in the Church a truly religious state, and as to the other aforesaid effects of invalidation.

And hence it appears why the Church does not approve in the state of true Religion, or as Religions or truly religious Orders, except Institutes which have solemn vows. For these perfectly display the nature of state and the nature of perfection, since through them man altogether totally and immovably tends to God and adheres to Him. But since this is wanting in simple vows from the limited acceptance of the Church herself, namely not to all the aforesaid effects, therefore Institutes with only simple vows, but not solemn vows, are approved by the same Church as Pious Institutes and also as Religious Congregations, but not as true Religions and true Religious Orders. Indeed, the essence or substance of the state of perfection, and consequently of the religious state, is also found in these Institutes, but in an inferior grade, as compared with true Religions and Religious Orders. Hence the pupils of these Institutes are truly and properly religious, but less strictly than the pupils of true Religions and Orders. Less strictly, namely as regards the very essence of the religious state, and as regards canonical institution. But in order that there be had a Religious Congregation, it is not enough that the vows have been approved by the Apostolic See; but they must be approved in such a way that the vows which are emitted in such a Congregation are accepted by someone in the name of the Congregation or of the Apostolic See.

For in order to have a formal Religion of solemn vows, or to have a true Religious Congregation of simple vows, it is altogether required that the vows emitted in it be not private, but public, accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate Superior. S. C. EE. et RR., 11 August 1889. If the vows are only private and accepted by no one, there is had only a pious Sodality, S. C. EE. et RR., 11 August 1889, or a secular Congregation, such as therefore is the Congregation of the Mission, Alexander VII, Brief Ex Commissa, 22 September 1655. I. M. 248.

With a handing over of oneself made to God. In the pronouncing of the three vows, considering their nature, there is had a total handing over of oneself to God. But this handing over of oneself, if the vows are solemn, is far more perfect and is truly a certain handing over and donation of oneself. But if the vows are simple, that handing over is less perfect, and is not an altogether total handing over of oneself; and since it is not altogether firm and immovable, it is rather a simple promise. Through the former handing over of oneself, made by authority of the Church, there is had a certain consecration of the person devoted and bound to God; but through the latter promise there is had rather a simple blessing of the person.

And accepted by Him; namely accepted by God through the Church and through proper superiors, because from the approval of the Church they receive this power and authority through the canonical approval itself of the Institute; “because God, according to ordinary providence, does not undertake the peculiar care of governing a private person immediately by Himself, nor does He need these sensible things so as to use them immediately and without the intervention of secondary causes. And therefore a donation thus made to God would either be vain and idle, or as if tempting God by demanding immediate rule from Him; and for that reason it does not please Him, nor is it immediately accepted by Him.” Suarez, de Relig., bk. 2, c. 4, nn. 7, 8; Bouix, pt. 1, s. 2.

R. To the second. That which Petrus says concerning the Sisters of the more recent Institutes, that they are true religious, taken simply, is simply true. For they themselves judge themselves to be such; all Bishops judge them to be such, as is clear from their testimonial letters for the approval of these Institutes; and the Supreme Pontiff himself holds them as such, as is gathered from several Briefs of Approval, in which those Sisters are praised and approved as Religious. But Petrus seems to say and signify more. For he says that they are true Religious, as are Dominican nuns and Poor Clares. And this is false, since Dominican nuns and Poor Clares are not only truly, but also strictly Religious; for they have solemn vows, and consequently their Institute has been constituted and confirmed by the Church, as a Religion or Order in the truly and strictly Religious state, by the Approval of the Apostolic See. More recent Institutes, on the contrary, since they have only simple vows, are by no means approved and established by the Church in the state of strict and true Religion, although they are approved as Religious Institutes. That is, the Sisters of these Institutes are indeed Religious, but in an inferior grade, not in that superior and nobler grade in which nuns are truly and strictly religious. To the reason added by Petrus, the answer is that, in order that the essence of the religious state be had in some way, the profession of religious vows in an Institute approved by the Church indeed suffices; but for the essence of the religious state true and strictly such, there is altogether required the solemn profession of religious vows in an Institute approved by the Church in the state of true and strict Religion or Order.

But it is altogether false what Paulus says, that the Sisters of the more recent Institutes are nothing except pious women, and in no way are religious. When the Sacred Penitentiary, 26 November 1852, and at other times, called them pious women, it declared its mind more than sufficiently by denying of them that they were nuns strictly such, since they did not emit solemn vows. By that expression “pious women” it wished to deny this only, by no means that they were not even true religious. And if for several years the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars denied to these Sisters the denomination Religious, it did this only so as to deny them the character of Religious true and strictly such. Later, however, when the signification of the words had been better established, to these modern Institutes was conceded that denomination of Religious Institutes, and to their pupils the denomination Religious men and Religious women. And by the Decree of 11 August 1889, the Sacred Congregation openly recognizes in these modern Institutes true Religious Congregations, expressly distinguishing in the same Decree between formal Religions of solemn vows and true Religious Congregations of simple vows. Therefore without solemn vows there is not had the essence of the strictly religious state; but with merely simple vows the essence of the truly religious state is indeed had. Here note that that word “truly” is sometimes for increasing and restricting the signification, and is equivalent to “strictly,” as in the cited Constitution of Benedict XIV; sometimes it is merely for determining the correct signification, as in the cited Decree. Finally, it is altogether false that the Church does not approve these more recent Institutes but merely tolerates them, as is openly clear from the same cited Decree, and as is proved by the very fact of the various Decrees of Approval, first by praising and then by positively approving.

2. “Cunegunda, a nun, determined with firm mind to avoid all mortal sins, but no venial sin. Nor does she make it a matter of conscience not to induce another companion to lie venially.

Question. 1. Whether for religious there is an obligation of tending to perfection? — 2. Does Cunegunda sin mortally in each case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 249. — To the second. In the first case, they affirm who, with Sanchez, bk. 1, in decalog., c. 5, and Bonacina, de peccatis, q. 3, p. 5, n. 13, contend that the will of committing, as the thing and occasion may allow, all venial sins, is not free from mortal sin. Many others deny this with Cajetan, Sylvester, Granados, Palão, Machado; to whom I myself willingly subscribe, led especially by this reason, that to commit in fact whatever venial sins occur is not mortal sin. And it pleases me to confirm this by the authority of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 4: all the venial sins in the world cannot have so much guilt as one mortal sin, which is precisely to say that even all venial sins do not make one mortal sin, nor are they equivalent to it. Therefore to will to commit them all is neither mortal, nor equivalent to mortal. The consequence holds, because the malice of the act is taken from the object; therefore, if to commit them all in fact, or to avoid none, does not involve mortal malice, neither does the will of committing them all, or of avoiding none, involve it.

Master Petrus de Tapia, Archbishop of Seville, says that the mortal malice which he contends a will of this kind involves must be drawn, not from the object, which he himself also admits is not infected according to itself with mortal gravity, but from the proximate danger of sinning lethally, which he judges to be contained in that universal will. Truly, either actually to commit all venial sins, precisely according to itself, brings with it such a proximate danger of sinning lethally, and then actually to commit all venial sins will be mortal, which is false, and the adversary himself denies it; or, precisely according to itself, it does not bring such a danger, and then neither can the will of committing them bring it, since an act morally takes its species from the object.

Convinced by this reason, others contend that venial sins so proximately dispose to mortal sins, that he who brings his mind to multiplying venial sins must be judged altogether to will to sin mortally. This response I undertake briefly to refute under multiple heads. And first, if we consult St. Thomas, cited q. 88, in one case alone can that which is venial from its genus become mortal: namely insofar as an end is constituted in it, or insofar as it is referred to mortal sin as to an end. But the will of committing all sins, but only venial sins, with the exclusion of all mortal sins, is borne toward venial sins insofar as these are contained within the limits of venial sins; so that consequently it neither constitutes in them the notion of an end, nor refers them to mortal sins. Therefore venial sins do not pass into mortal sin from that intention alone.

To these things, yield to me: where do you place that formal and proximate danger? Namely, in the collection of all venial sins? But all cannot be committed by one person. Namely, in some from the collection of all? But among some of these there is none which, if it is venial, would according to itself cast one sinning venially into this destructive danger. Besides, if all according to themselves imply this danger, then we are bound to avoid some of them, otherwise we would sin mortally; from which this other thing absurdly, yet necessarily, follows: that for eternal salvation it is not enough if someone observes all precepts obliging under mortal sin, but it is further required that he also observe those which oblige under venial sin. For all are bound under grave obligation to that which according to itself is necessary for avoiding mortal sins; therefore, if the avoidance of all venial sins is necessary in itself for avoiding mortal sin, all are bound to avoid some venial sin in order to attain eternal salvation. But if you say that this holds true by reason of danger, it remains that you define what venial sin in species someone can commit without falling into this danger, lest, if you affirm that by any venial sin in species one falls into this danger, you must swallow this absurdity: all venial sins, each and every one, by reason of this danger, are so many mortal sins.

I certainly think thus: as long as malice is confined within the bounds of light sin, it less affects and less strikes the mind of him whom the malice of the object is accustomed strongly to urge and terrify when it transcends to grave sin, so that consequently there can stand together both the will of committing all sins that are only venial and the detestation of any mortal sin whatever. Thus it is not wonderful if we know several who are little or not at all solicitous about avoiding venial sins, yet shudder at the very name of mortal sin, much less flee its sight; whence they can join in the same seat of the will the intention of avoiding all mortal sins with the intention of committing all venial sins.

For answering objections, diligently observe first that these two things fight against each other: that a sin bring with it a formal danger, or a proximate danger, of sinning mortally, and that it be contained within the bounds of venial sin. Wherefore, if Cunegunda in the collection of venial sins apprehended some sin as bringing such danger with it, or if in practice she doubted whether it could bring this danger, she would without doubt sin mortally; and that intention of avoiding all mortal sins would destroy itself, just as it would destroy itself if she apprehended that this very intention of committing all venial sins induced a formal and proximate danger of sinning mortally. Observe moreover that, in order that that intention truly exclude every mortal sin, it ought to be such that she does not will to commit those venial sins which, if they are increased in number, grow into mortal sin, either by reason of matter, as several light thefts which, multiplied, finally constitute grave matter of theft, or by reason of effect, as moderate draughts of wine which, more often repeated, bring grave harm to health and cause drunkenness.

Finally, observe principally that a nun, by reason of her state, ought to tend toward perfection; nevertheless she is not therefore bound under mortal sin to avoid venial faults. For she sufficiently tends toward the perfection of her state if, besides the precepts gravely obliging every Christian, she also observes those things which gravely bind a religious under a special title. For it cannot happen that she observes the grave precepts which are either contained in the rule, or imposed by superiors, and by which she has bound herself by the bond of vows, without aspiring to the perfection proper to the religious state as much as is enough for avoiding mortal sin. And just as the other faithful, who also ought to aspire to the perfection proper to a Christian, are not said to sin gravely against an obligation of this kind as long as they commit only venial sins, so also religious, as long as they commit only venial sins, cannot be said to offend gravely against the perfection of their proper state. I would not deny that it can happen that those things which are judged venial in a secular person become mortal in a religious, indeed also in any ecclesiastic who ought to go before others by example, by reason of scandal; and thus certain scurrilous words and indecent trifles, which in the mouth of seculars lightly offend pious ears, in the mouth of a religious, or of anyone else dedicated to God by a special title, can easily in a certain way become blasphemies, which gravely strike the ears of hearers, not without great contempt and disgrace of the religious and ecclesiastical state. But if Cunegunda decided to commit sins of that kind, she would splendidly deceive herself if she thought that she willed no mortal sin.

Meanwhile let the priest inculcate this again and again to Cunegunda: that venial sins, although remotely, nevertheless certainly dispose to mortal sins, so that it is altogether to be feared lest venial sins little by little pave the way by which she may finally be hurled into the abyss of eternal damnation. “He who despises small things will fall little by little,” Ecclesiasticus 19. “Those who rush into the greatest things begin from the smallest,” St. Bernard. “Let him beware the fever of venial sins who wishes to avoid the death of graver sins.” Through venial sins the fervor of charity is diminished; and although God denies to no one, as long as he has lived both physically and morally, when the precept urges, sufficient graces by which, if he wills, he may be saved through fulfillment of the precept, nevertheless in punishment even of venial sins He can deny efficacious graces. Hence it happens that, although he can, he does not will to be saved, since, succumbing to the weight of some grave temptation, he finally falls into mortal sin, to be assigned to eternal punishments. If the priest places these things before Cunegunda’s eyes, she, the grace of God breathing upon her, will extend the will of avoiding mortal sins to venial sins, placing her eternal salvation more and more in safety.

Coming to the later case, Master Corradus, pt. 1, Respons., Response 89, § Sequitur, with Master Soto as guide, teaches that it is graver to induce someone to one venial sin than to commit homicide, because it is a greater damage and a greater loss to commit one venial sin than is the death of the body; for which reason it is said that one must not sin venially even for the life of the whole world. Therefore, in the judgment of Master Corradus, Cunegunda, who induced her companion to lie lightly, is guilty of mortal sin. But I pronounce that she is to be absolved from mortal sin, with the Angelic teacher as guide, who, treating of scandal in II-II, q. 43, teaches in express words thus: If active scandal is per se, for example, when someone intends to lead another to sin, if indeed he intends to induce his neighbor to sin venially through an act of venial sin, it is a venial sin. I do not see what could be said more clearly against Corradus for Cunegunda.

But what if she did not induce the companion to that light lie in just any way, but with the direct design that the companion herself suffer that ruin which results from a light lie? Not even then would she sin mortally, according to the opinion of St. Thomas in IV, dist. 38, q. 2, a. 2, q. 3, where, treating of formal scandal, namely the special sin by which one intends to scandalize another, or by which one intends the harm of one’s neighbor, he openly teaches that he sins only venially who intends to induce another to some venial sin. This seems hard to Father Vasquez, who judges that an intention of this kind of the spiritual ruin of one’s neighbor, however light it is posited, is a mortal sin contrary to charity; and in this sense he thinks the opinion of Corradus and Soto true, because spiritual damage, if it is directly intended, gives a special malice to the act, and there is no doubt that this damage is greater than any temporal evil. Thus Father Vasquez, whose reasoning I cannot approve; because damage to one’s neighbor, if it is grave, infects the act with mortal malice not only when it is directly intended, but also when it is indirectly intended, as no one denies. And therefore he becomes guilty of mortal fault who, compelled by no necessity, shoots an arrow at a wild beast, even if he does not directly intend it, provided he foresees that from it the killing of his neighbor, or some other grave evil, will follow. Wherefore either let Vasquez affirm with Corradus that he sins mortally against charity who in any way induces his neighbor into venial sin, from which spiritual ruin is certainly going to follow; or let him deny with the Angelic Doctor that he sins mortally who directly intends that spiritual ruin. It is added that the reason on which Father Vasquez relies, if it proves anything, proves that it is a mortal sin against charity, by which each one ought to love himself more than his neighbor; I say, that it is a mortal sin if someone himself sins venially, willing also in himself the light spiritual ruin which follows venial sin, and which certainly does not cease to be greater than any temporal damage from the fact that each one intends it for himself rather than for another. But the consequence seems absurd; therefore the principle from which it follows is also absurd.

But is not spiritual damage, if it is directly intended, a thing which gives the act a special malice? Either grave or light, I concede; necessarily grave, I deny, with St. Thomas openly supporting us. But is not the damage inflicted by venial fault truly greater than any other temporal loss?

Father Sanchez (de Matrim., bk. 1, disp. 5, n. 25), with whom Fagundez agreed (in Eccles. Praecept., precept 1, bk. 3, c. 8, n. 18), responds that, in judging the gravity of damage, spiritual is not to be compared with temporal, or temporal with spiritual, but spiritual with spiritual, and temporal with temporal. But that response, although true, does not remove the difficulty, unless an efficacious reason is given why spiritual damage ought not be compared with temporal, so that from that comparison we may weigh its gravity. Therefore this reason seems to me to be that the spiritual ruin inflicted on the soul by venial sin is free, since it could altogether be avoided by the very person who freely allows himself to be induced into venial sin, and furthermore can easily be repaired. Hence it is not wonderful if, although it is of a superior order and in itself a graver evil, nevertheless it is estimated less in relation to the subject than the evil of homicide, which is not free to the neighbor and is altogether irreparable. And truly, if the difficulty taken from the reason of greater evil in itself ought to terrify us, it would be a greater sin, even without express and direct intention of spiritual loss, to induce someone to venial sin than to kill, because the former is a greater detriment than killing; and it would be a greater sin to lie venially than to amputate one’s own hand or another member of the body, which no one would say. Therefore let it stand that Cunegunda, in the species of the case, the nature of the thing being considered, did indeed sin, but venially, not mortally.

Unless perhaps accidentally she induced the companion to lie through an act of mortal sin, as if from hatred toward God or toward the companion herself, or if from envy of the perfection to which the companion was applying herself more zealously, she induced her by force or deceit to commit this or any other venial sin. For just as in the matter of money it can happen that a theft in itself most light, of one iulius, becomes a mortal sin by reason of grave harm inflicted upon a very poor man; and in the matter of reputation, although falsely to impute to someone that he is vain or a liar is light, it can become mortal by reason of infamy derived upon a religious man of good reputation and known probity; so, according to Cardinal de Lugo (de Iust. et Iur., disp. 9, sect. 2, n. 20), if you induce a perfect and holy man by force or deceit into venial sins, by reason of the harm which you bring, you can be made guilty of mortal fault.

I admit that he whom you would induce to venial sin does not sin gravely; but neither does he sin gravely who throws his money into a river. Yet truly you would sin gravely if by force or deceit you induced him to throw his money into a river. Therefore, although Cunegunda’s companion would not sin gravely in the case, you badly conclude from this that neither would Cunegunda sin gravely, when by force or deceit she would cast down, unwilling, from the state of most excellent perfection to which the companion is applying herself. Let priests take care to keep this doctrine before their eyes, so that they show themselves severe judges with those who are accustomed craftily to draw young people outstanding in purity and integrity of morals into vain and impure conversations; and even if I unwillingly permit that such conversations can be free from mortal fault, so that they are only venial, nevertheless “this very thing,” says the cited Lugo, “is a grave harm which is inflicted upon these young people in that state and purity of life.” And with stronger right and reason I would extend this to those who have undertaken the charge of imbuing young people of this kind with piety and doctrine.” Ithur., case 35; I. M. 249, 250.

To n. 250.

In the Constitutions or Rules of Religious Institutes, Rules are to be distinguished which in reality are not Constitutions of the Religious Institute, but certain spiritual or ascetical documents which are proposed to Religious so that with every effort they may tend toward perfection and make progress in it, always going from virtue to virtue. The matter is evident: there is no obligation per se of such Rules; and they are to be observed only so that someone may study always to preserve holiness of life and to increase it day by day. Therefore these Rules contain only a general spiritual direction and counsel for all.

But there are other Rules which contain true Constitutions of regular discipline to be observed by all in such an Institute, so that one who violates them can well be punished by the superior, some penance being imposed and altogether to be accepted and fulfilled by the subject. And thus also in Religious Congregations chapters of faults have been instituted. Cf. Norms of the Sacred Congregation on Religious, n. 167 ff.

Although these Rules or Constitutions do not of themselves bind under fault, nevertheless a religious is bound, even by obligation, to observe them by virtue of obedience, namely not always, but sometimes, that is, when its obligation presses either of itself or by accident. Namely, the object of the vow of obedience is only the external execution of the command of the Superior. But the virtue extends even to internal submission, thus rendering obedience perfect. Therefore the virtue of itself obliges one to observe the Rules or Constitutions when, concerning the Rules or Constitutions, a precept of the Superior intervenes: namely, so that then the religious not only executes the command of the Superior, which pertains to the vow of obedience, but also observes the Rules or Constitutions with an obedient and non-resistant will.

Likewise, the virtue of obedience obliges of itself not to despise the Rules and Constitutions. But it obliges by accident by reason of scandal or harm to the Community, which can arise from that non-observance of the Rules and Constitutions. And thus it is clear how the two numbers of the Norms, which at first sight appear to some to be mutually opposed, namely numbers 134 and 320, related below here, are easily reconciled.

But when the obligation of the virtue of obedience does not so press, the religious is still bound to observe the Rules or Constitutions of themselves from the virtue of obedience, not nevertheless by a strict obligation under liability of fault, but from the counsel and direction proposed to him by the will of legitimate Superiors and by mandate of the Church, if the Religious seriously wishes to study Christian perfection and to aspire to true holiness of life, to acquire it, and to increase it. From this also there arises an obligation of observing those Rules and Constitutions, not directly but indirectly, namely from another higher law, that the member be conformed to the whole and provide for the good of the whole.

For by the natural law itself he is held to this; from this, as he is bound always to act honestly, so also from this law he is bound to observe the Rules and Constitutions, insofar as it will not be without sin if he violates them from an end that is not right, if from circumstances his action is disordered, if finally the transgression of the Rules and Constitutions concerns matter contrary to the vows, or to natural or positive law by which he, like others, is bound.

These things having been laid down beforehand, it is easy to see that there is no opposition between the two cited numbers of the Norms.

"N. 134. From the virtue of obedience a Sister is held by the obligation of fulfilling the dispositions of the Constitutions and of Superiors.

"N. 320. The Constitutions of themselves do not oblige under liability of fault.

"Nevertheless a Sister who would transgress the Constitutions from contempt, or in a matter which was contrary either to the vows or to the precepts of God or of the Church, can by no means be excused from fault."

143. • QUESTION 7º. When does a Religious sin gravely against the precept of tending toward perfection?

Resp. In this he gravely offends: 1º if he violates the vows very often in a grave matter, as is plain; because he omits the means essential for observing this obligation, and consequently altogether necessary. - Thus all. 2º If he transgresses the rules generally from contempt, as was just said. But otherwise, if he violates them led by concupiscence, or because he thinks that they are not necessary for him for salvation, or if he thinks that they are not prescribed under grave obligation. For to transgress rules in matters of slight moment, even from custom, contempt being excluded, does not exceed venial sin. - Thus expressly St. Ligorius, n. 10, with St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and others commonly.

Yet there are not lacking those who contend that a Religious sins gravely against the obligation of tending toward perfection if he frequently, or at least for the most part, violates the rules; because they are efficacious means, although secondary, for directing a Religious in the way of perfection. But the prior opinion, which is common, appears truer, provided the omission of the rules does not lead into grave and frequent violation of the vows ⁸.

⁸ ** I think it rarely happens that that relaxation of soul in observing lighter rules, even directly voluntary, is from this title alone a mortal sin; because that negligence, speaking per se, is only a remote disposition, unless some peculiar circumstances accede which in some matter consummate a proximate occasion. Thus Suarez (De Relig., tr. VIII, bk. 1, ch. 4, n. 18). See also Card. De Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 15, nn. 49-50).

— He who must profess a state must at the same time profess the things which the truth of the state requires. But by his profession the religious is obliged to his state, which is one of pursuing perfection.

Therefore by an obligation formally distinct from the vows, the religious must tend toward the perfection of Christian charity.

But materially, positively, it is enough that the professed pursue perfection through the vows which are joined to profession and through toleration of the governance of his Institute.

Negatively, however, from this the religious is prohibited under grave sin: a. positively to contemn or cast away perfection; b. frequently to break vows or other grave precepts, for this is repugnant to a habitual effort toward charity; c. by contempt of the rule or of the power of the Superior, or by a manner of acting by which grave danger of expulsion is induced, virtually to cast away the yoke of religion or the state.

— Canon 592 imposes on religious, unless from the context of the discourse or the nature of the matter something else is established, the obligations of clerics concerning which in cc. 124-142. Cf. above, nn. 15-24.

— I. Notion. A rule is a norm of living according to evangelical perfection, imposed upon religious so that commonly and efficaciously they may tend toward the end of their religion.

From received usage, the word rule is rather reserved for the more ancient norms, which often are, for various Institutes, a certain fundamental law; while more recent norms, or those which are added to the rule, assume the name of constitutions. Thus the black Benedictines and the Trappists have the common Rule of St. Benedict, but their own Constitutions.

— II. Obligation of the Rule. Today the whole rule is never contained in counsels, but, at least in several articles, it brings forth some obligation, whether direct, when it induces guilt of sin, either proportioned to the matter or light; or indirect, or at least of undergoing a penalty (cf. I, n. 169). Already the Constitutions of the Friars Preachers, and then most of the more recent ones, are to be held as penal laws.

Although then, from its genus, an act prescribed by the rule remains indifferent, nevertheless practically, or in the concrete, violation of the rule, unless there is place for epikeia, will rarely be immune from fault because of the disorder of motive, or the common detriment, or inconstancy in purposes. Moreover a transgression from formal contempt of the rule as such, not as minimal or inopportune, will have to be charged with mortal pride. For by his profession the religious is subject to the rule, nor can he put off this subjection.

Observe that an act which is not immune from venial fault is not necessarily wholly vitiated. Cf. I, nn. 118 and 123.

— The rules which imposed it having been suppressed, subjects cannot be induced by religious Superiors in any way to make a manifestation of conscience to them (c. 530). A manifestation of conscience is a revelation of matters which lie hidden in conscience and proximately regard virtues or vices: therefore it is not a response about the external observance of the rule, nor about skill or lack of skill in praying. Subjects here seem to be understood as all who are called religious broadly, so that novices indeed, but not postulants, seem included under the name. Superiors seem to be taken as those properly such, such as Masters of novices are not. He induces to manifestation who, either openly or especially privately, exhorts subjects to manifest conscience; not he who benignly accepts a manifestation or renders it easy. An exhortation of this kind is prohibited only to Superiors, and when there is question of a manifestation to be made to themselves.

Spontaneous opening of the soul is not prohibited; indeed filial confidence is commended; and those are praised who prudently disclose doubts of conscience to Superiors. Prudently: wherefore the Code, c. 530, mentions only priest Superiors; yet it happens that intimate communication with the Superior herself is to be counselled.

— Choir is no longer a common obligation of religious. But where it exists, daily common recitation of the divine office is imposed in individual houses where there are at least four bound to choir and not actually legitimately impeded. In the same religions of men, and as much as can be done, also of women, Mass corresponding to the divine office must be celebrated daily according to the rubrics; and, with lay brothers excepted, solemnly professed who have been absent from choir must recite the canonical hours privately (c. 610).

— I. That they may preserve the truth of their state, religious must contend toward perfection by vows and religious observance.

II. The common obligations of clerics are of themselves extended to religious by canon 592.

III. They must observe the vows. Acts contrary to them are performed, of themselves, only illicitly by those simply professed, and invalidly by those solemnly professed. But violation of a vow induces the character of sacrilege.

1. By the vow of poverty all are prohibited from using any thing estimable by price for their own advantage as their own, that is, independently of the competent Superior. Dependence is preserved by permission not only express or tacit, but also reasonably presumed. But prohibited abdications or dispositions made in favor of others will be able, according to the manner in which the matter is understood, to be opposed to ecclesiastical law alone. Grave matter varies according to the various case. When there is question of the vice of proprietorship properly so called, or of acts which are prohibited by the vow of poverty from being done concerning things not one's own, the more common opinion judges that matter grave which would constitute grave theft. This gravity seems to be estimated relatively to the condition in which the religious by force of his profession is placed. But small sacrileges do not seem to coalesce. Thefts committed to the detriment of one's own religion are estimated more benignly than thefts of outsiders, so that the required quantity can be increased somewhat, for example by half.

2. By the vow of chastity a religious is prohibited, from the motive of religion, from all internal and external lust, and from marriage during the time of profession.

Professed who presume to contract marriage, even civilly only, and persons who presume to contract with them in the same way, are punished with excommunication reserved to the Holy See if they are solemnly professed, or to the Ordinary if they are professed of perpetual simple vows.

3. By the vow of obedience is promised to God the obedience which is owed in religious life. By force of the vow one must obey the Superior who is placed over the internal governance of the religion or house, and also the Prelate who commands a religious as such by force of the power of jurisdiction: such is the Supreme Pontiff, the regular Prelate at least exempt; and, for a diocesan religion, also the bishop or quasi-bishop. The remote matter of the vow is whatever is either explicitly presented by the rule or constitutions, or is very suitable for their observance; but the proximate matter comprehends precepts which are imposed upon religious as such by force of dominative power or even of jurisdiction. Not rarely today, in order that the vow be violated, it is presupposed that the Superior prescribe in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of holy obedience, or clearly express his will of obliging conscience. By the vow religious are also prohibited from impeding the preceptive action of the Superior, by withdrawing themselves from the dominion of the Superior, or from virtually violating precepts, by declaring absolutely, "I do not wish to obey; I will not do it": for they must preserve the state of subjection.

IV. Religious must observe the common life, by which they receive necessities for themselves from the convent in common, with a separate peculium therefore excluded, at least such as is prescribed by the Constitutions. And a peculium of perfect right, or one which cannot be taken away by the Superior, is commonly opposed to the present vow of poverty.

V. A rule is a norm of living according to evangelical perfection, imposed upon religious so that they may commonly and efficaciously tend toward the end of their religion; it has the obligation at least of a penal law, or even a greater one which has been expressly or tacitly added. The name of rule is often reserved to the more ancient norms, while the more recent ones are called Constitutions.

Everywhere, however, the obligation of manifesting conscience to Superiors has been suppressed; nor can they induce subjects to make it to themselves. But spontaneous opening of the soul is not prohibited; and filial confidence is commended by canon 530.

VI. Cloister obliges all religious not to go out of the religious house except with due permission; this is understood more strictly concerning nuns. Nor is it now lawful for Superiors to permit, even for a grave cause distinct from studies or, as we think, from proper ministries, that subjects remain outside the house of their own religion beyond six months (c. 606, §2).

Cloister, called papal, to be observed in the houses of regulars, whether of men or of women, prohibits among men the entry of all women of whatever age, class, or condition, with the wives, with retinue, of those who hold supreme rulership excepted. Among nuns, excepted are Cardinals and those who actually hold supreme rulership and their wives with retinue, the Visitor, the Confessor, physicians, and others whose work is necessary; no one of whatever class, condition, sex, or age can enter the cloister. Postulants are received within the cloister and are held by the law of cloister. Cloister is defined more precisely by the proper Ordinary, with common law attended to. Papal cloister is sanctioned by excommunication.

And also in the houses of religious Congregations, at least partial cloister, which in a particular case can be dispensed by Superiors, is now imposed as to be observed by the Code.

VII. The obligation of choir, where it exists, has been explained above.

The things common to all Religious are: 1° the very nature or essence of the religious state; 2° the necessity of vocation to the religious state; 3° probation; 4° profession of the three vows according to some rule.

1148. • The religious state is a stable mode of living in common of the faithful, tending under a certain rule to the perfection of Christian charity, the three substantial vows of perpetual chastity, poverty, and obedience having been emitted, approved by the Church with solemnity attributed to the vows. Thus, from the Law today in force in the Church, De Angelis.¹

1149. Corollaries. - I. The religious state according to itself and as to its substance was immediately handed down and instituted by Christ the Lord; for He Himself is the author of religious perfection, handing down the evangelical counsels.

This state in the Church is necessary as to the said substance, because she herself must be holy also by external and public sanctity, since sanctity is one of the notes by which she is discerned from false churches. But this public sanctity cannot shine without profession of the evangelical counsels. - But it is not necessary if it is considered as to peculiar forms by which it is determined to a certain Rule and Institute.

Whence as to substance the religious state is of divine law counseling; as to forms it is of ecclesiastical law.

II. For the essence of the religious state there is required some cause inducing permanence or firmness; otherwise it would not be a state. This cause of firmness is the vow. But for the essence of the religious state, considered by divine law alone, solemn vows are not required, but simple vows suffice. For all conditions necessary for the substance of Religion are also had in simple vows, and "the solemnity of the vow by the constitution of the Church alone" (according to De Angelis¹ a little before the middle of the eleventh century, as he argues from Cause 27. q. 1. Can. 40) "was invented" (cap. unic. L. III. T. XV. in 6°). This is also clear from the Bull of Gregory XIII Ascendente Domino, of the year 1584.

III. Although solemnity of vows is necessary for the religious state today even from the law of the Church, nevertheless already from the time of the Council of Trent another stable mode of living was introduced into the Church, which would include the three substantial vows, but would lack solemnity of vows, since in it simple vows were emitted, and it came under the name Congregation. Indeed another also supervened, which would not indeed have the essence of the religious state required by Christ, yet would imitate its form and retain something from it, namely only the vow of chastity, or the three vows, but temporary, or a similar mode of living without any vows; whence the former are called Congregations properly religious, the latter Congregations improperly religious (De Angelis L. III. T. XXXI. 6°). Religious Congregations are neither held by the laws nor enjoy the privileges of Regulars strictly so called, unless either the former were specially imposed on them or the latter were granted to them.

Therefore it is clear in what sense Congregations properly religious must be called such by ecclesiastical law, and in what sense not.

1150. • It is certain that divine vocation is given, namely that by most benign providence God calls some before others to a more excellent and more perfect state, and at the same time bestows endowments and graces for rightly executing and preserving it, especially as to the ecclesiastical and religious state. For all things in the natural order are governed by God in the mode proper to individuals; therefore a fortiori in the supernatural order. Otherwise, for embracing and pursuing the more perfect state, special endowments and graces are required, which can be granted by God alone, the supreme dispenser. It is clear besides from various places of Sacred Scripture. Thus concerning Priesthood in particular the Apostle says:¹ Neither does anyone take the honor to himself, but he who is called by God as Aaron. ... Moreover the same must be said of religious life, which is a more perfect and much more difficult state. (s) p. 483.

1151. Questions. - Query 1° Whether or how he sins who, feeling himself called to Religion, does not obey the divine vocation?

Resp. 1° Per se, rigorously speaking, he sins in no way, because divine counsels of themselves impose no obligation, since in this precisely they differ from precepts.

Resp. 2° Yet he can scarcely be excused from some fault on account of the danger of eternal salvation to which he commits himself. Indeed he would not be excused from grave sin who had been persuaded that this was the only means remaining for him of obtaining eternal salvation, that he flee from the dangers of the world.

But are those in a bad state who, morally certain concerning a divine vocation to Religion, strive to persuade themselves that they can obtain their salvation equally easily by remaining in the world, or by returning to it? It does not seem doubtful that these expose themselves to a great danger of salvation; because by remaining in the world against the vocation of God, they deprive themselves of those special helps which the providence of God had prepared for them in Religion, and therefore with difficulty they will resist the temptations of the world. Yet St. Alphonsus does not dare to bring a certain judgment on this; nevertheless he inclines much more to the opinion condemning this of mortal sin.²

1152. • Query 2° How does he sin who, not called, professes Religion?

Resp. He sins gravely if he clearly knew the defect of vocation, especially on account of the danger of salvation which he incurs while he undertakes obligations which morally he will not be able to satisfy. Fault will cease when he grieves over it, firmly proposing, grace having been implored, to fulfill the obligations of the state already undertaken.

1153. • Query 3° Whether those sin gravely who turn away sons, subjects, or any others from the religious state?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if they turn them away unjustly through threats, force, fraud, or importunate prayers; because they impede them from the attainment of a great good to which they have a right, and expose them to the danger of eternal salvation. When those turning away through threats, force, fraud are held to restitution, see n. 805. 3°.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, for the most part, even if they turn them away only by prayers and promises; because this cannot be without grave damage to them. - Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus,¹ who says that this opinion is altogether to be held against some. - Yet parents do not sin who oppose for a time the pious desires of younger children in order to prove their constancy, or on account of another just cause. But that cause can be judged just on account of which even the Superiors of the Order would not easily admit the candidate. Moreover even in proving the constancy of the younger, no small discretion is needed, lest the fragility of the candidate turn him away from a vocation otherwise true. Wherefore in this matter, to avoid illusions, one must stand by the counsels of a confessor or of an upright and learned man.

Query 4° Whether children entering Religion against the will or without the knowledge of parents sin?

Resp. Negatively, speaking per se, although in practice this ordinarily is not expedient, unless they rightly fear unjust vexation or impediment. The reason is that unless parents stand in the way for a just cause, children are altogether free concerning the choice of a state of life. - Recall the things said n. 425.

1154. • Query 5° What are the signs of religious vocation?

Resp. Generally speaking, or according to ordinary providence, two things are required and suffice for proving divine vocation, namely due aptitude and propensity of the will.

1° Aptitude is understood as suitability for the religious state in general, and in particular for the observance proper to such an Order. But it consists especially in right judgment, in good character, in a soul submitted to the yoke of obedience, in relatively sufficient knowledge, and in the absence of defects of body and soul which are opposed to the character of this life.

2° Inclination must be a) spontaneous, which generally arises from this, that the religious state is presented to the mind as congruent to one's own disposition, and suited to bringing about internal peace and happiness; b) constant, which therefore is not subject to frequent changes, notwithstanding otherwise some past delay arising from temptations of the devil or from a certain repugnance of nature. Yet it is not required that the inclination proceed from spontaneity or propensity more than from intimate persuasion of soul. Moreover that inclination c) must be right, namely proceed from a pure intention, from the mere desire of obtaining salvation more easily, of procuring the greater glory of God or also the salvation of souls, etc.

I said: generally speaking, or in ordinary providence; because there are more evident signs of vocation, namely 1° divine revelation, as St. Paul, St. Aloysius Gonzaga, St. Stanislaus Kostka, etc. were called; 2° a singular inspiration, which consists in an internal motion by which someone is vehemently impelled to a more perfect life and is, as it were, drawn.

Note. - Doubt concerning vocation persisting after long probation through protracted examination and fervent prayer, and the matter having been submitted to a prudent confessor and to Superiors constituted by God, one must remain in the inferior state; for no one ought to ascend to the superior state unless he is morally certain of divine vocation. Thus in the opinion set forth n. 1150.

1155. • Query 6° To what is he held who has vowed religion?

Resp. Distinguish. 1° He who vowed religion in general, that is, not determining either Order, or place, or laxer or stricter discipline, is held by ordinary means to seek some one in which discipline flourishes, at least as to the more principal observances. - If he is rejected from that one, he more probably must seek another, because his vow is general, concerning some Religion.

2° He who vowed Religion in species is held to enter some house of that Order, and where he is rejected by one, he is held to use ordinary means so that he can enter another.

3° He who vowed it individually, determining the place in such a way that he does not intend another, if he cannot be admitted into the fixed house, will be free; because he bound himself under this condition only.¹

Query 7° Whether one vowing religion sins gravely if, having entered, he departs?

Resp. Affirmatively, if he does not have a just cause; but negatively if he did not have the mind of professing, but only of trying. - If he is cast out as unfit, he must apply moderate diligence so that he may become fit for another; but if he has attempted this in vain, he commits no sin by remaining in the world, because the vow has been made impossible.¹

1156. • Novitiate is a mutual experiment, by which Religion, on the one side, tries the morals and qualities of the novice, so that it may see whether it is expedient to admit or reject him; and the novice, on the other side, tries the austerities and Statutes of Religion, and his own disposition, so that he may see whether it is expedient for him to profess it. - Thus Billuart.²

1157. Questions. - Query 1° Who are not to be admitted into the Novitiate?

Resp. 1° On account of defect of mind, those who are not masters of themselves, as is clear of itself.

2° On account of defect of liberty.

a) Slaves, on account of the injury which would be done to masters.

b) Those joined in Matrimony, concerning whom it will be treated in the Treatise on Matrimony.

c) Bishops, even only confirmed, unless with the permission of the Supreme Pontiff, on account of the bond by which they are bound to their Church in perpetuity.³

d) Those professed in some Religion, unless either they are previously dispensed from the vows emitted in it, or they pass to a stricter Religion, that is, such that its actual observance, not merely its primary institution, is stricter. Yet this transition must not be made rashly or from levity, or with grave damage to the Religion to be left. Besides, the permission of the Superior or of the Pope is to be sought, and, in the case of a privilege granted to the Order which is being left for this, it must also be obtained. But transition to a laxer Religion cannot be made except with permission of the Supreme Pontiff; but to an equal one by the same permission, or also, but with just cause, by permission of the Superior.⁴

3° Those whose parents are in grave or extreme necessity would be admitted illicitly, though not invalidly, if they can assist that necessity without being exposed in the world to proximate and grave danger of falling into mortal sin. Only grave necessity of brothers or sisters does not impede admission; indeed dispensation from the vow of entering is also necessary for someone to be able to defer entrance for a long time on account of it. But parents would illicitly enter Religion if they had unemancipated children constituted in grave necessity or destitute of sufficient education.¹

4° By natural law (concerning the dispositions of positive law, see n. 801. q. 4°), those burdened with debts would be admitted illicitly, if they were able to pay them in a notable part at least, and in a short time (say within two years), and without great difficulty or probable danger of sin or of losing vocation. - Thus St. Alphonsus² as more probable, although the opinion which denies absolutely and the opinion which affirms absolutely are also probable to him.

5° Those also would be admitted illicitly and most imprudently whom public acts show to have been accused or investigated before the secular court concerning some graver crime, unless they have been dismissed by the judge as innocent.³

6° Those are not to be admitted whose infirmity is such that they are not equal to bearing the burdens of common life and fulfilling the obligations of the Order.

7° Those would be admitted illicitly to the habit who had not sought and waited for a suitable time (three months) for testimonial letters both from the Ordinary of origin and from the Ordinary of the place in which, after the completion of the fifteenth year of their age, they stayed beyond a year, unless nevertheless the Institute which admits them has been dispensed by a special and non-communicable privilege from the Decree of Jan. 25, 1848,⁴ in which this disposition is contained.

8° The prepubescent (n. 911), against the will of parents or guardians.

1158. • Query 2° Whether clerics, especially those having care of souls, can be admitted to Religion without the permission of their own Ordinary?

Resp. Affirmatively, as is clear both from the unanimous opinion of the Doctors, and especially from the authority of Benedict XIV, Brief Ex quo, Jan. 14, 1747. Yet a priest exercising care of souls must make the Bishop more certain concerning his plan, lest the flock be left without guardianship. Besides, in the case in which the Church which the priest serves would suffer grave damage from his transition to Religion, the Bishop could recall him, even after profession, as is clear from the Brief just cited. - Which of our clerics are not absolutely able to enter Religion, see n. 374. 8°.

1159. Principles. - I. For valid profession there is required:

1° Aptitude of the one vowing, namely that he have no impediment which is judged substantial either from divine law, or from canon law, or from statutes confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff.

2° Consent and acceptance of the Prelate of the Order, or, where it is required, of the Chapter. (B) p. 477. But error concerning the substance, both on the part of the one professing and of the one admitting, makes the Profession void.

3° Liberty of the one vowing, that is, that Profession be made spontaneously, grave fear being excluded, or even reverential fear joined with importunate prayers often repeated, flatteries, command, or grave offense or indignation of blood-relatives continued for a long time, also with threats added concerning subsidies to be denied if he leaves Religion. For these things singly, or certainly joined together, considered with the condition of a rude and timid man, can induce just fear and invalidate profession; as Laymann teaches with others.¹ (l) p. 477.

II. From religious Profession is born the obligation, of itself perpetual, 1° of observing the vows; 2° of observing the rule; 3° of tending to perfection. I say: of itself perpetual; because, as we shall say below, it can either cease or be changed.

1160. • From the present discipline of the Church, the proper and necessary object of the vow of poverty is not 1) life, nor honor, nor reputation, nor knowledge, nor the right of conferring by election, presentation, or collation a regular benefice; 2) abdication of imperfect dominion (n. 590); but 3) dependent use, or only use of fact, of temporal goods, insofar as of themselves they are estimable by price (n. 675), is necessary. This is clear 1° from the fact that the possession of temporal goods estimable by price alone constitutes a man rich, in the proper sense of this word, and that from the lack of these alone he properly becomes poor. - 2° from those things which we taught with De Angelis n. 1149 under III; indeed also from the Pontifical Decree given by our Most Holy Lord Leo XIII for the Regulars of Belgium. - 3° from the fact that today there is no truly so-called religious Institute in whose rule independent use is permitted. Cf. Craisson¹ and St. Alphonsus.² Hence:

1161. • I. The following are not comprehended by the vow of poverty:

1. Manuscripts, whether one's own or accepted from another. For they are offspring of the intellect, which do not fall under the vow of poverty. Besides, common usage bears this, and it is clear from the Brief Postulat of Benedict XIII, year 1724, and the Declaration of Clement VIII. The continuator Tournely with others excepts if the contrary has been defined in the constitutions of the Order.³

2. Relics, since they are spiritual things.

3. Paintings, although offspring of the intellect, nevertheless cannot be made by a Religious, while the vow is preserved, with the intention of keeping them for himself, nor even (if they are made either by a lay-brother at the time in which he is held to work for the convent, or by any professed one with colors, etc. handed over by the convent) with the intention of giving them to outsiders.⁴

4. Peculium, that is, a temporal good destined for the uses of an individual and not for the common uses of the monastery, and this not only when necessaries are not supplied by the community, as is clear of itself; but also when they are supplied, provided in this case 1° it already exists by custom; 2° it is held dependently on the Superior, and therefore 3° with a mind prepared to renounce it at the nod of the same Superior; and 4° it is kept either in common, or in the cell even of the religious, but with permission of the Superior, and not locked with a key or so hidden that it is withdrawn from the free disposition of the Superior; 5° it is applied to uses neither illicit nor superfluous. - The first is required so that the prescription of Trent,¹ by which peculia are more probably prohibited,² may cease; the second, third, and fourth, that use of right, or independent use, may be guarded against; the fifth, as will be clear from what must soon be said.

5. An ecclesiastical benefice, for example an Episcopate, legitimately conferred. Namely he will be able to administer it and to dispose of its revenues independently of the Superior, since the thing is annexed to a spiritual thing; yet he cannot do this licitly except for his own support and pious uses.⁴

1162. • II. All acts of use independent of the rule or Superior, concerning temporal things, are comprehended by the vow of poverty, and therefore a Religious sins:

1. If he spends or lends something from things granted to him for use into another use without permission, or culpably loses, destroys, or makes it worse.⁵

2. If he accepts anything without permission, whether as a gift, or as a loan for consumption, or as a loan for use, or as a properly so-called deposit (n. 924), or refuses what is owed to Religion from a title of justice, for example inheritance, wages. Resolve otherwise concerning gifts, since the vow of poverty does not oblige one to acquire for Religion. Yet he who without just cause refused gifts of this kind would sin against charity toward the convent by impeding its good.⁶

3. If he buys anything without permission, even for the community.

4. If he asks or accepts something from an outsider to be spent on pious works not determined by the donor in the lowest species.⁶

5. If he hides something in such a way that it is withdrawn from the free disposition of the Superior.⁷

6. If a Procurator or Superior expends anything otherwise than the rule, the will of the Superior, custom, or reasonable cause permits. The reason is that these are not masters of common goods, but only administrators.¹

1163. Questions. - Query 1° What permission is required and suffices so that use is not independent?

Resp. to 1st. There is required: a) True permission, that is, not extorted by fear nor obtained by fraud, for example by feigning necessity. b) Reasonable permission, that is, not for illicit or vain uses, nor for superfluous, precious things unbecoming the religious state. For the Superior cannot give greater permission than he himself has; but he, since he is not master of the goods of Religion, cannot expend them at his own discretion and uselessly, but only for the necessity and utility of Religion.² Hence the opinion altogether pleases St. Alphonsus (although he does not dare to condemn the opposite) teaching that such permission is not merely illicit, but also invalid, except if it is a question either of superfluous things without notable excess, because otherwise the matter would be exposed to great scruples, or of a small sum to be exposed to a licit game, that is, not merely fortuitous.³

Resp. to 2nd. Tacit permission suffices, and more probably also permission presumed from certain probability of future concession; for each takes away independent use. Yet such presumption ordinarily is not without venial fault, because for the most part Superiors, at least as to the mode, are unwilling. (A) p. 477. Permission sought, but unduly denied, unless there is danger of grave damage in delay, does not excuse from transgression of the vow.⁴

Hence, that is, from presumed permission, a religious can assist a poor man laboring under great poverty when access to the Superior does not lie open; he can bestow moderate alms on the poor if with due permission he is living outside the convent; give them something edible when he is in the convent; make light donations to friends and blood-relatives as a sign of gratitude or due friendship, or for conciliating love toward Religion; make remunerative donations from goods granted to him for use, indeed give more than he received, up to an excess of a fourth part, because gratitude demands that more be returned than had been accepted; more probably also give those things which by living more sparingly he withdrew from himself from things granted to him for use, if a fixed quantity is assigned to him in such a way that neither the monastery is held to furnish more, nor he himself to render an account of what was assigned;¹ unless the contrary will of the Superior is clear; accept from outsiders something to be handed over to the Superior;² buy a thing if he knows that it will be very pleasing to the Superior and easy recourse to him is not open, for example on a journey; generally accept or expend something when the Superior cannot be approached and the occasion is urgent;³ give something to Peter, if he has permission of giving to Paul, unless the Superior gave permission for Paul on account of a peculiar reason, being going to deny it if it had been sought for Peter.⁴ Yet presumption would be illegitimate in a religious who, while traveling, turned aside to other places outside the way to see curious things, unless perhaps the distance were very short and no or very slight expenses had to be made, or unless in the particular case the permission of the Superior could rightly be presumed from the nature of the cause.

1164. • Query 2° What matter must be judged grave in violation of the vow of poverty?

Resp. 1° In sins which are at the same time against religion and justice, generally speaking, that is to be held as grave matter which constitutes mortal sin in theft.⁵

Moreover, that one may judge concerning the gravity of matter in thefts of this kind, it must be noted that moderately wealthy monasteries are commonly equated with quite wealthy private owners. Hence generally the same measure as for these constitutes grave matter. But if they are very wealthy, a greater quantity is required. A greater quantity is also required if a Religious usurps things of the Monastery for his own use, or gives them to others of the same Community, than if he spends the same things on outsiders, because thus they remain at home. Greater also in minute thefts, which besides, when a notable interval has intervened (see n. 698. q. 6°), do not coalesce into grave matter. Greater again in eatables, provided they are not reserved and the damaging of the convent is not excessive and in a more extraordinary and more precious thing.⁶

Resp. 2° In sins committed against Religion alone, or against the vow alone, the difficulty increases, and there is greater disagreement of Theologians. Yet more commonly they require no greater matter for mortal sin than in the preceding case, where justice is violated; because the act of proprietorship seems to be of the same gravity. Yet not improbably some grave Doctors require a greater quantity for grave sin. - Thus Elbel,¹ the Salmanticenses.²

But commonly they agree that a much greater value is required for sinning gravely when gifts are accepted from outsiders to be spent on others; because then the act of proprietorship is much less than if these were retained for one's own use.³

But generally a religious does not sin gravely by secretly accepting some thing from the Community, for example a book for his own use even for a long time (but not in perpetuity), unless he so hides it that it cannot be found by the Superiors; because then the Prelate is not judged unwilling as to the substance, but only as to the mode.⁴

As to things accepted or handed over by loan for consumption or loan for use without the permission of the Prelate, generally speaking he will not sin gravely against the vow of poverty if he gives the thing to outsiders for his own use or even other uses by loan for consumption or loan for use, provided he is certain of recovering them and does not therefore inflict grave damage on the Community, which for this reason, for example, lacks the use of a thing gravely necessary here and now. Much less will he sin gravely if he lends by loan for consumption or loan for use things granted to him for use to other religious of the same monastery. The reason is that although he posits some act of proprietorship in these things, nevertheless he does not sin gravely, according to the common interpretation of Theologians.⁵

1165. • Query 3° Whether a religious who has violated the vow of poverty is held to restitution, and whether one unable to restore is held to withdraw something from himself from the things granted to him for use?

Resp. to 1st Affirmatively, if by violating the vow he also violated justice at the same time. The reason is clear.

Resp. to 2nd. The negative opinion is truly probable to St. Alphonsus⁶ if the things granted for use are necessary. The reason is that it is not to be presumed that the Superior wishes to oblige the subject to this with so great an inconvenience.

1166. • Query 4° What is the difference between the vow and the virtue of poverty?

Resp. The vow regards only external acts of proprietorship; but the virtue also extends to internal affections of the heart. For the object of the vow is to despoil the Religious externally of temporal goods. But the virtue has as its end wholly to cut away every inordinate affection of the heart toward earthly things. Therefore the vow of poverty is like the means to the virtue, which is the end to be obtained. This being posited, everyone sees that the virtue of poverty extends much more widely than the vow; for as often as someone infringes the vow, at the same time he wounds the virtue also; but not vice versa.

I said that the vow affects only external acts of proprietorship; yet the vow could be violated by an internal act which regarded and touched an external act, namely by the desire of acting externally against the vow; since desire puts on every malice and species of the external act, as was said n. 228.

1167. • The vow of chastity must be judged much more excellent than the vow of poverty, since through it the Religious renounces not goods extrinsic to himself, but intrinsic, namely pleasures of the body and of the senses.

Its object embraces two things, namely those things which by natural and divine law are already prohibited, and also those things which could be done licitly in legitimate matrimony. Therefore this is the efficacy of the vow of chastity, that what otherwise could be licit becomes illicit for the Religious; but those things which are prohibited to all, he must avoid from a double obligation, namely of chastity and of Religion.

1168. Questions. - Query 1° Whether sins of lust even merely internal are opposed to the vow of chastity?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is that a Religious by force of the vow of chastity is held to abstain from every voluntary venereal delectation, whether internal or external, so that if he wounds chastity, he incurs a double guilt, namely of lust and of sacrilege.¹

1169. • Query 2° What is the gravity of sins committed against the vow of chastity?

Resp. This general rule must be established. The gravity of sin against the vow is entirely the same as against the Sixth and Ninth precept of the Decalogue, namely sin is mortal or venial against Religion according as it is mortal or venial against chastity. But smallness of matter is not to be admitted in sins of lust, nor can the fault be light except from imperfect consent, according to the things said n. 484, 485.

1170. • Query 3° Whether or what difference there is between the virtue and the vow of chastity?

Resp. 1° No difference is given by reason of object, since the vow extends as widely as the virtue itself. Yet they differ in this, that in those things which are prohibited by the virtue, two sins are given if the vow is violated, while one sin is committed in that which is interdicted by the vow alone. For if someone bound by a simple vow of Religion were to contract matrimony, he would perpetrate one sin, namely against Religion, in the use of marriage. Therefore the vow can sometimes be violated without the virtue itself being wounded.

Resp. 2° The virtue of chastity, besides the obligations which it imposes, also counsels mere counsels leading to greater perfection; while the vow affects only the matter of obligation.

1171. Principles. - I. A Religious from the vow of obedience is held to all things which the Superior prescribes according to the rules and constitutions of the Order, whether directly and expressly, or indirectly and implicitly.² Yet that there be sin against the vow, it is required that the Superior truly prescribe, and not merely advise; and this indeed will be clear from the words, mode of speaking, and various circumstances of things.

II. The Superior has the right of prescribing not only those things which are had explicitly in the rule or constitutions, such as abstinence, silence, etc., but also whatever things are implicitly contained in them, such as penalties against transgressors, and whatever pertains to the offices of the Community to be fulfilled rightly, or to its right administration. The reason is that a religious binding himself to observing the special constitutions of the Order obliges himself to all those things which are wisely established or prescribed for obtaining this end.

III. A Religious by force of his vow is not held to obey a Superior prescribing a thing a) impossible, or b) evidently illicit (as to reveal a secret which he is not held to reveal from another reason), or c) gravely harmful to himself. - And indeed he could not oblige himself to an impossible thing, since no one is held to the impossible; nor to a thing certainly illicit, since a vow cannot be a bond of iniquity; nor finally to a thing gravely harmful to himself, because this is foreign to the mind of Religion, and heroic acts commonly and implicitly do not fall under a vow, just as they do not fall under a precept. Yet except if it is a question of offices to be fulfilled within the limits of religious life, for example of caring for pestiferous religious of the same Order, etc.

Hence a subject is not held to obey a Prelate commanding that he walk upon waters, etc.; but if examples are reported by which it is clear that such obedience was approved by God and confirmed by miracles, it must be said that then the divine good pleasure had been manifested by a singular and supernatural light both to the one prescribing and to the one obeying.

1172. Questions. - Query 1° What difference intervenes between the virtue and the vow of obedience?

Resp. The same as was indicated above n. 1166 concerning poverty; namely the object of the vow is the external execution of the mandate of the Superior, while the virtue reaches even to internal submission, and effects perfect obedience itself.

But not only sins against the vow, but also against the virtue, must be carefully avoided by a Religious; and this indeed is usually wounded more frequently. For it happens (would that it were more rarely!) that a subject indeed obeys the mandate of the Prelate integrally by external action, but with a reluctant, sad, and bitter will. Then indeed, although he satisfies the vow, yet he recedes far from the virtue.

Therefore a Religious disobedient to a Superior truly prescribing more probably² commits a double sin, one against the natural precept which prescribes submission to a legitimate Superior, and the other against the vow. Hence in pious Congregations of men or women living a common life under the same Rule without the bond of vows, the disobedient are not exempted from sin if they are rebellious against Superiors, but they commit one sin.

1173. • Query 2° Whether a religious is held to obey in doubt whether the thing prescribed is licit, or exceeds the power of the Superior?

Resp. Affirmatively, because then presumption favors the Superior. Besides, the opposite opinion would disturb order in religious families. Except if the thing prescribed is either very difficult, or exposes the subject or a third party to danger of grave damage, provided that in this double case the subject acts from an opinion solidly probable. The reason is that then the morally certain right of the subject prevails over the uncertain right of the superior.¹

1174. • Query 3° When does a religious sin gravely against the vow of obedience?

Resp. He sins gravely in the following cases, which rarely occur, namely: 1° when he refuses to obey in grave matter a Superior prescribing in virtue of holy obedience, or in the name of Jesus Christ, or through other similar formulas, which must be used very rarely by Superiors; 2° when to a Superior prescribing he responds: I do not wish to obey, I do not wish to do it, I will not do it, or some other similar thing which smells of formal contempt of the authority prescribing; 3° when from disobedience there follows grave scandal of others, whether of subjects or of secular persons, or grave inconvenience either for the Community or for others, for example for the salvation of souls, etc.

In other cases disobedience does not exceed venial sin; but since the aforesaid cases of mortal sin rarely occur, commonly the sins of religious against obedience are to be reputed as venial. - Much more rarely still do sins committed against the virtue alone become mortal. - But a Rule ordering obedience in all things is to be understood of the perfection of obedience, not of obligation from the vow.²

1175. • Query 4° To whom must obedience be given?

Resp. Obedience must be given not only to greater Superiors, but also to lower ones, or ministers, or superiors prescribing from the mandate of Superiors, since the authority which enjoins the mandate is the same.

Query 5° How must obedience be given?

Resp. That the full perfection of obedience may be clear, obedience must be given: 1° from a supernatural motive, as the Apostle prescribes:¹ Not serving to the eye, as pleasing men.... Serve the Lord Christ. - 2° Cheerfully, or with joy and a willing soul: For God loves a cheerful giver.² - 3° Promptly, that is, either immediately, or at the prescribed time, and with due care, without sluggishness. - 4° Entirely, or by completing the whole prescribed work.

1176. Questions. - Query 1° How great is the obligation of the rule?

Prelim. Under the name of rule in this question also come Constitutions or Statutes which proceed from the Prelates alone or the Chapters of Religions.

Resp. 1° "Rule ... is not mere counsel," says Suarez; since violations of rule can be punished by the Superior. See Bouix.³

2° There can be a rule which obliges under mortal sin, or under venial sin, or only to penalty.

"If the rule obliges under sin, its transgression is against the vow and sacrilegious; the reason is that such a rule is not less preceptive than the voice of the Superior; ... therefore ... a Carthusian, for example, eating meats, or a Franciscan not fasting on Friday, sins against obedience and against temperance." - Thus Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus.⁴

3° If in the rule it is expressly said that it obliges as much as it can, its violation will be a mortal or venial sin according as the matter is grave or light; because the rule is not less obliging than the voice of the Superior, and the Superior can oblige according to the gravity of the matter.

4° Rule of itself does not oblige even under venial sin if this is declared in it. But if the rule is altogether silent concerning this, it is disputed. The opinion is to be preferred, says D. Bouix after Suarez, which holds that the rule then does not oblige under grave sin, and that it must be discerned from circumstances and from the interpretation received in each Religion whether it obliges under light sin or only to undergoing penalty:¹ but if someone from a good end transgresses some rule, for example of silence so that he may console a sad companion, he in no way sins.²

Yet several Doctors rightly note that transgressions of this kind rarely lack every fault, on account of negligence, contempt, or another inordinate affection; indeed he would sin gravely who frequently and almost by custom transgressed the rule, gravely disturbing religious discipline, for example if he were never willing to observe silence, nor to pray, nor to walk modestly; if he were to enter the rooms of all the religious, and transgress similar statutes of Religion.³ - He also sins gravely who infringes the rule from formal contempt of the Superior, as, for example, that he may show the Superior to be despised by him and held as nothing; likewise if he does this from hatred against Religion or its persons, or from the will of resisting the Prelate; likewise if he exposes himself to the proximate danger of falling into mortal sin, or foresees that he will for this reason be expelled. But if someone proposes never to observe the rule, it can scarcely happen that contempt is not present. Thus Suarez apud D. Bouix,⁴ and St. Alphonsus.⁵ - But the mere frequency of infractions does not seem sufficiently to prove contempt, since this frequency can arise from great sloth, in which nevertheless the slothful man can still hold the rules, Superiors, and Religion in great esteem.⁶

1177. • Query 2° Whether those professed according to a mitigated rule are held to reformation if it is introduced?

Resp. Affirmatively, if the reformation is made through statutes at least indirectly pertaining to the mitigated rule, or is necessary for the conservation of the Order, for example because with the present observance either very few strive to arrive at perfection, or the religious live with scandal of secular persons, or the essential vows and other statutes of Religion would not otherwise be observed. Otherwise negatively, because profession is made according to the rule, whether primitive or mitigated. Thus as certain, if the mitigation was introduced by the Pope; as probable, if by custom.¹

1178. • Query 3° Whether a Prelate gravely sins at some time by neglecting to correct light defects of subjects?

Resp. Affirmatively, with St. Alphonsus² and the common opinion against Lorca, in the case in which there were several defects and such (for example concerning silence, fasts, etc.) that they can relax discipline: whence concerning these he must inquire in order to correct them, yet without excessive solicitude: sometimes prudently dissembling, if the defects do not bring scandal, or if he foresees that the subject will become worse from correction, or if a more opportune time must be awaited. - But just as the Superior is held to correct, so he who has the office of Zelator is held to warn him concerning the transgressions of others.

1179. Principle. - A religious is held, not indeed to be perfect, but to tend in some way to perfection.

I say: 1° He is not held to be perfect, as a Bishop, who by force of his duty is obliged to acts of perfection, for example to laying down life for the sheep, since a religious per se, or by force of his state, is not held to acts of this kind.

I say: 2° He is held in some way to tend to perfection. For obligation to the evangelical counsels implies obligation of tending to perfection, since once these are observed, by that very fact you tend to this. For by exercising himself in these counsels, on the one hand he removes from himself the obstacles of charity or perfection, namely the threefold concupiscence, of the eyes by poverty, of the flesh by chastity, and the pride of life by the exercise of humble obedience; but on the other hand the observance of the same counsels disposes man so that he may become wholly God's, by handing over to Him all the things which he has, namely the goods of fortune by poverty, the body by chastity, the soul by obedience.

1180. Questions. - Query 1° By what means is a religious held to tend to perfection?

Resp. 1° He is held to tend primarily through the essential means of the religious state, namely through the observation of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.

Resp. 2° He is held to tend secondarily also through accidental means, namely through the proper rules of the Order, at least by not contemning those helps. But then the religious is judged to omit the rules from contempt when he transgresses them with the mind of not subjecting himself to them or to his Prelates; or if he holds them as empty.¹

1181. • Query 2° When does a religious sin gravely against the precept of tending to perfection?

Resp. In this he offends gravely: 1° If he infringes the vows very often in a grave matter, as is clear; because he omits means essential and consequently altogether necessary for preserving this obligation. - Thus all. 2° If he generally transgresses the rules from contempt, as has just been said. But otherwise, if he violates them led by concupiscence, or because he thinks they are not necessary for him for salvation, or if he thinks that they are not prescribed under grave obligation. For to transgress rules in matters of slight moment, even from custom, contempt being set aside, does not exceed venial sin. - Thus expressly St. Alphonsus.²

1182. • Query 3° Whether a religious sins gravely who intends to observe only the mandates obliging under grave obligation, and to care in no way concerning the rest?

Resp. The denying opinion is the more common, and to St. Alphonsus³ the more probable. The reason is that by the very fact that the religious wishes to fulfill those several things which oblige under grave obligation, he already tends to perfection, since he wishes to fulfill several things which with respect to others do not oblige, but are of mere counsel.

Moreover the Holy Doctor rightly notes that a religious so disposed can be living in grave danger of sinning mortally under other heads, for example by reason of danger of transgressing the vows, or of inflicting grave damage on Religion as to discipline, etc.

1183. • Although obligations existing from valid Profession are by their nature perpetual, yet they can cease, or even be changed.

They cease by dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff, or of him to whom this power has been given by the Supreme Pontiff, for example through the Rule. This is clear from those things which we said in the Treatise on Laws n. 158 and on the Second Precept n. 391. - Indeed even in solemn vows the Supreme Pontiff can dispense for a most grave cause. The reason is that solemnity of vows was instituted from ecclesiastical Law alone, as is clear from the Extravagant of John XXI, tit. 6, and from the bull Ascendente Domino, in which Gregory XIII says: "We considering that the solemnity of the vow was invented by the constitution of the Church alone," etc. Therefore the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in solemn vows, just as in simple vows, since that by which the former differ from these is of mere ecclesiastical institution. But according to all he can dispense in simple vows. Therefore, etc. This is also clear from various examples related in ecclesiastical history, that several Supreme Pontiffs used power of this kind. Especially in most recent times Pius VII granted several dispensations of this kind to solemnly professed monks and nuns for revalidating marriages sacrilegiously entered.

2151. • The obligations of Religious are: 1. to tend to perfection; 2. to observe the vows emitted; 3. to observe the rule of their own Order; 4. to persevere in the institute of life undertaken. Concerning the obligation of reciting the canonical Hours, see n. 2204, 3, and 2205.

2152. • Principles. I. A Religious is held, UNDER GRAVE obligation, to tend to perfection. - For by force of his profession he is bound to wish to preserve his State, which is a state of perfection, or a state of those tending to perfection; although this perfection, of itself, is not of precept but of counsel.¹⁸

2153. • II. A Religious is bound to strive toward perfection: - 1) through ESSENTIAL means, which are the exercise of virtues, assiduity in prayer, and frequentation of the Sacraments; - 2) through the GENERAL means of regular life, i.e. through observance of the vows, for by these the roots of worldly life are cut away; - 3) through the SPECIAL means of his Order, i.e. through at least imperfect observation of the rules, which are not only as it were the outer wall of the vows, but also means necessary for attaining the special end which each Religion has proposed to itself for serving God and perfecting its own members.¹⁹

Hence, a Religious sins gravely against the obligation of tending to perfection: 1. If he casts aside all the means of perfection; for then he is not in the way of salvation. 2. If he frequently infringes the vows in a grave matter; because the vows are to be observed not only by reason of themselves, but also insofar as they are essential means of perfection. - 3. If he violates the rules of the Order from contempt, or with grave detriment to common discipline, as will be explained below (cf. n. 2170).

2154. IT IS ASKED. Does a Religious sin gravely who wishes to observe only those rules which oblige UNDER MORTAL sin, and to neglect the others?

Resp. St. Alphonsus: "Many excuse him; but many do not. But Sanchez says knowingly that it will happen with difficulty that such a one be excused from mortal sin, at least from other heads, namely on account of the danger to which he exposes himself, either of offending against the vows or of inducing relaxation of the rule in the Community"²⁰ (cf. n. 343).

2155. • A Religious by force of the vows is bound to poverty, chastity, and obedience; and if he emitted other vows in profession, he is held to those similarly, according to the prescription of the rules and the custom of the Order.

DEFINITION. Religious poverty is placed in a certain abdication of dominion, whether radical or useful, over temporal goods.²¹

DIVISION. A FOURFOLD grade is distinguished by which evangelical poverty can be vowed: the first grade excludes the use of superfluous things; the second, the free and independent use of temporal things; the third, dominion over these things; finally the fourth, the very capacity of dominion. - This last grade is proper to Regulars who have bound themselves by solemn vow. But for the essence of the vow of poverty, in the religious state properly so called, the second grade is required and suffices, as is clear from the practice of the Church in approving various Institutes.¹ Hence we establish the following:

2156. • Principles. I. A Religious, through the SOLEMN vow of poverty, so ABDICATES the right of ownership over every temporal thing estimable by price, that 1) he can licitly have neither independent use nor independent disposition; 2) nor can he possess anything as his own; 3) nor does he retain the very capacity of possessing. This is clear both from cap. Cum ad monasterium 6, de Statu monach., and from Trent, sess. 25, c. 2, de Regul., and from the common interpretation of Canonists as regards the capacity of dominion. - But he retains dominion over spiritual goods, e.g. reputation, honor, etc. And the same is commonly taught concerning sacred Relics enclosed in cases of small value, and concerning manuscripts whether his own or received from another: both because they are fruits of genius, although of another, and therefore something spiritual; and because they pertain to knowledge, which does not fall under the vow of poverty; and because such is the common custom. But otherwise if the work has in any way been printed by type.²

It is said 1. neither independent use nor independent disposition...; for this is first and essential in every vow of poverty, whether solemn or simple, that it take away the free use of goods; and consequently the one vowing cannot, without the consent of the Superior, use any thing, or dispose of any thing, even if conceded to him for his own use. - Indeed, in order that Regulars and Nuns can, after solemn vows have been emitted, make a testament, cede their leases or a sum of money to blood-relations, or in turn receive rich revenues from them, they need not only the license of the Superior, but also of the Holy See.³

But it must be NOTED: 1) Although a Religious can neither donate nor remit the things which are owed to him, e.g. legacies left to him, the wage owed for his labors, an annual pension to be paid by parents, because the right to these is with the monastery; nevertheless he can refuse gifts offered to him without wounding the vow of poverty; but one refusing without a just cause sins against charity, namely by impeding the good of his Religion. - 2) It is not prohibited to Religious to invite outsiders to banquets, and to bestow gifts on them moderately, if a just cause suggests this: e.g. so that they may free the monastery from some vexation, so that they may conciliate benevolence toward it, indeed so that they themselves may testify their benevolence to friends.⁴

It is said 2. nor can he possess anything as his own. For the Council of Trent, loc. cit., c. 2, decreed thus: "Let it be licit to no one of Regulars, both men and women, to possess or hold immovable or movable goods as their own, or even in the name of the Convent; but let them immediately be handed over to the Superior and incorporated into the Convent." - And this is the ancient rule: that no one be reputed an owner, but that all ownership pertain to the monastery itself. - Nor indeed is it opposed to the vow of poverty if Religious have goods, even immovable, in common. Except Capuchins and Minors of the Observance, from Trent, l.c., c. 3, de Reg. (cf. n. 2136, 3).

It is said 3. nor does he retain the capacity of possessing. For this, by unanimous consent of the Doctors, is imported by the very solemnity of the vow: not that one professed with solemn vows cannot acquire, e.g. from labor, from donation, or even from inheritance, for he is capable of acquisition; but that he acquires not for himself, but for the monastery or Religion, according to that celebrated saying of law: "Whatever a monk acquires, he acquires for the monastery."

And this incapacity of dominion in a solemnly professed Religious is indeed so absolute and immutable that it can never be taken away by the Superior of the Order; because it is annexed, by the law of the Church, to the very solemnity of the vow, whose effects can be taken away by the Supreme Pontiff alone, through dispensation from a most urgent cause⁵ (cf. n. 2176).

2157. II. A Religious, through the SIMPLE vow of poverty, circumscribes the right of ownership for himself by such limits that, although he retains direct dominion of his goods, nevertheless he cannot licitly dispose of them or use them according to his own will and without legitimate license. This is clear from various Rules approved by the Holy See, and from the Declarations already cited (n. 2148) made on 12 June 1858, in which⁶ these things are read: "The professed of simple vows will be able to retain radical dominion, as they say, of their goods, but administration of them and expenditure and use of revenues are altogether forbidden to them. Therefore before profession of simple vows they must cede, for the time in which they shall have remained in the same profession of simple vows, the administration, usufruct, and use to whomever they please, and even to their own Order, if they shall have judged thus according to their choice."

We have said 1. although he retains direct dominion: which dominion indeed extends: 1) to temporal goods which he possessed before the vows; 2) to the fruits or revenues of the same goods; 3) to those things which come to him by right, as paternal inheritance, legacies of relatives, etc.; 4) to all goods which he receives from parents, kin, friends, with the license of Superiors and of the Constitutions.⁷ But such dominion is retained by Religious especially for this end, that the Institute may be able with greater liberty to dismiss them when it shall have been necessary, as Gregory XIII said in the Constitution Ascendente Domino.⁸ Today another end also has been added, namely the end of avoiding difficulties which civil law creates when it does not recognize religious vows.

We have said 2. they cannot dispose according to their own will; for the things said in n. 2156 concerning Regulars and Nuns are also valid concerning Religious emitting simple vows; with this difference, however, that the former dispose both illicitly and invalidly without license, but the latter only illicitly. Nevertheless dispositions of this kind seem to be voidable through the Superior, because all Religious are subjected to the dominative power of Superiors.⁹

We have said 3. nor can he use according to his own will; for to Religious of whatever Order or Congregation there is forbidden the active use of any thing, or use as of one's own thing; but to them there is conceded only use of fact, and indeed precariously, that is, as long as it shall seem good to the Superior. Hence a Religious sins when he uses a thing as his own, or beyond the use legitimately conceded to him.¹⁰

2158. Questions. QUESTION 1. What is the PECULIUM of Religious, and is it licit?

Resp. 1. By PECULIUM is understood whatever from stable or movable goods, e.g. from leases, pension, alms, sermons, Mass stipends, is conceded by the Superior to some member of the Community, and is permitted to him to have, without any right of ownership (in those solemnly professed), and for mere use of fact, and therefore revocably at the nod of the one conceding.

Resp. 2. The Council of Trent indeed prohibited it, by forbidding that a Religious possess, etc., even in the name of the Convent; likewise Clement VIII, Const. Nullus, 25 July 1599. But from a custom long since tolerated by the Apostolic See, it is licit, in some Religions, to have a moderate peculium for necessary and honest uses, e.g. for obtaining food, clothing, and books; provided the subject does not hold it hidden, and is ready, at the nod of the Superior, to deprive himself of it. For thus the use of a temporal thing is not independent, and the substance of poverty remains safe.¹¹

But St. Alphonsus admonishes, saying:¹² 1) "In practice, let all Prelates persuade themselves as certain, that if they introduce the use of peculium anew in monasteries, scarcely the name of poverty will survive there, and from this innumerable evils will supervene upon the Community as regards observance. - Wherefore, even if they themselves can be excused from grave sin by conceding the use of peculium with respect to the vow of poverty, nevertheless they will not be excused on account of the relaxation of the rule, to which by this concession they will without doubt give their work." 2) Subjects cannot refuse common life if Superiors wish to erect it; because although not to observe common life is not against the vow of poverty, nevertheless it is against the vow to reject common life, when nothing which is necessary is denied by the Convent; because this is to have goods independently of the will of Superiors.¹³

Nor must there here be passed over in silence what Pius IX, in the decree of 22 April 1851, enacted on this matter:¹⁴ "In all novitiate houses let perfectly common life be introduced; but in other houses let money be deposited in the common chest."

QUESTION 2. Of what kind must the Superior's LICENSE be, so that a Religious can legitimately use it?

Resp. 1. License expressly conceded can bring with it no difficulty, provided it is true and reasonable: true, i.e. conceded by a legitimate Superior, immediately or mediately through another, and neither extorted from the one conceding by fear nor by fraud; reasonable, i.e. conceded for honest uses. But whether one conceded for illicit or vain uses is valid? - The absolutely more probable opinion denies this, since the Superior is not the owner of the goods of the monastery, but only the administrator of them, nor is Religion ever to be judged to wish to concede anything unto the spiritual ruin of its own members. Whence, if a Prelate concedes to some Religious a general license of spending a sum of money at will, he can by no means spend it for illicit or vain uses. - Nevertheless he can validly, from that license, expose it to play, provided the game is licit and not of mere chance, and the sum moderate, and provided he himself does not belong to an Order of stricter observance.¹⁵

2. They commonly say that tacit license, or presumed license concerning the present, suffices: namely when the Superior knows and sees the subject receive, give, spend something, etc., and does not prohibit it, although he easily could; for then by being silent he is judged to consent. - Except if something else must be gathered from the circumstances.¹⁶

3. It is indeed doubted whether interpretative license, or license presumed concerning the future, is valid, namely that to which the Superior is presumed going to consent if he were asked; but the more probable opinion holds that it suffices whenever the presumption is reasonable, "because then the subject already proceeds with dependence on the will of the Superior, and this effects that he himself is freed from the fault of ownership."¹ And St. Thomas favors this opinion, when he teaches: "A monk ought not to give alms, except in extreme necessity, or, the Abbot being absent, something small under hope of ratification."² "Moreover," says St. Alphonsus, "such dispositions by subjects from presumed license, for the most part, are illicit at least venially; because the Superiors, at least as regards the manner, are unwilling, and not rarely even gravely, and especially when those dispositions have been expressly prohibited by them."³

4. License sought and undeservedly denied does not excuse from transgression of the vow, unless there is danger of grave harm in delay; because in such a case at least the license of major Superiors is presumed to be present, or one can act from epikeia, because necessity has no law.

QUESTION 3. What things are commonly permitted to a Religious from PRESUMED license?

Resp. Generally the following things are permitted: - to succor a poor person reduced to great want, when access to the Superior is not open; - to bestow moderate alms on the needy, if he is staying outside the Convent with due license; and if he is in the Convent, to give them something of food; - to make slight donations to friends and blood-relations as a sign of gratitude, or of due friendship, or for conciliating benevolence toward Religion; - likewise, to make remunerative donations from goods conceded to him for use, because they are as it were payments of debts; - to donate, according to the more probable opinion, those things which he subtracts for himself by living more sparingly, if a certain quantity is assigned to individual subjects, in such a way that neither the monastery must furnish more, nor are the subjects bound to render an account of the assigned thing; - to accept from outsiders, unless it is clear concerning the contrary will of the Superior, a thing to be handed over to the Superior; - to buy a thing which he judges will be pleasing to the Superior, if recourse to him is not easy, e.g. on a journey; - to give something to Peter, if he has license to give to Paul, unless the Superior gave license for Paul because of a peculiar reason and would have denied it if it had been sought for Peter. - Thus commonly.⁴

NB. Concerning the LICENSE of the Superior, it is also helpful to note the following: - 1. In obtaining or conceding it, account must be taken of each Institute; for what is permitted in one is often reproved in another. In stricter ones certain general and tacit faculties are not admitted which are tolerated in mitigated ones. 2. When the Superior gives license to one to give, although in the rigor of law license to receive is also required in the one receiving, in fact he is judged to give it to his own subject. 3. License conceded by one Superior perseveres under his successor, unless it has been explicitly or implicitly revoked by this successor.⁵

QUESTION 4. What QUANTITY is required for GRAVE sin against the vow of poverty?

Resp. 1. As regards the goods of the monastery or of others, this is the rule: that quantity which suffices in theft for constituting mortal sin against justice also suffices for constituting mortal sin against Religion, or against the vow. Nevertheless it must be noted that more is required in these thefts than in thefts from outsiders, but less than in thefts by children; for these have at least hope of dominion, but Religious do not; and Prelates are certainly more unwilling than parents, because the detriment which is inflicted on the monastery is at once temporal and spiritual. - Account must besides be taken of the very material harm really inflicted, which indeed is had less: 1) if the monastery is wealthy; 2) if the Religious does not give a thing of the Community to outsiders, but converts it to his own use; or if the thing is bestowed on Religious of the same monastery, because thus the thing remains at home;⁶ 3) if there is question not of money, but of eatables, or of other things consumable by use; for minute thefts in this last case do not coalesce unless they bring great detriment to the monastery.⁷ And "regularly a Religious does not sin gravely by secretly receiving, for example, a book for temporal use, even for a long time, but not in perpetuity; because then the Prelate is not judged unwilling as regards the substance, but only as regards the manner."⁸

2. As regards goods whose dominion a Religious with a simple vow retains, grave matter for violation of the vow is not easily determined; for in this case not justice itself, but only the vow is violated. Concerning this matter St. Alphonsus speaks thus: "But if something is received from outsiders, to be furnished to others, and therefore without wounding justice, still more is required; for then Jerome Garcia with others among the Salmanticenses assigns for grave matter a value greater than sixty silver pieces."⁹ Today we would say: greater than 60 francs.

QUESTION 5. Does a Religious violate the vow of poverty who expends money IN ANOTHER'S NAME?

Resp. Distinguish. 1) If he has received money with at least some designation of the persons to whom it is to be distributed, he does not violate the vow, because then he is a naked minister and like a servant; nevertheless he can offend against the rule of his Order. - 2) If he has received it with an indeterminate faculty of expending, so that he can confer it, according to his own judgment, on any good work whatsoever or on any needy person whatsoever, he violates the vow: "for, as Azor says,¹⁰ even to the vow of poverty there is opposed a use or administration from which the Abbot cannot remove the monk by his nod."¹¹

QUESTION 6. Whether and when must RESTITUTION be made to the monastery?

Resp. 1. He who without license, in a grave matter, donates or consumes, etc., goods of the monastery is certainly bound to restitution; nevertheless he is not bound to restore from the things given to him for use, unless they are superfluous; because the Prelate is not presumed to wish to oblige the subject with so great an inconvenience.¹²

Resp. 2. One receiving from a Religious a gift of great moment is bound to restore it, not indeed to the Religious from whom he received it, but to the monastery (cf. n. 1772 concerning the case reserved to the Supreme Pontiff).

2159. From what has been said you will resolve: 1. A PRELATE sins against the vow of poverty "if he permits a subject to expend goods coming from whatever cause or title for vain or illicit uses; or to have with him things superfluous, precious, and indecorous to his state."¹³ Indeed, it is more probable that this license is of itself invalid, according to what was said n. 2158, q. 2. - Likewise a procurator, economus, administrator, or official sins if he expends anything against the statutes or custom of the Order, or against the will of the Superior.¹⁴

2. A RELIGIOUS sins: - 1) By receiving or possessing illicitly: namely if he receives, possesses, or retains as his own something estimable by price, even something pertaining to food or clothing; or if he receives gifts, if he is a Religious not solemnly professed, without due license; - likewise, if without license he receives from outsiders, by loan or commodate, money or other things estimable by price; - likewise, if he retains a peculium, or things obtained from it, as owner, against the legitimate will of the Superior; - likewise, if he hides anything for the end of withdrawing it from the disposition of the Superior: nor can he be excused in this by the fact that he had previously obtained license.

2. By disposing illicitly: namely, if without the license of the rule or Superior he alienates, exchanges, lends by commodate, or donates anything estimable by price; - if he remits to others things owed to him, e.g. the wage of his labor, or, if he has solemn vows, an inheritance, a legacy left to him; - if he culpably loses or destroys things conceded to him for use; for it is the act of an owner to neglect a thing, or to make it worse at will; - if he gives things given to him for use to others by commodate or loan; this, however, is a light sin if he is certain concerning restitution, and there is not question of a thing necessary to the Community here and now.

3. By using illicitly: namely if he uses things against or apart from the will of the Superior, e.g. by retaining a thing beyond the limits of time fixed by the Superior; - by applying a thing determinately conceded for one use to another, even honest, use: for with respect to the other use, license is lacking; - much more by expending it on vain, base, or indecorous uses for a Religious. - Likewise he sins against the vow if he eats or drinks among outsiders without the permission of the Superior; if, while making a journey, he turns aside from the straight way to see curious things, unless perhaps the distance is brief and no expenses, or very moderate expenses, must be incurred.¹⁵

Note. A Religious sins against the VIRTUE of poverty, although the vow remains uninjured, if toward the things which he holds from legitimate license he fosters excessive affection; if he indulges his own comforts more than is fitting, etc. Concerning this we note that the vow, of itself, regards external acts alone; but the virtue, which is the end of the vow, is extended even to internal acts, and labors for the extirpation of every inordinate affection toward earthly things. - We have said that the vow regards only external acts; nevertheless, if someone should conceive a desire or purpose of acting externally against the vow, he would violate this very vow:¹⁶ as is clear from what was said concerning Internal Sins (n. 347 and 348).

2160. • By the VOW OF CHASTITY a Religious forbids to himself every voluntary venereal delight, even that which could become licit in legitimate matrimony.¹ Hence,

I. By force of the vow of chastity, a Religious is held UNDER GRAVE obligation to abstain from every voluntary act of luxury, both internal, as from base joy, desire, morose delectation; and external, as from immodest speech, sight, touch, etc.; and at the same time from probable danger of sinning against chastity. For he has vowed chastity both of mind and of body; and therefore, as often as he offends against this vow, he incurs the guilt of a twofold malice to be opened in Confession, namely guilt against the virtue of chastity and guilt of sacrilege against the virtue of religion.² "And most probably he also sins against the common good, if there is danger that by his sin Religion be defamed."³

Two things WORTHY OF NOTE are to be added here, namely: 1) From the simple vow of chastity, subsequent matrimony is prohibited, but is not invalidated; whence if a Religious, notwithstanding this vow, should enter nuptials, he would commit only one sin, namely against religion, in the petition of the conjugal debt. - 2) From the solemn vow, matrimony is both prohibited and invalidated, and therefore one bound by such a vow, in the use of an attempted marriage, would be stained by a twofold sin, i.e. the sin of fornication and the sin of sacrilege.

II. For the custody of chastity, the LAW OF ENCLOSURE has been established for monasteries, both of men and of nuns.

2161. • The law of ENCLOSURE, insofar as it affects monasteries of Regulars, prohibits two things: namely the going out of Regulars, and the entrance of women.

1. The going out of male Regulars is not licit, except by legitimate license of the Superior. For thus Clement VIII established: "Let no one dare to go out from the Convent except from a cause, and with a companion, and with license obtained from the Superior each time; who is not to concede it otherwise than once the cause has been proved, and is to join a companion to the one going out, not at the request of the petitioner, but by his own judgment, nor the same one too often. But general licenses of going out are to be conceded to no one."⁴

Authors commonly say that the transgression of this precept is grave if the going out is done at night, furtively, and this case is reserved in several Religions, or repeatedly through the day with scandal; but venial, if it happens once or twice without scandal and contempt.⁵

2. The ENTRANCE of women into the precincts of a monastery of male Regulars is prohibited under penalty of excommunication reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, which both the women themselves violating enclosure, under whatever pretext, and Superiors and others admitting them incur. In the Const. Apostolicae Sedis of Pius IX (cf. n. 1334).

It is said 1) entrance of women, of whatever condition they may be. Only Queens, Electresses, and similar women are excepted, and their daughters; likewise Foundresses, provided from the Constitution Regularis disciplinae of Benedict XIV⁶ they have a privilege from the Apostolic See in the form of a Brief, and exhibit it to the Ordinaries or prelates of the monastery. 2) Into the precincts of a monastery of Regulars, i.e. of those emitting solemn vows. For the penalty of excommunication does not regard other convents unless in them there is enclosure constituted by privilege after the likeness of regular enclosure.

But as regards the MANNER of observing enclosure, St. Alphonsus notes⁷ that legitimate and reasonable customs, approved by the authority of Superiors, are to be attended to; but not those which should rather be called abuses and corruptions.

2162. • The custody of nuns is stricter than that of Regulars; for,

I. AS REGARDS GOING OUT, they incur excommunication reserved to the Roman Pontiff if they go out from the monastery without most urgent necessity, even if this were done secretly. Thus from the Constitution Decori of St. Pius V, and from the Const. Apostolicae Sedis of Pius IX (cf. n. 1333).

It must be noted: 1. that this penalty by common law is not incurred except from violation of papal enclosure, which from the decrees of the Council of Trent and of the Supreme Pontiffs has been prescribed for nuns emitting solemn vows. Nevertheless episcopal enclosure also, as well as papal enclosure by special decree, can be imposed on nuns pronouncing simple vows under a similar penalty and in the same form.⁸

It must be noted 2. that in this violation of enclosure there is not given smallness of matter, even if the going out is done by only one step, or onto the roof, outside the window, in the turn turning outward, or in the exterior church, provided the whole person comes outside.⁹

It must be noted 3. that nuns are excused both from censure and from sin in a case of urgent necessity, as of great fire, great flood, incursion of soldiers, ruin of the building, infirmity of leprosy, epidemic, i.e. pestilence or some contagious disease, as St. Pius V speaks; but it is required, if time permits, that there be license of the Bishop in writing, and also of the regular Prelate if the monastery is exempt.¹⁰

2163. • II. AS REGARDS ENTRANCE. - All the faithful, of whatever class or condition, sex, or age they may be, entering monasteries of nuns without legitimate license incur excommunication reserved to the Pope; and likewise nuns, or others, introducing or admitting them, even if not to an evil end. Thus from the Const. of Pius IX (cf. n. 1333).¹¹ - Nevertheless,

1. The following CAN ENTER monasteries: 1) Bishops in a case of necessity or visitation, but accompanied by a few mature persons. - 2) Regular Prelates, once in a year, for the cause of visitation. - 3) The confessor, for administering the Sacraments in necessity, with a license, namely general, unless the necessity is extreme, and dressed in surplice and stole. But he can minister the Holy Eucharist to the sick as often as he ministers it to the healthy.¹² - 4) A physician, or ordinary surgeon. But his license, although general, is to be renewed every quarter, and two of the senior nuns must always accompany the one entering. Likewise an extraordinary physician in default of an ordinary one, just as also other physicians with whom counsel is to be entered. - 5) A notary, with special license, for seeking some necessary writing in the archive, or for making the testament of some girl. - 6) Craftsmen, gardeners, masons, bakers, porters, and others of that kind, for furnishing some necessary work, with the same special license. But once the work has been furnished, they must go out without delay; for every useless stay which is notably protracted is forbidden under grave obligation.¹³ Nor is entrance licit if they can exercise their art outside the enclosure.

2. The license is LEGITIMATELY GRANTED, by himself or through another, e.g. the abbess or confessor: 1) by the Bishop, or his Vicar, if the monastery is subject to the Bishop; 2) by the Bishop alone, or another expressly delegated by the Holy See, if the monastery is subject to the Apostolic See; 3) by the regular Prelate, if the monastery is subject to him and custom does not oppose.¹⁴ - Formerly, from the Tridentine decree, license had to be given in writing. Today, from the common interpretation of the Const. Apostolicae Sedis of Pius IX, one given orally suffices, at least for avoiding censure.

3. For legitimate license a REASONABLE CAUSE is always required, and probably a just one, i.e. moral necessity on the part of the monastery; nevertheless less for a woman than for a man, for daytime entrance than for nighttime entrance, for the first buildings than for the interior ones.¹⁵ The cause of learning some art does not suffice, unless the art would be necessary to the monastery; nor the cause of carrying out the funeral of a deceased nun, even if such a custom had already grown strong; nor the cause of blessing cells, or of exorcizing some nun; nor the cause of consecrating a virgin; nor the cause of clothing a novice, or of forming a painted image of a nun or girl; nor the cause of placing in a safe place a married woman separating from her husband.¹⁶ Finally, without license of the Holy See to be obtained each time, girls cannot be received into the enclosure for the sake of education.¹⁷

4. In a case of sudden necessity, e.g. danger of death, fire, etc., no license is required, because human law does not oblige in so great a crisis.¹⁸

2164. • IT IS ASKED. What concerning CONVERSATION at the grates with nuns?

Resp. 1. For protecting nuns in every better way, besides the most strict law of enclosure, laws have been issued by which 1) Lay persons frequenting monasteries of nuns without license of the Ordinary incur excommunication ferendae sententiae; but Clerics incur suspension to be imposed by the Bishop. Further, frequency consists in this, that someone approaches the monastery on three continuous days, or once in individual months for about a year, or four times in a week.¹⁹ 2) But Regulars undergo privation of active and passive voice and of office, and sin gravely, even if the conversation is held only once, for whatever honest cause and through whatever small space of time, according to the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council issued on 11 May 1669.²⁰

Resp. 2. The following are EXEMPTED from this prohibition: 1) Relatives joined in the first and second degree of consanguinity, except on forbidden days, and except also Regulars, who can never speak with nuns or other persons dwelling in enclosure without license of the Ordinary. 2) Confessors, whether ordinary or extraordinary. - 3) The poor and public beggars, from tacit license of Superiors; likewise servants bearing gifts and quickly dispatching themselves. - 4) Those speaking with the Abbess alone, because she, in odious matters, is not comprehended under the name of nuns.²¹

It must moreover be noted that these laws are not in force except in places where the law itself concerning papal enclosure most fully has force.

2165. "Poverty indeed is great, but integrity is a greater good; obedience is greatest, if it is kept uninjured. For the first dominates things, the second the flesh, but the third the mind and soul." Thus John XXII, in Extrav. Quorundam, de verbor. signif., v. f.¹

Principle. A Religious from the vow of obedience is obliged to all things which the Superior commands according to the Rules and Constitutions of the Order, whether directly and expressly, or indirectly and implicitly.² The reason is that a Religious has subjected himself by vow to the power of the Superior, namely both of jurisdiction, which the Superior has as quasi-episcopal from the Pope, Vicar of Christ, in exempt Orders; and dominative power, which the Superior has in every Institute, as father of a family, for the political governance of the house. Hence, a professed Religious, acting against a precept of obedience, more probably commits two sins: one against RELIGION by reason of the vow, the other against the VIRTUE OF OBEDIENCE, by reason of the promise and handing over made concerning himself in profession, on account of which, of itself, even without a vow, he is bound to obey a legitimate Superior³ (cf. n. 690).

It is said 1. He is obliged to all things which the Superior COMMANDS; for a precept is the proper object of obedience, nor can sin be committed where there is not a law or precept. - Whence: 1) If the Superior manifests his will or his desire only by optative words, there is of itself NO obligation of obeying; although the subject can sin from another source, for example by saddening him, by not preserving the reverence owed to him, by omitting a thing already prescribed of itself, etc. - 2) If the Superior commands simply, e.g. by using these words: I order, I command, the subject is held UNDER VENIAL sin to obey; because there is now a precept, although the Superior does not intend to use his whole power. - 3) If the Superior, in commanding in matter certainly or doubtfully grave, uses these words: in virtue of holy Obedience..., in the name of the Lord..., in the name of Jesus Christ..., under formal precept..., under penalty of excommunication ipso facto, or similar words, the subject is held, and indeed UNDER GRAVE sin, to obey; because from formulas of this kind it becomes known that the Superior wishes to use his whole authority.⁴

It is said 2. according to the Rules and Constitutions; for a Religious, by vowing obedience, wished to oblige himself only to living and obeying according to the Rules of the Order to which he freely consecrated himself. Whence the Superior CANNOT command things which are against the rule, unless he can dispense in it and a just cause of dispensing is present;⁵ or above the rule, i.e. graver things, e.g. that the subject accept an Episcopate, a benefice with cure, or even a simple benefice, or exercise himself in great austerities, etc.; or below the rule, i.e. more lax or vain things. - Nevertheless, he CAN command things which pertain only indirectly to the rule, or which make for fuller observance of it. Indeed, at times he can, if necessity or the spiritual or bodily utility of the subject himself requires it, command things which are against or above the rule: e.g. fasting as a punishment for some fault, assistance to be furnished to the sick of his own Order infected with a contagious disease; or even to outsiders, if those are lacking who would minister the necessary Sacraments to them⁶ (cf. n. 155).

2166. St. Alphonsus further NOTES the following: 1. A Prelate can probably command internal acts under sin, although this is not customary nor advisable;⁷ likewise, "he can command under grave sin what has been commanded by the rule only under light sin, if it is feared that otherwise the rule will not be observed."⁸ - 2. He can prohibit subjects from emitting vows without himself having been consulted; nevertheless vows emitted within the limits of the rule are not of themselves invalid, although they can be irritated; for the matter of the vow is accepted by God, although the mode displeases Him (cf. n. 638).⁹ - 3. He cannot command the revelation of a secret committed to some Religious, unless such revelation is necessary for averting harm to oneself, or to the monastery, or to a third party (cf. n. 1187, q. 2).¹⁰ - 4. LICENSE denied by a Prelate but conceded by a Superior of lower order is probably valid as often as the Prelate has not expressed that he wishes to derogate from the authority of the inferior; indeed it is licit if he has not positively prohibited the subject to execute the thing and the inferior Superior to give license (cf. n. 2158, q. 2).¹¹

2167. • Questions. QUESTION 1. Whom are Religious and nuns bound to obey?

Resp. By force of the vow, they are bound to OBEY: - 1) The Supreme Pontiff, as supreme Prefect of all Religions, from whom all power of religious jurisdiction emanates. 2) Their own Superiors, namely the Superior General, Provincial, and local Superior; but nuns, the Abbess: with this order being observed, that if different Superiors command, they obey rather him who is of higher grade.¹² - 3) The Ordinary of the place, if they are not exempt, but according to the rules approved by the Holy See (cf. n. 2190).

QUESTION 2. What power belongs to an ABBESS or SUPERIORISSA over nuns?

Resp. 1. An Abbess, or Superiorissa, CAN, by reason of the dominative power handed over to her by vow, or at least as minister of regular observance, demand, even in virtue of obedience according to the absolutely more probable opinion, that nuns fulfill that which is commanded by the rule, or that which conduces to their progress according to the rule. Likewise, although she is not capable of jurisdiction, nor can she, in an authoritative manner, dispense concerning vows and observances of Religion against the rule; nevertheless she can dispense in these from commission of the Prelate, or even, from a just cause, declare in her own name that such a precept, say fasting, is not obligatory on such a day or hour. Finally, by reason of dominative power, if she truly possesses this, she can irritate the vows of nuns, whether concerning supererogatory matter or concerning a thing about the rules; but the vows of novices she can suspend as regards execution, if they are an obstacle to probation.¹³

2. She CANNOT oblige nuns to receive Holy Communion more frequently or more rarely than has been defined by their ordinary confessor. Nevertheless she can, e.g. on account of some scandal given and not yet repaired, forbid them Holy Communion on some day, "if otherwise a penalty of this kind, as Suarez speaks,¹⁴ is conformable to her rule, does not exceed the ordinary mode of religious discipline ... and is not inflicted properly as a spiritual privation, but as it induces some mark or shame."¹⁵ - If, by force of the rules, she exacts from them an account of conscience, they are not bound to manifest to her their sins, whether present or past. Further, the Sacred Congregation of BISHOPS AND REGULARS (10 March 1860), "on account of abuses which have crept in, at present is by no means accustomed to approve the opening of conscience to the Superiorissa; but it is only permitted that Sisters, if they wish, can disclose defects in the observance of the rule and progress as regards virtues; for concerning other things they must treat with their own confessor."¹⁶

In various Institutes, with the Holy See approving, the Moderatrix general "must seek the deliberative vote of the Consultors in graver matters; especially for foundations and suppressions of houses, for contracts, for the vestition and profession of members, and other things of this kind."¹⁷

QUESTION 3. Is a subject bound to obey IN DOUBT concerning the power of the Superior, or concerning the licitness of the thing commanded?

Resp. 1. If the doubt is concerning the legitimacy of the Superior, he is not bound to obey unless that one is in peaceful possession, and is commonly held as Superior. - And the same must be said if there is doubt concerning the imposition of the precept (cf. n. 52, 693).

2. If it is doubted whether the thing commanded is licit or not, or whether it exceeds the power of the Superior, he is bound to obey, even if the opposite opinion seems to him more probable.¹⁸ EXCEPT 1) "if the thing is very difficult and troublesome; because then the difficulty of the work together with the probable opinion that the thing commanded is illicit, or that the precept exceeds the power of the Superior, prevails over that one's possession. - 2) If by obeying the subject would expose himself or another to danger of undergoing grave inconvenience in life, reputation, honor, or goods. The reason is that the subject is not then bound to deprive himself of his certain right which he possesses concerning such goods of great moment, lest the Superior be deprived of his possession, which in that case is in some way uncertain."¹⁹

2168. • From these things you will resolve: 1. A professed Religious SINS gravely against the VOW of obedience: 1) when he refuses to obey, in a grave matter, a Superior commanding in virtue of holy obedience, according to what was said n. 2165; 2) when he responds to a commanding Superior: I do not wish to obey, I do not wish to do it, I will not do it, or something else similar, which smells of formal contempt of the authority commanding; 3) when from disobedience there follows grave scandal, whether of subjects or of seculars, or grave inconvenience, whether for the community or for others, e.g. for the salvation of souls, etc. - In other cases, disobedience does not exceed venial fault²⁰ (cf. n. 693, q. 2).

2. A Religious SINS only against the VIRTUE of obedience, generally only venially: 1) when he refuses to obey Superiors of lower grade with whom there is not power of commanding from the vow; 2) when in the external execution of a precept he murmurs in heart, or internally does not submit himself. - Likewise, novices, oblates, and all others who live common life in pious Institutes without the bond of vows offend against the virtue of obedience alone, gravely or lightly according to the gravity of the precept²¹ (cf. n. 690 sqq.).

3. If the rules order that in all things one obey the Superior, or in all things in which sin does not appear, "this is understood not of the obligation of the vow, but of the perfection of obedience."²²

2169. • A RULE is that norm of living by which Religious are so directed in their operations that, in a due and congruent manner, they may strive toward the perfection of their state. - Under the name of RULE are also understood the Constitutions and Statutes which emanate from the Founders or Chapters of Religions.¹

Now indeed: 1. Rules which define the matter and conditions of vows impose the same obligation as the vows themselves: concerning these we have already said enough above. 2. Rules which regard regular discipline can oblige in various ways. Hence the following:

Questions. QUESTION 1. How great is the OBLIGATION of rules which regard discipline?

Resp. 1. "A rule," says Suarez,² "is not a mere counsel," since its violation can be punished by the Superior. - Except, however, those rules which are expressed by way of counsel or exhortation.

Resp. 2. There can be rules which oblige under mortal sin; others, which oblige under venial sin; finally others, which oblige to a penalty. 1) If a rule obliges under mortal sin, its transgression is against the vow and is sacrilegious: the reason is that such a rule is not less preceptive than the voice of the Superior; whence, for example, a Carthusian eating flesh meats, or a Franciscan not fasting on Friday, sins against obedience and against temperance.³ - 2) If a rule expressly declares that it obliges as much as it can, its transgression is a mortal or venial sin according as the matter is grave or light; because the rule is not less obliging than the voice of the Superior; but the Superior can oblige according to the gravity of the matter.⁴ - 3) If a rule declares that it does not oblige under sin, its transgression is of itself neither mortal nor venial; because a rule which is not preceptive is judged to be only an ordinance or admonition, obliging only to a penalty, if one is imposed.⁵ - Yet many Doctors rightly note that transgressions of this kind are rarely free from every fault, on account of negligence, contempt, or some other disordered affection; indeed, he would sin gravely who frequently and as it were by custom transgressed the rule, gravely disturbing religious discipline: e.g. if he "would never wish to observe silence, nor pray, nor walk modestly; if he entered the rooms of all the Religious, and transgressed similar statutes of Religion."⁶ He also sins GRAVELY who violates the rule from formal contempt of the Superior, as, for example, to show that the Superior is despised by him and held for nothing; likewise, if he does this from hatred against the Religion or its persons, or from the will of resisting the Prelate; likewise, if he exposes himself to proximate danger of falling into mortal sin, or if he foresees that he will therefore be expelled. But if someone proposes never to observe the rule, it can scarcely happen that contempt is not present. Thus Suarez (apud D. Bouix⁷) and St. Alphonsus.⁸ - But the mere frequency of infractions does not seem sufficiently to prove contempt; since this frequency can arise from great sloth, in which nevertheless the slothful person can still esteem the rules, Superiors, and Religion highly⁹ (recall what was said n. 2153).

QUESTION 2. Are Religious bound to submit themselves to a REFORMATION of the Rule?

Resp. 1. Affirmatively, if the reformation regards substantial things; because everyone must obey in those things which are necessary for salvation; nor can any custom prevail against natural or divine law. Whence the obligation of submitting oneself would press, if the Religion were such that, "unless it were reformed, it would be rather for harm to Religious than for utility."¹⁰

Resp. 2. If the reformation does not regard substantial things, a DISTINCTION must be made: either the mitigation was introduced by the Supreme Pontiff, and in such a case each one can conform himself to it, for it is a new law; or it was introduced by custom, and in this case, although those introducing it sinned, nevertheless their successors can follow it with a safe conscience. - But if the general Chapter or the greater part of the professed should establish a reformation, there are Authors who deny that private persons are bound to submit themselves to such a reformation; because they emitted profession according to the state of the rule as it was at the time of their profession, and therefore they are judged not to have wished to oblige themselves to more than the relaxed rule. This opinion is indeed probable; but the more probable opinion teaches that they are bound to obey.¹¹

QUESTION 3. Does a Prelate, sometimes neglecting to correct the LIGHT DEFECTS of subjects, sin gravely?

Resp. "Affirmatively (against Lorca) with Lugo and others commonly, in the case in which the defects are many and such (e.g. concerning silence, fasting, etc.) that they can relax discipline. The reason is that, although each Religious fails in a light thing by transgressing a light rule, nevertheless the Superior, neglecting to impede, when he can, the relaxation of observance, fails in a grave matter. And therefore he is bound not only to correct, but also to inquire into, defects of subjects which tend to the harm of the whole Community, so that he may correct, as St. Thomas teaches, yet without excessive solicitude.... But it is expedient that he sometimes dissemble in correcting, if the defects do not bring scandal, or if he foresees that the subject will become worse from the correction, or if a more opportune time must be awaited. And here it must be adverted that, if it is necessary for correcting, the Superior can even strike the subject and rebuke him with reproaches, from St. Thomas,¹² provided he does not act from anger, or before seculars or novices. And just as the Superior is bound to correct, so he who has the office of zealator is bound to admonish him concerning the transgressions of others."¹³

Note. At the time of a CANONICAL VISITATION Religious (or nuns interrogated by the Bishop or by the Prelate of the Order) are bound to open the truth to the visitor concerning the observances of the rule, even if the transgressions are light; because ordinarily from these begins the relaxation of the whole rule. - "Except if the delinquents have already come to their senses, or if the offense is occult, or known under a natural secret, or could be hidden without common harm, or if it has already been manifested by others, or if it is foreseen that the revelation would not be profitable or would be harmful to himself, and the concealment would not be to the harm of the Community"¹⁴ (cf. n. 1198).

2171. • The obligation of remaining in the religious state arises both from the nature of the thing (for state is so called from standing); and from the perpetuity of the vows; and finally from canon law, as regards Regulars and nuns of solemn vows. Hence that saying: once a monk, always a monk. - But as regards Institutes of simple vows, the firmness which is not had from canon law is sometimes supplied, as in the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, by the vow and oath of perseverance. For by this vow and oath a peculiar mutual contract is entered upon, by force of which the Religious binds himself to persevere in the Congregation until death; and conversely, the Congregation obliges itself not to dismiss the professed member except from a supervening cause which would be most grave.¹⁵

To stability are opposed, or seem in some way to be opposed: 1. Apostasy and flight; 2. ejection; 3. dispensation from vows; 4. transfer to another Religion; 5. translation to the Episcopate. - Concerning each, now a few things.

2172. • An apostate (from Religion) is he who departs from the monastery or Religion with the intention of totally deserting the Order and not returning to it. But he is called a fugitive who departs without license with the intention of returning. Whence, from Trent (sess. 25, c. 4, de Regul.), among fugitives are also numbered those who, without license of the local Superiors, flee to the major Superiors, unless they have been sent or called by them.

I. APOSTATES and FUGITIVES (whether the habit has been laid aside or retained, according as provision is variously made by the constitutions of Religions), incur, besides the guilt of lethal sin, excommunication ipso facto.¹⁶ - They are deprived besides of all privileges of Regulars, and are subjected to the Ordinaries of places, from Trent, l.c., cap. 19, de Reg. - Yet they are not released from the obligations of the state deserted, but are bound to observe their vows and all the constitutions of their Order, namely lest they obtain an advantage from fraud. - See the other things among the Canonists.¹⁷

II. Prelates ARE BOUND to SEEK OUT fugitives and apostates, because by divine and natural law they must provide for their salvation. - Except if this could not be done without grave harm of the Order, or if they were incorrigible; "because, if for a just cause they can be ejected, for the same also, after they have gone out, they will be able not to be received."¹⁸

2173. • By the name of ejection or dismissal is understood the perpetual separation of a Religious from his Order, made by the authority of a competent judge. The process of ejection must be made both according to the Canons and according to the Constitutions and style of each Order.¹⁹

I. Regulars solemnly professed can be ejected for three causes: 1) if in admission they concealed a very grave impediment, e.g. leprosy; 2) if they can no longer be tolerated without infamy of the Order; 3) if they are notoriously incorrigible in a grave and pernicious crime. Formerly it was lawful to eject Religious from the Order on account of any grave offense, even if admitted once; but Urban VIII (21 Sept. 1626, § 6) declared that no one (except a member of the Society of Jesus), unless he is incorrigible, can be ejected; but that those throwing off discipline can be punished by fasts and prison: which must always be observed with incorrigible nuns, where civil power does not obstruct.²⁰

The one ejected remains always a Religious and bound by vows, which he must observe, insofar as circumstances permit it. - Hence, 1) as regards poverty, he has only the use of the things which he acquires, but not dominion, which remains with the monastery, if this is capable of dominion;²¹ otherwise, with the Apostolic Camera. - 2) As regards obedience, the Divine Office (if he is not in Sacred Orders), and the other rules, he is now bound by no obligation, since he has been juridically dismissed by the Prelate. But he is bound to obey the Bishop, by whom nevertheless he cannot be ordained; indeed he remains suspended from every exercise of Orders, nor can he preach, nor teach (cf. n. 1365). - 3) He is bound to amend himself, so that he may merit being admitted again; for since he is held by vows, he must seek again that state in which he can carry out his vows. Yet if, although amended, he is not admitted, he can remain in the world with a safe conscience, and receive the Sacraments in the manner of clerics.²²

2174. • II. Religious of simple vows can be ejected for several causes, which are determined both by natural law and by the approved rules of each Institute. - Those ejected or dismissed in this case are commonly exempted from the obligations of the religious state, whether these come from a vow or from a rule, and are reduced to secular life; they belong to the jurisdiction of the Bishop to whom they were subject before inscription in the Institute.²³ - See concerning the Dispensed (n. 2177).

2175. • IT IS ASKED. Can Religious of simple vows be licitly and validly dismissed WITHOUT CAUSE?

Resp. 1. If in the Institute at least the essentials of the religious State are found, a professed subject can never be dismissed without grave cause, even if he himself should consent to his own dismissal; because, where the religious state exists, there intervenes in profession a handing over: by which, on the one part, the Religious has devoted himself to God and to the Institute in perpetuity, and by which, on the other part, the Institute in turn, through the acceptance of profession, has obligated itself, at least implicitly and from a quasi-contract, never to dismiss him without a just cause. But a just cause is not had in this alone, that the Religious acquiesces in his own dismissal. Although in this case a lesser cause will be able to suffice; for the subject can yield his own right.²⁴

Resp. 2. If in the Institute there are not found those things which are of the essence of the religious State, and the subject consents to his own dismissal, it seems that he can be dismissed without grave cause: e.g. on account of weak health; because in the circumstances of such things, neither the religious state nor the reclamation of the subject stands in the way.¹ - Yet advert that a just cause is always required if the Religious himself wishes to be dispensed from his vows, as is known.

Resp. 3. If a vow or oath of perseverance is emitted by the one vowing, there arises a special obligation on both sides of standing by the promises, whether a true religious state is found in the Institute or not; because such a vow or oath, accepted by the Congregation, has the character of a true bilateral contract: from which it happens that, just as the subject cannot, upon any new circumstance whatsoever arising, leave the Institute (unless for passing over into a stricter Order), so neither can the Institute, while the subject stands by his promises, dismiss him.²

2176. • I. As regards SOLEMN vows. Formerly, indeed, many thought that no one could be dispensed from solemn vows, and that the bond of religious profession was indissoluble by divine law. But this opinion has become less probable; for the common opinion today teaches that a Religious, even solemnly professed, can be released from his obligations, either in part or in whole. And the practice of the Supreme Pontiffs favors this opinion; for more than once, although generally only on account of a public cause, they have granted a dispensation of this kind (cf. n. 135, 642).³ - Thus the Roman Pontiff sometimes dispenses Religious even solemnly professed, so that true dominion of temporal goods may be in their possession; or so that at least they may be able to exercise acts of proprietors, namely when their incapacity is not recognized by the civil power. Yet in Indults of this kind the substance of the vow always remains safe, for the reason that the dispensed cannot do more than what is permitted by the Pontiff, and they need besides the permission of Superiors.⁴ Thus likewise, in the time of the French disturbance, the Pope dispensed not a few priests, both secular and regular, from the vow of chastity, at least in part. We say in part, i.e. in order to a marriage already contracted invalidly; for generally clauses of this kind were added to the dispensation: "with the same woman only, but not for contracting with another, nor for entering upon second nuptials, and if... outside the licit use of marriage he shall have offended, let him know that (the petitioner) will act sacrilegiously against the sixth precept."⁵

By common law, when there is dispensation in the solemnity of one vow, the other solemn vows cease to be solemn, unless the Pope shall have established otherwise.⁶

2177. • II. As regards SIMPLE VOWS. These vows are emitted either in Institutes approved by the Holy See, or in Institutes approved by Bishops. - If the first, dispensation is granted by the Roman Pontiff alone, although, from apostolic privilege, the same power can also belong to the Superior General, if there is question of a Congregation of men. The reason is that the vows were made as it were into the hand of the Pontiff.⁷ If the second, either those Institutes, distributed into various houses, are subject to a general Superior or Superiorissa; and in this case the several Bishops cannot dispense in the houses subject to themselves, because they would violate the right of the general Superior; or the individual houses subsist by themselves, and in this case the Bishop can release subjects from the vows of poverty and obedience, but not from the vow of perpetual chastity, as being reserved to the Holy See. - From the Response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 2 Jan. 1836⁸ (cf. n. 2190 and 2194).

It MUST BE NOTED: 1. For a valid dispensation of simple vows a lighter cause is required than for a dispensation of solemn vows; likewise, a lighter cause on the part of the Institute than on the part of the subject: either because in many Institutes the bond is not obliging equally on both sides, or especially because the common good of the Institute must always be preferred to the private good of the subject.

2. If any alumnus of such an Institute, without just cause, has sought and obtained dispensation from vows, the dispensation must be judged valid, although it was illicitly sought. The reason is that although a just cause was lacking on the part of the one seeking, nevertheless an excellent one was present on the part of the one granting, to whom belongs the right and office of procuring the common good by dismissing subjects who are not of good example to the others.⁹

2178. • Let only the following be NOTED: 1. By common law (i.e. from the Decretal Licet of Innocent III) passage from a more lax Religion to a stricter (or more austere) one is licit; provided it is done from a just cause, without grave harm of the Religion to be left, and provided that the license of the Superior or of the Pope is sought, indeed also (if the Order which is left enjoys a privilege specially conceded for this) provided that it is obtained.¹⁰

2. Passage to an Order of equal rigidity is also licit, but with a greater cause and with the license of the Superior; or, if this greater cause is lacking, with the permission of the Supreme Pontiff;¹¹ which must always be had if the passage is made to an Order of more lax observance, or if there is question of a cloistered nun.¹²

In any of these cases, from the Constitution Pastor bonus of Benedict XIV, the Major Penitentiary can grant the passage, "for just and grave causes respectively, however, to be approved by the same Major Penitentiary; the Superior of the Order from which the passage is to be made having first been heard, and with the consent of the Superior of the Order to which it is to be made."¹³ - Recall what was said n. 638. Hence 1 and 642, 3.

2179. • A Regular assumed to the Episcopate (or Cardinalate)¹⁴ is not exempted from profession, nor from all rules generally; but only from those obligations which do not agree with his new office or dignity. For to the question, "whether and how a Regular Bishop is bound to observe the rule which he has professed:" - the Sacred Congregation of BISHOPS AND REGULARS, on 6 May 1864, judged that it should respond: "Affirmatively, according to the prescription of the Constitution of Benedict XIII beginning Custodes, namely, a Regular Bishop is bound to observe the Rules of his Religion which determine the matter of the vow of poverty. Likewise he is bound to observe the other rules and observances not repugnant to episcopal dignity and office, with the same grave or light obligation by which he was held before he obtained the episcopal dignity: yet so that in particular cases he can prudently make a judgment whether those things agree with episcopal dignity and office."¹⁵

Hence. - 1. A Regular Bishop cannot, except by license of the Pope, make a testament, and take inheritances or legacies for himself. Yet he can legitimately acquire goods; namely, the use for himself, but the property for the Church over which he presides and of whose goods he is the dispenser.¹⁶ Nor does the vow of obedience cease in him, since he obtains the Supreme Pontiff himself as Superior.

2. If he is of the Family of the Minims, he is still bound to the vow of Lenten diet; if of the Family of St. Francis, to the fast of Friday, etc., unless he has been specially dispensed by the Apostolic Holy See.

3. As regards the Divine Office, he is bound, from the declaration of the Sacred Congregation of Rites made on 11 June 1605,¹⁷ to recite it, not indeed according to the rite of his Religion, but according to the rite of his diocese.

4. As regards the habit, he must indeed preserve the color of his Order; but in the form of the habit he can be vested in the manner of secular Bishops, as Clement VIII conceded.¹⁸

NB. Decisions of the Sacred Congregation of BISHOPS AND REGULARS issued for Regular Bishops must be extended to Religious Bishops of simple vows, yet with the due restrictions being made, e.g. as regards poverty.¹⁹

The obligations by which religious, as such, are held are reduced especially to the observance of the vows and of the other rules of each Order. But before something is said concerning the force of these obligations, it is useful to intimate something concerning the nature of the religious state, and concerning vocation to it.

Question 17. By what means and under what obligation is a Religious held to tend toward perfection?

Resp. He is held to tend primarily through the essential means of the religious state, namely through the observance of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. And since the obligation of tending to perfection is grave by force of the state in which he is found, he will sin gravely if in a grave matter he infringes those vows. But secondarily he is held to tend toward perfection also through accidental means, namely through the proper rules of the Order; and he will sin gravely if he infringes them from formal contempt, namely by spurning their authority as such and their known wisdom. It is otherwise, however, if he violates them, led by concupiscence, or because he thinks they are not necessary for him unto salvation, or if he thinks that they are not commanded under grave obligation. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 10.

Question 18. Does a Religious sin gravely who intends to observe only commands obliging under grave obligation, and to care nothing for the rest?

Resp. Negatively, more probably; and the reason is that by this very fact, that the Religious wills to fulfill those several things which oblige under grave obligation, he already tends toward perfection, since he wills to fulfill several things which, with respect to others, do not oblige but are merely of counsel. St. Alphonsus calls this opinion the more common and more probable; nevertheless he warns that a Religious disposed in this way can be in grave danger of sinning mortally from other heads, for example, by reason of the danger of transgressing the vows or of bringing grave damage upon the Religion as regards discipline, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 10 and seq. - Bouix, de Regul., vol. 2, pp. 550 and 551.

Although marriage is according to the right of nature, and at times was deservedly commanded by God to some, nevertheless from the right of nature there is no obligation properly so called, made either to individuals or to the community, of procuring offspring.

I. What we state in the first place was denied by the ancient heretics, namely certain of the Gnostics and the Manichaeans, who, as we have already observed in the preface, approved indeed the mingling of flesh, but said that the generation of offspring and the perpetual obligation of one to the other were evil, brought in by Satan. There will again be a place for disputing about these in Thesis VII. To them are added those more recent pseudo-philosophers who acknowledge no other legitimate nuptials except those which genial love has brought together, to endure as long as that love survives; for in reality they take away the covenants of nuptials and deny that these are from the right of nature. But no sane man fails to understand that marriage is according to the right of nature. That certainly is according to the right of nature whose principles are in nature itself and which, for attaining a certain end for which nature itself supplies the powers, is either counseled or required by nature itself. Now the principles of marital union are in nature itself: that is, the diverse sexes ordered to each other, and in the mingling of both the native force of producing offspring. But for the production of offspring and its right education, which nature requires, there is either required, or, to say now at least the minimum, since we shall dispute about this later, there is at least fitting, the mutual obligation of man and woman to stable union; and in this Marriage consists. Besides, to speak of this bond itself in itself, it must be said to be according to the right of nature if it is conformed to the principles of natural law; but such is this union. For friendship and society founded on a mutual communication of power, of which each party is capable, for the mutual communication of goods and mutual consolation and help, is approved by the same natural law by which there is approved both friendship and society generally among all, and especially that friendship and society whose seed and principle has been sown by nature itself. But the stability of union is the perfection of friendship according to the same law; therefore the conjugal bond is according to nature. Indeed, that cannot fail to be according to the right of nature which the author of nature instituted for a natural work, such as the propagation of the human family. But that God instituted marriage from the beginning is clear from Genesis II compared with Matthew XIX, testimonies which we shall explain afterward. Cf. canon 1, session XXIV, Council of Trent. But lest we dwell too long on a matter very clear in itself, the consensus of the human race is also a reason for proving this; for although passions might suggest something else, nevertheless when the human race made laws, it approved that union between man and woman which either truly was marriage or had some appearance of marriage.

II. But because not everything that is according to the right of nature is commanded, the question follows whether marriage and the use of marriage in the procreation of offspring is a thing commanded. That marriage was commanded to the first human beings, Adam and Eve, is certain; for God himself joined them and willed them to be husband and wife. But the question is properly about the use of marriage for the procreation of offspring, or about the propagation of offspring itself to be procured, in an honorable way, of course: whether those first authors of the whole race, and also the rest who followed, were therefore ordered by a true precept to procure it; whether the precept affects individuals or at least the community of men; and whether, if it is not a positive divine precept, it is at least natural.

Therefore appeal is made to the words of the Lord (Gen. I, 28): "Increase" (פרו, fructify, bear fruit, so that the act of copulation is thereby signified), "and multiply and fill the earth," said to the first parents. These words seem to contain a divine precept issued not only to those first human beings, who surely could not alone, by offspring received, fill the earth, but also indefinitely to their descendants, who were contained virtually in that first pair. Therefore the question concerns the sense of these words of the Lord.

We judge that this question must be answered thus: by those words is signified the intention of the end which God appointed for himself in the creation of the first male and the first female; this manifestation of an end in itself does not have the force of a precept, but accidentally it also exercised the force of a precept toward those first human beings and perhaps their children, as long as and insofar as they were situated in a condition similar to that of the first parents. This is proved, first, because those words "Increase and multiply" were said in the same way as the words immediately following: "and subdue it," the earth, "and have dominion over the fish of the sea and the birds of heaven and all living things which move upon the earth." But these do not express a precept, but a certain destination of men according to the dignity implanted from the beginning, whether by the natural order or beyond the order of nature. Indeed, the same words "Increase and multiply" were also said to living things in Genesis I, 22; but then the natural destination of these things, or the intention of God creating them distinct according to their kind, was signified. Thus also Cornelius a Lapide on this place. Likewise Chrysostom, homilies X and XXVI, takes these not as a command but as a blessing of God.

This is proved, second. The manifestation of some end intended by God, which is not essential to man and can be obtained without obligation imposed on man, does not in itself assume the account of a precept, unless from elsewhere it is clear that an obligation is generated. This is evident, because if that end can be obtained without obligation imposed on man, the will of God to obligate is not yet established merely by that end having been manifested; and where this is lacking, there is no precept. But in the words of the Lord we have the manifestation of an end which, first, is not essential to man; for offspring is not necessary to man in order that he be, or in order that he be perfect and blessed. Generation is indeed necessary to future men in order that they be; but these in themselves have no right to be, nor can the question now be about them, for we are speaking of those on whom a precept is imposed, and of this sort certainly are not those who do not yet exist. Now, second, in order that this end be obtained, the cooperation of men is indeed necessary, but it is not necessary that they be obligated. For they are sufficiently borne toward it by the propensity of nature, so that in a multitude of men it is morally impossible that there not be many who will it. These things being posited, what need is there, I ask, of a precept?

It is proved, third. We have said that a manifestation of an end of this kind does not in itself assume the account of a precept unless from elsewhere it is clear that an obligation is generated. This, moreover, first had place for the first parents, who were the one pair from which the human race could proceed. If they, indeed, had been unwilling to devote effort to generation, it would have been over with the end intended by God when he created them male and female and united them in marriage. Nor can it be said: even if they were not obligated, there would have been no fear lest generation follow; for what wonder would it be that two should consent to continence? To continence even the first parents could have been moved after sin, lest they procreate an unhappy stock subject to sin. Do you think that those first two human beings would have acted rightly if they had decreed this? Did this obligation then also exist for others? We suppose that Adam and Eve left several children, whom they were able to bring forth in so long a span of life, and that from these many other children arose.

Now, when they were very many, while natural propensity exercised its force, it was, as we said, morally impossible that many would not devote effort to generation; and therefore a precept concerning this matter was superfluous. And even if few had procreated children, this one thing would have followed: that the human race would have been propagated over the whole earth later. But this would not have been unfitting; for God had not signified that he intended the human race to be multiplied quickly. But when from the beginning they were few, or if this happened later also, so that it would not be morally impossible for all, from the choice of the will, to abstain from generation, they would have been situated in the same condition as the first parents. Therefore, lest the human race fail, an obligation pressed them to devote effort to generation; and this obligation in itself affected not all distributively but disjunctively, for it was enough to preserve the human race, since full multiplication was not immediately to be pursued. But the diverse circumstances in which those men were situated could determine those who would satisfy this obligation. Outside this case I do not see the necessity of any precept; for if men are very many, it is morally impossible, even without any obligation, that all, indeed that many of them, cease from generation. Thus, therefore, we understand a precept issued by the Creator concerning this matter: that a beginning be made for human generation, and provision be made lest the human family cease. The rest did not fall under the precept.

IV. And let these things have been said concerning the obligation which someone might wish to have existed before the subsequent increase of men, which nature can rightly demand. But once that increase had been obtained, and even, if you wish, after some space of time, was there some law of God commanding the conservation or continuation of the human family? Certainly I do not know whether appeal is rightly made to that law issued in creation which we have just weighed. For we hold as certain that at some time this whole human race on earth will cease, but we do not know when and how God has determined this. Therefore, if you have regard only to the account of that primitive law, by what argument will you establish that the human race occupying the whole earth is bound by divine precept to procreate its successors? The end has already been obtained in multiplication. Procreation continued without end is not intended by God. Of course, if no one generates, shortly afterward the human race will cease; but in itself this can be one of the ways by which this human race will at last depart from the earth, although it belongs entirely to God, anticipating, to impose another end. You will say that the human family, as long as it lives, ought to observe that command: "Increase and multiply." But Augustine did not perceive such a necessity by force of those words. When the objection of certain persons was proposed to him in this very question, "If all wished to preserve continence, the human race would cease," he responds: "Would that all wished it"; for thus, as he himself says, the number of the elect would be filled more quickly (On the Good of Marriage, chapter X). And indeed, provided that the act is not evil in itself, since that divine will concerning the continuation of the human race for that determinate age is not certain, why would sin be admitted by ceasing universally from generation?

But even if not by force of that divine will expressed by the words "Increase and multiply," still at least by force of another will, namely concerning the future advent of the Redeemer, was it not necessary that men, until he should come, devote effort to generation? It was certainly necessary; but for this there was no need of any precept. First, indeed, it can be said that the promise of the Messiah was made on the supposition of the foreseen future propagation of the human race by force of natural inclination, just as the promise of the sacrifice of the cross was made on the supposition of the foreseen evil will of those who would crucify Christ. Indeed, in order that the truth of the promise concerning Christ to come at a certain age might remain firm, these two elements were sufficient: on the part of men, a certain natural inclination to generation; but on the part of God, a certain gentle and efficacious providence which would moderate the free affections of men. These, however, in themselves abstract from a precept; therefore there was no need of any precept. Nevertheless, at that time, because of the very expectation of the Messiah to come in the flesh, it happened that those from whose family he was to arise were more inclined to procreate offspring. But the others from the Jewish people were borne into nuptials "by a love not only legitimate but holy," because this was the mode of propagating and conserving the people of God and the true worshippers of God, since then one people proceeding carnally from Abraham was guarding the true religion instituted by God. But it is false that in that age nuptials were commanded to individuals; for nowhere does this mandate exist. For what Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, chapter 22, reports from Deuteronomy XXV, 5-10, as it seems, that he was cursed in the law who did not raise up seed in Israel, is not expressed in the law in this way, nor is there any law made for individuals concerning nuptials. Rather, it is a law concerning taking the wife of a brother left without children; and this law indeed did not obligate the brother of the deceased unwillingly, except if he wished to possess the goods of the deceased by right of inheritance.

V. And these things said thus far concerning a divine precept are valid whether you speak of a precept made to individuals, or at least to the community. But because we have spoken of a divine precept insofar as it is positive and is distinguished from the natural, it certainly can happen that someone observes that we have in some way played or wasted labor in the demonstration of this matter; for the words of the Lord are an expression of natural right, and this truly commands the procreation of offspring. But on the contrary we reply with two points. First, the words of the Lord, if they express a precept, about which matter we have already spoken, express a precept formally divine, and only foundationally natural. Second, no natural precept properly so called exists, either for individuals or for the community, concerning the propagation of offspring.

The first of these, as you see, depends on the second. For if there is no precept from nature itself, that is, if nature in itself does not require that this be furnished by men, it will follow that if a precept is asserted, it arises immediately from the free will of God, with only a certain natural capacity or propensity supposed; but this is a precept formally divine, and only foundationally natural. Therefore we prove the second, of which that will be the necessary consequent.

Therefore, as regards the second, men can be considered both as individuals separately and in community. We affirm, a) first, that individuals are not obligated, or that nature does not require from them that they attend to the procreation of children. For if there were in individuals any obligation by natural right to procreate, it would have to be derived from the end, which is the procreation of children; for from that end those who press this obligation derive it. But the other ends of marriage can plainly be compensated and surpassed by other goods. Yet from that end there is, by natural right, no exigency and obligation of procreating in individuals. For an active capacity for it is not a sufficient reason of moral obligation. Propensity, if there is any, is free rather than necessary; and therefore that propensity to having children is not found in all. But naturally there is present a disposition, which is nothing but the active capacity we have mentioned. The good itself, which is offspring, if it is compared to individuals, is not for them the more excellent good which they can attain, but on the contrary it impedes goods more excellent both for individuals and, through them, for the community. For the more excellent good for man is that in which his perfection is chiefly situated; of this sort is the study and contemplation of truth, the exercise of charity toward God and neighbor, from which the greatest benefits redound to society. Yet the full and at least excellent attainment of these goods is impeded by the care of children. But the good of offspring, that is, its procreation, if it is compared with the offspring itself, is certainly an immense good for it and the principle of the rest; but before offspring exists, since it has no right, what obligation can there be toward it? Besides, we have seen that the state of continence is more perfect than the state of marriage, in which effort is given to generation; and this would also be so in the state of pure nature. But the right of nature cannot obligate men to that which is more imperfect with the loss of what is more perfect.

b) Nor by the right of nature is there any obligation of procreating children imposed on the community of men. For besides the things already said, which are also valid here, observe that the community cannot be obligated to this act insofar as it is a community; for this is an act which can be posited only by individuals, namely by pairs made one flesh from male and female, and insofar as they are such. Therefore the natural obligation which is called that of the community will come back to this: that some persons disjunctively from the community, either these or those, are obligated. But what sort of obligation is this, which can affect men only one by one, and yet from which individuals are immune? Do we not see in this matter the very same thing that happens in several other offices of society? For in society there must be farmers, physicians, teachers, artisans, etc. Is there need of any natural law morally obligating, in order that such men exist in society? The diverse natural disposition in individuals, the variety of occasions, advantage, profit, praise, and honor, which offer themselves for different things only in different conditions, are more than sufficient that there never be lacking those who perform those offices. Likewise, if it is necessary for the community that successors exist, which indeed is rather the good of future society than of present society, unlike the other offices enumerated, the propensity to nuptials, which unfolds itself in so many, in suitable circumstances, of which there is abundant supply, will effect that there is never lacking a generation of men succeeding a declining generation. Therefore in this matter we see only a certain instinct of nature, which besides is more vehement than the others, so that it needs restraint rather than impulse; by it nature, and the author of nature, sweetly obtains what he intends.

VI. But you will say: does not nature require her own continual propagation and the perpetual conservation of human society? Moreover, are not men, either taken distributively or at least disjunctively, bound by a true moral obligation to that which nature requires of them and which they can furnish only in a human and free manner? We concede this latter, but we deny the former: namely, that nature requires continual propagation from men. For nature first requires in individuals, and then in society, but by reason of individuals, in whom alone nature itself inheres, that which is necessary for them in order that they be and be well, so far as is needed for the ultimate end. But generation is not necessary for those in whom nature inheres, nor for existing society, but for future society, which nevertheless now can exercise no right. Therefore it is false that nature requires it; but nature confers the power and also the propensity. But if the author of nature wills a certain perennial series of generations, he knows by what modes he may use this inclination and the affections of men for attaining this end without any moral law.

Yet you will insist: no one would blame a king who, in certain circumstances, lest society be diminished and lest suitable men be lacking for certain offices, commands procreation; but he would make this law by the right of nature; therefore the right of nature commands procreation to society.

I answer: granting the antecedent, about which we do not wish to dispute, we deny the consequence. Namely, in order that a law issued by the community be just, there is no need that the very same thing which the positive law commands already be commanded by nature itself; rather it is enough that it be consonant with nature, and that nature teach that it is fitting in those circumstances.

V. On the contrary religious men, besides these precepts, are bound to observe the three vows and their own rule and constitutions, which the holy Patriarchs, the divine Godhead breathing upon them, prescribed as means which help and more easily conduce to the goal set before them.

VII. If Christians themselves must fulfil the duties of their own state and the offices of ruling a family, of educating sons, of providing necessaries for their household, and all the rest; how much more are religious men bound to execute the duties, vows, rites, statutes, and laws of their own Religion? But whence can it be gathered that religious men bestow their labour with a sincere mind upon the study of perfection? Perhaps from the observance of silence, from assiduity of prayer, from the compression of the senses, of the flesh, and of the appetitions, from the execution of the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience? Assuredly all these are signs. These are probable enough, but sometimes fallacious. For all these can be the fruits of hypocrisy. That a man may prepare himself a way to government, to prefectures, that he may procure for himself the estimation of a religious man and of an observer of his own institute, he can execute all the aforesaid, and under the cloak of sacred Religion become a martyr of the devil. What then are the arguments of a soul aspiring to Christian perfection? The exercises of charity; love toward all; patience and tolerance of injuries; candour of soul; sincerity of tongue; docility of mind; contempt of worldly things; the trampling down of political respects; the fortitude of an evangelical breast; a study of professing openly the discourses of Christ, hostile and adverse to flesh and blood; a neglect of one's own estimation and of worldly things. These are the indications which show a soul running in the stadium of Christian perfection. Since indeed means can be found without an end; but an end cannot subsist without means. Ceremonies therefore and observances of vows, constitutions, and other rites can appear outwardly destitute of the nuptial garment and covered with the mask of hypocrisy. But the exercises of charity, which are their end, cannot stand without the same.

THAT a Religious is bound to perfection, not indeed to have it in act, but to pursue it, the Doctors commonly grant with D. Bonaventure lib. 1. de professio religiosi, cap. 1. and in the questions on the Rule, quest. 16. and p. p. de Eccl. Hierarch. cap. 2. 3. and 4. and part. 4. cap. 4. Thus D. Thom. 2. 2. quest. 184. art. 5. ad 2. and quest. 186. art. 2. and 9. and there Cajetan, Abul. quest. 144. on cap. 9 of Matthew: Astensis sum. 2. part. tit. 47. art. 1. quest. 3. Carthus. de reform. claustr. lib. 1. art. 1. D. Antonin. 3. part. tit. 16. cap. 1. §. 1. Angelus verb. Religiosus, num. 27. Sylvester ibi 1. quest. 3. Armilla n. 5. Tabiena quest. 4. Navarro com. 1. de Regular. num. 10. disto 10. Corduba in reg. S. Francisci, cap. 1. quest. 3. disto 2. Viguer. lib. Instit. cap. 7. §. 1. Azor lib. 11. tract. 1. Instit. cap. ult. question 11. Valentia disp. 10. quest. 4. puncto 4. Bannes prima secundae, quest. 33. art. 3. dub. 3. Manuel qq. regul. tract. 3. quest. 48. art. 1. Beltram. tract. de voto paupert. cap. 3. Sanchez in Decal. Tom. 2. lib. 6. cap. 5. The reason of D. Bonaventure is, because this is the School of virtues. Therefore Christ says, Matth. 19. If you will, etc. This opinion is terrible to many Religious, as Balleus says V. obed. num. 17. with Navarro com. 1. de Reg. num. 10.

Yet all are not bound to pursue every perfection, but according to the condition of their rule. Thus D. Bonaventure in the epistle to the Provincials, and Custodes, and in the places adduced, and D. Thom. quest. 186. art. 2. and the rest with the Holy Doctors.

The REASON of D. Bonaventure, in the places adduced, is, because religions are instituted by the mind of their Founder, and with the confirmation of the Apostolic See, like ranks arrayed for attaining some end by the use of certain means: Therefore one must insist only on these; otherwise there will never be a firm exercise of virtues in any religious.

But there is a difficulty: Whether this is enjoined upon us by a particular precept.

I ASSERT that it is not a particular precept. This is the opinion of D. Bonaventure, who in the places cited, and everywhere enjoins and declares perfection through the observance of the rule. Therefore Cajetan also quest. 186. art. 6. Corduba cap. 1. of the Rule, quest. 3. dict. 3. — who seem to assert that it is a particular precept — conclude that contempt of the rule, and of this obligation of tending to perfection, are inseparable.

It is proven first by D. Bonav. de profess. relig. cap. 1. for Apoc. 2. Christ, rebuking that Prelate who had already become tepid, says: I have a few things against you: because you have left your first charity: wherefore do penance, and do the first works.

There nothing else is enjoined than that he resume the first works of virtue, especially charity, and retrace the interrupted way through the byways: Therefore those works of charity suffice for attaining the end. For thus also it is said in Eccles. 9.: Whatsoever your hand is able to do, work it earnestly; and this is said even to seculars, to whom nevertheless no one would say that perfection has been enjoined by a distinct precept: Otherwise all mortal sins would have to be doubled, which not even the most fearful would say. Thus also a religious, as often as he violates the vows or precepts, would commit twin mortal sins, which is unheard of, nor are sins to be so multiplied without cause, as Sanchez warns, num 5.

But the question is, when exactly is one at fault against this obligation?

D. Thomas quest. 186. art. 2. and 9. and Cajetan on that art. 2. and 9. D. Antoninus, Angelus, Armilla, Valentia, adduced num. 1. say that one contravenes it when there is contempt of the counsels, by which perfection is attained; and Valentia disp. 10. quest. 4. puncto 5. col. penult. with Cajetan explain this contempt to be when a Religious transgresses the rules because he is unwilling to subject himself to them. But Cajetan speaks of religious and seculars, as Azor notes, tract. 1. lib. 11. cap. ult. question 11.

BUT Sylvester verb. religio 1. quest. 3. Tabien. quest. 4. Corduba in Reg. cap. 1. quest. 3. dicto 3. say that to despise is not to esteem; and therefore that religious despises perfection who has no intention of tending toward it; Even if such a one does not sin out of contempt, but out of negligence, or cupidity. In the same manner speak D. Antoninus, Angel. and Sylvest. n. 1. adduced, with D. Thom. quest. 184. art. 5. ad 2., that religious are liars as often as they turn their mind away from the perfection they profess. Where Cajetan at the end, and Navarro Commentar. 1. de regular. num. 10. judge that D. Thomas in this place holds this to be a mortal sin; otherwise there would be no difference between religious and seculars; for these too sin mortally by despising the counsels, and thus the question about the obligation of the Religious by reason of his state, which is the school of perfection, would be empty.

1. D. BONAVENTURE in Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 5. cap. 6. says that a Religious is bound to perfection, because all things are renounced: but seculars to the precepts, without which Charity is not had. He has nearly the same in Apolog. Paup. cap. 3. resp. prima, where he says that the perfection of a religious consists in the observance of the counsels of the Gospel. And he explains this thus: as perfection, necessary to all, is the observance of the commandments, so the Gospel perfection of a religious consists in avoiding also those things which are occasions of sins, which are enumerated by D. John, epist. 1. cap. 2. Whatever is in the world is either the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life. But the incentives of the concupiscence of the flesh are avoided by the Vow of chastity, Matth. 19. There are Eunuchs, etc. The incentives of the concupiscence of the eyes, by the counsel of Christ, Matth. 19. If you will be perfect, etc. The pride of life, by the counsel of the same Christ, Matth. 16. Whoever wills to come after me, let him deny himself, etc. By the Vow of obedience, which is not extended to all the objects of the will, as I showed at length with D. Bonav. Tract. de voto, disp. 2. sect. 2. quest. 2. And in this threefold declination from evil, and from its origin, the first part of Gospel perfection consists, as Sacred Scripture intimates and the Holy Fathers, Founders of Religions, affirm.

THEREFORE in these declinations from evil, and from its occasions, he places the first part of Gospel perfection.

The SECOND, however, consists in the supererogatory pursuit of good through the active and contemplative life toward God; through vehement charity toward one's neighbor, through great beneficence toward enemies, concerning which Matth. 5. Do good to those who hate you, Be you perfect, etc.

The THIRD in the supererogation of undergoing adversities, by bearing them with a joyful mind, as it is said in James 1. Count it all joy, when you fall into various temptations.

He says that indeed the first three fall under vow. Therefore the Holy Father Francis hands down the rule: The rule of the Friars Minor is this: to observe the holy Gospel of our Lord, living in obedience, without property, and in chastity.

BUT he places the other three as things to be desired admonishingly, commending them: Let the brothers attend that above all they ought to desire to have the spirit of the Lord and His holy operation, to pray always to God with a pure heart, and to have humility and patience in infirmity and tribulation, and to love those who persecute us.

He SUBJOINS, however, that religious are bound to perfection by vow, and some by reason of state, that is, Bishops, who are bound to the acts of perfection.

And he places this perfection in the observance of the vows and precepts of the rule, and concludes: From all these it clearly appears that the vow of religion places one in the state of perfection.

From these I deduce those two assertions which follow.

FIRST I assert that perfection, sufficient for Christians, is to keep the Precepts.

It is proven from the Holy Doctor, 1. from Matth. 19. If you will enter into life, keep the commandments. The Holy Doctor says this is the ladder, on the Graduale of the Mass.

Then he proves it in the cited place from D. Prospero de vita contemplativa, lib. 1. cap. 15. They are perfect, who, willing what God wills, sin in no way by which God is offended, acquiesce.

He brings the same testimony from the Seven Itineraries, itinere 4. dist 4. art. 3.

He adds that passage of Deuter. 18. You shall be perfect, and without spot before the Lord your God, where the Gloss has without criminal spot.

Yet if he proposes that not to carry out the counsels is only venial, assert Sanchez lib. 6. cap 5. num. 8. with Cajetan quest. 186. art. 2. Corduba ad Reg. cap. 1. quest. 3. disp. ult. Valentia disp. 10. quest. 4. puncto 4. Azor lib. 11. Instit. cap. ult. quaesito 11.

As to Religious.

I SUPPOSE, from D. Bonavent. lib. 5. Compend. Theol. verit. cap. 69. and 70. that this perfection adds the observance of the counsels, which differ from the precepts by their nature, because a counsel is a persuasion of a better good of supererogation.

But the Holy Doctor finds TWELVE Counsels in the Gospel.

The FIRST is of poverty, Matth. 19. If you will be perfect, etc. Luke 14. Whoever does not renounce all, etc.

The SECOND of obedience, Matth. 23. Upon the chair of Moses, etc. all things whatsoever they shall say, etc.

The THIRD of chastity, Matth. 19. There are Eunuchs, who have castrated themselves.

The FOURTH of beneficence toward enemies beyond necessity, Matth. 5. Do good, etc.

The FIFTH of meekness, Matth. 5. If anyone strike you on one cheek, offer him the other also: and he who will contend with you in judgment, and would take your tunic, do not forbid him.

The SIXTH is of mercy of supererogation, Luke 6. Give to everyone who asks you.

The SEVENTH, of simplicity of words, Matth. 5. Let your speech be, yes, yes; no, no.

The EIGHTH, of avoiding the remote occasions of sin, Matth. 5. and 18. If your eye, etc.

The NINTH, of the perfect intention of the end, Matth. 5. Let your light shine, etc.

The TENTH, perfect conformity to doctrine, Matth. 23. For they bind heavy burdens.

The ELEVENTH, of avoiding solicitude, 1. Cor. 7. Rom. 12. Luke 10.

The TWELFTH, of reproving even venial faults, for as regards mortal sins correction is a precept, and its manner. Of these counsels some are promised under vow; others are urged by admonitions.

Caius, a young man of excellent ability and good morals, educated in a certain Catholic College, as the time for leaving the College approached, went to his confessor and asked what he ought to do. For he fears that he may be called to the religious state, since for almost an entire year the thought of entering religion has very frequently come into his mind, and he is persuaded that he would easily attain salvation in that state, whereas this would be rather difficult in the world because of his lively disposition and inclination to pleasures; nevertheless, his spirit shrinks from the austerity of religious life. He therefore wishes to know whether he is bound to enter religion. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a divine vocation, and how is it known whether someone has a vocation?

2. Does one who is called sin if he does not follow the vocation, or one who is not called if he thrusts himself into the religious state?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. This question is answered above, p. 23.

2. Does one who is called to religion sin if he does not follow his vocation, and does he sin who enters religion without a vocation?

The answer given above with regard to vocation to the priesthood may be applied to this question. With regard to religious life which does not involve the priesthood, many divines hold with St. Thomas that a general vocation is given by God to all who are free and suited to the religious state. So that any such persons who choose to enter religion for some supernatural motive are in fact called thereto by God. As a vocation to a religious life is a call to perfection and to the practising of the counsels of the Gospel, which do not bind under sin, no sin is committed per se by one who does not follow such a vocation. If, however, he is conscious that by remaining in the world he would expose his salvation to serious danger he would of course commit sin by neglecting the necessary means to save his soul. 1

3. The case. Caius, a young man of excellent disposition and good morals, is afraid that he has a vocation to the religious life. The thought of it has often been in his mind during the past year; he is persuaded that he could easily save his soul in that state of life, while he is afraid that on account of his lively disposition and inclination for pleasure he would find it difficult to do so in the world. What deters him is the austerity of religion. Caius manifests some of the ordinary signs of a religious vocation. His fear of the austerity of the life does not militate against his having a genuine vocation, and should not be reckoned when trying to come to a decision. The confessor therefore should tell Caius that a religious vocation is a great grace which God gives to those whom He specially loves, 1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 642.

as He did to the young man in the Gospel. He might tell him that he has many of the signs of a religious vocation, but he should not attempt to settle the question himself; he should let Caius do that, recommending him to make a retreat for the purpose.

Caia, a nun who recently professed simple vows, discloses to Titius, her confessor, that before entering Religion she had contracted with Paul a debt of twenty pounds that was not yet paid, of which she had made no mention to the superiors. Furthermore, she says that she brought fifty pounds with her into religion and gave it to the Order to compensate for the board and clothing furnished to her during the novitiate. Titius indeed knows that debt is an impediment to religion and that justice must be observed; nevertheless, he does not know what is to be done in the case. Hence it is asked:

1. Who may enter religion?

2. How do substantial and secondary impediments to entrance into religion differ?

3. Is a religious Order bound to pay the personal debts of its members?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. Who may enter Religion?

All those who have the aptitude for the duties of religious life and who ar£ not prevented by any special obstacle may enter religion. The chief obstacles are: the necessity of supporting parents, consummated marriage, and debts. Bishops can not become Religious without the leave of the Holy See. The different Religious Orders have special impediments in addition to these.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 643.

2. How do substantial impediments differ from secondary?

The former make religious profession invalid if they are not removed beforehand, the latter only render it unlawful. Debts constitute a secondary impediment.

3. Is a Religious Order bound to pay the personal debts of its members?

Certainly not. Personal obligations of this sort only affect him who contracted them.

4. The case. Caia did wrong to enter Religion without paying her debts. She has given all the money she had to pay for her own support during the novitiate to her superiors, who know nothing about the debt. She has no money left to pay the debt now. If she obtains any afterwards by inheritance or otherwise she will be obliged to pay the debt with the customary interest. In the meantime it will be sufficient if she repents of her fault, and resolves to fulfil her obligations when she can do so.

Patrick, a secular priest and a missionary in England but born in Scotland, seeks the counsel of Caius, a regular, in these circumstances. A few years ago Patrick entered a certain diocesan seminary in England and, after taking the oath of the Mission, was at length ordained under the title of the Mission. Afterwards, serving a certain Mission for two years, he brought forth much fruit in the vineyard of the Lord. Nevertheless, having experienced the dangers of such a life and having been captivated by love of religious perfection [a conjectural restoration of one corrupt printed word], he asks the Bishop for permission to return to his native country with the intention of entering a certain monastery there. The Bishop refuses; indeed, he asserts that Patrick is already in a state of perfection and that there is no reason for desiring religious life. So that he may forget it more easily, the Bishop orders him to go to another, very poor Mission, where neither labor nor poverty will be lacking. Patrick therefore asks Caius:

1. What obligations to serve the Mission rest upon him?

2. Is it true that the state of a secular priest is a state of perfection?

3. Can he enter religion, and under what conditions?

4. Is he bound to obey the Bishop with regard to the other Mission?

1. Under what obligations does Patrick lie of serving the Mission?

Patrick is bound to serve the diocese for which he was ordained by the very fact of his ordination and by his promise of canonical obedience to the Bishop. He is also bound by the terms of the missionary oath which he has taken.¹

1 Trent, xxiii, c. 16 De Ref.; Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 634.

2. Is it true that the state of a secular priest is a state of perfection?

A certain stability of life is necessary to constitute a state of life in the strict sense, and that it may be a state of acquiring perfection it should impose the obligation and offer special means to attain perfection. The secular priesthood is not a state of acquiring perfection, as there is not the requisite stability, nor does it offer special means of acquiring perfection. On account of the want of stability it can not strictly be called a state in which perfection is exercised like the state of bishops, but in the opinion of Suarez it may be called an imperfect and inchoate state of exercising perfection on account of the priest's duty of working for the sanctification of others.²

2 Suarez, De Relig., tract, vii, lib. i, cc. 14, 15, 17.

3. Can Patrick enter Religion and under what conditions?

If Patrick can get the leave of the Holy See he may enter Religion, but that leave is required by the terms of the missionary oath. He should therefore be advised to make up his mind whether as far as can be known he has a true vocation, and then if he wishes to follow it he must ask leave from the Holy See, which will doubtless first consult the Bishop and then grant leave or not as it judges to be for the best.

4. Is he bound to obey the Bishop and accept the poor Mission assigned to him?

It may reasonably be doubted whether Patrick is so obliged if he does not wish to leave his present post. To transfer him to a poorer and harder Mission has the appearance not of promotion but of degradation, and Patrick has done nothing to deserve that. When the First Council of Baltimore laid it down that priests were obliged to obey the bishop when he bade them accept any mission within the diocese, the S. Cong, de Prop. Fide substituted for it this clause: “ We admonish priests that mindful of the promise made at their ordination they should not refuse to accept any mission assigned to them by the bishop ” (Collectio Lacensis recent. Concil., Ill, p. 22). Which is much less peremptory.

Caius, a secular priest ordained under the title of the Mission for a certain English diocese, having experienced in himself not slight signs of a vocation to the religious state, and not for a brief time, consults his missionary Rector about the matter. The Rector says that he does not understand what Caius lacks for acquiring the highest perfection, since it is written in the Fourth Council of Westminster, decree XII, no. 7: “Moreover, by the Lord, who has compassion on our weaknesses, exceptional aids are granted to us in England, who fight for the kingdom of truth, for acquiring priestly perfection. To the priesthood with which missionaries are distinguished is entrusted the care of souls and therefore spiritual gifts of every kind that are attached to the pastoral state; furthermore, pastors are especially pastors of the poor, the friends of Jesus, ‘who have nothing with which to repay us,’ and they themselves also are poor, and are nourished and contented by the alms of the poor. There is added also the daily and almost perpetual denial of one’s own will in lightening the burdens of others, in comforting the sick, and in assisting the dying by day and night. Finally there remains the remarkable grace and privilege of the missionary oath, by which, on the threshold of the apostolate they have undertaken, after the likeness of the offering of Jesus made on the Cross, they freely offer themselves day by day as a living and pleasing sacrifice to God the Father.” “Behold for you,” says the Rector, “a state of perfection, and indeed one made stable by virtue of the oath of the Mission; poverty also, chastity, and obedience. What else can you have in religion that conduces to acquiring perfection?” Caius, however, still not content, secretly consults Julius, a regular, who, recognizing an excellent vocation, affirms that nothing prevents Caius from passing immediately to religion, since this privilege is granted in law to secular priests, nor does the oath of the Mission stand in the way, because, insofar as it is contrary to the evangelical counsels, it places an obstacle before the Holy Spirit, according to St. Thomas, in III, distinction 39, question 1, article 3, minor question 3, reply to 2, where the Angelic Doctor [correcting an evident omitted-letter printing error] adds these words: “By the very fact that someone swears that he will not enter religion, he is perjured.” Hence it is asked:

1. Is the state of a secular priest with the care of souls a state of perfection?

2. Is at least the religious state a higher state of perfection than the state of a secular priest with the care of souls?

3. Which state is of greater dignity?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. This question is answered above, p. 59.