Thesis V

Although marriage is according to the right of nature, and at times was deservedly commanded by God to some, nevertheless from the right of nature there is no obligation properly so called, made either to individuals or to the community, of procuring offspring.

I. What we state in the first place was denied by the ancient heretics, namely certain of the Gnostics and the Manichaeans, who, as we have already observed in the preface, approved indeed the mingling of flesh, but said that the generation of offspring and the perpetual obligation of one to the other were evil, brought in by Satan. There will again be a place for disputing about these in Thesis VII. To them are added those more recent pseudo-philosophers who acknowledge no other legitimate nuptials except those which genial love has brought together, to endure as long as that love survives; for in reality they take away the covenants of nuptials and deny that these are from the right of nature. But no sane man fails to understand that marriage is according to the right of nature. That certainly is according to the right of nature whose principles are in nature itself and which, for attaining a certain end for which nature itself supplies the powers, is either counseled or required by nature itself. Now the principles of marital union are in nature itself: that is, the diverse sexes ordered to each other, and in the mingling of both the native force of producing offspring. But for the production of offspring and its right education, which nature requires, there is either required, or, to say now at least the minimum, since we shall dispute about this later, there is at least fitting, the mutual obligation of man and woman to stable union; and in this Marriage consists. Besides, to speak of this bond itself in itself, it must be said to be according to the right of nature if it is conformed to the principles of natural law; but such is this union. For friendship and society founded on a mutual communication of power, of which each party is capable, for the mutual communication of goods and mutual consolation and help, is approved by the same natural law by which there is approved both friendship and society generally among all, and especially that friendship and society whose seed and principle has been sown by nature itself. But the stability of union is the perfection of friendship according to the same law; therefore the conjugal bond is according to nature. Indeed, that cannot fail to be according to the right of nature which the author of nature instituted for a natural work, such as the propagation of the human family. But that God instituted marriage from the beginning is clear from Genesis II compared with Matthew XIX, testimonies which we shall explain afterward. Cf. canon 1, session XXIV, Council of Trent. But lest we dwell too long on a matter very clear in itself, the consensus of the human race is also a reason for proving this; for although passions might suggest something else, nevertheless when the human race made laws, it approved that union between man and woman which either truly was marriage or had some appearance of marriage.

II. But because not everything that is according to the right of nature is commanded, the question follows whether marriage and the use of marriage in the procreation of offspring is a thing commanded. That marriage was commanded to the first human beings, Adam and Eve, is certain; for God himself joined them and willed them to be husband and wife. But the question is properly about the use of marriage for the procreation of offspring, or about the propagation of offspring itself to be procured, in an honorable way, of course: whether those first authors of the whole race, and also the rest who followed, were therefore ordered by a true precept to procure it; whether the precept affects individuals or at least the community of men; and whether, if it is not a positive divine precept, it is at least natural.

Therefore appeal is made to the words of the Lord (Gen. I, 28): "Increase" (פרו, fructify, bear fruit, so that the act of copulation is thereby signified), "and multiply and fill the earth," said to the first parents. These words seem to contain a divine precept issued not only to those first human beings, who surely could not alone, by offspring received, fill the earth, but also indefinitely to their descendants, who were contained virtually in that first pair. Therefore the question concerns the sense of these words of the Lord.

We judge that this question must be answered thus: by those words is signified the intention of the end which God appointed for himself in the creation of the first male and the first female; this manifestation of an end in itself does not have the force of a precept, but accidentally it also exercised the force of a precept toward those first human beings and perhaps their children, as long as and insofar as they were situated in a condition similar to that of the first parents. This is proved, first, because those words "Increase and multiply" were said in the same way as the words immediately following: "and subdue it," the earth, "and have dominion over the fish of the sea and the birds of heaven and all living things which move upon the earth." But these do not express a precept, but a certain destination of men according to the dignity implanted from the beginning, whether by the natural order or beyond the order of nature. Indeed, the same words "Increase and multiply" were also said to living things in Genesis I, 22; but then the natural destination of these things, or the intention of God creating them distinct according to their kind, was signified. Thus also Cornelius a Lapide on this place. Likewise Chrysostom, homilies X and XXVI, takes these not as a command but as a blessing of God.

This is proved, second. The manifestation of some end intended by God, which is not essential to man and can be obtained without obligation imposed on man, does not in itself assume the account of a precept, unless from elsewhere it is clear that an obligation is generated. This is evident, because if that end can be obtained without obligation imposed on man, the will of God to obligate is not yet established merely by that end having been manifested; and where this is lacking, there is no precept. But in the words of the Lord we have the manifestation of an end which, first, is not essential to man; for offspring is not necessary to man in order that he be, or in order that he be perfect and blessed. Generation is indeed necessary to future men in order that they be; but these in themselves have no right to be, nor can the question now be about them, for we are speaking of those on whom a precept is imposed, and of this sort certainly are not those who do not yet exist. Now, second, in order that this end be obtained, the cooperation of men is indeed necessary, but it is not necessary that they be obligated. For they are sufficiently borne toward it by the propensity of nature, so that in a multitude of men it is morally impossible that there not be many who will it. These things being posited, what need is there, I ask, of a precept?

It is proved, third. We have said that a manifestation of an end of this kind does not in itself assume the account of a precept unless from elsewhere it is clear that an obligation is generated. This, moreover, first had place for the first parents, who were the one pair from which the human race could proceed. If they, indeed, had been unwilling to devote effort to generation, it would have been over with the end intended by God when he created them male and female and united them in marriage. Nor can it be said: even if they were not obligated, there would have been no fear lest generation follow; for what wonder would it be that two should consent to continence? To continence even the first parents could have been moved after sin, lest they procreate an unhappy stock subject to sin. Do you think that those first two human beings would have acted rightly if they had decreed this? Did this obligation then also exist for others? We suppose that Adam and Eve left several children, whom they were able to bring forth in so long a span of life, and that from these many other children arose.

Now, when they were very many, while natural propensity exercised its force, it was, as we said, morally impossible that many would not devote effort to generation; and therefore a precept concerning this matter was superfluous. And even if few had procreated children, this one thing would have followed: that the human race would have been propagated over the whole earth later. But this would not have been unfitting; for God had not signified that he intended the human race to be multiplied quickly. But when from the beginning they were few, or if this happened later also, so that it would not be morally impossible for all, from the choice of the will, to abstain from generation, they would have been situated in the same condition as the first parents. Therefore, lest the human race fail, an obligation pressed them to devote effort to generation; and this obligation in itself affected not all distributively but disjunctively, for it was enough to preserve the human race, since full multiplication was not immediately to be pursued. But the diverse circumstances in which those men were situated could determine those who would satisfy this obligation. Outside this case I do not see the necessity of any precept; for if men are very many, it is morally impossible, even without any obligation, that all, indeed that many of them, cease from generation. Thus, therefore, we understand a precept issued by the Creator concerning this matter: that a beginning be made for human generation, and provision be made lest the human family cease. The rest did not fall under the precept.

IV. And let these things have been said concerning the obligation which someone might wish to have existed before the subsequent increase of men, which nature can rightly demand. But once that increase had been obtained, and even, if you wish, after some space of time, was there some law of God commanding the conservation or continuation of the human family? Certainly I do not know whether appeal is rightly made to that law issued in creation which we have just weighed. For we hold as certain that at some time this whole human race on earth will cease, but we do not know when and how God has determined this. Therefore, if you have regard only to the account of that primitive law, by what argument will you establish that the human race occupying the whole earth is bound by divine precept to procreate its successors? The end has already been obtained in multiplication. Procreation continued without end is not intended by God. Of course, if no one generates, shortly afterward the human race will cease; but in itself this can be one of the ways by which this human race will at last depart from the earth, although it belongs entirely to God, anticipating, to impose another end. You will say that the human family, as long as it lives, ought to observe that command: "Increase and multiply." But Augustine did not perceive such a necessity by force of those words. When the objection of certain persons was proposed to him in this very question, "If all wished to preserve continence, the human race would cease," he responds: "Would that all wished it"; for thus, as he himself says, the number of the elect would be filled more quickly (On the Good of Marriage, chapter X). And indeed, provided that the act is not evil in itself, since that divine will concerning the continuation of the human race for that determinate age is not certain, why would sin be admitted by ceasing universally from generation?

But even if not by force of that divine will expressed by the words "Increase and multiply," still at least by force of another will, namely concerning the future advent of the Redeemer, was it not necessary that men, until he should come, devote effort to generation? It was certainly necessary; but for this there was no need of any precept. First, indeed, it can be said that the promise of the Messiah was made on the supposition of the foreseen future propagation of the human race by force of natural inclination, just as the promise of the sacrifice of the cross was made on the supposition of the foreseen evil will of those who would crucify Christ. Indeed, in order that the truth of the promise concerning Christ to come at a certain age might remain firm, these two elements were sufficient: on the part of men, a certain natural inclination to generation; but on the part of God, a certain gentle and efficacious providence which would moderate the free affections of men. These, however, in themselves abstract from a precept; therefore there was no need of any precept. Nevertheless, at that time, because of the very expectation of the Messiah to come in the flesh, it happened that those from whose family he was to arise were more inclined to procreate offspring. But the others from the Jewish people were borne into nuptials "by a love not only legitimate but holy," because this was the mode of propagating and conserving the people of God and the true worshippers of God, since then one people proceeding carnally from Abraham was guarding the true religion instituted by God. But it is false that in that age nuptials were commanded to individuals; for nowhere does this mandate exist. For what Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, chapter 22, reports from Deuteronomy XXV, 5-10, as it seems, that he was cursed in the law who did not raise up seed in Israel, is not expressed in the law in this way, nor is there any law made for individuals concerning nuptials. Rather, it is a law concerning taking the wife of a brother left without children; and this law indeed did not obligate the brother of the deceased unwillingly, except if he wished to possess the goods of the deceased by right of inheritance.

V. And these things said thus far concerning a divine precept are valid whether you speak of a precept made to individuals, or at least to the community. But because we have spoken of a divine precept insofar as it is positive and is distinguished from the natural, it certainly can happen that someone observes that we have in some way played or wasted labor in the demonstration of this matter; for the words of the Lord are an expression of natural right, and this truly commands the procreation of offspring. But on the contrary we reply with two points. First, the words of the Lord, if they express a precept, about which matter we have already spoken, express a precept formally divine, and only foundationally natural. Second, no natural precept properly so called exists, either for individuals or for the community, concerning the propagation of offspring.

The first of these, as you see, depends on the second. For if there is no precept from nature itself, that is, if nature in itself does not require that this be furnished by men, it will follow that if a precept is asserted, it arises immediately from the free will of God, with only a certain natural capacity or propensity supposed; but this is a precept formally divine, and only foundationally natural. Therefore we prove the second, of which that will be the necessary consequent.

Therefore, as regards the second, men can be considered both as individuals separately and in community. We affirm, a) first, that individuals are not obligated, or that nature does not require from them that they attend to the procreation of children. For if there were in individuals any obligation by natural right to procreate, it would have to be derived from the end, which is the procreation of children; for from that end those who press this obligation derive it. But the other ends of marriage can plainly be compensated and surpassed by other goods. Yet from that end there is, by natural right, no exigency and obligation of procreating in individuals. For an active capacity for it is not a sufficient reason of moral obligation. Propensity, if there is any, is free rather than necessary; and therefore that propensity to having children is not found in all. But naturally there is present a disposition, which is nothing but the active capacity we have mentioned. The good itself, which is offspring, if it is compared to individuals, is not for them the more excellent good which they can attain, but on the contrary it impedes goods more excellent both for individuals and, through them, for the community. For the more excellent good for man is that in which his perfection is chiefly situated; of this sort is the study and contemplation of truth, the exercise of charity toward God and neighbor, from which the greatest benefits redound to society. Yet the full and at least excellent attainment of these goods is impeded by the care of children. But the good of offspring, that is, its procreation, if it is compared with the offspring itself, is certainly an immense good for it and the principle of the rest; but before offspring exists, since it has no right, what obligation can there be toward it? Besides, we have seen that the state of continence is more perfect than the state of marriage, in which effort is given to generation; and this would also be so in the state of pure nature. But the right of nature cannot obligate men to that which is more imperfect with the loss of what is more perfect.

b) Nor by the right of nature is there any obligation of procreating children imposed on the community of men. For besides the things already said, which are also valid here, observe that the community cannot be obligated to this act insofar as it is a community; for this is an act which can be posited only by individuals, namely by pairs made one flesh from male and female, and insofar as they are such. Therefore the natural obligation which is called that of the community will come back to this: that some persons disjunctively from the community, either these or those, are obligated. But what sort of obligation is this, which can affect men only one by one, and yet from which individuals are immune? Do we not see in this matter the very same thing that happens in several other offices of society? For in society there must be farmers, physicians, teachers, artisans, etc. Is there need of any natural law morally obligating, in order that such men exist in society? The diverse natural disposition in individuals, the variety of occasions, advantage, profit, praise, and honor, which offer themselves for different things only in different conditions, are more than sufficient that there never be lacking those who perform those offices. Likewise, if it is necessary for the community that successors exist, which indeed is rather the good of future society than of present society, unlike the other offices enumerated, the propensity to nuptials, which unfolds itself in so many, in suitable circumstances, of which there is abundant supply, will effect that there is never lacking a generation of men succeeding a declining generation. Therefore in this matter we see only a certain instinct of nature, which besides is more vehement than the others, so that it needs restraint rather than impulse; by it nature, and the author of nature, sweetly obtains what he intends.

VI. But you will say: does not nature require her own continual propagation and the perpetual conservation of human society? Moreover, are not men, either taken distributively or at least disjunctively, bound by a true moral obligation to that which nature requires of them and which they can furnish only in a human and free manner? We concede this latter, but we deny the former: namely, that nature requires continual propagation from men. For nature first requires in individuals, and then in society, but by reason of individuals, in whom alone nature itself inheres, that which is necessary for them in order that they be and be well, so far as is needed for the ultimate end. But generation is not necessary for those in whom nature inheres, nor for existing society, but for future society, which nevertheless now can exercise no right. Therefore it is false that nature requires it; but nature confers the power and also the propensity. But if the author of nature wills a certain perennial series of generations, he knows by what modes he may use this inclination and the affections of men for attaining this end without any moral law.

Yet you will insist: no one would blame a king who, in certain circumstances, lest society be diminished and lest suitable men be lacking for certain offices, commands procreation; but he would make this law by the right of nature; therefore the right of nature commands procreation to society.

I answer: granting the antecedent, about which we do not wish to dispute, we deny the consequence. Namely, in order that a law issued by the community be just, there is no need that the very same thing which the positive law commands already be commanded by nature itself; rather it is enough that it be consonant with nature, and that nature teach that it is fitting in those circumstances.