Section — Konings, Theologia Moralis

§ I. On the Obligation of Observing the Vows

¶1160.
    • From the present discipline of the Church, the proper and necessary object of the vow of poverty is not 1) life, nor honor, nor reputation, nor knowledge, nor the right of conferring by election, presentation, or collation a regular benefice; 2) abdication of imperfect dominion (n. 590); but 3) dependent use, or only use of fact, of temporal goods, insofar as of themselves they are estimable by price (n. 675), is necessary. This is clear 1° from the fact that the possession of temporal goods estimable by price alone constitutes a man rich, in the proper sense of this word, and that from the lack of these alone he properly becomes poor. - 2° from those things which we taught with De Angelis n. 1149 under III; indeed also from the Pontifical Decree given by our Most Holy Lord Leo XIII for the Regulars of Belgium. - 3° from the fact that today there is no truly so-called religious Institute in whose rule independent use is permitted. Cf. Craisson1 and St. Alphonsus.2 Hence:
¶1161.
    • I. The following are not comprehended by the vow of poverty:
  1. Manuscripts, whether one's own or accepted from another. For they are offspring of the intellect, which do not fall under the vow of poverty. Besides, common usage bears this, and it is clear from the Brief Postulat of Benedict XIII, year 1724, and the Declaration of Clement VIII. The continuator Tournely with others excepts if the contrary has been defined in the constitutions of the Order.3

  2. Relics, since they are spiritual things.

  3. Paintings, although offspring of the intellect, nevertheless cannot be made by a Religious, while the vow is preserved, with the intention of keeping them for himself, nor even (if they are made either by a lay-brother at the time in which he is held to work for the convent, or by any professed one with colors, etc. handed over by the convent) with the intention of giving them to outsiders.4

  4. Peculium, that is, a temporal good destined for the uses of an individual and not for the common uses of the monastery, and this not only when necessaries are not supplied by the community, as is clear of itself; but also when they are supplied, provided in this case 1° it already exists by custom; 2° it is held dependently on the Superior, and therefore 3° with a mind prepared to renounce it at the nod of the same Superior; and 4° it is kept either in common, or in the cell even of the religious, but with permission of the Superior, and not locked with a key or so hidden that it is withdrawn from the free disposition of the Superior; 5° it is applied to uses neither illicit nor superfluous. - The first is required so that the prescription of Trent,1 by which peculia are more probably prohibited,2 may cease; the second, third, and fourth, that use of right, or independent use, may be guarded against; the fifth, as will be clear from what must soon be said.

  5. An ecclesiastical benefice, for example an Episcopate, legitimately conferred. Namely he will be able to administer it and to dispose of its revenues independently of the Superior, since the thing is annexed to a spiritual thing; yet he cannot do this licitly except for his own support and pious uses.4

Notes to n. 1161. (1) Manuale, n. 2477-2485. 2749. (2) L. V. 14. (3) Ib. (4) Ib. Cfr. Salm. Tr. XII. c. II. n. 197-199.

¶1162.
    • II. All acts of use independent of the rule or Superior, concerning temporal things, are comprehended by the vow of poverty, and therefore a Religious sins:
  1. If he spends or lends something from things granted to him for use into another use without permission, or culpably loses, destroys, or makes it worse.5

  2. If he accepts anything without permission, whether as a gift, or as a loan for consumption, or as a loan for use, or as a properly so-called deposit (n. 924), or refuses what is owed to Religion from a title of justice, for example inheritance, wages. Resolve otherwise concerning gifts, since the vow of poverty does not oblige one to acquire for Religion. Yet he who without just cause refused gifts of this kind would sin against charity toward the convent by impeding its good.6

  3. If he buys anything without permission, even for the community.

  4. If he asks or accepts something from an outsider to be spent on pious works not determined by the donor in the lowest species.6

  5. If he hides something in such a way that it is withdrawn from the free disposition of the Superior.7

  6. If a Procurator or Superior expends anything otherwise than the rule, the will of the Superior, custom, or reasonable cause permits. The reason is that these are not masters of common goods, but only administrators.1

Notes to n. 1162 - note sequence 1. (1) Sess. 25. c. 1. de Regul. (2) L. V. 16. (4) Ib. n. 19. (5) L. V. 20. (6) St. Alph. Opere Ascet., Lett. e Istr. Circ. Oct. 1757. Tom. IV. p. 380. Cf. Vind. p. 372. - Ed. 2. T. I. p. 420. (7) L. V. 23. Notes to n. 1162 - note sequence 2. (1) L. V. 28.

¶1163.
  1. Questions. - Query 1° What permission is required and suffices so that use is not independent?

Resp. to 1st. There is required: a) True permission, that is, not extorted by fear nor obtained by fraud, for example by feigning necessity. b) Reasonable permission, that is, not for illicit or vain uses, nor for superfluous, precious things unbecoming the religious state. For the Superior cannot give greater permission than he himself has; but he, since he is not master of the goods of Religion, cannot expend them at his own discretion and uselessly, but only for the necessity and utility of Religion.2 Hence the opinion altogether pleases St. Alphonsus (although he does not dare to condemn the opposite) teaching that such permission is not merely illicit, but also invalid, except if it is a question either of superfluous things without notable excess, because otherwise the matter would be exposed to great scruples, or of a small sum to be exposed to a licit game, that is, not merely fortuitous.3

Resp. to 2nd. Tacit permission suffices, and more probably also permission presumed from certain probability of future concession; for each takes away independent use. Yet such presumption ordinarily is not without venial fault, because for the most part Superiors, at least as to the mode, are unwilling. (A) p. 477. Permission sought, but unduly denied, unless there is danger of grave damage in delay, does not excuse from transgression of the vow.4

Hence, that is, from presumed permission, a religious can assist a poor man laboring under great poverty when access to the Superior does not lie open; he can bestow moderate alms on the poor if with due permission he is living outside the convent; give them something edible when he is in the convent; make light donations to friends and blood-relatives as a sign of gratitude or due friendship, or for conciliating love toward Religion; make remunerative donations from goods granted to him for use, indeed give more than he received, up to an excess of a fourth part, because gratitude demands that more be returned than had been accepted; more probably also give those things which by living more sparingly he withdrew from himself from things granted to him for use, if a fixed quantity is assigned to him in such a way that neither the monastery is held to furnish more, nor he himself to render an account of what was assigned;1 unless the contrary will of the Superior is clear; accept from outsiders something to be handed over to the Superior;2 buy a thing if he knows that it will be very pleasing to the Superior and easy recourse to him is not open, for example on a journey; generally accept or expend something when the Superior cannot be approached and the occasion is urgent;3 give something to Peter, if he has permission of giving to Paul, unless the Superior gave permission for Paul on account of a peculiar reason, being going to deny it if it had been sought for Peter.4 Yet presumption would be illegitimate in a religious who, while traveling, turned aside to other places outside the way to see curious things, unless perhaps the distance were very short and no or very slight expenses had to be made, or unless in the particular case the permission of the Superior could rightly be presumed from the nature of the cause.

Notes to n. 1163. (2) L. V. 28. (3) Ib. n. 30-32. (4) Ib. n. 18. 33. Appendix annotation (Δ), to n. 1163. R. to 2nd. p. 448. col. 2. St. Alphonsus adds, L. V. 18: "Yet Elbel, t. 2. p. 632. n. 644, and Lugo, n. 128, with Suarez and Sanchez, warn that after such acceptance a religious is held, if he conveniently can, to manifest the matter to the Prelate, so that thereafter he may lawfully retain it. The same" (namely, that presumed permission suffices) "Elbel says, p. 631. n. 640, if the Superior is accustomed easily to grant permission for certain things, especially things to eat and drink; but in well-ordered monasteries such permissions are not usually granted everywhere, as Lessius says, l. c., except for very small things and those frequently occurring."

¶1164.
    • Query 2° What matter must be judged grave in violation of the vow of poverty?

Resp. 1° In sins which are at the same time against religion and justice, generally speaking, that is to be held as grave matter which constitutes mortal sin in theft.5

Moreover, that one may judge concerning the gravity of matter in thefts of this kind, it must be noted that moderately wealthy monasteries are commonly equated with quite wealthy private owners. Hence generally the same measure as for these constitutes grave matter. But if they are very wealthy, a greater quantity is required. A greater quantity is also required if a Religious usurps things of the Monastery for his own use, or gives them to others of the same Community, than if he spends the same things on outsiders, because thus they remain at home. Greater also in minute thefts, which besides, when a notable interval has intervened (see n. 698. q. 6°), do not coalesce into grave matter. Greater again in eatables, provided they are not reserved and the damaging of the convent is not excessive and in a more extraordinary and more precious thing.6

Resp. 2° In sins committed against Religion alone, or against the vow alone, the difficulty increases, and there is greater disagreement of Theologians. Yet more commonly they require no greater matter for mortal sin than in the preceding case, where justice is violated; because the act of proprietorship seems to be of the same gravity. Yet not improbably some grave Doctors require a greater quantity for grave sin. - Thus Elbel,1 the Salmanticenses.2

But commonly they agree that a much greater value is required for sinning gravely when gifts are accepted from outsiders to be spent on others; because then the act of proprietorship is much less than if these were retained for one's own use.3

But generally a religious does not sin gravely by secretly accepting some thing from the Community, for example a book for his own use even for a long time (but not in perpetuity), unless he so hides it that it cannot be found by the Superiors; because then the Prelate is not judged unwilling as to the substance, but only as to the mode.4

As to things accepted or handed over by loan for consumption or loan for use without the permission of the Prelate, generally speaking he will not sin gravely against the vow of poverty if he gives the thing to outsiders for his own use or even other uses by loan for consumption or loan for use, provided he is certain of recovering them and does not therefore inflict grave damage on the Community, which for this reason, for example, lacks the use of a thing gravely necessary here and now. Much less will he sin gravely if he lends by loan for consumption or loan for use things granted to him for use to other religious of the same monastery. The reason is that although he posits some act of proprietorship in these things, nevertheless he does not sin gravely, according to the common interpretation of Theologians.5

Notes to n. 1164. (1) L. V. n. 19-23. (2) Lacroix, L. 4. n. 118. (3) Ib. n. 109-111. (4) Ib. n. 119. (5) L. V. 24. (6) Ib. n. 24. 25.

¶1165.
    • Query 3° Whether a religious who has violated the vow of poverty is held to restitution, and whether one unable to restore is held to withdraw something from himself from the things granted to him for use?

Resp. to 1st Affirmatively, if by violating the vow he also violated justice at the same time. The reason is clear.

Resp. to 2nd. The negative opinion is truly probable to St. Alphonsus6 if the things granted for use are necessary. The reason is that it is not to be presumed that the Superior wishes to oblige the subject to this with so great an inconvenience.

Notes to n. 1165. (1) n. 646. (2) c. 6. n. 12. (3) L. V. 24. (4) L. V. 24. (5) Ib. n. 27. (6) Ib. 26.

¶1166.
    • Query 4° What is the difference between the vow and the virtue of poverty?

Resp. The vow regards only external acts of proprietorship; but the virtue also extends to internal affections of the heart. For the object of the vow is to despoil the Religious externally of temporal goods. But the virtue has as its end wholly to cut away every inordinate affection of the heart toward earthly things. Therefore the vow of poverty is like the means to the virtue, which is the end to be obtained. This being posited, everyone sees that the virtue of poverty extends much more widely than the vow; for as often as someone infringes the vow, at the same time he wounds the virtue also; but not vice versa.

I said that the vow affects only external acts of proprietorship; yet the vow could be violated by an internal act which regarded and touched an external act, namely by the desire of acting externally against the vow; since desire puts on every malice and species of the external act, as was said n. 228.

¶1167.
    • The vow of chastity must be judged much more excellent than the vow of poverty, since through it the Religious renounces not goods extrinsic to himself, but intrinsic, namely pleasures of the body and of the senses.

Its object embraces two things, namely those things which by natural and divine law are already prohibited, and also those things which could be done licitly in legitimate matrimony. Therefore this is the efficacy of the vow of chastity, that what otherwise could be licit becomes illicit for the Religious; but those things which are prohibited to all, he must avoid from a double obligation, namely of chastity and of Religion.

¶1168.
  1. Questions. - Query 1° Whether sins of lust even merely internal are opposed to the vow of chastity?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is that a Religious by force of the vow of chastity is held to abstain from every voluntary venereal delectation, whether internal or external, so that if he wounds chastity, he incurs a double guilt, namely of lust and of sacrilege.1

¶1169.
    • Query 2° What is the gravity of sins committed against the vow of chastity?

Resp. This general rule must be established. The gravity of sin against the vow is entirely the same as against the Sixth and Ninth precept of the Decalogue, namely sin is mortal or venial against Religion according as it is mortal or venial against chastity. But smallness of matter is not to be admitted in sins of lust, nor can the fault be light except from imperfect consent, according to the things said n. 484, 485.

¶1170.
    • Query 3° Whether or what difference there is between the virtue and the vow of chastity?

Resp. 1° No difference is given by reason of object, since the vow extends as widely as the virtue itself. Yet they differ in this, that in those things which are prohibited by the virtue, two sins are given if the vow is violated, while one sin is committed in that which is interdicted by the vow alone. For if someone bound by a simple vow of Religion were to contract matrimony, he would perpetrate one sin, namely against Religion, in the use of marriage. Therefore the vow can sometimes be violated without the virtue itself being wounded.

Resp. 2° The virtue of chastity, besides the obligations which it imposes, also counsels mere counsels leading to greater perfection; while the vow affects only the matter of obligation.

¶1171.
  1. Principles. - I. A Religious from the vow of obedience is held to all things which the Superior prescribes according to the rules and constitutions of the Order, whether directly and expressly, or indirectly and implicitly.2 Yet that there be sin against the vow, it is required that the Superior truly prescribe, and not merely advise; and this indeed will be clear from the words, mode of speaking, and various circumstances of things.

II. The Superior has the right of prescribing not only those things which are had explicitly in the rule or constitutions, such as abstinence, silence, etc., but also whatever things are implicitly contained in them, such as penalties against transgressors, and whatever pertains to the offices of the Community to be fulfilled rightly, or to its right administration. The reason is that a religious binding himself to observing the special constitutions of the Order obliges himself to all those things which are wisely established or prescribed for obtaining this end.

III. A Religious by force of his vow is not held to obey a Superior prescribing a thing a) impossible, or b) evidently illicit (as to reveal a secret which he is not held to reveal from another reason), or c) gravely harmful to himself. - And indeed he could not oblige himself to an impossible thing, since no one is held to the impossible; nor to a thing certainly illicit, since a vow cannot be a bond of iniquity; nor finally to a thing gravely harmful to himself, because this is foreign to the mind of Religion, and heroic acts commonly and implicitly do not fall under a vow, just as they do not fall under a precept. Yet except if it is a question of offices to be fulfilled within the limits of religious life, for example of caring for pestiferous religious of the same Order, etc.

Hence a subject is not held to obey a Prelate commanding that he walk upon waters, etc.; but if examples are reported by which it is clear that such obedience was approved by God and confirmed by miracles, it must be said that then the divine good pleasure had been manifested by a singular and supernatural light both to the one prescribing and to the one obeying.

Notes to n. 1171. (1) L. V. 37. (2) Ib. 38.

¶1172.
  1. Questions. - Query 1° What difference intervenes between the virtue and the vow of obedience?

Resp. The same as was indicated above n. 1166 concerning poverty; namely the object of the vow is the external execution of the mandate of the Superior, while the virtue reaches even to internal submission, and effects perfect obedience itself.

But not only sins against the vow, but also against the virtue, must be carefully avoided by a Religious; and this indeed is usually wounded more frequently. For it happens (would that it were more rarely!) that a subject indeed obeys the mandate of the Prelate integrally by external action, but with a reluctant, sad, and bitter will. Then indeed, although he satisfies the vow, yet he recedes far from the virtue.

Therefore a Religious disobedient to a Superior truly prescribing more probably2 commits a double sin, one against the natural precept which prescribes submission to a legitimate Superior, and the other against the vow. Hence in pious Congregations of men or women living a common life under the same Rule without the bond of vows, the disobedient are not exempted from sin if they are rebellious against Superiors, but they commit one sin.

¶1173.
    • Query 2° Whether a religious is held to obey in doubt whether the thing prescribed is licit, or exceeds the power of the Superior?

Resp. Affirmatively, because then presumption favors the Superior. Besides, the opposite opinion would disturb order in religious families. Except if the thing prescribed is either very difficult, or exposes the subject or a third party to danger of grave damage, provided that in this double case the subject acts from an opinion solidly probable. The reason is that then the morally certain right of the subject prevails over the uncertain right of the superior.1

¶1174.
    • Query 3° When does a religious sin gravely against the vow of obedience?

Resp. He sins gravely in the following cases, which rarely occur, namely: 1° when he refuses to obey in grave matter a Superior prescribing in virtue of holy obedience, or in the name of Jesus Christ, or through other similar formulas, which must be used very rarely by Superiors; 2° when to a Superior prescribing he responds: I do not wish to obey, I do not wish to do it, I will not do it, or some other similar thing which smells of formal contempt of the authority prescribing; 3° when from disobedience there follows grave scandal of others, whether of subjects or of secular persons, or grave inconvenience either for the Community or for others, for example for the salvation of souls, etc.

In other cases disobedience does not exceed venial sin; but since the aforesaid cases of mortal sin rarely occur, commonly the sins of religious against obedience are to be reputed as venial. - Much more rarely still do sins committed against the virtue alone become mortal. - But a Rule ordering obedience in all things is to be understood of the perfection of obedience, not of obligation from the vow.2

¶1175.
    • Query 4° To whom must obedience be given?

Resp. Obedience must be given not only to greater Superiors, but also to lower ones, or ministers, or superiors prescribing from the mandate of Superiors, since the authority which enjoins the mandate is the same.

Query 5° How must obedience be given?

Resp. That the full perfection of obedience may be clear, obedience must be given: 1° from a supernatural motive, as the Apostle prescribes:1 Not serving to the eye, as pleasing men.... Serve the Lord Christ. - 2° Cheerfully, or with joy and a willing soul: For God loves a cheerful giver.2 - 3° Promptly, that is, either immediately, or at the prescribed time, and with due care, without sluggishness. - 4° Entirely, or by completing the whole prescribed work.

Notes to nn. 1175-1186 - note sequence 1. (1) Bouix, T. II. p. 576. (2) L. V. 40. (3) Ib. (4) T. II. p. 549, 550. (5) L. V. 42. (6) Bouix, T. II. pp. 549. 550. Notes to nn. 1175-1186 - note sequence 2. (1) L. V. 43. 44. H. A. Tr. XII. 17. (2) Ib. n. 73. Notes to nn. 1175-1186 - note sequence 3. (1) L. V. 40. (2) L. V. 41. (3) L. V. 42. Notes to nn. 1175-1186 - note sequence 4. (1) De Syn. L. XIII. c. XI. n. 16 et seq. Notes to nn. 1175-1186 - note sequence 5. (1) Craisson, Man. n. 1090, sq. (2) S. C. Episc. et Reg. May 6, 1864. See Acta, Vol. I. p. 449 sq. (3) Craisson, Man. n. 1091. Notes to nn. 1175-1186 - note sequence 6. (1) Benedict XIV, C. Emanavit, Apr. 29, 1755. Notes to nn. 1175-1186 - note sequence 7. (1) Cfr. Gury, Edit. Rom. 1872. T. I. p. 578. Note (K). (2) Trid. Sess. 25. c. 15. de Regul. (3) Billuart, de stat. rel. Diss. 4. a. 2. (4) Craisson, Man. n. 2651. (5) Ib. n. 2652-2655.