The Properties of Virtues

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Chapter II. On Acquired Moral Virtues And Their Properties · Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Ch. II, Article II. On The Properties Of Acquired Virtues · Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Ch. II, Art. II, § 1. On The Mean Of Virtues · Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Ch. II, Art. II, § 2. On The Connection Of Virtues · Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Ch. II, Art. II, § 3. On The Inequality Of Virtues · Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Ch. III, Article II. On the properties of infused virtues

Three properties of virtues are chiefly enumerated: their being in a mean, their mutual connection, and their inequality. Concerning each property these things are noted:

n. 347.

I. The Being of Virtues in a Mean. 1. Notion. "The good of some thing," says St. Thomas, "consists in a mean, according as it is conformed to a rule or measure which can be transcended and fallen short of" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 3). Therefore the mean of virtue is the conformity of the act of virtue with its rule.

Division. The mean of virtues is twofold: either determined from the nature of the thing, or to be determined by reason. The first regards exterior things, and indeed their objective equality; therefore it is the same mean for all. The other regards interior passions, "in which the right cannot be established in the same way, because men have themselves differently toward passions" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 2); hence this mean is not the same for all.
Existence. a) Theological virtues, whose measure is God Himself, do not per se have being in a mean; for no one can believe God too much, hope in Him too much, or love Him too much. I say per se, for per accidens they have being in a mean, namely on our part, "because although we cannot be borne toward God as much as we ought, nevertheless we ought to be borne toward Him by believing, hoping, and loving according to the measure of our condition" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 4).

b) Moral virtues, whose rule is right reason, per se have being in a mean; for acts of moral virtues cannot be conformed to right reason except by avoiding defect from it or excess beyond it. But since justice regards exterior things, the mean of reason in this virtue necessarily coincides with the mean of the thing, and therefore is the same mean for all. The contrary occurs in the remaining moral virtues, whose mean must be determined by right reason according to diverse circumstances.

n. 348.

II. Mutual Connection of Virtues. There is one mutual connection of acquired virtues, another of infused virtues; there is also one connection of acquired virtues if they are considered in a perfect state, another in an imperfect state.

Acquired virtues in a perfect state are so connected among themselves that one cannot exist without the others. For the perfection of acquired virtues, as moral, depends on perfect prudence, since prudence must establish the mean in any given case; therefore, when perfect prudence is absent, the other acquired virtues are not perfectly present either. St. Augustine excellently illustrates this, saying: "Virtues which are in the human soul, although each is understood in one way or another, are nevertheless in no way separated from one another, so that whoever are equal, for example, in fortitude, are equal also in prudence, temperance, and justice. For if you say that these men are equal in fortitude, but that one excels in prudence, it follows that the fortitude of this one is less prudent, and by this very fact they are not equal in fortitude, since the fortitude of the other is more prudent. And thus you will find concerning the other virtues, if you run through all of them by the same consideration."¹
Acquired virtues in an imperfect state can exist one without the others. For someone can elicit more frequent acts of some virtue while neglecting acts of other virtues; but by acting thus he acquires for himself the virtue corresponding to the acts frequently placed. Therefore St. Thomas says: "We see someone... from some custom to be prompt for works of liberality, who nevertheless is not prompt for works of chastity" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 1).
Infused theological virtues are so connected among themselves that charity cannot exist without faith and hope; but faith and hope can indeed exist without charity. The first is clear from this, that charity is infused only with sanctifying grace; and the virtues of faith and hope always coexist with sanctifying grace. The second, with regard to the virtue of faith, is taught by the Council of Trent;² moreover, when the virtue of faith remains, there also remains the foundation of hope, which is not destroyed by every mortal sin, since mortal sin as such is opposed only to charity. Nor should it be said that faith and hope perish for this reason, that together with charity sanctifying grace is lost, which is the root of the origin of faith and hope. For even though it is true that faith and hope take their origin from sanctifying grace, nevertheless, once they have arisen, they no longer inhere in sanctifying grace as in a subject; rather, their immediate subject of inherence is the powers of the soul. Therefore the loss of sanctifying grace is not the reason for the loss of these virtues.
Infused moral virtues: 1. are so connected among themselves that one cannot exist without another; for all proceed equally from sanctifying grace and regard their intermediate ends on account of the ultimate end. 2. Infused moral virtues are so connected with charity that they cannot exist without it; for when man's habitual relation to the ultimate supernatural end perishes, habitual supernatural relations to intermediate ends also perish.

¹ Augustine, De Trinitate, bk. 6, c. 4, n. 6; cf. Salmanticenses, De virtutibus, disp. 4, dub. 1, whole (t. 6, p. 374 ff.).

² Session 6, canon 28.

n. 349.

III. Inequality of Virtues. By inequality of virtues is understood their diverse moral goodness. Now the moral goodness of virtues in human acts is attended to according as they are regulated by the due rule; the higher the rule, the nobler the moral goodness. But if diverse virtues are regulated by the same rule, the magnitude of their moral goodness must be measured by their diverse nearness to this rule; the nearer some virtue is to the rule, the greater its goodness. From these things the following conclusions result:

Theological virtues surpass moral virtues in dignity, because their rule, which is God Himself, surpasses in dignity right reason, which is the rule of moral virtues. But among theological virtues, charity surpasses in dignity, since it is nearer to the rule. Now St. Thomas says: "That which is through itself is greater than that which is through another. But faith and hope indeed attain God according as from Him there comes to us either knowledge of truth or acquisition of good; but charity attains God Himself, so that it rests in Him, not so that something may come to us from Him; and therefore charity is more excellent than faith and hope" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 23, a. 6).
Among moral virtues, which are all regulated by the same rule, namely right reason, whether illuminated only by natural light or by supernatural light, prudence surpasses in dignity, because it perfects reason itself and attains it according to itself. Then follows justice, as residing in the will, which is nearer to reason and has as its object a good proposed by reason. Fortitude follows next; for it resides in the irascible appetite, which acts according to the cogitative power. Finally comes temperance, since as its subject of inherence it has the concupiscible appetite, which acts according to imagination (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 66, aa. 1 and 4; II-II, q. 123, a. 12).

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 6 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Properties of the Virtues

n. 153.

Properties of the Virtues

Properties of the Virtues.—From the definition of virtue given above certain properties result.

(a) Since a virtue makes conduct agree with a certain fixed standard, it does not allow of excess or defect. Hence, virtue follows the golden mean.

(b) Since the other moral virtues would go to extremes without the guidance of prudence, and since prudence would not judge aright without the right dispositions of the other virtues, it follows that the four moral virtues, at least in their perfect state, must always be together. And because charity is the fulfillment of the whole law, he who has charity has also all the other infused virtues.

(c) Since the virtues are directed towards objects of varying degrees of excellence, and since they are habits, and are capable of increase and decrease (137 sqq.), it follows that both virtues of different species, and those of the same species, are or may be unequal.

(d) Since some of the virtues imply conditions that will not exist in the life to come, it follows that these virtues will be somewhat changed in the blessed. Thus, temperance, which subdues the rebellion of the passions, will not be exercised in heaven, where the passions do not rebel.

n. 154.

The golden mean is found differently in different virtues.

(a) In the case of justice, the mean is determined by an external object that is invariable, since justice gives what is due to others, neither more nor less; in the case of fortitude and temperance the mean is determined by prudent judgment and is not invariable, since these two virtues are concerned with the regulation of the internal passions according to conditions of individuals and circumstances. Thus, a debt of ten dollars remains the same whether the debtor is rich or poor, whether the creditor needs it or not. But a glass of liquor, which would be just enough for one who was well, might be far too much for him when he was sick; and a danger which a man might be expected to encounter, might be too much for a woman or a boy.

(b) The mean of the intellectual and speculative virtues is the agreement with objective truth, as lying between the extremes of false affirmation and false negation. The mean of the practical virtue of prudence, as regulating the moral virtues, is right reason, considered as directive of the desires and conduct so as to avoid excess and defect.

(c) The theological virtues have no mean, as far as their object is concerned, since God, being infinite in truth, power and goodness, cannot be believed in, hoped in, or loved too much. By reason of their subject, however, these virtues have a mean, since it is possible for one to exceed, for example, in hope by presumptuously expecting what is not due to one’s condition.

n. 155.

Without charity one may possess certain other virtues. (a) Thus, one may have the natural or acquired moral virtues, as is the case with many pagans, but such virtues are imperfect, since they do not direct their subject to the Supernatural End of man; (b) one may have the supernatural or infused virtues of faith and hope, as is the case with Christians who are not in the state of grace. Even such faith and hope are imperfect virtues, and are not meritorious.

n. 156.

Considered precisely as virtues (cfr. Article on Hope), the three groups rank as follows: (a) the theological virtues are the most excellent, since they deal directly with man’s supernatural end; (b) By reason of their object, universal truth, the intellectual virtues are superior to the moral virtues, which are concerned with particular goods; (c) the moral virtues, nevertheless, are more perfect as virtues, for, so considered in the order of action, in perfecting the appetites, they are more properly principles of action.

n. 157.

The highest of the virtues within each group are the following:

(a) Charity is greater than faith and hope, since it implies union with its objects, while the other two imply a certain distance from their object;

(b) Justice is superior to fortitude and temperance, since it deals with actions by which man is rightly ordered, both as to himself and as to others, while the others deal with the passions and the right disposition of man as to himself. The order of the moral virtues is: prudence, which is the guide of the others; justice, which deals with man’s actions and orders him rightly, both as to himself and as to others; fortitude, which governs the passions, even when life and death are the issues; temperance, which governs the passions in affairs of less importance;

(c) The chief of the intellectual virtues is wisdom, which considers the supreme cause of things, and therefore judges the other virtues of the intellect.

n. 158.

In the blessed the virtues will remain, but changed in some respects. (a) Thus, the rectitude of soul contained in the moral virtues will endure, but there will be no rebellious passions to overcome, no dangers to oppose, no debts of justice to be discharged, as in this life; (b) the intellectual virtues acquired in this life will remain, but the soul separated from the body will not employ sense images as in its earthly existence; (c) faith and hope will give place to vision and realization, but charity will never fall away.

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 2 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), First Commentary: On the Nature of Moral Theology

n. 37.

Since therefore man is destined to a supernatural end, he must tend to it by his own free acts. But since he cannot attain it by his own natural acts, supernatural virtues are therefore infused into man, which supply power to the intellect and will for connaturally producing supernatural acts. And, as in the natural order there is first the nature itself of the soul, and then its natural powers and acts, so in the supernatural order there is sanctifying grace, which inheres in the substance of the soul and elevates man to a supernatural nature; there are infused virtues, which inhere stably in the powers of the soul, namely the intellect and the will, to which they give force and power for eliciting supernatural acts; and finally there are actual graces, by which God actually concurs with each supernatural act of man, to prevent and excite, aid and perfect them. Wherefore an act at once vital and supernatural proceeds from a twofold proximate intrinsic principle, that is, from natural power and from the supernatural habit of infused virtue. This infused virtue is distinguished in two ways, theological and moral. The former has God Himself for its primary material object and some divine perfection for its formal object; the latter generally has for its formal object the very honesty of the human act. And as virtues are infused for the ordinary acts of supernatural life, so also the gifts of the Holy Spirit are conferred for extraordinary and more sublime acts of the supernatural life. To the former man is moved from the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit and from the judgment of reason; to the latter he is moved by the instinct of the Holy Spirit alone. Through the infused virtues man is disposed to be made promptly movable according to the common aspect of Christian virtues, or according to their common rule; through the gifts man is disposed to be made promptly movable by divine inspiration. St. Thomas, I-II, qq. 63, 68.

n. 37.

The relation of man to God in human acts constitutes the moral order. Wherefore if human acts are fitting to that end, they will lead man through to God. Now some of these acts order man immediately to God, naturally by natural knowledge and love, supernaturally by faith, hope, and charity. Other acts immediately order man either in himself, so that the higher powers rule the lower and the lower are subjected to the higher; or to other creatures, so that he may use them only insofar as they are useful to him for attaining his end, and so that he may constitute a fitting society with other men, destined to the same end as himself. Wherefore all these other acts also, by preserving the order of nature established by God, although mediately, consequently order and lead man to God as ultimate end; and in this attainment and eternal possession of the ultimate end there is beatitude. Indeed, by destining man to this beatitude of eternal life and supplying him with the means for attaining it, God evidently imposes upon man by His will the necessity of applying the aforesaid means suitable for attaining the aforesaid end. This necessity constitutes moral obligation, which moral Theology attends to and considers in human acts. - Therefore God as the ultimate end of man is the supreme principle of the whole of moral Theology, by which namely all things which must be performed by man are understood and determined, so that he may act licitly and at last attain eternal life.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 16 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Chapter II. On Acquired Moral Virtues And Their Properties

n. ¶64.

We divide this chapter into two articles: 1. on the existence and essence of acquired virtues; 2. on their properties.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Ch. II, Article II. On The Properties Of Acquired Virtues

n. ¶66.

The character of acquired virtues is manifested by four properties, namely: 1. that they consist in a mean; 2. that they are connected; 3. that they are unequal; 4. that they endure after this life. We shall treat each separately, at the same time touching in passing how the same properties belong also to infused virtues.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Ch. II, Art. II, § 1. On The Mean Of Virtues

n. 462.

462. Acquired moral virtue consists in a mean, whence the third Aristotelian definition cited above, n. 444, asserted: "Virtue is an elective habit consisting in a mean." The Holy Fathers often speak of this property, namely of the middle of virtue. Thus, for example, the author of the Commentary on Isaiah among the works of St. Basil¹⁷ says: "Virtue is mean and symmetry. But on either side, immoderation exceeding virtue and deficiency are inconcinnity and deformity. Thus fortitude is a mean, immoderation of the same is boldness, and deficiency is timidity. And so the beauty of the soul is symmetry according to virtue, but foulness is immoderation proceeding from malice." St. Gregory of Nyssa¹⁸ writes: "Virtue is the middle between two vices: namely between the defect of the honorable and exuberance." But St. Jerome¹⁹ says beautifully: "It is difficult to keep measure in all things. It is truly according to the opinion of the philosophers: 'Measure is virtue; too much is reckoned vice.'²⁰ We can express this in one brief sentence: Nothing too much."

St. Thomas²¹ proves this property of moral virtues in this way: Moral virtue is a good habit perfecting the appetitive part of man in some determinate matter. But the measure and rule of appetitive motion concerning appetible things is right reason itself; or in other words: Then the human appetite is good when it is commensurated with right reason. But a thing to be measured is good if it completely corresponds to the measure; but it is evil whether it does not reach the measure or exceeds the measure. Hence also the appetite to be measured and regulated by moral virtues will be good and virtuous if it is wholly conformed to right reason and neither exceeds nor falls short, but consists in the mean between excess and defect.

¹⁷ Cap. 5, n. 174 (Migne, Patr. graec. 30, 410).

¹⁸ Hom. 9 in Cant. (Migne, Patr. graec. 44, 971).

¹⁹ Ep. 108, n. 20 (Migne, Patr. lat. 22, 898).

²⁰ Μεσότης ἡ ἀρετή, ὑπερβολὴ κακία.

²¹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 64, a. 1.

n. 463.

463. Mean of reason and mean of the thing. Every moral virtue consists in the mean of reason; but the virtue of justice, besides the mean of reason, additionally requires the mean of the thing.²² The reason for this is that other virtues, such as chastity, sobriety, magnificence, etc., are occupied with internal passions, which cannot be measured physically and mechanically but only proportionally to the subject and the object. Hence, for example, the passion of anger which in such circumstances is moderate and virtuous, in other circumstances and especially in other men is immoderate and sinful. Therefore in any case reason in these virtues must determine what is moderate and what is immoderate, with attention given to the circumstances of person, place, time, etc. Wherefore, for example, one who, laboring under a grave typhoid fever, takes a great quantity of alcoholic liquor, indeed foreseeing the drunkenness that will follow from this, but intending only to recover health, does not wound the virtue of temperance, nor does he sin. The reason is that he takes the drink according to the right judgment of reason. - The matter is otherwise in justice, which is not directly occupied with passions but with exterior actions, namely of rendering to each what is his. This each one is bound to do without any respect to the diverse conditions of persons. Hence, for example, whoever has stolen 100 francs must also restore 100 francs. Hence in the virtue of justice not only the mean of reason is to be observed, but also the mean of the thing.

Billuart rightly observes:²³ "The mean in justice is not called the mean of the thing as if it were not the mean of reason. It [justice] indeed has from its specific account that it is the mean of the thing, but it has from the general account of virtue that it is also the mean of reason: both because nothing is more conformed to reason than to establish equality between right and debt, and because the act of justice, like the act of the other virtues, must be regulated by prudence and right reason, so that it be placed in due place and time, with right intention and other due circumstances; hence if someone, for example, paid a debt prematurely with detriment to himself or with a sinister intention, he would indeed satisfy the precept of restitution, but he would not exercise an act of justice, except only materially. It must be observed besides that in justice the mean or equality of the thing is twofold: one, namely, of quantity to quantity, which commutative justice makes, for instance by rendering twenty for twenty; the other, of proportion to proportion, which distributive justice makes, so that if to one having merit for four ten are given, then to another having merit for two five are given."

Note. The theological virtues of themselves and by reason of the object do not consist in a mean; hence we can never love God too much, or believe in him or hope in him too much. But per accidens,²⁴ especially by reason of ourselves, these virtues too necessarily consist in a mean, insofar as according to true prudence, that is, with time, mode, and other fitting circumstances observed, we must attend to acts of the theological virtues. Hence at an inopportune time, which ought, for example, to be spent on family matters, it is not licit to give oneself to the contemplation of divine truths.

²² Ib. 2, 2, q. 58, a. 10.

²³ De pass. et virt. a. 4, § 1.

²⁴ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 64, a. 4, and 2, 2, q. 17, a. 5 ad 2.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Ch. II, Art. II, § 2. On The Connection Of Virtues

n. 464.

464. All moral virtues are connected. Already St. Augustine, writing to St. Jerome, said: "That point concerning the inseparability of virtues ... pleased all philosophers.²⁵ Certainly from this they persuade: that he who has had one virtue has all, and that all are lacking to one to whom one has been lacking, because prudence cannot be cowardly, nor unjust, nor intemperate; for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Moreover, if prudence will then be, if it is also brave and just and temperate, certainly where it is, it has the others with it. So also fortitude cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust; so it is necessary that temperance be prudent, brave, and just; so justice does not exist unless it is prudent, brave, and temperate. Thus where any one of them is true, the others likewise are; but where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even if in some way it seems to be similar."²⁶ Other Holy Fathers speak in a similar way, such as St. Ambrose,²⁷ St. Gregory the Great,²⁸ who forcefully and most truly says: "One virtue without the others either is altogether nothing or is imperfect," and nearly all the Scholastics against Blessed Albert the Great²⁹ and the Scotists.³⁰ - Before this doctrine concerning the connection and concatenation of virtues is proved, it must be noted beforehand: here the matter concerns only acquired moral virtues, and those existing in a perfect state. For it is certain:

Intellectual virtues are not connected either among themselves or with the other virtues. For he who has one science or art does not therefore know all the others,³¹ nor does he have all moral virtues.
Theological virtues are not necessarily connected among themselves. For the Council of Trent³² defines: "If anyone says that grace once lost through sin, faith also is always lost together with it, or that the faith which remains is not true faith, ... let him be anathema." But faith and hope existing without charity are called unformed and imperfect virtues, but by divine mercy they are left to the sinner so that he himself can more easily be converted again to God.
All infused moral virtues are connected among themselves, because they are effects of sanctifying grace, together with which all are infused, and together with which, when it perishes, all perish.³³
Some dispositions, whether innate or acquired, toward this or that moral virtue can be present, although the other moral virtues do not exist perfectly in man.³⁴ Thus, for example, a man can be wholly given over to the vice of lust, and consequently lack the virtue of chastity altogether, who nevertheless is merciful toward the poor or just in selling and contracts. But those acts of mercy or justice do not proceed from the perfect virtue of charity or justice, but only from some more or less perfect disposition.
If one virtue is in man in a perfect way, it does not yet follow from this that all the others are also present in the same degree. Thus, for example, if a poor man through long exercise has acquired the virtue of meekness in the highest degree, it does not yet follow that he has in the same degree the virtue of liberality, which perhaps he has never been able to exercise on account of his poverty. Nevertheless he has that virtue "in disposition of soul," because when the case occurs and the possibility exists he is also greatly disposed to exercising that virtue.³⁵

With these things noted beforehand, let this be:

²⁵ Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. l. 6, c. ult.

²⁶ Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 735. In Ep. 167, however, St. Augustine seems to derive the connection of virtues rather from supernatural charity than from prudence.

²⁷ Expos. in Luc. l. 5, n. 63 (Migne, Patr. lat. 15, 138).

²⁸ Moral. l. 22, c. 1.

²⁹ 3 Sent., dist. 36, q. 1, a. 1.

³⁰ Cf. Billuart, De virtut. a. 4, § 2.

³¹ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 65, a. 1 ad 3.

³² Sess. 6, can. 28 de iustif. (Denz. n. 838).

³³ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 65, a. 3.

³⁴ Cf. ib. a. 1.

³⁵ Cf. ib. q. 66, a. 2.

n. 465.

465. Proposition: Acquired moral virtues are so connected that, if one is present in a perfect state, all the others are present; but if there is present a vice opposed to one moral virtue, then no other perfect moral virtue is in such a man.

It is proved. Neither perfect moral virtue without prudence, nor perfect prudence without the other moral virtues, exists in man. Therefore perfect moral virtues are necessarily connected with prudence, and consequently also among themselves; but all are destroyed if even one gravely vicious habit has destroyed one opposed virtue.

The individual points are explained: a) Perfect moral virtue is not given without prudence, for no moral virtue can exist unless it observes the mean, that is, unless it equally avoids excess and defect, as was said above. Hence moral virtue is also defined by Aristotle: an elective habit consisting in a mean. But to determine in what the mean consists belongs to prudence; wherefore Aristotle adds in the definition cited: "as the wise man, that is, the prudent man, will have determined." The same is clear by daily experience. For it not rarely happens that some man repeatedly exercises works objectively very virtuous, for example works of mortification, and nevertheless by no means acquires the corresponding virtue, chiefly because prudence is lacking in the exercise of such works.

b) Next, true and perfect prudence cannot exist in a man who is given over even to one vice directly opposed to some virtue. For although the virtue of prudence is not lost through one or another sinful act, for example a virtuous man who from a sudden temptation commits a grave sin against chastity does not thereby yet lose either prudence or the other acquired virtues; nevertheless he who by repeated acts has acquired a vicious habit, for example of lust, has also lost the virtue of prudence and all the other acquired virtues. For how can someone still be called truly prudent who again and again acts against reason? For a vicious habit is against right reason. - But if someone given over to some vice lacks the true virtue of prudence, how can he always and perfectly exercise acts of the other virtues, for example justice, fortitude, and temperance, when so many temptations and difficulties occur in the continual exercise of virtues? - We indeed concede that a man given over to vice can exercise one or another virtuous act, indeed even that he can have certain imperfect virtues; but it is impossible for such a man to have even one perfect virtue, since for any perfect virtue there are required perfect prudence and a firm will always and in every event to do those things which are right.

n. 466.

466. Corollary. From what has been said it follows that prudence and the other virtues depend on one another, but in a different way. Prudence depends on the other virtues as on a necessary disposition; or, the other virtues dispose most excellently for having and exercising prudence. Hence the Psalmist says: "I have understood above the ancients, because I have sought thy commandments."³⁶ On the contrary, vices very greatly cloud reason and render man like the horse and mule, which have no understanding.³⁷ Hence also we have seen from history that magnates, indeed even emperors, went to holy men for the sake of asking counsel even in earthly matters; for example, the duchess of Brabant consulted St. Thomas, and St. Antoninus was accustomed to give counsels with such great prudence that he was called "Antoninus of counsels." - But the other virtues depend on prudence as on a directing cause. For prudence sets before them suitable means for attaining their proper ends and guards lest they be corrupted either through excess or through defect. Wherefore prudence is completive of all moral virtues and their form.³⁸

³⁶ Ps. 118, 100.

³⁷ Cf. Ps. 31, 9.

³⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 166, a. 2 ad 1; 3, dist. 27, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 3.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Ch. II, Art. II, § 3. On The Inequality Of Virtues

n. ¶67.

Virtues are not equal, as the Stoics, Cicero, and Seneca wished.³⁹ The reason is that virtues are acquired habits, which can be increased or diminished and which, compared among themselves, are not of the same excellence. The whole doctrine concerning the inequality of virtues can be stated in the following propositions:

³⁹ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 66, a. 1.

n. 467.

467. 1. Virtues considered in themselves are unequal.

The reason is that one virtue has a nobler object than another. But the diverse virtues obtain this order among themselves:

The theological virtues and the other infused virtues obtain the highest degree, because they directly dispose man to the supernatural end. But simply the highest degree among all virtues is obtained by charity, of which St. Paul says: "And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."⁴⁰

After the infused virtues, the intellectual virtues obtain the second degree on the part of the object. For "that virtue is nobler which has a nobler object. But it is manifest that the object of reason is nobler than the object of the appetite.... Hence, speaking simply, intellectual virtues, which perfect reason, are nobler than moral virtues, which perfect the appetite." Thus St. Thomas,⁴¹ who nevertheless immediately adds: "But if virtue is considered in order to act, in this way moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose part it is to move the other powers to act, is nobler."

The moral virtues obtain the third degree, and especially the cardinal virtues, among which prudence obtains the first place, justice the second, fortitude the third, temperance the fourth. For prudence is the guide of all the virtues and perfects the intellect, which is a nobler faculty than the will and the sensitive appetite. But justice comes after prudence; this is clear both from its object and from its subject. The object or matter of justice is operations by which man is ordered not only in himself but also to another; and these operations are nobler than the restraints of passions, to which fortitude and temperance apply themselves. But the subject in which justice resides is the will, which certainly obtains the second place among the powers of the soul, namely after the intellect. After justice comes fortitude, which resides in the irascible appetite as in its subject and is occupied with fear in arduous things. Last comes temperance in the concupiscible appetite, which is occupied with restraining the lowest passions, namely concerning the appetite for foods and venereal things, which is common to man and brutes.⁴²

⁴⁰ 1 Cor. 13, 13; cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 6.

⁴¹ S. theol. l. c. a. 3.

⁴² Cf. ib. a. 4.

n. 468.

468. 2. Moral virtues in diverse men can be unequal.

The reason is that one man is better disposed to virtues than another, either a) because of greater habituation, or b) because of a better disposition of nature, or c) because of a more perspicacious judgment of reason, or d) because of a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of the giving of Christ," as St. Paul says.⁴³ From these things already said the error of the Lutherans teaching that all men are equally holy is refuted. Wherefore against them the Council of Trent defined that the just, in the very justice received through Christ, faith cooperating, grow through good works and are justified more.⁴⁴ For if inequality exists in supernatural habits, a similar inequality in natural acquired virtues is fitting.

⁴³ Eph. 4, 7; cf. S. theol. l. c.

⁴⁴ Sess. 6, c. 10 and can. 24 de iustif. (Denz. n. 803 and 834).

n. 469.

469. 3. Moral virtues in the same man can be unequal according to diverse times, that is, they can be increased or diminished.

For just as virtues are acquired by repeated acts and are increased through continual exercise, so also they are diminished or even totally removed through cessation from acts or through opposed vices. Against several authors St. Thomas⁴⁵ teaches that habits, and therefore also acquired virtues, are not increased by any acts whatsoever, even remiss ones, but only by intense acts. For just as a musician or painter who exercises his art remissly or negligently does not advance, but rather gradually declines, so also he who negligently performs acts of virtues, for example one who negligently says prayers, does not advance in virtues, but on the contrary gradually loses them.⁴⁶ That moral virtues in the same man can be diminished or even removed according to diverse times is clear by daily experience. This indeed happens either from cessation of acts or from repeated contrary acts. For if someone long ceases from acts of virtues, the impediments of acting grow step by step and contrary habits are induced; but if he often indulges contrary acts, a contrary vice gradually arises. Thus if someone who until now has been sparing in food and drink repeatedly commits excesses in eating and drinking, he will gradually contract the vices of gluttony and drunkenness.

⁴⁵ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 52, a. 3.

⁴⁶ Note. It is one thing to grow in acquired virtues, another to grow in merit. For all good acts, even remiss ones, if they are done in the state of sanctifying grace, merit an increase of grace and glory; but this merit proceeds rather from sanctifying grace than from the human act.

n. 470.

470. 4. Moral virtues, even at the same time, are not equal among themselves in the same man; for some are greater, but others lesser.

The reason is that these virtues are increased through continual exercise. Moreover, someone can exercise himself more in one virtue than in another. Besides, someone can, from his natural character itself, be more disposed to one virtue than to another; and finally God can give special graces for some special virtue and not others.⁴⁷ Hence also we see diverse saints to have excelled in diverse virtues, for example St. Francis in poverty, St. Dominic in apostolic zeal, etc.

⁴⁷ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 56, a. 2. Cf. above n. 464 c.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VI. On Virtues In Ge…, Ch. III, Article II. On the properties of infused virtues

n. ¶69.

Besides the four properties which are common to infused and acquired virtues,⁷⁸ three are enumerated which are special to infused virtues, namely: 1. infused virtues are intrinsically increased together with sanctifying grace; 2. they perish together with sanctifying grace (except the virtues of faith and hope); 3. they cannot directly be diminished.

⁷⁸ Cf. above n. 462.

n. 475.

475. 1. Infused virtues are intrinsically increased whenever sanctifying grace is increased.

It is established that sanctifying grace is increased: a) by the worthy reception of the sacraments and b) by any meritorious works de condigno. - That infused virtues truly can increase is manifestly clear from Sacred Scripture. St. Paul writes to the Romans: "May the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that you may abound in hope and in the power of the Holy Spirit";⁷⁹ to the Corinthians: "We have come even as far as you in the Gospel of Christ, ... having hope of your increasing faith";⁸⁰ to the Philippians: "This I pray, that your charity may abound more and more."⁸¹ Hence the Church itself prays: "Almighty everlasting God, give us an increase of faith, hope, and charity."⁸² For the rest, all theologians agree about the possibility and even about the fact of the increase of infused virtues; but they are by no means in agreement concerning the mode of that increase. Since, however, their disputes are almost of no utility and bring in no certainty, we omit them here.⁸³ If it is already most difficult to say how plants and other natural things grow, how much more difficult will it be to assign how infused virtues, which are supernatural things, are increased.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ Rom. 15, 13.

⁸⁰ 2 Cor. 10, 14 and 15.

⁸¹ Phil. 1, 9.

⁸² 13th Sunday after Pentecost.

⁸³ Cf. Billuart, De caritate diss. 2.

⁸⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 24, a. 4 ad 3, and art. 5 ad 3.

n. 476.

476. 2. All infused virtues are lost (except the virtues of faith and hope) through mortal sin.

Charity perishes through mortal sin, which destroys the very foundation of charity, namely sanctifying grace, concerning which the Council of Trent defined:⁸⁵ "It must be asserted that not only by infidelity, through which even faith itself is lost, but also by any other mortal sin, although faith is not lost, the grace of justification received is lost." But that, with sanctifying grace lost, the virtue of faith does not yet perish by that very fact, is certain by faith, as is clear from the same Council of Trent.⁸⁶ The same holds concerning hope, since the same reason is operative for each virtue.⁸⁷ Hence sinners can have true (although unformed) virtues of faith and hope, which God out of infinite mercy left in their hearts after sin had been committed. For those having faith and hope are converted to God much more easily than unbelievers, who either never had faith or lost it. Nevertheless that faith, because it is dead, by no means suffices for obtaining justification, as the Protestants wished. Hence St. Paul says: "And if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, but have not charity, I am nothing";⁸⁸ and St. James asserts: "What shall it profit, my brethren, if a man says that he has faith, but has not works? Shall faith be able to save him?"⁸⁹ Therefore St. Augustine says beautifully:⁹⁰ "Without charity, indeed, faith can exist, but it cannot also profit." The virtue of faith is lost through the sin of infidelity, as is clear from the Council of Trent cited above. But the reason is that through voluntary infidelity the formal object by which of faith is destroyed, as will be said more fully below, n. 494. Just as faith is lost by the sin of infidelity, so hope is lost by an act of despair. For the same reason obtains.

That infused moral virtues are lost from the loss of sanctifying grace is the common doctrine of theologians. For these virtues are as it were properties founded upon sanctifying grace. But if the foundation falls, it is necessary that also all things which are built upon it collapse.

⁸⁵ Sess. 6, c. 15 de iustif. (Denz. n. 808).

⁸⁶ Sess. 6, can. 28, cited above n. 464 b.

⁸⁷ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 71, a. 4. Hence the following proposition of Quesnel was condemned: "Everything is lacking to the sinner when hope is lacking to him; and there is no hope in God where there is no love of God" (Denz. n. 1407).

⁸⁸ 1 Cor. 13, 2.

⁸⁹ Jas. 2, 14.

⁹⁰ De trinit. lib. 15, c. 18, n. 32 (Migne, Patr. lat. 42, 1083).

n. 477.

477. 3. Infused virtues cannot directly be diminished.

Thus the most common opinion, to which almost Dionysius the Carthusian alone¹ seems to have contradicted. The reason is that such a diminution could not happen except either through venial sin or through cessation from acts of the virtues. For through mortal sin these virtues are not diminished, but taken away, as has been said. Moreover, infused virtues cannot be diminished a) through cessation from acts. For just as these virtues were not caused by human acts, but from divine infusion alone, so neither are they diminished through cessation from acts. Nor also b) through venial sins. For venial sin does not reach those virtues, because venial sin is only a certain disorder about the appetite of temporal good, without the intention of the ultimate end being injured thereby; but infused virtues are occupied about the supernatural ultimate end. - Moreover, if those virtues could be diminished by venial sins, then by many venial sins they would at length sometime be totally consumed, which is certainly false, since nothing except mortal sin can destroy infused virtues.²

Hence it follows that, if two men, e.g. having charity and infused virtues in degree 100, die, one of whom departs without venial sin, the other however with ten venial sins, both obtain the same degree of glory in heaven. Certainly he who passes from this world with ten venial sins must first go into purgatory, but afterward he will enjoy the same beatitude as the other existing without venial sin, because he has the same degree of charity.

Nevertheless in a certain indirect way infused virtues are diminished by venial sins, insofar as those sins heap up many and grave impediments, lest acts of virtues can easily be elicited. For from them arise disordered passions, which darken the intellect and weaken the will in the exercise of good works.³

Scholion. Concerning charity, insofar as it is the mother, queen, and form of all the virtues, and especially insofar as the whole state of perfection or religious state is founded upon perfect charity, discussion will occur below in the appendix on spiritual perfection.

¹ In Suarez, De gratia l. 11, c. 8, n. 6.

² Cf. De Rubeis, De caritate c. 31.

³ Cf. Muller, Theol. mor. I, § 119, and Chr. Pesch, Praecl. dogm. VIII, n. 93 sqq.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 74 passages

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Habits and Vi…, Second Part: On Habits Acc…, Question Four: On the Prop…, Article I: On the Mean of Virtue · Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Habits and Vi…, Second Part: On Habits Acc…, Question Four: On the Prop…, Article II: On the Connection of Virtues · Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Habits and Vi…, Second Part: On Habits Acc…, Question Four: On the Prop…, Article III: On the Equality of Virtues · Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Habits and Vi…, Second Part: On Habits Acc…, Question Four: On the Prop…, Article IV: On the Duration of Virtues

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Habits and Vi…, Second Part: On Habits Acc…, Question Four: On the Prop…, Article I: On the Mean of Virtue

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 1, 2, 3; De Virt. q. 1, a. 13.

600. The saying: "Moral virtue is in the mean":

Is not to be understood of a mean according to essence and by reason of habit, as if it signified that virtue is essentially between two extreme vices, one of which is opposed to it by excess, the other by defect: for this is false concerning the virtue of justice, to which injustice alone is opposed. Besides, by the same sin one sins simultaneously by excess and by defect, for he who gives less than he ought to one gives more than he can to another or to himself; and if someone gives more than he ought to another, he is already not just but liberal.

But it is to be understood causally, of the mean according to effect and by reason of the object, and it signifies that virtue has for its object a mean between excess (more) and defect (less) in its proper matter: for it brings it about that our appetite chooses operations or passions neither more nor less, but precisely in that measure which right reason dictates. Thus for temperance, excess in the matter consists in using delights more than one ought, defect in not using them when one ought, and the mean which is the object of temperance is to use delights as, when, in what way... one ought.

It is proved: The good of moral virtue is in adequation or conformity to the rule, that is, to right reason, without discord from it. But adequation is a mean between excess, by which something surpasses the measure, and defect, by which it falls short of it or does not attain it. Therefore the good of moral virtue is in a mean.

But if virtue is called the ultimate of a power, which indicates the highest, not a mean; - this is to be understood according to the perfection of the act, for thus virtue is at the summit of perfection; but not according to the quantity of the matter, because thus virtue is in a mean.

But the sense is not of a mean by reason of the subject and according to the mere measure of our weak condition, namely, that virtue is to be exercised moderately in such a way that man cannot tend to something greatest; - for the greatest is sometimes conformable to reason, as is clear concerning fortitude, magnanimity, virginity, etc.; and yet in this case virtue is still in a mean, because excess is to tend toward that greatest thing when one ought not.

n. 601.

601. The mean of virtue is the mean of reason, because it is conformity to the measure of right reason, which measure it does not exceed and from which it does not depart: but between excess and defect, adequation to the measure holds the mean. Hence it is defined: the property of virtue by which it is so concerned with its matter that it guards against excess and defect. Reason establishes that mean, dictates it, and imposes it on the moral virtues through prudence; whence St. Thomas says that "that mean belongs to prudence as regulating and measuring, to moral virtue as measured and regulated" (a. 3); therefore prudence is in the mean because it itself is the measure of moral virtue.

n. 602.

602. The mean of reason is sometimes the mean of the thing, namely in justice, insofar as reason dictates to justice to pay what is owed according to equality, or to give a thing equal to the person of another or to the thing (whether arithmetically or proportionally), neither more nor less.

n. 602.

For reason determines the mean of a virtue in its proper matter. But justice is concerned with operations which consist in exterior things without respect to the diverse conditions of the one operating. Therefore the mean of justice consists in a thing determined according to itself, without respect to the one operating, insofar namely as it gives to each what he is owed, neither more nor less. And thus the mean of reason is the mean of the thing.

n. 602.

But in the other moral virtues, which are concerned with interior passions, the mean of reason is taken by comparison to us, whence it varies according to persons, qualities, circumstances, and diverse relations to passions. Thus excess in drink for one man is not excess for another.

n. 603.

603. Observations. - 1. The intellectual virtues also are in the mean of the thing. The good of the intellect is truth, which depends on things, which are the measure of our intellect. "Therefore in this way the good of intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean through conformity to the thing itself, according as it says that what is, is, or that what is not, is not; in which the account of the true consists. Excess is according to a false affirmation by which it is said that what is not, is; but defect is taken according to a false negation by which it is said that what is, is not" (a. 3).

n. 603.

Furthermore, practical intellectual virtues have the account of a rule as to our works, and thus they are in the mean of reason like the rule itself which imposes the mean. Thus prudence imposes the mean on moral acts and virtues, and art on artifacts.

n. 603.

Certain theologians say that the virtues of Religion and Penance are not in the mean; but this is false: for although under one respect there cannot be excess in their matter, insofar as worship rendered to God and satisfaction for sins cannot be excessive in quantity, nevertheless under other respects - quality, mode, time, etc. - there is excess in their matter.

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Habits and Vi…, Second Part: On Habits Acc…, Question Four: On the Prop…, Article II: On the Connection of Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 1; De Virt. q. 5, a. 2.

n. 604.

604. Principle I. Imperfect moral virtues are not connected. - For inchoations of moral virtues, which dispose us to choosing this or that in certain circumstances, whether they inhere in us from nature on account of the disposition of the body, or come from custom, are not connected, as is clear from experience: for someone can be prompt toward liberality who is not prompt toward chastity. But those inclinations are sometimes called imperfect virtues; nevertheless they are not true and properly so called virtues, because they do not render one perfect.

605. Principle II. Perfect moral virtues are connected, which incline us to doing a good work constantly and in all circumstances, notwithstanding any difficulties whatever. Thus according to the mind of Saints Augustine1 and Thomas, against Scotus. For:

a) Moral virtue, which is a habit making choice good, cannot exist without prudence, because for choosing rightly the intention of the due end, to which moral virtue disposes, is not sufficient; but good counsel, judgment, and command concerning good means to the end are also required, to which prudence disposes: for to do evil on account of a good end is morally evil; whence perfect prudence is required for always acting rightly.

b) Prudence cannot exist without moral virtues; for:

For ordering means honorably there is required the intention of some good end, to which moral virtue disposes: for to order good means to an evil end is morally evil; and the ordering of means will not always and in all circumstances be honorable unless in all circumstances there is had the intention of the due end, to which we are not disposed except through all the perfect moral virtues.

Each one ordinarily judges according as he is affected; therefore moral virtues are necessary so that man may always judge well and in every case.¹

¹ To the matter Lessius, de Prudentia, c. 1, dub. 4, from Aristotle, VI Eth., c. 5 and 13: "It belongs to prudence to apprehend what is honorable in individual actions, or to judge it as fitting here and now. But moral virtue existing in the will (or appetite) brings it about that what is honorable seems fitting to the intellect and to be accepted here and now. Each one ordinarily judges according as he is affected: for the angry man apprehends vengeance by the intellect as fitting, and the intemperate man pleasure, the avaricious man having an abundance of money; but they do not apprehend keeping the mode of reason in these things as fitting to themselves here and now, but at most as fitting in general, or for some time and state of things... Therefore moral virtues lying hidden in the will (or appetite) bring it about that the intellect judges the honorable good in actions to be fitting to be done here and now; and they furnish this partly because they compress the passions which disturb reason in the consideration of the honorable and display the delectable good, partly because they so dispose the subject that the honorable work is as congruous to him as drink to one thirsting, food to one hungry... For that agreement which is between object and affection is the cause on the part of the object that it be apprehended by way of something fitting; just as, on the contrary, dissonance is the cause why the intellect apprehends it as disagreeable."

c) This, moreover, is clear from experience, for a judge well affected toward justice but desirous of money, when money is offered, will judge unjustly; and a chaste but timid woman, through fear of some evil, will consent to fornication; and many strong, liberal, devout persons, through defect of prudence, badly choose means to the end of virtue.²

² He writes in the epistle to St. Jerome: "That point concerning the inseparability of virtues... pleased all the philosophers (for example, Aristotle, Eth., l. VI, last chapter)... Certainly from this they persuade, that whoever has one virtue has all, and that all are lacking to him to whom one is lacking, because prudence can be neither cowardly, nor unjust, nor intemperate; for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Moreover if prudence will then exist, if it is also strong and just and temperate, certainly wherever it is, it has the others with it. So also fortitude cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust; so it is necessary that temperance be prudent, strong, and just; so justice is not, unless it is prudent, strong, temperate. Thus where any one of them is true, the others similarly are; but where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even if in some way it seems to be similar." P. L. XXXIII, 735.

Hence prudence and the moral virtues mutually include one another, and consequently all the virtues are connected through prudence. Prudence is of the essence of the definition of moral virtue, and moral virtue is of the definition of prudence insofar as prudence must be toward a good end.

Hence every man, in order to be perfectly virtuous, must be exercised concerning all the matters of the moral virtues which perfect man according to the common state and as to those things which commonly occur to be done in every human life; but the virtues which perfect man according to some eminent state (magnanimity, magnificence, liberality, virginity), not every virtuous man has in act, but he has them in proximate potency and in preparation of soul, so that they may be acquired by moderate exercise (a. 1, ad 1).

n. 606.

606. Observation. - Merely intellectual virtues are not all connected among themselves nor with the moral virtues, because they are concerned with diverse matters not ordered to one another, as is clear from the diverse sciences and arts; nevertheless all depend on the understanding of principles, but this, in turn, does not depend on the others.

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Habits and Vi…, Second Part: On Habits Acc…, Question Four: On the Prop…, Article III: On the Equality of Virtues

St. Thomas, q. 66, a. 1-5; De Virt. q. 5, a. 3.

n. 607.

607. Equality of virtues can be understood in three ways: 1. equality according to species; 2. equality in the same species of virtue according to itself, as to those things to which it extends itself or according to its extension to diverse objects; 3. equality in the same species according to grade and intensity, or according to participation of the virtue in the subject.

608. Principle I. According to species virtues are not equal, but some are more perfect than others according as they have nobler objects.

A. Comparing intellectual and moral virtues:

Speculative intellectual virtues, because their object is universal, therefore as habits (or entities) are simply nobler according to object or species than moral virtues, whose object is a particular good; moreover, among the intellectual virtues wisdom is eminent, whose object, the highest cause, is nobler than all. Whence wisdom judges concerning all the intellectual virtues and orders them, and therefore is called architectonic.

But moral virtues and prudence are nobler in a qualified sense (under one respect, namely, in order to act), insofar as they dispose more to operating: for they not only give aptitude for operating well, but also dispose to using their aptitude well. Whence as virtues they are more perfect.

B. Among the cardinal virtues: 1. prudence is more perfect, which is in reason, and therefore has as object the good of reason itself by essence, while the others are concerned with the good of reason participated in others; - 2. then justice: a) because it is in the will, which is a power nearer to reason and therefore participates in reason more; and b) because it not only orders man well in himself but also toward another; - 3. fortitude is preferred to temperance because the good of reason shines forth more in it, since its motive is not the delectable per se; furthermore fortitude subjects the sensitive appetite to reason concerning that which is greatest in man, namely, concerning life and death itself; - while 4. temperance is concerned with those things which immediately serve life.¹

¹ Thus speaking simply; for in a qualified sense one can be greater. Humility, namely, in removing that which prevents, namely pride, which lies in wait for good works; obedience, not on the part of the object, but on the part of him for whom one renounces; fortitude, because it defends and fights for the common good whose equality justice makes: it is a support of justice; liberality, insofar as it intends the supplement and splendor of justice: thus it is the ornament of justice and in some sense greater, but simply it is lesser because it is ordered under the principal virtue of justice.

C. Comparing the special moral virtues, after prudence there are eminent religion and penance, which approach nearer to God.

n. 609.

609. Principle II. According to extension, prudence and perfect moral virtues, as being connected, are equal, because they cannot be increased extensively, since they dispose to doing good in all circumstances; therefore in all men, and in the same man even at diverse times, they are equal according to extension (a. 1). - The contrary must be said of the inchoations of virtues, and of intellectual virtues, because they are not connected.

n. 610.

610. Principle III. According to intensity, perfect moral virtues, because they are connected, are equal in the same man at the same time; whence if one is increased, all are proportionally increased, just as the fingers of the hand are unequal according to quantity, but are equal according to proportion when they are increased proportionally. This is to be understood a) on the part of prudence and according to the formal element of virtue, which is the ordination of reason to good: for through prudence they adhere equally to the good of reason or to the mean, which is constituted equally well for all by one and the same prudence. "With reason existing as equally perfect in one and the same man, it is necessary that the mean be constituted proportionally according to right reason in any matter of virtues"; whence they are conformed equally to reason. Nevertheless b) they are not always increased according to the material element, that is, according to the inclination and proneness of the subject to the acts proper to it, for man can be more prompt toward certain virtues, whether from the disposition of the body, or from custom, or from the gift of grace (a. 2).

n. 610.

But they can be unequal according to intensity in diverse men and in the same man at diverse times: for thus they are not connected. "But if virtue is considered on the part of the subject participating, thus it happens that virtue is greater or lesser, whether according to diverse times in the same man, or in diverse men; because for attaining the mean of virtue, which is according to right reason, one is better disposed than another, either on account of greater habituation, or on account of a better disposition of nature, or on account of a more perspicacious judgment of reason, or also on account of a greater gift of grace" (a. 1).

n. 611.

611. Observation. - Merely intellectual virtues, because they are not connected, are not equal according to extension or intensity.

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Habits and Vi…, Second Part: On Habits Acc…, Question Four: On the Prop…, Article IV: On the Duration of Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 67, art. 1-2; De Virt., q. 5, a. 4.

n. 612.

612. Principle. In the blessed there remain those virtues which include no imperfection repugnant to their state. - Whence moral virtues remain, not indeed:

n. 612.

a) as to the material element or inclination to their acts, for in the future life there will not be exchanges and distributions of things, nor dangers of death, nor delights of foods and sexual matters, etc.; - but

…and 34 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Billuart, Summa Summae

Charles-René Billuart, O.P. — 27 passages

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On the Passions and the Vi…, On the Virtues, On the properties of the virtues

[Four properties of virtues St. Thomas enumerates in prooemium of question 64. First, that they consist in mean; second, that they be interconnected among themselves; third, that they be unequal; fourth, that they endure after this life.]

§ I. — Whether virtue consists in mean?

[I say 1° : Moral virtue consists in mean ¹. Whence it is defined by Aristotle, II Ethic., c. 6 : « Habit choosing existing in mean » ². ¹ Here q. 64, a. 1, c. ² Ibid.

Pt. I, Ch. V, Section II. Of Virtues in General · Pt. I, Ch. V, Sect. III, Intellectual and Moral · Pt. I, Ch. V, Section IV. Of the Mean in Moral Virtue

It is proved. Moral virtue properly is perfective of appetitive part of soul concerning some determinate matter; but measure and rule of appetitive motion concerning appetibles is reason itself. But good of anything measured and ruled consists in this that it conform itself to its rule, neither exceeding it nor failing from it, as good in artificial things is to be conformable to rules of art : Therefore good of moral virtue consists in adaequation to measure of reason, not exceeding it, nor failing from it : which is to consist in mean.

n. 5.

I say 2° : Every moral virtue consists in mean of reason. It follows from preceding; for mean of reason is said what is constituted by reason in some matter. But, as we were just saying, moral virtue consists in mean through conformity toward right reason. Therefore ³. ³ Ibid., a. 2, c.

n. 6.

It happens however that the mean, justice excepted, varies. In justice indeed is mean of thing, which is fixed, because compared to things themselves absolutely : E.g., if you owe one hundred, this, neither more nor less, you must repay. Other moral virtues however are concerned about interior passions, in which mean is not same for all, but diverse according to quality of persons : E.g. in temperance, what is mean for one is too little or too much for another. Moreover it must be observed, that even in justice mean depends on reason. Indeed it has from its specific reason that it be mean of thing, but has from general reason of virtue that it be also mean for reason; because nothing is more conformable to reason than constituting equality between right and debt.]

n. 7.

I say 3° : Intellectual virtues also consist in mean ¹. Reason is because true, which is their object, mediates between excess and defect : for indeed truth is injured by affirming either more than thing has, or less than it has, or denying what it has. There is nevertheless disparity, that mean of speculative intellectual virtues be mean of thing, namely conformity to thing, independently from determination of reason; but mean of practical intellectual virtues, as prudence, be mean of reason, as depending upon determining reason. ¹ Ibid., a. 3, c.

n. 8.

I say 4° : Theological virtues per se and by reason of object do not consist in mean, but well accidentally and by reason of subject ². Reason of first part, because we cannot transcend rule of these virtues; for God himself is, who is infinite truth, goodness and power. Whence, attention given to reason of object, we cannot love God too much, or believe and hope in him too much. Attention however given to reason of subject, or as far as concerns our part, we ought to be borne toward God according to measure of our condition, not with excessive effort whereby body be injured, not at unseasonable time which must needs be bestowed on others, as if someone give himself unto contemplation when he ought to attend affairs of family.] ² Ibid., a. 4, c.

n. 9.

§ II. — Whether all moral virtues are interconnected among themselves?

n. 10.

[Certain it is 1° all intellectual virtues not to be interconnected; for who has one science has not all sciences. Certain it is 2° all theological virtues not to be interconnected; for charity lost through sin, faith and hope can remain. Whence council Trident., sess. VI, can. 28, defined : « If anyone shall say, grace lost through sin, that faith is always lost together with it, or that faith which remains is not true faith...; let him be anathema. » Certain it is 3° all infused moral virtues to be interconnected, because they are properties of grace with which they are infused, and with which perishing they perish.

n. 11.

Virtue can moreover be considered twice over, in perfect state and in imperfect state ¹. Imperfect virtue is that which does not attain essential reason of habit, but is some disposition or inclination toward some good, arisen either from temperament or from custom of certain acts of imperfect virtue; or, if it attain essential reason of habit, has nevertheless mode of disposition, inasmuch as it inheres not firmly enough in subject, nor subjects it constantly amid all occurring impediments. That virtues imperfect in either way are not interconnected, we confess spontaneously. For we see some, from natural complexion, which is called good disposition, or from some custom, prompt, e.g., unto works of liberality, who are not prompt unto works of chastity : and elsewhere essence of virtue is absolute, not relative, and thus for essence of one another is not necessarily required. Perfect virtue is, not only when it is in heroic degree, but also when it so firmly actuates and perfects subject, that it incline it unto good work well and constantly done promptly and easily in every event and notwithstanding obstacles and difficulties occurring from everywhere.] ¹ Here q. 65, a. 1, c.

n. 12.

I say : Acquired moral virtues in perfect state are so interconnected among themselves, that whoever lacks one, perfectly possesses none ². It is common with St. Thomas, against the Scotists. ² Ibid.

n. 13.

It is proved. 1° From Fathers ³. St. Ambrosius, book VI on Luke, upon those words : Beati pauperes spiritu, says: « Interconnected and chained together are virtues, so that he who has one seems to have several. » St. Augustinus, book VI de Trinit., c. 4, n. 6 : « Virtues which are in human mind, although each single one be understood now in one way now in another, are nevertheless by no mode separated from each other, so that whosoever be equals, for example, in fortitude, be equal also in prudence, and temperance, and justice. For if you say these are equal in fortitude, but that one excels in prudence : it follows that fortitude of this one be less prudent, and thereby neither are they equal in fortitude, when fortitude of that one is more prudent. And thus about remaining virtues you will find, if you run through all with same consideration. » St. Gregorius, book XXII Moral., c. 1 : « One virtue without others is either altogether none, or imperfect..., because neither is prudence true which is not just, temperate and strong; nor temperance perfect which is not strong, just and prudent. » And Tullius himself said in book II de Tuscul. quaest. : « If you confess yourself not to have one virtue, it is necessary you will have none. » ³ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

n. 14.

Prob. 2° by reason ¹. Perfect virtue is not without perfect prudence. But perfect prudence is not without company of other virtues. Therefore. — Major is certain, because prudence, as regards elections, is rule of moral virtue : whence virtue is defined, « habit choosing as prudent man will have determined. » And clear, because unto right election inclination toward due end does not suffice, which is had through virtue, but also required that one rightly choose those things which are toward end; which is had through prudence, which is counseling, judging and prescribing those things which are toward end. Thence so often we see those who seem powerful with some virtue, suppose strong ones, magnanimous ones, liberal ones, penitents, devout ones, etc., through defect of prudence choose means badly in ordine to end of virtue. — Minor therefore is proved. Prudence is not perfect, if appetite be not perfectly rectified concerning particular ends and matters of all virtues. But rectitude of appetite concerning ends and matters of virtues is had through virtues themselves; for proper to each virtue is to rectify appetite concerning its own end and matter : e.g., it belongs to justice to rectify will concerning what is due to another; to temperance, to rectify appetite concerning delectables of touch; to fortitude, concerning audacities and fears. Therefore. — Major is proved. Prudence is right reason of things doable or elections of means. But there cannot be perfect and right reason of things doable, unless appetite be rightly affected concerning ends; for things doable or eligible hang upon right intention of ends, as conclusions in speculables hang upon principles. Therefore, as reason cannot rightly stand concerning conclusions unless it rightly stand concerning principles, so in practicables same reason cannot stand rightly concerning things doable or eligible, unless appetite rightly stands concerning ends; which rectitude, as was said, is had through virtues themselves. ¹ Ibid., c.

n. 15.

Thence you have that prudence and virtues hang upon each other in diverse genus of cause. Prudence hangs on remaining virtues in genus of disposive cause, because judgment of prudence cannot be perfect, unless affection be well disposed concerning ends and matters of all virtues, which rectitude is had through virtues themselves, as was said. Remaining virtues however hang on prudence in genus of directive and intrinsic formal cause, because prudence directs election of means unto end, cutting off extremes whereby its judgment could be corrupted and mean of virtue impeded, which extremes wander through all genera of virtues.]

n. 16.

§ III. — Whether acquired moral virtues are necessarily connected with charity?

n. 17.

[Not here question of infused moral virtues, which are known to be inseparable from charity, as properties of sanctifying grace : nor of theological virtues; for faith and hope, according to Trident., sess. VI, cap. 6, precede charity in justification, and can. 28 of council strikes with anathema those who say that, « grace lost through sin, faith is always lost together with it, or that faith which remains is not true faith. » Dealt therefore now only with acquired moral virtues. For whose resolution,

n. 18.

I say : True acquired moral virtues can exist without charity, as they were in many gentiles, but imperfect ¹. ¹ Ibid., a. 2, c, et q. 71, a. 4, c.

n. 19.

First part is proved. Acquired moral virtue separated from charity has whatsoever pertains to essence of true virtue. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. If something essential were lacking to virtue separated from charity, this would be order toward supernatural ultimate end. But order toward supernatural ultimate end is not something essential of acquired moral virtue : both because, as Angelicus says, IIa IIae, q. 47, a. 6, c, « end of moral virtues is human good, but human good of soul is to be according to reason : whence it must needs be that ends of moral virtues pre-exist in reason; » and because order toward supernatural end cannot be of essence of entitatively natural habit, such as acquired virtue is. Therefore.

n. 20.

It is confirmed. 1° Charity is not intrinsic and essential form of other virtues, otherwise all virtues would be of same species, but extrinsic only and accidental form, inasmuch as through her they are referred unto supernatural end, whereby as it were ornament they are formed in supernatural order. Therefore independently from charity they are true virtues. 2° Faith, according to definition of Trident., remains true virtue without charity. Why not acquired moral virtues?

n. 21.

Second part is proved. Perfect virtue is not without perfect prudence. But prudence, even acquired, is not totally destroyed through sin, but corrupted only in part, inasmuch as appetite is ill affected concerning end of some virtue against whom namely one sins. Therefore.

n. 22.

It is confirmed. Perfect virtue makes possessor simply good. Such however cannot sinner be called.

n. 23.

Thence you will infer that acquired moral virtues, although without charity they retain essence of virtue, are nevertheless not to be called virtues simply, but secundum quid; because they do not well order man respect simply ultimate end, but only respect ultimate end in some genus, and thus render man not absolutely and simply good. Whence virtues in gentiles are not to be called virtues simply, but according to essential reason of virtue. And perhaps opposite opinion pretends nothing else : whence question seems quasi nominal.]

n. 24.

§ IV. — On equality and duration of virtues.

n. 25.

[I say 1° : Intellectual virtues, speaking simply, are nobler than morals : both because they perfect nobler power, namely intellect; both because they have nobler object, namely things abstracted in common from matter ¹. Among moral virtues, prudence is nobler, because nearer to reason, in it indeed subjected; then justice, which resides in will; follows fortitude, lastly temperance, because good of reason shines more forth in fortitude than in temperance : fortitude indeed perfects appetite in those things which pertain immediately unto life and death, temperance in those which pertain mediately only unto both, namely foods and venereals. Greater however is good of reason in things pertaining unto life, whereon other things in man depend, than in foods and venereals. ¹ Here q. 66

n. 26.

I say 2° : Moral virtues do not remain after this life as regards their material element ; because there will no longer be place for delectation of foods and venereals, nor dangers of life, nor exchanges and distributions necessary unto use of this life; which all are matter about which moral virtues turn. They will remain nevertheless as regards formal element in fatherland, because appetite rectified and conformable to reason will remain ². ² Here q. 67

n. 27.

And let these few things concerning passions and virtues suffice for our institute. Who wishes to know more, let him read what St. Thomas treats more fully concerning these in cited places, likewise concerning seven gifts of Holy Spirit, eight beatitudes and twelve fruits of Holy Spirit, up to quest. 71.]

Rickaby, Moral Philosophy

Joseph Rickaby, S.J. — 17 passages

Pt. I, Ch. V, Section II. Of Virtues in General

Virtue in its most transcendental sense means the excellence of a thing according to its kind. Thus it is the virtue of the eye to see, and of a horse to be fleet of foot. Vice is a flaw in the make of a thing, going to render it useless for the purpose to which it was ordained. From the ethical standpoint, virtue is a habit that a man has got of doing moral good, or doing that which it befits his rational nature to do: and vice is a habit of doing moral evil. (See c. i., n. 5.) It is important to observe that virtue and vice are not acts but habits. Vices do not make a man guilty, nor do virtues make him innocent. A man is guilty or innocent according to his acts, not according to his habits. A man may do a wicked thing and not be vicious, or a good action and not be virtuous. But no man is vicious who has not done one, two, aye, many wicked things: and to be virtuous, a man must have performed many acts of virtue. Children do right and wrong, but they have neither virtues nor vices except in a nascent state: there has not yet been time in them for the habits to be formed. When sin is taken away by God and pardoned, the vice, that is, the evil habit, if any such existed before, still remains, and constitutes a danger for the future. The habit can only be overcome by watchfulness and a long continuance of contrary acts. But vice is not sin, nor is sin vice, nor a good deed a virtue.

The name of virtue is given to certain habits residing in the intellect, as intuition or insight (into self-evident truths), wisdom (regarding conclusions of main application), science (of conclusions in special departments), and art. These are called intellectual virtues.

It was a peculiarity of Socrates' teaching, largely shared by Plato, to make all virtue intellectual, a doctrine expressed in the formula, Virtue is knowledge; which is tantamount to this other, Vice is ignorance, or an erroneous view. From whence the conclusion is inevitable: No evil deed is wilfully done; and therefore, No man is to blame for being wicked.

Undoubtedly there is a certain element of ignorance in all vice, and a certain absence of will about every vicious act. There is likewise an intellectual side to all virtue. These positions we willingly concede to the Socratics. Every morally evil act is borne of some voluntary inconsiderateness. The agent is looking the wrong way in the instant at which he does wrong. Either he is regarding only the solicitations of his inferior nature to the neglect of the superior, or he is considering some rational good indeed, but a rational good which, if he would look steadily upon it, he would perceive to be unbefitting for him to choose. No man can do evil in the very instant in which his understanding is considering, above all things else, that which it behoves him specially to consider in the case. Again, in every wrong act, it is not the sheer evil that is willed, but the good through or with the evil. Good, real or supposed, is sought for: evil is accepted as leading to good in the way of means, or annexed thereto as a circumstance. Moreover, no act is virtuous that is elicited quite mechanically, or at the blind instance of passion. To be virtuous, the thing must be done on principle, that is, at the dictate of reason and by the light of intellect.

Still, virtue is not knowledge. There are other than intellectual habits needed to complete the character of a virtuous man. "I see the better course and approve it, and follow the worse," said the Roman poet.³ "The evil which I will not, that I do," said the Apostle. It is not enough to have an intellectual discernment of and preference for what is right: but the will must be habituated to embrace it, and the passions too must be habituated to submit and square themselves to right being done. In other words, a virtuous man is made up by the union of enlightened intellect with the moral virtues. The addition is necessary for several reasons.

(a) Ordinarily, the intellect does not necessitate the will. The will, then, needs to be clamped and set by habit to choose the right thing as the intellect proposes it.

(b) Intellect, or Reason, is not absolute in the human constitution. As Aristotle (Pol., I., v., 6) says: "The soul rules the body with a despotic command: but reason rules appetite with a command constitutional and kingly": that is to say, as Aristotle elsewhere (Eth., I., xiii., 15, 16) explains, passion often "fights and resists reason, opposes and contradicts": it has therefore to be bound by ordinances and institutions to follow reason's lead: these institutions are good habits, moral virtues, resident there where passion itself is resident, in the inferior appetite. It is not enough that the rider is competent, but the horse too must be broken in.

(c) It is a saying, that "no mortal is always wise." There are times when reason's utterance is faint from weariness and vexation. Then, unless a man has acquired an almost mechanical habit of obeying reason in the conduct of his will and passions, he will in such a conjuncture act inconsiderately and do wrong. That habit is moral virtue. Moral virtue is as the fly-wheel of an engine, a reservoir of force to carry the machine past the "dead points" in its working. Or again, moral virtue is as discipline to troops suddenly attacked, or hard pressed in the fight. ³ Video meliora proboque,/Deteriora sequor. (Ovid, Metamorph., vii., 21.)

n. 5.

Therefore, besides the habits in the intellect that bear the name of intellectual virtues, the virtuous man must possess other habits, as well in the will, that this power may readily embrace what the understanding points out to be good, as in the sensitive appetite in both its parts, concupiscible and irascible, so far forth as appetite is amenable to the control of the will, that it may be so controlled and promptly obey the better guidance. These habits in the will and in the sensitive appetite are called moral virtues, and to them the name of virtue is usually confined.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 71, art. 1, in corp.; ib., q. 58, art. 2; ib., q. 58, art. 3, in corp., ad 3; ib., q. 56, art. 4, in corp., ad 1-3.

Pt. I, Ch. V, Sect. III, Intellectual and Moral

St. Thomas (1a 2æ, q. 56, art. 3, in corp.)⁴ draws this difference, that an intellectual virtue gives one a facility in doing a good act; but a moral virtue not only gives facility, but makes one put the facility in use. Thus a habit of grammar he says, enables one readily to speak correctly, but does not ensure that one always shall speak correctly, for a grammarian may make solecisms on purpose: whereas a habit of justice not only makes a man prompt and ready to do just deeds, but makes him actually do them. Not that any habit necessitates volition. Habits do not necessitate, but they facilitate the act of the will. (s. i., nn. 1, 2, 8, pp. 64, 68.)

⁴ By doing good St. Thomas means the determination of the appetite, rational or sensitive, to good. He says that intellectual virtue does not prompt this determination of the appetite. Of course it does not: it prompts only the act of the power wherein it resides: now it resides in the intellect, not in the appetite; and it prompts the act of the intellect, which however is cot always followed by an act of appetite in accordance with it.

Another distinction may be gathered from St. Thomas (1a 2æ, q. 21, art. 2, ad 2), that the special intellectual habit called art disposes a man to act correctly towards some particular end, but a moral habit towards the common end, scope and purpose of all human life. Thus medical skill ministers to the particular end of healing: while the moral habit of temperance serves the general end, which is final happiness and perfection. So to give a wrong prescription through sheer antecedent ignorance, is to fail as a doctor: but to get drunk wittingly and knowingly is to fail as a man.

The grand distinction between intellectual and moral habits seems to be this, that moral habits reside in powers which may act against the dictate of the understanding,—the error of Socrates, noticed above (c. v., s. ii., n. 2, p. 70), lay in supposing that they could not so act: whereas the power which is the seat of the intellectual habits, the understanding, cannot possibly act against itself. Habits dispose the subject to elicit acts of the power wherein they reside. Moral habits induce acts of will and sensitive appetite: intellectual habits, acts of intellect. Will and appetite may act against what the agent knows to be best: but intellect cannot contradict intellect. It cannot judge that to be true and beautiful which it knows to be false and foul. If a musician strikes discords on purpose, or a grammarian makes solecisms wilfully, he is not therein contradicting the intellectual habit within him, for it is the office of such a habit to aid the intellect to judge correctly, and the intellect here does correctly judge the effect produced. On the other hand, if the musician or grammarian blunders, the intellect within him has not been contradicted, seeing that he knew no better: the habit of grammar or music has not been violated, but has failed to cover the case. Therefore the intellectual habit is not a safeguard to keep a man from going against his intelligent self. No such safeguard is needed: the thing is impossible, in the region of pure intellect. In a region where no temptation could enter, intellectual habits would suffice alone of themselves to make a perfectly virtuous man. To avoid evil and choose good, it would be enough to know the one and the other. But in this world seductive reasonings sway the will, and fits of passion the sensitive appetite, prompting the one and the other to rise up and break away from what the intellect knows all along to be the true good of man. Unless moral virtue be there to hold these powers to their allegiance, they will frequently disobey the understanding. Such disobedience is more irrational than any mere intellectual error. In an error purely intellectual, where the will has no part, the objective truth indeed is missed, but the intelligence that dwells within the man is not flouted and gain-sayed. It takes two to make a contradiction as to make a quarrel. But an intellectual error has only one side. The intellect utters some false pronouncement, and there is nothing within the man that says otherwise. In the moral error there is a contradiction within, an intestine quarrel. The intellect pronounces a thing not good, not to be taken, and the sensitive appetite will throw a veil over the face of intellect, and seize upon the thing. That amounts to a contradiction of a man's own intelligent self.

It appears that, absolutely speaking, intellectual virtue is the greater perfection of a man: indeed in the act of that virtue, as we have seen, his crowning perfection and happiness lies. But moral virtue is the greater safeguard. The breach of moral virtue is the direr evil. Sin is worse than ignorance, and more against reason, because it is against the doer's own reason. Moral virtue then is more necessary than intellectual in a world where evil is rife, as it is a more vital thing to escape grievous disease than to attain the highest development of strength and beauty. And as disease spoils strength and beauty, not indeed always taking them away, but rendering them valueless, so evil moral habits subvert intellectual virtue, and turn it aside in a wrong direction. The vicious will keeps the intellect from contemplating the objects which are the best good of man: so the contemplation is thrown away on inferior things, often on base things, and an overgrowth of folly ensues on those points whereupon it most imports a man to be wise.

To sum up all in a sentence, not exclusive but dealing with characteristics: the moral virtues are the virtues for this world, intellectual virtue is the virtue of the life to come.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 58, art. 2, in corp.; Ar., Eth., I., xiii., 15-19; St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 66, art. 3.

Pt. I, Ch. V, Section IV. Of the Mean in Moral Virtue

Moral virtue is a habit of doing the right thing in the conduct of the will and the government of the passions. Doing right is opposed to overdoing the thing, and to underdoing it. Doing right is taking what it suits a rational nature to desire, and eschewing what is unsuitable under the circumstances. (c. i., n. 5.)

But a thing may be unsuitable in two ways, by excess, and by defect: the rational choice is in the mean between these two. The moral order here is illustrated from the physical. Too much exercise and too little alike impair the strength; so of meat and drink in regard to health; but diet and exercise in moderation, and in proportion to the subject, create, increase, and preserve both health and strength. So it is with temperance, and fortitude, and all varieties of moral virtue. He who fights shy of everything, and never stands his ground, becomes a coward; while he who never fears at all, but walks boldly up to all danger, turns out rash. The enjoyer of every pleasure, who knows not what it is to deny himself aught, is a libertine and loose liver; while to throw over all the graces and delicious things of life, not as St. Paul did, who counted all things dross, that he might gain Christ, but absolutely, as though such things were of themselves devoid of attraction, is boorishness and insensibility. Thus the virtues of temperance and fortitude perish in excess and defect, and live in the mean. It is to be noticed in this illustration that the mean of health is not necessarily the mean of virtue. What is too little food, and too much exercise, for the animal well-being of a man, may be the right amount of both for him in some higher relation, inasmuch as he is more than a mere animal; as for a soldier in a hard campaign, where a sufficiency of food and rest is incompatible with his serving his country's need.

The taking of means to an end implies the taking them in moderation, not in excess, or we shall overshoot the mark, nor again so feebly and inadequately as to fall short of it. No mere instrument admits of an unlimited use; but the end to be gained fixes limits to the use of the instrument, thus far, no more, and no less. Wherever then reason requires an end to be gained, it requires a use of means proportionate to the end, not coming short of it, nor going so far beyond as to defeat the purpose in view. The variety of good that is called the Useful lies within definite limits, between two wildernesses, so to speak, stretching out undefined into the distance, wilderness of Excess on the one side, and wilderness of Defect on the other.

A true work of art cannot be added to or taken from without spoiling it. A perfect church would be spoiled by a lengthening of the chancel or raising the tower, albeit there are buildings, secular and ecclesiastical, that might be drawn out two miles long and not look any worse. The colouring of a picture must not be too violent and positive; but artistic colouring must be chaste, and artistic utterance gentle, and artistic action calm and indicative of self-command. Not that voice and action should not be impassioned for a great emergency, but the very passion should bear the mark of control: in the great master's phrase, you must not "tear a passion to tatters." It is by moderation sitting upon power that works of art truly masculine and mighty are produced; and by this sign they are marked off from the lower host of things, gorgeous and redundant, and still more from the order of "the loose, the lawless, the exaggerated, the insolent, and the profane."