Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 3. On The Inequality Of Virtues
Virtues are not equal, as the Stoics, Cicero, and Seneca wished.39 The reason is that virtues are acquired habits, which can be increased or diminished and which, compared among themselves, are not of the same excellence. The whole doctrine concerning the inequality of virtues can be stated in the following propositions:
39 Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 66, a. 1.
467. 1. Virtues considered in themselves are unequal.
The reason is that one virtue has a nobler object than another. But the diverse virtues obtain this order among themselves:
The theological virtues and the other infused virtues obtain the highest degree, because they directly dispose man to the supernatural end. But simply the highest degree among all virtues is obtained by charity, of which St. Paul says: "And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."40
After the infused virtues, the intellectual virtues obtain the second degree on the part of the object. For "that virtue is nobler which has a nobler object. But it is manifest that the object of reason is nobler than the object of the appetite.... Hence, speaking simply, intellectual virtues, which perfect reason, are nobler than moral virtues, which perfect the appetite." Thus St. Thomas,41 who nevertheless immediately adds: "But if virtue is considered in order to act, in this way moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose part it is to move the other powers to act, is nobler."
The moral virtues obtain the third degree, and especially the cardinal virtues, among which prudence obtains the first place, justice the second, fortitude the third, temperance the fourth. For prudence is the guide of all the virtues and perfects the intellect, which is a nobler faculty than the will and the sensitive appetite. But justice comes after prudence; this is clear both from its object and from its subject. The object or matter of justice is operations by which man is ordered not only in himself but also to another; and these operations are nobler than the restraints of passions, to which fortitude and temperance apply themselves. But the subject in which justice resides is the will, which certainly obtains the second place among the powers of the soul, namely after the intellect. After justice comes fortitude, which resides in the irascible appetite as in its subject and is occupied with fear in arduous things. Last comes temperance in the concupiscible appetite, which is occupied with restraining the lowest passions, namely concerning the appetite for foods and venereal things, which is common to man and brutes.42
40 1 Cor. 13, 13; cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 6.
41 S. theol. l. c. a. 3.
42 Cf. ib. a. 4.
468. 2. Moral virtues in diverse men can be unequal.
The reason is that one man is better disposed to virtues than another, either a) because of greater habituation, or b) because of a better disposition of nature, or c) because of a more perspicacious judgment of reason, or d) because of a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of the giving of Christ," as St. Paul says.43 From these things already said the error of the Lutherans teaching that all men are equally holy is refuted. Wherefore against them the Council of Trent defined that the just, in the very justice received through Christ, faith cooperating, grow through good works and are justified more.44 For if inequality exists in supernatural habits, a similar inequality in natural acquired virtues is fitting.
43 Eph. 4, 7; cf. S. theol. l. c.
44 Sess. 6, c. 10 and can. 24 de iustif. (Denz. n. 803 and 834).
469. 3. Moral virtues in the same man can be unequal according to diverse times, that is, they can be increased or diminished.
For just as virtues are acquired by repeated acts and are increased through continual exercise, so also they are diminished or even totally removed through cessation from acts or through opposed vices. Against several authors St. Thomas45 teaches that habits, and therefore also acquired virtues, are not increased by any acts whatsoever, even remiss ones, but only by intense acts. For just as a musician or painter who exercises his art remissly or negligently does not advance, but rather gradually declines, so also he who negligently performs acts of virtues, for example one who negligently says prayers, does not advance in virtues, but on the contrary gradually loses them.46 That moral virtues in the same man can be diminished or even removed according to diverse times is clear by daily experience. This indeed happens either from cessation of acts or from repeated contrary acts. For if someone long ceases from acts of virtues, the impediments of acting grow step by step and contrary habits are induced; but if he often indulges contrary acts, a contrary vice gradually arises. Thus if someone who until now has been sparing in food and drink repeatedly commits excesses in eating and drinking, he will gradually contract the vices of gluttony and drunkenness.
45 S. theol. 1, 2, q. 52, a. 3.
46 Note. It is one thing to grow in acquired virtues, another to grow in merit. For all good acts, even remiss ones, if they are done in the state of sanctifying grace, merit an increase of grace and glory; but this merit proceeds rather from sanctifying grace than from the human act.
470. 4. Moral virtues, even at the same time, are not equal among themselves in the same man; for some are greater, but others lesser.
The reason is that these virtues are increased through continual exercise. Moreover, someone can exercise himself more in one virtue than in another. Besides, someone can, from his natural character itself, be more disposed to one virtue than to another; and finally God can give special graces for some special virtue and not others.47 Hence also we see diverse saints to have excelled in diverse virtues, for example St. Francis in poverty, St. Dominic in apostolic zeal, etc.
47 S. theol. 1, 2, q. 56, a. 2. Cf. above n. 464 c.