Section VI. On the Properties of Virtues

Three properties of virtues are chiefly enumerated: their being in a mean, their mutual connection, and their inequality. Concerning each property these things are noted:

I. The Being of Virtues in a Mean. 1. Notion. "The good of some thing," says St. Thomas, "consists in a mean, according as it is conformed to a rule or measure which can be transcended and fallen short of" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 3). Therefore the mean of virtue is the conformity of the act of virtue with its rule.

2. Division. The mean of virtues is twofold: either determined from the nature of the thing, or to be determined by reason. The first regards exterior things, and indeed their objective equality; therefore it is the same mean for all. The other regards interior passions, "in which the right cannot be established in the same way, because men have themselves differently toward passions" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 2); hence this mean is not the same for all.

3. Existence. a) Theological virtues, whose measure is God Himself, do not per se have being in a mean; for no one can believe God too much, hope in Him too much, or love Him too much. I say per se, for per accidens they have being in a mean, namely on our part, "because although we cannot be borne toward God as much as we ought, nevertheless we ought to be borne toward Him by believing, hoping, and loving according to the measure of our condition" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 4).

b) Moral virtues, whose rule is right reason, per se have being in a mean; for acts of moral virtues cannot be conformed to right reason except by avoiding defect from it or excess beyond it. But since justice regards exterior things, the mean of reason in this virtue necessarily coincides with the mean of the thing, and therefore is the same mean for all. The contrary occurs in the remaining moral virtues, whose mean must be determined by right reason according to diverse circumstances.

II. Mutual Connection of Virtues. There is one mutual connection of acquired virtues, another of infused virtues; there is also one connection of acquired virtues if they are considered in a perfect state, another in an imperfect state.

1. Acquired virtues in a perfect state are so connected among themselves that one cannot exist without the others. For the perfection of acquired virtues, as moral, depends on perfect prudence, since prudence must establish the mean in any given case; therefore, when perfect prudence is absent, the other acquired virtues are not perfectly present either. St. Augustine excellently illustrates this, saying: "Virtues which are in the human soul, although each is understood in one way or another, are nevertheless in no way separated from one another, so that whoever are equal, for example, in fortitude, are equal also in prudence, temperance, and justice. For if you say that these men are equal in fortitude, but that one excels in prudence, it follows that the fortitude of this one is less prudent, and by this very fact they are not equal in fortitude, since the fortitude of the other is more prudent. And thus you will find concerning the other virtues, if you run through all of them by the same consideration."¹

2. Acquired virtues in an imperfect state can exist one without the others. For someone can elicit more frequent acts of some virtue while neglecting acts of other virtues; but by acting thus he acquires for himself the virtue corresponding to the acts frequently placed. Therefore St. Thomas says: "We see someone... from some custom to be prompt for works of liberality, who nevertheless is not prompt for works of chastity" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 1).

3. Infused theological virtues are so connected among themselves that charity cannot exist without faith and hope; but faith and hope can indeed exist without charity. The first is clear from this, that charity is infused only with sanctifying grace; and the virtues of faith and hope always coexist with sanctifying grace. The second, with regard to the virtue of faith, is taught by the Council of Trent;² moreover, when the virtue of faith remains, there also remains the foundation of hope, which is not destroyed by every mortal sin, since mortal sin as such is opposed only to charity. Nor should it be said that faith and hope perish for this reason, that together with charity sanctifying grace is lost, which is the root of the origin of faith and hope. For even though it is true that faith and hope take their origin from sanctifying grace, nevertheless, once they have arisen, they no longer inhere in sanctifying grace as in a subject; rather, their immediate subject of inherence is the powers of the soul. Therefore the loss of sanctifying grace is not the reason for the loss of these virtues.

4. Infused moral virtues: 1. are so connected among themselves that one cannot exist without another; for all proceed equally from sanctifying grace and regard their intermediate ends on account of the ultimate end. 2. Infused moral virtues are so connected with charity that they cannot exist without it; for when man's habitual relation to the ultimate supernatural end perishes, habitual supernatural relations to intermediate ends also perish.

¹ Augustine, De Trinitate, bk. 6, c. 4, n. 6; cf. Salmanticenses, De virtutibus, disp. 4, dub. 1, whole (t. 6, p. 374 ff.).

² Session 6, canon 28.

III. Inequality of Virtues. By inequality of virtues is understood their diverse moral goodness. Now the moral goodness of virtues in human acts is attended to according as they are regulated by the due rule; the higher the rule, the nobler the moral goodness. But if diverse virtues are regulated by the same rule, the magnitude of their moral goodness must be measured by their diverse nearness to this rule; the nearer some virtue is to the rule, the greater its goodness. From these things the following conclusions result:

1. Theological virtues surpass moral virtues in dignity, because their rule, which is God Himself, surpasses in dignity right reason, which is the rule of moral virtues. But among theological virtues, charity surpasses in dignity, since it is nearer to the rule. Now St. Thomas says: "That which is through itself is greater than that which is through another. But faith and hope indeed attain God according as from Him there comes to us either knowledge of truth or acquisition of good; but charity attains God Himself, so that it rests in Him, not so that something may come to us from Him; and therefore charity is more excellent than faith and hope" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 23, a. 6).

2. Among moral virtues, which are all regulated by the same rule, namely right reason, whether illuminated only by natural light or by supernatural light, prudence surpasses in dignity, because it perfects reason itself and attains it according to itself. Then follows justice, as residing in the will, which is nearer to reason and has as its object a good proposed by reason. Fortitude follows next; for it resides in the irascible appetite, which acts according to the cogitative power. Finally comes temperance, since as its subject of inherence it has the concupiscible appetite, which acts according to imagination (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 66, aa. 1 and 4; II-II, q. 123, a. 12).