Article First. On the Nature of Virtues.

254. Definition. 1. Virtue in general is defined as a habit perfecting a power for operating well.²

a. A twofold habit is distinguished: substantive, which inheres in the substance of the soul and gives to it a new mode of being, of which kind is sanctifying grace; and operative, which inheres in the powers of the soul and perfects them for acting, of which kind is virtue.

b. Virtue is an operative habit, which perfects a power for acting. But this perfection can be of two kinds: either it inclines a power, already complete for its operation, to acting, so that it can exercise its acts with a certain facility; or it elevates and completes a power incomplete and insufficient in itself for exercising an operation. Habits of the former kind give to a power that it can operate easily; habits of the latter kind give that it can operate simply.

c. Virtue, which is a good habit, cannot elicit anything except good acts, just as vice, which is a bad habit, cannot elicit anything except bad acts. Therefore virtue is customarily defined as a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly.³ Although virtue cannot be the principle (elicitive) of a bad act, nevertheless it can be the object of a bad act, as if someone hates virtue or is proud about it. But man can use other habits, which are distinguished from virtues, such as knowledge and art, for good and bad acts.

2. Three things must be considered in virtues: the efficient cause, the subject, and the object.

a. The efficient cause of a virtue is said to be that by which the virtue is produced. By reason of the efficient cause, virtues are divided into natural and supernatural, infused and acquired.

b. The subject of a virtue, and that the proximate subject, is said to be that power of the soul in which the virtue is present and from which the acts of a certain virtue are elicited. The remote subject is the very person having the virtue.

The powers in which virtues inhere are the intellect, the will, and the sensitive appetite; in this appetite namely there are those virtues which turn about moderating the passions, of which kind are temperance and fortitude.

c. The material object of a virtue is that about which the act of virtue turns; the formal object is the reason or motive on account of which it turns about its material object. Thus the material object of faith is the truths revealed by God; the formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing.

¹ St. Thomas I. II. q. 55-61. Suarez, De virtutibus. Lessius, De iustitia et iure ceterisque virtutibus cardinalibus. Greg. de Valentia, Commentar. scholast. II. disp. I. q. 5. A. Tanner, Theologia scholast. II. disp. 3. q. 2. ss. Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis (Romae. Forzani. 1894). Waffelaert, De virtutibus cardinalibus (Brugis. Beyaert, 1889). Tractatus de virtutibus ad usum seminarii Mechliniensis (Mechliniae. Dessain 1896). E. Muller, Theologia moralis^7 (Vindobonae. Mayr. 1894) I. § 104 ss. Hilarius a Sexten, Compendium theologiae mor. l. c. 4. I. B. Scaramelli, Directorium asceticum t. 3. De virtutibus moral. (Augustae Vindel. 1770). I. E. Pruner, Katholische Moraltheologie^4 (Freiburg, Herder. 1902) I. S. 117-175.

² A habit is a quality inhering in a power in order to its act (St. Thomas).

³ St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio l. 2. c. 19.

255. Division of virtues. a. According to the diverse subject in which virtue is present, virtues are divided into intellectual virtues, which perfect the intellect for knowing the true, and appetitive (moral) virtues, which perfect the will for pursuing the good. The intellectual virtues are numbered by the philosophers as five: understanding, wisdom, knowledge, art, and prudence, to which theological faith is added by the theologians; but the appetitive virtues are numbered as very many.

Of the intellectual virtues, three are speculative habits: understanding, wisdom, and knowledge; two are practical habits: art and prudence. Understanding perfects the mind for knowing the true which can be known immediately and of itself; wisdom for knowing the true which is known through discourse and is simply ultimate (the first cause); knowledge for knowing the true which is known through discourse and is ultimate in some determined genus.

b. By reason of effect, virtues are divided into moral virtues, which make a man good simply or morally, and intellectual virtues, which make a man good in a qualified respect, e.g. a good philosopher, a good craftsman. The former are present in the will and in other powers only insofar as they are ruled by the will; the latter are present in the intellect independently of the command of the will.

To the moral virtues accepted in this sense belong also the theological virtues and prudence; to the intellectual virtues accepted in this sense belong understanding, wisdom, knowledge, and art.

c. By reason of the efficient cause, they are divided into infused and acquired virtues: the former are produced immediately by God in the powers of the soul; the latter are obtained by man through acts more often repeated. Some infused virtues are called infused per se, others infused per accidens: the former can be had only from God infusing them, of which kind are all supernatural virtues; the latter can also be had by human effort, since they are of the natural order, but sometimes are infused by a special gift of God.

That virtues are acquired by repeated acts is established by experience; but by revelation we are taught that virtues are infused into us immediately by God (n. 28). Acquired and infused virtues agree in this, that they are habits by which we are disposed for operating well; but they differ both in origin and in effect (n. 254).

d. With the preceding division there almost coincides as regards the thing that by which virtues are divided into natural and supernatural: the former are acquired by natural powers through repeated acts and are ordered to a natural end, namely natural beatitude; the latter are exercised by the help of supernatural grace and are ordered to a supernatural end or supernatural beatitude.

e. By reason of the object, they are divided into theological and moral virtues: the former have for their immediate object some divine perfection and therefore turn immediately about God; the latter have for their immediate object a created good, i.e. the honesty of actions. Thus the material object of mercy is the relief of the needy person, and the formal object is the moral honesty which shines forth in the relief of the needy person.

Therefore moral virtue is taken in two ways, according as it is opposed to theological virtue, and according as it is opposed to intellectual virtue.

f. By reason of perfection, they are divided into common and heroic: the former are exercised in a common or ordinary mode; the latter are exercised promptly, expeditiously, and above the common mode of operating.

g. By reason of the remote subject, namely the person having the virtue, they are divided into formed and unformed, according as the person having the virtue is in the state of grace or in the state of mortal sin; grace or charity is called the form of the other virtues.

256. On the mean of virtue. 1. The mean of virtue is called the measure by which excess and defect are excluded from it; thus liberality is in the mean between prodigality and avarice, fortitude is the mean between rashness and timidity, because it preserves the due mode between excess and defect.

a. The chief property of virtues is that by which they are said to be in the mean between excess and defect. For the acts of virtues, in order to be such, must be conformed to right reason; but they would not be conformed to right reason if either through excess or through defect they turned aside from the mean of right reason; therefore virtues consist in the mean in this, that their acts by reason of object and circumstances are conformed to right reason.

b. The mean of virtues can be considered on the part of the object about which it turns, and on the part of the subject, or by reason of the mode by which virtue is exercised. In the mode of exercising virtue one can turn aside from the mean if it is exercised rashly, inopportunely, with excessive effort, etc. Moreover all virtues have and require a mean on the part of the subject.

c. The mean of virtues on the part of the object is twofold: the mean of the thing and the mean of reason. The mean of the thing is the measure which is determined by nature itself and therefore is the same for all; the mean of reason is the measure which reason, by prudent estimation after considering the person and circumstances, determines, and therefore is not the same for all, but is diverse in diverse cases.

2. All moral virtues have a mean on the part of the object, and indeed justice has the mean of the thing, but the other moral virtues have the mean of reason.

What he ought to do who intends to observe justice strictly is not determined by prudent estimation, but has already been defined by nature: namely he must give as much as is owed. For justice requires that he who owes a hundred also pay a hundred, whoever he is, rich or poor, and whoever his creditor is. The mean of the other moral virtues is the mean of reason: for what matter in these is conformed to right reason must be determined by reason according to the quality of the person; for what is suitable for one in taking food can be too much or too little for another, and what is suitable for a man in undergoing danger is too much for a boy or a woman.

3. Theological virtues do not have a mean on the part of the object but only on the part of the subject or by reason of the mode: for since the object of these virtues is God himself, it is impossible to sin against them by excess; and indeed we cannot believe and hope too much in God or love God too much. But in the mode by which these virtues are exercised, sin can occur even by excess.

257. On the connection of virtues. Those virtues are called connected of which one cannot exist without another.

1. Theological virtues are connected among themselves insofar as, in the order of generation, charity supposes hope and faith, and hope supposes faith, and all are infused together; but they are not connected insofar as one can be without another: for when charity has been lost, hope and faith remain, and when hope has been lost, faith can remain (n. 29, 5).¹

2. Infused moral virtues are connected among themselves insofar as they are infused together with grace and charity, and when these have been lost the virtues are lost at the same time. But infused virtues are not necessarily connected with acquired moral virtues; for infused virtues can be without acquired virtues, as in baptized little ones, and acquired virtues can be without infused virtues, as in adult sinners: for when infused virtues have been lost through sin, acquired virtues are not also lost.

3. Acquired moral virtues are not necessarily connected as long as they are imperfect; but if they are perfect, they are necessarily connected with one another, so that he who perfectly possesses one likewise has all the others.

In order that a virtue can be called perfect, it is not necessary that it be exercised in a heroic degree, but this is required: that it be exercised easily, promptly, and constantly in every event, even in ordinary difficulties. Virtue can be imperfect in two ways: either a. because it has not yet come to the nature of a habit, but either is a certain natural and innate inclination to the good or is a certain disposition to the habit of virtue arisen from some imperfect acts; or b. because it indeed reaches the nature of a habit, but does not yet firmly inhere in the power nor dispose to exercising virtue constantly even in difficulties.

a. Imperfect acquired virtues are not connected among themselves: for by experience it is established that many, either from innate disposition or from some habituation, are prompt for works of mercy, who nevertheless are not prompt for works of chastity; likewise that some are prompt for exercising chastity who are not prompt for exercising liberality or humility.

b. Perfect acquired virtues are necessarily connected among themselves; therefore he who lacks one has none perfectly. The internal reason seems to be this: because there is no perfect virtue without perfect prudence; but where there is perfect prudence, there all the other virtues are more or less perfect: for that prudence is not perfect which at the same time is not just, temperate, and brave.

It is not required that all perfect virtues reach the same degree of perfection, but both in the same man and in diverse men one can be more perfect than another; hence it comes about that in one saint this virtue, in another that virtue, especially shines forth and is praised.

¹ By what reason it can happen that, after sanctifying grace has been lost, faith and hope remain in the soul, although grace is the foundation and principle of these, cf. Suarez, De gratia l. 6. c. 13. Kleutgen, Theologie d. Vorzeit II. n. 200 ff. Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis n. 184 ss.