Article III: On the Equality of Virtues

St. Thomas, q. 66, a. 1-5; De Virt. q. 5, a. 3.

607. Equality of virtues can be understood in three ways: 1. equality according to species; 2. equality in the same species of virtue according to itself, as to those things to which it extends itself or according to its extension to diverse objects; 3. equality in the same species according to grade and intensity, or according to participation of the virtue in the subject.

608. Principle I. According to species virtues are not equal, but some are more perfect than others according as they have nobler objects.

A. Comparing intellectual and moral virtues:

1. Speculative intellectual virtues, because their object is universal, therefore as habits (or entities) are simply nobler according to object or species than moral virtues, whose object is a particular good; moreover, among the intellectual virtues wisdom is eminent, whose object, the highest cause, is nobler than all. Whence wisdom judges concerning all the intellectual virtues and orders them, and therefore is called architectonic.

2. But moral virtues and prudence are nobler in a qualified sense (under one respect, namely, in order to act), insofar as they dispose more to operating: for they not only give aptitude for operating well, but also dispose to using their aptitude well. Whence as virtues they are more perfect.

B. Among the cardinal virtues: 1. prudence is more perfect, which is in reason, and therefore has as object the good of reason itself by essence, while the others are concerned with the good of reason participated in others; - 2. then justice: a) because it is in the will, which is a power nearer to reason and therefore participates in reason more; and b) because it not only orders man well in himself but also toward another; - 3. fortitude is preferred to temperance because the good of reason shines forth more in it, since its motive is not the delectable per se; furthermore fortitude subjects the sensitive appetite to reason concerning that which is greatest in man, namely, concerning life and death itself; - while 4. temperance is concerned with those things which immediately serve life.¹

¹ Thus speaking simply; for in a qualified sense one can be greater. Humility, namely, in removing that which prevents, namely pride, which lies in wait for good works; obedience, not on the part of the object, but on the part of him for whom one renounces; fortitude, because it defends and fights for the common good whose equality justice makes: it is a support of justice; liberality, insofar as it intends the supplement and splendor of justice: thus it is the ornament of justice and in some sense greater, but simply it is lesser because it is ordered under the principal virtue of justice.

C. Comparing the special moral virtues, after prudence there are eminent religion and penance, which approach nearer to God.

609. Principle II. According to extension, prudence and perfect moral virtues, as being connected, are equal, because they cannot be increased extensively, since they dispose to doing good in all circumstances; therefore in all men, and in the same man even at diverse times, they are equal according to extension (a. 1). - The contrary must be said of the inchoations of virtues, and of intellectual virtues, because they are not connected.

610. Principle III. According to intensity, perfect moral virtues, because they are connected, are equal in the same man at the same time; whence if one is increased, all are proportionally increased, just as the fingers of the hand are unequal according to quantity, but are equal according to proportion when they are increased proportionally. This is to be understood a) on the part of prudence and according to the formal element of virtue, which is the ordination of reason to good: for through prudence they adhere equally to the good of reason or to the mean, which is constituted equally well for all by one and the same prudence. "With reason existing as equally perfect in one and the same man, it is necessary that the mean be constituted proportionally according to right reason in any matter of virtues"; whence they are conformed equally to reason. Nevertheless b) they are not always increased according to the material element, that is, according to the inclination and proneness of the subject to the acts proper to it, for man can be more prompt toward certain virtues, whether from the disposition of the body, or from custom, or from the gift of grace (a. 2).

But they can be unequal according to intensity in diverse men and in the same man at diverse times: for thus they are not connected. "But if virtue is considered on the part of the subject participating, thus it happens that virtue is greater or lesser, whether according to diverse times in the same man, or in diverse men; because for attaining the mean of virtue, which is according to right reason, one is better disposed than another, either on account of greater habituation, or on account of a better disposition of nature, or on account of a more perspicacious judgment of reason, or also on account of a greater gift of grace" (a. 1).

611. Observation. - Merely intellectual virtues, because they are not connected, are not equal according to extension or intensity.