§ 1. On The Mean Of Virtues

462. Acquired moral virtue consists in a mean, whence the third Aristotelian definition cited above, n. 444, asserted: "Virtue is an elective habit consisting in a mean." The Holy Fathers often speak of this property, namely of the middle of virtue. Thus, for example, the author of the Commentary on Isaiah among the works of St. Basil¹⁷ says: "Virtue is mean and symmetry. But on either side, immoderation exceeding virtue and deficiency are inconcinnity and deformity. Thus fortitude is a mean, immoderation of the same is boldness, and deficiency is timidity. And so the beauty of the soul is symmetry according to virtue, but foulness is immoderation proceeding from malice." St. Gregory of Nyssa¹⁸ writes: "Virtue is the middle between two vices: namely between the defect of the honorable and exuberance." But St. Jerome¹⁹ says beautifully: "It is difficult to keep measure in all things. It is truly according to the opinion of the philosophers: 'Measure is virtue; too much is reckoned vice.'²⁰ We can express this in one brief sentence: Nothing too much."

St. Thomas²¹ proves this property of moral virtues in this way: Moral virtue is a good habit perfecting the appetitive part of man in some determinate matter. But the measure and rule of appetitive motion concerning appetible things is right reason itself; or in other words: Then the human appetite is good when it is commensurated with right reason. But a thing to be measured is good if it completely corresponds to the measure; but it is evil whether it does not reach the measure or exceeds the measure. Hence also the appetite to be measured and regulated by moral virtues will be good and virtuous if it is wholly conformed to right reason and neither exceeds nor falls short, but consists in the mean between excess and defect.

¹⁷ Cap. 5, n. 174 (Migne, Patr. graec. 30, 410).

¹⁸ Hom. 9 in Cant. (Migne, Patr. graec. 44, 971).

¹⁹ Ep. 108, n. 20 (Migne, Patr. lat. 22, 898).

²⁰ Μεσότης ἡ ἀρετή, ὑπερβολὴ κακία.

²¹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 64, a. 1.

463. Mean of reason and mean of the thing. Every moral virtue consists in the mean of reason; but the virtue of justice, besides the mean of reason, additionally requires the mean of the thing.²² The reason for this is that other virtues, such as chastity, sobriety, magnificence, etc., are occupied with internal passions, which cannot be measured physically and mechanically but only proportionally to the subject and the object. Hence, for example, the passion of anger which in such circumstances is moderate and virtuous, in other circumstances and especially in other men is immoderate and sinful. Therefore in any case reason in these virtues must determine what is moderate and what is immoderate, with attention given to the circumstances of person, place, time, etc. Wherefore, for example, one who, laboring under a grave typhoid fever, takes a great quantity of alcoholic liquor, indeed foreseeing the drunkenness that will follow from this, but intending only to recover health, does not wound the virtue of temperance, nor does he sin. The reason is that he takes the drink according to the right judgment of reason. - The matter is otherwise in justice, which is not directly occupied with passions but with exterior actions, namely of rendering to each what is his. This each one is bound to do without any respect to the diverse conditions of persons. Hence, for example, whoever has stolen 100 francs must also restore 100 francs. Hence in the virtue of justice not only the mean of reason is to be observed, but also the mean of the thing.

Billuart rightly observes:²³ "The mean in justice is not called the mean of the thing as if it were not the mean of reason. It [justice] indeed has from its specific account that it is the mean of the thing, but it has from the general account of virtue that it is also the mean of reason: both because nothing is more conformed to reason than to establish equality between right and debt, and because the act of justice, like the act of the other virtues, must be regulated by prudence and right reason, so that it be placed in due place and time, with right intention and other due circumstances; hence if someone, for example, paid a debt prematurely with detriment to himself or with a sinister intention, he would indeed satisfy the precept of restitution, but he would not exercise an act of justice, except only materially. It must be observed besides that in justice the mean or equality of the thing is twofold: one, namely, of quantity to quantity, which commutative justice makes, for instance by rendering twenty for twenty; the other, of proportion to proportion, which distributive justice makes, so that if to one having merit for four ten are given, then to another having merit for two five are given."

Note. The theological virtues of themselves and by reason of the object do not consist in a mean; hence we can never love God too much, or believe in him or hope in him too much. But per accidens,²⁴ especially by reason of ourselves, these virtues too necessarily consist in a mean, insofar as according to true prudence, that is, with time, mode, and other fitting circumstances observed, we must attend to acts of the theological virtues. Hence at an inopportune time, which ought, for example, to be spent on family matters, it is not licit to give oneself to the contemplation of divine truths.

²² Ib. 2, 2, q. 58, a. 10.

²³ De pass. et virt. a. 4, § 1.

²⁴ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 64, a. 4, and 2, 2, q. 17, a. 5 ad 2.