§ 2. On The Connection Of Virtues

464. All moral virtues are connected. Already St. Augustine, writing to St. Jerome, said: "That point concerning the inseparability of virtues ... pleased all philosophers.²⁵ Certainly from this they persuade: that he who has had one virtue has all, and that all are lacking to one to whom one has been lacking, because prudence cannot be cowardly, nor unjust, nor intemperate; for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Moreover, if prudence will then be, if it is also brave and just and temperate, certainly where it is, it has the others with it. So also fortitude cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust; so it is necessary that temperance be prudent, brave, and just; so justice does not exist unless it is prudent, brave, and temperate. Thus where any one of them is true, the others likewise are; but where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even if in some way it seems to be similar."²⁶ Other Holy Fathers speak in a similar way, such as St. Ambrose,²⁷ St. Gregory the Great,²⁸ who forcefully and most truly says: "One virtue without the others either is altogether nothing or is imperfect," and nearly all the Scholastics against Blessed Albert the Great²⁹ and the Scotists.³⁰ - Before this doctrine concerning the connection and concatenation of virtues is proved, it must be noted beforehand: here the matter concerns only acquired moral virtues, and those existing in a perfect state. For it is certain:

1. Intellectual virtues are not connected either among themselves or with the other virtues. For he who has one science or art does not therefore know all the others,³¹ nor does he have all moral virtues.

2. Theological virtues are not necessarily connected among themselves. For the Council of Trent³² defines: "If anyone says that grace once lost through sin, faith also is always lost together with it, or that the faith which remains is not true faith, ... let him be anathema." But faith and hope existing without charity are called unformed and imperfect virtues, but by divine mercy they are left to the sinner so that he himself can more easily be converted again to God.

3. All infused moral virtues are connected among themselves, because they are effects of sanctifying grace, together with which all are infused, and together with which, when it perishes, all perish.³³

4. Some dispositions, whether innate or acquired, toward this or that moral virtue can be present, although the other moral virtues do not exist perfectly in man.³⁴ Thus, for example, a man can be wholly given over to the vice of lust, and consequently lack the virtue of chastity altogether, who nevertheless is merciful toward the poor or just in selling and contracts. But those acts of mercy or justice do not proceed from the perfect virtue of charity or justice, but only from some more or less perfect disposition.

5. If one virtue is in man in a perfect way, it does not yet follow from this that all the others are also present in the same degree. Thus, for example, if a poor man through long exercise has acquired the virtue of meekness in the highest degree, it does not yet follow that he has in the same degree the virtue of liberality, which perhaps he has never been able to exercise on account of his poverty. Nevertheless he has that virtue "in disposition of soul," because when the case occurs and the possibility exists he is also greatly disposed to exercising that virtue.³⁵

With these things noted beforehand, let this be:

²⁵ Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. l. 6, c. ult.

²⁶ Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 735. In Ep. 167, however, St. Augustine seems to derive the connection of virtues rather from supernatural charity than from prudence.

²⁷ Expos. in Luc. l. 5, n. 63 (Migne, Patr. lat. 15, 138).

²⁸ Moral. l. 22, c. 1.

²⁹ 3 Sent., dist. 36, q. 1, a. 1.

³⁰ Cf. Billuart, De virtut. a. 4, § 2.

³¹ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 65, a. 1 ad 3.

³² Sess. 6, can. 28 de iustif. (Denz. n. 838).

³³ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 65, a. 3.

³⁴ Cf. ib. a. 1.

³⁵ Cf. ib. q. 66, a. 2.

465. Proposition: Acquired moral virtues are so connected that, if one is present in a perfect state, all the others are present; but if there is present a vice opposed to one moral virtue, then no other perfect moral virtue is in such a man.

It is proved. Neither perfect moral virtue without prudence, nor perfect prudence without the other moral virtues, exists in man. Therefore perfect moral virtues are necessarily connected with prudence, and consequently also among themselves; but all are destroyed if even one gravely vicious habit has destroyed one opposed virtue.

The individual points are explained: a) Perfect moral virtue is not given without prudence, for no moral virtue can exist unless it observes the mean, that is, unless it equally avoids excess and defect, as was said above. Hence moral virtue is also defined by Aristotle: an elective habit consisting in a mean. But to determine in what the mean consists belongs to prudence; wherefore Aristotle adds in the definition cited: "as the wise man, that is, the prudent man, will have determined." The same is clear by daily experience. For it not rarely happens that some man repeatedly exercises works objectively very virtuous, for example works of mortification, and nevertheless by no means acquires the corresponding virtue, chiefly because prudence is lacking in the exercise of such works.

b) Next, true and perfect prudence cannot exist in a man who is given over even to one vice directly opposed to some virtue. For although the virtue of prudence is not lost through one or another sinful act, for example a virtuous man who from a sudden temptation commits a grave sin against chastity does not thereby yet lose either prudence or the other acquired virtues; nevertheless he who by repeated acts has acquired a vicious habit, for example of lust, has also lost the virtue of prudence and all the other acquired virtues. For how can someone still be called truly prudent who again and again acts against reason? For a vicious habit is against right reason. - But if someone given over to some vice lacks the true virtue of prudence, how can he always and perfectly exercise acts of the other virtues, for example justice, fortitude, and temperance, when so many temptations and difficulties occur in the continual exercise of virtues? - We indeed concede that a man given over to vice can exercise one or another virtuous act, indeed even that he can have certain imperfect virtues; but it is impossible for such a man to have even one perfect virtue, since for any perfect virtue there are required perfect prudence and a firm will always and in every event to do those things which are right.

466. Corollary. From what has been said it follows that prudence and the other virtues depend on one another, but in a different way. Prudence depends on the other virtues as on a necessary disposition; or, the other virtues dispose most excellently for having and exercising prudence. Hence the Psalmist says: "I have understood above the ancients, because I have sought thy commandments."³⁶ On the contrary, vices very greatly cloud reason and render man like the horse and mule, which have no understanding.³⁷ Hence also we have seen from history that magnates, indeed even emperors, went to holy men for the sake of asking counsel even in earthly matters; for example, the duchess of Brabant consulted St. Thomas, and St. Antoninus was accustomed to give counsels with such great prudence that he was called "Antoninus of counsels." - But the other virtues depend on prudence as on a directing cause. For prudence sets before them suitable means for attaining their proper ends and guards lest they be corrupted either through excess or through defect. Wherefore prudence is completive of all moral virtues and their form.³⁸

³⁶ Ps. 118, 100.

³⁷ Cf. Ps. 31, 9.

³⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 166, a. 2 ad 1; 3, dist. 27, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 3.