What a duel is and why it is forbidden

347. Definition. A duel is defined as a single combat, undertaken by agreement, with arms apt for killing.

a. A single combat is a combat entered into between two, or between several in an equal number on each side. For constituting a true duel it makes no difference with what intention it is undertaken: for the sake of spectacle, of showing courage, of vengeance, of repairing honor, or of exercise.

b. By agreement is an essential condition of a duel, and indeed by agreement concerning time, place, and arms; whence between the agreement for the duel and the duel itself some space of time ought to intervene. Therefore it is not a duel if two men, from an impulse of anger, provoke each other to a fight and immediately engage, even if they betake themselves to a determined place in order to fight; nor if someone provokes another to a duel and immediately attacks him, while the latter, having snatched up arms, defends himself.

c. With arms apt for killing: for it is of the notion of a duel that it be done with arms, and indeed with arms apt for killing or lethally wounding, such as guns, swords, daggers. It is not of the notion of a duel that a lethal wound can be inflicted, or that there be danger of killing or mutilation; but this is required, that a grave wound can be inflicted of itself and not only by accident, that is, a wound which constitutes a grave injury of the body or a gravely sinful injury. Therefore fights which are made with switches or sticks, or with iron whose edge is blunted, are not duels; nor are they duels which are so instituted that a grave wound cannot be inflicted except by accident, for example, because of the lack of skill of the combatants.

d. A grave wound is taken in a threefold sense: in a moral sense it signifies an injury which constitutes grave sin; in a juridical sense it signifies an injury which is punished in court by a determined penalty; in this sense, in the Austrian code, an injury is considered grave which cannot be healed within twenty days; in a specific sense it signifies a lethal injury.

e. Therefore three things are of the notion of a duel: alpha. a single combat; beta. undertaken by agreement; gamma. with arms apt for killing or lethally wounding. By reason of the second condition, a duel differs both from a brawl and from legitimate defense.

f. A fictitious duel is not a duel. Therefore those who fictitiously provoke and accept without the intention of engaging, or with certain hope that the duel will be impeded, or who only fictitiously fight without any danger of a wound, do not incur censures and do not sin except by reason of scandal, since the will of dueling is excluded.

¹ Ferraris, Bibliotheca, s. v. duellum. Das Duell in seinem Ursprunge und Wesen (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1864). M. Hofmann, Stellung der Kirche zum Zweikampf (Zeitschrift fur kath. Theol., XXII, 1898, pp. 455, 601). A. Wiesinger, Das Duell vor dem Richterstuhle der Religion, der Moral, des Rechtes und der Geschichte (Graz, 1895).

348. A duel is divided: a. Into solemn, which is done with certain solemnities, namely letters of provocation and employed seconds, etc., and simple, which is done without solemnity.

b. Into fatal, which is to death or with the intention of killing, and non-fatal, which is done only with the intention of wounding.

c. Into public and private, according as it is undertaken by public authority or only in a private name.

That even non-fatal duels are by law true duels and fall under the penalties of a duel is gathered from the constitution Illius vices of Clement VIII, who interdicted even duels entered into with the pact "of ending the combat as soon as either one has been wounded or has shed blood." But the reason why the Church also punishes non-fatal duels as fatal by the gravest penalties is chiefly this: because they promote fatal duels.

349. Principles. 1. A duel undertaken by private authority is never licit. And indeed it is opposed to the law of nature: for duelists expose themselves to danger of death, mutilation, or at least wounding, to be inflicted both on themselves and on another; but this is equally illicit as the very killing, mutilation, or wounding inflicted on oneself or another. Nor can that action be made honorable from its end; for it is never licit to posit an action evil in itself for a good end. It is also opposed to ecclesiastical law: for the duel has been prohibited and punished with penalties by the Council of Trent and afterward more often by the Church.¹

a. Among the decrees by which duels are prohibited by the Church, especially to be noted is the constitution Detestabilem of Benedict XIV, by which five theses concerning the duel are condemned.² From these it is clear that every duel properly so called is illicit, even if it is offered or accepted to avoid the gravest evils, for example, lest reputation, office, or goods of great importance be lost. For that the acceptance of a duel may be licit for preserving the greatest goods, the good effect, or the conservation of the goods, ought to follow from the duel at least equally immediately as the evil effect, or the danger or injury of one's own and another's life. But the conservation of the goods does not follow immediately from this, that someone exposes his own or another's life to danger or injures it in reality, but from this, that one accepting a duel procures for himself the common estimation of those who, by a dangerous confusion of concepts, call culpable rashness true fortitude.

b. From the older authors, several had taught that it is licit to accept a duel if it were the only means of avoiding the gravest evils.³ But now this opinion, after the Benedictine constitution, can no longer be defended; rather this must altogether be held, that to expose one's own or another's life to danger is licit only for defending one's life or goods against an actual aggressor. But in this case there is no actual aggressor.⁴

2. Duels which are undertaken by public authority for the common good are licit, when that common good cannot be obtained without the shedding of blood. For if an army can licitly fight against an army by public authority, a few against a few, or one against one, will also be able to do this.

The sole cause of the common good on account of which a duel is licitly undertaken is this: that a just war may be ended or forestalled. But if duels are undertaken by public authority from another end, for example, to avenge an injury, to finish private controversies, or to manifest truth and innocence (the vulgar purgation), they are equally illicit, because to obtain these ends there is at hand another more apt means, namely legitimate judgment.

¹ Sess. 25, c. 19, De reform. Constitution of Gregory XIII, Ad tollendum (5 Dec. 1582); constitution of Clement VIII, Illius vices (17 Aug. 1592); constitution of Benedict XIV, Detestabilem (10 Nov. 1752); constitution of Pius IX, Apostolicae sedis (12 Oct. 1869); encyclical letter Pastoralis officii of Leo XIII (12 Sept. 1891). The Austrian criminal code also punishes duelists with the penalty of grave prison of at least ten years.

² They can be consulted in Lehmkuhl, I, n. 852; their first is this: A military man who, unless he offers or accepts a duel, would be held as fearful, timid, abject, and unfit for military offices, and thence would be deprived of the office by which he sustains himself and his own, or would have to lack forever the hope of promotion otherwise owed and merited by him, would be free from fault and penalty, whether he offers or accepts a duel.

³ St. Alphonsus (n. 400) attributes this doctrine to Holzmann, Pichler, Reiffenstuel, Sporer, Elbel, Lessius, Sanchez, etc.

⁴ Cf. Lugo, disp. 10, n. 172; Lehmkuhl, Das Duell im Lichte der Vernunft (Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1894, I, p. 345).

350. On academic duels. From the declaration of the Holy See it is clear that duelists of this sort and their seconds are irregular from infamy of law.¹ From this these three things are gathered: a. The single combats of students are true duels; for infamy of law is a penalty imposed on duelists by the Council of Trent. The same is clear from the nature of the thing: for in academic fights all things are present which constitute a true duel: a single combat undertaken by agreement with arms apt for lethally wounding. And although the danger of killing or mutilation is excluded of itself, nevertheless it is so instituted that a grave wound (in the moral sense) can be inflicted of itself, not only by accident. b. For a duel prohibited by the Church under penalties it is not required that there be danger of a lethal wound, but the danger of grave injury of the body suffices. c. Students who commit the Mensur incur excommunication; for if they incur the other penalty imposed by the Council, namely infamy, they also undergo this one imposed by the same Council. And indeed, if from the declaration of the Church they commit a true duel, they cannot escape the penalties inflicted by the same Church on duelists.

The penalties which are always affixed to duels and still have force are reckoned: a. infamy of law, which is contracted by the very fact of committing the duel, and from which irregularity arises; b. excommunication simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff; c. deprivation of ecclesiastical burial, if the duelists die in the conflict itself; to these penalties there can be added d. irregularity from delict, if death or mutilation really occurs.²

¹ S. C. C., 9 Aug. 1890.

² Cf. Acta s. sedis, XXIII, p. 212.

A DUEL is defined to be a premeditated and prearranged combat between two persons with deadly weapons, and usually in the presence of at least two witnesses, called seconds, for the purpose of deciding a quarrel, avenging an insult, or clearing the honour of one of the combatants or of some third party whose cause he champions.

A duel, then, is a premeditated and prearranged single combat, for if two persons begin to quarrel and then come to blows, it is not a duel even if death be the result. Nor is it a duel if two enemies meet by accident and begin straightway to fight. A duel is a combat with deadly weapons, so that a fight with sticks or with the fists is not a duel. Although seconds are commonly present, yet their absence would not prevent a single combat from being a duel if the other conditions were verified. The duel is for the purpose of deciding a private quarrel, and for such a purpose it is unlawful even if it have the sanction of public authority, for there are other and lawful means of settling such matters. A single combat between champions of hostile nations entered into by public authority for the purpose of terminating the war, or giving courage to the army, would not be a duel, and might be permitted.

It is never lawful to fight a duel by private authority, for it obviously exposes the parties to grave risk of killing or wounding, or of being killed or wounded, and this is never lawful by private authority except under the conditions which justify killing in self-defence, and these are not verified in the duel. The Council of Trent¹ very emphatically condemned duelling as a detestable practice and excommunicated the guilty parties, their seconds and abettors, as well as emperors, kings, and princes who permit it in their territories. This excommunication is renewed by Canon 2351, and the power of granting absolution if it has been incurred is reserved to the Pope. Benedict XIV, by a constitution dated November 10, 1752, condemned the following propositions as false, scandalous, and pernicious: ““(a) A military man who, unless he offer or accept a duel, would be considered cowardly, timid, worthless, and unfit for office in the army, and so would be deprived of his post by which he gains support for himself and his family, or would for ever lose all hope of promotion otherwise due to him, would incur neither fault nor penalty if he offered or accepted a duel.

“‘(b) Those who accept or challenge to a duel for the sake of defending honour or avoiding disgrace may be excused when they know for certain that the combat will not come off, inasmuch as it will be prevented by others. (c) A general or officer in the army who accepts a duel through serious fear of losing reputation or office does not incur the penalties inflicted by the Church on those who fight a duel.”

The contradictory of these false propositions must be held by all who admit the authority of the Church.

¹ Sess. 25, c. 19, de Ref.

What is a duel? A duel strictly so called, and as it is prohibited by canon law with grave penalties, is a fight between two or a few, undertaken by private authority and by agreement, with danger of killing, mutilation, or grave wound.

Between two or a few, namely in equal number; and thus it is distinguished from war, which is of many against many. By private authority, for by public authority, such as that of David with the giant Goliath, and of the Horatii with the Curiatii, it is lawful, since a fight of a few is no less lawful than of many, if each is undertaken by public authority for the common good. By agreement, namely an agreement which by common consent indicates place and time, and thus it is distinguished from a brawl, which supposes no preceding pact. The weapons also must be designated for the penalties to be incurred. For this is the ordinary custom of duels, that weapons also be designated. Therefore the Roman Pontiffs, prohibiting duel and establishing penalties against duellists, are to be judged to be speaking of such a fight, a detestable practice, although they make mention only of agreement, a fixed time, and an appointed place. Gregory XIII, C. Ad tollendum, a. 1582. With danger, etc., so that all those fights unsuited to inflicting grave injury are excluded from the notion of duel strictly such, such as those which are done with light rods or other instruments not ordered to killing or gravely wounding, although in such a fight one is injured per accidens. Hence it is clear that one acts unlawfully indeed and sins mortally, but nevertheless it is not a duel strictly so called, and consequently not subject to the penalties of law, when two men, burning suddenly with anger because of an injury, and provoking each other to a fight, suddenly engage, although from the same impulse of anger and vengeance they immediately go together to some suitable place for this. The reason is that thus the provocation and fight are not morally two actions, but only one, and therefore it is not properly a fight from a previous agreement or designation of time and place. Struggl 55 seqq.; Sanch. in Decal. l. 2, c. 39, aa. 13, 14; La-Croix l. 3, p. 1, n. 843 seqq.; L. 399, 401.

Is a duel lawful? - Duel is intrinsically evil and mortal. Proof: 1. For it is contrary to natural law knowingly and by private authority to expose oneself and another to the proximate danger of killing, mutilation, or wound; for the right of God is usurped, who alone is Lord of life. 2. Trent, s. 25, C. 19 de R., teaches "that the detestable practice of duels was introduced by the devil's contrivance, so that from the bloody death of bodies he may also gain the ruin of souls." Leo XIII, Letter Pastoralis officii, 12 Sept. 1891; C. 1, 2 de Cler. pug. in duel.; L. 399, 400, 401; E. M.

You will resolve: It is not lawful to accept a duel lest someone incur a mark of timidity and disgrace among others. Indeed neither is it lawful to accept it although he would be deprived of office and sustenance. For what is intrinsically evil can never be lawful. But if it is unlawful to accept a duel in cases of this sort, much more is it unlawful to offer it. C. 1, 2 de Torneam.; Extr. un. de Torneam. Cf. prop. 2 condemned by Alexander VII, and props. condemned by Benedict XIV, C. Detestabilem, a. 1752; L. 400, 401; E. M.

Is a duel unlawful also if the condition is added that it be ended after the first blows have been inflicted; or if someone only simulates it, although he knows certainly that the fight will not follow? R. Affirmatively; for as to the first, even in that case there is present the greatest danger of a lethal wound, as experience itself establishes. Besides, Clement VIII in Bull Illius vices, a. 1592, has this: "By Apostolic authority and by the tenor of the present letters we decree and declare... that those between whom agreements have been entered concerning ending the contest as soon as either has been wounded, or has shed blood, or a certain number of blows has been inflicted on each side, are held by the same penalties" of the other Pontiffs. Besides, that kind of duel creates scandal and gives occasion to fatal duels. As to the other, because then someone sins by furnishing at least to the other scandal and an occasion of sin. Besides, he sins by furnishing also to others scandal and occasion of sin; for those who undertake a duel in the designated place can rightly be believed by others to be combatants in a duel. Besides, the laws of the Church not only prohibit killings, but also intend to exterminate the detestable practice of duels; but even fictitious duels are contrary to this end. Reuter p. 3, n. 380.

If a duel is commanded to two guilty men condemned to death, with pardon of life promised to the victor, this indeed on the part of the magistrate would be altogether unlawful, by reason of scandal and by reason of the dishonorable end, which can scarcely be absent. But on the part of the duellists it would be lawful to them; for by reason of vindicative justice they are lawfully killed and kill. La-Croix l. 4, n. 1497.

Can a duel at least sometimes be lawful? - A duel indeed is lawful in all those cases in which the matter concerns defense of oneself against an aggressor; for then in reality it is not to make a duel, but to repel force by force, which all laws concede. Hence Struggl n. 65 says that "a duel can become lawful if a duel necessarily had to be undertaken against an unjust aggressor for the defense of life, or of immense goods; as if someone should actually threaten you with certain death, the plundering of goods, or the burning of a house, unless you actually enter into duel with him.

For it is lawful to defend oneself against an unjust aggressor of life and of immense goods, which are irrecoverable by another way." And where the matter is not about defending life itself and goods, but about defending honor itself, the same theologian had previously handed down these things, n. 61: "If therefore one provoked to a duel is a noble man, knight, or soldier, to whom flight from the provoker and actual aggressor would be very disgraceful, it is lawful for him to say to the one provoking, even while grasping a sword in hand: I will defend myself with this sword, wherever you have sought me, which I will also furnish here if you have attacked me; but to go out to an agreed place is not the act of a Christian man, as being against the law of nature, of God, and of the Church. The reason is that such a man is not bound from charity to flee with so grave an inconvenience of honor and mark of timidity; and therefore he can lawfully stand and defend himself by standing. For thus before an actual duel he would conduct himself merely defensively. Yet if from flight there would not threaten to some other man danger of wounding from behind, or grave disgrace, he would be bound to flee; as La-Croix 841 teaches with others."

404. Principles. - I. A duel undertaken by public authority is lawful if it is done for the common good, for example so that war may be ended ¹; otherwise, if it is commanded or permitted for other causes ². The reason of each is manifest.

¹ Sanchez (In Dec., lib. 2, c. 39, n. 13-14) indicates another end, namely for preserving estimation among enemies, and lest the army fall in spirit. Bonacina (De Cens. in spec., disp. 2, q. 3, p. 58, n. 4) calls duels of this sort a part of war.

² Thus, for example, if it is done for the sake of spectacle and pleasure, or for vainly showing off the strength of soldiers (Sanchez, In Dec., lib. 2, c. 39, n. 12).

II. A duel undertaken by private authority can never be lawful. The reason is that it is opposed: 1. to natural law, since God has given dominion over one's own or another's life, nor over the members, to no man outside the case of defense against an actual aggressor; 2. to canon law, as is clear from Trent, sess. 25, cap. 19, where duel is called: "A detestable usage, introduced by the devil as fabricator." - St. Alphonsus, n. 399, 400.

334. 1. Origin of the duel. Among the ancients there were no duels properly so called, for the sake of vindicating honor, but singular combats between leaders or soldiers of two armies for the purpose of putting an end to battle; thus David with Goliath, Menelaus with Paris, Hector with Ajax, Achilles with Hector, Turnus with Aeneas, the three Horatii with the Curiatii engaged. Besides, at Rome there flourished bloody fights of gladiators between captives or slaves, indeed sometimes between free men, for the sake of displaying strength. - In the Middle Ages judicial duels were in use, for the sake of ending a lawsuit, which seem to have been borrowed from the Germans and Lombards: namely, when full proof could not be brought before a judge, a duel between the litigants was often in use, with the magistrates approving that the matter be left to the judgment of God, according to this: if laws do not suffice, let us come to arms. - But tournaments held among knights differed from duels, since they were not undertaken with a hostile mind, but for the sake of exercise and for the display of fortitude.

¹ J. P. Pigna, Il duello, 1554; Boyssat, Recherches sur les duels, Lyon, 1610; J. Savaron, Traite contre les duels, Paris, 1610; F. Bacon, Charge concerning duels, 1614; Cockburn, History of duels, London, 1720; Basnage, Dissert. historique sur les duels, Basel, 1740; Stadler, S.J., Tr. de duello, Ingolstadt, 1751; F. Gorguereau, Le duel considere dans tous les rapports historiques, moraux et constitutionnels, Paris, 1791; Pinet, Du duel en jurisprudence, Paris, 1829; Cauchy, Du duel considere dans ses origines et dans l'etat actuel des moeurs, Paris, 1846; Mendez, Essai sur le duel, 1854; Millingen, History of duelling, London, 1841; Sabine, Notes on duel, Boston, 1859; Tavernier, Le duel, Paris, 1884; Letainturier-Fradin, Le duel a travers les ages, Paris, 1892.

But already from the sixteenth century duels properly so called, for the sake of vindicating honor, began to prevail; namely, if anything harmful to reputation or honor had been inflicted, nobles and military leaders judged that this could be vindicated only by arms and washed away by blood; for they thought that they did not carry swords in vain. This cruel custom indeed first began to flourish among nobles and soldiers, afterward also among men of the robe; holy men and some Princes indeed resisted it; but today among many Nations it still flourishes, especially among leaders, soldiers, or political men.²

² Since duels are not recounted in public documents, it is difficult to know how many there are in various regions. In France, besides duels held among soldiers, from the year 1878 to the year 1890 about 647 are counted, of which not a few (1/77) were lethal (in Garraud, Traite du Droit Penal, Paris, 1891, t. IV, p. 310; cf. Questions Actuelles, t. XIV, 1892, p. 162-163).

335. 2. Notion and species. (A) A duel, as it is understood today, is a singular combat between two or more, entered into by agreement, with arms apt for killing or gravely wounding. - Therefore three things are required for a duel: (a) a singular combat, which is entered upon between two, or between several, but one against another; it matters little with what intention it is done, for the sake of exercise, or of vengeance, or of repairing honor, or of showing fortitude; (b) entered into by agreement, in which the adversaries agree concerning time, place, and arms; hence if two immediately fight from an impulse of anger, or if one provokes and attacks another and the latter defends himself, it is not properly a duel; (c) arms apt for killing or gravely wounding; therefore it is not necessary that in fact death or a grave wound follow, but it suffices that of itself a grave wound can be inflicted; hence fights which are done with the fist, rods, staffs, or with a sword of blunted edge, under the condition that neither be lethally wounded, are not duels.

(B) A duel is public when it is entered into from public authority and on account of the public good, e.g., for ending a dispute between two nations; or private when it is undertaken in a private name. The former is licit, if it is done on account of the common good, for ending war, lest the blood of many be poured out: for if in war army can fight against army, leaders can agree that one fight against one, or a few against a few; today, however, singular combats of this kind have gone into disuse. But if it were entered into on account of a particular good, even with the authority of a judge, for vindicating injury or manifesting truth, it would be illicit, since other means are at hand for obtaining these ends. But the latter is a grave sin, as will be clear from the following proposition.

336. 3. Principle: A duel, entered into by private authority, is always of itself gravely illicit. It is certain.

It is proved: (A) By authority. For the Church has more than once reproved the duel as a grave crime; thus the Council of Trent imposed penalties against duelists, declared them excommunicated, and, if they died in the combat, judged them unworthy of the honor of ecclesiastical burial; it exposed its mind concerning the gravity of this sin by these words: "Let the detestable use of duels, introduced by the fabrication of the devil, so that by the bloody death of bodies it may gain also the destruction of souls, be utterly exterminated from the Christian world."¹ Benedict XIV enlarged and explained the Tridentine sanctions, exploding various reasons alleged by duelists.² The Code renewed the excommunication to be incurred by the very fact and simply reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, already issued by the Roman Pontiffs, against "those perpetrating a duel, or simply provoking to it or accepting it, or giving any assistance or favor whatever, and also those deliberately watching it, and those permitting it, or, as much as is in them, not prohibiting it, of whatever dignity they may be."³ Already Leo XIII, confirming the decrees of his Predecessors, had lucidly set forth how empty are the things which are customarily brought forward for defending or excusing the savage custom of the duel.¹

¹ Sess. XXV, cap. 19 de Reformatione.

² Constit. Detestabilem, Nov. 10, 1752, where he condemns the following propositions as false, scandalous, and pernicious:

1. "A military man who, unless he offers or accepts a duel, would be held as fearful, timid, abject, and unfit for military offices, and thence would be deprived of the office by which he sustains himself and his own, or would be bound perpetually to lack the hope of promotion otherwise due and deserved for him, would be free from fault and penalty, whether he offers or accepts a duel."

2. "Those accepting a duel, or provoking to it, can be excused, even for the sake of protecting honor or avoiding human contempt, when they know certainly that the fight is not going to follow, as being about to be impeded by others."

3. "A military leader or officer accepting a duel from grave fear of loss of reputation or office does not incur the ecclesiastical penalties issued against duelists."

4. "It is licit in the state of natural man to accept and offer a duel for preserving fortunes with honor, when by another remedy their loss cannot be repelled."

5. "The asserted license for the state of nature can also be applied to the state of a badly ordered city, in which, namely, either by negligence or by malice of the magistrate, justice is openly denied."

This manner of speaking indeed seems harsh; but it is therefore employed so that vain evasions may be forestalled; if the duel were permitted in these cases, empty reasons would soon be devised for excusing every duel.

³ Code, can. 2351. - With this excommunication are punished:

A) The duelists themselves, that is, those who perpetrate a duel; indeed, also he who provokes another to a duel, or who accepts, even if in reality the duel does not follow;

B) Those giving any assistance or favor whatever, that is, a) all and each who cooperate in any way with a duel. Thus: seconds, unless they accept this office with the intention and hope of altogether impeding the duel; - those ordering that a duel be done; - those persuading or advising, if the advice or reason was efficacious of itself, and the duel follows; - the physician who, asked by the duelists, assists at the duel; - the physician and confessor who, by agreement with the duelists, stand in a neighboring house or in a nearby place.

b) Those deliberately watching, even from mere curiosity, but not those who watch while passing by by chance, or in secret, nor those who go to the place of combat in order altogether to impede the duel;

c) Those positively permitting the duel, and indeed also those who, being endowed with authority, do not prohibit it, as much as is in them, when they ought and are able to prohibit it.

Cf. Treatise on Censures, n. 1182; J. Sole, De delictis et poenis, Rome, 1920, p. 320-325.

¹ Apostolic Letter Pastoralis officii, Sept. 12, 1891, to the bishops of the German and Austro-Hungarian empire.

337. (B) By reason. (a) For the duel by its nature directly tends to the killing or wounding of the adversary; certainly, as Leo XIII says (l. c.), "those who provoke to a private combat or accept one offered do this, and direct their mind and powers to this, bound by no necessity: to take away life or at least to inflict a wound upon the adversary"; now directly to intend this is a grave sin, from what has been said above, n. 312. - Nor can it validly be said that here there is question of the case of legitimate defense; for there is no urgent necessity, since the aggression, if there was any, is not actually existing but already past; on the other hand, recourse can be had either to judges or to upright men who can compose the matter peacefully; indeed recourse to arms cannot vindicate honor or reputation: "for although," Leo XIII continues, "he who, after receiving injury, has challenged to the combat, departs victor from the combat, this will be the judgment of all sensible men: by such an outcome of the combat, the challenger is proved indeed better in strength for wrestling, or in handling arms, but not for that reason better in honesty; but if the same man falls, to whom again would this manner of protecting honor not seem imprudent, not plainly absurd?" Therefore the duel can by no means be excused under the pretext of legitimate defense, especially because it often arises from a passion for revenge, which is especially opposed to Christian charity.

338. (b) Besides, he who undertakes a duel rashly casts his own life into grave and manifest danger; but the natural and divine law prohibits this, when otherwise there is no reason of office or charity which may persuade this rashness. And this manner of acting is to be reproved all the more because duelists bring damage not only upon themselves, but upon their own family, or that of the adversary: for if either one or both are wounded or killed, how many dissensions, envies, and miseries arise from this?

339. (c) Moreover, by duels the social order is disturbed; for if it is licit for each person to vindicate his own rights by private force and hand, and to avenge the honor which he thinks violated, it is finished with the legitimate authority of judges, and with the peace of families and society; force will be repelled by force, even outside the case of actual and unjust aggression, and thus the morals of Barbarians will begin to reign everywhere.

340. 4. The difficulties are solved. (a) Many indeed object that they cannot refuse an offered combat without being held as sluggish and cowardly.

Leo XIII, l. c., responds: "If the duties of men were to be measured from the false opinions of the crowd, not from the eternal norm of the right and just, there would be no natural and true distinction between honorable actions and shameful deeds. The wise men of the gentiles themselves both knew and taught that the fallacious judgments of the crowd are to be spurned by a brave and constant man." Certainly he exhibits greater fortitude who, obeying the voice of conscience, despises the empty judgments of the crowd, than he who, against the dictate of conscience, undertakes the offered combat lest he be despised by others.¹

¹ So that sensible men may more easily and efficaciously refuse the duel, it is altogether expedient that they be associated and bind themselves by pact to avoid all combats of this kind. This was already done in past centuries; cf. Faillon, Vie de M. Olier, 4th ed., Paris, 1873, t. II, p. 258.

341. (b) At least, not a few continue, duels must be permitted to soldiers, so that by such exercise military virtue may be sharpened, and at the same time an end may be imposed upon quarrels which otherwise would arise frequently among soldiers.

To this Leo XIII says: "The incentives of military virtue look to this, that the city be better prepared against enemies. But can this be effected by the help of that custom which by its own nature looks to this, that, when a disagreement has arisen among soldiers, of which the causes are not rare, from the individual parts of the defenders of the fatherland one or the other be killed?" - And indeed there are other means for composing disagreements,² namely the judgment of leaders or arbiters (jury d'honneur).

² Among some nations, e.g., the English, duels are strictly prohibited, and the mark of infamy is by no means branded upon those avoiding singular combat. Cf. Science Sociale, t. XXIV, 1897, p. 77-92.

342. (c) They insist: most duels are by no means dangerous, since the adversaries stop as soon as a light wound has been inflicted and the first drops of blood are shed.

It happens not rarely that, notwithstanding an agreement of this kind, a grave wound or death itself is inflicted in the heat of the fight. Besides, is it not ridiculous to agree upon such a condition? What special virtue is inherent in the first drops of blood, that they may vindicate the honor of the offended man? Is this not an ignoble vestige of a ruder age and foreign barbarity?

343. 5. On academic duels. In certain regions, especially in Germany, duels flourish which are called academic, in which, namely, students of the academies, using a certain small knife, try to inflict upon themselves an incision or wound in the face, the other parts of the body being well covered; in these, death or mutilation is not intended, nor always vengeance or reparation of honor, but often the display of fortitude and strength; very rarely does death or a grave wound follow from this. - Nevertheless the S. C. of the Council, having been questioned concerning this matter, on August 9, 1890, responded that irregularity is incurred in this case by the duelists and their seconds, from infamy of law.¹ From this it follows that contests of this kind truly are duels, since infamy of law is a penalty imposed by Trent upon duelists; in reality the conditions set forth above are found there: singular combat, entered into by agreement, with arms apt for gravely wounding; although death or mutilation rarely follows, nevertheless the danger of both is present.

¹ In Acta S. Sedis, XXIII, p. 242.

344. 6. Points to be noted for practice. Since duels in certain armies are sufficiently frequent, and are often imposed by commanders, there can be soldiers who unwillingly in good faith undertake a singular combat, whether they are ignorant of the censures attached to the same, or falsely persuade themselves that they cannot avoid such a fight; therefore it can happen that, on account of good faith, they are excused from censures or grave sin, from what was said in the Treatise on Human Acts, n. 94. Likewise, when they approach the sacred tribunal and otherwise are found well disposed, it is not always expedient that they be questioned specifically concerning the purpose of never refusing an offered combat; it suffices that in a general way they will to observe the divine and ecclesiastical laws. Cf. Treatise on Penance, n. 105. - On the other hand, account must be taken of the scandal which would be given if a Catholic soldier or commander accepted a duel.

124. Definition. Dueling is a contest between two or a few persons, done by agreement concerning place, time, and lethal weapons (or at least weapons gravely wounding).

It is explained. For constituting a true duel, it makes no difference with what intention it was done, e.g., for the sake of vainglory, of saving honor, of preserving an office, of taking revenge. Hence in the definition nothing is said concerning intention. But it is said 1. a contest between two or a few, because a contest between two armies is no longer called a duel, but war. Although in ancient times duels were celebrated in such a way that on each side several persons fought at the same time, nevertheless today this mode of dueling is unusual, and a duel is always a strictly singular fight, i.e., between two persons.

It is said 2. from agreement concerning place, time, and weapons. This threefold agreement or pact is an essential condition of a duel. For if two fight from an impulse of anger or revenge, they are not in a duel, although perhaps they go to a determinate place for the sake of fighting. As to the third agreement or pact, namely concerning weapons, it is required and enough that the weapons be suited for inflicting a grave wound, e.g., a gun, revolver, sword, dagger (commonly, Rapier, Schläger), etc. Therefore it is not a duel which is done for exercise in certain schools of swordsmanship, or which is done with rods or sticks. But it is not required that a lethal wound be immediately inflicted by these weapons, nor that in the duel there be grave danger of death. It is enough that a grave wound can be inflicted. Hence even the so-called academic duels or "Mensuren, Bestimmungsmensuren," although in them directly lethal weapons are not employed, have been proscribed by the Church as true duels and are subject to the ecclesiastical penalties established against dueling.¹³³

Division. Dueling is divided a) into solemn or public and into private; b) into fatal and non-fatal. A solemn or public duel is that which in ancient times was had by public authority on account of the public good, e.g., for ending a dispute between two nations. A private duel is that which is undertaken in a private name, and indeed ordinarily for defending honor, as they say. Even in a private duel there are seconds and other assistants. A fatal duel is that which has or at least intends a fatal outcome, i.e., the death of one of the duelists; otherwise it is called a non-fatal duel.

¹³³ S. C. Conc., Aug. 9, 1890, Feb. 10, 1923, June 20, 1925 (Acta Ap. Sed. XV, 155 and XVIII, 137).

125. Principle. A duel undertaken by public authority for the common good is not morally evil; but one done by private authority is gravely illicit and induces grave ecclesiastical penalties.

It is proved. a) That a duel undertaken by public authority is lawful is plain of itself; for if from public authority army can fight against army on account of the common good, a fortiori (namely lest the blood of many be poured out) a singular fight in a duel can be permitted on account of the same common good. Thus at least of itself. Thus it was lawful that David fight with Goliath. But I say that this is lawful only for the common good. Hence duels of private men do not yet become licit if the legislative power of some region indulges private duels too much, because from these private duels no true utility arises for the common good, as in the fights of gladiators among the pagans.

b) Private dueling gravely opposes the law both natural and ecclesiastical, and also at least certain civil laws. And certainly it opposes natural law; for duelists "direct their mind and strength to this, bound by no necessity, that they take away life or at least inflict a wound upon the adversary."¹³⁴ Moreover, they expose themselves to danger of death or grave wounding without sufficient motive. For the motive of dueling ordinarily is honor to be saved. This motive, although it is not always the end of the worker, since he not rarely completes the duel compelled by harsh necessity, nevertheless is almost always the end of the work. No one of sound mind will say that honor, whether mine or another's, has been saved if I have killed or wounded the adversary, or, what is still clearer, if I myself have been killed or wounded. Therefore there is not a sufficient motive for making or accepting a duel and thus exposing oneself to grave danger. To this is added that from dueling very grave damages often arise, without any notable good following from it.¹³⁵

But since dueling is so damaging and irrational, ecclesiastical law has several times most severely prohibited it. Thus the Council of Trent¹³⁶ established: "Let the detestable use of duels, introduced by the contrivance of the devil, so that by the bloody death of bodies he may also gain the destruction of souls, be utterly exterminated from the Christian world. The emperor, kings ... and temporal lords by whatever other name, who shall have conceded a place for single combat [i.e., duel] in their lands among Christians, are by that very fact excommunicated.... But those who have entered upon the fight, and those who are called their seconds, incur the penalty of excommunication ... and of perpetual infamy, and ought to be punished as homicides according to the sacred canons; and if they die in the very conflict, let them perpetually lack ecclesiastical burial." The Council likewise punishes with excommunication those counseling or watching a duel. Benedict XIV enlarged and explained these Tridentine laws in the Constitution Detestabilem,¹³⁷ in which he condemns the following propositions as false, scandalous, and pernicious:

1. "A military man who, unless he offers or accepts a duel, would be held as fearful, timid, abject, and unfit for military offices, and from this would be deprived of the office by which he sustains himself and his own, or would have to lack perpetually the hope of promotion otherwise due and deserved for himself, would be free of fault and penalty, whether he offers or accepts the duel."

2. "Those accepting a duel, or provoking to it, can also be excused for the sake of protecting honor or avoiding human contempt, when they know certainly that the fight is not going to follow, since it is to be impeded by others."

3. "A commander or military official accepting a duel from grave fear of loss of reputation and office does not incur the ecclesiastical penalties established by the Church against duelists."

4. "It is lawful, in the state of natural man, to accept and offer a duel for preserving fortunes with honor, when the loss of them cannot be repelled by another remedy."

5. "The asserted license for the natural state can also be applied to the state of a badly ordered city, in which, namely, either by negligence or by malice of the magistrate, justice is openly denied."

From all these things it follows that a duel properly so called is never licit. Hence the sophisms which are often brought forward in its favor, and which were clearly and profoundly rejected by Leo XIII in the letter Pastoralis officii of Sept. 12, 1891, to the bishops of Germany and Austria, are to be made little of. But I say "a duel properly so called"; for if it is only a fight for defending oneself and one's goods against an unjust invader, then it is licit with the moderation of blameless defense, as is plain from the things said above, n. 120, concerning an unjust aggressor.

The civil laws of several nations also gravely prohibit dueling, e.g., in England and Austria.¹³⁸ In some regions, however, although dueling is prohibited of itself, nevertheless great connivance is employed toward those who nevertheless have perpetrated a duel.

¹³⁴ Leo XIII, apostolic letter Pastoralis officii, Sept. 12, 1891.

¹³⁵ Cajetan (In S. theol. 2, 2, q. 95, a. 8) treats acutely of the malice of dueling, concluding: "The nature of a duel is foreign to the nature of a just war, both defensive and vindicative. And therefore in no respect is a duel found to be a proportionate means for the ending of a dispute, whether civil or criminal. And because evils are not to be done that goods may come, let him rather suffer who cannot otherwise protect his rights." On the history of dueling, see Staatslexikon der Görres-Gesellschaft, s.v. "Zweikampf."

¹³⁶ Sess. 25, c. 19 de reform.

¹³⁷ Nov. 10, 1752; Denz. n. 1491-1498.

¹³⁸ Articles of war n. 101. Mandate of Emperor Charles, Nov. 4, 1917.

365. A duel, among moralists, is a singular combat (monomachy) entered into between two or more persons, from a pact or agreement, with arms suited to killing or gravely wounding. Whence three things are required for it:

a) a singular combat, which generally is entered into between two, sometimes between several equal in number, with whatever intention it is done, whether for the sake of exercise, or of vengeance, or of repairing honor, or of showing fortitude, or of proving a right;

b) entered into from a pact, in which, namely, the adversaries agree concerning the time, place, and arms: but if two, under a movement of anger, immediately come together, or one attacks another and the latter defends himself, it is not a duel properly so called;

c) arms suited to killing or gravely wounding, so that it is by no means necessary that in fact death or a grave wound follow, but it suffices that of itself a grave wound can be inflicted, which, namely, would be matter of grave sin. Thus a fight which is done with the fist, a rod, a staff, or a sword with blunted edge, so that of itself neither is gravely wounded, is not a duel, although it can be a mortal sin.

One duel is public, which is entered into from public authority on account of the public good; another is private, which is undertaken in a private name.

A public duel can be licit if it is done for the common good, to weaken enemies, or to end a controversy or war between two peoples, with less damage, lest the blood of many be poured out; - not always, however, but provided that it favors the common good or at least does not harm it:¹ for if a whole army, for defending the common good, can fight against another army, even the leaders can agree that one or a few should fight against one or a few. Yet on account of a particular good, from the authority of a judge, such a duel would not be licit for vindicating an injury or manifesting the truth, because it is not a means necessary for these ends, since other means are present, nor is it done, as in the prior case, for impeding greater violence.

¹ Three cases are indicated in Billuart, On Charity, diss. 7, a. 5: The first case is if he who wages a just war feels himself inferior in forces to the enemy, and that one must either fight and succumb or duel; he can both accept and offer a duel, because he defends the common good in the better way in which he can, and chooses the lesser danger. The same, for the same reason, seems to have to be said if he is doubtful concerning victory, and there is no hope of restoring the army in the case in which it is routed. The second case: if the leaders, considering the inconveniences of war, the detriments of goods, the deaths of many, etc., judge it more useful for the republic to settle the controversy by duel than by war; for then the duel is judged licit by many on the part of him who wages a just war, provided, however, that the victory is not made more doubtful than in war. The third case is if, from the fact that the duel offered by the enemy is not accepted, the enemy becomes bolder and more powerful, the other cast down and more timid; then also it is the opinion of many that it can be accepted. And in a similar case David seems to have fought against Goliath.

But a private duel is always a grave sin, as the doctrine of the Catholic Church holds.²

² On dueling M. Gierens, Ehre-Duell und Mensur, can usefully be read.

Among the ancients there were no duels except public and solemn ones between the leaders of armies or certain soldiers, for putting an end to war. At Rome indeed there existed bloody fights of gladiators between captives and slaves; but they were not duels properly so called, since those men were compelled to the fight, and did not freely agree upon it.

In the Middle Ages, there were private singular combats, among the Gauls and Germans, for vindicating to oneself a determinate right or good; from this usage judicial duels or ordeals seem to have arisen, for the sake of ending a controversy, which, borrowed from the Germans and Lombards, existed widely diffused: when full proof was lacking, under the authority of a judge, a duel between litigants was in use for proof of the truth, which thus was left to the judgment of God, whom they supposed to intervene in favor of justice. But tournaments held among knights differed from duels, not indeed with a hostile mind, but for the sake of exercise and of showing fortitude; although nevertheless at times they degenerated into duels or were entered into with danger of life.

From these tournaments and from the suppression of ordeals, in the sixteenth century there arose, first in France and Italy, duels, according to the manner of speaking today, more strictly so called, held, namely, for the sake of vindicating honor. When reputation or honor had been injured, nobles and military leaders thought that this could be vindicated only by arms and washed with blood: for they judged that they did not carry swords in vain. This custom first prevailed among nobles and soldiers, then also among men of the gown and political men.

366. Principle. A private duel is of itself and intrinsically and always gravely evil and unjust. - It is proved:

A. From the doctrine and legislation of the Church, reprobating the duel as a grave crime and punishing it with grave penalties. After various decrees of Pontiffs, bishops, and particular councils, sanctions against the duel were enacted in the Council of Trent, sess. 25, c. 19, on reformation, and then, explained by Benedict XIV and renewed by Pius IX, are found confirmed in the new Code of Law.

Can. 2351: "§ 1. Those who perpetrate a duel, - or simply provoke another to it, - or accept it, or furnish any assistance or favor, - and also those deliberately watching it - and those permitting it, or, so far as is in them, not prohibiting it, of whatever dignity they may be, are subject ipso facto to an excommunication simply reserved to the Apostolic See.

"§ 2. But the duelers themselves and those who are called their seconds are besides ipso facto infamous." Hence they are irregular from defect according to canon 984, 5°, and if death has followed or grave mutilation, the duelers are also irregular from delict (can. 985, 4° and 5°).

Can. 1240: "They are deprived of ecclesiastical burial, unless before death they have given some signs of penitence... those dead in a duel or from a wound received from it."

B. By reason: A duel is intrinsically and gravely evil, because the dueler rashly and without sufficient reason exposes himself both to danger of his own death or injury, and to danger of killing or injuring another. Hence a duel includes:

1. the injustice of suicide toward God, the author and lord of life;

2. the injustice of homicide, also toward another;

3. an illegal injustice toward society, since it is born gravely to harm not only the very family of the dueler but also the public peace, and it is repugnant to social order: for it is not licit by private force and hand to vindicate one's own right, apart from the case of legitimate defense against an actual and unjust aggression, in the case of urgent necessity, as was explained above.

In the case of a duel it is manifest that the necessity of legitimate defense is not present, for

a) the aggression, if there was any, is not actually existing but already past;

b) recourse can be had to judges or other prudent men who are able to compose the matter;

c) recourse to arms is incapable of vindicating honor or reputation: "For although," says Leo XIII,³ "he who, after receiving an injury, has appointed the combat departs victor from the contest, this will be the judgment of all sensible men: by such an outcome of the contest he is proved indeed better in strength for wrestling, or in handling arms, than the challenger, but not therefore superior in honor; but if the same man himself has fallen, to whom in turn would this manner of protecting honor not seem ill-considered, not plainly absurd?"

³ In the apostolic letter Pastoralis officii, 12 Sept. 1891, to the bishops of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

d) similarly, a duel is not a means apt for proving innocence, or proving a right or the truth of an assertion; moreover, to suppose God's special intervention in favor of truth or justice in a duel is impious, and to demand or require this is nothing other than to tempt God Himself.

367. Corollaries. - 1. Hence those are not excused who accept a duel in order to avoid very grave evils, or lest they be held sluggish or cowardly.⁴ Even for the best end, it is illicit to employ evil means. Therefore Leo XIII says: "If the duties of men were to be measured from the false opinions of the crowd, not from the eternal norm of the right and the just, there would be no natural and true distinction between honorable actions and shameful deeds. The pagan sages themselves both knew and handed down that the fallacious judgments of the crowd must be spurned by a strong and constant man." Moreover, one can propose something else, namely, an office of charity to be undertaken with danger of death.

⁴ "A knight challenged to a duel can accept it, lest he incur among others the mark of timidity": proposition 2 condemned by Alexander VII.

2. Even to soldiers duels are not licit, so that by such exercise military virtue may be sharpened and an end imposed on the innumerable quarrels which arise among them. For, says Leo XIII, "the incitements of military virtue look to this, that the state may be more prepared against enemies. But will this be able to be effected by the aid of that custom which by its own nature looks to this, that, when a disagreement has arisen among soldiers, the causes of which are hardly rare, one or the other from the individual parts of the defenders of the fatherland is killed?" Besides, there are other means for composing disagreements, such as, for example, the judgment of arbitrators.

3. Less dangerous duels, in which the adversaries stop from fighting after a certain number of blows has been completed, or at the first light wound inflicted, or, as they say, at the shedding of the first drop of blood, are also true duels, since they are done with arms of themselves suited to gravely wounding and do not exclude grave danger, whence even in such duels a more unhappy outcome sometimes occurs. But how ridiculous it is to bargain for such a condition appears to one thinking even lightly, since no special force can be in the first little drops of blood so that it may vindicate the honor of the offended man. It is added that Clement VIII also prohibited non-fatal duels, and that this kind is born to create scandal and to furnish occasion for fatal duels.

4. Academic duels, as they are called, in which students, with certain parts of the body well covered, try to inflict a wound upon one another in the face with a lighter sword, in ecclesiastical law are to be equated with true duels, even if of themselves they do not bring danger of graver wounding, as is established from the declaration of the S.C.C., 9 Aug. 1890, which retains its force with the new code promulgated, as was said 10 Feb. 1923, and again was confirmed and illustrated 13 June 1925.

For they are a favor furnished to the duel and a preparation for it, as also a confirmation and propagation of the prejudices upon which the duel rests; whence they constitute grave scandal. Besides, they too are done of themselves with arms suited to gravely wounding.

368. Remark. - After the recent war the practice of dueling happily began to decrease. In some regions, however, perhaps it could still happen that a duel is sometimes imposed on soldiers by leaders. Although generally the doctrine of the Church concerning the duel is not unknown, nevertheless there can be soldiers who in the said circumstances, unwillingly and in good faith, undertake a duel, whether they are ignorant of the penalties annexed, or falsely persuade themselves that they cannot avoid such a fight. The confessor will have to attend to this good faith, so that in warning the penitent he may be prudent, lest altogether uselessly he disturb his conscience. Nevertheless, generally it is better that men know that every duel is condemned by the Church, and that scandal must be guarded against which would result from a duel accepted by a Catholic soldier.

I say. Dueling undertaken by private authority can never be licit; because not only is it repugnant to natural right, since God has given to none of men dominion over his own life or that of another, nor over members, outside the case of defense against an actual aggressor; but also to canon law, as is clear from Trent, sess. 25, cap. 19, where dueling is called: "A detestable usage, introduced by the devising of the devil." - I said private, because if it is undertaken by public authority for the common good, e.g., so that war may be settled, it will certainly be licit no otherwise than war. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 399 and 400.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. Certainly, practically speaking, there can be dispute concerning the conditions of a duel, all of which are required for the whole malice of the act and the incurring of penalties; but never concerning a cause which could legitimate the provocation or acceptance of it, since it is something intrinsically evil. Wherefore, once the existence of a duel has been proved in some particular case, no reason, however grave, will ever excuse.

2nd. It is not licit to undertake a duel by this rule, that when one person has been wounded, or a certain number of blows has been completed, the fight should cease; both because Clement VIII prohibited even non-fatal duels, and because those acting thus implicitly admit any outcome whatsoever of the fight and consequently contract the whole malice of dueling.

3rd. But it is licit to fight for mere defense, even by accepting weapons from the adversary, if death is threatened by him unless the fight is accepted, and there is not another way of escaping this danger; but it is not licit to betake oneself to another place, or to appoint another determined time for defense; because then a duel properly so called would be had.

4th. Those who, on account of an injury, suddenly growing hot with anger, and provoking one another to a fight, immediately come together, do not enter into a duel properly so called; because it is more truly a brawl than a duel, which must be done from an agreement concerning place and time. - Sacred Congregation, Oct. 5, 1744. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 401.

You will ask 1° what a duel is.

I answer. A duel, in Greek monomachia, is the fight of one against one, and thus taken broadly it is the brawl of two between themselves; but as it is taken in law and with respect to ecclesiastical censures, it is commonly defined :²²³ «A dangerous fight of two entered into by agreement or compact, with designation of time and place.» And because the matter of censures is odious, and therefore to be restricted, all parts of this definition are to be taken strictly. Therefore ²²³ S. Lig., lib. IV, n. 406.

It is called 1° «the fight of two;» because, if several promiscuously fight against several, there will be simply a brawl, not a duel, unless single ones determined against single ones determined fight, as is done in a solemn duel. For a twofold duel is distinguished : one solemn or public, when certain ceremonies are employed, as the choice of godfathers or, as they call them, seconds, the assumption of witnesses, letters of challenge, or libels of citation commonly called cartel, etc.; another simple, when these ceremonies are not employed.

It is called 2nd «a dangerous fight;» because fights which are made without peril of killing or grave wounding, such as with fists, a light staff, pulling of hair, etc., although sometimes they are grave sins, are nevertheless not properly duels.

It is called 3rd «by agreement or compact.» So express it Gregory XIII, constitutio Ad tollendam, given in the year 1582, and Clement VIII, in the constitutio Illius vices, given in the year 1592; that is, from an agreement previously made of fighting at a determinate place and time. Whence those who meeting unexpectedly fight, or if one has sought out another, or threatened him, there is no duel, for lack of compact. Similarly, if of two quarreling, one or both run home and return with arms and fight; likewise, if in a rush of anger they say : «Let us fight here,» and they fight, there is not properly a duel, for lack of compact.

It is called 4th «with designation of time and place.» Thus require Gregory XIII and Clement VIII, in the cited constitutions; so that, if the designation either of a determinate place or of a determinate time be wanting, there is no duel properly subject to censures.

You will ask 2° whether the duel is licit.

I answer. 1°. The duel by private authority is not licit : 1° because every private vengeance is illicit; 2° because by the precept Thou shalt not kill not only is killing forbidden, but also proximate peril of killing, as in other precepts; 3° because both the Church and Christian princes prohibit the duel under gravest penalties. Trent, sess. XXV, On Reform., cap. 19; Gregory XIII and Clement VIII, in the cited constitutions.

[Specially Alexander VII condemned this proposition, n. 2 : «A horseman challenged to a duel can accept it, lest he incur the mark of timidity among others.» Since afterwards several authors asserted that the duel is licit in some circumstances, Benedict XIV, constitutio Detestabilem, given November 10, 1752, condemned the following five propositions as false, scandalous and pernicious :

1° «A military man who, unless he offer or accept a duel, would be held as fearful, timid, abject and unfit for military duties, and thence would be deprived of the office whereby he sustains himself and his own, or ought perpetually to lack hope of promotion otherwise due and merited by him, would be without fault and punishment, whether he offer or accept a duel.»

2° «They can also be excused, for the sake of guarding honor or avoiding contempt among men, who accept duels or challenge to them, when they certainly know that the fight will not follow, namely because it will be impeded by others.»

3° «A duke or military official accepting a duel out of grave fear of loss of fame and office does not incur the ecclesiastical penalties laid down by the Church against duellists.»

4° «In the natural state of man it is licit to accept and offer a duel, for preserving fortunes with honor, when the loss of them can by no other remedy be warded off.»

5° «The asserted license for the natural state can also be applied to the state of a badly ordered city, in which plainly justice is denied either through negligence or malice of magistrates.»

It must be added that it is no more licit to take up a duel on this law, that, one being wounded, the fight must cease : because besides the prohibition and scandal, there is present danger of lethal wound. Even if it were certain that the wound would not prove lethal, nevertheless the combat would be illicit : both because any voluntary wound and even blows are included under the precept Thou shalt not kill; and because Clement VIII, constitutio Illius vices, of the year 1592, forbade «duels even non-lethal.»]

I answer. 2°. The duel by public authority is rarely licit. Proof 1° In the first place it is not licit for sake of spectacle or ostentation of strength; because the prince has no right over the life of subjects except malefactors.

2° It is certain that the duel is illicit for detecting crime or innocence, as was once frequent; because in a duel the innocent as equally as the guilty can fall. Whence the manifestation of truth would be awaited either from the devil, and it would be superstition; or from God, and it would be temptation of God.

3° It is not licit to have a duel for ending litigation or controversy between private persons : because either the duel is instituted that through its outcome it may be discerned on which side justice stands, and thus returns the preceding argument; or it is instituted only for this, that, a duel having been made, the parties cease from litigation, and then it is insane and diabolical to wish to incur peril of life, that they desist from a litigation from which they can desist by their own will and with safe life, or which can be terminated by authority of the supreme prince, or by a lot free of danger.

4° Speaking per se, it is not licit to have a duel for ending a controversy, or for avoiding or terminating war between supreme princes; because the duel neither from God nor from nature is a means ordained and proportioned to warding off injury, or to obtaining satisfaction for injury inflicted, which are the two causes of wars and controversies between supreme princes. Ergo. — Proof of the antecedent. He whose state has the right can equally be conquered as the other. For either the faculty of fighting of each is equal, or if one be more practiced, very many things are wont to happen in this singular combat, on account of which often the stronger and more practiced succumbs; and therefore the justice and common good of the state, whether in warding off injury, or in obtaining satisfaction, which ought to be defended by the common forces of the whole community, is exposed to the hazard of the duel. Ergo.

Nor do you say that the common good is likewise exposed to the hazard of war. For a supreme prince cannot enter into war, whether defensive or offensive, except a greater hope of conquering shine forth, whether by force, by stratagems, by help of confederates; or, should he be conquered, of restoring and increasing his forces. For the enemy holds himself toward his enemy as agent toward patient; but the agent acts not unless he be stronger than the patient.

Therefore when it is opposed, that it is better to end a war by the death of one than of many, it is answered that this is true when the killing of one is a means ordained and proportioned to usefully ending the war for the state; which we deny of the duel, except per accidens, in the cases to be reported below. And therefore I said, «speaking per se, it is not licit».

I said also in the answer that the duel is «rarely» licit by public authority; because several cases are assigned by many in which it seems licit by public authority.

The first is, if he who justly wages war feel himself inferior in forces to the enemy, and that he must either fight and succumb, or fight a duel, he can both accept and offer a duel; because he defends the common good in the better way he can and chooses the lesser danger. The same, for the same reason, seems to be said, if he be doubtful about victory, nor is there hope of restoring the army if it be routed.

Second case. If leaders, weighing the inconveniences of war, the detriments of goods, the deaths of many, etc., judge it more useful to the state to settle the controversy by duel than by war; for then the duel is judged by many licit on the part of him who wages just war, provided however that thence victory become not more doubtful than in war.

Third case is, if from this, that a duel offered by the enemy be not accepted, the enemy become bolder and stronger, the other cast down and more timid. Then also that it can be accepted is the opinion of many. And David seems in a like case to have fought against Goliath; or it must be said that he fought thus by divine instinct.

You will ask 3° what are the punishments of duellists.

[The following were laid down by the council of Trent, sess. XXV, On Reform., cap. 19: «Emperors, kings, dukes, princes, marquesses, counts and temporal lords by whatever other name, who shall have conceded a place for monomachy in their lands among Christians, let them be by that very fact excommunicate and understand themselves deprived of jurisdiction and dominion over the city, castle or place in which or near which they permitted the duel to be made, which they hold from the Church, and if they be fiefs, let them be acquired straightway by their direct lords. Those truly who committed the fight, and those called their godfathers, let them incur penalty of excommunication, proscription of all their goods, perpetual infamy : and let them be bound to be punished as homicides according to the sacred canons, and if they die in the conflict itself, let them lack forever ecclesiastical burial. Those also who give counsel in the cause of a duel both in law and in fact, or by whatever other reason persuade anyone thereto, as well as spectators, let them be held in the bond of excommunication and perpetual malediction : notwithstanding any privilege or evil custom whatsoever, even immemorial.»

The punishments of proscription of all goods and perpetual infamy, which can now nowise be applied, have grown obsolete. The penalty of excommunication latae sententiae is numbered among the censures simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff in the constitutio Apostolicae Sedis, Oct. 12, 1869. There is mentioned «those perpetrating duels, or simply challenging to it, or accepting it; and any accomplices whatever or offering any aid or favor, as well as spectators of deliberate purpose, permitting it, or not prohibiting it as far as lies in them, of whatsoever dignity they be, even royal or imperial.» Thus were confirmed, besides the decree of Trent, the constitutions of Gregory XIII, Ad tollendam; Clement VIII, Illius vices; Benedict XIV, Detestabilem.

This text, sufficiently perspicuous, will be explained below, on Censures. It need only be noted here that the excommunication extends wider than in the Tridentine decree, namely to challengers with mind of fighting, and to accepters, although from any cause whatever the duel does not follow. This fully accords with the aforesaid bull of Clement VIII.

Privation of ecclesiastical burial, which is a penalty distinct from excommunication, was decreed by Trent against those alone who «died in the conflict itself.» That the abuse of duels might be more efficaciously extirpated, Benedict XIV, in the constitutio Detestabilem, Nov. 10, 1752, decreed that severer measures be taken : «We decree and declare, he says, privation of sacred burial inflicted by the most holy Tridentine synod upon those dying in the place of the duel and combat to be incurred forever, even before sentence of the judge, upon him dying also outside the place of combat from wound accepted therein, whether the duel be publicly or privately declared, and even if the wounded man before death gave not uncertain signs of penance and obtained absolution from sins and censures : taken away the faculty of interpreting and dispensing concerning this penalty from bishops and Ordinaries of places; whereby to others there be offered a document of fleeing the crime and rendering due obedience to the laws of the Church.

Perhaps someone will object that this penalty is prescribed less strictly in the Roman Ritual increased and corrected at the command of the same Benedict XIV, where is read, tit. On Funerals : «Ecclesiastical burial is denied... to those dying in a duel, even if before death they gave signs of penance;» whereby the penalty seems restricted to duellists dying «in the conflict itself,» as had been enacted by Trent.

I answer that the constitution Detestabilem was published after the Brief Quam ardenti, whereby Benedict XIV, March 25, 1752, approved the new edition of the Ritual.]

You will ask 4° if one or both provoke themselves to a duel for preserving honor, not with mind of fighting, certainly knowing it will be impeded by friends, or otherwise not come about, or even with mind of fighting and inflicting some blows, but morally certain that no damage will follow thence, rather peace to be reconciled — do they incur excommunication.

I answer. probably negatively, because they provoke not truly, but apparently only, to a duel; for a duel is a dangerous fight. Yet in the external forum, where nothing is judged of internal things, it will be reckoned a duel, and therefore cannot be excused from fault.

You will ask 5° who can absolve from a duel.

I answer. That Clement VIII, by the cited bull, reserved this case to the Pope alone, derogating from the faculties and indults granted to any persons whatsoever of whatsoever order, state, rank or condition.

[In the constitutio Apostolicae Sedis, as was said above, this censure is inscribed among the cases simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff, and therefore cap. Liceat of the council of Trent can be applied to it, of which below.]

Nevertheless weighty authors judge that, when the case is occult, bishops can absolve from it, on account of the privilege granted to them by the council of Trent, sess. XXIV, cap. 6, Liceat, which was not derogated from by this constitution of Clement VIII, since no mention of it is made, as ought to have been done, that it be judged derogated. So Lezana, after Bonacina and Sanchez. And I judge this to be the common practice.

ARTICLE IV

On scandal.

MONOMACHIAM, or the Duel, S. Bonavent. says in speculo animae, cap. 1., toward the end, is prohibited by the Laws, and has the character of mortal sin, both in the appellants and in the lord by whose authority it is held, and in the procurators and in the combatants fighting for money; and this is clear since it has the character of tempting God, and the weak is overcome by the strong, not by right but by nature. Some say, however, that custom excuses this deed; the contrary of which is commonly held by Theologians and Jurists. Such is S. Bonaventura's account.

DVELLUM is a combat of two or more, by agreement, in a fixed and appointed place and time, to redeem the truth of some matter, or to purge a crime or an imputed infamy. So the Doctors commonly: Sanchez Lib. 2. Decal. cap. 39.; Azor Tom. 3. lib. 2. cap. 5.; Bonacina tract. 3. disp. 11. quaest. 3. puncto 42.

TALE a combat is prohibited by the Church in cap. Monomachiam 2. quaest. 5. et cap. 1. et 2. de purgat. vulgari, and cap. Porro; although the Bishop could dispense in this, provided no death or mutilation of a member followed, as D. Bonavent. relates in confessionali, cap. 5. particula 29.

The Theologians condemn it also, with D. Bonavent. here, and D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 95. art. 8. ad 3.

DAMNATUR — the duel is gravely condemned in the Council of Trent sess. 25. cap. 19.. He speaks there of the solemn and public duel, held by the authority of Princes in their States.

RURSUS Gregory XIII also condemned the private duel in the Brief ad tollendam detestabilem, in the year 1582. And finally the same was decreed by Clement VIII in the year 1592.

FULMINAT — the Council of Trent moreover fulminates excommunication in these words:

Detestabilis — The detestable custom of duels, introduced by the contrivance of the Devil, that it might reap the ruin of souls together with the bloody death of bodies, is to be wholly eradicated from the Christian world. Emperors, Kings, Dukes, Princes, Marquesses, Counts, and by whatever other name temporal Lords, who have granted a place for Monomachia in their territories among Christians, are by that very fact excommunicated, and are to be understood as deprived of the jurisdiction and dominion of the city, castle, or place in which or near which they permitted the duel to take place, which the Church claims for herself; and if they be feoffed,

directis — the lands are at once acquired by the direct Lords. But those who have engaged in the combat, and those who are called their seconds, shall incur the penalty of excommunication and proscription of all their goods, and of perpetual infamy; and as homicides they ought to be punished according to the Sacred Canons. And if they have died in the conflict itself, let them be forever without Ecclesiastical Sepulture. Those also who have given counsel in the cause of a duel, both in law and in fact, or have by any other reason persuaded anyone to it, as well as the spectators, are bound by the chain of excommunication and perpetual Malediction: notwithstanding any privilege whatsoever, or wicked custom, even though immemorial.

ADVERTUNT — Fagundez, however, in Quintum praeceptum, Lib. 5. cap. 8. et alii, observes that the excommunication laid by the very fact upon Princes is not reserved, and accordingly can be absolved by any approved Confessor; for whenever the supreme Pontiff imposes an excommunication, if he does not reserve it, it is considered reserved to no one, and any Priest exposed to it can absolve from it, as Delrius noted, lib 4. disq. mag. cap. 4. quest. 4. sect. 2.; Graffis p. p. decis. lib. 4. cap. 23.; Sà V. Excommunicatio, 14.; Sanchez Tom. 1. decal. Lib. 2. cap. 39. num. 27. et tom. 2. de matrim. disp. 13.; Fagundez loco cit. num. 4.

ENIM — but Pius IV, in the year of our Lord 1560, in his Constitution, and Clem. VIII in 1592, reserved this excommunication to themselves; and they extend this censure, and the other penalties of the Council, to private duels as well.

POSSUNT — Religious, however, who hold the faculty of absolving from the papal cases, can absolve outside Italy and in Rome itself, as the Sacred Congregation declares, as gathered by Fagundez num. 5. and Diana part. 5. Tract. 14. resol. 102., who says they can be absolved in Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia, which are probably outside Italy.

DEINDE — mark further that the excommunication of combatants, seconds, and spectators, in the Council, is not expressly stated to be by the very fact: therefore it is not a latae sententiae penalty — so teach Petrus Navar. Lib. 2. de restit. cap. 32. num. 293. and Rodriquez tomo 1. summae, in 2. edit. cap. 73.

EAM — that it is nonetheless laid by law, Suarez holds, de censur. disp. 13. sect. ult. num. 11.; Sanchez Lib. 2. decal. cap. 39. num. 26.; Navar. summa Lat. cap. 27. n. 150.; Delrius lib. 4. disq. magic. quaest. 4. sect. 4.; Toletan. 5. summa cap. 6. num. 32.; Sà V. Excommunicatio; Graff. p. p. decis. tract. 4. cap. 23.; Fagundez num. 7. For he seems to suppose the same from what has been said.

SED — but the dispute is already cut short, for Pius IV and Clem. VIII bind all of them by excommunication latae sententiae.

POENAE — the remaining penalties, however, require the sentence of a Judge, even deprivation of sepulture, as many Doctors teach, as gathered by Fagundez. Pius IV adds many other penalties, of which the same holds. Gregory XIII, however, includes also those who command and do not hinder.

CLEMENS — Clement VIII, moreover, interdicts the places in which a duel is held with the permission of the Lords, whose relaxation he reserves to himself and his successors alone; and because it is a censure, it is incurred by the very fact, as the Doctors commonly teach, as gathered by Sanchez Lib. 2. decal. cap. 39. num. 32.

GRAVITER — I observe, however, gravely, first, with Hurtado 2. 2. disp. 170. sect. 21. §. 190., Fagundez num. 35. and others gathered by him num. 29., against Filliucius tract. 29. cap. 9. num. 176., that the penalties inflicted for dueling are not incurred unless the duel follows. Wherefore if those going to it are removed, it is not incurred. The instigators, however, the relators, and those who intermeddle to promote the duel do incur them, by Clement VIII and Gregory XIII, as gathered by Fagundez num. 29.

ADVERTO — I observe secondly that some say it is lawful to hold a duel to protect life, so that force may repel force: but this is altogether false, as is commonly taught by Sanchez Tomo 1. decal. Lib. 2. cap. 39., Valencia, and others. Hurtado imagines a case indeed, which seems to me rather metaphysical than practical. See Diana part. 5. Tract. 14. resol. 99., who refutes him.

NEQUE — nor is a duel lawful to protect honor, the Doctors cry out commonly, as gathered by Sanchez cap. 39. num. 9.; Azor tract. 3. lib. 2. cap. 4. quaest. 6.; Fagundez num. 39. Alex. VII defined this in the decree of 1665, as I noted, set forth and proved in the place cited at the end of question 3.

PROPONIT — Diana, however, proposes the question part. 5. tract. 13. resol. 27.: whether, if the accuser offers a purgative duel, an innocent man may accept it in order to protect temporal goods, or his life, or a part of his body, which he would otherwise lose through the malice of the judge and of the accuser.

Negative — Negative answers are given by Lessius lib. 2. cap. 9. dub. 8. num. 47.; Filliucius tomo 2. tract. 29. num. 144.; Suarez de Charitate, disp. 13. sect. ult. num. 5.; Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 3. ad 3.; Abul. primo Reg cap. 17. quaest. ult.; Salon 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 3. controu. 3.

ASSERUNT — but Sanchez affirms it, in summa, tomo 1. Lib. 2. cap. 39. num. 7.; Bannes 1. 2. quaest. 64. art. 7. dub. 4.; Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 95. art. 8. ad 1. et in summa, V. Duellum.; Hurtado 2. 2. disp. 70. sect. 8. §. 170.; and others, as gathered by Fagundez num. 41. et 44.

PROBANT — they prove it because this is not a duel but just defense; for since it is lawful to kill an unjust despoiler of one's goods, the acceptance of a duel of this kind will also be just.

SED — but these men do not read the reasoning of D. Bonavent., who rebukes them: for this mode of defense is absurd and tempts God; for the innocent can easily be slain by the wicked, and it is not a just defense of the goods of a lower order to demand a life, and — what is more insane — to expose even one's own life to the peril of death.

Hinc — Hence Diana smiles wrongly, when he says that one may even accept a duel for the protection of honors and public offices.

Neque — Nor does the opinion of Hurtadi 2. 2. disp. 170. sect. 9. §. 82. prove to my mind, that an innocent man may offer single combat to his accuser when he cannot otherwise protect himself and his own; with him adhere Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 7. dub. 4. Sanchez tomo 1. sum. Lib. 2. cap. 39. num. 7. Petrus Nauar. de restit. lib. 2. cap. 3. num. 289. Valentia tomo 3. disp. 3. quaest. 17. puncto 1. Nutilius 2. 2. tract. de Charitate, quaest. 17. art. 1.

Errant — They are perfectly in error, for, as D. Bonavent. says, they do not have the conditions of necessity with the moderation of blameless self-defense, since other ways lie open for their defense; and this one is assumed whereby they lose the valid protection of Justice, if the innocent man casts himself into the peril of death, repelling the aggressor only in a foolish manner, tempting God, and desiring that his own life and innocence be preserved from wounds — all of which, in my judgment, sound foolish, as the S. Doctor argues, and with him very many, as gathered by Fagundez num. 47.

Utinam — Would that the zealots for honor would attend to the fact that they are to be proclaimed infamous by the Church, accursed, and cast out for burial like an ass's. These would best satisfy the cartel by saying that they are Christians, to whom the Duel is forbidden because of infamy, as Bassaeus says, V. Homicidium 1. num. 15.

Sane — Ludovicus XIII. Iustus, rightly acclaimed by the supreme Pontiff Urbano VIII., sanctioned in the most flourishing Empire of Gaul that law worthy of golden tablets: that those who engage in a duel, sealed with the mark of perpetual infamy, after death inflicted by the executioner, should carry with them to Orcus the eternal disgrace of their glory. Most prudently did that glorious Monarch restrain the generous spirits of the Gauls from the more frequent slaughter of their own people. As some Orator shrewdly expounds, it was a device truly not unlike that by which the African peoples drew back the Lions from slaughter, hanging very many from the branches of trees and exposing them strangled. For the Generous Progeny indeed attended that spectacle of infamy, nor did the offspring of the Lion, seeing their fathers hanging from the gallows, ever return again to waylay merchants and travelers on those roads. They too likewise rested, nor did they lead their lion cubs on to the slaughter.

Audiant — Let them hear, therefore, the penalties inflicted upon duels by the new law of the Council of Trent, of Pius IV, Gregory XIII, and Clement VIII. Of these five are spiritual: first, Excommunication latae sententiae, reserved to the supreme Pontiff. Second, Deprivation of Ecclesiastical sepulture, if they die in the duel. Third, Interdict upon those places in which the duel was held, with the knowledge of their Lords. Fourth, Deprivation of ecclesiastical dignities and benefices, if they were Ecclesiastical persons. Fifth, Inability to obtain those and other things.

Quinque — Five also are temporal. The first is deprivation of States and dominion for those Princes who are subject to the Roman Church; or deprivation of the jurisdiction and dominion of the place in which the duel is held, for other Princes not subject. Second, the crime of Lèse-majesté. Third, rebellion. Fourth, confiscation of all goods. Fifth, perpetual infamy.

Omnes — All the temporal penalties require the sentence of a Judge in order to be incurred, likewise also the spiritual, except Excommunication and Interdict, as Fagundez proves at length, num. 51., in accordance with what I proved in Tract. de Legibus, disputatione 5. quaestione 7.