3. On Dueling

124. Definition. Dueling is a contest between two or a few persons, done by agreement concerning place, time, and lethal weapons (or at least weapons gravely wounding).

It is explained. For constituting a true duel, it makes no difference with what intention it was done, e.g., for the sake of vainglory, of saving honor, of preserving an office, of taking revenge. Hence in the definition nothing is said concerning intention. But it is said 1. a contest between two or a few, because a contest between two armies is no longer called a duel, but war. Although in ancient times duels were celebrated in such a way that on each side several persons fought at the same time, nevertheless today this mode of dueling is unusual, and a duel is always a strictly singular fight, i.e., between two persons.

It is said 2. from agreement concerning place, time, and weapons. This threefold agreement or pact is an essential condition of a duel. For if two fight from an impulse of anger or revenge, they are not in a duel, although perhaps they go to a determinate place for the sake of fighting. As to the third agreement or pact, namely concerning weapons, it is required and enough that the weapons be suited for inflicting a grave wound, e.g., a gun, revolver, sword, dagger (commonly, Rapier, Schläger), etc. Therefore it is not a duel which is done for exercise in certain schools of swordsmanship, or which is done with rods or sticks. But it is not required that a lethal wound be immediately inflicted by these weapons, nor that in the duel there be grave danger of death. It is enough that a grave wound can be inflicted. Hence even the so-called academic duels or "Mensuren, Bestimmungsmensuren," although in them directly lethal weapons are not employed, have been proscribed by the Church as true duels and are subject to the ecclesiastical penalties established against dueling.¹³³

Division. Dueling is divided a) into solemn or public and into private; b) into fatal and non-fatal. A solemn or public duel is that which in ancient times was had by public authority on account of the public good, e.g., for ending a dispute between two nations. A private duel is that which is undertaken in a private name, and indeed ordinarily for defending honor, as they say. Even in a private duel there are seconds and other assistants. A fatal duel is that which has or at least intends a fatal outcome, i.e., the death of one of the duelists; otherwise it is called a non-fatal duel.

¹³³ S. C. Conc., Aug. 9, 1890, Feb. 10, 1923, June 20, 1925 (Acta Ap. Sed. XV, 155 and XVIII, 137).

125. Principle. A duel undertaken by public authority for the common good is not morally evil; but one done by private authority is gravely illicit and induces grave ecclesiastical penalties.

It is proved. a) That a duel undertaken by public authority is lawful is plain of itself; for if from public authority army can fight against army on account of the common good, a fortiori (namely lest the blood of many be poured out) a singular fight in a duel can be permitted on account of the same common good. Thus at least of itself. Thus it was lawful that David fight with Goliath. But I say that this is lawful only for the common good. Hence duels of private men do not yet become licit if the legislative power of some region indulges private duels too much, because from these private duels no true utility arises for the common good, as in the fights of gladiators among the pagans.

b) Private dueling gravely opposes the law both natural and ecclesiastical, and also at least certain civil laws. And certainly it opposes natural law; for duelists "direct their mind and strength to this, bound by no necessity, that they take away life or at least inflict a wound upon the adversary."¹³⁴ Moreover, they expose themselves to danger of death or grave wounding without sufficient motive. For the motive of dueling ordinarily is honor to be saved. This motive, although it is not always the end of the worker, since he not rarely completes the duel compelled by harsh necessity, nevertheless is almost always the end of the work. No one of sound mind will say that honor, whether mine or another's, has been saved if I have killed or wounded the adversary, or, what is still clearer, if I myself have been killed or wounded. Therefore there is not a sufficient motive for making or accepting a duel and thus exposing oneself to grave danger. To this is added that from dueling very grave damages often arise, without any notable good following from it.¹³⁵

But since dueling is so damaging and irrational, ecclesiastical law has several times most severely prohibited it. Thus the Council of Trent¹³⁶ established: "Let the detestable use of duels, introduced by the contrivance of the devil, so that by the bloody death of bodies he may also gain the destruction of souls, be utterly exterminated from the Christian world. The emperor, kings ... and temporal lords by whatever other name, who shall have conceded a place for single combat [i.e., duel] in their lands among Christians, are by that very fact excommunicated.... But those who have entered upon the fight, and those who are called their seconds, incur the penalty of excommunication ... and of perpetual infamy, and ought to be punished as homicides according to the sacred canons; and if they die in the very conflict, let them perpetually lack ecclesiastical burial." The Council likewise punishes with excommunication those counseling or watching a duel. Benedict XIV enlarged and explained these Tridentine laws in the Constitution Detestabilem,¹³⁷ in which he condemns the following propositions as false, scandalous, and pernicious:

1. "A military man who, unless he offers or accepts a duel, would be held as fearful, timid, abject, and unfit for military offices, and from this would be deprived of the office by which he sustains himself and his own, or would have to lack perpetually the hope of promotion otherwise due and deserved for himself, would be free of fault and penalty, whether he offers or accepts the duel."

2. "Those accepting a duel, or provoking to it, can also be excused for the sake of protecting honor or avoiding human contempt, when they know certainly that the fight is not going to follow, since it is to be impeded by others."

3. "A commander or military official accepting a duel from grave fear of loss of reputation and office does not incur the ecclesiastical penalties established by the Church against duelists."

4. "It is lawful, in the state of natural man, to accept and offer a duel for preserving fortunes with honor, when the loss of them cannot be repelled by another remedy."

5. "The asserted license for the natural state can also be applied to the state of a badly ordered city, in which, namely, either by negligence or by malice of the magistrate, justice is openly denied."

From all these things it follows that a duel properly so called is never licit. Hence the sophisms which are often brought forward in its favor, and which were clearly and profoundly rejected by Leo XIII in the letter Pastoralis officii of Sept. 12, 1891, to the bishops of Germany and Austria, are to be made little of. But I say "a duel properly so called"; for if it is only a fight for defending oneself and one's goods against an unjust invader, then it is licit with the moderation of blameless defense, as is plain from the things said above, n. 120, concerning an unjust aggressor.

The civil laws of several nations also gravely prohibit dueling, e.g., in England and Austria.¹³⁸ In some regions, however, although dueling is prohibited of itself, nevertheless great connivance is employed toward those who nevertheless have perpetrated a duel.

¹³⁴ Leo XIII, apostolic letter Pastoralis officii, Sept. 12, 1891.

¹³⁵ Cajetan (In S. theol. 2, 2, q. 95, a. 8) treats acutely of the malice of dueling, concluding: "The nature of a duel is foreign to the nature of a just war, both defensive and vindicative. And therefore in no respect is a duel found to be a proportionate means for the ending of a dispute, whether civil or criminal. And because evils are not to be done that goods may come, let him rather suffer who cannot otherwise protect his rights." On the history of dueling, see Staatslexikon der Görres-Gesellschaft, s.v. "Zweikampf."

¹³⁶ Sess. 25, c. 19 de reform.

¹³⁷ Nov. 10, 1752; Denz. n. 1491-1498.

¹³⁸ Articles of war n. 101. Mandate of Emperor Charles, Nov. 4, 1917.

126. The ecclesiastical penalties against dueling are four:

a) They incur excommunication, to be incurred by the fact itself and simply reserved to the Holy See, "those who perpetrate a duel, or simply challenge to a duel, or accept it, or furnish any favor or assistance to it, and also those who intentionally watch it, or permit it or do not prohibit it so far as they can, of whatever dignity they may be."¹³⁹ By this excommunication six classes of persons are punished:

1. Those perpetrating a duel, even an academic duel or "Mensur";¹⁴⁰

2. Those challenging, namely seriously, even though afterward the duel itself does not follow.

3. Those accepting. Grave fear of losing an office does not excuse;¹⁴¹

4. Any who furnish favor, e.g., seconds, witnesses, physicians, those renting a house, provided nevertheless that the duel actually follows. For if the duel has been impeded on account of some cause, then the censure is not incurred by the seconds, witnesses, and physicians.¹⁴²

A physician and a priest can indeed licitly be called to him who has been wounded in a duel, but they cannot, by agreement, wait in a place near the duel in order more easily to help him who will be wounded. For this would make the duelists more courageous, and consequently would be the same as favoring the duel.¹⁴³

5. Those intentionally watching, i.e., those who openly and with explicit intention approach the place of the duel for the sake of watching, and thus make the duelists more courageous. Therefore he does not fall under the excommunication who by chance comes to the place of the duel and sees the duelists, or who, without the duelists knowing it, watches the fight from a hiding place.

6. Those permitting, i.e., those who can and ought from office to impede the duel and do not do it.

b) The duelists and their seconds are infamous by the fact itself.¹⁴⁴

c) He who kills or mutilates another in a duel incurs a twofold irregularity, namely from delict (of homicide) and from infamy of law. But he who has been wounded in a duel incurs only one irregularity, namely from infamy of law.¹⁴⁵

d) He who dies in the duel itself, or a little afterward from a wound received in the duel, cannot be given ecclesiastical burial unless he has given signs of penitence before death.¹⁴⁶ The ancient discipline, introduced by the Council of Trent and confirmed by Benedict XIV, never conceded ecclesiastical burial to those dead from a duel, even penitents.

¹³⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 2351.

¹⁴⁰ S. C. Conc., Aug. 9, 1890, and Feb. 10, 1923.

¹⁴¹ Cf. above, prop. 1 and 3.

¹⁴² Hollweck, Kirchenrechtliche Strafgesetze p. 408.

¹⁴³ S. C. Inquis., May 28, 1884.

¹⁴⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 2351, § 2.

¹⁴⁵ Thus the Council of Trent, l.c.; Code of Canon Law, c. 2351, § 2; S. C. Conc., Aug. 9, 1890.

¹⁴⁶ Code of Canon Law, c. 1240, § 1, n. 4.

127. Scholion 1. On societies fostering dueling. In some Universities there are accustomed to exist corporations of students which by force of statutes oblige to a duel when the case occurs. Certainly no Catholic young man can become a member of corporations of this kind unless a) there is a most urgent cause, and b) a founded hope is present that he will never be in the necessity of accepting a duel, and in fact will never accept a duel. If these two conditions are present, Catholic members of these corporations can sometimes be left in good faith.¹⁴⁷ But if someone says that this opinion is too lax, he is also bound to prohibit all Catholic young men from accepting the office of officer in certain modern armies, since even there every officer is obliged by force of statutes to a duel. But no theologian teaches this.

¹⁴⁷ Against this opinion see: Kirchl. Anzeiger f. d. Erzdiöz. Köln 1926, Nr. 45, 3, p. 36.

128. Scholion 2. On the obligation of restitution arising from a duel. It is not easy in practice to determine according to the principles concerning unjust damaging when from a duel which has been done there arises an obligation of restitution. Yet the following seem to be sufficiently certain: a) He who freely challenges another to a duel has no right to exact reparation for damages perhaps brought upon himself from the duel. Hence if he himself is wounded, he must bear all the expenses of the physician; if he dies, his heirs can reclaim nothing from the other duelist. b) He who indeed has been challenged by another to a duel, but freely and spontaneously accepts it, also has no right to any reparation of damage inflicted upon himself. For he is presumed to yield his right. c) He who has been challenged by another to a duel and accepts it only compelled by grave fear has a right that the other duelist repair all the damages arisen. Hence if he has been wounded, the challenger is bound to make good the expenses of treatment (unless nevertheless the wounded man forgives this explicitly or implicitly); but if he has died in the duel, then the challenger must repair to the heirs all the damages arisen from the duel and death. Deservedly Lehmkuhl¹⁴⁸ says: "Wherefore it is false that duelists are never held from justice to make compensation to the survivors."

¹⁴⁸ Theol. mor. I, n. 1182.