Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Question Four: On Dueling
365. A duel, among moralists, is a singular combat (monomachy) entered into between two or more persons, from a pact or agreement, with arms suited to killing or gravely wounding. Whence three things are required for it:
a) a singular combat, which generally is entered into between two, sometimes between several equal in number, with whatever intention it is done, whether for the sake of exercise, or of vengeance, or of repairing honor, or of showing fortitude, or of proving a right;
b) entered into from a pact, in which, namely, the adversaries agree concerning the time, place, and arms: but if two, under a movement of anger, immediately come together, or one attacks another and the latter defends himself, it is not a duel properly so called;
c) arms suited to killing or gravely wounding, so that it is by no means necessary that in fact death or a grave wound follow, but it suffices that of itself a grave wound can be inflicted, which, namely, would be matter of grave sin. Thus a fight which is done with the fist, a rod, a staff, or a sword with blunted edge, so that of itself neither is gravely wounded, is not a duel, although it can be a mortal sin.
One duel is public, which is entered into from public authority on account of the public good; another is private, which is undertaken in a private name.
A public duel can be licit if it is done for the common good, to weaken enemies, or to end a controversy or war between two peoples, with less damage, lest the blood of many be poured out; - not always, however, but provided that it favors the common good or at least does not harm it:1 for if a whole army, for defending the common good, can fight against another army, even the leaders can agree that one or a few should fight against one or a few. Yet on account of a particular good, from the authority of a judge, such a duel would not be licit for vindicating an injury or manifesting the truth, because it is not a means necessary for these ends, since other means are present, nor is it done, as in the prior case, for impeding greater violence.
1 Three cases are indicated in Billuart, On Charity, diss. 7, a. 5: The first case is if he who wages a just war feels himself inferior in forces to the enemy, and that one must either fight and succumb or duel; he can both accept and offer a duel, because he defends the common good in the better way in which he can, and chooses the lesser danger. The same, for the same reason, seems to have to be said if he is doubtful concerning victory, and there is no hope of restoring the army in the case in which it is routed. The second case: if the leaders, considering the inconveniences of war, the detriments of goods, the deaths of many, etc., judge it more useful for the republic to settle the controversy by duel than by war; for then the duel is judged licit by many on the part of him who wages a just war, provided, however, that the victory is not made more doubtful than in war. The third case is if, from the fact that the duel offered by the enemy is not accepted, the enemy becomes bolder and more powerful, the other cast down and more timid; then also it is the opinion of many that it can be accepted. And in a similar case David seems to have fought against Goliath.
But a private duel is always a grave sin, as the doctrine of the Catholic Church holds.2
2 On dueling M. Gierens, Ehre-Duell und Mensur, can usefully be read.
Among the ancients there were no duels except public and solemn ones between the leaders of armies or certain soldiers, for putting an end to war. At Rome indeed there existed bloody fights of gladiators between captives and slaves; but they were not duels properly so called, since those men were compelled to the fight, and did not freely agree upon it.
In the Middle Ages, there were private singular combats, among the Gauls and Germans, for vindicating to oneself a determinate right or good; from this usage judicial duels or ordeals seem to have arisen, for the sake of ending a controversy, which, borrowed from the Germans and Lombards, existed widely diffused: when full proof was lacking, under the authority of a judge, a duel between litigants was in use for proof of the truth, which thus was left to the judgment of God, whom they supposed to intervene in favor of justice. But tournaments held among knights differed from duels, not indeed with a hostile mind, but for the sake of exercise and of showing fortitude; although nevertheless at times they degenerated into duels or were entered into with danger of life.
From these tournaments and from the suppression of ordeals, in the sixteenth century there arose, first in France and Italy, duels, according to the manner of speaking today, more strictly so called, held, namely, for the sake of vindicating honor. When reputation or honor had been injured, nobles and military leaders thought that this could be vindicated only by arms and washed with blood: for they judged that they did not carry swords in vain. This custom first prevailed among nobles and soldiers, then also among men of the gown and political men.
366. Principle. A private duel is of itself and intrinsically and always gravely evil and unjust. - It is proved:
A. From the doctrine and legislation of the Church, reprobating the duel as a grave crime and punishing it with grave penalties. After various decrees of Pontiffs, bishops, and particular councils, sanctions against the duel were enacted in the Council of Trent, sess. 25, c. 19, on reformation, and then, explained by Benedict XIV and renewed by Pius IX, are found confirmed in the new Code of Law.
Can. 2351: "§ 1. Those who perpetrate a duel, - or simply provoke another to it, - or accept it, or furnish any assistance or favor, - and also those deliberately watching it - and those permitting it, or, so far as is in them, not prohibiting it, of whatever dignity they may be, are subject ipso facto to an excommunication simply reserved to the Apostolic See.
Can. 1240: "They are deprived of ecclesiastical burial, unless before death they have given some signs of penitence... those dead in a duel or from a wound received from it."
B. By reason: A duel is intrinsically and gravely evil, because the dueler rashly and without sufficient reason exposes himself both to danger of his own death or injury, and to danger of killing or injuring another. Hence a duel includes:
- the injustice of suicide toward God, the author and lord of life;
- the injustice of homicide, also toward another;
- an illegal injustice toward society, since it is born gravely to harm not only the very family of the dueler but also the public peace, and it is repugnant to social order: for it is not licit by private force and hand to vindicate one's own right, apart from the case of legitimate defense against an actual and unjust aggression, in the case of urgent necessity, as was explained above.
In the case of a duel it is manifest that the necessity of legitimate defense is not present, for
a) the aggression, if there was any, is not actually existing but already past;
b) recourse can be had to judges or other prudent men who are able to compose the matter;
c) recourse to arms is incapable of vindicating honor or reputation: "For although," says Leo XIII,3 "he who, after receiving an injury, has appointed the combat departs victor from the contest, this will be the judgment of all sensible men: by such an outcome of the contest he is proved indeed better in strength for wrestling, or in handling arms, than the challenger, but not therefore superior in honor; but if the same man himself has fallen, to whom in turn would this manner of protecting honor not seem ill-considered, not plainly absurd?"
3 In the apostolic letter Pastoralis officii, 12 Sept. 1891, to the bishops of Germany and Austria-Hungary.
d) similarly, a duel is not a means apt for proving innocence, or proving a right or the truth of an assertion; moreover, to suppose God's special intervention in favor of truth or justice in a duel is impious, and to demand or require this is nothing other than to tempt God Himself.
367. Corollaries. - 1. Hence those are not excused who accept a duel in order to avoid very grave evils, or lest they be held sluggish or cowardly.4 Even for the best end, it is illicit to employ evil means. Therefore Leo XIII says: "If the duties of men were to be measured from the false opinions of the crowd, not from the eternal norm of the right and the just, there would be no natural and true distinction between honorable actions and shameful deeds. The pagan sages themselves both knew and handed down that the fallacious judgments of the crowd must be spurned by a strong and constant man." Moreover, one can propose something else, namely, an office of charity to be undertaken with danger of death.
4 "A knight challenged to a duel can accept it, lest he incur among others the mark of timidity": proposition 2 condemned by Alexander VII.
- Even to soldiers duels are not licit, so that by such exercise military virtue may be sharpened and an end imposed on the innumerable quarrels which arise among them. For, says Leo XIII, "the incitements of military virtue look to this, that the state may be more prepared against enemies. But will this be able to be effected by the aid of that custom which by its own nature looks to this, that, when a disagreement has arisen among soldiers, the causes of which are hardly rare, one or the other from the individual parts of the defenders of the fatherland is killed?" Besides, there are other means for composing disagreements, such as, for example, the judgment of arbitrators.
- Less dangerous duels, in which the adversaries stop from fighting after a certain number of blows has been completed, or at the first light wound inflicted, or, as they say, at the shedding of the first drop of blood, are also true duels, since they are done with arms of themselves suited to gravely wounding and do not exclude grave danger, whence even in such duels a more unhappy outcome sometimes occurs. But how ridiculous it is to bargain for such a condition appears to one thinking even lightly, since no special force can be in the first little drops of blood so that it may vindicate the honor of the offended man. It is added that Clement VIII also prohibited non-fatal duels, and that this kind is born to create scandal and to furnish occasion for fatal duels.
- Academic duels, as they are called, in which students, with certain parts of the body well covered, try to inflict a wound upon one another in the face with a lighter sword, in ecclesiastical law are to be equated with true duels, even if of themselves they do not bring danger of graver wounding, as is established from the declaration of the S.C.C., 9 Aug. 1890, which retains its force with the new code promulgated, as was said 10 Feb. 1923, and again was confirmed and illustrated 13 June 1925.
For they are a favor furnished to the duel and a preparation for it, as also a confirmation and propagation of the prejudices upon which the duel rests; whence they constitute grave scandal. Besides, they too are done of themselves with arms suited to gravely wounding.
368. Remark. - After the recent war the practice of dueling happily began to decrease. In some regions, however, perhaps it could still happen that a duel is sometimes imposed on soldiers by leaders. Although generally the doctrine of the Church concerning the duel is not unknown, nevertheless there can be soldiers who in the said circumstances, unwillingly and in good faith, undertake a duel, whether they are ignorant of the penalties annexed, or falsely persuade themselves that they cannot avoid such a fight. The confessor will have to attend to this good faith, so that in warning the penitent he may be prudent, lest altogether uselessly he disturb his conscience. Nevertheless, generally it is better that men know that every duel is condemned by the Church, and that scandal must be guarded against which would result from a duel accepted by a Catholic soldier.