Chapter — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

VI. On Duel

746.

What is a duel? A duel strictly so called, and as it is prohibited by canon law with grave penalties, is a fight between two or a few, undertaken by private authority and by agreement, with danger of killing, mutilation, or grave wound.

Between two or a few, namely in equal number; and thus it is distinguished from war, which is of many against many. By private authority, for by public authority, such as that of David with the giant Goliath, and of the Horatii with the Curiatii, it is lawful, since a fight of a few is no less lawful than of many, if each is undertaken by public authority for the common good. By agreement, namely an agreement which by common consent indicates place and time, and thus it is distinguished from a brawl, which supposes no preceding pact. The weapons also must be designated for the penalties to be incurred. For this is the ordinary custom of duels, that weapons also be designated. Therefore the Roman Pontiffs, prohibiting duel and establishing penalties against duellists, are to be judged to be speaking of such a fight, a detestable practice, although they make mention only of agreement, a fixed time, and an appointed place. Gregory XIII, C. Ad tollendum, a. 1582. With danger, etc., so that all those fights unsuited to inflicting grave injury are excluded from the notion of duel strictly such, such as those which are done with light rods or other instruments not ordered to killing or gravely wounding, although in such a fight one is injured per accidens. Hence it is clear that one acts unlawfully indeed and sins mortally, but nevertheless it is not a duel strictly so called, and consequently not subject to the penalties of law, when two men, burning suddenly with anger because of an injury, and provoking each other to a fight, suddenly engage, although from the same impulse of anger and vengeance they immediately go together to some suitable place for this. The reason is that thus the provocation and fight are not morally two actions, but only one, and therefore it is not properly a fight from a previous agreement or designation of time and place. Struggl 55 seqq.; Sanch. in Decal. l. 2, c. 39, aa. 13, 14; La-Croix l. 3, p. 1, n. 843 seqq.; L. 399, 401.

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Is a duel lawful? - Duel is intrinsically evil and mortal. Proof: 1. For it is contrary to natural law knowingly and by private authority to expose oneself and another to the proximate danger of killing, mutilation, or wound; for the right of God is usurped, who alone is Lord of life. 2. Trent, s. 25, C. 19 de R., teaches "that the detestable practice of duels was introduced by the devil's contrivance, so that from the bloody death of bodies he may also gain the ruin of souls." Leo XIII, Letter Pastoralis officii, 12 Sept. 1891; C. 1, 2 de Cler. pug. in duel.; L. 399, 400, 401; E. M.

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You will resolve: It is not lawful to accept a duel lest someone incur a mark of timidity and disgrace among others. Indeed neither is it lawful to accept it although he would be deprived of office and sustenance. For what is intrinsically evil can never be lawful. But if it is unlawful to accept a duel in cases of this sort, much more is it unlawful to offer it. C. 1, 2 de Torneam.; Extr. un. de Torneam. Cf. prop. 2 condemned by Alexander VII, and props. condemned by Benedict XIV, C. Detestabilem, a. 1752; L. 400, 401; E. M.

749.

Is a duel unlawful also if the condition is added that it be ended after the first blows have been inflicted; or if someone only simulates it, although he knows certainly that the fight will not follow? R. Affirmatively; for as to the first, even in that case there is present the greatest danger of a lethal wound, as experience itself establishes. Besides, Clement VIII in Bull Illius vices, a. 1592, has this: "By Apostolic authority and by the tenor of the present letters we decree and declare... that those between whom agreements have been entered concerning ending the contest as soon as either has been wounded, or has shed blood, or a certain number of blows has been inflicted on each side, are held by the same penalties" of the other Pontiffs. Besides, that kind of duel creates scandal and gives occasion to fatal duels. As to the other, because then someone sins by furnishing at least to the other scandal and an occasion of sin. Besides, he sins by furnishing also to others scandal and occasion of sin; for those who undertake a duel in the designated place can rightly be believed by others to be combatants in a duel. Besides, the laws of the Church not only prohibit killings, but also intend to exterminate the detestable practice of duels; but even fictitious duels are contrary to this end. Reuter p. 3, n. 380.

If a duel is commanded to two guilty men condemned to death, with pardon of life promised to the victor, this indeed on the part of the magistrate would be altogether unlawful, by reason of scandal and by reason of the dishonorable end, which can scarcely be absent. But on the part of the duellists it would be lawful to them; for by reason of vindicative justice they are lawfully killed and kill. La-Croix l. 4, n. 1497.

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Can a duel at least sometimes be lawful? - A duel indeed is lawful in all those cases in which the matter concerns defense of oneself against an aggressor; for then in reality it is not to make a duel, but to repel force by force, which all laws concede. Hence Struggl n. 65 says that "a duel can become lawful if a duel necessarily had to be undertaken against an unjust aggressor for the defense of life, or of immense goods; as if someone should actually threaten you with certain death, the plundering of goods, or the burning of a house, unless you actually enter into duel with him.

For it is lawful to defend oneself against an unjust aggressor of life and of immense goods, which are irrecoverable by another way." And where the matter is not about defending life itself and goods, but about defending honor itself, the same theologian had previously handed down these things, n. 61: "If therefore one provoked to a duel is a noble man, knight, or soldier, to whom flight from the provoker and actual aggressor would be very disgraceful, it is lawful for him to say to the one provoking, even while grasping a sword in hand: I will defend myself with this sword, wherever you have sought me, which I will also furnish here if you have attacked me; but to go out to an agreed place is not the act of a Christian man, as being against the law of nature, of God, and of the Church. The reason is that such a man is not bound from charity to flee with so grave an inconvenience of honor and mark of timidity; and therefore he can lawfully stand and defend himself by standing. For thus before an actual duel he would conduct himself merely defensively. Yet if from flight there would not threaten to some other man danger of wounding from behind, or grave disgrace, he would be bound to flee; as La-Croix 841 teaches with others."