What Moral Theology Is

The source of moral theology is taken in a twofold sense: that from which moral truths are first known, a source; and that in which known moral truths are contained, theological places.

9. Sources. The supreme sources of moral theology, from which moral truths are known, are divine revelation and human reason, both natural and theological, that is, enlightened by faith.

a. Moral theology embraces supernatural truths manifested to us through divine revelation: for since the end to which this science must direct man is supernatural, it must contain within itself truths of the supernatural order; and indeed we must know these truths from divine revelation.

b. In order to obtain the end of human life, it is necessary that man also observe the laws of the natural order: for the supernatural end does not exclude the natural end, but supposes and perfects it. Therefore the laws of the law of nature, manifested to us through reason, likewise belong to the object of moral theology. Moreover reason declares and illustrates moral truths divinely revealed, and by reasoning deduces new truths from them.

c. Which moral truths have been manifested to us either through revelation or through reason, we learn from the infallible magisterium of the Church. For this magisterium was instituted by God and endowed with the prerogative of infallibility so that, with supreme and infallible authority, it might propose and declare to us truths, both supernatural and natural, pertaining to the moral order. Therefore by some authors the magisterium of the Church is called the formal or directive principle of moral theology, just as of dogmatic theology.

¹ Melchior Cano, De locis theologicis VIII, 4. From the time when moral theology, among the theological sciences, began to exhibit a discipline standing by itself and distinct from dogmatic theology, treatment also began concerning the sources or places of moral theology. For although the sources of moral and dogmatic theology are almost the same, nevertheless moral theology has some proper to itself. Francis Zacharia, S.J., first published a special treatise concerning the places of moral theology, whom others then followed in this matter. Cf. the dissertation prefixed as prolegomena to Alphonsus de Liguori's moral theology, concerning the origins, places, and excellence of casuistic theology; Zacharia composed this dissertation at the request of St. Alphonsus himself, and the holy Doctor had it placed before the third edition of his work.

10. The places of moral theology. Now those documents must be exhibited in order in which moral truths, both supernatural and natural, are found deposited.

1. Sacred Scripture, both of the Old and of the New Testament.

a. Sacred Scripture of the New Testament is the primary place of moral theology, insofar as it contains not only moral precepts and counsels brought forth from the mouth of the divine Savior Himself, but also exhibits to us the most perfect example of Christian life in the most holy life of Christ the Lord.

b. Sacred Scripture of the Old Testament comprises precepts both moral and ceremonial and judicial. The ceremonial and judicial precepts, deprived of the force of binding, have ceased; but the moral precepts, confirmed by Christ and raised to greater perfection, retain binding force in the New Testament.

Note. The moral doctrine of the Old Testament is not absolutely, but nevertheless relatively, perfect; and this indeed in a twofold sense: both because it is more perfect than the moral doctrine of the other peoples of antiquity, and because it contains the perfection of the New Testament as it were in its root. For Christ the Lord did not come to destroy the law, but to fulfill it.¹ By the most wise counsel of divine providence it was brought about that divine revelation was gradually developed from imperfect beginnings to the perfection due to it. Moreover morality had to be accommodated to the character and capacity of the Israelite people, to whom the utterances of God were entrusted.² Therefore to a people not yet capable of a more perfect morality, precepts are at first proposed from authority without internal motives, which are added later; likewise at the beginning the same people are drawn to the keeping of the law more with a view to reward than with a view to virtue. But it can by no means be conceded that the Old Testament contains anything opposed to uprightness. What they reproach in the Old Testament, namely that the actions and precepts of God - killing the innocent, taking away what belongs to another, hating enemies, and the like - are vicious, and that persons inspired by God teach and perpetrate things which are vicious, rests upon passages of Sacred Scripture wrongly understood. Besides, the sayings and deeds of the Old Testament must be measured not according to the perfect norms of the New Testament, but according to the intellectual and moral culture of the Israelite people.

2. Councils, both general and particular - whether national, provincial, or diocesan - by canons which pertain to morals, partly declare and define moral precepts divinely given, and partly establish new precepts for the salvation of the faithful.

It must be noted that most laws given by the Church are disciplinary laws, which direct the external morals of the faithful and therefore are variable. For external morals, just as the circumstances of things, are changed day by day; hence it happens that disciplinary laws also are various according to the character of times and places: for what is useful at this time and place becomes useless at another time and place, indeed sometimes even harmful.³

3. Decrees of the supreme pontiffs, by which in diverse ways - either through constitutions, or encyclicals, or through responses of the congregations - either false moral doctrines are condemned, or moral precepts of divine or ecclesiastical law are declared, or it is expressly established what must be held and what must be done concerning determinate matters.⁴

From condemned propositions, directly and immediately the proscribed error is known; but indirectly and mediately, at the same time, the truth defined by the Church is also known. For by this very fact, that the error is rejected, the contradictorily opposite proposition is established as true; and since condemned propositions are infallibly false, it is rightly inferred that the opposite propositions are infallibly true.⁵ Of condemned propositions which pertain to moral matter, these are the chief:

a. The 28 propositions condemned by Alexander VII on September 24, 1665, as scandalous and dangerous in practice.

b. The 17 propositions condemned by the same Alexander VII on March 18, 1666, as scandalous.

c. The 66 propositions condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679, at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice.

d. The 31 propositions condemned by Alexander VIII on December 7, 1690, as rash, injurious, ill-sounding, savoring of heresy, and so forth.

e. The 5 propositions concerning the duel condemned by Benedict XIV on November 10, 1752, by the constitution Detestabilem, as false, scandalous, and pernicious.⁶

4. The works of the holy Fathers. The holy Fathers of the Church are to be considered not only as witnesses of tradition, but also as teachers of truths pertaining to morals. Therefore it must be distinguished whether they propose ecclesiastical doctrine or their own. If they agree in proposing ecclesiastical doctrine, their opinion is to be held as absolutely certain, for the Church cannot fail from the truth. But if they propose a truth concerning which nothing has been defined by the Church, whether they agree or do not agree, the arguments by which they confirm it are to be considered and weighed; and regarding their authority, the rules to be established concerning the authority of theologians are valid.

5. The works of theologians, especially of those whom the Church greatly esteems, and indeed the Church attributes singular authority to St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus. Hence, when people seek decisions in moral matters, the Church sometimes responds: "Let approved authors be consulted."

Concerning the authority of theologians, these points from Fr. Zacharia must be held:

a. "If in some question all casuists agree with one another, saying that something is lawful, it is close to heresy to depart from their opinion.

b. From the common opinion of almost all casuist authors, arguments are taken as probable to such a degree that, unless a plainly grave and by no one observed reason or authority - but a clear and manifest one - stands in the way, it is rash to oppose them.

c. The testimony of even many casuist theologians, if other learned men contend against them, has no more force for producing belief than either their own reason or a weightier authority will have approved.

d. A single author, if he is above all exception and brings forward a reason which others have not considered or have not sufficiently solved, while he himself conveniently solves the reasons of others, although he teaches against the common opinion, will be able to render an opinion probable."⁷

6. The usage and practice of the Church: for the moral doctrines and laws which the Church proposes are found expressed in the morals and examples of the faithful. Therefore the usage of the Church fittingly serves to prove and confirm moral truths, especially those which refer to the sacraments. Therefore monuments which testify to the ancient usage of the Church are deservedly counted among the sources of moral theology.

¹ Matt. 5:17.

² Rom. 3:2.

³ Cf. Benedict XIV, De synodo l. 5, c. 3, n. 7.

⁴ A collection of these decrees was made by Jan. Bucceroni, Enchiridion morale complectens selectas decisiones sanctae sedis et s. r. congregationum^3 (Rome: Typographia iuvenum opificum, 1908).

⁵ Cf. Dominicus Viva, Theses damnatae, etc., proemial question.

⁶ Commentaries on the condemned propositions were chiefly written by: Dominicus Viva, Damnatae theses ad theologicam trutinam revocatae; Ioannes de Cardenas, Crisis theologica (on the propositions condemned by Innocent XI); Ioannes Reuter, Theologia moralis, Part I, Analysis theologiae moralis reprobatae; Didacus Duarte, Brevis expositio propositionum damnatarum a sede apostolica.

⁷ Cf. Zacharia, Dissertatio prolegomena, pr. 2, c. 5.

11. What they are. 1. There can be speech concerning the principles of moral theology in a threefold sense, since the following are called principles of moral theology:

a. Divine revelation and human reason, both natural and especially supernatural reason enlightened by faith; for the means of knowledge by which we acquire some science are called its principles.

b. The places of moral theology; for the documents from which the truths of some science are drawn are likewise called its principles.

c. Certain moral truths; for truths from which others are deduced by reasoning are customarily called principles.¹

2. If by the name of principle certain moral truths are understood, two kinds of principles must be distinguished, general and particular. General principles are those fundamental truths which exhibit the conditions and qualities that must belong to all human acts so that they may be apt for the end, and which therefore pervade and govern the whole of moral theology. Particular principles are the individual moral truths taken from their proper sources, from which truths, as from a root, other truths are deduced by reasoning. For just as revealed truths, which constitute the object of dogmatic theology, are called its principles, so particular moral truths must be called the principles of moral theology. Here the discussion is about general principles; particular principles constitute the chief object of special moral theology.

General principles are: human acts must be proportioned to the ultimate end; they must be morally good, supernatural, meritorious; they must be conformable to the dictate of conscience and to divine law, and the like. Particular principles are: truths revealed by God must be believed; God must be loved above all things; the needy neighbor must be helped; it is not lawful to commit adultery; it is not lawful to steal; and the like.

¹ Cf. Kleutgen, Institutiones theologicae (Ratisbon: Pustet, 1881), p. 27 ff.

12. Division of general moral theology concerning principles. In order that moral theology may hand down the supreme principles or conditions and properties which must belong to all human acts so that they may be apt for obtaining the ultimate end, it must first teach what is the ultimate end to which man has been destined by God, and to which he must tend by his acts. Moreover, it must teach how human acts themselves ought to be arranged, so that they may be apt for the end. In order that human acts may be apt for the end, they must be conformable to law and to the dictate of conscience, their norm. Acts conformable to the moral norm are virtues; acts not conformable to it are sins. Hence virtues and sins constitute the two supreme genera of all moral actions. Therefore fundamental moral theology must treat in order concerning these five things: a. concerning the ultimate end of man; b. concerning human acts; c. concerning law; d. concerning conscience; e. concerning virtues and sins.

The end for which Jesus Christ established his Church was the sanctification and salvation of souls. This end the Church was to obtain chiefly by preaching the Gospel which her Founder had revealed and by administering the sacraments which he had instituted.¹ Men were to be sanctified and prepared for eternity by holy living through the grace of God communicated to them principally by means of the sacraments. The Gospels contain a short summary of the general teaching of Jesus Christ; this is developed somewhat in certain directions in the other writings of the New Testament, but the preachers of the Word soon found it convenient to have by them brief summaries of the moral teaching of our Lord by itself. This need was met by such works as the Didaché, or Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, composed about the end of the first century, and the Pastor of Hermas, written a little later. It would be utterly impossible to give even an outline of the ethical works of all the Fathers of the Church. Together they form a very voluminous and complete course of moral theology, and more than one such course has been put together by simply printing a consecutive selection of their works. Thus in 1791 an Italian priest, Angelo Cigheri, published at Florence his Veterum Patrum Theologia Universa, in thirteen volumes quarto, of which the three last are devoted to morals. A fairly complete catalogue of ethical works by the Fathers will be found in the indices of Migne’s Patrology, arranged under the separate headings which figure in our modern manuals of moral theology. All that we can do here is to select a few typical works which exhibit the gradual development of the science of Christian ethics. The Didaché may be looked upon as the first handbook of morals which has come down to us, and it will be worth while to give a short analysis of its contents.

¹ Matt. xxviii 19, 20.

This first handbook of moral theology begins with the first general principle of ethics. All righteousness is summed up in the general precept to avoid evil and do good. The doing of good consists in the observance of the two great commandments of love for our God and for our neighbour. The golden tule is added to the statement of the general first principles of morality. ‘‘ There are two ways,” we read, “one of life and one of death; and there is much difference between the two ways. Now the way of life is this: First thou shalt love God that made thee; secondly, thy neighbour as thyself; and all things whatsoever thou wouldest should not happen to thee, neither do thou to another.” The rest of the first chapter is occupied with a development of the precept of love for our neighbour, expressed for the most part in the language of the Sermon on the Mount. The second chapter enumerates some of the principal negative duties toward our neighbour. A similar enumeration occupies the third chapter, but here there is an attempt to give the reason for the different prohibitions, as, for example: ‘“‘ Be not prone to anger, for anger leads to murder; neither a zealot, nor contentious, nor passionate, for from all these things murders are begotten.” In the fourth chapter are set down the duties towards preachers of the Gospel, of making peace, of judging righteously, of almsgiving; duties toward parents, children, servants; of avoiding hypocrisy, and not adding to or taking away from the precepts of the Lord which they had been taught. The chapter concludes with, “ This is the way of life.”

The fifth chapter consists of a long enumeration of sins, and ends with the prayer, “ May ye be delivered, children, from all these.”

In the sixth chapter there is a warning against being led away from this teaching by anyone, for such a one would not teach according to God. A distinction is drawn between what is required for perfection and what is morally possible. The faithful are bidden specially to beware of what has been sacrificed to idols.

A brief instruction on Baptism occupies the seventh chapter, and in the eighth Christians are taught to fast on Wednesdays and Fridays, so that their fasting-days may be different from those of the Jews, who fasted on Mondays and Thursdays, They are told to say the Our Father three times a day. The ninth and tenth chapters give instructions on the celebration of the Eucharist, while the two following deal with the way in which prophets and strangers should be received. The thirteenth chapter prescribes the offering of firstfruits. In the next chapter the faithful are instructed to meet together on every Lord’s Day, to offer the eucharistic sacrifice, after confessing their sins, so that their sacrifice may be pure. Enemies, too, should be reconciled lest the sacrifice be defiled. It was of this sacrifice that Malachias prophesied. The fifteenth chapter deals with the election of bishops and deacons and the respect which is due to them. The duties of fraternal correction, of prayer and almsdeeds, are enjoined as they are contained in the Gospel of our Lord. The last chapter contains an exhortation to watch, and inculcates the necessity of faith and perseverance, for Antichrist will appear and seduce many. The treatise concludes with a short description of the signs of the last day.

The whole of the second book of the Pastor of Hermas is a document of early Christian moral teaching very similar to the Didaché, but more attempt may be observed in it to show the connection between one prohibition and another, and to give reasons and motives for their observance.

A great advance is observable in the catechetical works of Clement of Alexandria. They are almost exclusively devoted to moral teaching, which their learned author illustrates and confirms by constant quotations from the Greek classical authors, With an enthusiastic and personal love for Jesus Christ, and faith in his teaching as a divine and full revelation of the truth to men, he combines a high esteem for reason and philosophy. According to Clement, philosophy was the pedagogue of the pagan world, preparing it for Christ and leading it to him, as the law did the Jews. Philosophy is the handmaid of theology, he says, and the dictates of reason are but the promptings of the Word .which illuminates every man that cometh into the world. This, of course, is but a development of ideas which we find in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, and it is a natural consequence of Christian teaching concerning God and his relation to man and to the world. It is a very superficial view which regards the action of Clement and other Fathers in the use they made of reason and philosophy as a corrupting influence in Christian teaching. With them, as with the scholastics in the Middle Ages, that action was the necessary result of a firm faith in the Gospel message, and the natural desire to understand it and penetrate its full meaning as far as possible. It was Fides quaerens intellectum, the moving spirit of Catholic theology from the beginning. Better than any lengthy-exposition, an extract or two from Clement will show how far the science of moral theology had progressed at the end of the second century. The following extract is taken from an apologetic work entitled An Exhortation to the Heathen.

“Wherefore, since the Word himself has come to us from heaven, we need not, I reckon, go any more in search of human learning to Athens and the rest of Greece, and to Ionia. For if we have as our teacher him that filled the universe with his holy energies in creation, salvation, beneficence, legislation, prophecy, teaching, we have the Teacher from whom all instruction comes; and the whole world, with Athens and Greece, has already become the domain of the Word. For you, who believed the poetical fable which designated Minos the Cretan as the bosom friend of Zeus, will not refuse to believe that we who have become the disciples of God have received the only true wisdom; and that which the chiefs of philosophy only guessed at, the disciples of Christ have both apprehended and proclaimed.”¹

¹ Exhortation to the Heathen, c. 11.

The next extract, from the Pedagogus, a work containing instructions for recent converts, shows the place which reason or conscience holds in Christian ethics. “ Everything that is contrary to right reason is sin. Accordingly, therefore, the philosophers think fit to define the most generic passions thus: lust, as desire disobedient to reason; fear, as weakness disobedient to reason; pleasure, as an elation of the spirit disobedient to reason. If, then, disobedience in reference to reason is the generating cause of sin, how shall we escape the conclusion that obedience to reason—the Word— which we call Faith, will of necessity be the efficacious cause of duty? For virtue itself is a state of the soul rendered harmonious by reason in respect to the whole life. Nay, to crown all, philosophy itself is pronounced to be the cultivation of right reason; so that, necessarily, whatever is done through error of reason is transgression, and is rightly called sin.”¹

¹ Pædagogus, i, c. 13.

The Stromata, or Miscellanies, are a collection of materials for the ethical instruction and training of the Christian theologian. The philosophical and theological detail to which Clement descends in the treatment of his subject may be illustrated by an extract from the fourteenth chapter of the second book of the Stromata, on the different ways in which an act may be involuntary. The matter, of course, belongs to the treatise on Human Acts, sometimes said to be the last treatise which was added to our manuals of morals. “What is involuntary is not matter for judgement, But this is twofold—what is done in ignorance, and what is done through necessity. For how will you judge concerning those who are said to sin in involuntary modes? For either one knew not himself, as Cleomenes and Athamas, who were mad; or the thing which he does, as Aeschylus, who divulged the mysteries on the stage, who being tried in the Areopagus was absolved on his showing that he had never been initiated. Or one knows not what is done, as he who has let off his antagonist, and slain his domestic instead of his enemy; or that by which it is done as he who in exercising with spears having buttons on them, has killed someone in consequence of the spear throwing off the button; or knows not the manner how, as he who has killed his antagonist in the stadium, for it was not for his death but for victory that he contended; or knows not the reason why it is done, as the physician who gave a salutary antidote and killed, for it was not for this purpose that he gave it, but to save.”¹

¹ Stromata, ii, c. 14.

As yet no attempt had been made in the Church to write a systematic treatise of morals by reducing the various virtues and vices to logical order under appropriate general principles. This step was taken by St Ambrose at the end of the fourth century. This great Father and Doctor of the Church com posed his work De Offictis for the instruction of the clergy of his church of Milan. He expressly tells us that he followed Cicero’s work with the same title as his pattern. Cicero wrote his book for the instruction of his son; St Ambrose desired to write for the instruction of his spiritual children. Although he followed Cicero closely in the arrangement and treatment of the matter, yet he never loses sight of what appears to have been the chief motive that he had in view in the composition of his work—namely, to demonstrate the superiority of Christian over pagan ethics.

The work is divided, like Cicero’s, into three Books. In the first he treats of what is honourable and dishonourable. He points out that the philosophic distinction between ordinary and perfect virtue has its counterpart in the Gospel, which distinguishes between what is matter of strict precept and of counsel. Certain elementary duties, as those toward parents and elders, are touched on, and then follows a discussion on the four cardinal virtues. The second Book treats of what is expedient with reference to eternal life. The third Book treats of what is honourable and expedient in conjunction, and the author has no difficulty in reconciling these conflicting principles according to Christian teaching. “ For,” he writes, “T said that nothing can be virtuous but what is useful, and nothing can be useful but what is virtuous. For we do not follow the wisdom of the flesh, whereby the usefulness that consists in an abundance of money is held to be of most value, but we follow the wisdom which is of God, whereby those things which are greatly valued in this world are counted but as loss. For this κατόρθωμα, which is duty carried out entirely and in perfection, starts from the true source of virtue. On this follows another or ordinary duty. This shows by its name that no hard or extraordinary practice of virtue is involved, for it can be common to very many.” This principle of perfection is then applied to the pursuit of gain and other questions, A very famous book on morals, somewhat more restricted in scope than the De Officus of St Ambrose, is the Pastoral Care of St Gregory the Great. This, together with the same author’s Morals on Job, was a favourite textbook in the Middle Ages. It lays down the qualities required in those who have the cure of souls, how they themselves should live, how they should instruct and admonish those subject to their authority. The book was brought to England by St Augustine and translated into English¹ by King Alfred for the benefit of the bishops and priests of his kingdom.

¹ De Officiis, iii, c. 2.

A word must here be said on Christian asceticism, which has been so utterly misunderstood and misrepresented by such writers as Lecky and Harnack, and whose true relation to Christian morals is so seldom perceived by non-Catholic authors.

Christ our Lord expressly taught that renunciation of self, of the world with its riches and pleasures, was in a certain sense a necessary condition of discipleship. This renunciation, however, admitted of different degrees, as is also plain from the Gospels. Some were called only to spiritual poverty and detachment, and these hoped to save their souls by remaining in the world without being of it. Outwardly they lived much like other people, but their affections were detached from this world and centred on God and eternity. They went to heaven by the way of the commandments. Others, on the contrary, voluntarily embraced the counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience, given by our Lord to those who were called, and who felt that they had the spiritual strength to follow the call. They made a special profession of following the counsels, and were assigned a place of honour in the Christian assemblies, but at first they seem to have lived in the bosom of their families. They soon, however, began to find it very difficult to persevere in their adopted form of. life while exposed to the distractions and temptations of the world, and this, together with the violence of the persecutions, drove them into the desert. There they lived at first solitary lives as hermits, but before long they began to come together and put themselves under the authority of some ancient Father of the desert renowned for his prudence and sanctity. Their aim was to subdue their passions and ascend the heights of Christian perfection. The task is notoriously difficult both in theory and in practice, and many mistakes were made. The Church had not yet drawn up her minute code of laws for the regulation of religious life. Those writers, however, who industriously pick out the mistakes and the exaggerations of indiscreet fervour, and piece them together to produce a picture of Christian monachism and asceticism, only succeed in producing a caricature. ‘To convince one’s self of this it is sufficient to dip into the Institutes of Monasteries and the Conferences of Cassian, who was in the middle of a long life in the year 400, In the twelve Books of his Institutes Cassian describes the dress of the monks, their method of singing the divine office, the training of postulants and novices, and then he devotes the last eight Books to a minute account of the nature, causes, and remedies of the eight principal vices which bar the way to the summit of Christian perfection. He maps out every portion of the pilgrim’s progress to his heavenly country, and shows what dangers and obstacles he will meet by the way. In brief, he says, progress toward perfection begins with the fear of God, from which arises a salutary sorrow for sin, which leads to renunciation and contempt of the world; this begets humility, from which springs mortification of the will, and by this all vices are subdued and extirpated. Then all virtues begin to flourish in the soul, which thus arrives at purity of heart and the perfection of apostolic charity.¹ The vices to be overcome are classed under eight different heads by Cassian, and he says that the classification was admitted by all.² These principal or capital vices are typified by the seven people, whom the Israelites were commanded by God to extirpate when they came into the land of promise. Egypt makes the eighth, from which they had been delivered, and which, Cassian says, typifies gluttony. From this vice the monk is indeed delivered by his abandoning the world for the desert, but he may not extirpate it altogether; he should aim only at curbing its excesses. Gregory the Great adopted in substance the teaching of Cassian on the capital vices, but by making pride the queen of all the rest, and placing it in a category by itself, the other seven became the seven deadly sins which with their daughter vices were so famous in the literature of the Middle Ages, and figure in the books of morals and in the catechisms of Christian doctrine to the present day.

¹ De Cenobiorum Institutis, lib. iv, c. 43.

² Collatio v, c. 18.

To show how conservative the Catholic tradition has been, even in the expression of doctrine, I will give the following passage in St Gregory's own words: " Ipsa namque vitiorum regina superbia cum devictum plene cor ceperit, mox illud septem principalibus vitiis, quasi quibusdam suis ducibus devastandum tradit. Quos videlicet duces exercitus sequitur, quia ex eis proculdubio importunae vitiorum multitudines oriuntur. Quod melius ostendimus, si ipsos duces atque exercitum specialiter, ut possumus, enumerando proferamus. Radix quippe cuncti mali superbia est, de qua, Scriptura attestante, dicitur: Initium omnis peccati est superbia (Ecclus. *("For pride, the very queen of the vices, when it has fully seized a conquered heart, straightway hands it over to be laid waste by the seven principal vices, as though by certain generals of its own. And an army follows these generals, because from them, without doubt, importunate multitudes of vices arise. This we shall show better if we set forth the generals themselves and the army, enumerating them particularly, as we are able. For the root of all evil is pride, of which, as Scripture testifies, it is said: Pride is the beginning of all sin.)*x 15). Primae autem ejus soboles, septem nimirum principalia vitia, de hac virulenta radice proferuntur, scilicet (And its first offspring, namely the seven principal vices, spring from this venomous root, that is to say) gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, avaritia, ventris ingluvies, luxuria. Nam quia his septem superbiae vitiis nos captos doluit, idcirco Redemptor noster ad spirituale liberationis proelium spiritu septiformis gratiae plenus venit.

"Sed habent contra nos haec singula exercitum suum. Nam de inani gloria inobedientia, jactantia, hypocrisis, contentiones, pertinaciae, discordiae, et novitatum praesumptiones oriuntur. De invidia, odium, susurratio, detractio, exsultatio in adversis proximi, afflictio autem in prosperis nascitur. ira, rixae, tumor mentis, contumeliae, clamor, De indignatio, blasphemiae proferuntur. De tristitia, malitia, rancor, pusillanimitas, desperatio, torpor circa praecepta, vagatio mentis erga illicita nascitur. perjuria, inquietudo, obdurationes laetitia, cordis scurrilitas, De avaritia, proditio, violentiae, et contra oriuntur. De immunditia, ventris inconsideratio, inconstantia, ingluvie, multiloquium, sensus circa intelligentiam propagantur. mentis, fraus, fallacia, misericordiam inepta hebetudo De luxuria, caecitas praecipitatio, amor sui, odium Dei, affectus praesentis seculi, horror autem vel desperatio futuri generantur. Quia ergo septem principalia vitia tantam de se vitiorum multitudinem proferunt, cum ad cor veniunt, quasi subsequentis exercitus catervas trahunt. (For because he grieved that we were held captive by these seven vices of pride, therefore our Redeemer came, full of the spirit of sevenfold grace, to the spiritual battle of our deliverance. “But each of these has its own army against us. For from vainglory there arise disobedience, boasting, hypocrisy, contentions, obstinacies, discords, and the presumption of novelties. From envy are born hatred, whispering, detraction, exultation at a neighbour’s adversity, and affliction at his prosperity. From anger are put forth quarrels, swelling of mind, insults, outcry, indignation, and blasphemies. From sloth are born malice, rancour, faint-heartedness, despair, torpor concerning the commandments, and a wandering of the mind after what is unlawful. From avarice arise treachery, fraud, deceit, perjuries, restlessness, violence, and hardness of heart against mercy. From gluttony are propagated foolish mirth, scurrility, uncleanness, heedlessness of speech, and dullness of sense regarding understanding. From lust are begotten blindness of mind, precipitation, inconstancy, self-love, hatred of God, attachment to the present world, and horror or despair of the world to come. Since therefore the seven principal vices bring forth so great a multitude of vices from themselves, when they come to the heart they draw after them, as it were, the troops of a following army.) Ex quibus videlicet septem quinque spiritalia, duoque carnalia sunt," The Conferences of Cassian are represented by him as the teachings of celebrated abbots on various questions of the spiritual life. They are partly speculative, partly practical. There are twenty-four in all, each being divided into a greater or less number of chapters. These two works have provided an ample store of moral and ascetical doctrine for all subsequent Catholic writers on the subjects treated in them.

A large portion of moral theology is taken up with the duties arising from the positive legislation of the Church. In this legislation we have the practical application of Christian moral principles to the varying requirements of time and place, and change and variety are here conspicuous. With the establishment of the Christian religion the positive precepts of the Mosaic law ceased to be binding, but the Church received from her divine Founder authority to make new laws for the sanctification and salvation of her children, The Apostles used this legislative authority, as we see from the Epistles of St Paul, especially from those to Timothy and Titus, and within twenty years after the Ascension we find them legislating¹ in the Council of Jerusalem on the disputed question of legal observances. The decree which we have in the Acts² was a true positive law imposing a new obligation on the faithful concerned, as long as the peculiar circumstances of the time rendered its observance desirable and necessary.2 This council of the Apostles formed the type and pattern for the oecumenical and provincial councils of the Church which were to be held in the future. Innumerable laws and regulations have been enacted by these, affecting Catholic life, discipline, and worship. The bishops, too, as successors of the Apostles, have continued in all ages to exercise the legislative authority committed by them to God and the Church. The Roman . Pontiffs, especially, in the exercise of their jurisdiction over the whole Church in succession to Blessed Peter, have in all ages made wise laws for the peace and prosperity of the Christian people. As instances of this action of the Popes in the early centuries may be mentioned St Clement’s first epistle to the Corinthians in the first century, St Victor’s decision about the observance of Easter in the second century, St Stephen’s about the baptism of heretics in the third, and similar action on the part of Popes Liberius, Damasus, and Siricius. Subsequently papal decisions became frequent and notorious. Collections of the decisions issuing from all these sources of positive law began to be made in very early times.. Of these some have survived the ravages of time. The Didascalia of the Apostles may, in the judgement of the learned, be ascribed to the first half of the third century, and the so-called Constitutions of the Apostles, together with the Canons of the Apostles, to the early part of the fifth century. The materials of which these collections are composed are, of course, still more ancient. At the beginning of the fourth century the decrees of the councils were collected and arranged at first in chronological order in the East. At the beginning of the sixth century systematic collections arranged under suitable titles began to appear. Of these early collections of canons the most celebrated is that of John the Scholastic. In the West, Dionysius Exiguus made his translation of Greek canons into Latin about the year 500. A copy of this collection was presented by the Pope to Charlemagne when he was in Rome, and he caused it to be received and approved by the clergy of his empire in 802 at the great Council of Aix la Chapelle. Collections of Church laws continued to grow in number and 2 It ceased to bind in the Latin Church about the ninth century. in bulk twelfth century the monk Gratian issued his Decretum, which became the most famous of them all, and still forms the first volume of the Corpus Juris Canonici. It contains some 4,000 decisions on law and morals taken from the decrees of Popes, the canons of councils both general and particular, the opinions of the Fathers, and even from the civil law.

¹ Moralium, lib. xxxi, c. 45.

² Acts xv 28, 29.

No attempt, of course, can be made in this short sketch to trace the varying phases through which the innumerable positive laws of the Church have passed. It will be sufficient for our purpose to trace in outline those chief precepts which bind all Catholics and which are specially known as the precepts of the Church. They are usually reckoned six in number: the due observance of Sundays and feast-days, the days of fasting and abstinence, confession and Communion, the support of pastors, and the prohibition of marriage within certain degrees of kindred and of its solemnization at certain times of the year.

The observance of the Sunday and its substitution for the Sabbath appears to be due to apostolic institution. There are traces of it in the New Testament; in the Didaché the faithful are bidden to come together on the Lord’s Day, as it was called even then in honour of the Resurrection, and offer the eucharistic sacrifice after confessing their sins. In the second century the custom of observing the Lord’s Day was universal throughout the Church. The chief duty to be performed on that day was to hear Mass. Very soon particular provincial laws began to be enacted urging the obligation and imposing penalties on transgressors. At the beginning of the fourth century the Council of Illiberis in Spain decreed that anyone who might be absent from Mass on three successive Sundays should be deprived of Communion. The Council of Agde at the beginning of the sixth century prescribed that all were to hear an entire Mass on Sunday and not leave until after the blessing of the priest on pain of a public reprehension by the bishop.

It was natural that when Sunday became the Christian Sabbath it should be kept much in the same way as the Jews kept their Sabbath. While knowing from the teaching of our Lord himself that pharisaic exaggeration was to be avoided in this matter, and from St Paul that the sabbatical rest was no longer of obligation, still St Caesarius of Arles in the sixth century expressly says that the Doctors of the Church decreed to transfer all the honour of the Sabbath to the Lord’s Day. The very necessity of hearing Mass on that day made a certain abstention from work also necessary. Tertullian testifies to the Christian custom of his day in this respect. Constantine prescribed that judges and artisans in towns should abstain from work on the Sunday, but that agriculture should be allowed on account of necessity. The strictness with which the Sunday repose was observed varied somewhat according to time and place in the period with which we are dealing.

Besides the Sunday other feast-days began gradually to be observed in the same manner by hearing Mass and abstaining from servile work. Easter and Pentecost were assigned to movable Sundays, but the days on which renowned martyrs suffered for the Faith, those on which churches were dedicated, Ascension Day, Christmas Day, and the Epiphany, were soon added to the list. The letter of the Church of Smyrna concerning the martyrdom of St Polycarp in the middle of the second century expresses the intention of celebrating the anniversary of the day of martyrdom with joy, both in memory of those who had suffered and as a preparation for those who survived.¹ As the Christian Church took over the Jewish Sabbath but changed the day on which it was observed and rejected the exaggerations of the Pharisees in its observance, so, too, it adopted the Jewish practice of fasting at stated times. As we have seen from the Didaché, the fast of Monday and Thursday was changed into one on Wednesday and Friday. The obligation of fasting on all Wednesdays and Fridays ceased almost entirely about the tenth century, but the fixing of those days by ecclesiastical authority for fasting, and the desire to substitute a Christian observance at Rome for certain pagan rites celebrated in connection with the seasons of the year, seem to have given rise to our Ember Days. In the time of St Leo, in the middle of the fifth century, the Ember Days were a settled institution, though the time at which they fell varied somewhat at different times and in different places.

¹ Cf. A. Villien, Histoire des Commandements de l’Eglise, 1909.

The earliest indication that we have of the fast of Lent is contained in a short extract from Irenaeus which has been preserved for us by Eusebius.¹ Writing to Pope Victor about the middle of the second century, St Irenaeus says that the controversy in the East was not merely about the proper time of celebrating Easter but also about the manner of fasting. “ For some think,” he says, “that they ought to fast only one day, some two, some more days; some compute their day as consisting of forty hours night and day; and this diversity existing among those that observe it is not a matter that has just sprung up in our times, but long ago among those before us, who, perhaps not having ruled with sufficient strictness, established the practice that arose from their simplicity and inexperience, and yet with all these maintained peace, and we have maintained peace with one another; and the very difference in our fasting establishes the unanimity of our faith.” At the time this was written the Lenten fast was obviously very short, and there was no uniformity even in its duration. Tertullian,. fifty years later, refers to the Lenten observance as the fulfilment of the words of our Lord: “ But the days will come when the bridegroom shall be taken away from them; then shall they fast in those days.”

¹ Historia Ecclesiastica, v, c. 24.

The first allusion to a period of forty days’ fast occurs in the fifth canon of the Council of Nicaea (325). In the time of St Leo in the fifth century the period was sufficiently well established to be referred by him to apostolic institution. The period was six weeks, but omitting Sundays the actual fasting days were only thirty-six in number. The four days before the first Sunday of Lent were added sometime in the seventh century. The fasts assigned to certain vigils arose from the practice of the early Christians of assembling on the eve of a feast and spending the night in prayer, fasting, and reading the Scriptures. By degrees Matins took the place of the night office, and the vigil office was moved back to the Saturday morning, as. we see to this day from the morning office of Holy Saturday. The fast was thus prolonged through the Saturday till after the morning office of the feast of the next day.

The fast which used to. be observed on the rogation days took its rise in France at the close of the fifth century, and by degrees spread to other Churches. The interrupted fast of Advent was introduced as a preparation for Christmas toward the end of the fourth century. The manner of fasting has varied greatly at different times and in different places, At first the fast seems to have been absolute and continuous. During the days of the bridegroom’s absence the faithful neither ate nor drank anything. When the period was lengthened such a total fast became impossible, but at least in the East food was restricted on fast days to one meal of bread, salt, and water, taken in the evening, or three in the afternoon, at least not before In the time of St Gregory fish was allowed at the single meal in the West. Flesh meat was never allowed on fasting days.

The essence of fasting is still placed by theologians in the single meal, but many relaxations have crept in by degrees. The monks while listening to a Collatio of Cassian before going to bed introduced the practice of drinking an acidulated liquor called posca. By degrees fruits and lighter kinds of food in limited quantity were added, and when about the thirteenth century the full meal began to be taken at twelve midday, the evening collation became an established practice.

In the thirteenth century it was an accepted principle that liquid does not break the fast, and this became the source of another relaxation. A little wine, or coffee, or chocolate, was taken sometimes in the morning, with candied fruits (electwaria) on occasion. The practice was not condemned when the Sacred Penitentiary was asked about it in 1843, provided that the solid food taken then did not exceed two ounces in weight.

At first all seem to have fasted except children and those who were sick. St Thomas’s opinion that those who are still growing are not bound to fast, and that in general the period of growth lasts till the completion of the twenty-first year, has prevailed. Exemptions in favour of workmen and others were soon admitted, and toward the close of the Middle Ages dispensations from the law of fasting began to be granted. The Lenten indult was an established custom before the new Code came into force.

The precept of abstinence from flesh meat which is still observed on Fridays is a survival of the obligation of fasting on that day which obtained in the primitive Church. As we have seen, the Didaché prescribed fasting on all Wednesdays and Fridays, and to this fast all the faithful except mere children and the sick were formerly bound. About the tenth century the obligation of the Friday fast was reduced to one of abstinence from flesh meat, and the Wednesday fast, after being similarly mitigated, gradually disappeared altogether.

While in the East Saturday was observed as a festival in honour of the creation,¹ at Rome and in other Churches of the West it began in early times to be observed as a fasting day On account of the difference of discipline on this point great difficulties arose in the fourth century, as we know from the correspondence of St Augustine and St Jerome. St Ambrose said that he kept festival on Saturday when he was at Milan and a fast when at Rome, and he advised St Augustine to follow the same rule. About the eleventh century the Saturday fast was reduced to an obligation of abstinence, and this was the common law of the Church until the new Code of Canon Law came into force. A dispensation from abstinence on Saturdays, the feast of St Mark, and on Rogation Days was granted for England by a rescript of Propaganda, May 29, 1830.

¹ Apostolic Constitutions, vii, 23.

The Sundays in Lent were never observed as fasting days, but they early became days of abstinence as they remained till the new Code came into force on May 19, 1918.

Annual confession and Communion was first made a positive universal law of the Catholic Church in the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). As we know from the Gospel of St John,¹ both confession and Communion were prescribed by our Lord, but he determined neither precept in detail. The practice of the different Churches in the early ages was various in respect to both precepts. We will first trace in outline the history regarding the precept of annual Communion.

¹ John vi 54.

From the earliest times, as we have seen, Mass was celebrated for the assembled faithful on Sundays, and all who were present appear to have received Holy Communion. In some places it was the practice for the faithful to take home with them consecrated particles and communicate themselves therewith out of Mass. Many at Rome, in Spain, and in Africa received Communion daily. This was a common practice at the end of the fourth century, as we learn from the letters of St Jerome and St Augustine. The latter interprets the daily bread for which we ask in the Lord’s Prayer as Holy Communion. The Council of Agde (506) decreed that those who did not communicate at least on the feasts of the Nativity, Easter, and Whit-Sunday were not to be reckoned as Catholics. In subsequent centuries this became a general rule in the Western Church; in the East, according to Theodore of Canterbury, the law was much stricter. The Greeks, he says, both laity and clerics, communicate every Sunday, and anyone who omits to do so on three Sundays is excommunicated. A synod held (747) at Cloveshoe in England prescribed that innocent youths and those in whom years had cooled the ardour of passion should be exhorted to communicate very frequently, A synod held under St Patrick in the fifth century decreed that the Eucharist was to be received at all events at Easter, and that anyone who neglected this duty was not a member of the Church. Robert Pullen, an Englishman who wrote in the middle of the twelfth century, tells us that in his day some communicated more frequently, others less so, but that even laymen followed the rule of the Fathers and communicated at least three times a year. So that when the Lateran Council established the universal law that all who had come to years of discretion were bound to communicate at least at Easter, it made no new rule; it merely enforced by universal statute the least that was expected of anyone who called himself a Catholic.

The precept of annual confession is intrinsically connected with that of Easter Communion both in the Church’s legislation and in its own nature. For, as the Catechism of the Council of Trent teaches,¹ the power of order, although primarily it refers to the consecration of the Eucharist, yet also comprises all that is necessary to dispose the faithful to receive the Eucharist worthily and profitably. It comprises, then, the power to forgive sins, inasmuch as no one who is conscious of mortal sin may receive Holy Communion without previous confession and absolution. The Council of Trent² teaches that the words of St Paul, “‘ Let a man prove himself,” have always been understood in the Church of the necessity of sacramental confession and absolution before Holy Communion when there is consciousness of mortal sin. The law of the Lateran concerning annual confession and Communion is thus one law, confession being ordinarily a necessary preparation for Holy Communion in those who rarely communicate. That the Church always understood this is witnessed to by Alcuin in the eighth century,³ by St Leo in the fifth,⁴ St Augustine in the fourth,⁵ and St Cyprian in the third.⁶ We have the same conjunction of confession and Communion in the sentence of the Didaché: “ But on the Lord’s day do ye assemble and break bread, and give thanks, after confessing your transgressions, in order that your sacrifice may be pure.”⁷ In all probability the confession here spoken of should be interpreted as meaning sacramental confession to a priest. The Council of Trent, then, was justified in saying that before receiving Holy Communion it had always been considered a duty to go to confession when there was consciousness of mortal sin. In the fifth or sixth century a practice sprang up which was the forerunner of the Lateran law of annual confession. At the beginning of Lent public penance was imposed on those who had been guilty of great and notorious crimes. In some of the Penitential Books⁸ the priest is bidden to invite all who are conscious of mortal sin, and even all who by any sin whatever have soiled their baptismal robe, to make humble confession to their own priest on Ash Wednesday, and accept the penance enjoined according to the canons. If there was any special reason for granting absolution at once, that was done, otherwise absolution was deferred till Maundy Thursday, when, the penance having been performed, the penitent was absolved and admitted to Communion. This was a mitigation of the earlier discipline of some Churches, especially in the East, according to which public penance sometimes lasted for years.⁹ The name of Shrove Tuesday and the custom of receiving ashes on the head on Ash Wednesday, still remind us of the old discipline of the Catholic Church, It was natural, then, that when the Church made it obligatory on all to receive Holy Communion at least every Easter, it should also impose the obligation of annual confession. The law indeed does not indicate Easter as necessarily the time for the annual confession, but in practice it follows the time for the annual Communion. Originally the annual confession had by law to be made to the parish priest or to the bishop of the penitent, but for centuries it has been lawful to make it to any priest who has faculties for hearing confessions in the place.

¹ Pt. ii, c. 7, q. 6.

² Supra, p. 102.

³ De Psalmorum Usu, P.L., ci, 499.

⁴ Epist. 108, P.L., liv, 1011.

⁵ Serm. 278, P.L., xxxviii, 2273.

⁶ Epist. 10, P.L., iv, 254; Epist. ii, ib. 257; De Lapsis, xvi, ib. 479.

⁷ C. xiv.

⁸ Schmitz, Bussbücher, i, 775.

⁹ Duchesne, Christian Worship, p. 435.

The faithful are bound by natural and divine law according to the teaching of St Paul¹ to contribute to the support of their pastors. For some centuries the revenues of the Church derived from the offerings of the faithful and from other sources constituted one fund, and this was administered by the bishop. The support of the poor, the maintenance of public worship, as well as the support of the clergy and other needs, were all supplied from the common fund. According to a decretal of Pope Gelasius (501) the Church revenues were to be divided into four portions, one for the bishop, another for the clergy, a third for the relief of the poor and strangers, the fourth for the Church fabrics. In his celebrated answers to St Augustine, Gregory the Great tells the first Archbishop of Canterbury that as he was a monk he did not need a separate portion, and should be content to share in - common with his clergy. For several centuries no positive law of the Church was needed to compel the faithful to do their duty in this matter. The Fathers who occasionally urge the obligation are content to appeal in support of it to the teaching of St Paul or to the law of tithes under the Mosaic dispensation.

¹ 1 Cor. ix; Gal. vi 6.

The Penitential attributed to St Theodore enjoins that the custom of the province should be observed relative to contributions to the Church, but that the poor were not to be subjected to violence for the sake of tithes or other matters.

Positive ecclesiastical laws, however, began to appear both on the Continent and in England in the eighth century. Thus the seventeenth article of the legatine council held in England by the authority of Pope Adrian I (785-787) contained the following provision: ‘‘ Wherefore also we solemnly lay upon you this precept, that all be careful to give tithes of all that they possess, because that is the special part of the Lord God; and let a man live on the nine parts, and give alms.” At first there was some variety in the appropriation of tithes, but when the parochial system was introduced, between the tenth and thirteenth century, the appropriation of tithes to the parish priest became the settled rule. In modern times, at least in English-speaking countries, the offerings of the faithful constitute almost the only source of Church revenues as they did in the early ages of Christianity, and their apportionment and distribution are regulated by special laws.¹ As marriage was raised to the dignity of a sacrament by Christ our Lord, and the Church alone has jurisdiction over the administration of the sacraments, it follows that Christian marriage is subject exclusively to the laws of God and of the Church. There are several passages in the Epistles of St Paul² which show that the Church was conscious of her authority in this matter, and that she used it from the earliest times. St Ignatius in his letter to St Polycarp says that it is proper that Christians should contract marriage according to the judgement of the bishop, and Tertullian asserts that marriages which were contracted without being previously notified to the Church were in danger of being considered as no better than adulteries and fornications. The history of the many laws relating to Christian marriage is too large a subject to be treated here even in outline.

¹ Constitution of Leo XIII, Romanos Ponitifices.

² 1 Cor. v, vii; 2 Cor. vi 14.

We will confine ourselves to the impediments of consanguinity and close time.

The natural and divine law prohibits marriage in the first degree of the direct line, and most probably in all degrees indefinitely in the same line. In the collateral line, also, it most probably forbids marriage at least in the first degree. With respect to further degrees in the collateral line the Church adopted the Mosaic legislation, and there are no traces of her having exercised further the independent power which she certainly possessed to enlarge or restrict the limits of kindred before the fourth or fifth century. The Council of Epaon (517) forbade marriages between second cousins, Gregory II (721) prohibited marriage with relations in general, and from the eighth to the eleventh century the prohibition was extended to the seventh degree according to the canonical mode of reckoning. The Fourth Council of Lateran (1215) restricted the prohibition to the fourth degree, and the new Code restricts it to the third.

As the solemn celebration of marriage is not in keeping with penitential exercises, a council of Laodicea in the fourth century forbade the celebration of marriage during Lent. Subsequently the solemnization of marriage was forbidden from Septuagesima Sunday till the octave of Easter, during three weeks before the feast of St John Baptist, and from Advent till after the Epiphany. There was a dispute as to the three weeks before the feast of St John Baptist, and Clement III, at the end of the twelfth century, decided that the period was to be interpreted as extending from the Rogation Days till the Sunday after Pentecost. The Council of Trent¹ decreed that close time for the solemnization of marriage was to extend from Advent till after the Epiphany, and from Ash Wednesday till after Low Sunday, which the Code has altered as above (p. 212).

¹ Sess. xxiv, c. 10.

We must not leave this first period in the history of moral theology without saying something about the penitential books which began to appear in the sixth century and subsequently became very numerous. They were intended as a help to bishops and priests in their duty of imposing canonical penances on sinners and reconciling them to God and the Church. At first they were little more than lists of sins with the appropriate canonical penance annexed to each sin. The quality and length of penance assigned were derived from the councils or from the canonical letters of St Basil, St Peter of Alexandria, St Athanasius, and other Fathers of the Church. Afterward chapters were added containing short moral rules on a great variety of subjects, the method of receiving and dealing with penitents, and the method of reconciling them. They are of importance in the history of moral theology as furnishing a standard by which the malice of various transgressions was measured according to a great variety of circumstances. They fell into disuse with the gradual cessation of public penance in the Church.

Permit me, kind reader, to set forth briefly the reasons which have led me to publish this Summa of Moral Theology. Besides the wishes of friends who urged me to this, there were chiefly two reasons for publishing it.

The first lies in this: often a great usefulness already comes to readers from the fact that the same doctrine is found set forth in different ways by different authors. For such is the condition of human understanding that things said in this way seem obscure to some, while those same things seem clear to others. And while I pondered this, a great hope held me: that my own manner of speaking also might not be without all usefulness, at least for some readers. This consideration gave me the greater courage when I found it confirmed by these words of St. Augustine:

"Whoever, when he reads, says: this has not been well said because I do not understand it, let him blame my expression, ... and perhaps it truly could have been said more plainly; nevertheless no man has spoken in such a way that in all things he was understood by all. Therefore let him to whom this in my discourse is displeasing see whether he understands others who are engaged in such matters and questions, while he does not understand me, and let him spend his effort and time rather on those whom he understands. Yet on that account let him not think that I ought to have been silent, ... For not all things which are written by all come into the hands of all; and it can happen that some who are able to understand even these writings of ours do not find those plainer books and at least come upon these. And therefore it is useful that many books be made by many persons, in different style, not with different doctrine, even about the same questions, so that the matter itself may reach very many: to those in this way, and to others in that way" (De Trinitate, book I, chapter 3, number 5).

The other reason is founded on a wish which, as I read the authors who have treated moral doctrine, often came into my mind. For it is certain that clarity and perspicuity in teaching chiefly receive a greater increase in proportion as the different treatises of doctrine and their different chapters cohere with one another in a more continuous connection, and follow one another in a more lucid order. I thought that this intimate connection of order in books written on moral doctrine often had not escaped the notice of an attentive reader as something wanting. For that reason I also tried to direct my labor in writing to this: that order and connection, both in the various treatises and in the different chapters of each treatise, and also in the very handling of the matter, should be observed as much as possible, hoping that by acting thus I might be able to bring some advantage.

But, to use again the words of St. Augustine, "I am mindful not only of my will, but also of my weakness. From those also who are going to read these things I ask that they forgive me where they notice that I have rather wished than been able to say what either they themselves understand better, or do not understand because of the difficulty of my expression: just as I forgive them where, because of their own slowness, they are unable to understand" (De Trinitate, book V, chapter 1, number 1).

I was writing at Nijmegen, in the College of St. Alphonsus, on 2 August 1932.

L. Wouters, C. SS. R.

The notion of moral theology - as the notion of every science - must be drawn from its object. For since knowing is an action or direction of the mind, and every action is directed by its object, it follows that any science whatever is defined from the notion of its object. Considering these things, moral theology can be defined: the science which teaches, from supernatural principles, what is commanded or forbidden in order to the ultimate supernatural end. It is said:

1. What, or what human actions are commanded or forbidden. By these words the material object of moral theology is indicated. Human actions constitute it, and indeed those actions which fall under command or prohibition. Namely, moral theology, strictly speaking, generally teaches how man is directed to the ultimate end. But lest its matter grow out beyond measure, it does not dwell on each individual act of the Christian life; rather, content with narrower limits, it regards those things, at least chiefly, which are imposed or forbidden by law or precept.

2. In order to the ultimate supernatural end. By these words the formal object which of moral theology is assigned. Human actions constitute it insofar as they are commanded or forbidden in order to the ultimate supernatural end.

3. From supernatural principles. By these words the formal object by which of moral theology is indicated. That is, the said science draws its knowledge of commanded or forbidden human actions from principles taught by God immediately or mediately. Yet in the course of the treatises we shall not pass over principles founded upon natural reason, as will appear more clearly from the sources to be assigned under II.

From what has been said it is gathered that moral theology differs: 1. from dogmatic theology, which regards speculative truths more, while moral theology dwells on practical matters. Yet both constitute one science, which is called theology; 2. from ascetical theology and mystical theology, which regard those things that are not commanded but are supererogatory and pertain to the perfection of the Christian life;¹ 3. from canon law, which treats human actions insofar as they are directly ordered to the common good of the Church; 4. from moral philosophy, which, founded on principles known by the natural light of reason, considers human actions in order to the natural end.

¹ Moral theology, as we have said, by force of the term certainly comprehends all morals or human actions; but lest its matter be extended too far, it regards only those things which, by the law of God, fall under command or prohibition. The rest are left to ascetical theology or mystical theology, according as the discussion concerns the ordinary way or the more or less extraordinary way.

As regards St. Alphonsus, he is not only Doctor of moral theology, but also of ascetical and mystical theology. His spiritual works contain ascetical theology, not indeed written systematically, but nevertheless written with great wisdom and abundance of matter. In them the chief point is the doctrine concerning loving and imitating Jesus Christ, concerning constancy in praying, concerning invoking the Blessed Virgin Mary, and concerning the method of meditating. You will find mystical theology concisely and briefly, yet almost completely, in the Praxis Confessarii, which is at the end of the Theologia Moralis, chapter VII and especially chapter IX.

From the formal object indicated, it is plain that the proper sources of moral theology are revelation, and likewise the magisterium and discipline of the Church, whether they have been consigned to writing or sanctioned only by tradition or use. Now the Church speaks both by her express edicts, and by commending the doctrine of doctors, and by the consent of believers or teachers concerning some doctrine, if it truly exists.¹ Moreover, as we have already noted under I, we shall not pass over principles known by the natural light of reason: both because many obligations occur in life concerning which revelation is silent, and because natural reason itself can bring very much light to those things which have been revealed. And thus it will come about that the whole hall of moral theology is continually and most beautifully illuminated by the doubled light of divine Wisdom, namely both supernatural and natural.

¹ We say "if it truly exists"; for this is sometimes asserted too hastily. Besides, that consent is then only a criterion of Catholic truth if, for a long time and constantly, it presents something as certain and necessarily connected with a dogma of faith. But as regards theological doctrines, insofar as they are handed down in the schools only as such and are defended by authors in books, Cardinal Franzelin says: "It is certainly not repugnant that some opinion, common for some time among theologians, should afterwards, when arguments and documents have been better examined, cease to be common or even become obsolete" (De divina traditione, thesis 17). Cardinal de Lugo says: "An opinion which in this century is very frequent in the schools, and is defended by almost all, in the next century, after the matter has been better examined and new foundations have appeared, is retained by few" (De fide, disputation 20, number 128). Cf. Ter Haar, De systemate morali antiquorum probabilistarum, p. 98.

In the history of moral theology three principal epochs can be distinguished.

1. The first runs from the beginnings of the Church up to the Middle Ages. The Fathers of the first century, or the Apostolic Fathers (St. Clement of Rome, St. Ignatius, St. Polycarp, Hermas, and others), discussed many things concerning Christian ethics, especially commending faith, charity toward neighbor and toward God, and also patience. The apologists of the second and third centuries, opposing the practice of Christian life to pagan morals, preached contempt of the world, beneficence, virginity, and martyrdom. Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, and St. Cyprian excellently developed Christian practice. They are followed by Sts. Ambrose and Augustine, whose works contain the first rudiments of a systematic exposition of Christian ethics. You will find many moral matters in the works of St. Jerome, St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. John Chrysostom, St. Ephrem, and St. Cyril of Jerusalem. Finally, St. Gregory the Great, in the thirty-five books of the Moralia and in the Book of the Pastoral Rule, left to the Church something like a repertory of moral and pastoral theology.

2. The second epoch extends from the Middle Ages up to the Council of Trent. At the beginning of this age, once the moral documents of the Holy Fathers and the penitential canons had been collected, St. Isidore of Spain, St. Bede the Venerable, St. John Damascene, and others brought forth little from their own store. From the eleventh century, moral science began to be handed down scholastically as a part of all theology by very great doctors; among these, after Peter Lombard, St. Albert the Great, and Alexander of Hales, the Angelic Doctor Aquinas especially stands out, chiefly in the second part of the Summa Theologica. After others, St. Raymond of Pennafort (d. 1275) and others greatly promoted casuistry. St. Antoninus (d. 1459) treated moral theology separately from dogmatic theology.

3. The third epoch was opened after the Council of Trent. From that time moral doctrine was set forth and developed in very ample treatises, either joined with dogmatic theology or - from the end of the sixteenth century - separated from it. Some illustrated the moral doctrine of St. Thomas with commentaries; others treated the entire abundance of moral theology by a scholastic-casuistic method; or they also commented on particular matters in a fuller style. This was a golden age, which lasted almost to the middle of the eighteenth century. From that time both the excessive benignity of many theologians in moral matters, and the immoderate rigor of others, and the very sharp controversies which blazed up from these things, with the Jansenists applauding and instigating, long obscured the splendor of moral theology. Meanwhile the Supreme Pontiffs tried to bring a remedy to this, whether by condemning exaggerated propositions or by indicating the way to be followed in moral matters. Finally St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori (1696-1787) "not without a most provident counsel of God undertook to compose moral theology, so that he might accurately and solidly set forth a truly Catholic doctrine of morals, holding the middle between excessive severity and excessive benignity,"¹ in such a way that through it "the directors of the souls of Christ's faithful could walk with unoffending foot."²

After the accusations of laxity against the doctrine of St. Alphonsus had died away in the earlier decades of the last century, all who wrote on moral matters professed to teach at least according to the mind of St. Alphonsus; so that, as a doctor whose authority is not suspect testifies, "the moral theology of today can be called Alphonsian."³ To this result, besides the internal character of Alphonsian doctrine, the continued commendation of his doctrine by the Supreme Pontiffs and the honors of Doctor of the Church conferred upon the Saint contributed much.

Especially in recent decades, serious detractions and calumnies have been raised almost everywhere on earth against Catholic moral theology. The Holy Fathers of the Church, as though anticipating these, already answered them by demonstrating to their contemporaries both the precepts and the practice of the Christian life. St. Augustine did this most beautifully in the book On the Morals of the Church, addressing the Catholic Church;⁴ likewise in the book The City of God;⁵ and finally in his Letter to Marcellinus.⁶ "Those who say that the doctrine of Christ is opposed to the republic, let them give such an army as the doctrine of Christ has ordered soldiers to be; let them give such provincials, such husbands, such wives, such parents, such children, such masters, such servants, such kings, such judges, and finally such payers and collectors of the taxes of the treasury itself, as Christian doctrine commands them to be, and let them dare to say that it is opposed to the republic; or rather, let them not hesitate to confess that, if it is obeyed, it is a great salvation of the republic."

¹ Thus E. Muller, Theologia moralis, I, p. 55.

² Pius IX, Apostolic Letter concerning St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori being honored with the title Doctor of the Church, 7 July 1871.

³ Bouquillon, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, Introduction, number 137.

⁴ Book I, chapter 30, numbers 62-63.

⁵ Book XIX, chapter 17.

⁶ Letter 138.

A threefold method can be distinguished in treating moral theology: the speculative-scholastic method, which dwells on elucidating and proving principles, and thus provides the foundation on which casuists, as they are called, can rely; the casuistic method, which, after briefly setting forth the principles, inquires what is lawful or unlawful in various circumstances, especially in complicated ones; and the mixed method, which joins both methods. The latter method, that is, the mixed method, is to be preferred. For since moral theology is indeed a science, but one that is plainly directed to practice, it is clear that in learning and handing it down, not only the speculative-scholastic method, which deduces more general rules of morals from principles, but also the casuistic method must be employed. For this latter method supplies a very useful and almost necessary exercise for rightly weighing the minute circumstances in which human actions often happen to be immersed. Nor therefore can it be excluded, provided that the solutions of the proposed questions are exhibited with the greatest discretion and with perpetual attention to the principles themselves. Indeed, you will rightly call casuistry the very collection of decisions of ecclesiastical authority which regard the manifold practical cases of the Christian life; and no one fails to see that the study of this is necessary in itself.

To the point St. Alphonsus says: "They assert that knowledge of principles is enough, and that, for acquiring moral theology, it is sufficient to turn through only those books which, bearing before themselves a display of erudition, think that the whole sequence of this long art consists in general principles, while necessary questions and doubts are passed over, and while they loftily and foolishly despise the authorities of the more celebrated authors; but they are entirely mistaken.... For the greatest difficulty of this science consists in this: that principles be well applied to particular cases, and in a different way according as different circumstances occur, on which the variation of resolutions depends" (Dissertation on the moderate use of probable opinions). And already the Angelic Doctor observed: "Universal moral discourses are less useful, because actions are in particulars" (II-II, Prologue).

Moral theology is divided into general or fundamental theology and special theology. For the division of a science must be drawn from its matter or object. Now the whole of moral theology consists in this: that it teach how human acts are directed to the ultimate end, or - what comes to the same thing - how one lives in a Christian manner. It teaches this by discussing first the general principles of the Christian life, which general moral theology will set forth; then the very exercise of the Christian life, or the cultivation of the virtues; then the principal aids of the Christian life, or the sacraments; and finally the sanction of the Christian life, or ecclesiastical penalties, which special moral theology will set forth. And thus the whole of moral theology will be completed in four books.

Definition.—Moral Theology is defined: (a) etymologically, as the study of God, considered as the beginning and the end of man’s moral life, i.e., of those acts that proceed from reason and will; (b) scientifically, as that part of Sacred Theology which treats of God as our Last End, and of the means by which we may tend to Him.

Hence, Moral Theology differs from various related sciences or habits. Thus: (a) it differs from Ethics, which is the science of human conduct as directed by reason to man’s natural end, for Moral Theology uses faith as well as reason, and is concerned with man’s supernatural end; (b) it differs from faith, since it includes not only principles revealed by God, but also conclusions derived from them; (c) it differs from synderesis, or the habit that perceives the natural principles of morality that are self-evident to the mind, for Moral Theology deals also with supernatural truths and with truths that are not self-evident; (d) it differs from conscience, which draws conclusions for individual cases, since Moral Theology is concerned with general conclusions.

Relation of Moral Theology to Dogmatic Theology.—(a) They do not differ as two distinct sciences, for the main object, in the light of which all else is studied, is the same in both—viz., God. (b) They do differ as two quasi-integral parts or branches of the same science, Dogma being concerned more with the speculative, and Moral with the practical aspects of theology. Dogmatic Theology is the more important of the two, as treating more directly on divine things and as being the basis of Moral Theology.

In Dogma, God Himself is considered in His own nature and creatures as they proceed from Him as from an exemplary and efficient cause, or Creator. Moral Theology continues the pursuit of knowledge of God, concentrating upon Him as He is the Final Cause of things. Creatures emanate from God by way of creation, and this is part of the subject-matter of Dogma; but creatures return to Him, each in its own proper way by virtue of its nature created by God and directed by His Providence and Government, and this return of creatures to God constitutes the general subject-matter of Moral Theology. As Divine Providence and Government are continuations of His Creation, Moral Theology continues to study and to unfold the implications of Dogma’s consideration of God as Creator. God is known to have created as an Intelligent Being ordering His handiwork to Himself as end. His special masterpiece, man, special because he is made to the Image of God, returns to God in a special way proper to him as an Image, i.e., by way of acts of his intellect and will guided and moved by Divine Providence and Predestination. It is of this special way of returning to God by man, His image, that Moral Theology treats. Thus it adds to and perfects Dogmatic Theology, enriching our knowledge of God by way of making explicit the implications of Divine Creation and Providence to His image, man.

The Objects of Moral Theology.—(a) The central theme or object of Moral Theology, which is considered for its own sake and to which all else is secondary (objectum formale quod), is God as the supernatural End or Destiny of man.

(b) The secondary object (objectum materiale) is the means by which one is advanced towards one’s Last End (such as human acts, virtue, grace, the Sacraments), or the obstacles which hinder one from attaining that End (such as vice, temptation, etc.).

(c) The medium through which the above objects are known (objectum formale quo) is the light of natural reason illuminated by faith studying the sources of divine revelation and deducing conclusions from doctrines revealed by God.

Hence Moral Theology includes: (a) the revealed doctrines concerning man’s destiny and duty that are contained in the written and oral Word of God and as interpreted by their custodian, the Catholic Church; (b) the conclusions that are contained in revelation; (c) the duties of man to human laws that are based on the divine natural or positive law; (d) the opinions of theologians on matters that are disputed, as in the controversy about the systems of conscience.

The Sources of Moral Theology, therefore, are: (a) Holy scripture; (b) tradition; (c) the decisions of Popes, Councils, and Congregations, Laws, etc.; (d) the authority of Doctors and theologians; (e) natural reason.

Holy scripture.—“All scripture, inspired by God, is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice” (II Tim., iii. 16). (a) Thus, the deeds narrated in scripture contain lessons for our instruction; but not all of them, even though they be concerned with holy men, are offered for our imitation. (b) The laws of the Old Testament known as ceremonial (such as the rite of circumcision), and those called judicial (such as the prohibition against the taking of interest), are no longer obligatory; but the moral precepts, such as those found in the Decalogue, always remain in force. (c) The ordinances of the New Testament are of three kinds: the Gospel counsels, which are not laws, but invitations to a higher practice of virtue than is necessary for salvation (e.g., the advice of our Lord that one sell all and give to the poor); the laws of the New Testament, which are the commands that it imposes for all times (such as the precepts that one believe the Gospel message, receive Baptism, hear the Church, etc.); temporary regulations, which are those dispositions that were made only for passing circumstances (such as the prohibition issued by the Apostles against the eating of animals that had been suffocated).

Tradition.—Tradition contains those doctrines concerning faith and morals, not found in scripture, that were given orally by Christ or inspired by the Holy Spirit, and that have been handed down from one generation to another in the Catholic Church.

Tradition becomes known to us: (a) through the teaching of the Church expressed by her solemn or ordinary magisterium; (b) through the writings of the Fathers of the Church; (c) through the practice of the Church expressed in her universal customs and laws; (d) through the worship of the Church expressed in her universal forms of prayer and liturgical observance.

Decisions.—In addition to divine tradition just spoken of, Moral Theology uses: (a) Apostolic tradition, which comes down from the Apostles, but whose subject-matter is not a teaching revealed to them, but an ordinance which they themselves made as rulers of the Church (e.g., the law that Sunday be sanctified as the Lord’s day); (b) ecclesiastical tradition, which contains regulations made by the authorities in the Church and handed down to succeeding times (e.g., the introduction of certain days of feast or fast).

Authority of Doctors and Theologians.—(a) St. Thomas Aquinas has been recognized by the Church as her highest theological authority, and the Code of Canon Law (Canons 589, Sec. 1, and 1366, Sec. 2) orders that in all seminaries and religious houses of study the courses of theology shall be made according to his method, teaching and principles.

(b) When the theologians agree with unanimity that a certain doctrine pertaining to faith or morals is divinely revealed, it would be next to heresy to hold the opposite; if they agree only that it is certain, it would be rash to contradict them, unless new and serious objections unknown to them can be offered; if they are divided between schools and systems (even though great claims for opinions are made by their partisans), it is lawful for competent theologians to use their own judgment and decide for the side that seems to have the better arguments in its favor.

Reason.—The uses of natural reason in Moral Theology are: (a) it demonstrates certain preambles to the teachings of Moral Theology, such as the existence of God, His omniscience and veracity; (b) it corroborates from philosophy many of the revealed teachings, viz., that man’s end is not in things finite, that he has duties to God, to society, to himself, etc.; (e) it affords analogies in the natural order by which we may illustrate the end and duties of man in the supernatural order; (d) it supplies the means by which the teachings on morals may be developed into the conclusions that are contained in them, by which those teachings may be defended against the fallacious objections of adversaries, and by which the whole may be arranged scientifically into a body of doctrine.

Moral Theology is served not only by the various branches of philosophy (such as Ethics, Theodicy, Psychology, Logic), but also by many of the natural sciences. Thus: (a) Medicine and Physiology are useful for understanding the morality and imputability of acts; (b) Sociology and Economics may throw light on problems concerning justice; (c) Jurisprudence is, of course, closely related to questions concerning duties that arise from human laws; (d) History confirms the teachings of Christian morality by the lessons of experience.

The Method to Be Followed in Moral Theology.-(a) The positive method is a simple statement of moral principles and doctrines, with little attention to argument, except such as is found in the positive sources (e.g., scripture, tradition, the decisions of the Church).

(b) The Scholastic method is a scientific statement of moral teaching through accurate definition of terms, systematic coordination of parts, strict argumentation and defense, attention to controversies, and recourse to philosophy and other natural knowledge.

(c) The casuistic method, or case-system, is the application of moral principles to the solution of concrete problems of lawfulness or unlawfulness.

The Scholastic method is the one best suited for the study of Moral Theology, because it is more scientific, and fits one better to understand, retain, and apply what one learns. But it is not exclusive of the other methods, since it perfects the positive method, and is the groundwork for the case method. Each method has a special suitability for certain ends. Thus: (a) the positive method is well adapted to preaching, and hence was much in favor with the Fathers of the Church, as can be seen from their moral homilies and treatises; (b) the Scholastic method is the best for study, teaching, apologetic, and was followed by the great classical works of theology in the Middle Ages and later; (c) the case method is very helpful to the seminarian and the priest in the exercise of the ministry of the confessional.

The History of Moral Theology.—There are three periods in the history of Moral Theology: the Patristic, the Medieval, and the Modern.

(a) The Patristic Period (1st to 12th century).—The moral writings of the-Fathers are popular, exhortatory, and occasional; and it is not till the Middle Ages that we meet with works of systematic Moral Theology. The following are among the most notable moral works of the Fathers: the Paedagoga of Clement of Alexandria (d. about 217), which explains what the everyday life of the Christian should be; the Catecheses of St. Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 386); the De Officiis Ministrorum of St. Ambrose (d. 397), a Christian counterpart of Cicero’s work De Officiis; the De Civitate Dei of St. Augustine (d. 430), which contrasts love of God and love of self; the Expositio in Job seu Moralium libri XXV of St. Gregory the Great (d. 604), which consists of moral instructions based on the Book of Job.

Celebrated among the ascetical and mystical writings are: the Ladder of Paradise of St. John Climacus (6th century), the Conferences of Cassian (about 416), the Libri V de Consideratione of St. Bernard (d. 1153). St. Gregory the Great’s De Cura Pastorali is a systematic work of pastoral theology, and is regarded as a classic.

(b) The Medieval Period (12th to 16th century).—The method of the moralists of this period differs from that of the Fathers in that the former is systematic and philosophical, and more proximately adapted to the use of confessors. The masterpiece of scientific Moral Theology is of course found in the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). Works of casuistry were composed by St. Raymond of Pennafort (about 1235), by John of Freiburg (d. 1314), by John of Asti (about 1317), by Angelus of Chiavasso (about 1476), by Sylvester Prierias (d. 1523). The Summa Theologica of St. Antoninus of Florence (d. 1459) has been called an inexhaustible storehouse for manuals of casuistry.

Among the ascetical writers are: St. Bonaventure, the Seraphic Doctor (d. 1274), John Gerson (d. 1429), John Tauler (d. 1361), Bl. Henry Suso (d. 1366), and Denis the Carthusian (d. 1471).

(c) The Modern Period (16th century to the present).—Characteristic of this period are the commentaries written on St. Thomas, the controversies over the systems of conscience, the appearance of numerous manuals and special treatises, and the attention given to changed conditions of society and ecclesiastical discipline. Noteworthy among modern works are: the Commentary on St. Thomas by Cajetan (d. 1534); the writings of Bartholomew de Medina (d. 1581), called the father of moderate Probabilism; the De Paenitentia of Lugo (d. 1660), a handbook that combines speculative and casuistical theology; the Roman Catechism, which was issued by the authority of the Council of Trent in 1566; the Theologia Moralis of St. Alphonsus Liguori (d. 1787), a work whose authority is universally recognized; the celebrated treatise on the virtues by Lessius (d. 1623); the classic work of Suarez (d. 1617), De Religione; the Summa Casuum Conscientiae of Toletus (d. 1596); the commentaries of Francis de Victoria (d. 1546), which are writings of extraordinary merit. More recent works are so numerous that it is impossible to mention them here.

Among the many modern works on Moral Theology which have been published abroad, not a few are in the vernacular—in German, French, Italian, Spanish, etc. While they are not intended to replace the Latin text-books used in seminaries, these are nevertheless a very great help to a fuller knowledge of the matter treated and to a more ready use of it in the work of the ministry.

So far there has been a dearth of works on Moral Theology in English; and it is this want that has occasioned the present work, which aims at presenting Moral Theology, not only in its essentials, but even more in detail and with greater fullness than is done by most of the text-books commonly in use. And yet, while pursuing this larger and more comprehensive plan, the authors of this new work have tried to be as brief and compact as possible. It has been their endeavor especially to avoid digressions into other fields and to sum up pertinent matter in as clear and simple a manner as the subjects treated will permit.

The Division and Order of Parts in Moral Theology.—The arrangement of his matter made by St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica is admittedly unsurpassed and unsurpassable in the qualities that good distribution should have, viz., clearness, connection between parts, completeness. Hence, we cannot do better than follow the order he has used in his treatment of moral subjects. His general division is as follows:

(1) The Last End of Man.—From the Last End acts derive their morality, those being good that advance man towards its attainment, and those evil that turn him away from its possession. The Last End is considered; (a) as to its existence; (b) as to its nature (i.e., the constituents of supreme beatitude).

(2) The General Means Tending to the Last End.—God is approached, not by the steps of the body, but by the operations of the soul, and thus it is human acts that lead one to one’s Last End. These acts are considered: (a) as they are in themselves or absolutely, and according to the twofold division of acts proper to man (human acts) and acts common to man and beast (passions); (b) as to the internal principles from which they proceed, i.e., habits, whether good (virtues) or bad (vices); (c) as to the external principles by which they are influenced. The external principle of evil is the demon, who tempts man to sin. The external principle of good is God, who instructs us by His law and the voice of conscience, and assists us by His grace.

(3) The Special Means Tending to the Last End.—These are our own good works; hence, here are considered the virtues incumbent on all classes of men, i.e., the theological and moral virtues.

Some of the topics just mentioned (e.g., divine grace) are discussed fully in works on Dogmatic Theology, and hence may be omitted here. Again, since the Last End of man is considered at great length in dogmatic works on Eschatology, little need be said about it here. Hence, it will be convenient to divide this work into two parts as follows: General Moral Theology, in which are treated the more remote principles on duty, such as the Last End, human acts, good and bad habits, laws and conscience, grace; (b) Special Moral Theology, in which are treated the more immediate rules concerning duty, i.e., man’s obligations as regards the virtues and the Commandments.

What is moral theology? - If the name is considered, it is that part of theology which is concerned with morals. But if the thing itself is considered, it can be defined: that part of theology which, resting upon divine law manifested through revelation, inquires what is lawful and what is unlawful in human actions, so that it may direct these actions in order to eternal life. The human act is the subject of this science. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of human acts is the material object of this science. But the lawfulness or unlawfulness of human acts, insofar as it is demonstrable by divine law manifested through revelation, or by the revealed word of God, constitutes the formal object of this science. From this also the proper source of this science is clear. Therefore moral theology is distinguished from moral philosophy, because the former directs human acts to the supernatural end, the latter to the natural end of man; the former rests especially upon the light of faith, but the latter upon the natural light of reason. Hence it is easily clear how great is the excellence, necessity, and usefulness of moral theology.

By divine law manifested through revelation; for the principles of morals flow from the same sources as dogmas. They are contained first of all in Scripture, and are made known by Tradition, of which splendid monuments exist in the writings of the holy Fathers. Writings of this kind do not contain a distinct and methodical account of moral discipline, but certainly, together with the dogmas of faith, they present the principles of morals, besides also several particular cases, in which what is lawful and what is not lawful is discussed, as is especially to be seen in Tertullian, Cyprian, Chrysostom, and Augustine. But those who afterward treated moral discipline according to the method of the schools explained those principles more fully, adapting them to the individual cases which arise day by day.

What is lawful, what is unlawful; for in this it is distinguished from Ascetic and Mystical theology. Ascetic theology adds to Moral theology, commonly so called, in that it does not so much direct human acts so that they may simply be good, as hand down the manner by which human life may be adorned with all the virtues. Mystical theology, moreover, adds to common sanctity the manner of a special union with God, which is granted not to all, but only to some. Moral theology is also distinguished from Canon Law. For in the latter the laws by which the Church is governed are properly explained, especially as regards her whole external government. But Moral Theology also considers these laws, certainly, yet insofar as they bind in conscience and must be observed, and consequently what, also in regard to them, is lawful or unlawful in conscience. S. Th. I. p. q. I., 1. 2. q. 91. a. 4.; Commentary On the Nature of Moral Theology.

What have been the vicissitudes of Moral Theology? - There have been various vicissitudes of Moral Theology, both as regards its didactic development and as regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases.

As regards its methodical form, various ages can be distinguished in it, and they are the following six.

The first age, from the beginning, in the time of the Apostles, was when moral doubts were resolved by the decisions of the Supreme Pontiffs, by the decrees of Councils, and by the opinions of the Fathers, who especially in their homilies and sermons to the people explained those things which are necessary for rightly informing morals and for salvation.

The second age succeeds a little later, when in the first centuries of the Church the use of canonical penance became established, and Penitential Books were employed. Special treatises on moral matters were gradually multiplied in this age, either together with speculative doctrines or separately, up to the twelfth century, when, after St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, who died in the year 1033, and after St. Bernard, first Abbot of Clairvaux, who died in 1153, Peter Lombard, called the Master by antonomasia, wrote the books of the Sentences, in the third of which he treats of the virtues and of vices; he died in 1164. Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 11, c. 11; Decree of Gratian, at the end.

The third age extends from the thirteenth century to the fourteenth. In this age sacred practical doctrine made great progress, especially through the work of William of Paris, who died in 1249, St. Bonaventure, O. Min., who died in the year 1274, St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P., who died in the year 1274, called the Angelic Doctor, St. Raymond of Pennafort, of the Order of Preachers, who died in the year 1275, and Peter Paludanus, O.P., who died in the year 1342, who for St. Alphonsus is a doctor of perfect knowledge.

The fourth age embraces the two following centuries, the fifteenth and the sixteenth; and it is distinguished by the notable saints who flourished in this age. Among others are celebrated St. John of Capistrano, O. Min., who died in the year 1440, St. Bernardine of Siena, O.S. Fr., who died in the year 1444, St. Lawrence Justinian, who died in the year 1455, St. Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, who died in the year 1459, Thomas Cardinal Cajetan, O.P., who died in the year 1534, a man of most subtle genius, Francis de Vitoria, O.P., who died in the year 1546, Dominic Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1560, Peter Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1563, Bartholomew Medina, O.P., who died in the year 1581, St. Charles Borromeo, who died in the year 1584, Martin Azpilcueta, called Navarrus, who died in the year 1590, Cardinal Francis Toletus, S.J., who died in the year 1596, and Louis Molina, S.J., who died in the year 1600.

The fifth age embraces the seventeenth and eighteenth century up to St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, and it is distinguished by many learned scholastic theologians who expressly expounded and illustrated moral questions in copious treatises. Among many others there excel Thomas Sanchez, S.J., who died in the year 1610, Francis Suarez, S.J., who died in the year 1617, Leonard Lessius, S.J., who died in the year 1623, Basil Pontius, O.S. Aug., who died in the year 1629, the Salmanticenses, O. Carm. Disc., from 1631 to 1722, Martin Bonacina, who died in the year 1631, Giles Coninck, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Ferdinand De Castro Palao, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Paul Laymann, S.J., who died in the year 1635, Francis Sylvius, who died in the year 1649, Augustine Barbosa, who died in the year 1649, Cardinal John De Lugo, who died in the year 1660, Peter Marchant, O. Min., who died in the year 1661, Antoninus Diana, Cleric Regular Theatine, who died in the year 1663, Zacharias Pasqualigo, Cler. Reg., who died in the year 1664, Hermann Busembaum, S.J., who died in the year 1668, Henry Pirhing, S.J., who died in the year 1670, Thomas Tamburinus, S.J., who died in the year 1675, Anacletus Reiffenstuel, O.S. Franc., who died in the year 1703, Claude La-Croix, S.J., who died in the year 1714, Patrick Sporer, O. Min., who died in the year 1714, Prosper Lambertini, Benedict XIV, who died in the year 1758, and Lucius Ferraris, Ord. Min., who died in the year 1760.

The sixth age takes its beginning from St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, who died in the year 1787, and extends down to our own times. St. Alphonsus, most outstanding in genius and doctrine as well as in sanctity of life, and divinely given for exterminating Jansenist errors and severities, wrote a Moral Theology in which he treats all questions learnedly, eruditely, and with the highest prudence, recounting almost all that had been handed down before him; hence he was deservedly adorned by the Church with the title of Doctor. Hence it happened that in more recent times Moral Theologians followed St. Alphonsus as leader and master. In our age very many compendia of Moral Theology have been published.

The name indeed is modest, but the works are certainly of notable merit. For in these compendia the whole doctrine of Moral Theology is handed down briefly and in order, and in them is contained, accurately set forth, not only the doctrine of the old theologians accumulated in the course of time, but also that which has been acquired for Moral Theology either from the more recent Acts of the Holy See and of the Sacred Roman Congregations, or also from the progress of the natural sciences. Nor indeed have more expansive treatments been lacking in this age, as can be seen in the treatises On Justice and Law and On Contracts of D. Carriere, and in the scholia, annotations, and dissertations of Fr. Anthony Ballerini, S.J. Zitelli, Enchirid.;

Hurter, Nomenclat.; D'Annibale, Summ., 4th ed., p. 1, n. 2 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction V.

As regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases, for several centuries each one defended his own opinion, according to the varying weight of the reasons, as seemed better to him. In the year 1572 Antonius Cordubensis first began to contend on behalf of law, because of the authoritative and obligatory prerogative of law, and accordingly he established that in doubt the safer part must always be held. But in the year 1577 Bartholomew Medina, professor at Salamanca, began, on the contrary, to contend on behalf of liberty because of the prerogative of its natural right, and accordingly he established that in doubtful matters he acts prudently and licitly who follows an opinion truly probable and favoring liberty, even after leaving aside the more probable opinion in favor of law. He was the first who reduced the doctrine concerning probable opinions into a system. From this Tutiorism and Probabilism arose.

In the following seventeenth century Synnichius, who died in the year 1666, brought Tutiorism down into Rigorism, while Caramuel brought Probabilism into Laxism: for the former denied that we can follow an opinion favoring liberty, even if it is most probable, which was condemned by Alexander VIII in the year 1690; the latter, on the opposite side, affirmed that we can follow an opinion even slightly probable, which was proscribed by Innocent XI in the year 1679. Hence in that same century Probabilism was widely diffused, and became a very common and very received doctrine in every school: of almost all the disciples of St. Thomas, of almost all the disciples of Scotus, of almost all the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, and of other theologians, with few exceptions.

But since many of these probabilists favored liberty too much, asserting that it was lawful to follow even an opinion that was probably and doubtfully probable, the Probabilists were divided among themselves, and there arose moderate Probabilism, standing in an opinion truly and gravely probable, and broad Probabilism, proceeding even to doubtful probability. Hence, while the Fathers of the Society of Jesus commonly remained in Probabilism, the Thomists passed over to Probabiliorism, requiring for liberty an opinion more probable than the opinion favoring law. Zitelli, in his Enchiridion, mentions as the head of the probabiliorists Francis Genet, who died in the year 1702.

In the eighteenth century, to overthrow broad Probabilism and Probabiliorism at the same time, St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori undertook to defend moderate Probabilism, establishing that it is lawful to use a probable opinion even in competition with one more probable for law, whenever the former has a certain and grave foundation. And for that reason the Holy Doctor called his system moderate Probabilism, against rigid Probabiliorists and lax Probabilists, Equiprobabilism, with aeque taken according to the nature of true probability, not according to equality of degree.

But since the word nevertheless was not free from ambiguity in itself, hence after St. Alphonsus another system arose, which the Redemptorist Fathers defend, namely the system of Equiprobabilism, by which it is established that it is lawful to follow an opinion favoring liberty when it is equally or a little less probable than the opinion favoring law; but that it is not lawful when the latter is much more probable than the former, which in truth falls back into Probabiliorism. La-Croix, vol. 1, prodromal book, Franc. Ant. Zachariae and Quaest. facti of Stephen De Champs; Zitelli, Enchir.; D'Annibale, p. 1, n. 8 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction II; E. E. M. n. 114, 119.

What is the division of Moral Theology; and what is the order of the treatises? - All the questions of moral theology are reduced to certain principal treatises into which it is divided. That we may proceed in order, we shall speak: 1. On human acts, which are as it were the proper subject of honesty and sin. 2. On conscience, which proximately regulates human actions. 3. On laws in general, which remotely regulate the same actions. 4. On sins, which arise from the lack of conformity of human actions with respect to the rule, whether proximate or remote. 5. On laws in particular, by which what is lawful or unlawful in human actions is determined in particular. The first four treatises constitute fundamental or general Moral Theology, while the remaining treatises, on particular laws, constitute special Moral Theology.

Now the following order must be used in treating of these particular laws: 1. On the properly evangelical precepts, which are established by revealed divine law, namely on the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, by which man immediately tends to his end. Moreover, "law is not imposed by any lord except upon his subjects.... But the first subjection of man to God is through faith.... And therefore faith is presupposed for the Precepts of the Law." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 16. a. 1. But through hope man is led to the observance of the law, and from charity follows the observance of the precepts. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 22. a. 2.

2. On the precepts of the Decalogue, properly constituted by natural law, although also positively confirmed by divine law, as is clear from Matt. 19:17 and Trent, sess. 6, c. 19. 3. On the precepts of the Church, which depend upon human law. 4. On the obligations of various states. For after the more general precepts one must proceed to the more particular.

By the observance of all these latter precepts man tends mediately to his end. For other precepts concern various acts of the moral virtues. And as God is immediately attained by the theological virtues, so by the other moral virtues there is immediately attained only the honesty of some created thing.

5. On the precepts of the sacraments, which contain a law at once commanding and assisting; for through them sanctifying grace is infused, and other aids of grace are given, by which man can observe the whole law, so that he may thus be preserved in the friendship of God, or be restored to it if, by transgressing the law, he has sinned gravely against God.

6. On censures, which are ecclesiastical penalties, preventing and following upon the transgression of certain special laws; and on irregularities, which are partly penalties and partly impediments to receiving sacred orders. 7. On indulgences, through which, sins having otherwise been remitted, the temporal punishment still due to them is remitted; and thus man is proximately disposed to attain eternal life. Theol. Wirceburg., on the Theological Virtues, 32 ff., on the Virtue of Religion, 9 f.

By what method is Moral Theology treated? - Moral theology can be treated by a threefold method: positive, casuistic, and scholastic. The first sets forth and proves moral precepts and dogmas in an orderly way from properly theological sources. The second insists upon resolving practical cases, by applying general principles to particular cases determined by various circumstances. The third proceeds by the discourse of reason rather than by authority. For moral precepts and dogmas, already positively proved by properly theological arguments, it confirms and illustrates by philosophical principles and reasons, and declares their connections, relations, and consequences.

That threefold method can easily be joined and employed together, and from this threefold method, mixed together, there is had a perfect and excellent treatment of moral theology. In the present Institutions we shall insist a little more upon reason than upon authority. For the disputation which is instituted in the schools is not directed to removing error, but to instructing and leading the mind to the understanding of the truth which it intends; "and this ought to rest upon reasons which investigate the root of truth and cause one to know how that which is said is true; otherwise, if the master determines the question by bare authorities, the hearer will indeed be made certain that it is so, but he will acquire nothing of science or understanding, but will depart empty." S. Th. Quodl. 4, a. 18.

This latter scholastic method is of itself brief in the treatment of questions. But since several of the older scholastics often undertook a long examination of the opposed opinions of others, in order to refute them directly, hence, especially as regards moral theology, it has happened that their most learned works were handled only by few. In order that these, our whatever-sort-of Institutions, may be of greater use and utility, we have determined to proceed in them in scholastic form, omitting that long discussion of the opinions of others, which we also observe was done in the Summa Theologica by the Angelic Doctor. - Pius VI, Constitution Auctorem fidei, August 28, 1794, proposition 76; Pius IX, Syllabus, proposition 13.

What is the force of extrinsic probability? - There is no doubt that extrinsic probability constitutes an opinion truly and sufficiently gravely probable. "Someone of small knowledge," says S. Th. 2. 2. q. 4. a. 3, "is made more certain about that which he hears from some learned person than about that which seems to him according to his own reason." This probability therefore has force, because someone is not judged to speak without grave foundation. L. 1. 1. n. 79. Hence, if someone does not rest in authority alone, but weighs this foundation, then extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic. But sometimes this extrinsic probability itself constitutes intrinsic probability, namely when the question concerns a matter which greatly depends on the estimation of the wise, L. 1. 3. n. 1032, namely a matter rather of fact than of law, for example, what is grave matter in the canonical hours, in fasting, etc.

An extrinsically probable opinion is usually designated by common, more common, most common opinion. Concerning these Sanchez, De Matr. l. 3. d. 44. n. 3, has these things, from which one can make a judgment about a common, more common opinion, etc.: "That opinion is not called common which has many doctors asserting it, with no preceding discussion, but superficially, and as they say, following it in passing....

Therefore Navarrus very well says that he regards as more common an opinion approved by six doctors treating the matter professedly, than by fifty who are led almost by the authority alone of the former. To these add Ioannes Lupus... saying that doctors are not to be believed, however much they excel in doctrine, when they lack foundation." - La-Croix l. 1. n. 164. 165; Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1806, p. 21 seq.; E. M. 122. 131.

Note: From the common opinion of theologians "one must not easily depart in a practical matter." Lugo De Iust. et Iur. d. 16. n. 106. Yet this must not be taken too scrupulously, and much less extended. Hence S. Alph. does not hesitate to affirm that he "departed from the opinions of many grave authors," l. 3. n. 547, and ibid. below he says: "Where reason convinced me, I did not refuse to go against several authors." Cf. also l. 6. n. 257. 427, where S. D. departs even from the most common opinion. Indeed an opinion is not therefore probable because it is taught by several authors, if they do not bring to it a grave reason. La-Croix n. 136 seq.; L. 1. 6. n. 657.

Does the authority of one doctor suffice for the probability of some opinion? - R. Negatively, ordinarily speaking. The reason is that if it is of some ancient author and has been deserted by all, by this very fact it ordinarily lacks a sufficient foundation. But if it is of some more recent author, either he brings a grave reason, or not. If the first, his opinion is ordinarily handed down also by others. If the second, he cannot render his opinion probable to others, since he brings no sufficient reason for this. Ordinarily speaking: for if some grave author treats some question which others have not treated, and brings a grave reason, or if he sustains an opinion against the common opinion, but sustains it by some new reason unknown to others, nothing prevents him, even alone, from rendering his opinion probable; but soon several others will adhere to it, if that doctrine is publicly spread. And thus "the Salmanticenses, etc., note that the statement of an excellent doctor, even a modern one, asserting that a law has been abrogated, suffices so that we are disobliged from the law." L. 1. 1. n. 107. And certainly the Holy See expressly declared that a confessor is not to be disturbed who follows the doctrine of S. Alphonsus on account of his authority alone, without having weighed his reasons. S. Poenit. July 5, 1831; E. M. 131.

Note: Proposition 27 condemned by Alexander VII: "If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion ought to be judged probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable," was altogether rightly condemned, because the proposition is general, and can be understood of any author whatever, even of humble reputation, and affirms an opinion to be probable by the very fact that it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable. E. M.

To n. 1, 665, 671, 675, 693, 695, 701, 703, 704, 705. ON MORAL THEOLOGY AND ON LIBERTY

All good and honorable men at present direct their mind to the reformation of human society. The necessity of this reformation appears too plainly from so many and such great evils of errors and iniquities by which any civil community is at once oppressed and depressed. Many remedies are brought forward by many persons. No other remedy can be efficaciously applied to them except the right knowledge and observance of the precepts of Our Lord Jesus Christ to be persuaded. Indeed the Word was made flesh, that He might be the true light which enlightens every man coming into this world, John 1:9, 14, and might save His people, Ps. 27:9. And therefore Christ sent the Apostles into the world for this end, that going they might teach all nations, teach them to observe all things whatever He Himself commanded, Matt. 28:19, 20. Moral Theology narrates, explains, and demonstrates these precepts to be observed. And the study and discipline of them also tends to this, that we who devote labor to it may be able to continue the mission of the Apostles, with the Church as guide and teacher, also we going into the whole world by our own person, voice, writings, and example of our life. The mission of the Apostles has not ended, but is always continued and will be continued even unto the end. Sending the Apostles, Christ added: And behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the age. Matt. 28:20.

Therefore we are held to study Moral Theology with all diligence, with every effort, so that in the midst of the night of the age we may be able to show to those erring the way of justice, through which all men may pass from the power of darkness into the light and kingdom of God, and all societies may be established in stable peace and proceed prosperously to true happiness. Indeed, without virtue, without honesty, without morality, to renew old things, to restore those fallen apart, is an impossible matter, and true happiness cannot be had on this earth; neither individual men, nor peoples and civil communities, can attain it. Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord, Ps. 118:1. Blessed is the nation whose Lord is its God, Ps. 32:12.

Fittingly St. Alphonsus, most versed equally in moral doctrine and in the care of souls, in the Dedicatory Letter directed to Benedict XIV, which is found at the beginning of the Moral Work, gives to the Supreme Pontiff this reason for his Work. "For since," he says, "I had been called by the benefit of God to the ministry of Missions, for helping the people scattered through the countryside, and especially those who are more destitute of spiritual helps, there seemed to me necessary for this a knowledge, more than mediocre, of moral matters, which would be suited both to instructing and to governing souls."

If to the holy Doctor a knowledge, more than mediocre, of moral matters seemed so necessary for peoples scattered through the countryside, how much more necessary will be not common knowledge, but exquisite, for the peoples of great cities? And if that knowledge, more than mediocre, of moral matters was necessary at that time, how much more will an excellent knowledge be necessary in this our time, in which Modernists and Americanists, with the name of science usurped, try to overturn the very nature of vices and virtues.

Well instructed in this moral doctrine, we will fight the good fight, and trusting in the assisting grace of God, we will open our mouth in the midst of the Church, to show and reprove that false and condemned liberty by which almost the whole world is disturbed up and down, and from which every error, every iniquity draws its origin. For from this condemned and condemnable liberty flows that liberty of opining, whence, as occasion arises, every error of rationalism and naturalism arises; that liberty of speaking, writing, acting, whence every iniquity, every delict and crime sprouts against persons, against civil society, against the society of the Church. What nation indeed exists which, notwithstanding the powerful apparatus of arms and soldiers, stands quietly in peace, without daily fearing social commotion and revolution? Dark freemasons and sectaries, socialist and communist agitators, and all others who, having the modern soul, as they say, by proclaiming themselves defenders of liberty, especially attack the Church of Jesus Christ, as the enemy of all liberty, and proclaim the separation of the civil state from the Church, plotting the ruin of Church and civil state together, continually prepare it by employing all wicked means. But all these vanished in their thoughts; and their foolish heart was darkened; for saying that they were wise they were made fools. Rom. 1:21, 22.

History itself refutes them. For the Church of Jesus Christ has always proceeded together with liberty, and has always advanced pari passu from its beginning.

For indeed, as the Apostle says, Gal. 4:26: That Jerusalem which is above, namely the Church, is free, and she is our mother. If liberty is truly liberty from dejection, from chains and bonds, the Church is the one that protects the dignity of man by proclaiming him destined for the adoption of sons of God, heir of God, coheir of Christ. The Church is the one that most constantly defends the dignity of woman by most firmly preaching the indissolubility and sanctity of matrimony, by invincibly proscribing adulterous divorce. The Church is the one that vindicates for each one dominion of his own conscience and of his own things. The Church is the one that, from the doctrine of Jesus Christ, commands one to love all, even enemies, and prohibits anyone private from taking vengeance for delicts, this right being reserved to public authority. Consequently the Church has always labored to abolish the monstrous servitude of men, always to reconcile peace among peoples, also to proscribe errors against the liberty of man by which man was being reduced to the condition of beasts.

We, having an ancient soul, not haters of liberty, will on the contrary preach to all that true liberty, repeating to all the words of the Apostle Paul to the Galatians, 5:13: For you have been called unto liberty, brethren; 4:31, Brethren, we are not children of the bondwoman, but of the free: by the liberty by which Christ has freed us; and by which, even from the beginning of His birth, peace was announced to men of good will, Luke 2:13.

Which liberty consequently brought by Christ is not confusion between true and false, is not a mixing of good and evil, is not contempt of any superior power, is not violation of any right and obligation, is not transgression of any divine and human law, is not destruction of any order. This is not liberty, not liberty, but unbridled license, most shameful lust. If it is called liberty, it is that liberty which, according to the Apostle Peter, is the cloak of every iniquity. For so is the will of God, he says, that by doing good you may silence the ignorance of imprudent men: as free, and not as having liberty as a cloak of malice. 1 Pet. 2:15, 16.

Is that liberty by which, because men are equal by nature and by natural faculties, it denies every subjection to any power, of wife toward husband, of children toward parents, of subjects toward public powers? By nature and by natural faculties men are certainly equal among themselves; but they are not equal among themselves, nor can they be, in the evolution of the same faculties, in this order of things. And this is from nature itself and from God, the author and ordainer of nature. Hence the Apostle Paul, writing to the Romans, 13:1 seqq., concludes: Let every soul, therefore no soul is excluded, let every soul be subject to higher powers. And behold the reason and foundation of this subjection: For there is no power except from God; and those that are, are ordained by God.... Therefore he who resists the power resists the ordinance of God.... Therefore be subject of necessity, not only on account of wrath, but also on account of conscience. On account of conscience, not on account of the person of a man. On account of conscience, because if there is no power except from God, wherever that power is found, it itself is from God, and is the minister of God. On account of conscience, because it is from the ordination of God. Therefore if anything is commanded against the ordination of God, then certainly one must obey God rather than men, Acts 5:29, and rather die than be defiled.

Liberty is a gift of God, and therefore cannot be against the ordination of God Himself, and true and perfect liberty can exist only in good. Wherefore against God Himself, against religion, against the Church of God Himself, there can be no true liberty. Moreover liberty is the most noble dowry and perfection of human nature. Wherefore again against the right reason of man, against human nature itself, against the order and good of man and of human society, true liberty cannot be had. Liberty against the right order of things is something absurd.

For which reason the Apostle Paul, whom we have heard preaching liberty, addresses all Christians, saying: Render to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor. Rom. 13:7.

Kings and Princes of all the earth, therefore render to all their dues. Hear King David: Render justice to all, equity, and judge right things, Ps. 57:2. Hear King Solomon: Love justice, you who judge the earth, Wis. 1:1.

And you who are subjects, render to all their dues. Hear the Prince of the Apostles: Be subject to every human creature, on account of God, whether to the king, as excelling; or to governors, as sent by him.... Fear God, honor the king. 1 Pet. 2:13 seqq.

And you who are masters, render to all their dues. Hear the Apostle:

Masters, furnish to servants what is just and equal, knowing that you also have a Lord in heaven. Col. 4:1.

And you who are servants, render to all their dues. Hear also the Apostle: Servants, obey carnal masters with fear and trembling, ... serving with a good will, as to the Lord and not to men. Eph. 6:5^†.

And all you men, render to all their dues. Hear the Apostle: Husbands, love your wives, and do not be bitter toward them. Col. 3:19.

And you wives, render to all their dues. Hear likewise the Apostle: Women, be subject to your husbands, as it is fitting, in the Lord. Col. 3:18.

And you children, render to all their dues. Hear the Apostle: Children, obey your parents in all things. Col. 3:20^†.

And you fathers, render to all their dues. Hear also the Apostle: Fathers, do not provoke your children to indignation; but educate them in the discipline and correction of the Lord. Col. 3:21.

And all you men, all you Christians, all you Catholics, laymen, clerics, religious, render to all their dues. Render dues to God, render dues to neighbor, render dues to yourselves.

Hear Christ Our Lord Himself: You shall love the Lord your God from your whole heart, and from your whole soul, and from all your strength, and from all your mind; and your neighbor as yourself.... Do this and you shall live. Luke 10:27, 28.

Hear the Apostle to the Romans, 13:8. Owe nothing to anyone, except that you love one another: for he who loves neighbor has fulfilled the law.

But especially you Priests, clerics, and religious, render to all their dues. Hear the Apostle: You must be blameless, sober, prudent, modest, hospitable, not following shameful gain. Be an example of the faithful in word, in conversation, in charity, in faith, in chastity. 1 Tim. 3, 4. Render dues especially to the Vicar of Christ on earth, the Supreme Pontiff, our most loving and most beloved Father. Render to him love, honor, reverence, obedience to his most wise commands.

Hear my great Father, St. Ignatius of Loyola: "Let us be altogether of one mind and conformable with the Catholic Church itself," he says, "if something which appears white to our eyes she shall have defined to be black, we ought likewise to pronounce that it is black. For it is undoubtedly to be believed that the Spirit of Our Lord Jesus Christ and of the orthodox Church, His Spouse, is the same, through whom we are governed and directed to salvation; nor is there one God who once handed down the precepts of the Decalogue and another who at this time instructs and rules the Hierarchical Church." And He instructs and rules her through the Supreme Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ.

And hear the Supreme Pontiff himself, the Vicar of Christ, Pius X. In an Address, in the Italian language, given to Priests in the year 1912, "Love," he says, "Love the Supreme Pontiff, because the Supreme Pontiff is.... Love, not in word, nor in tongue, but in work and truth. When someone loves another he is conformed to him in thought and will, searching out his desires. And if Our Lord Jesus Christ said of Himself, if anyone loves me, he will keep my word, so the Supreme Pontiff is to be loved by furnishing due obedience to him. And therefore, when the Supreme Pontiff is truly loved, questions are not raised about that which He decrees and prescribes, how far obedience is owed, and in what things obedience is to be given; when the Supreme Pontiff is truly loved, it is not said, in order to elude obedience, that he spoke somewhat obscurely; nor are his Decrees and Ordinances called into doubt...; nor is his authority restrained within arbitrary limits; when the Supreme Pontiff is truly loved, the authority of other persons, however learned they may be, who dissent from the Supreme Pontiff, is not preferred to the authority of the Pontiff. If they are learned, they are certainly not holy, because he who is holy cannot dissent from the Supreme Pontiff." Behold the Italian words: "To love the Pope, it is enough to reflect who the Pope is.... How must he be loved? Not in word, nor in tongue, but in work and truth. When one loves a person, one seeks to conform oneself in everything to his thoughts, to execute his wishes, to interpret his desires. And if Our Lord Jesus Christ said of Himself: If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, so to show our love for the Pope it is necessary to obey him. Therefore when one loves the Pope, one does not make discussions about what He disposes or requires, or how far obedience must reach, and in what things one ought to obey; when one loves the Pope, one does not say that he did not speak clearly enough... one does not put his orders in doubt... one does not limit the field in which He can and ought to exercise his authority... one does not prefer to the authority of the Pope that of other persons, however learned, who dissent from the Pope; these, if they are learned, are not holy, because one who is holy cannot dissent from the Pope." He is not holy, sanctus non est. What then is he? He is a modern soul.

Therefore all render to all their dues, and the whole of society will be reformed; all observe the commands of Christ concerning charity and justice, and all things will be renewed in Christ. As the physical order consists in this, that each thing be placed in the place due to it, so the moral order consists in this, that rational and free creatures observe their own due obligations. From order observed there is had peace, which is the tranquility of order; and with the peace of one's own soul, and the peace of men among themselves, there is had that happiness and blessedness which can be had in this life, both of individual men and of individual societies of men. And truly then there will be new heavens and a new earth. Indeed true and perfect blessedness can be possessed only in the other life, by the possession of God. Hence happiness and blessedness in the present life can be had as no other than that which disposes us to attaining that eternal and perfect blessedness, and which is contained in justice, namely that justice which renders dues to all, and thus makes the will of man right, through due order to the end. Indeed, as is said in Prov. 14:34: Justice raises up a nation; but sin makes peoples miserable. Concerning this justice, which renders dues to all, which consequently establishes peace in the world, and which already makes us sharers of true happiness, we can well say with Aristotle: "Neither Hesperus nor Lucifer is worthy of such admiration"; και ουθ' εσπερος, ουθ' εωος, ουθω θαυμαυτος. Eth. Nicom. l. 5, c. 1, toward the end.

1. Every treatment and question, in order that it may be rightly instituted, unfolded, and at length resolved, begins from the definition of the thing to be treated and investigated, from its division, and from the way to be followed in it, which is to be established beforehand. Concerning these matters, therefore, we shall speak briefly at the beginning of these Commentaries on the whole of Moral Theology.

2. Theology, in general, is defined: the science concerning God, acquired from divine revelation. Wherefore its material object is: all divine things demonstrable from divine revelation; its formal object is: truth demonstrable from the same divine revelation; its subject: God; its end: both, chiefly, the contemplation of divine truth, and also the sanctification of human life.

3. For indeed Theology, simply so called, is taken antonomastically for sacred or supernatural Theology; and here it is defined by a nominal and real definition. God can be known in two ways: first, from creatures, according to a certain imperfect likeness; second, from Himself, according to His proper nature and proper mode of being. The first knowledge of God is natural, for it is had by natural reason; and it constitutes natural Theology. The other knowledge of God is natural to God alone; exceeding every created intellect, it is wholly supernatural to it. We are made participants in this knowledge through the virtue of faith divinely infused into us. For through it we adhere to God, the First Truth, as to the principle of knowing, believing those things to be true which are revealed by God, because of the authority of God Himself revealing. Hence another science concerning God arises, resting upon this divine and supernatural revelation, which is called Sacred Doctrine, Sacred Theology, and supernatural Theology; and consequently it is rightly defined: the science concerning God, acquired from divine revelation.

4. The material object, or the object which, is that which is proximately and directly attained by some faculty, as whiteness with respect to sight. But Theology proximately and directly attains all divine things demonstrable from divine revelation. These, therefore, are its material object.

5. Hence: 1. The material object of Theology is both those things which we gather by reasoning from faith, and those things which we hold by faith itself; for Theology also demonstrates these, although from the principles or sources of faith itself. - 2. Faith is distinguished from Theology, and precedes it. For faith supplies the first principles from which, by reasoning and demonstration, Theology proceeds to know other things. - 3. The same truth can be the object of faith and of Theology: of faith, insofar as it is immediately believed by divine revelation; of Theology, insofar as it is demonstrated from divine revelation. And in this case, although, speaking per se, faith in the thing which is demonstrated does not precede, nevertheless faith in the thing from which it is demonstrated does precede, that is, in divine revelation and authority, which are known and certain by faith itself. For we believe by divine faith not only the things which have been said by God, but the very word of God itself.

6. The formal object, or the object on account of which, or by which, is that aspect by which the material object is attained by a faculty, as color with respect to sight. But Theology investigates truth from divine revelation, and, as a science, assents to truth on account of this demonstration. Therefore its formal object is truth demonstrable from the word of God.

7. The subject, or object concerning which, of some faculty is that thing to which the material object and the formal object, considered concretely, pertain; as the body, of which there is whiteness and color, is the subject of sight. But all those things which Theology attains as demonstrable from divine revelation are either God Himself, or indeed other things from God, but insofar as they have order to God as to their principle and end, and insofar as they are referred to the greatest knowledge of God. Therefore God is the subject of this science.

8. Hence it is clear: 1. that in the definition of Theology handed down, its subject and formal object are set forth. - 2. Although Theology treats of many and various things, which therefore in some way are its subject, nevertheless properly God alone is its subject; for under the aspect of God it treats those many and various things, and the treatment of each thing is ordered to the manifestation of God. And thus Theology treats of the world, not as Physics or Astronomy does, which consider its various qualities of extension, motion, etc., but by manifesting that it was created by the Omnipotence of God, is governed by Wisdom, and that all things in it cooperate unto good for those who love God. - 3. A twofold formal aspect can be distinguished: of the object and of the subject. The formal aspect of the object, or by which or under which, is the aspect by which something can be demonstrated by Theology; and this is divine revelation. The formal aspect of the subject, or which, is the reason why something is considered by Theology; and this is divinity. - 4. Theology is one science both in object and especially in subject. In object, because it demonstrates all things by divine revelation. In subject, because it is God, who is one not by genus or species, but by singularity.

9. The end of Theology, that is, the end of the work, or that toward which its intrinsic nature tends, is God, the supreme truth to be contemplated; for it discusses the nature and properties of God, the Trinity of the divine Persons, and other mysteries which per se and directly are not ordered to directing human operations. From this side Theology is speculative. Yet the end also of the work, toward which it tends by its nature, is God, the supreme Good to be sought, to whom every human action is to be directed; for it treats of God as the last end, of laws, of grace, of virtues, and of other things which per se and directly are referred to the ordering of the whole of human life. From this side Theology is practical. Yet it is chiefly speculative, because those very things which are proximately referred to the ordering of human life ultimately regard the more perfect knowledge of God. Moreover, each thing is to be judged more from its ultimate end than from its proximate end, since the ultimate end is the final measure of all things which are in it.

10. Theology is the most excellent of all human sciences, both by the dignity of its matter, by the certainty of its conclusions, and by the end to which it orders human life. - By the dignity of its matter. - 1 Cor. 2:6, 10. We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden, which none of the princes of this world knew... but God has revealed it to us by the Holy Spirit. Therefore divine faith contains very many most sublime truths, hidden and altogether remote from human reason. But Theology rests upon faith; every other human discipline rests upon natural reason. - By the certainty of its conclusions. - Other sciences have certainty from the natural light of human reason, which can err. For although the principles of human reason are most certain, nevertheless they are abstract. Wherefore, in order that we may arrive at knowledge of other things, we need the experience of the senses, and many things are obtained by the aid of human faith. But spiritual things do not fall under the senses, and are apprehended after the manner of sensible things. Hence there is danger, and manifold danger, of erring. But Theology has certainty from the light of divine science, which cannot be deceived. For the principles from which it proceeds are the very word of God; and it draws very many conclusions from the same word of God; and while it treats others by reasoning, it is directed by the infallible magisterium of the Church. - By its end. - Any natural science can dispose man only to natural happiness. But Theology, which is the science of faith, disposes and orders man to that supernatural happiness which is placed in eternal life.

11. Theology, as we have already indicated, is divided into theoretical or dogmatic, and practical or moral. For if the matter which Theology treats is considered, it either proximately rests in the contemplation of divine things, or in directing and ordering operation and human life. If the first, Theoretical or Dogmatic Theology is had; if the second, Practical or Moral Theology is had. Therefore moral Theology can be taken in a broader and in a less strict signification. In the broader signification it is confounded with practical Theology; in the stricter signification, on the contrary, it is distinguished from it, as will soon be explained.

12. If the method by which Theology proceeds is considered, either it merely dwells upon dogmas from the written and handed-down Word of God to confirm them, or it proceeds further to the understanding and reason of the same dogmas, insofar as this can be done by human reason, declaring what is contained in them, searching out their connection and relation, and by reasoning from them also arriving at other things; and thus it tends from faith to understanding. In the first case there is Positive Theology, which lays down the principles and foundations of the science, and which rests upon positive arguments. In the second case there is Scholastic Theology, so called because more common in the Schools. For those ancient masters of Theology, who handed down Theological Institutions in the public Schools, thought that labor should be given rather to the understanding of dogmas than to their demonstration.

13. The Church has not only permitted, and permits, Theology to be cultivated and handed down according to the principles and method of the Scholastic Doctors, but has always commended and does commend it. Now the principles by which the Scholastic Doctors handed down Theology were not, indeed, certain natural principles of reason, from which supernatural truths could not be deduced; rather they were principles of the supernatural order, employed by the Fathers themselves: divine revelation and the divine authority of the Church. The method, however, was not investigative of truth, which in Theology cannot be found by natural reason, since it is of the supernatural order; rather, it is acquired by God's revelation, so that it is held most certainly by faith, and one may not doubt concerning it. Wherefore the method of the Scholastics was only demonstrative and declarative of truth. If, therefore, Theology, as it always accords with the necessities of all times and the progress of the sciences, so also Scholastic Theology accords with these same things, the same certainly must be said of this our time, since sciences are not changed by time in their intrinsic nature. Indeed this must be said especially of this our time, since now on every side naturalism and rationalism attempt to pervade human minds. Wherefore proposition 13 was deservedly condemned in the Syllabus: "The method and principles by which the ancient Scholastic Doctors cultivated Theology are in no way suited to the necessities of our times and to the progress of the sciences."

14. The subjective principle of knowing Theology is not only the human intellect instructed by the natural light of reason, but also adorned by the supernatural light of divine faith. - Theology proceeds from faith, by demonstrating the object of faith, explaining it, and by the knowledge of it arriving at other cognitions. But a progress of this kind presupposes an intellect not only adorned with its native power, but also imbued with the supernatural light of faith.

15. The objective principles, or sources or loci, from which theological cognitions are drawn, are counted as four: Sacred Scripture, divine Tradition, the Church, human reason. The other loci can be referred to these, of which the principal are the Holy Fathers and Theologians. - Divine revelation is contained only in Sacred Scripture and Tradition. The Church is the guardian and interpreter of both; excluding a new revelation, but with the Holy Spirit assisting, she infallibly proposes to us the revelation once divinely made. Therefore Scripture and Tradition are, as they say, the quasi-constitutive principles of Theology; the Church is the directive principle. Since, however, Theology proceeds by reasoning and demonstrating, there is another principle of it, namely human reason and natural science, whose value and use are determined by the principles of faith. - Now all cognition is drawn either from the light of faith or from the light of reason. If the first, the sources of such cognition will be Scripture, Tradition, the Church; if the second, the source will be human reason. The Holy Fathers and Theologians, however, are referred to Tradition.

16. But in order that the object of Theology may be fully unfolded, Theology is aided by subsidiary disciplines, of which the chief are: Exegesis or Exposition of the Sacred Books, Ecclesiastical History, Sacred Archaeology, to which all the rest can easily be referred.

17. Just as Philosophy not only investigates its proper object, asking what body is, what spirit is, what the world is, etc., but also considers the very principles of natural cognition, treating of intellect, of reason, of sense, of conscience; similarly Theology not only treats revealed truths, but also treats of revelation itself, of the Word of God Written and Handed Down, and of the other sources of supernatural cognitions. Now this treatment can be instituted in two ways. For either, proceeding by human reason alone, we show by historical and philosophical arguments the fact and value of revelation, of the institution of the Church, etc.; or, setting out from faith, we inquire what revelation itself teaches concerning these principles. The former manner of proceeding supplies the Evangelical Demonstration, which is also called Apologetics. It is not a part of Theology, but a certain propaedeutic or preamble of Theology. For since Theology is the science of faith, it must receive its principles of demonstration through faith itself.

18. The supreme objective principle of demonstration, from which namely other truths are derived by reasoning, is contained in the notion of God received by revelation. - For the supreme principle of any science is situated in the definition of its subject. And thus in man, for example, all properties are deduced from his definition or nature. Those very things which in man are done freely and are known through history are understood and judged according to his nature. In like manner, those things which follow upon the divine nature are deduced from its revealed notion; but things freely done by God are not indeed demonstrated from the same notion of God as having been done, but are understood and judged according to that notion.

19. Concerning the value of the theological sources or loci, these few things suffice. - On Sacred Scripture. 1. Although in Sacred Scripture some things which directly and per se order us to eternal life are proposed for their own sake, while other things are proposed not for their own sake but for the manifestation of these, nevertheless all things are to be believed by divine faith, for all are supported by the same authority of God speaking. The books of Scripture are therefore held to be sacred and divine because, having been written with God inspiring, they have God as their author, and truly and properly are the word of God. Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1. - 2. The Council of Trent declared that, from the various versions, "the old and Vulgate edition, which by the long use of so many centuries has been approved in the Church itself, is to be held as authentic in public readings, disputations, preachings, and expositions," Sess. 4. Wherefore it can and must be called a true and genuine source of revelation. From such a decree, however, as is clear from its whole tenor, end, and circumstances, it does not follow that it is forbidden for the original texts and other ancient versions to be used, and that intrinsic certainty also be had from them. Although their authenticity is declared by no solemn decree, it is proved both by long use and by critical and hermeneutical arguments. - 3. The genuine sense of Scripture is had: 1. from the declaration of the Church; 2. from the consent of the Fathers, against whom, although Scripture cannot be expounded, nevertheless it is not forbidden to bring forward an exposition adding something else to the common exposition; 3. if at times different Fathers expound a certain place differently, it does not on that account follow that a firm argument cannot be drawn thence. For the genuine sense can be determined by hermeneutical rules. The principal rules are: without an evident reason to the contrary, one must adhere to the proper and obvious sense. - Likewise one must adhere to the literal and historical sense, unless it is certainly established concerning the mystical sense.

20. On Tradition. The Council of Trent, Sess. 4, declares the nature of Tradition when it says that "saving doctrine is contained in written books and in unwritten traditions, which, received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ Himself, or from the Apostles themselves at the dictation of the Holy Spirit, have come down even to us, handed on as it were from hand to hand." - The rule for distinguishing tradition, as regards the doctrine of faith, is this: if anything in the universal Church, at any time, is taught and believed as a dogma of faith, that thing, even if it is not written, is certainly contained in divine tradition. And the reason is that the universal Church can never defect from the true faith. - But as regards tradition which concerns the discipline or rites of the Church, the words of St. Augustine are well known, Ep. 54 to Januarius: "Those things which, not written, but handed down, we keep, which indeed are observed throughout the whole world, are understood to have been retained as commended and established either by the Apostles themselves, or by plenary Councils, whose authority in the Church is most salutary." But since those things which are established by Councils are recorded in their acts and in other documents of history, those things which are observed throughout the whole world, of whose beginning no trace is had in history, are deservedly referred to apostolic tradition. And if these are such that they exceed human power, as are rites concerning the substance of the sacraments, and other things which are intimately connected with dogma, such as the baptism of infants, they are with the best right referred to divine tradition transmitted through the Apostles.

21. On the Church. The Church is strong with an ordinary and perpetual magisterium, which is a continuous and ever-living Tradition expounding and completing the Sacred Scriptures. But since infallibility has been granted not to any part whatever of the Church, but only to the universal Church and to its Head, the Roman Pontiff, it follows that only those things enjoy the firmest certainty which are strengthened either by the universal consent and judgment of the Pastors, or by the judgment of the Supreme Pontiff. - And here it must be noted that the form of expressing a judgment of this kind matters little, provided that the mind of the Fathers or of the Pontiff to define is manifestly established, that is, to declare by proper and full authority what is the sentence to be held by all the faithful. - Since the magisterium of the Church exists for instructing the faithful, just as the universal Church cannot defect from the truth in teaching, so also neither can she defect in believing. Hence the common sense of the faithful furnishes a most firm argument.

22. On the Holy Fathers. The Fathers of the Church are those Ecclesiastical Writers who, besides antiquity, have singular doctrine and sanctity. Now although the authority of individuals is great, nevertheless full authority is had only when by unanimous consent they hand down a doctrine of faith; for then it is certain that it is taught and believed by the Church herself, which venerates them as Fathers. - As the Church not only guards the deposit of faith, but also explains it, so the Fathers are not only faithful witnesses of dogmas, but also doctors declaring them. Therefore those things which the Fathers hand down by unanimous consent for expounding the doctrine of faith are truly to be believed to pertain to the understanding of faith. Likewise, those things which, although known by the natural light, the Fathers hand down as connected with faith, are to be held as such; and in these matters their authority prevails over reason. - In order that there be unanimous consent of the Fathers, by which divine tradition is demonstrated, it is not necessary to find or recite the testimonies of all. From the sayings of some, the consent of others can be deduced from several heads. If at any time one or another seems to contradict all the rest, their sayings are to be explained benignly: from the context; from the end, because, while opposing an error, and being perhaps little concerned about an opposite error not yet arisen, they spoke more securely; finally from the time, because when errors have arisen and matters have been better discussed, formulas of speaking are more determined by use and by ecclesiastical judgment. But if this benign explanation cannot be made, the unanimous consent does not on that account fail, because a morally, not arithmetically, universal consent suffices.

23. On Theologians. In the first centuries of the Church, the Fathers were succeeded, in later time, by Theologians, who are those ecclesiastical Writers who are distinguished both by entire orthodoxy and by excellent doctrine. Their concordant sentence produces certainty. For this concord can be sufficiently explained only from the truth of the matter. What they hand down by unanimous consent in the schools, the pastors preach in the Churches, and the faithful believe. Hence it must not be doubted that those things which they hand down by a concordant, firm, and stable sentence are approved by the Church.

24. On human reason. Human reason is understood here both as the natural faculty of reasoning and as every natural science. Its use in Theology is manifold: 1. to show the foundations and credibility of Faith, Council of the Vatican, De Fide, chs. 3, 4; 2. to deduce the several heads of faith from the principles of Faith; 3. so that those things which are known by divine revelation may either be confirmed by natural arguments, or at least be declared and illustrated, insofar as this can be done; 4. so that errors, which are drawn especially from the natural sciences, may be refuted from those same sciences.

25. Finally, concerning dogma, theological opinions, and censures, a few things also suffice. Dogma here is properly called a sentence proposed by the Church to be believed with divine and catholic faith, or manifestly contained in Scripture or Tradition. And thus the Council of the Vatican, De Fide, ch. 3, says: "All those things are to be believed with divine and catholic faith which are contained in the word of God written and handed down, and which are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal magisterium (by which Scripture and Tradition are attested to be the word of God), as divinely revealed and to be believed."

26. A theological sentence is here properly called one which, although it is not revealed or is not handed down as revealed in the common magisterium of the Church from an express definition of hers, nevertheless has an evident connection with revealed things and is deduced from them. If this deduction is imperfect, there will be a scholastic opinion or a theologically probable sentence. But if the deduction is perfect, then it is called a theological sentence simply, or theologically certain; and likewise it is said that it cannot be denied without error and rashness, since it cannot be denied except by one who has cast aside either faith or reason, or both.

27. A theological censure is called that note by which some depraved doctrine is reproved from the principles of faith, whether by the public magisterium of the Church or only by the authority of theologians. There are three principal censures: heretical, erroneous, rash. A sentence is called heretical when it is evidently and directly opposed to an evident dogma of faith. If a dogma of faith is indeed certain, but is not evident as a dogma of faith, then the sentence is called proximate to heresy. But if the dogma of faith is certain and evident, yet it is not certainly and evidently established that there is direct opposition, then it is called suspected of heresy, savoring of heresy, favoring heresy.

28. Error is called an assertion directly opposed to a theological conclusion, or to a theologically certain sentence. Therefore error is opposed to a sentence which is not of faith or dogma, but which is certain from faith, or which is deduced from dogma by an evident inference. Since there are various grades of connection with dogma, if the connection is not proximate but remote, the opposite opinion is not called error, but proximate to error.

29. Rash is the name given to an opinion which is destitute of every sufficient reason and is directly opposed to a sentence commonly received in the Church. For rashness, according to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, II-II, q. 53, a. 3, ad 2, is not only to act without reason, but also to act from contempt of the directing rule.

30. After the nature of Theology, considered universally, has been declared, the intimate nature of Moral Theology is now easily understood. Moral Theology is a part of it, and consequently those things pertain to Moral Theology which pertain to Theology generally, and which consequently are common to speculative and practical Theology.

31. Moral Theology, strictly taken, if the name is considered, is the same as discourse concerning morals in order to God. This nominal definition, since the names of things and sciences are not without reason, is proved and explained from the real definition itself. - But if the thing itself is considered, it can be defined: that part of Theology which, resting upon divine law manifested through revelation, inquires what good and evil there is in human acts, what licit and illicit is found in them, in order that it may direct them in order to eternal life.

32. It is called Moral Theology, a part of Theology according to the matter which it treats. For Theology which contemplates divine things is called Dogmatic Theology; but Theology which considers human operations is called Moral. The former is speculative, for it rests in contemplating the truth of things. The latter is practical, for it proceeds to directing operations to man's ultimate end. Yet both attain their proper object by the same formal aspect, since the formal object of Theology is nothing other than truth demonstrable from the revealed word of God. Hence "Sacred Doctrine, being one, extends to those things which belong to diverse philosophical sciences, on account of the aspect which it considers in diverse things, namely insofar as they are knowable by the divine light: whence, although in the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless Sacred Doctrine comprehends both under itself, just as God by the same science knows Himself and the things which He makes." St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 4. Therefore Moral Theology is not distinguished from Dogmatic Theology as science from science, but as one and the same science according to one part and another part of its proper material object; since the unity of a science is taken not from the material object but from the formal object. Hence a diverse aspect of the knowable induces a diversity of sciences. St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2; aa. 3, 7. But if, from the fact that "Sacred Doctrine does not determine concerning God and concerning creatures equally, but concerning God principally and concerning creatures according as they are referred to God as to principle or end... the unity of the science is not impeded," St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 3 ad 1, this is especially true of Moral Theology. For if this Theology does not treat immediately of God Himself, but of human acts, it certainly treats of these according as through them man is ordered to the perfect knowledge of God, in which eternal beatitude consists. St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 4.

33. It is said further that Moral Theology rests upon divine law manifested through revelation, so that at the same time both the formal object and the proper source of this science may be indicated: divine law manifested through revelation. For the good and evil, the licit and illicit, which Moral Theology inquires into in human actions, is proximately derived from law. And if Moral Theology, as Sacred Doctrine, proceeds by reasoning from divine revelation, it properly rests upon divine law manifested through revelation in Sacred Scripture and Tradition, and proposed and explained through the magisterium of the Church. Hence Moral Theology does not proceed from principles known by the light of the natural intellect, whether of human Jurisprudence, or of natural Ethics, or of moral philosophy; but from principles known by the light of a higher science, which is the science of God and of the Blessed. Hence it believes those revealed principles from God. St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 2. If it also receives something from other human and philosophical disciplines, it does not receive it as from superiors, but uses them only as inferiors and handmaids. Nor indeed does it do this because it needs them of necessity, but for the greater manifestation of those things which are handed down in this science, on account of the defect of our intellect, which, from those things that are known by natural reason, from which the other human sciences proceed, is more easily led by the hand into those things which are above reason and are handed down in this science. St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 5 ad 2.

34. Therefore moral Theology does not exclude moral philosophy from itself, but on the contrary contains it within itself; for the supernatural end does not exclude the natural end, but on the contrary presupposes and contains it, since it elevates it to the supernatural order of grace and glory, by which "He has given us the greatest and precious promises, that through these we may be made partakers of the divine nature." 2 Pet. 1:4. Hence it is that what is evil and turns us away from God as natural end also turns us away from God as supernatural end, as is certain by reason and faith. On the contrary, that which leads us to God as natural end cannot lead us to God as supernatural end without supernatural grace, as likewise is certain by reason and faith.

35. And from these things it is clear that the subjective principles of knowing are the same in Moral Theology and in dogmatic Theology: faith of divine revelation and human reason. For in order to attain man's supernatural end it is necessary to observe the laws and precepts of both orders, supernatural and natural. We know the former by divine revelation; the latter also by natural reason. But as divine revelation confirms even natural precepts, so human reason illustrates revealed divine precepts. And we learn the same precepts, whether of the supernatural order or of the natural order, from the infallible magisterium of the Church, which is also the directive principle of moral Theology, as it is the directive principle of dogmatic Theology.

36. But the fundamental and universal objective principle of demonstration, pervading and governing the whole of moral Theology, is that God is the ultimate end of man, and accordingly that man is bound by obligation to tend to God by acts proportioned to the aforesaid end, morally good, and moreover supernatural, since God is the ultimate end of man not merely naturally but supernaturally. For the beatitude to which man is destined in the present order of divine providence consists in the intuitive vision of God and in the fruitful love of God; this end is wholly supernatural, exceeding all the powers and all the exigencies of created nature. Indeed, the reason by which God is moved to create the world and man is His own divine goodness and infinite perfection itself, namely love of His own infinite goodness and perfection. The world exists and we exist because God is good. But since divine goodness and perfection are infinite and cannot in any way be increased in themselves, God, creating the world and man, can intend nothing other than to communicate outwardly His good and His perfections, which consequently all creatures may manifest, and rational creatures may know, and thus may tend to God and glorify Him. The Lord has wrought all things for Himself, Prov. 16:4. Therefore man was founded by God in order that he may know and love Him; and in this knowledge and love of God consists both the glory of God and at the same time the beatitude of man. But, showing the riches of His divine goodness and infinite perfection, God made man a sharer in the divine nature, by destining man to see Him as He is, not through a mirror in an enigma, but face to face. Therefore after this mortal life man enjoys the divine essence, by whose knowledge and love he possesses eternal beatitude. But this immediate and intuitive vision of God, and enjoyment of God from love of the divine goodness immediately known, is a participation in the divine life itself: when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, 1 John 3:2; and consequently it exceeds all natural exigencies and powers, and is wholly supernatural. Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love Him. 1 Cor. 2:3.

37. Since therefore man is destined to a supernatural end, he must tend to it by his own free acts. But since he cannot attain it by his own natural acts, supernatural virtues are therefore infused into man, which supply power to the intellect and will for connaturally producing supernatural acts. And, as in the natural order there is first the nature itself of the soul, and then its natural powers and acts, so in the supernatural order there is sanctifying grace, which inheres in the substance of the soul and elevates man to a supernatural nature; there are infused virtues, which inhere stably in the powers of the soul, namely the intellect and the will, to which they give force and power for eliciting supernatural acts; and finally there are actual graces, by which God actually concurs with each supernatural act of man, to prevent and excite, aid and perfect them. Wherefore an act at once vital and supernatural proceeds from a twofold proximate intrinsic principle, that is, from natural power and from the supernatural habit of infused virtue. This infused virtue is distinguished in two ways, theological and moral. The former has God Himself for its primary material object and some divine perfection for its formal object; the latter generally has for its formal object the very honesty of the human act. And as virtues are infused for the ordinary acts of supernatural life, so also the gifts of the Holy Spirit are conferred for extraordinary and more sublime acts of the supernatural life. To the former man is moved from the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit and from the judgment of reason; to the latter he is moved by the instinct of the Holy Spirit alone. Through the infused virtues man is disposed to be made promptly movable according to the common aspect of Christian virtues, or according to their common rule; through the gifts man is disposed to be made promptly movable by divine inspiration. St. Thomas, I-II, qq. 63, 68.

The relation of man to God in human acts constitutes the moral order. Wherefore if human acts are fitting to that end, they will lead man through to God. Now some of these acts order man immediately to God, naturally by natural knowledge and love, supernaturally by faith, hope, and charity. Other acts immediately order man either in himself, so that the higher powers rule the lower and the lower are subjected to the higher; or to other creatures, so that he may use them only insofar as they are useful to him for attaining his end, and so that he may constitute a fitting society with other men, destined to the same end as himself. Wherefore all these other acts also, by preserving the order of nature established by God, although mediately, consequently order and lead man to God as ultimate end; and in this attainment and eternal possession of the ultimate end there is beatitude. Indeed, by destining man to this beatitude of eternal life and supplying him with the means for attaining it, God evidently imposes upon man by His will the necessity of applying the aforesaid means suitable for attaining the aforesaid end. This necessity constitutes moral obligation, which moral Theology attends to and considers in human acts. - Therefore God as the ultimate end of man is the supreme principle of the whole of moral Theology, by which namely all things which must be performed by man are understood and determined, so that he may act licitly and at last attain eternal life.

38. Moreover, Moral Theology inquires what good and evil there is in human acts, what licit and illicit is found in them. For its material object is not contained in human acts insofar as they are beings of nature, but insofar as they are moral being. Hence the Angelic Doctor, I-II, q. 7, a. 2, says: "First, the theologian considers human acts according as through them man is ordered to beatitude.... Second, the theologian considers human acts according as in them there is found good and evil, better and worse.... Third, the theologian considers human acts according as they are meritorious or demeritorious." And in the same place, ad 3: "The theologian has considerations concerning virtuous and vicious acts... and considers acts according as they merit punishment or reward."

39. If the material object of Moral Theology is considered thus generally and indiscriminately in its whole breadth, it is certainly not distinguished from Practical Theology, and it extends as broadly as the latter extends. But if moral Theology is taken in a certain stricter sense, and according to the common acceptance at present, then Moral Theology is distinguished from Practical Theology as a part from the whole. For Moral Theology is now usually taken in a certain restricted signification, namely insofar as it is confined to the mere consideration of the licit and illicit, or of sins, in human acts. And thus Ascetical and Mystical Theology are usually distinguished from Moral Theology, all of which Practical Theology embraces, and into which it is consequently divided. Ascetical Theology hands down not so much the doctrine of good and evil as the way and manner by which we can free ourselves from vices and attain virtues. Hence, as Moral Theology treats rather of determining sins, Ascetical Theology treats of explaining virtues. But Mystical Theology treats not of the common sanctity of morals, which Ascetical Theology does, but of that special union with God through more sublime contemplation and more intimate love, to which not all can tend and arrive, but those who are heaped by God with special gifts of grace.

We have already spoken of Theology in general in the first volume of Dogmatic Theology. Here, therefore, it will be enough to premise a few things concerning the notion, sources, and history of Moral Theology.

1. 1° Definition. (A) Theology in general is defined: the supernatural science concerning God and creatures insofar as they are referred to God.

¹ St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 4-5; Zacharia, Dissertatio de Casuisticae Theologiae originibus, locis atque praestantia, in Heilig, Theol. Moralis S. Alphonsi, Mechlin, 1845, p. XXVII-CXLVIII; Patuzzi, Prodromus ad universam morum theologiam, in Migne, Theol. Curs. Compl. XI, col. 9-64; Muller, Theol. Moralis, Introduction, § 1-14; T. Bouquillon, Theologia Moralis Fundam., 3rd ed., Introduction, p. 1-167; Hogan, Clerical Studies, Boston, 1898, ch. V; which work was rendered into French under the care of Boudinhon, Paris, 1902: Les Etudes du Clerge.

It is divided into dogmatic and moral theology: the former, which is more speculative, sets forth and demonstrates the truths to be believed, and deservedly is called the rule of things to be believed; the latter, which is more practical, is concerned with morals or things to be done, and therefore is called the rule of things to be done. Yet from this it is not lawful to infer that dogmatic theology is merely speculative, and moral theology merely practical: for the dogmas which are proposed to our faith, although primarily they present to the mind an objective concept, are finally ordered to our sanctification and glorification; on the other hand, the rule of morals flows logically from Christian dogmas, and nothing more efficaciously allures to the practice of virtues than the attentive and pious contemplation of the divine mysteries, for example, Creation, Providence, and the Incarnation. Hence dogmatic theology is indeed primarily, but not exclusively, the rule of things to be believed; and moral theology, although it is primarily the rule of things to be done, must also embrace speculative questions.

2. (B) Moral theology can be defined: a science, relying at once upon reason and faith, treating of human acts insofar as they are means for attaining the supernatural end.¹ - It is called:

¹ Today not a few defenders of independent ethics ambitiously define this science as the breviary of humanity, namely the compendium of all sciences which render man happier; others, with Payot, Cours de Morale, p. 6, assert that it is the science by which human life is made more perfect, more intense, and happier. There is no one who does not see that these definitions are too comprehensive and confused.

(a) A science, that is, a series of conclusions deduced from certain principles and connected in logical order. It differs therefore from that theology which is merely casuistic, and which is situated in the solution of practical difficulties; for Moral Theology ascends higher: it investigates, sets forth, and demonstrates the principles of morals, known both by reason and by faith; afterward from these it deduces in logical order conclusions which approach more nearly to practice; and it hands down rules by which human acts can tend toward our supernatural end.²

² Recently there has arisen, especially in Germany, a controversy among Protestants and Catholics, and indeed among Catholics themselves, concerning the method to be followed in Moral Theology: for many have contended that the casuistic discipline rests upon no solid foundation, and gives occasion to many abuses. This indeed is true when the rules of morals are set forth independently of dogmatic truths; but it is by no means verified in the works of theologians who, adhering to the footsteps of St. Thomas, diligently investigate principles, with the help of analysis and synthesis, and from them logically deduce conclusions. Cf. Mausbach, Die katholische Moral, ihre Methoden, Grundsaetze und Aufgaben, Cologne, 1901; Adloff, Katholische Moral und Sittlichkeit, Strasbourg, 1901; E. Van Roey, Recentes controverses de Morale, in Revue Neo-Scolastique, May-Nov. 1902, pp. 213, 464.

(b) Relying upon reason and faith, that is, obtained not by natural light alone, but also with the help of revelation; and thus it is distinguished from Ethics, or moral Philosophy, which treats of the principles of morals known by reason alone, and insofar as they tend toward the ultimate natural end.

3. (c) Treating of human acts insofar as... by these words the object of this science is declared, namely all human acts, whether internal or external, pertaining to private, domestic, or social life, not indeed under every respect, but insofar as they tend toward the ultimate supernatural end; therefore it treats of human acts both in themselves and in their principles; of the laws by which acts of this kind are regulated; and also of the internal or external means, for example, the sacraments, by whose help we may be able to direct our actions to our supernatural end. And thus it is distinguished from those human sciences which treat of laws pertaining to some particular end, for example, from economic science, which hands down norms by which riches ought to be acquired and distributed; from politics, which hands down norms of prudent governing, etc. - It is likewise distinguished from those ecclesiastical sciences, such as canonical and liturgical science, which are proximately ordered to promoting the external governance of the Church or public worship, although remotely they also tend toward the ultimate end. Nevertheless moral theology uses these various sciences, and even in some respect presides over them, insofar as the proximate end ought to serve the ultimate end.

4. Moral theology taken in the broad sense embraces ascetical and mystical theology; but in the strict sense it is distinguished from them: for it is concerned with the laws of the Christian life; ascetical theology, however, with the rules and counsels of Christian perfection; and mystical theology with the higher ways of contemplation and of intimate union with God.

5. 2° Division. Commonly moral theology is divided into two parts: (a) General, or Fundamental, which treats both of the last end of man and of the norm of morality, which is nothing other than the ordering of acts to the last end, and of the general means by which we tend toward the end; (b) and special, which discusses the particular means by which we tend toward the end; namely, the virtues common to every Christian, and the duties proper to each state; and also the sacraments, by which grace is conferred for rightly fulfilling the duties of the Christian life.

6. But since in the Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology the doctrine, not only speculative but also practical, concerning the four sacraments has already been set forth, we first completed the sacramental matter, by setting forth the moral and canonical doctrine concerning the three other sacraments, namely Penance, Matrimony, and Order; afterward, however, in the following order we shall discuss the various parts of Fundamental and Special Theology:

Fundamental or General Theology:

On the Last End and the norm of morality.
On Human Acts.
On Laws.
On Conscience.
On Sins and Vices.
On Virtues in general.

Special Theology:

On Theological Virtues.
On Moral Virtues, or on the Decalogue.
Appendix concerning the precepts of the Church.
On Justice and Contracts.
On the Various Obligations of States.

7. The reason for the division will be clear to one who attends a little. First, in the Fundamental part, there is treatment of the Last End toward which we tend, according to that saying: in all things look to the end; afterward, of Human Acts, insofar as they are means to the end; of Laws, by which our acts are directed to the end; of Conscience, by whose help general laws are applied to individual persons; of Sins and Vices, by which the human will turns aside from the law; of Virtues, by whose help we are inclined to live according to the law.

Special theology, which treats of particular duties, first treats of theological virtues, and secondly of moral virtues, because under these two genera are comprehended all the common duties of the Christian life; thus the precepts of the Decalogue, which are referred to the virtues, are set forth. By way of Appendix, however, there is joined the Treatise on the Precepts of the Church, as a complement of Decalogal Theology. - But because among the moral virtues justice demands a longer exposition, there is special discussion of it in the Treatise on Justice and Contracts. - Finally, since besides the duties common to all, there are certain duties proper to various states, these are discussed in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States.¹

¹ In the special edition for the use of seminaries, where Moral Theology is set forth separately from Dogmatic Theology, we follow this division: T. I. Fundamental moral theology; on virtues and precepts. T. II. On Justice and contracts; on the various obligations of States. T. III. On the Sacraments in general and in particular.

The sources from which moral truths are drawn are the same as the theological sources, concerning which there has been treatment in the Synopsis of Fundamental Theology. It may be permitted to add only a few things which more directly concern moral discipline.

8. 1° Concerning the use of Scripture in moral matters. All who admit the inspiration of the Scriptures confess that the Scriptures both of the Old and of the New Testament are useful, indeed necessary, for the right institution of morals: "All Scripture, inspired by God, is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice; that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good work."¹ In truth, in them are found both precepts and examples by which morals are instructed.

¹ II Tim. 3:16-17.

(A) But when we use the books of the Old Testament, three things especially must be kept before our eyes: (a) that there was a constant and progressive increase of revelation from the Patriarchs even to Christ; and that God, in those things which He prescribed, permitted, or tolerated, accommodated Himself to human weakness, so that not all things which were lawful for the Jews are permitted to Christians; for example, polygamy and divorce, which at least were tolerated in ancient times, are wholly prohibited under the new dispensation; and the law of charity toward neighbor was not understood in the same manner by Jews and Christians. Hence texts taken from the Old Testament ought not to be alleged or understood without choice and discrimination, but with account taken of this evolution.

(b) In the legal books there are found precepts of three kinds: moral precepts, which retain their force, provided they are taken not precisely in the manner in which they lie there, but as approved, explained, and perfected by Christ; ceremonial precepts, which regarded worship; and judicial precepts, which constituted the law proper to the Israelite nation. These two latter kinds have now been abrogated, and we cannot use them except for determining more fully what is lawful or expedient in certain circumstances, what pertains to natural or positive law, or also for illustrating by analogy certain Christian truths or practices.

(c) As to the examples which are reported there, many indeed are worthy of imitation; but since even the holiest men are not free from human frailty, not all things which they did are for that very reason commendable, although they are not expressly reprehended by Scripture. Therefore it must be carefully weighed, from the context and parallel places, whether these are approved or not; and if they are approved, whether in themselves, under the moral respect, or under another respect; and if any actions either are evil, or at least bear before themselves the appearance of evil, they are not to be drawn into imitation. - The same must likewise be noted as to certain parables and some examples related in the New Testament.

9. (B) In reading the books of the New Testament, attention must chiefly be given to these three things: (a) Christian revelation was not completed in one moment, but grew successively until the death of the last of the Apostles; even after the Apostles had died, the Spirit of God teaches through the infallible magisterium of the Church, and those things which are contained only obscurely, implicitly, and virtually in the Gospels, Epistles, and divine Tradition, are in the course of time proposed more lucidly, explicitly, and formally by the Church herself. Hence, in order to set forth Christian ethics fully, one must wisely use the various books of the New Testament, the divine Traditions, and the infallible magisterium of the Church, whether extraordinary or ordinary.

(b) Since certain things are handed down under precept, but others under counsel, these must not be mixed indiscriminately, but must be distinguished with great circumspection. The foundation of this distinction is found in the Gospel itself:¹ for when the very rich young man had come to Christ, asking, "What good shall I do that I may have life everlasting?", the Master answered: "But if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." The young man said that he had kept these from his youth; then Jesus said to him: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven." From this it is inferred that, for attaining eternal life, the observance of the commandments strictly suffices; but for perfection something further is required, namely poverty and the other evangelical counsels. Hence from the text, the context, parallel places, the subject matter, and especially the interpretation of the Church, it must be discerned what is established by way of precept and what by way of counsel.

¹ Matt. 19:16-21; cf. Maldonatus, on this place; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 118, a. 4.

(c) Likewise among precepts, some are universal, some particular, others perpetual, others temporary; for example, the Apostles in the Council of Jerusalem established these things:¹ "For it hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things; that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." Now from elsewhere it is clear that the prohibition of fornication is perpetual, absolute, and universal, but that the other things are prohibited only for a time. Hence likewise the context, parallel places, and the interpretation of the Fathers and of the Church must be diligently inspected.

¹ Acts 15:28-29.

10. 2° Concerning the use of Tradition in Moral Theology. It has already been set forth elsewhere (On the Sources of Revelation, n. 961 sq.) by what means Tradition is transmitted and known; what is the authority of the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church, of the Fathers, theologians, Congregations, etc. It may be permitted to add only a few things which more nearly regard practice.

(A) In reading the decrees of Councils and Supreme Pontiffs, these things especially must be attended to: (a) Definitions concerning moral matters indeed contain principles of morals which in themselves are immutable; but their application can be diverse according to the diverse circumstances of times and places. Thus definitions concerning usury, established in those times when economic laws differed much from those which now prevail, cannot today be applied in the same way as in the Middle Ages. (b) Disciplinary laws vary according to various times and nations, and therefore can be changed or abrogated; hence more recent decrees sometimes correct and reform older ones. Yet the theologian ought to use these so that he may better understand and explain the new dispositions of laws. (c) As to condemned propositions, in order to uncover their sense, it must be carefully inquired by whom and in what circumstances they were uttered, why and how they were reprobated.²

² For accomplishing this, cf. D. Viva, Damnatae Theses; Vacant-Mangenot, Dictionnaire de Theologie, I, 740, 748, etc.

11. (B) The Roman Congregations, in the name of the Pontiff, often promulgate decisions very useful concerning moral matters. For they not only have the power of authentically interpreting the Tridentine decrees and other ecclesiastical laws, each according to its proper competence, with the approval of the Roman Pontiff preserved; but in addition they settle controversies which are to be solved in a disciplinary or administrative manner:¹ decisions of this kind, however, which make law only between the parties, bear very great authority for similar cases. But among these one must speak a little more fully concerning the Holy Office, whose duty it is "to guard the doctrine of faith and morals,"² and also concerning the Tribunal of the Sacred Penitentiary, whose office it is "to examine and settle questions of conscience."³

¹ The examination of questions which are to be treated in judicial order is reserved to the Tribunal of the Sacred Rota; its sentences, which contain the reasons both in fact and in law, are of the greatest importance.

² Pius X, Bull Sapienti Consilio, June 29, 1908.

³ Ibid.

(a) The Congregation of the Holy Universal Inquisition, which is commonly called the Holy Office, has the right of proceeding and defining in all causes concerning heresy, schism, apostasy from the faith, magic, and abuse of the sacraments; for which reason it has issued not a few decrees for explaining the Bull Apostolicae Sedis, where these crimes are punished by various censures. Its doctrinal responses enjoy great authority, especially because they are not issued except after mature discussion of the matter, and are always approved by the Supreme Pontiff; nevertheless this approval, ordinarily in common form, in no way renders them infallible.

(b) The Sacred Penitentiary solves practical difficulties for the internal forum,⁴ but it does not settle speculative controversies; hence its decisions must be received with the greatest reverence, and can be very useful even in similar cases; but they do not have the force of law, since they are issued only for a particular case.

⁴ In truth Benedict XIV, Constitution Pastor Bonus, granted to the Major Penitentiary that "he may be able, with the counsel of his Doctors and Theologians, to declare all doubts in the matter of sins, or otherwise concerning the penitential forum in any way." - More briefly, Pius X, Bull Sapienti Consilio: "It examines questions of conscience, and settles them."

12. 3° Concerning the use of reason in Moral Theology. (A) Although the theologian treats especially of those things which God has revealed and which the Church proposes to us to be believed and done, he cannot pass over the principles of morals which are known by natural reason: for God is the author of reason as well as of faith, and revealed truths

are better understood and set forth when they are compared with truths of the natural order. On the other hand, revealed truths themselves ought to be understood reasonably; from these same truths conclusions and practical conclusions are to be inferred. Therefore Moral Theology can and ought to use reason in order rightly to set forth the principles of morals, to prove and illustrate them, and to unfold them for practical uses.

Yet human reason in moral matters is not independent, but subordinated to faith, and it ought to acknowledge the infallible magisterium of the Church in moral questions as much as in dogmatic ones.

(B) Among the natural sciences which can be useful to moralists are numbered: (a) natural Ethics, which treats of the various duties of men, and therefore the works of philosophers, even pagans, which deal with virtues and duties; (b) Psychology, not only speculative, where there is question of human faculties, habits, passions, etc., but also practical, which is acquired from discreet commerce with men; nor should experimental psychology be passed over, especially that part in which the various diseases are described which can affect the internal faculties; (c) Pastoral Medicine, where physiological and pathological notions are handed down which, on account of the intimate relations between body and soul, are very useful for judging concerning the morality of certain actions; (d) Sociology, which treats of the rights and duties of citizens, insofar as they are members of the social organism; (e) Political Economy, which hands down principles concerning the production and equitable distribution of temporal goods; (f) Civil Jurisprudence, insofar as it sets forth by law those things which among various nations complete and perfect the natural law; (g) History, especially that part which describes the morals, worship, and moral precepts of various peoples: for in this way the progress or regression of moral science is better understood; and besides, from the experience of past times it is more wisely inferred by what means morals can be restored.

1. DEFINITION. —Catholic Moral Theology, broadly speaking, is the scientific exposition of the ethical teaching of the Gospel, or, more definitely, that theological discipline which sets forth the laws, rules, and precepts man must know and obey in order to attain his supernatural destiny.

There is a distinction between "moral" and "ethical." "Ethical" is derived from the Greek ἦθος, which means in the singular, custom, usage, habit; in the plural (ἤθη), disposition, temper, character (Latin, mores).¹ Every free act, good or bad, performed by a rational being is "ethical;" but no act is "moral" unless it be ethically good.²

¹ Cfr. 1 Cor. XV, 33.

² Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 58, art. 1 (Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. I, London 1896, p. 167); Comment, in Sent., III, dist. 23, qu. 1, art. 4. English text-books use "moral" and "ethical" synonymously, as a generic term and then specify morally good and morally bad.

The words "moral" and "immoral" are sometimes used with sole reference to the Sixth Commandment. Their true meaning is much larger. Morality is by no means confined to the sexual sphere. Other vices, such as injustice, hatred, revenge, can be and are quite as immoral as the vice of impurity. The fact of the matter is that the use of the expressions "immorality" or "immoral life" for the vice of impurity is merely an idiomatic euphemism adopted to avoid a clearer description of what is meant, and is not intended to restrict immorality to the sexual sphere.

2. SCOPE. —In order to give a scientific exposition of the laws that govern human conduct, Moral Theology must first ascertain the conditions under which man's actions will enable him to reach his final destiny, and then draw from Revelation the correct principles for guiding him aright both in private and public life. All the problems of human existence, including those of the social and economic order, have a religious and an ethical bearing, and they can not be completely solved except in the light of Christian justice and charity.⁴

⁴ Cfr. John I, 9; XIV, 6; 1 Cor. X, 31; Col. III, 17.—Cfr. J. Hogan, Clerical Studies, Boston 1898, pp. 197 sqq.; (A. Boudinhon, Les Etudes du Clergé, Rome and Paris 1901, pp. 240 sqq.); F. Walter, Theorie und Praxis in der Moral, Paderborn 1905; J. Mausbach, Die kath. Moral, ihre Methoden, Grundsätze und Aufgaben, 2nd ed., Cologne 1902; A. Meyenberg, Die kath. Moral, 2nd ed., Stans 1901; A. Müller, Ist die kath. Moral reformbedürftig? Fulda 1902.

Moral Theology must avoid two extremes: —overemphasizing the ascetic point of view and resolving itself into mere casuistry.

³ See E. R. Hull, S.J., in the Bombay Examiner, Jan. 11, 1919.

Moral Theology is an independent science with a well-defined scope and object, and it is neither its sole nor its principal aim to train preachers or confessors.⁵ The latter function belongs to casuistry, which is "the study of cases of conscience" with a view ''to define the exact limits and frontiers of wrong-doing."⁶

⁵ Cfr. H. E. Plassmann, Die Moral gemäss der Schule des hl. Thomas, Soest 1861, p. 8; M. Jocham, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, Sulzbach 1852, p. 31.

⁶ Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, London 1902, p. 197.

READINGS.—Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 601-11.—J. B. Hogan, Clerical Studies, Boston 1898, pp. 197 sqq.—Thos. Bouquillon, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 3rd ed., Bruges 1903, Introduction.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Short History of Moral Theology, New York 1909, pp. 3 sqq.—A. Krawutzky, Einleitung in das Studium der kath. Moraltheologie, 2nd ed., Breslau 1898.—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, London 1902, pp. 197 sqq.—J. Mausbach, Die katholische Moral, ihre Methoden, Grundsätze und Aufgaben, 2nd ed., Cologne, 1902.—IDEM, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists (tr. by A. M. Buchanan), New York 1914.—J. Bucceroni, S.J., Commentarius de Natura Theologiae Moralis, Rome 1910.—A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., Haaren 1910, pp. 5 sqq.—A. Caldara, Il Problema Morale nei Tempi Moderni, Rome 1918.

Catholic Moral Theology is essentially theistic, that is, it presupposes belief in God and the freedom of the human will.¹ Without these suppositions there could be neither responsibility nor duty. Materialism, Pantheism, and such other systems as exclude theistic belief in God and in the freedom of the human will, may evolve the notion of "utility," but they will never arrive at the concepts of "good" and "bad," in the strict moral sense of the terms, viz.: as things to be done or to be avoided under the sanction of an absolute and imperative duty. Lacking a religious basis, these systems have not "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." ² One who holds that morality is autonomous will occasionally do that which is commanded, and sometimes avoid that which is forbidden by the divine law, but not because it is commanded or forbidden. An atheist may abstain from murder, or help his neighbor, but being an atheist, he does these things from motives different from those that impel the theist.

¹ On the freedom of the will see M. Maher, S.J., Psychology, 4th ed., London 1900, pp. 394 sqq.; IDEM, in the Cath. Encycl., Vol. VI, pp. 259-263; Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 291 sqq.; R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, New York 1899, pp. 95-116; V. Cathrein, S.J., Die kath. Weltanschauung, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1909, pp. 44 sqq., 76 sqq.; W. G. Ward, Philosophy of Theism, London 1884; H. Gründer, S.J., Free Will, the Greatest of the Seven World-Riddles, St. Louis 1911; Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Free-Will and Four English Philosophers, London 1906. A good survey of the free-will controversy in Fonsegrive's Essai sur le Libre Arbitre, 2nd ed., Paris 1896.

² Rom. I, 16.

As ethics is impossible without metaphysics, so there can be no Moral Theology without dogma. Dogma and Morals are the two great branches of systematic theology (theologia scholastica) and together cover the entire domain of Christian belief and practice. Dogmatic Theology furnishes the rule of faith (regula credendorum), which in turn determines the rule of conduct (regula agendorum). The two sciences may be said to postulate each other because dogma must bear fruit in good works, and Christian morality could not exist if there were no revealed faith.³

³ Cfr. John XVII, 3; Heb. XI, 6; Mark XVI, 16; Matth. VII, 21; Jas. II, 26.

Though Moral Theology thus stands in a most intimate relation to Dogmatic Theology, the two sciences are separate and independent. For whereas the latter deals with God, His essence, attributes, outward operation, etc., and shows Him to be the sovereign good and source of all created goodness, the former is entirely concerned with directing man to his eternal goal.

Moral conduct results from the cooperation of three separate and independent factors. Man must first perceive the difference between right and wrong; second, will to do that which is right; and, third, conform his actions to the moral law. "No excess of the aesthetic faculty," says B. Bjornson, "can outweigh a moral defect." And Ch. F. Gounod: "An ocean of talent does not equal a single drop of holiness." Moral autonomism, so called, is false and pernicious.⁴

⁴ Cfr. C. Gutberlet, Ethik und Religion, Münster 1892, pp. 193 sqq.; V. Cathrein, S.J., Religion und Moral, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1904, pp. 70 sqq.; IDEM, Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 372 sqq. On the “ethical movement” and the Society for Ethical Culture see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. V, p. 561; the New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, Vol. IV, pp. 183 sq.; W. L. Sheldon, An Ethical Movement, New York 1896; W. R. W. Sullivan, Morality as a Religion, New York 1899; H. J. Bridges, The Ethical Movement, Its Principles and Aims, 2nd ed., London 1912.

Though the moral teaching of the Catholic Church is drawn from Revelation, it is not without mysteries. There is a mystery of iniquity (mysterium iniquitatis) as well as a mystery of faith (mysterium fidei).⁵ Not all ethical problems can be solved by a short and clean-cut formula.

⁵ Cfr. 1 Tim. III, 9; 2 Thess. II, 7.

READINGS.—F. Hettinger (tr. by V. Stepka), Timothy; or Letters to a Young Theologian, St. Louis 1902, pp. 372 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S.J., Die kath. Weltanschauung, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1909.—Ph. Kneib, Die “Heteronomie” der christlichen Moral, Vienna 1903.—IDEM, Die “Jenseitsmoral” im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen, Freiburg 1906.—J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, New York 1914, pp. 3 sqq.—J. B. Hogan, Clerical Studies, 2nd ed., Boston 1898, pp. 197 sqq.—De Broglie, La Morale sans Dieu, Paris 1903.

1. Catholic Moral Theology is based on the dogmatic teaching of the one true Church. Protestant ethics rests on arbitrary doctrinal assumptions. ¹ Hence the fundamental difference between the two sciences. Catholics acknowledge an infallible authority in questions of both dogma and morals, whereas Protestants possess no objective rule for either, but are buffeted to and fro by the winds of subjectivism and error.

¹ The dogmatic differences in the systems of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin may be clearly traced in their moral teaching. Cfr. H. Denifle, O.P., Luther and Lutherdom, tr. by R. Volz, Vol. I, Somerset, O., pp. 53 sqq.; C. von Kügelken, Ethik H. Zwinglis, Leipsic 1902; P. Lobstein, Ethik Calvins, Strassburg 1877.

Besides these there are other points of difference. Thus Catholics, unlike Protestants, do not regard the Bible as the sole source of knowledge in matters of faith and morals. Nor do they hold that man by the fall of Adam and Eve has lost his freedom, or that God overpowers the will by grace. Catholics regard free-will as an essential condition of morality and hold that man could perform no moral act if he were not free.

Furthermore, Catholics do not look upon justification as a wholly subjective and purely internal act, but regard it as an ethical process, conditioned (ordinarily) upon the reception of the Sacraments, either in re or in voto.

Finally, true liberty, i. e., the "liberty of the children of God" (sanctity), is not the beginning but the end and object of morality and religion. ² It is not faith in Christ, making sin harmless, but victory over sin and passion, the result of a constant and patient cooperation with grace.³

² John VIII, 32; Rom. VIII, 21.

³ Cfr. 2 Cor. III, 17-18.

Whoever denies the above-mentioned truths has no foundation upon which to erect a system of moral teaching. Protestant ethics really owes its existence to an inconsistency and in some measure also to the fact that Protestants, consciously or unconsciously, retain many Catholic practices, though they have long ago rejected the principles underlying them.

2. Protestant writers deny or ignore the fundamental distinctions just outlined. They claim that the chief difference between Catholic Moral Theology and Protestant ethics lies in the fact that the former is addicted to a false empiricism, which wrongly distinguishes between mortal and venial sin and between perfect and imperfect contrition, thereby catering to human frailty and derogating from the spirit of the Gospel.

They furthermore allege that the Catholic Church attributes a magical effect to her Sacraments and regards the process of justification as independent of the disposition of the sinner.

Another favorite accusation is that the Church, harking back to the Old Testament, imposes purely human laws and thereby inculcates a false morality, which, like that of the ancient Pharisees, exaggerates external acts at the expense of character and thus breeds servility and hypocrisy. All this, they declare, is opposed to the Protestant idea of morality, which claims to be drawn from the teaching of St. Paul.

The fourth and last objection against Catholic Moral Theology is that it is dualistic because it makes a distinction between precepts and counsels, and measures religious and seculars by a different rule, discriminating against the latter in favor of the former.

All these charges will be refuted in the course of this treatise. Here let us merely remark that the erroneous notions which so many non-Catholics entertain of the Catholic teaching on perfection, are to a certain extent pardonable in view of the hyperbolic language sometimes employed by Catholic writers in describing the religious state. Perfection is not a matter concerning solely the select few or attainable by a small minority only. On the contrary, it is within reach of all. There is but one perfection, and that is charity, or the love of God, which manifests itself by obedience to the divine will, i. e., keeping the commandments and doing good. Christian perfection is nothing more or less than a complete and willing observance of the law of God.

READINGS. —J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, New York 1914, pp. 131 sqq. —P. Höveler, Harnack und die kath. Aszese, Düsseldorf 1902. —H. A. Kröse, S.J., Der Einfluss der Konfession auf die Sittlichkeit, Freiburg 1900. —Ph. Kneib, Die "Jenseitsmoral" im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen, pp. 65 sqq., 79 sqq. —V. Cathrein, S.J., Die kath. Weltanschauung, 2nd ed., pp. 441 sqq., 453 sqq. —Hettinger-Stepka, Timothy; or Letters to a Young Theologian, pp. 376 sqq. —A. Devine, C.P., art. "Perfection" in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, pp. 665 sq. —IDEM, A Manual of Ascetical Theology, London 1902. —E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 40 sqq., Vienna 1887. —Thos. Slater, S.J., The Foundation of True Morality, N. Y. 1920.

As there is a purely philosophic discipline treating of God (theodicy), so there is a purely philosophic discipline dealing with morality. The latter, among Catholics, is commonly called Ethics.¹

¹ Rom. I, 19 sqq.; Apoc. XIV, 14—16. —Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 2: "The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that God, the principle and end of all things, can be known with certainty from created things by the natural light of human reason." —Can. de Rev., 1: "If anyone says that the one and true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty through the things that have been made by the natural light of human reason, let him be anathema." — Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1914, pp. 15 sqq.; Th. H. Simar, Theologie des hl. Paulus, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1883, pp. 75 sqq.

Ethics and Moral Theology differ from each other in three respects: (1) as to their source, (2) as to their object, and (3) as to their contents. 1. Ethics, or moral philosophy, derives its principles and motives entirely from unaided human reason. Its object is to ascertain what is right and what is wrong, and how man must regulate his conduct to be naturally good and (supposing him in the pure state of nature) how to attain his natural destiny.

2. Moral Theology, on the other hand, draws its precepts and proofs from Revelation and from reason enlightened by supernatural faith. It takes for granted that man is no longer in the pure state of nature and regards him as a rational creature raised to the supernatural order, showing how he must regulate his conduct in order to attain his supernatural end.

Hence Moral Theology is more perfect than Ethics. Its superiority may be further seen from the fact that it inculcates its principles with absolute clearness and certainty ² and furnishes supernatural motives (fear, hope, charity) and supernatural aids (the example of Christ and the saints, the Sacraments, etc.) to a moral life. History shows that, with proper cooperation on the part of man, Catholic moral teaching is able to produce saints.

² John XIV, 6; Matth. V, 17-44: But I say to you. —Cfr. Grasset, Morale Scientifique et Morale Évangélique, Paris 1909, pp. 7 sqq.

3. Despite the essential differences existing between the two sciences, Ethics is a valuable help to Moral Theology, for the reason that faith presupposes natural intelligence. Thus Moral Theology may be said to comprise within its scope natural Ethics, and to derive from it its scientific substructure, while on the other hand Ethics possesses in Moral Theology an unfailing loadstar.

It would be wrong to assert that there is no morality outside the Christian religion. The Church has repeatedly and formally condemned the proposition that the virtues of the heathen are but glittering vices.³ Moreover, pagan philosophy has exercised an undeniable influence on Christian moralists.⁴

³ Prop. Baii Damnat., prop. 25; Prop. Damnat. ab Alexandro VIII, prop. 8; Prop. Damnat. Quesnelli, prop. 42, 48 (Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum, 10th ed., by Fr. Clement Bannwart, S.J., n. 1025, 1298, 1392, 1398); Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 7; Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1917, pp. 179 sqq.

⁴ Cfr. F. Hasler, Über das Verhältnis der heidnischen und christlichen Ethik, Munich 1866; W. Redepenning, Der Einfluss des Aristoteles auf die Moral des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Goslar 1875; C. Merk, Klemens Alexandrinus in seiner Abhängigkeit von der griechischen Philosophie, Leipsic 1879; E. de Faye, Clément d'Alexandrie, Étude sur les Rapports du Christianisme et de la Philosophie Grecque au IIe Siècle, Paris 1898; B. Barthel, Über die Benutzung der Schriften Ciceros durch Laktanz, Strehlen 1903; P. Ewald, Einfluss der stoisch-ciceronianischen Moral auf die Darstellung der Ethik bei Ambrosius, Leipsic 1881; R. Thamin, S. Ambroise et la Morale Chrétienne au IVe Siècle, Paris 1895; Ph. Schmidt, Ambrosius und die Stoa, Göttingen 1897; Th. Zielinski, Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte, 2nd ed., Leipsic 1908.

Pagan Ethics as such, however, is very imperfect. It misconceives man's relation to his Creator and thereby robs the concept of morality of its prime constituent. Though the science of ethics attained to a high stage of development among the heathen philosophers of antiquity, it never succeeded in stripping off its innate egotism. The true idea of humanity and the great Christian motive of charity remained entirely outside its ken.

A non-Catholic writer who has made a special study of the ethical teaching of the Greeks and Romans outlines its leading characteristics as follows: " It never entered into the pagan concept of humanity to show mercy, much less love, to an enemy. This virtue is not a postulate of human nature or of natural reason. Even among Christians it is not practiced as universally as one might be inclined to expect especially of those who would establish amicable relations between Christianity on the one hand and human nature and civilization on the other. ... To love one's enemies is a supernatural virtue, found only among those who clearly perceive that Christianity requires its followers to sacrifice to God even the natural sentiments of the heart, —in other words, that it imposes regeneration and sanctification. I must admit that I have in mind particularly the saints of the Catholic Church. The noble and humane practice of treating wounded enemies with kindness, which flourishes among the Christian nations of modern times, is quite a different thing. Men as a rule feel no personal grudge against individual members of an enemy nation, and if one of them is hurt, they naturally sympathize with him. The humanity of the ancients scarcely went beyond the feelings of natural sympathy and antipathy. Cicero finds it quite in conformity with natural ethics to hate one's fellowmen heartily (libenter), and says it is impossible to serve all.⁵ Yet it is precisely this that Christianity demands for the sake of God and as a supernatural duty. Tacitus regarded it as an honor to have many enemies.⁶ True, the pagan philosophers distinguish between a mere difference of opinion (opinionum dissensio) and a quarrel (animorum contentio),⁷ and hold that the former should never degenerate into the latter. Cicero plumes himself upon the fact that he and Pompey did not allow their political differences to disturb their friendship.⁸ But where real enmity existed, the average pagan took no pains to conceal the pleasure he derived from his enemy's discomfiture.

⁵ Ad Attic., XIII, 40, 2.

⁶ Dial., 40: "Ipsa inimicitiarum gloria."

⁷ Cicero, Ad Famil., II, 13, 2.

⁸ Phil., II, 38.

... Cursing an enemy and wishing him evil, was quite common.... Christianity exercised a strong influence against slavery, which it opposed in principle, though out of regard for existing conditions and the lot of the unfortunate slaves themselves, the Church discountenanced revolutionary measures." ⁹ If we wish to draw a fair comparison between pagan ethics and the moral teaching of Christianity, we must not detach single propositions from their context but weigh system against system. Doing so we shall find that the latter far surpasses the former.¹⁰ "What ancient Greek culture did for the intellect," says Houston Stewart Chamberlain, "Christ did for the moral life; it was from Him that humanity first received moral power."¹¹ ll "To profit by suffering," writes Bishop Keppler, "was the highest stage attained by ancient philosophy; the religion of the cross teaches us to practice charity while we suffer and to make our suffering productive of charity." ¹² Christianity, as even Protestants admit, was the first to recognize the importance and value of personality; the philosophers of ancient times did not even know the term and hence were unable to appreciate its ethical bearing. 13 READINGS. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, or Ethics and Natural Law, London 1908. —Chas. Coppens, S.J., A Brief Text-Book of Moral Philosophy, New York 1895.—V. Cathrein, S.J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, pp. 556 sqq. —J. L. Perrier, The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy, New York 1909, pp. 136 sqq. —Th. Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1906; Vol. II, 1900. —A. Castelein, S.J., Institutiones Philosophiae Moralis et Socialis, Bruxelles 1899. —L. du Roussaux, Éthique, Bruxelles 1890 —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, especially pp. 13 sq. —E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 38 sqq., Vienna 1887.—J. Elliot Ross, C. S. P., Christian Ethics, New York 1919, pp. 7 sqq.

⁹ M. Schneidewin, Die antike Humanität, Berlin 1897, pp. 202 sq., 209. Cfr. M. Waldmann, Die Feindesliebe in der antiken Welt und im Christentum, Vienna 1902; S. Randlinger, Die Feindesliebe nach dem natürlichen und positiven Sittengesetz, Paderborn 1906, pp. 22 sqq., 101 sqq.; F. Steinmüller, Die Feindesliebe, Ratisbon 1909, pp. 17 sqq. —On the attitude of the Church towards slavery see C. S. Devas, The Key to the World's Progress, Being an Essay on Historical Logic, London 1906, pp. 143 sqq.

¹⁰ Cfr. H. Kellner, Hellenismus und Christentum, Cologne 1866; A. Chollet, La Morale Stoicienne en Face de la Morale Chrétienne, Paris 1889, pp. 43 sqq., 59 sqq.; A. Bonhöffer, Epiktet und die Stoa, Stuttgart 1890; A. Dyroff, Die Ethik der alten Stoa, Berlin 1897, pp. 327 sqq.; M. Baumgarten, L. A. Seneca und das Christentum, Rostock 1895; Th. Zahn, Der Stoiker Epiktet und sein Verhältnis zum Christentum, 2nd ed., Erlangen 1895; K. Jentsch, Hellenentum und Christentum, Leipsic 1903; L. E. M. Bautain, La Morale de l'Évangile, Paris 1855; Germ. tr. by J. M. Gaisser, Die Moral des Evangeliums, Tübingen 1856, pp. 349 sqq., 377 sqq.

¹¹ Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts, Vol. I, 4th ed., Munich 1903, p. 207.

¹² P. von Keppler, Das Problem des Leidens in der Moral, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1904, p. 26.

The Catholic idea of the value of personality is beautifully explained by F. Sawicki, Wert und Würde der Persönlichkeit im Christentum, Cologne 1906, especially pp. ¹³ sqq. and 35 sqq.

¹³ Cfr. G. Wobbermin, Der christliche Gottesglaube in seinem Verhältnis zur heutigen Philosophie, Berlin 1902, p. 80; 2nd ed., 1907, pp. 130 sq. Wobbermin is a Protestant.

According to the dogmatic teaching of the Church, the final end and object of moral conduct is man's eternal happiness in Heaven (beatitudo).¹ Basing its teaching on Sacred Scripture,² the Council of Trent declares that man is free to do good propter retributionem, i. e., for the sake of gaining a reward.³ But may he do good to be happy?

¹ Cfr. St. Augustine, Confessiones, l. X, c. 22: " This is the happy life: to rejoice concerning You, toward You, and because of You; this is it, and there is no other. But those who think that it is something else pursue another joy, and not the true one. Yet their will is not turned away from some image of joy." — Ibid., c. 23, n. 33: "For the happy life is joy in the truth. For this is joy in You, who are the truth." —St. Ignatius Loyola says: "Man was created that he might praise the Lord our God, show Him reverence, and through these things save his soul." (Lib. Exercit.). — Cfr. E. Janvier, Exposition de la Morale Catholique, Vol. I, Paris 1904, pp. 45 sqq.—J. S. Vaughan, Happiness and Beauty, London 1913.

² Ps. CXVIII, 112 (Vulg.): "I have inclined my heart to perform Your justifications forever, for the sake of reward." (Cfr. G. Hoberg, Die Psalmen der Vulgata, Freiburg 1892, p. 351). —Heb. XI, 26: "For (Moses) looked to the reward."

³ Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, c. 11. — On man's true happiness see St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 1 sqq.; V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, pp. 81 sqq.; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 78 sqq.; Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, London 1908, pp. 6 sqq.

The Catholic Church has been accused of Eudemonism or Hedonism for answering this question in the affirmative. We are told that the desire for happiness is a mean motive, incompatible with the idea of perfect morality. 1. The Stoics and the followers of Kant⁴ assert that any system of ethics that commands men to do good, not because it is a duty, but in order to obtain a reward, is egoistic and unworthy of a true philosopher. This is a very plausible objection, yet it has absolutely no basis in fact. Those who raise it misunderstand human nature. Man is so constituted that he cannot truly desire anything which does not afford him interior satisfaction. Whatever he may do or omit, he is in a certain sense always seeking his own happiness. Even the wicked sin to be happy.⁵ When a man desires something for others, he does not desire it purely for their sake, but partly also because the desired object has some value for himself. In this sense the desire for happiness and egoism are necessary constituents of every human act. A wholly unselfish act of the will, i. e., one in no way related to the personal satisfaction or happiness of the agent, is impossible. Even the so-called unselfish love that causes men to make sacrifices for others or for the sake of ideals, is not entirely free from "selfishness," because when man makes a sacrifice, he does it for his own satisfaction as well as for the sake of others.

⁴ On Kant's ethical teaching see K. Fischer, Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. IV, 3rd ed., Munich 1882; Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 115-119, London 1908; Wm. Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 540 sqq., Boston 1903. —For a refutation of Kant see C. Didio, Die moderne Moral und ihre Grundprinzipien, Freiburg 1896, pp. 64 sqq.; Ph. Kneib, Die "Lohnsucht" der christlichen Moral, Vienna 1904, pp. 7 sqq.; IDEM, Die "Jenseitsmoral," pp. 6 sq. and 109 sqq.; Schneider, Göttliche Weltordnung, 2nd ed., pp. 517 sqq. —On Eudaemonism cfr. F. J. Stein, Historischkritische Darstellung der pathologischen Moralprinzipien, 2nd ed., Würzburg 1879, pp. 55 sqq.; J. Holtzmann, Moderne Sittlichkeitstheorien und christliches Lebensideal, Strassburg 1907; Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. I, pp. 369 sq.; Vol. VI, p. 640; Vol. VII, p. 132.

⁵ St. Augustine, Serm. in Ps., CXVIII, 1, n. 1: "Happiness, which there is no one who does not seek. For who ever can be found, or could have been found, or will be found, who does not wish to be happy? ... Indeed, to be happy is so great a good that both the good and the wicked desire it. It is no wonder that the good are good for this reason; but what is wonderful is that even the wicked are wicked for this reason: that they may be happy. For whoever, given over to lusts, is corrupted by luxury and debauchery, seeks happiness in this evil and considers himself miserable when he does not attain the pleasure and delight of his concupiscence, but does not hesitate to proclaim himself happy when he attains it. And whoever burns with the torches of avarice gathers riches in whatever way he can for this purpose, that he may be happy; ... in all crimes he seeks happiness." (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1501 sq.) IDEM, Serm. in Ps., CL, c. 3, n. 4: "For even he who is good is good for this reason, that he may be happy; and he who is wicked would not be wicked unless he hoped that through it he could be happy." (ibid., XXXVIII, 809).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 29, art. 4.

Moreover, man's will and destiny are inseparable from his nature because it is of the very essence of the will to desire and tend towards beatitude, which, being "a state made perfect by the aggregate sum of all things good,"⁶ is identical with God as the sovereign good and source of all goodness. Now if God and eternal happiness are synonymous terms, it is perfectly consistent to be good in order to attain eternal happiness, and there is no sense in inculcating "pure" duties, i. e., such as abstract entirely from the motive of self-love. Therefore, whilst we do not deny that Catholic moral teaching, like every other rational system of ethics, contains a eudaemonistic element, nay even a strain of "egoism," ⁷ we must insist that this admixture is justifiable and supplies a most effective antidote against precisely that false egotism which our enemies charge against us, inasmuch as it emphasizes true charity (love of God and neighbor).⁸ We claim that the moral teaching of Christ effectively reconciles and combines altruism with egoism.

⁶ "Status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus" (Boethius). — St. Thomas, Summa c. Gent., l. II, c. 48, n. 3; IDEM, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 26, art. 1, ad 1; 1a 2ae, qu. 3, art. 2, ad 2. —Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God, the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, pp. 190 sqq.; God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 93 sqq.

⁷ Cfr. S. Huber, Die Glückseligkeitslehre des Aristoteles und des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Freising 1893; C. Gutberlet, Ethik und Religion, pp. 158 sqq.; C. Didio, Die moderne Moral, Freiburg 1896, pp. 21 sqq.; B. Peters, Die christlichen Begriffe der Sittlichkeit und Seligkeit, Münster 1902.

⁸ Cfr. Matth. XXII, 37-39-

2. Certain Quietists and pseudo-mystics denounced the habit of doing good for the sake of obtaining an eternal reward as at best an imperfect virtue, and demanded an absolutely unselfish and disinterested love (amour désintéressé), which expects no reward and would even surrender its claim to eternal beatitude if God so willed. This is construing an imaginary opposition between God as the highest, and eternal happiness as a merely secondary good.⁹

⁹ Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, St. Louis 1917, pp. 136 sq.; H. Heppe, Geschichte der quietistischen Mystik, Berlin 1875; E. A. Pace in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 608 sqq.

Such teaching is philosophically untenable and opposed to Revelation. Sacred Scripture again and again exhorts men to strive for eternal happiness and promises the joys of Heaven as a reward for obeying the law of God.¹⁰

¹⁰ Cfr. Matth. V, 12, 46; X, 41 sq.; Luke VI, 23, 32-35.

If God did not reward virtue, He would be unjust, the moral order would hang in the air, and the so-called moral law would be nothing but the fiat of an absolutistic tyrant, and consequently immoral.

The proper character and usefulness of our Moral Theology seem to us to be manifested, or at least intimated, by the very title with which it is inscribed.

For we promise Principles, Responses, and Counsels.

Principles cannot be handed down without an intrinsic examination of causes.

By Responses, cases are to be solved clearly, for the necessary and prudent instruction of practice.

Finally, Counsels are given concerning the better good. Wherefore our solicitude will not be only about weighing sins which are to be avoided; but it will also extend itself to the positive part of Christian justice, to be explained and recommended.

Written wholly after the Code, the book will more easily be accommodated to the present norms of law than treatises which have merely been revised after the Code. That it may serve use the more, it seemed good to set down the usefulness of the argument before chapters or titles; moreover summaries will be subjoined to the individual chapters, which will present a brief repetition of the chapter.

With the kindly work of friends expert in these matters having been brought in, in treatises which must be completed by the ordinances of civil laws, we shall be able, and shall not neglect, briefly to sketch not only Latin law but also American, English, and German law; in liturgical and disciplinary institutes, the historical beginnings of the present discipline and its successive preparations.

The public apostasy of the nations corrupts not only the intellect, but also the morals of men. From the flood of neo-paganism those must be preserved whose light, as the Lord admonishes ¹, ought so to shine before men that from their good works the heavenly Father may be glorified.

May it be possible, with the help of God's grace, that this work of ours, such as it is, contribute something to the sublime end of the divine glory!

Rome, on the sacred day of Pentecost, June 4, 1922.

¹ Gospel of St. Matthew, 5, 16.

I. Fundamental Theology.

II. On the Duties of the Virtues.

III. (Canonical-liturgical and moral) On the Precepts of the Church and the Sacraments.

IV. Special Treatise on Chastity and the Opposed Vices.

There is no true science if its object is presented to the mind only confusedly. But a distinct setting forth of the object to be investigated, of the method to be employed, and of the comparison with related sciences, no less than a clear image of the material thing itself to be considered and of its location in space, wonderfully assists both the intellect and the memory.

Moral theology, or practical theology ¹, is defined by us as: The science which, from the articles of faith, regulates for man elevated and repaired his own human acts.

The definition is explained. a) "Science" signifies the systematic proposition and rational deduction of conclusions from principles known through themselves. But since the principles of theology are not known to us through themselves, but are divinely revealed, theological science is, under this respect, in us only imperfectly and defectively.

Does not this very science, of a diminished name, seem to be lacking in books which omit binding their conclusions to principles by an internal connection, and pursue almost this one thing: that, after various opinions have been cited, they may demonstrate by the enumeration itself which are common, which at least probable?

b) "Which, from the articles of Faith." Articles of Faith, strictly, "are divinely credible things, which both are explicitly revealed and cannot be deduced from others prior to them" ¹. Moreover, in the articles which are referred to use or practice, moral theology finds its first principles and hence its formal object.

The other articles of Faith, that is, the speculative ones, found dogmatic theology. But since each theology, speculative and practical, assumes the articles of Faith as revealed and believed, so that in each there is one ultimate motive of assent, each has the same formal object. Therefore dogmatic theology and moral theology are not to be proposed as two sciences specifically distinct and coming together into one genus, which would be Theology; rather they must be called two integral parts of one divine science.

The matter is otherwise in rational sciences, which are drawn out from first principles known through themselves. Then each set of principles possesses its own proper evidence; the habit of first speculative principles is not the same as the habit of operable principles; a man most apt for metaphysical matters can be found almost unfit for discerning moral matters; whereas all the articles of Faith are believed by acts of the same habit of faith with equal ease or difficulty. Wherefore ethics, or the natural science of morals, differs formally or specifically from theodicy, or the natural science of God.

Nevertheless, since in gathering conclusions we use our own reason, we by no means deny that it can happen, and that the matter is not infrequent, that one who is a distinguished expositor of dogmatic theology may stumble in moral theology.

c) "Regulates." By this word we assign to moral theology its proximate object, which is the scientific proposition of practical dictates or statements. But a practical dictate is a speculative-practical judgment ² by which pronouncement is made concerning some more general principle or concerning an application to a particular case: that principle is right or perverse; that action must be done, or can be done, or is forbidden.

Concerning a principle, I say, as when it is said that damage unjustly inflicted must be repaired; or when it is denied that dishonest means can be purified by the goodness of the end. Concerning an application, as when it is declared: a precept given in these circumstances is to be executed; such a walk or such a transaction is licit; the usurpation of such a temporal thing is to be marked with the vice of theft.

d) "For man elevated and repaired," that is, for man in his present condition, who, by the gratuitous benefit of God, was called to a supernatural order and end, was miserably cast down from that noble state by the sin of Adam, and finds in Christ, the new Adam, a new Father by whom he is regenerated and is reformed more wonderfully than he had been created. Contrary, therefore, to Ethics, which imagines man as he could have been but never was and never will be, moral theology considers man as he truly is in reality. Thus moral theology alone is the absolutely prior science of morals.

The definition, however, could have omitted express mention of the subject for whom the studies of moral theology were destined. For that subject's being man elevated and hence repaired was already established from the fact that the rules of moral theology were taken from the articles of faith. For articles of faith could have been revealed for no other man than man elevated; practical dictates can be gathered from the articles of faith for no other man than man elevated and repaired.

Our definition, as to the matter itself, is not different from others by which moral theology is said to be the science concerning human acts insofar as they have an order to a supernatural end. Cf., for example, Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor., Prolegomena.

e) "His own human acts," that is, acts which are sufficiently in man's power that practical dictates concerning them may usefully be sought, or, what is the same thing, that they can and ought to be regulated.

Human acts, therefore, are the remote material object of moral theology; human acts to be regulated, or their "regulation," are the proximate material object of the same science.

¹ The very word theology for a long time signified various things, for example, Sacred Scripture itself or the divine page. Sources are indicated by de Ghellinck, S.J., Le mouvement theologique du XIIe siecle, p. 66.

¹ Desan, S.J., De Deo, n. 7.

² It is called speculative-practical because it is remotely ordered to practice, and therefore is still speculative, insofar as it does not yet regard an action to be done here and now.

In what way moral theology is distinguished from the sciences related to it is gathered without difficulty from the definition itself.

It is distinguished from Dogmatic Theology by the difference of the material object, as has been said.

It is separated from Ethics both by its end and by its formal object. For Ethics considers a hypothetical and fictive direction to a natural end; moreover, it employs its principles as evident or demonstrated by reason, whereas moral theology, even when its own principles seem materially the same as those of ethics, assumes them as revealed or confirmed by revelation. And although moral theology itself also makes much use of natural reasoning, it does this only because we know that the supernatural order is not the overthrow of the natural order, but its perfection; so that the inchoate goodness of an action considered naturally cannot be neglected by us, nor can an action naturally evil become supernaturally good.

It indeed cannot be denied that the direct use of the revealed source becomes far less in moral theology than in dogmatic theology; this is sufficiently explained by the very material object of each part of divine science. For dogmatic theology has as its end the scientific exposition of Faith; it proposes truths which, at least for the most part, are inaccessible to human reason, or concerning which definitions of the ecclesiastical magisterium are usually made; then, because it is a merely speculative science, it abstracts from the man who must believe the dogmas. On the contrary, moral theology, since it regulates human actions, can prescind neither from the agent nor from his nature. But the laws of human nature, which are not to be violated, but are fulfilled more sublimely by a more dignified subject, that is, by man elevated, are accessible to reason itself and are not, for the most part, revealed in particular. Wherefore their demonstration enters moral theology itself. Thus many precepts are materially common to the natural order and to the supernatural order. Some, indeed, are proper to the present order of elevated nature; yet these also are observed by an acting man, who, according to the fundamental laws of his nature, must obey every divine law. Wherefore, if revelation proposes new objects to our action, our action always belongs to our nature, sane but normally informed and strengthened by grace. But those objects themselves, that is, dogmas to be believed, sacraments to be administered and received, are, as it were, loaned to moral theology by dogmatic theology. Besides, when it touches an object which is revealed only accidentally, or which is known to reason, then dogmatic theology itself has many things in common with human science. Thus, in the treatise on the one God, dogmatic theology is scarcely distinguished materially from theodicy. But what rarely happens in dogmatic theology is wont to happen in moral theology.

Therefore there is no other science which makes so manifest what we were just recalling: that human nature is by no means destroyed by grace, but is elevated.

There are not a few questions common to canonists and moralists; but canon law directly regards laws, partly divine and partly human, of ecclesiastical society; and it observes human acts, at least exterior acts (of internal acts the praetor does not judge), under the respect of the external forum, or insofar as they agree with or differ from the laws of visible society. On the contrary, moral theology considers ecclesiastical laws only insofar as, by obliging conscience, they become a rule of human acts. Cf. Wernz, Ius Decretalium, I, n. 57.

We have deliberately described moral theology in such a way that it would not exclude the ascetical and mystical parts. Can a rule of morals be called complete which neglects more perfect things, and is in no way solicitous concerning the special communication of God with his creature? Indeed, can neglect of the study of the more perfect be composed with perfect honesty ¹? For this reason, in the very title of the present work, we judged that counsels must be added to moral responses. They are indeed accustomed to say that in moral theology, taken more strictly, there is defined what is licit and what is forbidden, while ascetical and mystical discipline are solicitous about perfection. We place the distinction rather in this: that ascetical and mystical discipline are not content with the notion of more perfect actions, but inquire into the ways of pursuing those more perfect things, and thus approach a certain spiritual art.

Ascetical discipline itself, insofar as it is distinguished from mystical discipline, is concerned with the ordinary means of acquiring Christian perfection, while mystical discipline investigates the more sublime and less ordinary ways by which the soul is led to special union with God.

¹ Wherefore rightly and deservedly the periodical booklet La vie spirituelle, from its first beginning, vindicated the place of ascetical science in moral theology.

Place and dignity of moral theology. The comparison made also teaches us in what place and rank moral theology is to be put among the sciences.

For it is manifest through itself that moral theology surpasses the human sciences both by its end and by its object.

As to the sacred sciences, the dogmatic part of theological science excels the moral, insofar as it regards higher truths upon which, as foundations, moral theology rests; and it has God, not only, as does every theology, as the subject of attribution (or that to which all things are referred), but also as its principal material object. Yet in a certain respect the practical part excels the speculative, on account of the greater use which it has in the very ordering to the end of eternal life.

To ascetical theology, moral theology more strictly so called is related as a subalternating science, since ascetical theology must borrow its principles from moral theology; yet the end of ascetical theology is accidentally, or by degree, more sublime, at least insofar as it is more directly solicitous about perfection.

Both by its more noble proximate end, by which it intends rectitude before God, and by the source whence it draws its chief conclusions, and by the very breadth and universality of its object, moral theology is more excellent than canon law.

Pastoral theology instructs sacred ministers concerning their duties, and forms the same ministers for rightly undertaking their offices. And because pastoral theology insists upon the very way by which the salvation of souls will be better procured, rather than upon science, it must be called an art, just as ascetical discipline itself. But ascetical discipline makes a man solicitous concerning his own perfection, while pastoral discipline makes the sacred minister solicitous concerning the salvation and perfection of others. Yet neither the duties of pastors nor the rules of prudently administering the sacraments are passed over in moral theology. Wherefore pastoral discipline enters moral theology almost as a part, especially that moral theology which adds counsels to responses, so that it seems to differ from moral theology almost only by a fuller exposition of matters.

1. We have distinguished juridical discipline from moral discipline; yet we do not want them so separated that we proclaim the jurist released from moral consideration.

But in non-Catholic schools today there are not lacking supporters of a divorce of this kind, which conceives the province assigned to the jurist in approximately this way.

2. To the science of law there are offered for investigation the norms by which the exterior action of men in the society about which the discussion is being made is coercively directed. By these rules the life of the people is in fact imbued, so that their force and efficacy can be measured.

What then will the science of law do? It will try to reduce all the rules concerning individual objects to some synthetic unity, so that by this effort it may arrive at a certain abstract definition which virtually contains the various rules, and from which, consequently, they can be deduced. Thus there will be composed, for example, the abstract notion of the State, of the Family, of Property, such as can be defined in our age in Italy, in France, in Germany, in Europe.

This is the proper work of the jurist. He ignores metaphysical norms as such; he attends only to the vigor which public opinion attributes to them. But positive institutions he judges according to their proportion to the prevailing opinion: he will approve those which agree with it, he will disapprove those which differ from it.

Today all will readily acknowledge that those institutions are mutable and perfectible. Indeed, they think the same institutions are in perpetual motion. But their greater perfection is not to be gathered from some absolute norm to which they become more conformable, but from the fact that they participate in the inclination and tendencies of opinion itself.

Thus institutions which are an image of the prevailing opinion will be proclaimed good by the jurist; but those will be called better which already sketch the image of the opinion soon to come.

Does there exist an absolute norm superior to positive law? Let the philosophers see to that. What is more fitting for such a people? Let politicians effect that. The jurist adheres to the consideration of facts alone.

Indeed, there were once some (rather than there are now) who with Marx denied all force and efficacy of moral persuasions upon juridical institutions. But this historical materialism is refuted by the most manifest facts of every age. It is enough to recall how much the matrimonial regime, for example, has been changed by Christianity.

3. Censure of that divorce. It is certainly in man's power to consider things precisively, and consequently to weigh the relation between institutions and the persuasions of men. And such precision, if it is made opportunely and prudently, can have its political and social utility.

But why the jurist must be content with that inadequate consideration in no way appears, nor is it demonstrated. Who, besides him, will refer the positive institutions of men to the divinely established order theoretically and practically? Since the metaphysical philosopher, occupied with abstract things, is ignorant of positive institutions as such, if the jurist observes only the relation of facts, no comparison with absolute norms will be made, no effort will be made to attain them practically, and that which is at once the honor and the duty of man will be wholly neglected: namely, that in his private and public action he imitate God.

In what way also will you deny to the jurist that, by the authority which he possesses, he should influence the very persuasions of the people, and thus fulfill his own part in procuring common happiness?

What of this, that from the natural law rules must be supplied for cases which were not foreseen by the human legislator? Moreover, common sense itself cries out that from the same law there are many things in human decrees to be condemned and corrected. By what title are reforms of laws demanded? That injustices may cease; that greater justice may reign. Therefore an absolute norm is invoked by all reformers, so that a certain ideal image of absolute good is set before the eyes of all. If that image were fallacious, if it were a dream without reality, we would be deceived by our very nature.

But he who, without respect to a superior law, proclaims good whatever is received among men, will often praise what is to be condemned, will blame what is to be praised, and thus will become a pernicious sower of error.

4. That a divorce of this kind, by which juridical matters are separated from moral matters, has been devised must be blamed on metaphysical skepticism and the present intellectual anarchy.

The province which, in such a system, is assigned to the expert in law could befit only beings which are subject to a fatal evolution. But it is opposed equally to human psychology and to objective truth. A role diminished and harmful to the common good would be imposed upon the jurist.

5. Therefore it is necessary that we hold these things firmly: every true progress is either required by absolute good, or is desirable according to that good. From meditation on that good there arises a greater hope of true progress. Opinion, however, and common persuasions are only imperfect criteria, in which alone we cannot trust.

Besides, we freely acknowledge this: moral persuasions alone do not avail for having or changing juridical institutions. The force also of economic utility is by no means to be denied. Not rarely it will stand in the way of the better good. And if it favors the moral matter, it is rather a removal of an obstacle than a positive element of progress. This formula can be given: progress is made according to the absolute good to which lower utility does not stand opposed.

But in bringing about the happy advancement of peoples and men, no Catholic will deny that supreme direction is in the hand of God Provident.

Concerning the province of the jurist and the various opinions which have been proposed about this matter, let the excellent work of Professor Francis Geny be consulted: Science et technique en droit prive positif, 3 vols., Paris, 1914-1915-1921.

The sources of knowing, from which moral theology must draw forth its arguments, are the same as those offered for use to theology in general.

Therefore the first place is owed to the Word of God, both that which is written and that which has been handed down by mouth.

Then comes the magisterium of the Church, to which the deposit of faith is committed to be guarded and proposed. This is exercised in an extraordinary manner in the solemn definitions of Councils.

Moreover, from the end of the persecutions to the year 1139, or before Gratian, ten ecumenical Councils were held, besides several particular Councils which obtained great authority. For several canons of the Oriental Councils were received universally. "In the Western Church, the Roman, African, and Spanish Councils excel by singular authority, such as the Council of Elvira (300-306) and the Councils of Toledo, likewise the Gallican Councils celebrated in these centuries" (Wernz, Ius Decretalium, I, n. 203).

Afterward it is known that ten other ecumenical Councils were celebrated, if you count the Council of Constance, of which the last, the Vatican Council, has not yet been closed.

The same magisterium is exercised in an ordinary manner in common preaching and instruction. Cf. canon 1323.

Then come human authorities. Approved authors together, as Koch astutely observes ¹, almost like the Holy Fathers, bear witness to the doctrine of the Church for us, and by their own reasonings and conclusions provide for the advancement of theological science. To desert their unanimous opinion would be rash; while he is secure who follows positions proposed by many notable authors.

Among these authorities, as regards our discipline, St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus stand out. Yet they are in an unequal place and kind. St. Thomas, "the illustrious ornament and light of the Christian world," Leo XIII "declared and established as heavenly patron of all Catholic schools" for "the increase of the sciences and the common utility of mankind" (cf. Lesson of the second Nocturn in the feast of St. Thomas). Therefore his philosophy is especially commended, and his principles are to be held. St. Alphonsus "among the complex opinions of theologians, whether laxer or more rigid, laid down a safe way, by which directors of the souls of Christ's faithful could walk with unoffending foot" (Pius IX, March 23, 1871, cited by Koch, loc. cit.). Therefore his practical prudence is commended and proclaimed. Yet no approval and commendation impose the individual opinions of a most approved Doctor. Indeed, after the Sacred Penitentiary, on July 5, 1831, declared that a confessor who, in the practice of the sacred tribunal of penance, simply followed all the opinions of St. Alphonsus was by no means to be disturbed, and pronounced that a professor who professes the opinions of the same Doctor is safe, it expressly added: "Yet without its being thought from this that those are to be blamed who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors."

And it is far from the mind of the Church that distinguished Doctors should, as it were, dispense later theologians from personal study and labor. Koch opportunely cites this saying from Lacordaire: "St. Thomas is a lighthouse, but must not be a boundary."

Finally, Reason must scrutinize and prudently apply the principles and documents of sound doctrine and philosophy. And it is to be desired that present-day moral theologians restore that splendid method by which the great moral Doctors of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century deserved so well of moral science, and that they not be content with ever smaller handbooks ¹, which have nothing in common with the handbooks which the scholastic Doctors of the Middle Ages adorned with the name of Theological Summa for the use of students.

¹ Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, Introduction, § 8.

¹ By these words, however, we by no means intend to detract from the merit and practical utility of summaries such as, with no mediocre art, the recent Fr. Arregui, S.J., and other Doctors have composed. But science of the true name cannot be restricted to works of this kind.

That it may deserve the name of science, moral theology is necessarily solicitous concerning the reasons of its conclusions and concerning the principles to which they are referred; that it may be practical, it must translate principles to concrete cases. Therefore no moral theology is conceived which merely exhibits a catalogue of conclusions, or which is occupied solely in discussing principles.

Nevertheless, according to the principal intention, the method is distinguished as positive and scholastic. The former inquires less than the latter into the reason why; it more dogmatically expounds what the latter polemically defends; it cares less about joining truths among themselves and reducing them into unity. The latter strives to connect them scientifically among themselves.

We shall use a method rather scholastic, yet in such a way that we permit a fuller exposition of principles and polemical defense either to other disciplines, for example, moral philosophy, or to special treatises ² already written by us or to be published.

Moral theology is called remotely practical or proximately practical, that is, casuistic, according as it dwells more upon general principles, or thinks of foreseeing and resolving practical doubts. We shall try to cultivate both kinds at the same time, while after proposing principles we shall not omit to subjoin the principal applications.

Finally, moral theology can be called individual or social, according as it is destined for directing the singular man alone in his private dealings, or is also solicitous concerning man's social duties. And they turn to the fault of not a few who, in our age, have given their work to moral theology, that, being too solicitous about the singular man alone and about domestic society alone, they did not sufficiently study to provide for public society. Therefore we shall by no means put social considerations after the rest.

Concerning method this can be doubted: whether in arguments which also require dogmatic treatment, for example, in the sacraments, it is better to separate moral conclusions from dogmatic discussion, or, on the contrary, whether it is preferable to join both respects, the dogmatic and the moral, in the same school. Each way of proceeding has its own advantages and disadvantages. Simultaneous presentation favors synthetic unity, avoids every repeated exposition, and is also commended by the example of St. Thomas and of distinguished scholastic theologians. Yet again today, because of many controversies, dogmatic exposition must be much more lengthy than formerly, and it is very remote from moral applications. Moreover, different qualities of mind are required in the school of dogma and in the moral school. Therefore, if one and the same professor is ordered to be at once dogmatician and moralist, there is danger lest, according to his special aptitude, he neglect one or the other part too much, or lecture on it less well.

But it is altogether to be desired that principles which are not so remote from practice be explained solidly together with the conclusions.

A canonical-moral treatment of matters which pertain at once to the discipline of law and to moral discipline also seems to be commended. We shall try to accomplish this in the volume on the sacraments.

To the right method of moral theology this also pertains: that it teach how to use moral or juridical sayings or aphorisms prudently, and that it appeal, in their proper place, to the censures of condemned propositions in such a way that it neither increases nor diminishes their force.

We call "sayings" the various formulas or dictates which are frequently appealed to by writers in order, in few words, either to confirm a conclusion or to solve a knot or difficulty. Some are rules of law; others are philosophical distinctions. For excuse, for example, to what is appeal more often made than to the distinction per accidens?

We do not deny the utility of brevity; nevertheless care must be taken lest we increase the force of rules, lest we employ distinctions outside their proper place, and thus lest we seem content with a merely "verbal" solution.

Therefore, concerning the prudent use of sayings, we think these things must be observed.

² We have already written questions on religion, on justice, and a work on chastity.

I. On rules of law. We must begin from the wise admonition of the legislator: "A rule is that which briefly narrates the thing as it is. Not that law is taken from the rule, but that from the law which exists the rule is made" (Digest, De regulis iuris [L, 17], Rule 1).

Therefore they are sometimes called principles, or, at least by philosophical reason, axioms, by a rather improper usage. For principles strictly so called must contain in themselves the reason of the conclusions or corollaries of which they are sources, whereas employed sayings not rarely rest upon a reason extrinsic to them; thus that common saying: in doubt one must answer in favor of the validity of the act. An axiom, philosophically, signifies a sentence whose truth we immediately intuit, whereas several sayings, for example, concerning the privileges of the possessor, need demonstration. Therefore:

1. When the reason of some saying is external to the saying itself, its true reason must be investigated, lest, beyond that reason, we make a fallacious use of the saying.

Let the saying be, for example: "In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act." Since men perform acts, some good, some evil, some valid, some invalid, the truth of the saying is not immediately manifest. Yet the rule must be proved because of these added reasons:

a) Man must employ only that diligence which is human. But it would be inhuman to demand that, without a positive and serious motive, acts once performed should have to be recalled again to the scales. Therefore this first reason already teaches us this correct use of the saying: in negative doubt, solicitude about our past acts can safely be laid aside.

b) In the external forum, matters must often be determined by presumptions. And since acts are for the most part done validly, the presumption by which, at least in the external forum, an act is presumed to have been done validly in doubt, even positive doubt, is just and fair. Yet the force and value of that presumption will vary according to the will of the legislator and according to the efficacy of that will. According to his will, I say. Thus, what before the canonical Code was disputed, the legislator now wills that the presumption for the validity of marriage be stronger than for the validity of baptism. Wherefore, where the baptism of one or the other party has been doubtful, canon 1070, § 2, says that one must stand "for the validity of the marriage until it is certainly proved that one party was baptized, the other not baptized." Yet it reserves the privilege of the faith, because in favor of the faith the same marriage can be held as null ¹.

We added "according to the efficacy of that will." For there are acts which the legislator can render certain from doubtful by his will, whereas others are necessarily left in their objective state, notwithstanding the presumption of the external forum. Thus public authority can render the jurisdiction of an inferior certain by supplying the defect. Wherefore use of probable jurisdiction is always honest, since canon 209, in a positive and probable doubt whether of law or of fact, supplies jurisdiction. On the contrary, no will of a human legislator will be able to supply deficient baptism. Hence it will happen that consciousness of doubtful baptism obliges you to receive baptism again under condition, for example, in order to your own eternal salvation, even though, in order to marriage, it is presumed to have been valid.

c) Finally, if we consider an act as the source of obligation, in positive doubt no simple answer is supplied to us by the praised saying. For if your obligation alone comes to be considered, an act concerning whose validity there is positive doubt will bear only an uncertain obligation, which can be passed over. For this reason a private vow whose validity is doubtful is not to be urged. But if the utility of another private man or a public cause intervenes, many other things will have to be considered, which will be weighed in their own place. The case will have been: a doubtful marriage, a doubtful religious profession, a doubtful payment of a debt.

And thus our inquiry has led us to this conclusion: a saying which must be admitted because of a reason extrinsic to itself does not have perpetual use.

2. Other sayings indeed contain in themselves the reason of their truth, but must be completed in order that their use can be prudent.

Thus, once the nature of ordered charity has been seen, it appears true that "charity does not oblige with excessive inconvenience"; but the proportion of inconvenience must be gathered from elsewhere, so that we may prudently judge the inconvenience to be excessive.

3. Other sayings, even when complete, require that attention be given to the condition which is expressed together with them or understood beneath them.

When we say, "In an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better," we enunciate something complete, which is made true from the very nature of possession. Yet it can be doubted, and is doubted, when a cause is to be called equal. And besides, the very principle of possession cannot exert its own proper efficacy unless true possession is had. But possession supposes two persons who can contest concerning a right; it also supposes a fact, or exercise of a right, which exists, or can exist, separated from the right. Thus one man can possess a field of which another has the right of ownership. Now, neither law nor liberty are two persons. But if you take them metaphorically for the legislator and the subject, the subject, in matter in which the legislator is competent, cannot contest with him concerning any right, but is within the decision of the one legitimately commanding. Finally, law and immunity from law either are or are not: a law cannot be conceived which obliges in fact but not in right, or an immunity from law which is at once moral and illegitimate. For this reason, not a few writers who try to solve moral doubts by considering whether law or liberty is in possession use an argumentation which we call futile, because it is fictive. For there is no possession of liberty with respect to the legislator, and the principle of possession occupies its proper seat in the matter of justice. Cf. Bouquillon, Theologia fundamentalis, n. 296; De Bock, Trac. fundam., I, p. 280, observation IV.

¹ Cf. what we wrote in Periodica de re canonica et morali, X, p. 25.

II. On excuse through "accident." There is very much use and abuse of the distinction between per se and per accidens in moral matters.

1. First, the twofold meaning of the distinction must be attended to. a) A thing is said to happen per se which for the most part, by way of rule, seems to flow as it were from the nature of the thing or from the circumstances; but that is said to happen per accidens which occurs rarely, by way of exception. This distinction is useful, because our human providence generally ought not extend itself beyond those things which regularly happen or follow. Which words, for example, are to be avoided as harmful, insulting, offensive; which occasions of sinning are to be held grave or proximate, before experience, are estimated according to that norm. b) By a more philosophical usage, we do per se what, by our voluntary causality, we effect or produce; but that happens per accidens which, besides our intention, follows because of the intervention of another cause which we cannot impede. Wherefore Almighty God indeed wills some things per accidens, but is said to do nothing per accidens. Thus, for example, to use the classic example, a commander of an army intends to explode a fortress with instruments of war. With the explosion of the fortress his causality per se is ended. But it can happen that, by chance or by the will of another, innocent persons have been shut up in that fortress. The commander, as we suppose, cannot procure that they leave from there or be expelled. The killing of these accompanies the explosion of the fortress per accidens.

From the same example it appears that some effect can be called per se according to the first signification, which according to the other follows per accidens. The killing of the innocent, in the proposed case, follows per se, from the circumstances in which the explosion is made, if we attend to the first signification; it follows per accidens according to the other signification.

Now to speak of the very frequent excuse: if we wish to avoid fallacy, it will have to be weighed what is held per accidens, and at what time of our action.

For per accidens, or because of a concurrent cause which is not in my power, some condition required for the very honesty of the action can be lacking, or the effect to which the action has an order; and it can also happen that a new evil effect is added.

In the first case, whether the condition of honesty was lacking per se or per accidens, the action remains equally dishonest. In the second case the action will preserve its species morally, just as physically.

It is not licit to kill a hare with danger to human life: whether the danger arises per se or per accidens, that hunt will remain illicit. But that food moderately taken is not digested in the stomach per accidens will not morally vitiate the eating. These things must be attended to greatly in the question concerning the use of marriage. Cf. Suarez, De Legibus, l. 3, c. 25, n. 12.

Finally, in the third case, which will be proposed more distinctly later, the action will be honest or dishonest according as you have, or have not, satisfied the positive duty of preventing that evil effect from following from your action. The force of that duty is one thing in one matter and another in another matter, and will be weighed in its own place.

III. On proscribed propositions. There can also be an incorrect use of the judgments of the Holy See, especially those by which certain propositions or theses are disapproved.

For in dogmatic theology the various notes with which propositions are branded are accurately distinguished. For they are condemned as heretical, as proximate to heresy, as erroneous, as proximate to error, or savoring of heresy or error, as rash, as scandalous, as offensive to pious ears. Now the three latter notes, and to a certain extent also the fourth, "savoring of heresy or error," contain no positive and direct judgment of the Holy See concerning the falsity of the proposition itself. Directly, only the enunciation, at least public or open, of a thesis proscribed in this way is forbidden.

Therefore, in order that you may bring a certain argument from authority, it is not enough to recall that the contrary, or rather contradictory, proposition was condemned by such a Pontiff, unless it was struck at least with the stigma of error.

It indeed happens that the Holy See imprints its note upon individual propositions, which is then authentically declared to us; but it also happens that it condemns a series of propositions collectively with various notes which nevertheless do not fall upon the individual propositions.

Then, authoritatively, the individual propositions are affected at least by the smallest note; but which ones deserve a worse note private Doctors will have to teach.

Thus in moral matters, by Alexander VII, in decrees of September 24, 1665, and March 18, 1666, forty-five propositions were condemned "at least as scandalous"; by Innocent XI, in a decree of the Holy Office, March 2, 1679, sixty-five propositions were "all condemned and prohibited, as they stand, at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice"; by Alexander VIII, on August 24, 1690, two propositions, of which one is declared and condemned "as heretical," the other as "scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous"; and by the same Pontiff, in a decree of the Holy Office, December 7, 1690, thirty-one propositions, some dogmatic, some moral, "as rash, scandalous, ill-sounding, injurious, proximate to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, schismatic, and heretical respectively."

Yet very often appeal is made to these proscriptions as though they contained an infallible declaration of falsity.

It is also manifest that condemned propositions are wrongly alleged to demonstrate theses which are not so contradictory to them that the negation of the one is the affirmation of the other. This, however, in moral matters, is to be received with a grain of salt, since the open mind of the legislator can indicate a somewhat broader use of certain words.

All moral theology admits this first division, by which the more general, or fundamental, part is distinguished from the special part.

What general theology of morals contains is easily gathered from the very definition of moral theology. For fundamental theology can be called a certain explanation of that definition.

For we shall have to treat in as many treatises:

1. On man elevated and repaired, or on the subject for whom moral theology is written;

2. On his human acts, which we have said are the remote object of moral theology;

3. and 4. On the rules by which those acts are to be ordered. For a regulative science ought to know and apply those rules. And from the articles of faith themselves we are taught that human acts are to be ordered according to a twofold rule: the remote rule, such as law is, and the proximate rule, such as conscience is;

5. Our deficient liberty has evil acts, which demand a treatise on sins;

6. For doing good acts we are helped by various actual and habitual aids, concerning which there will be the sixth treatise.

Special theology embraces two great parts. One is on the exercise of virtues and the connected duties; the other on the right use of the sacraments. For it pleased the divine munificence to open to us, from the merits of Christ, fountains of graces in the sacraments, and by sacramental actions to help, confirm, and perfect our human actions.

To these parts there is usually added, by way of a kind of appendix, a treatise on the canonical matter of ecclesiastical penalties, since those penalties are to be avoided by our human action, and they affect not a little the right use of the sacraments.

But the treatise on laws, on the sacraments, and on penalties claims for itself a place not secondary in canon law, although the respect is different. Wherefore we have prepared a separate canonical-moral volume on the positive obligations of Christians, on the sacraments, and on penalties, so that it can be useful to each school.

Indeed, the same plan could have been taken concerning Laws in general, concerning which the same reason held. Nevertheless, notions concerning laws are so necessary before the most weighty treatise on justice, and in the whole of moral theology they find such frequent applications - since everywhere natural law is mixed with positive law, whether divine or human - that we have not dared to separate that treatise from moral theology.

Besides, there could be uncertainty concerning the place in which the treatise on Chastity and the opposed vices might more suitably be proposed. Since the right use of the generative faculty is reserved to the conjugal state, its norms are not well grasped before sufficient knowledge of the matrimonial state has been acquired. Wherefore several approach that delicate argument twice: in the treatise on virtues they treat only of carnal vice; what use of the faculty is honorable and praiseworthy they explain in the treatise on matrimony. This division of one argument, this interposition of vice among the virtues, are strange and not without inconveniences. Yet again, a treatise which is wholly moral is not well placed among parts that are rather canonical. Therefore, all things having been weighed, we have preferred to devote a separate little book to that treatment.

The part of theological science which is called moral seeks and proposes practical dictates by which, in the present order of elevated and repaired nature, according to faith and reason, human acts are to be regulated.

II. It differs from dogmatic theology by its material object, that is, human acts, and those to be regulated, while dogmatic theology is occupied with the truths themselves of faith, as such, to be proposed systematically to the intellect; from canon law, by the justice which it pursues, which is justice in the internal forum or before God, while canon law makes a citizen just in the external forum of the Church; from ascetical, mystical, and pastoral science, by the greater extension of the object, which is every honorable thing and not only the better good, and by a more speculative proposition, while ascetical and mystical science, concerned with perfection, and pastoral theology, at the same time inquire into the ways of attaining their objects. It transcends all human sciences, even Ethics itself, by its formal object, which it finds in the articles of faith.

Although the science of law and the science of morals must be distinguished, nevertheless they must not be so separated that the expert in law can abstract from moral truth. Those who preach such a separation spread an anti-natural error harmful to society.

Below dogmatic theology, moral theology subordinates to itself ascetical science, to which it ministers fundamental principles, although by its end ascetical science is superior to it in degree.

III. The sources of moral theology are the sources common to all theology: the Word of God, the Magisterium of the Church, human authorities, and reason. Although, because of its material object, moral theology ought more often than dogmatic theology to appeal to reason.

Among authorities St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus stand out; nevertheless their individual opinions are by no means imposed as to be followed; their commendation dispenses theologians from no personal investigation.

Authorities, moreover, at the same time attest the accepted doctrine of the Church and by their own labor enrich the science.

IV. The method, which can be scholastic or casuistic, will rather be scholastic, insofar as we shall devote labor to seeking the intrinsic reasons of conclusions. Nevertheless our treatment will be brief, because we shall send a fuller exposition and polemical disputations to the special treatises joined with this work of ours.

V. Historical notes. Already in the sacred letters themselves of the New Testament there are many moral parts in which we read principles, precepts, counsels, reproofs, and definitions of authority. The Fathers of the Apostolic age are exhorters; in the second and third century they are exhorters and apologists; then, in the golden period which runs from the fourth century to the middle of the fifth century, they hand down to us the doctrine of morals drawn from the revealed sources, and at the same time they struggle against invading pagan morals. In the subsequent period, the Fathers rather preserve and collect things said before, which then the Fathers less properly so called (from the middle of the seventh century in the West, the eighth in the East) order more methodically, while in abbatial and episcopal schools the age of the Scholastics of the Middle Ages is prepared (from the thirteenth century to the sixteenth). Then, by the cultivation of dialectic (even excessive) and the philosophy of Aristotle, minds perfected moral doctrine by the aids of human reason. The Scholastics of the modern age, who flourished in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, adorned this doctrine, already thus expounded, with a fuller exposition and a more careful application to facts, so that that age can be called the golden age of moral theology. Then, already from the middle of the seventeenth century, because of excessively subtle lucubrations and the Jansenist plague, there succeeded an age which we can name from civil wars, when Catholic writers themselves contended so sharply among themselves concerning probabilism and the administration of the sacrament of penance. The prudent science and labor of St. Alphonsus recalled minds to concord, while at the same time inaugurating an age more practical than doctrinal. It is now permitted to hope for a new golden age, in which, with St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus as leaders, modern erudition may be joined with a greater penetration of principles, souls may be more confidently stirred up to pursuing the positive parts of Christian justice, and the very examination of applications may be completed by psychological observation.

Nevertheless controversies have never been lacking: there has been dispute concerning the value of the baptism of heretics, concerning penance, concerning virginity and widowhood, concerning simoniacal ordination, concerning voluntary poverty, concerning mysticism, concerning usury, concerning probabilism. Present-day questions are concerning "active" virtues with Americanism, concerning the ascetical method, concerning the liturgical informing of piety, concerning matrimony and the duties of spouses, concerning cooperation with modern liberties.

After, in the twelfth century, canon law was separated from moral discipline, nevertheless each science evolved in a sufficiently parallel manner: not rarely the same men were moralists who were outstanding canonists. The Decretum of Gratian came to light with the books of the Sentences; the Decretals of Gregory IX with the Summa of St. Thomas; and now the recently promulgated Code of Canon Law increases the hope conceived concerning moral theology.

Historical facts also demonstrate this: dissensions of Catholics harm solid moral science less than heresies to be attacked; the forgetting of sound philosophy harms it more than exterior calamities.

Moral theology needs both the documents of faith and the labor of reason; applications to concrete cases must be connected with principles.

Today it is necessary with great care to demonstrate Catholic conclusions; to join solicitude concerning perfection with responses concerning things strictly necessary; and not to consider only individual persons, but to attend more to social respects.

VI. This will be the natural order of general theology: that successively we treat of the subject for whom moral theology exists, or of man elevated and repaired; of his human acts; of the remote and proximate rule of those acts, or of laws and conscience; finally, of sins, and of the aids for the right use of our free will.

To forestall fallacies and errors, we have warned beforehand that prudent use must be made of rules of law, lest they be appealed to beyond what the reason on which they rest permits, or where there is no place for them. We demonstrated this concerning these three sayings: In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act; Charity does not oblige with excessive inconvenience, or with grave and proportionate inconvenience; In an equal cause, the condition of the possessor is better.

We also spoke of the right use of the very celebrated distinction between per se and per accidens, which can be referred either to the plurality of cases or to causality itself, observing that no excuse arises if a condition of honesty has accidentally been lacking, but indeed there is an excuse if the consequent effect has accidentally been impeded; and that an evil effect which must be attributed to a concurrent cause is not imputed to him who avoided that evil effect as much as he was bound by a positive duty to take care of it.

Finally, lest we be deceived in alleging condemned propositions, we said that the various notes by which propositions are branded must be observed, and the strict meaning itself of the thesis which is disapproved.

Thus we have prepared the approach to the more general or fundamental theology itself.

Good manuals of moral theology are not lacking. Yet few in the past century have proceeded from the Thomistic school. And those which have their origin elsewhere generally fail in the method or doctrine of St. Thomas, or also in the accurate declaration and demonstration of notions and principles. Many of the moralists are more attentive to practical applications, or are content to recite the more or less probable opinions of others; and very many of their works, it has quite recently been said, by their slightness or by the very catechetical form of questions and answers, have seemed to profess a less mature age of the science.

The return to the doctrine and method of St. Thomas, which has had such salutary fruits in metaphysics and dogmatics, has not extended itself in the same degree to moral theology, because of the harmful and persistent divorce between speculative and practical theology.

Having considered these things, perhaps it will not be unwelcome to hear from the Thomistic school a voice which, more than may be in the wishes of some, sets forth doctrine scholastically and by principles, yet within the limits of a certain moral summa. But since again and again they affirmed that the lectures which we were delivering in the theological college of Louvain for the elementary course answered, however imperfectly and deficiently, the aforesaid end, we now intend to make these public. They are according to the mind of St. Thomas, the Common Doctor; and according to the norm of the New Law, canonical and civil.

Roman law has everywhere been abolished, and to expound it practically in this work would rather generate confusion in minds than scientific usefulness. Therefore we consider only present-day law, especially French law, which, having been worked out earlier and being partly in force in our own country, has in many things been the model of others, although certain very recent codes may seem capable of having been more aptly formed and more perfectly.

In like manner, leaving aside the Decretals and the Corpus Iuris, we consider only the Code of Canon Law promulgated by Benedict XV, without, however, choosing that its order should be followed, because, however much it may be congruent with the science of law, nevertheless in moral questions all things must be adapted and subordinated to the order of theology, the supreme science.

May God grant that, under the patronage of the Blessed Virgin, mediatrix of all graces, this work may be able to contribute to the instruction of the clergy and the usefulness of schools.

Rome, in the Angelicum College, on the feast day of the Sacred Heart, June 27, 1930.

The Author.

1. Notion of Theology. - Theology is a science deduced from the principles of revelation concerning God and other things in order to God. For, led by the light of supernatural revelation, it treats scientifically of the deity itself, that is, of God as God. Now God, under the aspect of deity, is a supernatural being, inasmuch as He is elevated absolutely above every created nature and natural knowledge, and knowable by revelation alone, and is the supernatural principle or cause and end of things, especially of man.

Theology embraces a twofold part: first, one is merely speculative, "concerning God in Himself and as He is the principle and end of things," which treats of God in Himself, one and triune, and of His works ad extra, especially of man, whom God has destined to a supernatural end: the intuitive vision of Himself, to which man can come through divine grace, which Christ bestows upon us. From this, secondly, there spontaneously arises the other, practical part: for if God is our principle and end, duties follow in us toward Him; namely, we must acknowledge Him as our author and tend toward Him as our ultimate end. This part immediately treats of human acts by which we tend toward God, and also, but consequently, of their rules and principles. Hence it is inscribed by St. Thomas: "concerning the motion of the rational creature toward God."

Thus in I, q. 2, in the proemium. - It is a treatise on man as the image of God "insofar as by image is signified what is intellectual, and free by choice, and possessing power over itself" (Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa II, 12), that is, "insofar as he himself is the principle of his acts, as having free choice and power over his works." St. Thomas, I-II, in the prologue.

In brief: theology is the science of supernatural religion. Religion is the moral bond between God and man. Hence theology treats not only of God, the author and end of supernatural things, and of man destined to a supernatural end, but also of the bonds and duties by which man is bound to God, and of the moral relations also which intervene between the two.

2. Difference between Speculative and Practical Theology.

Speculative and practical theology differ:

1. In end: speculative theology directly and solely tends to the knowledge of truth, which it seeks for its own sake, that is, for the perfection of the intellect, and in which it rests; practical theology tends further to right operation and seeks truth for the sake of something else, that is, for the perfection of the will. Namely, it seeks those truths which are necessary for acting well; indeed, because it is a rule of acting, it directly and principally intends to direct human acts and morals. Hence it speculates concerning practice.

2. In matter: speculative theology treats of those things which are merely to be known or also believed, which are called matters of faith or dogmas, and therefore it is called dogmatic; practical theology treats of things to be known and at the same time to be done, which are called matters of morals, whence it is called moral.

3. Definition of Moral Theology. - Moral theology is defined: the part of theological science which treats of human acts to be ordered to God as supernatural end according to revealed principles. It is said:

1. Of science: for it is an evident and certain knowledge of truths which are deduced from certain principles and are coordinated among themselves into a synthesis by a logical connection and order; and thus it is distinguished from common and catechetical knowledge, which all the faithful in some way have concerning human acts and their duties.

2. Theological, that is, deduced from the principles of revelation; and thus it is distinguished from human and merely rational sciences, which proceed from the light of natural reason alone.

3. Part, because it is not a distinct species but only an integral and constitutive part of theological science. For theology does not embrace several sciences as philosophy does, but is an entirely one science, because it has one subject: God, and one formal reason (formal object by which): revelation. Hence moral theology is one and the same science with dogmatic theology, although they are different parts.

4. Which treats of human acts: this is the special matter of which moral theology treats and about which it is immediately occupied, namely, all human acts; and therefore it regards all things which pertain to them, and thus it is distinguished from dogmatic theology.

5. To be ordered to God as supernatural ultimate end: moral theology considers all things in order to God, the supernatural ultimate end, or to God as God. For theology has one principal subject, God, of whom dogmatic theology treats; and all other things, even human acts to be ordered, it considers in order and conformably to God, who is their supernatural principle, exemplar, and end. Hence moral theology is not a merely descriptive science, but a normative one, which judges human acts and directs them to the ultimate end; and yet it differs in species from natural ethics, which directs them to the natural end.

6. According to revealed principles: this is the formal reason, or the proximate motive and immediate medium by which the subject, which is the supernatural end, and the acts necessary for it are known. For revealed principles, admitted by the divine light of faith, are the medium for arriving at theological conclusions and for understanding them.

The conclusions themselves are properly the object of theological science, and they are concerning God and concerning things in order to God, especially, for the moral part, concerning human acts; although these are also customarily called by moderns the object: namely, God the primary object, other things the secondary object. But they understand the object about which theology treats, not the object which it asserts: the latter is theological conclusions.

4. Relation between Moral Theology and Other Disciplines.

From the preceding definition it is understood:

1. From Moral Philosophy: the latter considers human acts in order to the natural end and relies on the principles of reason alone; the former, however, considers human operations as they are ordered to the supernatural end, and its proper medium of knowledge is divine revelation; whence they differ in matter and end, and at the same time in the formal motive.

Nevertheless, a) the supernatural end does not exclude but rather contains the natural end, as the perfect contains the less perfect; likewise b) revelation does not destroy reason but rather perfects it; finally c) revelation also teaches and expressly confirms many rational moral truths, and has others connected with itself. And therefore moral theology agrees in many things with moral philosophy and includes the matter of the latter. But it exceeds it, because it extends more widely even to revealed things, namely, to supernatural actions, virtues, and laws, and because it directs us by a higher light.

2. A fortiori, from the Science of Civil Law, Politics, Sociology, Economics, etc., which have a proximate end that is temporal, or also particular, not the ultimate end itself.

3. From Dogmatic Theology, as has already been said, n. 2.

4. From Ascetical and Mystical Theology: moral theology in the stricter sense treats more of acts necessary to the end insofar as they are under precept (according to the purgative way from sin); ascetical and mystical theology treat of acts insofar as they are of perfection and counsel, that the end may be attained better and more fully. For they teach the ways of perfection, either for progressing in virtue and acquiring perfection (according to the illuminative way), or for exercising perfection and contemplative union with God (according to the unitive and mystical way).

Yet if moral theology is considered in its full and complete sense, it includes ascetical and mystical theology, which rest upon the same principles. But, just as dogmatic and moral theology are now usually treated separately, although they are two parts of one and the same theological science, so nothing prevents those things which are more of precept and those things which are of perfection and counsel from being specially and distinctly explained, as is usually done, yet as integral parts of one practical science ordered to the supernatural ultimate end.

5. From the Science of Canon Law and of Liturgy, which study the scientific knowledge of laws, that is, of their origin, interpretation, and mutual relation to one another and to their proper end. For they are immediately concerned with the laws by which the external order of the Church or public worship is determined, and consequently certain acts of the faithful are directed, but proximately to the order and governance of Christian society, not to the ultimate end. Hence they directly regard the social order and the external forum; moral theology, however, is immediately concerned with acts, and only consequently with laws, even ecclesiastical laws, but it takes these laws in relation to the ultimate end and treats of their value in the forum of conscience. And considered in this way, positive laws already pertain to moral science, of which they are an integral part.

6. From Pastoral Theology: this properly is not a science, but a practical method and art by which the pastor of souls, according to the principles of moral and ascetical theology, leads the souls entrusted to him to salvation and perfection.

B. That it excels the other practical sciences 1) in end and necessity, for unlike them it does not tend toward a further end but is concerned with the ultimate end itself; 2) in extension, for it touches all operations in order to the ultimate end; 3) in certitude, for it rests upon the divine light itself. Hence it is the supreme practical science, and therefore is a) the norm of the others, by which they are to be regulated, insofar as, with respect to their proper end and with respect to the choice and use of means, they must be honorable, conformable to the ultimate end; likewise b) their mistress, because the others serve it insofar as it uses them as aids, disposing of them for its own end.

D. That, unlike Ethics, which hypothetically supposes and feigns man such as he could have been but never was nor will be, namely, in the natural state, Moral Theology considers man such as he truly is. And therefore it alone is absolutely the practical science of morals.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis I, n. 1.

E. That it is inferior to Dogmatic Theology: 1) for it treats of human acts, which are a certain secondary matter, whereas dogmatic theology treats of God, who is the chief and proper subject of theology; whence 2) dogmatic theology is the foundation of the moral part; indeed 3) the end, since the moral part is ordered to speculative theology perfected in heaven, where, namely, the motion into God ceases, and there is now perfect rest in God.

5. Division of Moral Theology. - Moral theology is divided into a twofold part:

a) The general part explains the general and common notions and principles upon which one must rest as upon a foundation in solving various moral questions. Hence it treats:

Literature. Franc. Zacharia, S.J., Prolegomena de casuisticae theologiae originibus, locis atque praestantia, which dissertation St. Alphonsus added to some earlier editions of his Moral Theology, but afterward omitted. Vinc. Patuzzi, O.Pr., Prodromus ad universam morum theologiam (ap. Migne, Theol. curs. tom. XI). Jos. Bouquillon, Theol. moralis fundamentalis (Bruges 1903, Beyaert). Noldin, S.J., Sum. theol. mor. de principiis (Innsbruck 1924, Rauch). Otto Schilling, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie (Munich 1927, Huber).

In this introduction we shall treat: 1. of the notion and end of Moral Theology; 2. of its sources; 3. of its method; 4. of its history.

1. Nominal definition. If the name itself is considered, moral theology is nothing other than the theological consideration of morals, that is, of moral or human acts. Now human morals can be considered in many ways, which diverse ways, however, can be reduced to two more principal categories, namely, to the philosophical and theological consideration of them.

Philosophically human morals are considered if they are judged and directed by the guidance and light of natural reason alone toward the last natural end, that is, earthly beatitude. This is performed by the discipline which is commonly called Moral Philosophy or Ethics. St. Thomas Aquinas writes to the point:¹ "It belongs properly to moral philosophy ... to consider human operations, according as they are ordered to one another and to the end.... The subject² of moral philosophy is human operation ordered to an end, or also man, insofar as he is voluntarily acting on account of an end." - More briefly still it can be said: Ethics is the science of the licit and the illicit, or the science of the rules of human activity toward the last end.³ A twofold principal office falls to moral philosophy: 1. by natural light to judge and indicate what is licit and what is illicit in human acts; 2. to command, by the authority of natural reason, what is to be done and what is to be omitted, after judgment has been passed concerning licitness or illicitness. Since this office embraces the whole free activity of man, it immediately follows that natural Ethics must cultivate a vast field of operations. Accordingly there are joined to it many subordinate sciences, for example, sociology, which considers human actions, namely obligations and rights, in order to human society; economic science (in the Aristotelian sense), which considers the rights and obligations of any domestic society or family; political science, which under a moral aspect considers the activity either of individuals or of communities in the governing of the state, etc.

Theologically human morals are considered if not only human reason is consulted and the natural end intended, but also if a) divinely revealed faith is established as the supreme rule, and b) the supernatural end, namely eternal beatitude or union with God in heaven, is intended. From what has been said it is plain why moral theology is very well described, according to the nominal definition, as the theological consideration of morals. For by it all human morals (whether good or evil) and all free acts (whether merits or demerits) are considered under the aspect of God, namely insofar as, divine revelation teaching, they lead to God or lead away from God. Wherefore the Angelic Doctor⁴ very well, succinctly, and profoundly teaches: "All things are treated in sacred doctrine [in Theology] under the aspect of God, either because they are God Himself, or because they have an order to God as to their principle and end. Whence it follows that God truly is the subject of this science." God is the principle, because His revelation is the first rule of morality; but He is the end, because the last end of all moral actions is conjunction with God in eternal beatitude. Hence true moral theology is necessarily theistic or theocentric, but not deistic nor autonomous in the Kantian sense.

Real definition. From what has been said concerning the nominal definition or explanation of Moral Theology, the way is now prepared for the real definition. 2 Among the ancients there is scarcely found a real definition of Moral Theology. But definitions given by moderns are not rarely obscure or incomplete. The following definition seems to be rather good: Moral theology is that part of theological science which judges and directs human acts in order to the supernatural end according to revealed principles.

It is said, 1°: it is part of theological science. Theology is divided by moderns in many ways: dogmatic, mystical, ascetical, exegetical, patristic, symbolic, liturgical, catechetical, positive, speculative, scholastic, polemical theology, etc. The old doctors are not accustomed to speak of these divisions; indeed the Angelic Doctor⁵ expressly teaches that Theology is one science, because it has only one formal object, which is God as principle and end. Nevertheless the same St. Thomas⁶ admits that, notwithstanding the unity of Theology, it is speculative and practical; which, according to him in this place, signifies dogmatic and moral theology. - Whatever may be the case concerning the parts of Theology, Dogmatics and Morals are intimately joined and cannot be separated from each other. For Dogmatics must always carry the torch before Morals, and Morals is bound to judge and direct human operations conformably to the truths illumined by Dogmatics. Therefore dogmatic Theology also is practical, namely, illuminating reason. Yet because it is occupied principally with the divine mysteries (the divine attributes, the Trinity, Redemption, etc.), whereas Morals is occupied with human actions, hence Dogmatics and Morals are suitably distinguished from each other as speculative and practical science, and Morals can be called a part of Theology. - It was said pointedly and deliberately, "of theological science"; for Morals is a science properly so called, equally as Dogmatics is. For science is commonly defined: knowledge of things through causes. Now moral Theology does not set forth rules of acting nakedly and crudely, but draws them out from the highest principles and investigates their causes; nor moreover is it merely casuistry, but from true theoretical principles it is bound to solve individual practical cases.

It is said, 2°: which judges and directs human acts... By these words the material object of this science is declared, which is human acts. But moral Theology is not a merely descriptive science of human acts, such as, for example, psychology is, but is a practical and normative science. For just as the cardinal virtue of prudence, so also moral Theology has a threefold act, and generally almost the same thing must be said of moral science as of the virtue of prudence, at least if moral Theology is considered as it is a habit existing in the mind. Now St. Thomas⁷ teaches that the acts or functions of prudence are three: to take good counsel, to judge, and to command. Thus similarly the office of moral Theology is first to take good counsel, namely to inquire with great diligence concerning principles and concerning the connection of the conclusion with the principles. It is by no means sufficient (as not rarely was done by Moral Casuistry of an inferior stamp) to heap together the opinions of some authors and then to admit some opinion proposed by them as probable; rather it is altogether necessary always to recur to indubitable principles, so that it may appear whether some opinion is right or not. Such recourse having been employed, the second office of moral Theology is: to judge concerning the licitness or illicitness of acts. But it must not stop here; rather its further office is to command or prohibit human acts in particular, or to direct them to the last end according especially to the norm of divine law.

It is said, 3°: in order to the supernatural end, to indicate the formal object or respect under which human acts (the material object) are considered. For whatever this science teaches must dispose toward obtaining the supernatural end better and more securely. For God, as He is the last end, is the proper object of moral Theology. Hence it appears why in the sacrament of penance, in which sinful man is joined anew (or more closely) with God, so fertile a field of labor is offered to moral Theology.

Since man cannot attain the supernatural end except by the exercise of virtues and the fulfillment of duties, hence moral Theology can also not unfittingly be defined: the doctrine concerning Christian virtues and duties, which man must fulfill in order to attain the supernatural end. But it is said: must, because it pertains not so much to moral Theology as to ascetical Theology to instruct concerning virtues to be exercised freely and in the most perfect degree.

Dignity and necessity of Moral Theology. As is clear from what has been said above, the principal end of Moral Theology is to direct human acts to the last end, or to meriting eternal life. 3 This end indeed is the highest. From this is plain both the dignity and the necessity of this discipline.⁸ Moreover moral Theology is a wholly necessary means for fruitfully exercising the government of souls, which deservedly is called by St. Gregory "the art of arts."⁹ For not all priests laboring for the salvation of souls need to be great orators, illustrious doctors, learned historians; nevertheless all must be well instructed in moral Theology. For how otherwise will they be able fruitfully to administer the sacrament of penance and to teach the Christian people the science of salvation? Accordingly the learned Mabillon¹⁰ deservedly admonishes: "The study of Moral Theology is to be cultivated before the others; ... to this, as long as one lives, labor must altogether be given."

Corollary. On the relation of Moral Theology to allied sciences. From what has been said, it can easily be drawn out what relation Moral Theology has with other allied disciplines, and indeed:

4 1. With Ethics. In the present condition of things the whole human race has been elevated to the supernatural order; and accordingly every action ethically good or evil is also morally good or evil, that is, it has an order to the supernatural end. Wherefore there is not given something ethically evil (a so-called philosophical sin) which is not at the same time theologically evil.¹¹ Therefore, although Ethics and moral Theology are intimately connected and in no way opposed, nevertheless they differ in many things, namely: a) by reason of the breadth of the object: Ethics considers only natural practical truths, whereas moral Theology adds to these supernatural practical truths; b) by reason of the means of knowledge: Ethics knows all things through natural reason, but moral Theology also through supernatural faith; c) by reason of the end: Ethics considers man as a creature of God whom it directs to the natural end and happiness, whereas moral Theology considers man as a son of God and directs him to the supernatural end and happiness.

¹ Lect. 1 in l. 1 Ethic.

² What the Angelic calls the subject of some science, modern authors are accustomed to call its object.

³ Thus Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 8.

⁴ S. theol. I, q. 1, a. 7.

⁵ Ibid., a. 3.

⁶ Ibid., a. 7.

⁷ S. theol. II-II, q. 47, a. 8.

⁸ Cf. S. theol. I, q. 1, a. 5; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 20.

⁹ Regula past. officii c. 1 (Migne, Patr. lat. 77, 14). In the strict sense moral Theology itself cannot be called an art, because the same thing under the same respect cannot be simultaneously science and art. Now moral Theology is a science properly so called, as was proved above, whose object is truth, namely the truth concerning the morality of human actions. But since moral Theology is so necessary for the art of the government of souls that that government is almost nothing other than the application of moral Theology, hence moral Theology itself is sometimes (but less properly) called "the art of arts."

¹⁰ De studiis monast. part 3, c. 2.

¹¹ Cf. below, concerning the morality of human acts, n. 99 sqq.

2. With Dogmatics. The great theologians of old did not distinguish, that is, did not treat separately, Dogmatics and Morals, as was already said above. But if by the more moderns Morals is separated from Dogmatics, still Dogmatics must always remain its foundation and principle. For Dogmatics deduces from theological faith the conclusions to be believed, which conclusions to be believed Morals supposes and applies to the directing of human acts. Dogmatics therefore is as it were the root, while Morals is as it were the tree full of sweet fruits, which must draw its sap from the root, and which would at once wither if it were torn from the root; or Dogmatics is as it were the solid foundation, but Morals as it were a splendid palace built upon this foundation.

3. With Pastoral Theology, which is instruction concerning the care of souls rightly to be exercised, and which accordingly treats of the office of the pastor of souls. Pastoral Theology as a special discipline and distinct from the others was not in use before the eighteenth century; but now it is commonly a special discipline, which, upon moral Theology as upon a solid foundation, treats of those things which particularly concern the pastor of souls, and rightly instructs him in fruitfully performing his office.

4. With canon and civil law. Each of these bodies of law contains laws which (clothed with the due conditions) oblige in conscience. Wherefore moral Theology must attend to and rightly explain the moral obligations arising from ecclesiastical and civil laws.¹² But the juridical interpretation of those laws does not pertain to moral Theology, but to the disciplines of ecclesiastical or civil law.

¹² Em. Card. D'Annibale rightly says: "To give no attention at all to law and to promise oneself as a moral theologian is to be foolish" (Summula Theol. mor. Proemium n. 16).

The sources of existence¹⁴ of some science are called the places or storehouses from which it takes its arguments. Moral Theology does not have other sources than dogmatic Theology, namely Sacred Scripture, Tradition, the Holy Fathers, the decisions of the Roman Pontiffs, general Councils, the authority of theologians, and natural reason. Only a few things may be touched here which pertain more specially to Moral Theology.

¹⁴ Besides sources of existence, sources of knowledge are distinguished, that is, the means of knowing some science. The sources of knowledge of Moral Theology are divine revelation manifested to us through the magisterium of the Church and natural reason.

5. 1. On the use of Sacred Scripture in moral matters. Sacred Scripture, which indeed is nothing other than the written Word of God, or, as St. Augustine beautifully says,¹⁵ "letters sent by God to men, which exhort us to live well," is the clearest source of Moral Theology. Whence St. Paul¹⁶ teaches: "All scripture divinely inspired is useful for teaching, for reproving, for correcting, for instructing in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, instructed for every good work." - From these things it is plain that any priest studying Moral Theology is bound frequently to read and search Sacred Scripture. Therefore in the Corpus iuris¹⁷ it is held: "Ignorance, the mother of all vices, must especially be avoided in the priests of God, who have taken up the office of teaching among the peoples. For the Apostle Paul admonishes priests to read the Sacred Scriptures frequently.... Therefore let priests know the holy Scriptures and the canons, and let all their work consist in preaching and doctrine." Let St. Bonaventure¹⁸ also be heard writing these things: "Since according to Blessed Gregory the government of souls is the art of arts, and since the wounds of thoughts are more hidden than those of the viscera, it is truly horrible to see certain priests of our time, who either through torpor neglect to read Sacred Scripture, in which the art of the aforesaid government is most sufficiently handed down, ... or through ignorance do not know it. And nevertheless they do not shamelessly fear to profess themselves physicians of the heart in hearing confessions." - Certainly neither is the so-called philological or critical study of the Bible among moderns required nor is it sufficient for Moral Theology. Far be it indeed from us to disparage anything of this sort of study, which, when corrected within just limits, certainly can be very useful; but for Moral Theology it is exceedingly dry and unfruitful, at least if it alone is had. On the contrary, a truly theological study of Sacred Scripture is required, in order to draw from it the living truths of faith and morals.

In the Old Testament ceremonial, judicial, and moral precepts are commonly distinguished.¹⁹ Ceremonial precepts (for example, concerning circumcision, concerning sacrifices) no longer oblige, nor now can they licitly be observed in the New Law. Judicial precepts (for example, concerning the restoration of goods in the jubilee year, concerning usury, etc.) now no longer oblige, but can be prescribed anew by ecclesiastical or civil power, and this has sometimes been done; for example, certain impediments of marriage of the Old Testament have been sanctioned again by the Church. But moral precepts, for example, the precepts of the Decalogue, still remain in force, as being precepts of the natural law. - The things which are contained in the New Testament all remain in force and oblige; some indeed as precepts, for example, the reception of the Eucharist, but some as counsels, for example, the so-called evangelical counsels. By custom, however, the prohibition issued by the apostles (Acts 15:20) concerning not eating blood and what has been strangled has been taken away. Not a few places in Sacred Scripture need right interpretation concerning moral duties, for example, those things which are said there concerning the prohibition of an oath (Matt. 5:34), concerning communion under both species (Matt. 26:28), concerning divorce (Matt. 5:32), etc.

¹⁵ On Psalm 90 (Migne, Patr. lat. 37, 1159).

¹⁶ 2 Tim. 3:16-17.

¹⁷ Dist. 38, c. 1, from the Fourth Council of Toledo.

¹⁸ In the Prologue of his Confessional.

¹⁹ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. I-II, q. 99.

6. 2. On the use of Tradition in Moral Theology. "The sacred, ecumenical and general Synod of Trent,²⁰ ... following the examples of the orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with an equal affection of piety and reverence all the books of both the Old and New Testament, since one God is the author of each, and also the Traditions themselves pertaining both to faith and to morals, as having been dictated either orally by Christ or by the Holy Spirit and preserved in continuous succession in the Catholic Church." Therefore Sacred Scripture is not the sole infallible rule both of faith and of morals, but Tradition preserved in continuous succession is such in an equal manner. In Moral Theology Tradition is especially to be attended to. For there are many things which become known to us only by Tradition (divine or apostolic or ecclesiastical), and oblige us, for example, the matter and form of confirmation, of orders, of extreme unction, etc. Tradition is manifested, if it is lawful so to speak, through the life of the Church, namely by actions (for example, liturgical actions), signs and doctrines (for example, catechetical doctrines), admitted in the Church herself by universal custom, although all these things have not been explicitly declared by her infallible magisterium. But I say: admitted by universal custom. For a particular custom or the doctrine of some particular doctor, however great, is not an irrefragable witness of Tradition, and accordingly does not so strictly oblige. St. Thomas²¹ teaches to the point: Theology uses "the authorities of other doctors of the Church as if arguing from proper sources, but probably," that is, the authority of one or of a few doctors asserting something, the others being silent, is of itself only probable. St. Augustine²² expresses this very well: "Nor ought we to have the disputations of any men whatever, although catholic and praiseworthy men, as canonical Scriptures, so that it would not be lawful for us, with the honor due to those men preserved, to disapprove and reject something in their writings, if perhaps we have found that they thought otherwise than the truth has, understood by divine help either by others or by us. Such am I in the writings of others; such do I wish the understanders of my writings to be." Therefore neither the opinion of St. Augustine, nor of St. Thomas, nor of St. Alphonsus, if their authority alone is attended to, makes something morally certain and strictly obligatory in Moral Theology; nor is any theologian alone a sufficient witness of ecclesiastical Tradition. Nevertheless it would be a matter of great rashness to contradict such great doctors without a most efficacious reason.

²⁰ Sess. 4, Decree concerning the canon of Scripture (Denz. n. 783).

²¹ S. theol. I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2.

²² Ep. 148 to Fortunatianus n. 15 (Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 638).

7. The authority of St. Alphonsus. Certain things are here subjoined concerning the authority of St. Alphonsus de Ligorio, Doctor of the Church, in Moral Theology. Several times the Supreme Pontiffs and Roman Congregations have extolled the Moral Theology of this holy Doctor with the highest praises.²³ For the sake of brevity let us here weigh only the more principal points. In the first place comes the decree of the S.R.C. of 18 May 1803, concerning the revision and approbation of the works of Venerable Alphonsus in order to his beatification: "A full report having been made both of the aforesaid printed works and of all the other manuscripts, nothing worthy of censure was found in them." - Such or a similar decree is always required and given when there is question of the solemn beatification of some author who has published books. Whence from a decree of this sort no special commendation can be drawn out. This is also plain from the fact that this decree speaks not only of the Moral Theology of St. Alphonsus, but also of his other works. Now among the other works of this Saint are found some (for example, his doctrine concerning grace) which certainly have no special commendation of the Holy See. Generally Benedict XIV²⁴ teaches that "it can never be said that the doctrine of a servant of God has been approved by the Holy See, but at most that it can be said not to have been disapproved, if the revisers reported that nothing is found in his works which is opposed to the decrees of Urban VIII."

In the second place comes the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, given on 5 July 1831 to the Archbishop of Besancon, Rohan-Chabot. Two questions had been proposed: I. "Whether a professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which Blessed Alphonsus a Ligorio professes in his Moral Theology?" II. "Whether a confessor is to be disturbed who follows all the opinions of Blessed Alphonsus a Ligorio in the practice of the tribunal of Sacred Penance for this reason alone, that nothing worthy of censure was found by the Apostolic Holy See in his works?" The Sacred Penitentiary judged that the answer should be: To I: "Affirmatively, yet without it being judged from this that those are to be reprehended who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors." To II: "Negatively, regard being had to the mind of the Holy See concerning the approbation of the writings of servants of God for the effect of canonization." This response was approved by Gregory XVI; but as Bouquillon²⁵ says: "It appears clearer than the midday light that this response is nothing other than the consequence and application of the preceding decree." For from it nothing else follows except that it is licit to follow the opinion of St. Alphonsus just as of any canonized author.

In the third place come other encomia bestowed by the Holy See upon the holy Doctor, for example: "Let him consult approved authors, especially St. Alphonsus de Ligorio, book VI, n. 321, and Benedict XIV, and conform himself to their opinions."²⁶ - "St. Alphonsus moreover elucidated obscure things and declared doubtful things, since amid the entangled opinions of theologians, whether laxer or more rigorous, he laid out a safe way"; thus Pius IX, Apostolic Letter concerning St. Alphonsus, Doctor of the Church. Pius X, in the letter given on 12 June 1905 to Leonard Gaude, calls St. Alphonsus the Doctor "whom all can safely follow in doctrines of morals" (at the beginning of vol. I of the new edition of the Moral Theology of St. Alphonsus). - Certainly also from these or similar words nothing else follows except that St. Alphonsus is a very approved author and that his doctrine, considered in its complex whole, is altogether eminent; but it does not also follow that the individual opinions of this holy Doctor are to be preferred to others or even that they are true. For, as regards his opinions touching canon law, not rarely have the Sacred Congregations not admitted them, for example, concerning a confessor hearing the confession of an accomplice but not absolving him,²⁷ concerning mixed marriages as probably permitted without dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff.²⁸ But even in some merely moral questions the opinion of St. Alphonsus is opposed by many theologians not without reason, for example, concerning a doer of damage excused from restitution, who burns the house of Caius instead of the house of Titius (Theol. mor. 3, n. 629). Since these things are so, we approve those things which Bouquillon²⁹ says: "These things seemed to have to be proposed sincerely, namely by the study of truth alone. For so great is the authority of St. Alphonsus that it is not necessary to increase it by gratuitous praise. But to us they seem to exceed the just limits of praise who deduce from the documents brought forward that St. Alphonsus is the greatest among the moralists, that he can be in the place of the others, since he read eight hundred, discussed them, etc.; that St. Alphonsus is of as much value in Morals as St. Thomas is in Dogmatics (as if the Angelic did not equally shine forth in each science); likewise those who conclude from the alleged approbations that all opinions of St. Alphonsus are altogether founded, eminent, probable, common; that it is scarcely possible that any opinion of St. Alphonsus lose its probability otherwise than by a judgment of the Holy See, etc."³⁰

²³ You may see these encomia in Marc, Inst. moral., at the beginning of the work.

²⁴ De beatif. et canoniz. Sanct. book 2, c. 34, n. 12.

²⁵ Theol. mor. fund. n. 81.

²⁶ S.C.C. 29 Aug. 1860.

²⁷ Book 4, n. 556; cf. S. Poenit. 1 March 1878; S. Offic. 5 Dec. 1883.

²⁸ Book 6, n. 56; cf. S. Offic. 3 Jan. 1871.

²⁹ L. c. n. 85.

³⁰ c. 1366, § 2. Cf. Mausbach, Die kath. Moral I (1913); Koch, Lehrb. der Moralth. § 8; Pruner, Lehrb. der Moralth. 12, and others.

8. 3. On the use of reason in Moral Theology. Right reason is never employed too much in Moral Theology, provided that it is truly right reason. Indeed Moral Theology is a science which primarily rests upon revealed faith; but since between faith and right reason no true contradiction can ever arise - as the Vatican Council defined, and as can easily also be shown, since one and the same truthful and infallible God is the author both of faith and of reason - it follows that reason can inquire with all its powers concerning the objects of Moral Theology. The best guide in this matter is St. Thomas Aquinas, who strives to explain even the highest mysteries of religion by reasons, insofar as this is possible. We shall try according to our powers to follow this Angelic Doctor as guide, and we shall indicate also the internal reason of almost all our assertions. For in this way knowledge will be more perfect and assent firmer. There is no reason for us expressly to note - for it is plain of itself - that we utterly repudiate the attempts of many moderns who wish moral science to be entirely independent from faith, and who patronize the so-called "voraussetzungslose Ethik," that is, an Ethics which is altogether independent from religion. For the end of moral science is to lead to the supernatural end, or to bind us again with God. Therefore moral science without religion is altogether impossible.

Scholion. On other sources of Moral Theology. Here we omit the question of how the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, of the Holy Roman Congregations, and Canon Law are sources for moral science. This matter will be treated better when the discussion is concerning the obligation of laws. For the present let this stand as a general rule: certain ecclesiastical laws introduce a moral obligation for Christians, that is, for those rightly baptized, and accordingly are sources of moral science.

9. By the method of Moral Theology is here understood the mode and form which is employed in handing on and learning moral science. Now a threefold method is commonly distinguished:

1. The scholastic or speculative method, which considers all moral truths more accurately and more profoundly, illustrates them, compares them among themselves and with others, proves and defends them against adversaries, yet without neglecting practice. Besides the great scholastics of the Middle Ages, St. Thomas and St. Antoninus, Cajetan above all, de Lugo, Suarez, Billuart, and others used this method.

2. The casuistic method, which gathers together very many particular cases, whether true or fictitious, and concerning them judges what is licit and what indeed is illicit (gravely or only lightly). Deeper doctrine is often not present. This method has been called by some, not ineptly: spiritual pathology, or even the science of sins (Sundenlehre), because it labors especially in discerning sins. Many so-called "Summists" of the Middle Ages used this method, and besides them: Diana³¹ (who was called "Atlas of the casuistic world"), Escobar, Busembaum, and others (among moderns Berardi perhaps is to be numbered among the Casuists).

3. The ascetical (mystical) method, which above all considers the virtues and divine grace, and impels man toward Christian perfection in the threefold way, namely the purgative, illuminative, and unitive. St. Bernard, the Mellifluous Doctor, St. Bonaventure, the Seraphic Doctor, Thomas a Kempis, Henry Suso, O.Pr., Tauler, O.Pr., St. Francis de Sales, Scaramelli, S.J., Contenson, O.Pr., in his celebrated Theologia mentis et cordis, Valgornera, O.Pr., Ludovicus Blosius, O.S.B., Philip of the Most Holy Trinity, Order of Carmel, and many others used this method.

Certainly each of these methods is good and licit, nor has the Church prescribed any determinate method. But in order to discern which one is to be preferred, account must be taken both of the end and of the circumstances of times and places. The objective end of Moral Theology is to judge and direct human acts to the supernatural end. The subjective end is deservedly called that which each person intends in the study of Moral Theology. If someone chiefly intends to become a good confessor and to hear many confessions, then certainly he must cultivate the casuistic method; if someone intends to be a good preacher or instructor, he must cultivate the ascetical method; if someone intends to become a good apologist against the impugners of Catholic Moral Theology, or if he wishes to have a profound knowledge of moral truths, he must labor in the scholastic method. Certainly the best method is that which is at once scholastic, casuistic, and ascetical, and for this reason certain authors (although rare) have attempted to unite these three methods; and the better, more simply, and more briefly this has truly been done, the more perfect the method is. I deliberately said: the more simply and briefly this has been done; for usually any more prolix method makes Manuals too extensive, which harm rather than profit the study of disciples. Since these things are so, I also shall try according to my powers to unite this threefold method, and indeed with as much simplicity and brevity as I shall be able.

³¹ Cf. Concina, Apparatus ad Theol. christ. book 3, diss. 1, q. 2.

14. The treatise of Moral Theology is conveniently divided by considering separately the individual parts of the definition given: Moral Theology is that part of theological science which judges and directs human acts in order to the supernatural end. Therefore the office of Moral Theology is twofold: 1. to judge, that is, perfectly to know human acts, not indeed as they are in the psychological order, but as in the moral order they are ordered to the supernatural end; 2. to direct those acts to the supernatural end. And therefore the whole of Moral Theology is also conveniently divided into two parts, namely: the first part, concerning all things which pertain to this perfect knowledge of human acts; the second part, concerning the proximate means for attaining the supernatural end. These means indeed, in the present state of things, are sanctifying grace and actual grace, which are chiefly conferred or increased for us in the sacraments of the New Law. - To the perfect knowledge of human acts there belongs above all the knowledge of the last end, from which acts receive morality and on account of which all our acts are done. Then the human acts themselves are to be considered, insofar as they serve for obtaining this end. The morality of human acts is measured by a twofold rule: one remote and objective, namely law (eternal law); the other proximate and subjective, namely conscience. Whence, after the treatise on human acts, one must first treat of laws and then of conscience. The causes of human acts are habits, whether good or evil. Whence consequently one must treat of good habits or virtues, and of evil habits or vices; and indeed first in general and then in species. And thus the first part of Moral Theology is ended. - The other part will be, as was already said above, concerning the proximate means⁶⁵ without which it is impossible to arrive at the supernatural end, that is, concerning grace, which is conferred upon us in the sacraments. Therefore one must treat of the sacraments in general and in species.

To one looking carefully it appears that this division of the matter almost agrees with the division of the Summa theologica of St. Thomas. There is, however, this difference: St. Thomas treats of the sacraments in Dogmatics; we, on the contrary, in Morals, because the administration of the sacraments pertains so much to the daily practice of the priest that Moral Theology, if it did not instruct perfectly concerning this practice, would be altogether maimed.

Therefore the division of the whole of Moral Theology is contained in the following brief conspectus.

Part I

1. On the last end and beatitude.

2. On human acts; there is subjoined a treatise on the passions, insofar as they influence human acts.

3. On laws.

4. On conscience.

5. On sins in general.

6. On virtues in general.

7. On faith and the opposed vices.

8. On hope and the opposed vices.

9. On charity and the opposed vices.

10. On prudence and the opposed vices.

11. On justice and the opposed vices. - There is added a treatise on contracts.

12. On fortitude and the opposed vices.

13. On temperance and the opposed vices.

Part II

1. On the sacraments in general and on sacramentals.

2. On baptism.

3. On confirmation.

4. On the Eucharist.

5. On penance, where there is added a treatise on censures and indulgences.

6. On extreme unction.

7. On order.

8. On marriage.

⁶⁵ Besides the proximate means of salvation, namely grace, there also exist remote means, whether natural, for example, the intellective powers, created things, human society, etc., or supernatural, for example, the Church, revelation, etc.

St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., ed. G., preface to the edition; Vind. Alph. (ed. 2), Preliminary Dissertation and Appendix, 2; Zacharia, Historical, Didactic, Apologetic Dissertation (ed. Theol. mor. S. Alph., III to VII); Muller, Theol. mor. (ed. 9), Introduction; Bouquillon, Introd. ad Theol. fund.; Mausbach, die kath. Moral; Christent. u. Weltmoral.

1. Moral theology is a part of sacred doctrine. Sacred doctrine, according to the opinion of St. Thomas (P. I, q. 1, a. 7), treats all things under the aspect of God, either because they are God Himself, or because they have an order to God. Hence it is called theology, from the two Greek words Theos and logos, which have the same sound as discourse concerning God. It embraces all things which religion (in its broader acceptance) teaches concerning God and concerning divine things, proposing both what things are to be believed and what things are to be done. Dogmatic theology discusses the things to be believed, but moral theology the things to be done.

This latter part is what we here undertake to treat, with St. Alphonsus Maria de Ligorio, Doctor, especially as leader and master, whose "moral theology is most celebrated everywhere on earth, and plainly furnishes a safe norm which directors of conscience may follow."¹ But before we enter upon the work undertaken, we judge that some things must be premised, both concerning the nature, excellence, and necessity of moral theology itself, and concerning its method, history, sources, and partition.

2. Definition. Moral theology can be defined: A science directing human actions according to the law of God, that man may attain his end, that is, eternal life.

It is called, 1. a science: for it is certain and firm knowledge deduced by discourse from certain and immutable principles.

2. directing human actions: by these words its material object is expressed, namely all acts which proceed deliberately from the will of man.

3. according to the law of God: by these words its formal object is designated, namely the conformity to be impressed upon human actions with the divine law; under this name, however, come all laws, insofar as they have the force of obliging from the divine law.

4. that man may attain his end: these words show the supreme end to which all theology is referred.

3. From the aforesaid definition it can at once be gathered how moral theology, according to its nature, is distinguished from all other disciplines which in some way are concerned with the morals of men.

It is distinguished, 1. from dogmatic theology, which discusses faith and divine things universally, in order that it may propose the rules of believing and prove them by fitting arguments; while moral theology itself disputes concerning virtues and vices and sins, in order that it may establish and confirm rules of acting, especially in the internal forum.

2. From ascetical, mystical, and pastoral theology. It belongs to moral theology to measure and define all duties necessarily to be fulfilled by man, and to indicate to him the limit beyond which he cannot pass without incurring the guilt of sin. And hence it is that this sacred science is occupied more with sins than with virtues.

But indeed, the end of theology, both ascetical and mystical, is different: for each discusses much less the sins to be avoided than the virtues to be exercised; each teaches the exercise, motives, and means of Christian perfection itself, yet with this difference, that ascetical theology teaches the ordinary way of perfection, but mystical theology the extraordinary way. But the end also of pastoral theology is different. For this treats of the government of souls, by teaching the pastor how he may withdraw the sheep committed to him from harmful things, direct them to salutary things, and always keep them in the path of virtue, whether these sheep proceed by a slow step through the ordinary and necessary way of salvation, or advance with a greater step in the way of perfection.

3. From the science of canon and civil law; which science hands down rules according to which the Church and civil society are to be governed, while moral theology more generally inquires whether and how much these rules oblige in conscience.

4. From ethics, and indeed both by reason of the principle of knowledge and by reason of the object. For ethics has only one principle of knowledge, and this darkened and weakened, namely the light of reason. But moral theology, besides this slight light of reason, has also another principle, namely the most splendid light of divine revelation, to which there is added besides, as a perfect complement, the infallible magisterium of the Church. It is distinguished also by reason of the object: for this in moral theology extends itself to many more things than in ethics, namely to the supernatural end of man, and to the means by which this end is obtained.

4. Excellence. "Of practical sciences," writes St. Thomas (P. I, q. 1, a. 5), "that one is worthier which is ordered to a further end. But the end of this doctrine, insofar as it is practical, is eternal beatitude, to which, as to the ultimate end, all the other ends of practical sciences are ordered." And hence it is manifest that, just as dogmatic theology excels all speculative sciences in dignity, so moral theology surpasses all practical sciences in dignity.

Necessity. Nor this only; but it surpasses them all also in necessity. And indeed, what science is equally necessary as that which teaches how the supreme evil can be averted and the supreme good acquired? But this, as has been seen, moral theology provides.

Since these things are so, it is clear that this sacred science, before all other sciences, and even before dogmatic theology itself, is to be learned by clerics. "Certainly there is need," said St. Alphonsus, "of dogmatic theology, but there is more need of moral theology. For if this science is lacking, there will be neither good confessors nor capable pastors."² Nor indeed is it enough to have learned this science once. For just as it is the most necessary of all sciences, so it is the most difficult of all. Aptly to the matter the Holy Doctor (Prax. conf., n. 17): "St. Francis de Sales used to say," he says, "that the office of hearing confessions is the greatest and most difficult of all. In reality it is so. It is the greatest of all: because it is the end of all sciences, which ought to be nothing other than eternal salvation. And it is the most difficult of all: first, because the office of confessor requires knowledge of all sciences, of all offices and arts; second, because the science of moral theology embraces so many matters diverse among themselves; third, because in great part it consists of so many positive laws and sacred canons, whose understanding must be taken according to their true signification. Moreover, each of these laws is rendered difficult, since, by reason of the circumstances which make cases dissimilar, resolutions must be varied. Some... say that, for confessions to be received rightly, it suffices to know the general principles of morals: by these, they say, all particular cases can be resolved. Who can deny that all particular cases are to be resolved by these principles? But the whole work and the whole labor is in adapting principles of this kind to particular cases, entangled in so many different circumstances, and in discerning which of the principles agrees with the occurring circumstances; nor can this be done without a great discussion of the reasons which stand for either side. And this is what the moralists have accomplished, while they labored in explaining from which principles many particular cases should be resolved. Moreover, in this our age, as has been said, there are so many positive laws, so many Bulls, so many decrees, which cannot be known unless casuists are read, who have gathered them together, and according as the variety of matters demands, there they are found opportunely; and therefore, the more recent these moralists are, the more useful they are than the ancients."

From this the Holy Doctor infers that the study of moral theology must never be abandoned by the confessor.

5. By method here is understood the form which the treatment of moral theology assumes, or the mode which the theologian follows in treating moral matters.

Now a threefold method is given: the first is called positive, the second speculative or scholastic, the third casuistic.

It is called positive when the dogmas of morals are proved and confirmed from the proper sources of theology, and are set forth in right order. It is called speculative, or scholastic, when the dogmas of morals are taken from positive theology as already proved, so that they may be illustrated by the principles of philosophy and their intimate connections and internal reasons may be declared. Finally, it is called casuistic when the general principles of morals are applied to particular cases accustomed to occur in life, and practical questions, according to general principles, are duly discussed and resolved. Cf. Muller, Theol. mor., Introduction, 27.

That there is in each method its own proper and special excellence is sufficiently known from the definitions set forth. From this it follows that the treatment of moral theology is to be judged the more excellent, the more perfect and universal a mixture of that threefold method is found in it. For the use of this kind of mixed method effects this: that "the dogmas of morals," as the distinguished Ernest Muller says in the place cited, "are rightly set forth, suitably proved and illustrated, solidly fortified against opponents, and also particularly unfolded and explained for practical uses." And hence it is why the writers of moral theology today generally follow this method mixed in a threefold kind. This same method we also shall try to follow in the treatment of our whole work indeed, but especially in the first part, which we shall entitle: On the first principles of moral theology. For thus a solid foundation of the whole moral matter will be laid. Then in the remaining parts, we judge that we must use especially the casuistic method, yet with the positive and speculative method by no means neglected.

6. History. The history of moral theology (the distinguished Ernest Muller bearing witness, Introduction, 211) can conveniently be divided into three periods. Its first period runs from the beginning of the Church up to the time when scholastic theology began to flourish; the second from the beginning of introduced scholastic theology up to the time of the Reformation; the third, finally, from the time of the Reformation up to our age.

I. First period. Moral doctrine, although arranged into no scientific system, nevertheless in all its points, according as necessity demanded it, is found to have been explained, indeed discussed, by the Fathers of the Church and by ecclesiastical authors already in those ancient times; and this indeed: 1. In writings against the Gentiles attacking Christian ethics (St. Justin, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and St. Cyprian). 2. In works written for Christians themselves, in which they were admonished to holiness of life, especially to defending and confessing the faith bravely, to loving enemies and persecutors sincerely, to showing obedience exactly to ecclesiastical and civil power, etc. Cf. Hermas, in the work entitled Pastor; the three works of Clement of Alexandria: Paedagogus, Stromata, and On the Right Use of Riches; likewise very many works of Tertullian; the opuscula of St. Cyprian: On the Lapsed, On the Lord's Prayer, On the Dress of Virgins, On Work and Alms, etc.; likewise some works of St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Gregory of Nyssa; likewise the books of St. Augustine: On Lying, On the Combat of Christ, On the Morals of the Church, etc. 3. In public sermons, in which moral precepts were handed down to the faithful people. Let St. John Chrysostom, St. Basil, and St. Gregory the Great be consulted. 4. Finally, in special instructions to priests, such as, for example, the instructions of St. Chrysostom, St. Ephrem the Syrian, St. Gregory Nazianzen: On the Priesthood; St. Ambrose's three books: On Duties; St. Jerome's letter to Nepotian; St. Gregory the Great's Moralia on Job and On Pastoral Care, etc. Among those who, from the seventh century up to the beginning of scholastic theology, treated moral matters, St. Isidore of Seville (seventh century), St. John Damascene and Venerable Bede (eighth century), and St. Peter Damian (eleventh century), chiefly deserve to be named.

II. The second period shines forth with doctors of the greatest name. Their praise is to be placed chiefly in this, that they arranged not only dogmatic truths but also moral truths into a scientific system, using especially the scholastic or speculative method. For those most learned men attained this: that they illustrated by the aid of philosophy all the moral doctrines contained in Sacred Scripture or in Tradition, and all those either expressly proposed by the Church, or at least universally received in the Church, and fortified them with solid reasons against any opponents whatever, and thence drew legitimate conclusions. In this great labor before the rest shone Peter Lombard (d. 1164), Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), Albert the Great (d. 1280), St. Bonaventure (d. 1274), called the Seraphic Doctor; then he who stands before all as prince, St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), the Angelic Doctor; and lastly Duns Scotus (d. 1308), the Subtle Doctor.

But the casuistic method was cultivated no less. For to this belong both the Summa on Penitential Cases, by St. Raymond of Pennafort, and the Moral Mirror, which is ascribed to Vincent of Beauvais, and the Theological Summa and Confessional Summa, by St. Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, and many other works. See more in the outstanding dissertation of Father Zacharia, on the origins of casuistic theology, etc.³

III. Third period. "The heresiarchs of the sixteenth century," says Ernest Muller, "attempted to weaken and overthrow the foundations of moral doctrine; for these, therefore, to be strongly defended, it was necessary to take arms especially from Sacred Scripture and from Tradition; for which reason, from that time, moral theology, as also dogmatic theology, was handed down more positively, without however the speculative treatment of the same lying neglected; for most scholastics still flourishing in this age (such as Suarez, Vasquez, Lessius, Lugo, Gregory of Valencia, Becanus) set forth the sacred discipline of morals both positively and speculatively.

"Casuistic theology was very much cultivated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For the less the innovators admitted good works as necessary for salvation, the more Catholic theologians, with Holy Mother Church, urged the same, and the more studiously they strove to explain the rules of acting well. Very many theologians of this kind being passed over in silence, the following are celebrated with great praises by right and merit: Francis Toletus (d. 1596), heaped with encomia by the Roman Pontiffs themselves; Reginald (d. 1623), numbered by St. Alphonsus among the classical authors, whose works St. Francis de Sales, and also St. Charles Borromeo those of Reginald, commended to their clergy; Emmanuel Sa (d. 1596), highly esteemed by St. Pius V; John Azor (d. 1603), especially commended among theologians for talent and knowledge; Francis Suarez (d. 1617), whom Benedict XIV called a luminary of theology; Leonard Lessius (d. 1623), highly esteemed by Paul V, Sixtus V, and Urban VIII, and endowed with praises by St. Francis de Sales on account of his 'most useful work' On Justice and Right; Thomas Sanchez (d. 1610), held in the highest esteem by Clement VIII and called by St. Alphonsus a most pious man; Laymann (d. 1635), outstanding in doctrine and talent, consulted as an oracle from the most remote places; Martin Bonacina (d. 1631), who is deservedly numbered by St. Alphonsus among the classical authors; Cardinal De Lugo (d. 1660), whom St. Alphonsus says is easily prince among moral theologians after St. Thomas; the Salmanticenses (the theologians of the college of Salamanca in Spain), who likewise are numbered by St. Alphonsus among the classical doctors. Herman Busenbaum (d. 1668) composed a compendium of moral theology, which from the year 1650 to the year 1770, in more than two hundred repeated editions, had been spread everywhere, imitating, as he himself says, little bees, which gather the most useful things from the best flowers and arrange them in order in the hive."

When, in the seventeenth century, the Jansenists poured forth assertions opposed to the sound doctrine of Christ, moral science experienced very sad fortunes. For those heretics, deceitfully simulating great piety and a singular fervor for protecting moral science, brought it about that in France, Italy, and other provinces they drew many learned men to their side: among whom were also Peter Collet (the celebrated continuator of Honore Tournely), Louis Habert, and Natalis Alexander, who, although they rejected other errors of the Jansenists, nevertheless accommodated themselves in many things to their immoderate rigor. Indeed there were not lacking those who defended more benign opinions, such as Louis Abelly, Eusebius Amort, Castropalaus, Gobat, Roncaglia, Cardenas, Viva, Lacroix, Sporer, Reiffenstuel, Reuter, Voit, Holzmann, Elbel, Mazzotta, etc., without however being able wholly to repress the swelling rigor of doctrine.

While these things were being done, St. Alphonsus Maria de Ligorio, not without the most provident counsel of God, undertook to write moral theology, that he might accurately and solidly defend the truly Catholic doctrine of morals, holding the middle between excessive severity and excessive benignity. First indeed (in the year 1748) he published the Medulla of Herman Busenbaum, with notes and cases added; but since this work did not fully satisfy his end, he began to elaborate another very extensive work (in the year 1753), in which, with singular perspicacity, most profound learning, and rare facility and clarity of discussion, he treats of all moral matters "which serve more for practice." With what method this most wise man proceeded in composing this work, he himself declares in these words worthy of remembrance (Apolog., 1): "I protest before God that I certainly did not send the Moral Theology to press in order that I might receive from men the name of learned; but the end of this work was no other than the glory of God and the salvation of souls. For the space of almost thirty years I read innumerable authors, both strict and benign, and in this time I continually prayed God that He deign to enlighten me. Finally, I built the moral system not upon my own reason, but upon the doctrines of theologians, and first of all of the prince of theologians, St. Thomas Aquinas; if, therefore, I err, I err with this Holy Doctor. The texts drawn from canon law I examined and noted in the sources with the greatest care. If I found cited the text of some Father bearing on the matter concerning which there is controversy, I noted it with its proper words, and with all the study owed to such authority I investigated the sense. Besides, also in more intricate controversies, where I could not resolve doubts from the authors, I consulted various learned men; and I learned many things by the experience of thirty years of confessions and missions."

As regards the method observed in this work, St. Alphonsus follows the same order which H. Busenbaum held in his Medulla of Moral Theology; indeed, he sets forth first the whole text of that author, to which afterward he is accustomed to add those things by which the opinions alleged from the Medulla are accurately discussed, or confirmed, or rejected, or modified, with very many things also added which are lacking in the Medulla, and which he himself treats at length. Then in individual controversies he is accustomed to bring forward all the opinions of doctors with their reasons, and to interpose his own judgment concerning them, with reasons added. Moreover this work, which while St. Alphonsus was still living obtained nine editions in Italy, was reduced (in the year 1757) by the same Holy Doctor into a compendium, which first was entitled Istruzione e pratica, then, turned into Latin, Homo Apostolicus. To these he added the little work whose title is Praxis confessarii, which had already been published in the Italian idiom in the year 1755 (cf. preface to the edition), and in the year 1764 another brief compendium, which he entitled Confessore diretto. This compendium indeed is the more commendable, because it was written after the Blessed Doctor had already established his moral system in a definitive manner, and because it sets forth more openly the opinions which he holds in practice (cf. Vind. Alph., Preliminary Dissertation).

Finally, as regards the authors who in this century have written on moral matters, it remains for us to say that most of them, because of the singular esteem with which the Holy See has followed the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, have chiefly attended to this: that they might follow him as teacher and leader (cf. Concession of the title Doctor, Response to the observations, c. 4, n. 196).

7. Sources. The sources of moral theology, in the stricter sense, are theological places, or documents in which known moral truths are contained and from which they are drawn.

Commonly the following eight are cited: 1. Sacred Scripture, both of the Old and of the New Testament. 2. Councils, both general and particular. 3. Decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, issued either through Constitutions (Encyclicals) or through responses of the Sacred Congregations. 4. Works of the Holy Fathers, who are both witnesses of Tradition and doctors of truths pertaining to morals. 5. Works of theologians, especially of those whom the Church highly esteems; she attributes singular authority to St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus. 6. Ecclesiastical and civil law. 7. The usage and practice of the Church. 8. Moral philosophy (Zacharia, Dissertation already cited).

It must be noted that, since moral theology is sacred doctrine, some of these sources are constitutive, others auxiliary, and not all are by nature fitted to enjoy equal authority in every matter.

8. In every science, one is accustomed to proceed from general and universal principles to the proper and special object; whence the treatment of any science embraces two parts, the one general, the other special.

The universal and distinguished esteem which the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus always had has greatly increased among all from the time when the Saint was numbered among the Doctors of the Church. From this very esteem there arose the desire that, since it is lawful safely to put his genuine doctrine into practice, this doctrine should be written not only compendiously, but also in that method which would be more suitable for public lectures. For a long time it has been, moreover, among the wishes of our venerable clergy that in a compendious and methodical exposition of this kind of Alphonsian doctrine account be taken of the condition which is proper to our ecclesiastical Provinces and to these regions. I have endeavored, according to my powers, to fulfill the expectation of this desire by this little work of whatever kind. In this matter indeed I frankly confess that I have played the part of compiler rather than of author. For the doctrine which I hand down, and from which I have endeavored not to recede even the breadth of a fingernail, is the doctrine of St. Alphonsus; the things which pertain to our affairs I have taken for the greatest part from the Acts and Decrees of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore and from the Moral Theology which Kenrick, of good and clear memory, wrote, with his rather difficult and at times more obscure style somewhat changed. But most especially I turned to my own use the Compendium of Father Gury, whose method and order I have followed, and several of the notes which Ballerini, Cretoni, and the Ratisbon editor added to the same; yet with very many things added and changed, as will be plain to those who read through this fifth edition of my work, and striving before other things that I should bring it as completely as possible into conformity with Alphonsian doctrine. The things which I wrote about Probabilism I owe for the greater part to a friendly confrere; the things concerning the specific and numerical distinction of sins, and likewise very many things concerning scandal and cooperation in the sins of others, and concerning certain contracts, I have from the Notes of the distinguished Van Egeren. To the work whose title is Vindiciae Alphonsianae, I frequently refer the reader who desires more concerning certain questions.

The things which I have written from my opinion alone, or from that of others than St. Alphonsus, concerning certain points which are not touched by the Holy Doctor, I have labored, as much as I could, to hand down according to his mind. The things which I have taken from our civil laws, often in the vernacular idiom, I submitted to the judgment of a most illustrious jurist of our country, to whom I render due thanks in this place.

Lest the text of the compendium be unpleasantly interrupted, and in order that I might have regard for brevity, those Decrees, Declarations, and Instructions of the Supreme Pontiffs and of the Sacred Congregations which pertain to the moral matter, and which are longer and are not exhibited in the acts of our Plenary Council of Baltimore, and likewise the faculties which are customarily granted by the Holy See to our Bishops, I have placed before the work, referring the reader to them in their own places.

I judged also that I would do something pleasing to a disciple of St. Alphonsus, if I prefixed to the Compendium certain excerpts from the Vindiciae Alphonsianae concerning the excellence and authority of the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus, and also a Key of his moral works, or Rules for discerning the genuine opinions of the Saint.

It remains that I declare certain abbreviations which I have used in this Compendium.

1 For the sake of those who use earlier editions here, or the second edition of Father Haringer, I note: What in this edition is inscribed Book II is, in the earlier editions, Book V; what is Book III here is Book II there; what is Book IV here is Book III there; what is Book V here is Book IV there.

I. What is Moral Theology? If you consider the name, it is that part of Theology which is concerned with morals; if the thing, it is that part of theological science which directs human actions to moral honesty in order to eternal life.

It is said: 1° that part of theological science, by which words the proximate genus of the definition is expressed.

It is said: 2° which directs human actions to moral honesty, which words exhibit the ultimate difference of the definition, and the object of our science, both material and formal. - a) The ultimate difference, namely from the other theological disciplines, especially from Dogmatic Theology, which treats of faith and of divine things universally, in order that it may establish and confirm rules of believing, while Moral Theology treats of virtues and vices, in order that it may establish and confirm rules of acting, especially in the internal forum. - b) The object, both material, or human actions considered in themselves; and formal, or the aspect under which the material object is considered, that is, the directibility of those human actions to honesty.

II. What are the places, or sources, of Moral Theology, from which the rules are taken according to which human actions are to be directed to honesty? They are almost the same as those of Dogmatic Theology, namely Sacred Scripture; the Holy Fathers of the Church; the Decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs; Councils; constant and firm Tradition; Law both canonical and civil; the Authority of Theologians; Reason both natural and theological. Concerning each, hold these few things - which for the greatest part I have taken from the Dissertation preliminary to the Moral Theology of St. Alphonsus, which Fr. Ant. Zacharia composed:

1° To confirm some conclusion, use the Scriptures only in the literal or mystical sense, never however in the accommodated sense, and not even in the mystical unless it is established that this is truly the mystical sense.

2° Do not think that histories in which Sacred Scripture narrates that just men performed something which either is truly evil, or has the appearance of evil, are rules for solving cases. Therefore beware lest from the deed of Noah cursing the descendants of Ham you conclude that it is lawful for parents to curse their children.

3° Do not take singular examples which are read in the Scriptures for confirming a universal law. Thus someone would prove ridiculously by this argument the true proposition: Four conditions are required in him who absolves from censures: 1) he must be a cleric; 2) he must have contentious jurisdiction; 3) he must absolve with certain knowledge; 4) he must absolve spontaneously, and not coerced: Paul, who absolved the incestuous Corinthian, had the four aforesaid conditions. For the reasoning would be similar to this: Paul, who absolved the incestuous man, was an apostle; therefore he who absolves from censures ought to be an apostle.

4° Do not take the moral precepts which are sanctioned in the Old Testament in that restriction in which they seem to be expressed in Exodus, nor according to the false interpretation of the Scribes or the popular tradition of the Hebrews, but according to that addition which either Moses or other Canonical Writers applied, and especially according to that explanation which Christ hands down in the Gospel. Thus, although the Jews thought that only external acts were prohibited by the law, and by no means thoughts, desires, etc., nevertheless it is unlawful to think thus, since Christ preaches the opposite doctrine.

5° One must see lest, incautiously, we should wish the force of preception to be present in words of Scripture by which some pious counsel is proposed.

or the ancient ecclesiastical writers from the Apostolic age to the middle of the twelfth century, whose line Bernard, the Mellifluous Abbot of Clairvaux, closes.

1° If in some question which regards morals, and which is to be defined, all the Fathers teach the same thing, it must be held as certain.

2° The authority of one or two Fathers in those things which pertain to the doctrine of morals can indeed furnish a probable argument, but not a firm one.

3° Even the authority of several Fathers, with the rest, although fewer, reclaiming, cannot avail to suffice and furnish to the Theologian those arguments against which it would be unlawful to resist.

4° Those things which are had from the homilies of the Fathers, ascetical books, and orations, and labors of that kind, do not make for the Theologian that faith which those things can make which are read in Dogmatic instructions, letters, etc. For many things in books of this kind are put forward more exaggeratively; nor is this wonderful, since this is solemn for all orators; many things also regard counsel rather than precepts.

5° It is ill-advised to select those places of the Fathers where the Fathers, treating of something altogether different, indicate a few things concerning another matter after occasion has been taken, while neglecting those places where they examine this matter professedly.

6° In investigating the sense of the Fathers, these rules especially must be observed. a) Those things which are in the context of the book or chapter must be diligently considered. b) Similar and dissimilar places of the same Father must be compared. c) The time at which that book was published by some Father must be attended to. For from the occasion of writing the book the mind of the author will easily become known; we shall also understand whether perhaps at that time that Father was occupied by some preconceived opinion, which it is probable, or even certain, that he afterward put off. d) We shall consult other Fathers synchronous with this one concerning whose mind we inquire; for what this or that word signified in this or that century, and to what the notation of this or that custom may regard, we shall more easily discover. Let this example be that of Cyprian,¹ where he permits that, the priest being absent, the sick may also make the exomologesis of their fault before a deacon. For it does not follow from this that a deacon was then the minister of Sacramental Confession; for not only this is denoted by the name exomologesis, but also the canonical reconciliation of public penance, which Tertullian² calls the discipline of casting down and humbling the man. e) It is of an imprudent man to fish out the mind of the Fathers from doubtful Works of theirs, when certain Works, received by all, of the same Fathers are at hand.

1° One must see whether the things which are cited are genuine. Hence you will accomplish nothing from the false decretals of the Pontiffs up to Siricius, which all critics explode.

2° Beware lest you draw what was merely a precept of discipline to deciding moral questions. Thus from the response of Nicholas I to the consultations of the Bulgarians, that in Lent every pleasure is to be renounced by spouses, one would now badly infer that the conjugal work is not lawful in the time of Lent.

3° In those questions in which the validity of some thing is treated, for instance of clandestine marriage, decrees of the Pontiffs are cited in vain which establish only that something is illicit.

4° A subsequent

decree which in certain special cases limits something does not derogate from a decree of a Pontiff permitting that thing universally. Innocent III,¹ for example, permits clerics to dwell together with those in whom the natural bond permits nothing of suspicion of a base crime. On the contrary, the Council of Nantes, whose constitution was inserted into the Decretals of Gregory IX, excludes even mother, aunt, and sister from the houses of clerics, namely when there is question of this or that man whose morals are depraved, and when familiarity with absolutely any woman is suspect.

5° It is not lawful to draw the words of a Pontiff permitting something to a sense repugnant to Catholic dogma, or foreign to the obvious sense of the words by which that decree was issued. Benedict XIV brings an example in the Book De Synodo Dioecesana.²

6° If a Pontiff grants something which he had previously denied, from that prior denial it is understood very well what was afterward lawful through him. Again you have an example in the same Benedict XIV.³

7° In Pontifical constitutions which command something to be done, one must note first of all whom they affect, then what reasons moved the Pontiff to command that thing. Thus what is prohibited to Latin priests is not always to be judged prohibited likewise to Greeks. Hence from the decretal of Innocent III, by which priests established at Constantinople are prohibited from conferring Confirmation, it is badly inferred that Confirmation conferred by Greek priests is invalid and illicit. For the Pope speaks expressly concerning Latin priests. - It is also badly inferred from the constitution of Nicholas I commanding that Bulgarians confirmed by them be confirmed again, that this is not lawful universally for Greek priests. For Nicholas was led to this by reasons altogether other than those which would make this prohibited to all Greek priests.⁴

8° Where the Pontiffs condemn some proposition, they are to be judged to have condemned it especially in the sense in which it was published by the Authors. Thus, for example, what Alexander VIII condemned when he struck the proposition saying that it is not lawful to follow an opinion most probable even among the probable is to be taken especially from Sinnichius, from whose book it was excerpted.

9° From the pontifical condemnation of some proposition it is not lawful to infer the condemnation of another which rests upon an altogether different reason. You have an example in Benedict XIV,⁵ which regards Confession through an internuncio.

10° If the Pontiffs have prohibited something, one must see whether by an oracle of the living voice they have so explained their mind that the prohibition is to be restricted in some part of itself. You have an example in the Treatise on Censures as regards the faculties revoked by the Constitution of Pius IX, Apostolicae Sedis. See n. 1753, q. 1°, R. 3°.

11° One must also see whether later Pontiffs have restricted a prohibition made by their predecessors.

12° Finally, that too must be noticed: whether a pontifical Constitution prohibiting something has not been received somewhere.

1° All Councils which have neither been gathered nor confirmed by the authority of the Roman Pontiff can err in the doctrine of morals, and therefore cannot make certain faith concerning those things which are to be done or avoided.

2° Councils of any kind whatever - but especially General Councils - which have been confirmed by Pontifical authority furnish a most certain rule of doctrine to the Moral Theologian.

3° From councils which indeed have not been approved by the Roman Pontiff, but neither have been condemned by him, a probable argument is taken, as for persuading dogmas of faith, so also for establishing doctrines which regard morals. Of this matter that argument is abundantly great, namely that from innumerable Councils of this kind very few are found which have declined from right doctrine.

4° Beware lest you confuse decrees of Councils which regard discipline with those which regard morals. For Canons of morals are not subject to variety; on the contrary, Canons of discipline can be changed according to the diversity of places and times. Hence an argumentation limps from the ecclesiastical discipline of some region, or of an older century, if either it was not received everywhere, or it was abrogated by a contrary law. - Likewise, something can be illicit in some diocese which may be lawful in others.

5° We shall interpret the Decrees of Councils from the sense and custom of the times in which they were established.

6° The very formulas of Councils will have to be exacted according to the style and barbarism of the age in which they were celebrated; for communion, imposition of hands, and six hundred other things of that kind did not signify the same thing in all centuries. Wherefore the Glossary of Du Cange will be able to be of the greatest use to the Moral Theologian.

7° Do not believe that all things which you will find in Councils regarding morals were precepts; but many of them proceeded from pious counsel, and savor more of exhortation than of preception. Several examples of this matter are to be found in the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore. Thus, for example, in article 149 of this Council it is said: "To them," that is, to priests, "we also vehemently commend" (which word is not of one commanding, but of one exhorting) "that they constantly wear the cassock, insofar as it can be done."

As regards the remaining places of Moral Theology, we remit the reader to those things which Dogmatic Theology teaches concerning Tradition, and also to those things which we ourselves shall hand down in the Treatises on Conscience and on Laws concerning Canonical and Civil Law, and concerning the authority of Theologians and the use of reason.

III. How is the whole of Moral Theology divided? The following order of treating the matters has seemed to us more accommodated to practice. The first disputation for us will be concerning the nature of human acts, insofar as it regards moral goodness or depravity; for this will be as it were the foundation of the other disputations. - From there we shall make a step to the twofold rule of human acts: one indeed internal, which is conscience, the other external, which is law. - Then we shall speak of human acts insofar as they agree or disagree with this twofold rule, or concerning sins and virtues. And these indeed will constitute as it were the general part of our Theology. - In the part which has begun to be called special, various laws and precepts will follow one another in order, namely those of the Decalogue and of the Church; we shall treat in a special place the disputation concerning the Seventh precept of the Decalogue, which involves the most ample question concerning Justice and Right, and also concerning Contracts. There will follow the laws by which the various states of men and the administration and reception of the Sacraments are ruled. Finally, since the observance of laws is assisted by the infliction of penalties, we shall have a discourse concerning ecclesiastical penalties, or concerning censures and irregularities, and shall conclude this whole work with an Appendix concerning Indulgences.

IV. How great is the necessity of Moral Theology? For one undertaking the office of hearing Confessions, or one who will sometime undertake it, the necessity of learning Moral Theology is as great as that of saving the soul. For "if the blind offer leadership to the blind, both fall into the pit."¹ But a blind confessor is one who, although he may excel in zeal and be strong in talent and also in practical judgment, is ignorant of the principles and practical rules by which both talent and judgment must be directed, and zeal moderated. Scavini aptly says:² "Not all," he says, "ecclesiastics ought to be great orators, illustrious doctors, erudite historians; nevertheless all of the clergy ought to be very instructed in Moral Theology." And the learned Mabillon:³ "The study of Moral Theology is to be cultivated before the others; ... to this, as long as one lives, work will altogether have to be given."

V. History of Moral Theology from Bonquillon.⁴ - Three epochs are suitably distinguished in the history of Moral Theology: the first from the beginning of the Church to the time when Scholasticism was introduced; the second from the beginnings of the School to the Council of Trent; the third from the Council of Trent down to our age.

Epoch of the Fathers. - In the first epoch moral truths had not yet been scientifically reduced into some body of doctrine, but were explained separately, without any connection among themselves: whether in apologies against the heathen (St. Justin, Athenagoras, Tertullian); or in

instructions for Christians (Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus, Stromata, etc.; St. Cyprian, de lapsis, de oratione dominica, etc.; St. Gregory of Nyssa, de perfecta Christiani forma; St. Augustine, de mendacio, etc.); or in homilies to the faithful people (Sts. J. Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory the Great); or in special admonitions to the clergy (St. J. Chrysostom, de sacerdotio; St. Ambrose, de officiis; St. Gregory the Great, de cura pastorali); or in doctrinal letters; or finally in explanations of the Sacred Letters (the two books of St. Ambrose, de Cain et Abel; the two books de Abraham; the two books de Jacob et anima beata; the book de Elia et Jejunio; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, etc.). But although during this whole time the positive method was chiefly employed, nevertheless the speculative method also was cultivated, nor was casuistry neglected, as is clear from the questions which ecclesiastical writers weigh with great study, for example, whether it is lawful to serve as a soldier in the army of heathen emperors. To this also belong the penitential canons of the Holy Fathers and Councils, which may be read in Zacharia in the cited preliminary dissertation.¹

Epoch of the Scholastics. - The complete system of moral doctrine is owed to the second epoch, under which truths were handed down not only theoretically, but also practically, now in a coherent order. Moreover, in this age, the positive part having been as it were presupposed from the work of Peter Lombard, in which especially the sentences of Sacred Scripture and of the holy Fathers were found collected, the doctors were wholly occupied in illustrating Ethics together with Dogmatics speculatively by the help of Aristotelian philosophy. In this matter Alexander of Hales, Blessed Albert the Great, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus stood out before the others by labor, diligence, and talent. But to casuistry belong the Summa de casibus poenitentialibus of St. Raymond of Pennafort; the Speculum morale of Vincent of Beauvais; the Summa major seu confessariorum of John of Freiburg; the Astesan Summa de casibus conscientiae; the Summa casuum conscientiae, called the golden and Monaldina; the Pupilla oculi of John de Burgo; the three-part little Work of John Charlier de Gerson, concerning the precepts of the Decalogue, concerning Confession, and concerning the art of dying; the Consolatorium timoratae conscientiae; the Preceptorium and book de contractibus mercatorum of John Nider; St. John Capistran's Speculum conscientiae; the Summa theologica and Summa confessionalis of St. Antoninus; the Summa Angelica, etc.

Epoch of the more recent authors. - The third epoch comprehends three periods altogether to be distinguished.

The first, which extends itself from the Council of Trent through the space of nearly one century down to Jansenism, can truly be called the golden age of Moral Theology. For then, after the question concerning probabilism had been thoroughly discussed, the fundamental principles of Ethics were explained systematically; and Ethics as a whole was also handed down accurately, not only in the most learned commentaries on St. Thomas or on the Master, but also separately from Dogmatics, both in summas and compendia by Navarro, Toletus, Sa, Busembaum, and in ampler form by Layman, Azor, Castropalao, Filiuccio, Sayrus, Bonacina, and very many others. Besides, ample treatises were published concerning individual matters, in which all questions are resolved under whatever aspect positively, speculatively, and practically; of this kind are, others being omitted, the works of L. Molina concerning right and justice, of Thomas Sanchez concerning Matrimony, of Suarez concerning laws, concerning the virtue of religion, concerning Faith, Hope, and Charity; of L. Lessius concerning right and justice; of J. De Lugo concerning Faith, concerning justice and right, concerning the Sacrament of the Eucharist, concerning Penance; of Aeg. De Coninck concerning the Sacraments.

In the second period of this epoch the lot of Moral Theology was most sad because of the very bitter controversies excited by the work of the Jansenists. For just as their dogma concerning the wounds of fallen nature, and especially concerning invincible ignorance, cannot stand with the foundation of Christian Ethics, so the consequences which those heretics deduced into practice from their principles, and which directly tended to this, that the yoke of the precepts should be rendered unendurable and the help of the Sacraments become null, are altogether opposed to the rules by which Catholic doctors directed the morals of the faithful. Meanwhile, however, sound doctrine did not lack its defenders and champions. But, as is wont to happen, some, while they wished to avoid the Charybdis of Rigorism, fell into the Scylla of Laxism.

Since these things were so, at last a new period, happier even than the golden one itself, began with

St. Alphonsus, concerning the merits and authority of whose doctrine we have already spoken, and whose influence upon Moral Theology was so great that the authors who in the last thirty or forty years have published books concerning it have either copied St. Alphonsus and reduced him into a compendium, or at least followed him as their chief master. From this it happened that the salutary doctrines of the most holy and most learned man are propagated more and more, and that the minds especially of ecclesiastical youth are imbued with them.¹

I. Question I. Ought the physician of souls to know, first of all, the wounds of human nature? The answer is affirmative. Human nature is here taken for free will — namely, for the intellect and the will, not excluding the imagination, the sensitive appetite, and the other affections which man employs for the exercise of his operations. It is taken also for the body itself, from whose diverse temperament and varying disposition, and from the difference of age and of sex, both the affections of the mind and its diverse motions flow.

II. First of all, then, it is necessary that the curator of souls be thoroughly versed in the powers, the infirmities, the wounds, the depraved inclinations of the nature just described. This is evident in the physician, who, in order to apply the fitting remedies for the healing of the sick man, labors seriously to explore his strength, his temperament, and the gravity of his disease.

III. Question II. What was the first sin of Adam? Answer: The first sin of Adam was pride, whence the rest of his crimes proceeded as from a root, as is found in Ecclesiasticus x: The beginning of the pride of man is to fall away from God: because his heart is departed from him that made him: for pride is the beginning of all sin. St. Thomas proves, in the II-II, q. 163, art. 1, that the first sin of Adam could not have been anything but pride: The first inordinateness of the human appetite could not have been from this, that he desired some sensible good, toward which the concupiscence of the flesh tends beyond the order of reason. It remains, therefore, that the first inordinateness of the human appetite was from this, that he inordinately desired some spiritual good... Whence it is manifest that the first sin of the first man was pride. The object of this pride was a certain likeness to God, the rule which God had prescribed being despised; or it was the appetite of his own excellence, subjection to God being cast off. For he sinned at that time by an excessive complacency and indulgence toward his wife Eve, and by disobedience to the divine command, and by an inordinate appetite for eating the fruit, most beautiful to the sight and sweet to the taste.

IV. Question III. Does the sin of Adam pertain in some manner to his posterity? Answer: It is of faith that all men sinned in Adam, and that the first sin was transfused into Adam's posterity — which sin is on that account called original sin. Wherefore Pelagius with his disciples was condemned as guilty of heresy, because he had denied that original sin is contracted by the children of Adam. Into the opposite extreme fell Luther and Calvin, who, confessing original sin against the Pelagians, blurted out that by such sin the free will of man is utterly extinguished in the moral order. This error the Council of Trent transfixed with anathema, Session 6, canon 5. The free will of man, therefore, is not extinguished, but wounded by original sin with many and indeed grave diseases.

V. Question IV. What are the effects of original sin? Answer: The first effect, or penalty, of original sin is the privation of original justice, adorned with which the soul obeyed God and held dominion over all the inferior faculties. This harmony being disturbed and the yoke shaken off, the soul remained besieged by an intestine tumult of appetites.

VI. The second effect, or wound, is the ignorance of the mind: which most grievous wound St. Augustine, in order to explain it, distributes into four parts. And first, our mind is overspread with ignorance of those very things which are necessary for the preservation of life, says the holy Doctor in Book I of On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 38. The second wound of ignorance is dullness and fatuity of mind, which so clings to some from their birth that they are scarcely able to discern what profits them and what harms them. That very great difficulty of acquiring the sciences torments our mind in the third place. How many lie torpid and wallow in the darkness of ignorance, lest they should bear the trouble and tedium of acquiring the sciences! And what of the fact that those very men who excel in acuteness of talent are blind in very many things which regard either the honesty or the turpitude of actions? On every side our mind is overspread with darkness. Hence that multitude and variety of opinions; hence so great a battle of disputations: things which seem true to me seem false to you — although truth alone is the way which leads to life.

VII. The third effect of original sin is the inordinate love of the will, by which it perversely desires its own good. From this perverse love all evils proceed, as St. Augustine expounds at length in Book 22 of The City of God, chapter 22.

VIII. The fourth effect is the disorder in the sensitive part. This is the deep wound left by original sin, which inverts and disturbs the whole order of nature, and penetrates the inmost recesses of the human heart. The order established for nature demands that the inferior obey the superior — the senses and appetites, reason; and reason, God. Reason having been cast down from her throne by the first sin of Adam, the faction of the senses and appetites usurped a tyranny. This sensitive part is divided into the concupiscible and the irascible. These are the two intimate and domestic enemies whose ambushes, molestations, insults, rebellions, deceits, and machinations we are compelled to endure so long as we are pilgrims away from the Lord. We are by no means able to drive them out of the house of our heart; but against their machinations and assaults we must keep watch, do battle, and conquer, if we would obtain the prize. For our life is a perpetual warfare in this wretched valley of tears. This struggle and intestine war all the Saints have experienced, apart from a special privilege. Of these two enemies the concupiscible prevails, and is more hostile to us than the irascible. Innumerable, finally, are the other calamities which follow upon original sin. This must now be seriously weighed: that actual mortal sin slays the soul of the delinquent, and inflicts upon the mind and the will wounds similar to those with which original sin wounded universal nature: for it inflames rebellious concupiscence, weakens the powers of the will, and binds the captivity of liberty with new chains.

IX. First Corollary. Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius would have the freedom of the will utterly extinguished in the moral order. All Catholics confess that it is wounded with most grievous blows, but deny that it is extinguished. All defend that the human will can by its own powers perform some moral work good in its kind, or from its object. But they dispute whether there presses a precept of always referring this work to God as to a supernatural end. Not a few affirm it; the more common opinion, and to me the more probable, denies it. There presses indeed the divine precept declared by the Apostle, of referring all things to the glory of God; but since that precept is an affirmative one, it does not bind always and for always: wherefore when an Infidel bestows an alms, resting in the honesty of the action without twisting it to his own glory, he performs a good work, which of its own nature tends to an honest end. Yet all confess that this rarely happens. This proposition of Baius — All the works of Infidels are sins, and the virtues of the Philosophers are vices — St. Pius V condemned. Some works of Infidels, therefore, are not sins. This disagreement, however, is of light moment. For it is agreed among all that Infidels commonly sin, in that they direct all their works to a depraved end.

X. Second Corollary. The director of souls must have before his eyes this tragic picture of human infirmity, that he may be able to prescribe for the sick man under his care what dangers he must avoid and what remedies he must apply. He recognizes that the man burns with the thirst both of lust and of money: he will therefore interdict to him the familiar conversation of women, the frequenting of dances and comedies, and contracts suspect of usury. The man is enveloped in the darkness of ignorance, and cannot by his own powers vanquish the grave temptations of the demon, the flesh, and the world: he will therefore prescribe to him the reading of the sacred books, and fervent and assiduous prayers, by which he may implore the divine light, that he may see the truth, and the divine helps, by which the will, raised up, may be able to shun evil and accomplish good.¹

¹ See Tome I, Apparatus, Book 1, Dissertation I.

I. Words fail me with which to lay open, as its dignity deserves, the extreme necessity of the study here proposed. If I could impress this single truth more deeply upon your soul, O director of souls, and fully persuade you of it, I should attain the fruit which I have proposed to myself in the labor I have undertaken. Words do not reform the morals of men; but the law of the Lord alone converts souls. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and innumerable others delivered for the most part excellent institutions of morals; yet they recalled no one to a better way of life. Gather from this what fruit so many books, whether old or new, which swarm with the mere opinions of men, are apt to bring forth. Such is the disposition and nature of man, that he refuses to submit to the authority of other men's judgments. It is divine authority that takes the minds of men captive into its obedience, and confines their morals within the paths of virtue. Hence it is that that Theology which does not draw its conclusions from the holy Scriptures deserves to be called not Theology but Battology — vain babbling — utterly unfit for making morals honest.

II. The divine Scripture itself commands the meditation of itself in six hundred places. In Deuteronomy, chapter 6, these words are found: Hear, O Israel, and observe to do the things which the Lord hath commanded thee, that it may be well with thee... Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength. And these words which I command thee this day shall be in thy heart: and thou shalt tell them to thy children, and thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising: and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand: and they shall be and shall move before thy eyes: and thou shalt write them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house... Take heed diligently lest thou forget the Lord.

III. I beg and adjure you, O director of souls, to bend your serious meditations for a little while upon this divine testimony. Two things are here prescribed: one, the exercise of divine love; the other, the study of the divine law. Could the commandment of divine love be expressed in clearer words and more lucid phrase? Tell me, pray: could it ever have entered your mind that Theologians would be found who would attempt to reduce so most grave a commandment almost to nothing? And yet, as is plain to all, very many have striven to attenuate this first and most grave precept with vain inventions. For some cavil that this precept never of itself binds and presses in the whole course of life; others, only at the point of death; others, incidentally at some time; others, once within five years; and others, once within two years. Gather from this: if a commandment so lucid and expressed with such perspicuity — a commandment which is the basis and foundation of the whole law and the bond of the Christian law, which Christ renewed in his Gospel and imposed more strongly upon Christians — if, I say, many authors have dared to cavil at and elude this precept, with what inventions will they not obscure the other precepts, which are not so perspicuous, but ambiguous, and as it were remote conclusions? What Christian, the prejudices of certain Casuists being removed, reading the law just transcribed, would call into question its morally continuous obligation? You have now comprehended how necessary is the meditation of the divine law; since according to it, and not according to the pleasures of the Casuists, you shall be judged. And the burden by which Theologians — above all the curators and directors of souls — are bound to devote their labor to the study of the Scriptures is the graver, inasmuch as unlettered Christians, ignorant of the Latin tongue, cannot read holy Scripture. The Church has therefore wisely forbidden them this reading, in order that the Pastors may hold out to them this heavenly and divine food pure and refined from every noxious error. Nor may you rejoin that all the Casuists too study the divine Scriptures. Be it so. But from their commentaries upon the law transcribed above it is clearly evident that they read the holy Scriptures loaded with prejudices and anticipations, and distracted by various affections — if indeed they really read them at all, and do not rather transcribe what the earlier Casuists have taught.

IV. Passing over the innumerable Scriptures of the old Testament which inculcate the reading and serious meditation of the holy Law, I shall relate some testimonies of the new Covenant. Christ the Lord reproved the Pharisees for being ignorant of the holy Scriptures, saying in Matthew 22: And Jesus answering, said to them: You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God. Again, questioned by the Pharisees on another matter, he sends them back, not to the Jewish Casuists and the Rabbis, but to the Scriptures: Search the Scriptures: for you think in them to have life everlasting: and the same are they that give testimony of me (John 6). St. Paul, in Romans 15, commands the unwearied study of the Scriptures: For what things soever were written, were written for our learning: that through patience and the comfort of the Scriptures, we might have hope. Again, writing to Timothy, he first sets before his eyes, in chapter 3, the evils and calamities of the time to come, and then, that he may guard himself against such great evils, he strongly enjoins upon him the reading of the Scriptures: But thou hast fully known my doctrine, manner of life, purpose, faith, longsuffering, love, patience... But continue thou in those things which thou hast learned, and which have been committed to thee: knowing of whom thou hast learned them. And because from thy infancy thou hast known the holy scriptures, which can instruct thee to salvation, by the faith which is in Christ Jesus. All scripture, inspired of God, is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good work. But what the Apostle immediately subjoins in chapter 4 must be impressed more deeply upon the soul and seriously meditated: Preach the word: be instant in season, out of season: reprove, entreat, rebuke in all patience and doctrine. For there shall be a time, when they will not endure sound doctrine; but, according to their own desires, they will heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears: and will indeed turn away their hearing from the truth, but will be turned unto fables. But be thou vigilant, labour in all things, do the work of an evangelist, fulfil thy ministry. A time will come, says Paul, when they will not endure sound doctrine. What is sound doctrine? That which consists of truth alone, say all the Fathers. Doctrine is corrupted by the admixture of falsity. That doctrine, therefore, is certainly corrupt which teaches the use of contrary opinions, of which, if one is true, the other must needs be false. The most tremendous of all the punishments with which God threatens is the neglect of the Scriptures, and a reading of them that is burdensome and full of disgust. The time seems already to have come which Amos foretold in chapter 8: I will send forth a famine into the land: not a famine of bread, nor a thirst of water, but of hearing the word of the Lord... They shall go about seeking the word of the Lord, and shall not find it. The Lord withdraws both the reading and the understanding of the Scriptures from those who either neglect them or strive to elude them with arbitrary inventions. Turn over the innumerable books of the many Casuists which are read by Parish priests and Confessors as masters in the government of souls: scarcely any exhortations of divine Scripture in them, most rare any argumentations drawn from it. If some testimony is alleged, it is frequently twisted to confirm lax opinions, as is evident in this text: My yoke is sweet — which the Probabilists commonly use in order to accommodate Christian Morals to human appetites. Scarcely one of them expounds the evangelical oracle in its genuine sense: namely, that the yoke of Christ is sweet because it is the yoke of divine love, because it is anointed with the unction of charity, because the Christian law is the law of divine love. But divine love wars with the love of the flesh and of the world.

V. The Councils and all the Fathers most deeply inculcate the reading of the Scriptures upon Priests. The Council of Trent, Session 5, chapter 1, commands that Bishops, Archbishops, and Primates, either by themselves — as they are bound by divine law, when they are able — or through a substitute, interpret sacred Scripture to the people. It prescribes that revenues be established from which the men destined for this office are to be supported. Then, many things being passed over, it subjoins: In the Monasteries of Monks also, where it can conveniently be done, let there likewise be a lecture on sacred Scripture... And in the Convents of the others, in which studies can conveniently flourish, let a lecture on sacred Scripture likewise be held. The Fourth Council of Toledo established the following, which is found in the Decretum, distinction 37, chapter 1: Ignorance, the mother of all vices, is to be shunned most of all in the Priests of God, who have undertaken the office of teaching among the peoples: for the Apostle Paul frequently admonishes Priests to read the holy Scriptures, saying to Timothy: Attend etc. Let Priests therefore know the holy Scriptures and the canons, that all their work may consist in preaching. The chief, therefore, and almost the sole occupation of Priests, and above all of Pastors, is the study of holy Scripture. What if Pastors should occupy the greater part of their life in business affairs, in reckoning up revenues, in settling lawsuits, in domestic and economic cares, and should hand over to certain Religious the administering of the food of holy Scripture to the flock committed to themselves, not to others? Such men, assuredly, would be not Pastors, but hirelings and betrayers of their own ministry. Pastors are bound to feed the flock out of their own selves: they may employ ministers and helpers in those things which they cannot themselves perform. They are exceedingly deceived, and shamefully mock themselves, when they believe that they can fulfill their ministry by the labor of others. They must expend all their strength, their studies, their vigils, and their cares in discharging their own ministry; and when they cannot alone fulfill all its parts, then let them take ministers to their aid. Let them commit the government of temporal things to others, that they themselves may be able to devote themselves wholly to God and to the guarding and forming of their flock. Those Pastors run the road of damnation who commit spiritual things to ministers, reserving to themselves the cares of earthly business.

VI. What are the chief sacred books which holy Pastors and directors of souls ought to read and meditate? They are the books of the Psalms, of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and the Prophets, from the old Testament. More abundant still will be the fruit which you will gather from the mature reading of the new Testament. You will not stumble there upon petty questions, cases, and disputations; because the Gospels teach how to live holily, not how to dispute subtly. No lawgiver has inserted into his laws the controversies and petty questions which the wits of men are able to devise. The holy Fathers of the Church, who are our Masters — Justin Martyr, Cyprian, Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Chrysostom, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory the Great, and innumerable others — settled questions of morals by the holy Scriptures and the divine traditions, and thus governed the peoples committed to them. These men had engraved deep in their soul the oracle of Christ the Lord, who says in John 14: But the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind. On this text St. Thomas writes as follows, lecture 6: He will teach you all things: because whatever a man may teach from without, unless the Holy Spirit give understanding within, he labors in vain: for unless he be first present to the heart of the hearer, the discourse of the Teacher will be idle.

VII. I hear many clamoring that these things are theoretical, not practical. Those who do not hear confessions, who write in their chamber and do not handle the business of human society, most easily publish specious rules which serve nothing for practical execution and direction. There is need of good and solid practice. Explain to us where in the holy Scriptures are found the doctrines by which can be resolved those immense volumes of questions which Caramuel, Diana, Sánchez, Escobar, Castropalao, Candido, Zanardi, Sporer, Tamburini, Gobat, and the other recent Doctors have published?

VIII. I answer that by a few oracles of holy Scripture the greatest part of the questions which luxuriant wits have stirred up is struck down and reduced to nothing; concerning which St. Augustine writes as follows in Sermon 143 de tempore: These, my brethren, are the great deliriums of great Doctors. Nor am I one to disapprove all the controversies which the new Casuists agitate; but I say that many are of no moment, and that more can be resolved by the divine Scriptures alone, by the traditions, and by the doctrine of the Fathers. And because not a few appeal to practice, I am willing to obey them. The controversies which the new Casuists have brought in against the first commandment of charity toward God and the Neighbor — are they not dissolved by the mere words in which God expressed it? Those innumerable questions which they discuss concerning impure touches, concerning conjugal matters, concerning sodomy and other most shameful acts, concerning dances, concerning comedies, concerning the promiscuous conversation of men and women, are overthrown by these divine oracles alone: He that loveth danger shall perish in it (Ecclesiasticus 3). Turn away thy face from a woman dressed up (Ecclesiasticus 10 [recte 9]). If thy eye scandalize thee, pluck it out... If thy hand scandalize thee, cut it off, etc. (Matthew 5). From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves (1 Thessalonians 5). If these and six hundred other similar divine oracles were consulted with prejudices laid aside, and without the zeal of twisting such commandments to the desires and appetites of men, those most empty little questions and petty distinctions, agitated in our age with such contention for the obscuring of evangelical truth, would go up in smoke. The disputations which the most recent authors have stirred up concerning homicide, concerning the duel as vindicator of honor, concerning the material lie, concerning amphibologies, concerning thefts, concerning compensations, concerning usury, and other matters, and which fill those immense volumes of the Casuists, can be settled by the most lucid testimonies of divine Scripture, if evangelical truth alone be regarded, and that zeal for pleasing men and hunting after human favor be utterly rooted out.

IX. In like manner the commandments of the Church are clear and manifest, and the examples of holy men lie open to all. It is pleasing to hear what St. Augustine writes in Epistle 119: But this I grieve at exceedingly: that many things which are most wholesomely commanded in the divine books are less cared for, and all things are so full of so many presumptions, that he is more gravely rebuked who during his octave has touched the earth with bare foot, than he who has buried his mind in wine. All such things, therefore, as are neither contained in the authorities of the holy Scriptures, nor found decreed in the Councils of the Bishops, nor strengthened by the custom of the universal Church, but are varied innumerably by the diverse customs of diverse places — so that scarcely, or never at all, can the causes be found which men followed in instituting them — I judge, where the liberty is granted, are to be cut away without any hesitation. I pass over many things which the holy Doctor writes in the same place, and I exhibit a few of those which he adds toward the end of the epistle: And I marvel that this escapes you: that not only in innumerable other matters many things escape me, but even in the holy Scriptures themselves I am ignorant of far more things than I know. And therefore I bear a hope, not unfruitful, in the name of Christ; because I have not only believed my God that on those two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the Prophets, but I have also experienced it, and experience it daily. For no mystery, no discourse however obscure, is opened to me out of the sacred writings, where I do not find these same precepts: The end of the commandment is charity, from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith; and, The fulness of the law is charity. Therefore, O Christian, whether these things or others, so read, so learn, as to remember that it was most truly said: Knowledge puffeth up, charity edifieth. But charity envieth not, is not puffed up. Let knowledge, then, be so employed, as a kind of scaffolding by which may rise the structure of charity, which abideth for ever, even when knowledge shall be destroyed.

X. Not only, says Augustine, have I believed my God revealing it, but I have also daily experienced that the whole law and the Prophets are contained in those two precepts of charity. If Christians would seriously meditate these two commandments alone, they would laugh at and despise the innumerable questions and most vain entanglements of certain Casuists. But so far are many of these from referring the questions that arise back to these two precepts, that on the contrary they attenuate these two commandments, restrict and limit the force of their obligation, in order to be able to soften the other laws.

I. The spirit of the Christian profession transforms the earthly man into a heavenly one, as the Apostle Paul says in 1 Corinthians 15: As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of the heavenly. The Christian puts off the image of the earthly man in the very profession of Baptism, by which he renounces Satan, his pomps, and his works. This renunciation precedes the profession of faith, says Salvian in Book 6 of The Government of God: For what is the first confession of Christians in saving Baptism? What, indeed, but that they protest that they renounce the Devil, and his pomps, and his spectacles, and his works? ... And what more? I believe, sayest thou, in God the Father almighty, and in Jesus Christ his Son. First, therefore, the Devil is renounced, that God may be believed. For he who does not renounce the Devil does not believe God. The genuine and precise sense of this profession I shall explain when we come to speak of Baptism; and I shall make plain that Pastors frequently sin because they neglect to lay open to baptized youths the burdens of this profession which they have made.

II. Question I. What rules ought Pastors of souls to observe in healing the sick? Answer: These spiritual physicians must first of all have thoroughly examined the gravity of the infirmity, as has been said; then they must know what the rules of health are. If the physicians of bodies did not know when the pulse of the arteries is ordered and regular, how could they distinguish the sick man from the healthy? What a healthy Christian is, therefore, must be well known to the directors of souls. Now those Christians are held to be healthy who are conformed to Christ Jesus, as St. Paul testifies in Romans 8: For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son; that he might be the firstborn amongst many brethren. The physicians of souls, therefore, must set before their eyes the image of the life which Christ Jesus led on earth, that they may be able to cure souls and restore them to firm health.

III. These, moreover, are the lineaments of that divine image, says St. Peter in his first Epistle, chapter 2: But you are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people. This image pours forth rays of sanctity in every direction, as the Apostle Paul adds in 1 Thessalonians 4: This is the will of God, your sanctification; and in 2 Corinthians 7 [recte 13]: Salute all the Saints; and elsewhere: For you are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body. Nay more, that our bodies are members of Christ he testifies again in 1 Corinthians 6: Your bodies are the members of Christ. And finally, Ephesians 4: Let us grow up in him in all things, who is the head, Christ. But how can it come to pass that a Christian man should become like to God? I shall show in few words.

IV. Question II. In what does the spirit of Christian perfection chiefly consist? Answer: In charity and humility. Of the first now; of the latter, below. The fire of divine love, when the pitch of worldly and carnal affections has been consumed, kindles a heavenly flame, and makes us like to God and observers of his whole law, as Christ himself teaches in Matthew 22: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, etc. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets. Him whom you love, you do not injure, you do not visit with wrongs; you do not steal what is his; you do not blaspheme his name; you do not circumvent him with deceits or frauds; you carry out what pleases him; you do not rashly bring lawsuits against him; you abstain from the things that displease him. Behold how true is the saying of the Apostle: love is the fulfilling of the law.

V. This is the man of God adorned with the eight beatitudes, says the Evangelist Matthew in chapter 5, who imitates God and fulfills his following commandments: Love your enemies: do good to them that hate you: and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you... Go first to be reconciled to thy brother. He commands these things to be done, not that we may please men, but that we may please God. He warns that it cannot come to pass that we should serve God and the World; for we must needs hold one or the other in hatred. That we must refrain from the greedy heaping up of riches and from solicitude about things, the Gospels frequently inculcate: Take heed that you do not your justice before men... Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth... No man can serve two masters... Be not solicitous... For if you will forgive men their offences, your heavenly Father will forgive you also your offences. We must read what the same Matthew prescribes in chapter 7, where he cries out that our foot must be restrained from the broad way, and that we must enter by the strait and narrow way: Enter ye in at the narrow gate: for wide is the gate, and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life: and few there are that find it! By this narrow gate and strait way Christ our exemplar entered into the kingdom of heaven, and the same way have walked all his true disciples, whom we know with certainty to have entered the kingdom of God. He wishes us to be prompt and prepared for the renunciation of all things that we possess in this world: He that doth not renounce all that he possesseth, cannot be my disciple.

VI. St. Paul the Apostle, taught by Christ Jesus, paints in vivid colors the character which Christians must sustain upon the theater of this world. And first, we are compared, in 1 Corinthians 9, to those who run in the race to obtain the prize: And every one that striveth for the mastery, refraineth himself from all things: and they indeed that they may receive a corruptible crown. Meditate this truth more deeply. Those who run in the race restrain their senses, and aim all their powers and endeavors at this one thing alone, to obtain the prize. Do those runners, while they run, turn aside their eyes to look at games, comedies, dances, spectacles, and the other illusions of the raving World? Far from it. They have absolutely nothing else in mind and soul but the attainment of the crown — and that a corruptible one. We all run in the race to obtain an incorruptible, infinite, and eternal crown. And do we labor under such fatuity that, this eternal crown being spurned, like boys devoid of reason we bend our soul to catching the breeze of the world, to vain spectacles, to fables, to fooleries? With our mouth we boast that we wish to obtain this crown; but meanwhile in very deed we spend our time and our whole life in games, in colloquies with women, in banquets, in consolations, which war as enemies against the attainment of the crown. If you consult the volumes of certain Casuists, they report this battle to you as light, not deadly; and many affirm, with various little distinctions added, that you can both attain the crown and enjoy the aforesaid blandishments and delights of the World. Against them cries the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7: This therefore I say, brethren; the time is short; it remaineth, that they also who have wives, be as if they had none; and they that weep, as though they wept not; and they that rejoice, as if they rejoiced not; and they that buy, as though they possessed not; and they that use this world, as if they used it not: for the fashion of this world passeth away. Behold the state of this mortal life depicted for you. But there remain more shining lineaments still. What are they? To battle with the senses, to torment the flesh, to restrain the appetites, and daily to carry the cross of Christ, our exemplary master: If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me. And they that are Christ's, have crucified their flesh, with the vices and concupiscences.

VII. To this is added that all who would sustain the image and character of Christ in this valley of tears must bear patiently and with a constant soul the hatred of the world, its mockeries, contempts, and persecutions. The Disciples lamented that the world held them in hatred. Christ the Lord replied, John 15: If the world hate you, know ye, that it hath hated me before you. If you had been of the world, the world would love its own: but because you are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you. And again he thunders by the mouth of Paul: If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ; and again: All that will live godly in Christ Jesus, shall suffer persecution.

VIII. These are the ornaments, the definitions, the pronouncements, the axioms, and the principles of the Christian profession, which the Pastors of souls ought always to have both engraved in their soul and sounding on their lips. It is necessary that they ponder these things with themselves in serious and humble meditation, that they may be able to hold them out with profit to their flock, as food excellently disposed and prepared.

IX. Question III. Is humility the chief virtue of Christian perfection? Answer: One of the chief effects of original sin, with which men are born stained and wounded, is pride, whose antidote is called humility. The sages of the Heathen were ignorant both of original sin and of true humility. Most admirably, after the Fathers, St. Thomas, in the II-II, q. 161, art. 5, ad 2, declares that the sublime and lofty edifice which the Son of God raised up consists chiefly of two things: namely, of humility, which occupies the place of the foundation, and of charity, which is the form of the whole edifice, and which, bestowing value, beauty, and firmness, couples and consolidates all the parts of the fabric in a wondrous bond. These are the words of the Angelic Doctor: As the ordered assemblage of the virtues is by a certain similitude compared to an edifice, so also that which is first in the acquisition of the virtues is compared to the foundation, which is first laid in a building. But the virtues are truly infused by God. Whence what is first in the acquisition of the virtues can be taken in two ways: in one way, by way of removing an obstacle; and thus humility holds the first place, inasmuch as it expels pride, which God resisteth, and renders man submissive and open to receive the influx of divine grace, inasmuch as it empties out the inflation of pride. Whence it is said in James 4 that God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble: and in this respect humility is called the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Wherefore, as no fabric can stand without a foundation, so no virtue can shine forth without humility.

X. The more necessary is this antidote of humility for expelling pride, the more difficult is its execution and practice. Unless the Son of God had taught this virtue both by word and by example, it would scarcely shine forth among men, swollen, puffed up, and supercilious with the poison of pride. The divine Word emptied himself, putting on the form of a servant and of a sinner, that he might induce men to the study and exercise of so great a virtue. Wisely does St. Augustine expound, in the book On Holy Virginity, chapter 45 [recte 35], these words — Learn of me, because I am meek, and humble of heart — which he interprets thus: He to whom the Father hath delivered all things, and whom no one knoweth but the Father, and who alone knoweth the Father, and he to whom he willeth to reveal him, saith not: Learn of me to frame the world, or to raise the dead; but: because I am meek, and humble of heart. O wholesome doctrine! O Master and Lord of mortals, to whom death was ministered and poured out in the cup of pride! He would not teach what he himself was not; he would not command what he himself did not. But, passing over the very many things which he here writes in commendation of humility, I shall recall before your eyes a few of those which he has in Epistle 56 [recte 118], to Dioscorus: To this, he says, my Dioscorus, I would have you submit with entire piety, and construct for yourself no other way for grasping and holding the truth than that which has been constructed by him who, as God, sees the infirmity of our steps. And that way is, first, humility; second, humility; third, humility; and as often as you should ask, so often would I say this — not that there are not other precepts to be spoken of, but unless humility precede, accompany, and follow whatever good we do, unless it be set before us to look upon, and beside us to lean upon, and over us to restrain us, while we are rejoicing over some good deed, pride wrests the whole from our hand. The other vices, indeed, are to be feared in sins; but pride is to be feared even in deeds rightly done, lest those things which have been laudably done be lost through the very desire of praise. Therefore, as that most renowned Rhetorician, when he was asked what seemed to him the first thing to be observed in the precepts of eloquence, is said to have answered, Delivery; when it was asked what second, the same Delivery; what third, to have said nothing else but Delivery: so if you should ask, and as often as you should ask, concerning the precepts of the Christian Religion, I would answer nothing else but humility, even though necessity should perhaps compel me to speak of other things, etc.

I. Two things I have thus far touched upon: the infirmity and the deadly wounds of human nature, which is the first; the other, the remedies suited for healing that nature. I now desire you as judges, O Pastors of souls: is not an assured knowledge, both of human infirmity and of the remedies by which it must be cured, supremely necessary — and that in advance? Let us now converse together, prejudices laid aside. For how few are there who approach the curing of souls imbued with this instruction! Who first of all expounds original sin, pride, and the evils that proceed thence? Who inculcates the force and necessity of the most grave precept of humility, which is the antidote of pride? Scarcely do very many of those whose books are worn by handling for the government of souls make any mention of this virtue, which is the basis and foundation of the whole evangelical edifice. Who among them brings forward the axioms and rules of Christian sanctity — namely, the daily carrying of the cross, the battling with the flesh, the soul prepared to sustain the hatred of the world, persecutions, derisions, contumelies, calumnies — and cries out that these are as it were the preludes of the Christian life, and that charity is that form which animates and vivifies the spirit of the evangelical profession? If a Physician should approach to cure a sick man without having thoroughly examined the rules of health, and without taking care to explore the nature of the sick man and the gravity of his disease, would he not be convicted of manifest folly? And yet how many are the physicians of souls who have ascertained the force of the baptismal profession, and the rules which Christ himself prescribed for the ordering of the Christian life and which we have indicated, and who impose the observance of them upon sinners?

II. When worldly men behold Christians, Priests, and religious Men fallen into lust, avarice, gluttony, and similar disgraces, they murmur, they are amazed, they wonder; on the contrary, those who are free from these vices they extol. That very many are damned on account of lust and avarice, holy Scripture teaches. But few are they who bend their soul toward pride, the root of these and of the other crimes. And yet it is certain that men for the greater part perish eternally on account of the most hidden crime of pride. By pride Lucifer fell with the third part of the Angels; by pride fell Adam, the head of the human race. The disease infecting the whole human race is pride: this is the prevailing and dominant fever, the most malignant of all diseases, which penetrates all the hiding-places and recesses of the human heart; this is the pestilential plague which, from ambush and as it were by underground passages, brings forth the slaughter of souls. From the carnal vices, which strike the senses of men and beget infamy, we abstain, if not from love of virtue, at least from dread of undergoing ignominy. Frequently we cover vice with vice; and in order to catch the favor, applause, esteem, and deference of the world, we detest the sordid and vile sins. But dazzling is the crime of pride, which bewitched the mind of the supreme Angel and of the first man. It often either steals away or gnaws at the very merit of good works, or lays snares for it. On every side it besieges and surrounds us, so that we glory even in sanctity itself. At that very time when we are extolling the virtue of humility and magnifying its necessity, pride, clothed in a splendid garment, transforms itself into an Angel of light, and works its machinations within us, and stirs up a breeze of sweet and insensible complacency. Pride, says Augustine, lies in wait even for good works. More of this I shall make manifest when we come to speak of pride and humility.

III. From these things which I have touched upon in passing, gather, O Pastors of souls, how much it is to be feared and dreaded at that very time when we flatter ourselves about chastity, about poverty, about equity. Most cunning self-love creeps within us, gnaws, excites elation without our noticing, and makes our souls swell. Against these most hidden rocks we dash souls — we ourselves, Theologians, ministers of God, Confessors — who, in order to be eminent and to shine above others, in order to conciliate to ourselves the worldly Powers, often speak pleasing things, and most pugnaciously defend opinions smeared with the paint of a new benignity, which indulge flesh and blood, and which procure for us the patronage of the Rich and of Magnates.

IV. All those books, therefore, which neglect the aforesaid evangelical doctrine and the rules which Christ our Savior himself established for the curing of our diseases, which do not inculcate them, which swarm with definitions, petty distinctions, petty questions, and disputations devised by the wit of men, are unfit for instructing Pastors in the government of souls. You, therefore, Ministers of Christ, if the salvation of others and your own is dear to your heart, first of all bend your soul, your powers, and your studies upon the Gospels of Jesus Christ and the Pauline Epistles. Unless the doctrine of Christ is thoroughly known to you, how can you detect the falsity of human opinions? The evangelical doctrine is simple: it teaches not to cavil, nor to wrangle, nor to dispute, but to execute the divine law with a humble and docile soul; it inflames the heart and kindles the fire of divine love; it begets contempt of the world and of earthly things.

V. "What has been said thus far serves Preachers and mystical Men, not the cultivators of moral Theology." So chatter those who, prepossessed by the art of caviling, have introduced new and unheard-of rules of morals. But, to reduce them to straits, I ask: are the things we have thus far gathered from the Gospels true, or false? If they blurt out that they are false, they themselves are not Christians. If true: then these things above all are to be expounded, inculcated, and urged. Then those books which are empty of the aforesaid precepts, which set up the mere petty opinions of men as rules of morals, are unfit for curing the infirmities of Christians. The most holy Fathers of all ages observed this method which we have described. Consult your own self, excellent Reader. Do you not, while you read and meditate the evangelical sayings recited, find yourself moved? Do you not feel the futility of many human opinions, with which not a few casuistical volumes swarm? Sit as judge yourself. When, from the reading of certain Casuists, have you experienced yourself inflamed toward God? When animated and impelled to cultivate humility; to trample upon riches, the applause of men, and worldly glory; to bear the cross daily; to crucify the flesh and the appetites with their concupiscences by the severity of fasts and vigils? When have you read in books of that kind that the observance of this evangelical oracle is forcefully inculcated: Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect? Of the precept of humility, which is, as we have said and as must continually be repeated, the first foundation of the Christian edifice, and of the other most grave commandment of yearning after evangelical perfection seated in charity, either no discourse at all, or a dry one, is found in not a few casuistical books. If, then, the first and chief rules of the Christian profession and of the reformation of morals are neglected, what wonder if Christians for the greater part profane the Sacraments of Christ, and lead a life corrupted with perpetual vices? But of this more in its place. You meanwhile, Pastor of souls, have always before your eyes that Christians who are to be saved must be conformed to the divine exemplar, Christ Jesus. This single most certain rule will teach you more than the volumes of many of certain authors.

I. The authority of the Supreme Pontiffs in settling controversies of morals and of faith wise theologians have illustrated in entire volumes. All Catholics receive and venerate it alike. In this compendium it is not permitted, for brevity's sake, to illustrate this argument at greater length.

II. The Doctors and Fathers of the Church must be distinguished from doctors who are in the Church. The Probabilists and Casuists call one another by the title of Doctor. Nothing is more frequent in their books than this phrase: So the Doctors; so the Doctors commonly. And who are these Doctors? Caramuel, Diana, Gobat, Escobar, Tamburini, La Cruz, Vera Cruz, Sporer, Candidus, La-Croix, and six hundred of the same sort. If these men have received the laurel of the Doctorate in some University — as it is wont to be received very easily — they may be called doctors dwelling in the Church, but not Doctors and Fathers of the Church. Three endowments are required that anyone be numbered among the Fathers and Doctors of the Church: 1. eminent doctrine; 2. signal sanctity; 3. the testimony of the Church. The Doctors of the Church are called, in the fifth chapter of Matthew, the salt of the earth and the light of the world: You are the salt of the earth ... You are the light of the world ... so let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works. Wisdom dissipates darkness and illuminates minds; sanctity of morals inflames others to the pursuit of virtue; the testimony of the Church approves both the wisdom and the sanctity.

III. As the first Fathers of the Church, and at the same time as divine writers, the Evangelists and Apostles stand eminent, and after them follow the disciples of the Lord, all of whom by degrees are Fathers of Fathers; as St. Augustine says, explaining the versicle of Psalm 44, Instead of thy fathers, sons are born to thee: that is, he says, the Apostles were sent as Fathers. In the place of the Apostles, sons have been born to thee: bishops have been established. The episcopal grade is a singular prerogative, which, joined with eminent doctrine and signal sanctity, constitutes a more excellent Father of the Church; since the episcopate is the chief channel of tradition, through which the uncorrupted doctrine of the Apostles has come down to us.

IV. The Fathers are commonly distributed into three ages. The first age comprehends the first three centuries; the second, the following three; the third extends from the beginning of the seventh century to the thirteenth. The Fathers of the first age are worthy of the greater veneration, the nearer they stood to the primeval origin and fountain of the apostolic traditions. Yet the Fathers of the second age do not for that reason excel with lesser authority, if they have illustrated the Church more copiously with the splendor of a richer doctrine and of heroic virtues. The Fathers of the third age, although inferior to their predecessors in antiquity, erudition, and eloquence, nevertheless, since they have taught the same doctrine as the first, and at times hand it down more compactly and more distinctly, are themselves also to be held in the highest esteem.

V. The chief among the Latin Fathers are Cyprian, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Hilary, Leo the Great, Prosper, Fulgentius, Gregory the Great. The more celebrated among the Greeks are Ignatius, Justin, Irenaeus, Clement, Basil, Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Cyril of Jerusalem, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, Damascene.

Titius, a priest, reads in a certain periodical an article written by another young priest concerning the method of moral theology, in which, among other things, the following are put forward: “Much is lacking in the textbooks which are in circulation, for they touch only one part of present-day life; they treat sins, whereas the duties of men in private and social life ought to be treated; the method is not scientific, since individual questions are proposed to which different answers are often given, so many dissenting authors being cited that it truly produces skepticism. In place of this casuistical method, a manner adapted to modern science is to be followed, so that a solid foundation is first laid, namely: that to be ethically evil which produces evil effects; then, an analysis of human acts having been instituted and history also having been adduced, it is possible to rise to general principles scientifically certain and verified.” It seems to Titius that a method approved by the experience of so many centuries in the Church is not deserving of such censure; nevertheless, he is troubled and does not know what is to be answered. Hence it is asked:

1. What is moral theology?

2. What is to be said about the opinions of the anonymous writer?

1. What is Moral Theology?

Moral Theology is defined by Fr. Bucceroni: That part of theology which, resting upon divine law manifested through revelation, investigates what is lawful and what is unlawful in human actions, in order to direct these toward eternal life.¹ Moral Theology, then, takes its principles from revelation, and because they rest on revelation they have a more secure and certain foundation than human reason could afford. But moral theology does not cover the whole field of Christian conduct. Its object is not to place high ideals of virtue before the people and train them in Christian perfection. Its task is much more restricted and humble. It lays down rules for determining what is right and what is wrong according to the teaching of the Christian faith. Its primary object is to teach the priest how to distinguish what is sinful from what is lawful, so that he may fruitfully administer the sacrament of Penance and perform the other duties of his sacred ministry. It is not intended for edification, nor for the building up of character, nor, it may be added, is it intended to teach people how to shake off the burden of the moral law, or to minimize its obligations.

1 Instit. Theol. Mor., vol. i, n. 1.

2. What is to be said about the opinions of the anonymous writer?

The perfect text-book of moral theology has not yet indeed been written, if it is ever destined to be written. It certainly could not be written on the lines laid down by the anonymous critic. Outside the Catholic Church there is a tendency to regard moral problems from the point of view of evolution, and from the purely naturalistic standpoint. The critic seems to have been reading some modern author of this school, and to have become infected with his spirit. While we remain Christians it would be foolish and disastrous to abandon our secure position in order to adopt the constantly changing systems of our adversaries. We have seen why sin is so prominent in our text-books, but we may add here that in deciding what is sinful we are also virtually laying down duties, for sin is only a violation of duty. The method of moral theology is strictly scientific, but it proceeds by way of deduction from principles which rest on revelation, not by way of induction. The varying answers given in the books to particular questions do not concern moral principles, but their application to particular cases. In these questions it is often impossible to reach any certain conclusion, and so, perforce, different opinions have to be acknowledged, but this does not produce skepticism. We hold fast the truth, but we know the limits of our knowledge, and we know how to arrive at a practical decision when there is a conflict of opinions.

The foundation which the critic proposes for the science of morals is by no means solid. Consideration of the effects of an action often enables us to decide its moral quality, and the ordinary text-books do not neglect this consideration. But much depends upon what we mean by the effects of an action. Evolutionary ethics restricts its attention to the temporal effects of the present life, and those effects are often so subtle, and yet so far-reaching, that is it very difficult to estimate them at their proper value. Even if this could be done, this evolutionary criterion upsets the whole perspective of moral guilt. Judged by their temporal evil effects, how should we classify in the order of guilt (a) the theft of five shillings, (b) indulgence in an immodest thought, (c) the denial of the goodness of God, and (d) an unkind speech to one’s neighbor? We do not know all the bad effects of sin, but among them we must assuredly reckon the displeasure of Almighty God, the loss of heaven, and the sufferings of purgatory and hell. In our estimate of evils we shall go very much astray if we leave the chief of all out of account.

We may and should make use of history in moral theology, especially where positive law is concerned; but with the Catholic theologian it will not occupy the all-important position that it holds in the evolutionary science of ethics.

Most of the teachings of Catholic morality have been sufficiently verified by the experience of twenty centuries. But as they rest on faith, and faith is the conviction of things that appear not, we shall not be able to verify them fully in this life, and to claim the right to do it is virtually to abandon a life of faith, and seek to live by knowledge, which one can not do and remain a Christian.

This book deserves a welcome as an honest attempt to grapple with the difficulties of moral science. How great those difficulties are is generally recognized, and by none more fully and freely than by those who have tried to overcome them. Modern theories in history and science have directed renewed attention to the fundamental problems of ethics, and it is fitting that readers who are interested in the subject should be able to study the Catholic answer to those problems in the mother tongue. Students of theology, too, will benefit by being able to consult an English author, who goes over the ground rendered so familiar to them by our Latin text-books. There are many such works published in other modern languages, but as yet the English language is singularly deficient in them.

These, however, were not the reasons that induced Dr. McDonald to publish his essay. He tells us in his preface that while it is his main object to explain and defend the traditional system of morals which has been taught for centuries in the Catholic schools, yet he claims to have arrived at some important conclusions which are not to be found elsewhere. “If it were otherwise,” he says, “I should not have thought of writing or publishing.”

In the course of teaching moral theology, he noticed a considerable difference between the general principles formulated in the treatises on Human Acts, Laws, and Conscience, and the special conclusions arrived at afterwards when treating of the particular ’ virtues. These special conclusions he regards as the true rules of moral conduct, and as furnishing the material for that wider synthesis which forms the substance of the earlier and fundamental treatises. Hence these special conclusions should furnish a test for the validity and accuracy of the general principles laid down in the treatises on Human Acts, Law, and Conscience.

I quite agree. A general principle of morals which breaks down when applied to particular cases does not deserve to rank as a principle. It makes a pretense of being a rule of conduct, while in practice it furnishes no guide to conduct at all. If, then, the contention be true, that some of the general principles of the fundamental treatises of moral theology as found in our text-books do not harmonize with the doctrine on special virtues, all moralists will welcome the demonstration of its truth, and will be thankful for an accurate and plain statement of the general principles which should be substituted in place of the old.

No theologian would pretend that the common doctrine found in our text-books on the fundamental treatises of moral theology has reached its final, definitive, and perfect stage. Progress is still possible, and no doubt progress will be made in the method of presenting the doctrine, in the enunciation and ordering of the principles, and in other ways. And if we are to advance, some one must attempt the task, some one must act as pioneer of the way. This is another reason why this book deserves a welcome. But if the advance is to be on secure lines, it is no less necessary that the critic should be on the look out, and should perform his task honestly and fearlessly.

This is what I propose to do in this article. For the great bulk of the book, inasmuch as it presents in a good English dress the common doctrine of the Catholic schools, I have nothing but praise and a sincere welcome to offer. It is with two or three of those special conclusions at which Dr. McDonald has arrived, and which he says are not to be found elsewhere, that I propose to deal. I may say frankly at the outset that I do not agree with them; and so I find my place among those many students of morals, who, as he tells us in his Preface, the author foresaw would question and deny the success of his attempt in the direction of novelty.

In the remarks which I have to make I shall strive to be as impersonal as possible; I shall look at the doctrines criticized from the purely objective point of view, and I am sure Dr. McDonald will not resent the friendly and honest criticism of a fellow-worker in a field of knowledge, as difficult as it is interesting.

A good practical test of the morality of an action is the effect which it produces. Adultery, theft, selfishness, are seen to be morally wrong because of the evil consequences which they produce. What, however, is to be said of the moral quality of an action which produces both good and bad effects? The administration of chloroform renders the subject insensible to pain, but it also deprives him of the use of reason for the time being; craniotomy preserves the mother but it kills the child. How are we to judge of the morality of such actions as these which produce effects of opposite moral quality? Dr. McDonald discusses and rejects the test which is commonly given in our text-books of moral theology. He translates the principle as formulated by Father Lehmkuhl thus : —

It is lawful to perform an action which produces two effects, one good, the other bad,—provided (1) the action, viewed in itself is good or at least indifferent; (2) the agent does not intend the evil effect, but only the good (it is well to add in some cases: and provided there is no danger of subsequent evil consent or intention); (3) the good effect is produced as immediately as—that is, not by means of—the bad; (4) and there is a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect. (Page 149.)

He then proceeds to criticize the principle in this manner : —

There is not one of these four conditions that does not present difficulties to my mind. Let us take them in order :—

(1) ‘‘The action’’—that is, as I understand it, the external action—‘‘viewed in itself, must be good or at least indifferent.’’ But is not the whole question at issue this: how is one to know whether this action is good in itself, when its effects are good as well as evil? You tell me that it is to be considered lawful—which is the same as good— if, among other things, it is good in itself; and I do not see how this makes me a whit the wiser. (Page 149.)

Dr. McDonald misunderstands the principle which he impugns. The whole question at issue is, of course, the morality of the action which produces both good and bad effects. We wish to know whether the administration of chloroform, for instance, is a good action; whether craniotomy is lawful; whether, to take a third example given by Dr. McDonald, it is lawful to walk to the fields in summer time for the sake of exercise and relaxation, in spite of the fact that at each step we crush the life out of many lowly forms of sentient being. The principle tells us that such actions will be morally good if certain conditions are verified. The first is that the action viewed in itself, that is, apart from its effects, must not be bad. This is not the whole question at issue, as Dr. McDonald asserts that it is; the question at issue is, whether the action remains good, even though it produce an evil effect. We can examine the morality of the action apart from its evil effect, and this is what the principle tells us to do. Thus, in the last instance quoted from Dr. McDonald, it is possible to walk in the fields without destroying sentient life at all, or at least we may conceive of its being done; the question is, whether it remains a lawful action in summer time, when it cannot ordinarily be done without destroying animal or insect life. The action of walking in the fields, even in summer time, is ethically good, or at least indifferent, viewed in itself, apart from consequences, and thus it satisfies the first condition laid down in the principle. This is a distinct step towards the solution of the question concerning the morality of walking in the fields in summer time; when we have got thus far, we are something more than a whit the wiser. For, if the question were whether I may tell a lie to save another’s life, or in other words, whether a lie is lawful when it produces a good effect in spite of its also producing a bad one, the question would at once be settled in the negative by the application of our principle; the first condition would not be satisfied, because to lie is bad in itself. Dr. McDonald proceeds : —

(2) ‘‘The agent must not intend the evil effect, but only the good.’’ But, according to the doctrine laid down in the last chapter, the question of intention or subsequent consent does not arise. We want to test whether a certain external action, regarded in itself, is morally good or bad; and I think I have shown that external acts, as such, do not depend for their morality on any concomitant or subsequent act of the will. (Page 149.)

Dr. McDonald misunderstands the second condition as seriously as he misunderstood the first. We are not concerned here with the mere external action regarded in itself. We want to know whether it is lawful to walk in the fields in summer time. The action is regarded as a complete human act, therefore as a voluntary act, as one issuing from free will, therefore as necessarily informed by a certain intention, an intention which may be good or bad. To walk in the fields in order wantonly to destroy sentient life is a bad action, because informed by a vicious intention ; to walk in the fields for recreation, or to till them, is good. With a view to settling whether in a concrete case walking in the fields is a good and lawful action, the principle lays down the condition that the intention must not be bad. This has nothing to do with the disputed question whether the intention can change the nature of the external act.

The third condition is: “The good effect must be produced as immediately as — that is — not by means of the bad.”

Criticizing this condition Dr. McDonald asks: “Is this universally true?” I answer, Yes, if in the circumstances the evil effect remains evil, for we must not do evil that good may come of it. To amputate a diseased leg in order to save life is not evil, and so the example does not show that the condition laid down is false, though the Doctor seems to think that it does. And though he here implies that when chloroform is administered, the good effect is obtained through the evil, he does not prove it; and even if that were proved, he would still have to show that to produce unconsciousness by administering chloroform when there is good reason for it, is evil. Dr. McDonald refers us to another work of his for a criticism of the terminology of the fourth condition, and then briefly subjoins:

The ‘‘weighty reason’’ required is the good effect which must also be produced by the action. . .. Now it is not much addition to one’s sum of knowledge to be told that an action is wrong which does not produce any but an evil effect; nor does it help much to be informed further that the good effect produced must bear some proportion to the evil. (Page 150.)

I shall have something to say to this further on.

After his polemic against the principle of a double effect, Dr. McDonald inquires whether the distinction between direct and indirect causality may not serve as a basis for the test which ought really to be applied in all cases of mixed results. He rejects this suggestion, but in his discussion on this point he falsifiés the meaning of the distinction as commonly used by theologians, and confounds it with the distinction between per se and per accidens. When theologians treat of the lawfulness of direct and indirect killing, the distinction does not merely refer to the direct or indirect causality of the external act; it has special reference to the intention.¹ Dr. McDonald, indeed, rules the question of intention out of court, but such is not the practice of moral theologians when they discuss the questions with which the Doctor is here occupied, and inasmuch as those questions are concerned with human acts, acts necessarily informed by some intention, not with the merely physical external acts of the body, as he seems to suppose, it is difficult to see the reason for abstracting from the intention.

¹

Finally, the Doctor proposes a principle of his own in substitution for the principle of a double effect. He states it thus: —

“That is said to be intended directly in any action which is intended primarily and for its own sake. Its correlative is indirectly, which is said of that which is intended only by reason of another and as it were accidentally. . . . In morals, he directly intends homicide who commands it; indirectly, he who posits some cause of it, such as drunkenness, from which it follows.”—Lexicon Scholasticorum Verborum.

An external action is to be considered morally good, even though it should produce a bad as well as a good effect, provided (1) it does not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated; and (2) the good effect produced is sufficient to compensate for the bad. (Page 158.)

The chief reason why Dr. McDonald wrote his book was, it will be remembered, to remedy a defect in other authors. As he says, just before the statement of his new principle: —

I am convinced that when they come to practical work our theologians retain their sound common sense and forget or neglect the general principle which they were at such pains to establish at an earlier period, when treating of what I may call the metaphysics of moral science. (Page 157.)

Unless I am very much mistaken this procedure will be necessary in the case of Dr. McDonald’s own principle. In fact, he himself virtually acknowledges as much. On two conditions, he says, an external action will be morally good, even though it produces a bad as well as a good effect; first, it must not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated. But which are those beings which by nature are not to be subordinated? Unless this is known, it will not be possible to apply the general principle. It will only be a general rule of conduct in so far as it enables us to decide the morality of particular cases. However, Dr. McDonald confesses that there is no general rule that can be given.

It is reasonable to ask [he says] how one is to decide whether and how far any being is by nature subservient to another. I know of no general rule that may be applied; one has to go through the different essences in nature, examine their circumstances, compare them, and then decide whether and how far they are independent or subservient. (Page 163.)

To go through the different essences in nature, examine their circumstances, and compare them, is the work of a theologian, and not an easy task even for him; so that there will be no slight difficulty in discovering whether the first condition is verified in a particular case.

The second condition is, that the good effect produced should be sufficient to compensate for the bad. Now this seems identical with one of the conditions ordinarily required by theologians in the common statement of the principle of a double effect. “ There must be a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect,’ says Father Lehmkuhl, quoted above. Dr. McDonald would seem to have forgotten his criticism of that condition in the former connection: “Nor does it help much,” he wrote, “to be informed that the good effect produced must bear some proportion to the evil” (page 150). If it did not help much there, I cannot see how it can help much here. Furthermore, he confesses that here also no general rule can be given for deciding whether the good effect is sufficient to compensate for the bad (page 165). The circumstances must be balanced in particular cases, certain allowances have to be made; what those allowances are is a question which the writer on ethics has to face when he comes to treat of the separate virtues; in doing this he must draw liberally on the light supplied by other practical sciences. The work, evidently, is not child’s play; in any case the result will not help us much.

I am afraid practical moralists will not find Dr. McDonald’s principle of much use. It is as difficult to decide whether the conditions laid down are verified, as to decide the moral quality of the external action.

Moreover, unless I seriously misunderstand the Doctor’s meaning, the principle is inadequately formulated. As laid down it would allow actions to be done which are certainly wrong. For example: I am in poverty, and I have the opportunity of relieving my wants and those of my family by stealing £5 from a wealthy neighbor. This action produces a good and a bad effect; it relieves my want, though to be sure it also deprives my neighbor of a sum which he will hardly miss. The action will be lawful, according to Dr. McDonald, on condition that it does not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated, and if the good effect is sufficient to compensate for the bad. Both these conditions would seem to be verified by my action. I subordinate money to human wants, as by nature it should be subordinated; the good effect is out of all proportion to the bad. The money in my hands goes to feed my family, in the hands of its owner it would go to feed his dogs.

I must confess I do not see why this is not a legitimate application of Dr. McDonald’s principle; it is with the purpose of excluding such applications of the principle of a double effect that theologians require, as a first condition, that the action in itself should be good, or at least indifferent; but Dr. McDonald rejects that condition as involving the whole question at issue.

Besides the principle of a double effect, Dr. McDonald adversely criticizes the common doctrine about penal laws. However, his chief objections to that doctrine are not new; they appear to me to have been abundantly answered by such classical writers on Law as Suarez and Laymann. Besides, I should very much doubt whether the Doctor’s rather strict views on this point are at all general in the land of potheen. It will be more interesting to pass on to his criticism of the fundamental principle of Probabilism and Equiprobabilism alike, the principle that doubtful laws do not bind the conscience.

This principle is capable of being understood in several ways. All theologians hold that doubtful laws bind in some sense. Thus, in a case of practical doubt as to the existence of a law I am bound to make due inquiry, and I am not at liberty to act until I can, directly or reflexly, form a certain conscience on the question. Dr. McDonald strives to show that there is no general law which obliges one in doubt to acquire certainty as to the rightness of his action before he proceeds to act. (Page 199, sqq.) But surely the law which forbids us to act with a doubtful conscience binds us to do this. Quod non est ex fide peccatum est. If I doubt whether it be a day of abstinence or not, and eat meat without taking any pains to form a certain conscience, I commit a sin, and that whether it be a day of abstinence or not. For the very fact of my eating meat in spite of my being doubtful whether it is not forbidden by the Church shows that I am prepared to break the law of the Church about abstinence, and this is a sinful disposition, which is externated by my eating meat, which act therefore is a sin, whether there be a prohibition to eat meat on that day or not. This explains why it is always a sin to eat meat with a doubtful conscience, even when the doubtful law does not exist. How would Dr. McDonald explain this on his assumption that doubtful laws bind directly and of their own force? A law which does not exist cannot bind. Dr. McDonald’s argument, therefore, seems destitute of force. The fact that the sin committed by one who acts in doubt is of the same species as would be the sin committed against the doubtful law if it existed, does not show that a doubtful law binds the conscience; it only proves that there is a general law which prescribes that we must form a certain conscience before we act.

Moreover, a doubtful law may in a certain sense be said to bind after due inquiry has been made, and the doubt cannot be directly solved. If, after forming my conscience in this case I act against the law which really exists, I commit a material sin, but I am excused from formal guilt. All theologians, I think, also admit this. The doubtful law is said in such cases to bind imperfectly, in actu primo, not perfectly and in actu secundo. Dr. McDonald hardly seems to admit the validity of this distinction as applied to the obligation of law, and almost violently attacks the defenders of probabilism, who use it in the exposition of their system. His remarks, however, show that he has misunderstood its history and meaning.

I do not know [he writes] when or by whom this distinction between first and second act was introduced into treatises on the binding force of laws. St. Alphonsus took it, apparently, from Cardinal Gotti; and the curious in such matters may inquire whether the learned Cardinal is responsible for first transferring the terms in question from the treatises on actuality and activity, where they were found originally and where they serve some purpose, to treatises on law and its obligation, where they are almost without meaning. (Page 206.)

But surely treatises on law and its obligation are treatises on actuality and activity. This appeared so evident to Suarez that he took it for granted at the beginning of his great treatise on Laws.²

² Lib. I., c. iv., n. 3.

There can be no objection, then, to using the distinction, in actu primo and in actu secundo, of the different phases in which we may consider the obligation of laws. Such classical authors as Suarez and Sylvius used it in this sense long before Gotti wrote. The very term obligation is derived from physical activity, as St. Thomas explains in a celebrated passage: —

The command of some ruler stands in relation to binding in voluntary matters by that mode of binding which can befall the will, just as bodily action stands in relation to binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never induces necessity in another thing except through the contact of the coercion itself with the thing upon which it acts; hence no one is bound by the command of any king or lord unless the command reaches the very person to whom it is given; and it reaches him through knowledge. Hence no one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept; and therefore one who is not capable of knowledge is not bound by a precept, nor is anyone ignorant of a precept of God bound to fulfill the precept, except insofar as he is bound to know the precept. But if he is not bound to know it and does not know it, he is in no way bound by the precept. Just as in bodily things a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge.

It is difficult, then, to see what ground Dr. McDonald has for objecting to a distinction which is in accord with the nature of things, and which has been consecrated by the usage of centuries in the schools. His subsequent remarks, however, show that he has seriously misunderstood the meaning in which the distinction is used.

ETHICS has a special place in the Christian religion. Lactantius, writing under the Emperor Constantine, points out this fundamental difference between paganism and the true religion. Pagan religion, he says, is concerned only with external rites and ceremonies performed in honor of the gods; it gives no precepts of righteousness and virtue; it does not form and cultivate men’s characters.¹ On the other hand, ethics forms an essential part of the Christian religion. Christ was called Jesus because He came among us to save us from our sins. This He did not only by atoning for them, but by His example, His teaching, and His grace He showed us how to lead good lives and enabled us to do it. He came to do and to teach, so that not only His words but His actions, too, were lessons to us in conduct. He proposed Himself to us as the Way by which we should walk; He bade us follow His example; He taught us to learn of Him meekness, humility, and all virtues. In Him God, our Creator and Lord, was revealed to us; He is our first beginning and last end. To Him we must refer and order our whole lives and our every action. We are His stewards, and when life comes to an end each of us will be called upon to render a strict account to Him, as our judge, of every thought, word, and action of our lives. Heaven will be the reward of the faithful servant, eternal suffering in hell will be the just punishment of the wicked.

¹ De Divinis Instit., iv, c. 3.

Before finally quitting the earth Our Lord founded His Church, a hierarchical society of men, to continue the work which He had begun for the sanctification and salvation of the whole human race. His last solemn commission to His apostles was a command to teach men to observe all that He had commanded; certain truths had been revealed to them concerning God, as well as moral rules for their guidance, but even the truths concerning God were not merely speculative; they, too, were revealed for the sanctification and salvation of men. A duty of submission of the intellect, under pain of eternal damnation, was laid on all who heard the Gospel preached. The basis of Christian morality thus rests firmly established on the word of God, requiring unwavering faith, not on the uncertain and shifting sands of human opinion. That Gospel contained not only moral precepts which are obligatory on all, but counsels also of great perfection which those who had the moral strength were encouraged to adopt as rules for the conduct of their lives. The perfect holiness of God Himself was held up as the model which they were to imitate and the lofty ideal at which they were ever to aim.

This revelation of Christ was committed to the Church as a sacred deposit to be faithfully kept, guarded from all admixture of error, and diligently preached to men for their instruction, guidance, sanctification, and salvation. The Catholic Church has always understood that this was the object of her foundation by Jesus Christ. That was her mission, to preach the Gospel, to keep the deposit of faith, to teach what Christ had revealed, and not to allow it to be changed or corrupted even by an angel from heaven. It is the boast of the Catholic Church that by the assistance which Christ promised her, through the constant guidance of the indwelling Spirit of Truth which He sent down upon her, she has faithfully accomplished her task. In spite of enemies within and without, in defiance of the hostile powers of hell and of the unbelieving world, she has persisted through the ages in preaching in season and out of season the divine revelation which was committed to her faithful keeping. At first sight it might seem that no history of such a system of doctrine is possible. History is the scientific narration of the varying fortunes and changes which befall the subject of it. What history can there be of a system of doctrine which has always been the same?

The Christian revelation as taught by the Catholic Church does indeed always remain the same in itself, objectively, as it was completed when the last of the apostles died. This revelation, and nothing else, the Church was commissioned to keep and to preach to the end of time for the salvation of men. It is the Church’s greatest boast, as it is her highest claim to our gratitude, that she has ever preserved unsullied through the ages the divine teaching of Jesus of Nazareth. No man ever taught like Him. The moral doctrine which He inculcated by word and by deed is the loftiest ideal of conduct which has ever been manifested to the world. It cannot be improved upon, and it is impious to attempt to change it. The Catholic denies that it has been changed in the Catholic Church. Non-Catholic historians of Christian morals profess to discover instances of change, but this is due to their own philosophical or religious presuppositions. Thus when the Lutheran Dr. Luthardt discovers in the “Didaché,”

written as he acknowledges at the end of the first century, “the beginnings of a false view of works,”¹ we reply that the same view of works appears in the documents that make up the New Testament, and that it is not false. Lecky discovered a change of view as to the lawfulness of taking human life when Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire.² In proof of this he quotes Lactantius and one or two other Fathers who held that it is never lawful to take human life. It would not be difficult to quote instances of Christian writers up to our own days who have held the same doctrine, and one might deduce therefrom an argument to show either that Christian morality had progressed, or deteriorated, or had remained stagnant for nineteen centuries, according to the exigencies of one’s philosophical system. Harnack discovers the sources of Catholic monachism in the writings of St. Methodius.³ The Catholic sees them writ large in the Gospel of St. Matthew.

¹ History of Christian Ethics, p. 117.

² History of European Morals, ii, p. 42.

³ History of Dogma, iii, p. 110.

These instances will show why the Catholic cannot accept the accounts of growth, change, and decay which are given in many so-called histories of Christian morals. Nevertheless, he allows that there is a progress and development which admits of being traced historically. The Catholic Church has always been explicit on this point. After teaching that the revealed doctrines of the Faith were not proposed by God to man’s intellect to be improved upon like some philosophical system, but were committed to the Church as a divine deposit to be faithfully kept and infallibly explained, the Council of the Vatican could find no better terms in which to describe true development of that doctrine than those which had been used by St. Vincent of Lerins in the fifth century.

“Therefore,” it says, “let the understanding, knowledge, and wisdom of each and of all, of individuals as well as of the whole Church, increase and make much and great progress through the ages and the centuries; but only in its own line, that is, in the same truth, in the same sense, and in the same thought.”¹ Change in Christian dogma and moral we refuse to accept or to acknowledge; we readily admit that there has been and ought to be development. The precepts of Christian morality have not always been equally well understood; what was obscure and uncertain has been made more clear and certain. The existence of different conditions, circumstances, and wants, in different ages and countries, necessitated some change in the adjustment of the teaching to the varying surroundings. New duties arose from new positive legislation. Besides, the science of Christian morals is not a mere exposition of the moral precepts of the Gospel and of the positive legislation of the Church. Books have been written containing such an exposition in the very words of Scripture, like the “Speculum” of St. Augustine, and the “Scintillæ” attributed to Venerable Bede,² but such as these are not works of moral theology. The science of moral theology arranges its subject-matter in an orderly and logical way; it shows the grounds and the reasons of the doctrine, it harmonizes part with part so as to form a compact and systematic body of doctrine. All this is the work of time and of many minds, and it admits of historical treatment. In the brief space at our disposal we propose to trace at any rate the chief stages in the development of Catholic moral theology. Our history may conveniently be divided into three periods; the first will embrace the age of the Fathers, the second that of the scholastics, the third will be the modern period.

¹ Vatican, sess. iii, c. 4.

² Migne, P. L. 88, 598.

The end for which Jesus Christ established His Church was the sanctification and salvation of souls. This end the Church was to obtain chiefly by preaching the Gospel which her Founder had revealed and by administering the sacraments which He had instituted.¹ Men were to be sanctified and prepared for eternity by holy living through the grace of God communicated to them principally by means of the sacraments. The Gospels contain a short summary of the general teaching of Jesus Christ; this is developed somewhat in certain directions in the other writings of the New Testament, but the preachers of the Word soon found it convenient to have by them brief summaries of the moral teaching of Our Lord by itself. This need was met by such works as the “Didaché,” or “Teaching of the Twelve Apostles,” composed about the end of the first century, and the “Pastor” of Hermas, written a little later. It would be utterly impossible to give even an outline of the ethical works of all the Fathers of the Church. Together they form a very voluminous and complete course of moral theology, and more than one such course has been put together by simply printing a consecutive selection of their works. Thus in 1791 an Italian priest, Angelo Cigheri, published at Florence his “Veterum Patrum Theologia Universa,” in thirteen volumes quarto, of which the three last are devoted to morals. A fairly complete catalogue of ethical works by the Fathers will be found in the indices of Migne’s “Patrology,” arranged under the separate headings which figure in our modern manuals of moral theology. All that we can do here is to select a few typical works which exhibit the gradual development of the science of Christian Ethics. The “Didaché” may be looked upon as the first handbook of morals which has come down to us, and it will be worth while to give a short analysis of its contents.

¹ Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.

This first handbook of moral theology begins with the first general principle of ethics. All righteousness is summed up in the general precept to avoid evil and do good. The doing of good consists of the observance of the two great commandments of love for our God and for our neighbor. The golden rule is added to the statement of the general first principles of morality. “There are two ways,” we read, “one of life and one of death; and there is much difference between the two ways. Now the way of life is this: First thou shalt love God that made thee; secondly, thy neighbor as thyself; and all things whatsoever thou wouldest should not happen to thee, neither do thou to another.” The rest of the first chapter is occupied with a development of the precept of love for our neighbor, expressed for the most part in the language of the Sermon on the Mount. The second chapter enumerates some of the principal negative duties toward our neighbor. A similar enumeration occupies the third chapter, but here there is an attempt to give the reason for the different prohibitions, as, for example: “Be not prone to anger, for anger leads to murder; neither a zealot, nor contentious, nor passionate; for from all these things murders are begotten.” In the fourth chapter are set down the duties toward preachers of the Gospel, of making peace, of judging righteously, of almsgiving; duties toward parents, children, servants; of avoiding hypocrisy, and not adding to or taking away from the precepts of the Lord which they had been taught. The chapter concludes with, “This is the way of life.”

The fifth chapter consists of a long enumeration of sins, and ends with the prayer, “May ye be delivered, children, from all these.”

In the sixth chapter there is a warning against being led away from this teaching by any one, for such a one would not teach according to God. A distinction is drawn between what is required for perfection and what is morally possible. The faithful are bidden specially to beware of what has been sacrificed to idols.

A brief instruction on Baptism occupies the seventh chapter, and in the eighth Christians are taught to fast on Wednesdays and Fridays, so that their fasting-days may be different from those of the Jews, who fasted on Mondays and Thursdays. They are told to say the “Our Father” three times a day. The ninth and tenth chapters give instructions on the celebration of the Eucharist, while the two following deal with the way in which prophets and strangers should be received. The thirteenth chapter prescribes the offering of first-fruits. In the next chapter the faithful are instructed to meet together on every Lord’s Day, to offer the Eucharistic Sacrifice, after confessing their sins, so that their sacrifice may be pure. Enemies, too, should be reconciled lest the sacrifice be defiled. It was of this sacrifice that Malachias prophesied. The fifteenth chapter deals with the election of bishops and deacons and the respect which is due to them. The duties of fraternal correction, of prayer and almsdeeds, are enjoined as they are contained in the Gospel of Our Lord. The last chapter contains an exhortation to watch, and inculcates the necessity of faith and perseverance, for Antichrist will appear and seduce many. The treatise concludes with a short description of the signs of the last day.

The whole of the second Book of the “Pastor” of Hermas is a document of early Christian moral teaching very similar to the “Didaché,” but more attempt may be observed in it to show the connection between one prohibition and another, and to give reasons and motives for their observance.

A great advance is observable in the catechetical works of Clement of Alexandria. They are almost exclusively devoted to moral teaching, which their learned author illustrates and confirms by constant quotations from the Greek classical authors. With an enthusiastic and personal love for Jesus Christ, and faith in His teaching as a divine and full revelation of the truth to men, he combines a high esteem for reason and philosophy. According to Clement, philosophy was the pedagogue of the pagan world, preparing it for Christ and leading it to Him, as the law did the Jews. Philosophy is the handmaid of theology, he says, and the dictates of reason are but the promptings of the Word which illuminates every man that cometh into the world. This, of course, is but a development of ideas which we find in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, and it is a natural consequence of Christian teaching concerning God and His relation to man and to the world. It is a very superficial view which regards the action of Clement and other Fathers in the use they made of reason and philosophy as a corrupting influence in Christian teaching. With them, as with the scholastics in the Middle Ages, that action was the necessary result of a firm faith in the Gospel message, and the natural desire to understand it and penetrate its full meaning as far as possible. It was Fides quaerens intellectum, the moving spirit of Catholic theology from the beginning. Better than any lengthy exposition, an extract or two from Clement will show how far the science of moral theology had progressed at the end of the second century. The following extract is taken from an apologetic work entitled “An Exhortation to the Heathen.”

“Wherefore, since the Word Himself has come to us from heaven, we need not, I reckon, go any more in search of human learning to Athens and the rest of Greece, and to Ionia. For if we have as our teacher Him that filled the universe with His holy energies in creation, salvation, beneficence, legislation, prophecy, teaching, we have the Teacher from whom all instruction comes; and the whole world, with Athens and Greece, has already become the domain of the Word. For you, who believed the poetical fable which designated Minos the Cretan as the bosom friend of Zeus, will not refuse to believe that we who have become the disciples of God have received the only true wisdom; and that which the chiefs of philosophy only guessed at, the disciples of Christ have both apprehended and proclaimed.”¹

¹ Exhortation to the Heathen, c. 11.

The next extract from the “Pædagogus,” a work containing instructions for recent converts, shows the place which reason or conscience holds in Christian ethics.

“Everything that is contrary to right reason is sin. Accordingly, therefore, the philosophers think fit to define the most generic passions thus: lust, as desire disobedient to reason; fear, as weakness disobedient to reason; pleasure, as an elation of the spirit disobedient to reason. If, then, disobedience in reference to reason is the generating cause of sin, how shall we escape the conclusion that obedience to reason,—the Word,—which we call Faith, will of necessity be the efficacious cause of duty? For virtue itself is a state of the soul rendered harmonious by reason in respect to the whole life. Nay, to crown all, philosophy itself is pronounced to be the cultivation of right reason; so that, necessarily, whatever is done through error of reason is transgression, and is rightly called sin.”¹

¹ Pædagogus, i, c. 13.

The “Stromata,” or “Miscellanies,” are a collection of materials for the ethical instruction and training of the Christian theologian. The philosophical and theological detail to which Clement descends in the treatment of his subject may be illustrated by an extract from the fourteenth chapter of the second Book of the “Stromata,” on the different ways in which an act may be involuntary. The matter of course belongs to the treatise on Human Acts, sometimes said to be the last treatise which was added to our manuals of morals.

“What is involuntary is not matter for judgment. But this is twofold—what is done in ignorance, and what is done through necessity. For how will you judge concerning those who are said to sin in involuntary modes? For either one knew not himself, as Cleomenes and Athamas, who were mad; or the thing which he does, as Æschylus, who divulged the mysteries on the stage, who being tried in the Areopagus was absolved on his showing that he had never been initiated. Or one knows not what is done, as he who has let off his antagonist, and slain his domestic instead of his enemy; or that by which it is done, as he who in exercising with spears having buttons on them, has killed some one in consequence of the spear throwing off the button; or knows not the manner how, as he who has killed his antagonist in the stadium, for it was not for his death but for victory that he contended; or knows not the reason why it is done, as the physician who gave a salutary antidote and killed, for it was not for this purpose that he gave it, but to save.”¹

¹ Stromata, ii, c. 14.

As yet no attempt had been made in the Church to write a systematic treatise of morals by reducing the various virtues and vices to logical order under appropriate general principles. This step was taken by St. Ambrose at the end of the fourth century. This great Father and Doctor of the Church composed his work “De Officiis” for the instruction of the clergy of his church of Milan. He expressly tells us that he followed Cicero’s work with the same title as his pattern. Cicero wrote his book for the instruction of his son; St. Ambrose desired to write for the instruction of his spiritual children. Although he followed Cicero closely in the arrangement and treatment of the matter, yet he never loses sight of what appears to have been the chief motive that he had in view in the composition of his work; namely, to demonstrate the superiority of Christian over pagan ethics.

The work is divided, like Cicero’s, into three Books. In the first he treats of what is honorable and dishonorable. He points out that the philosophic distinction between ordinary and perfect virtue has its counterpart in the Gospel, which distinguishes between what is matter of strict precept and of counsel. Certain elementary duties, as those toward parents and elders, are touched on, and then follows a discussion on the four cardinal virtues. The second Book treats of what is expedient with reference to eternal life. The third Book treats of what is honorable and expedient in conjunction, and the author has no difficulty in reconciling these conflicting principles according to Christian teaching. “For,” he writes, “I said that nothing can be virtuous but what is useful, and nothing can be useful but what is virtuous. For we do not follow the wisdom of the flesh, whereby the usefulness that consists in an abundance of money is held to be of most value, but we follow the wisdom which is of God, whereby those things which are greatly valued in this world are counted but as loss. For this κατόρθωμα, which is duty carried out entirely and in perfection, starts from the true source of virtue. On this follows another, or ordinary duty. This shows by its name that no hard or extraordinary practice of virtue is involved, for it can be common to very many.”¹ This principle of perfection is then applied to the pursuit of gain and other questions.

¹ De Officiis, iii, c. 2.

A very famous book of morals, somewhat more restricted in scope than the “De Officiis” of St. Ambrose, is the “Pastoral Care” of St. Gregory the Great. This, together with the same author’s “Morals” on Job, was a favorite textbook in the Middle Ages. It lays down the qualities required in those who have the cure of souls, how they themselves should live, how they should instruct and admonish those subject to their authority. The book was brought to England by St. Augustine and translated into English by King Alfred for the benefit of the bishops and priests of his kingdom.

A word must here be said on Christian asceticism, which has been so utterly misunderstood and misrepresented by such writers as Lecky and Harnack, and whose true relation to Christian morals is so seldom perceived by non-Catholic authors.

Christ our Lord expressly taught that renunciation of self, of the world with its riches and pleasures, was in a certain sense a necessary condition of discipleship. This renunciation, however, admitted of different degrees, as is also plain from the Gospels. Some were called only to spiritual poverty and detachment, and these hoped to save their souls by remaining in the world without being of it. Outwardly they lived much like other people, but their affections were detached from this world and centered on God and eternity. They went to heaven by the way of the commandments. Others, on the contrary, voluntarily embraced the counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience, given by Our Lord to those who were called, and who felt that they had the spiritual strength to follow the call. They made a special profession of following the counsels, and were assigned a place of honor in the Christian assemblies, but at first they seem to have lived in the bosom of their families. They soon, however, began to find it very difficult to persevere in their adopted form of life while exposed to the distractions and temptations of the world, and this, together with the violence of the persecutions, drove them into the desert. There they lived at first solitary lives as hermits, but before long they began to come together and put themselves under the authority of some ancient Father of the desert renowned for his prudence and sanctity. Their aim was to subdue their passions and ascend the heights of Christian perfection. The task is notoriously difficult both in theory and in practice, and many mistakes were made. The Church had not yet drawn up her minute code of laws for the regulation of religious life. Those writers, however, who industriously pick out the mistakes and the exaggerations of indiscreet fervor, and piece them together to produce a picture of Christian monachism and asceticism, only succeed in producing a caricature. To convince oneself of this it is sufficient to dip into the “Institutes of Monasteries” and the “Conferences” of Cassian, who was in the middle of a long life in the year 400. In the twelve Books of his “Institutes” Cassian describes the dress of the monks, their method of singing the divine office, the training of postulants and novices, and then he devotes the last eight Books to a minute account of the nature, causes, and remedies of the eight principal vices which bar the way to the summit of Christian perfection. He maps out every portion of the pilgrim’s progress to his heavenly country, and shows what dangers and obstacles he will meet by the way. In brief, he says, progress toward perfection begins with the fear of God, from which arises a salutary sorrow for sin, which leads to renunciation and contempt of the world; this begets humility, from which springs mortification of the will, and by this all vices are subdued and extirpated. Then all virtues begin to flourish in the soul, which thus arrives at purity of heart and the perfection of apostolic charity.¹

¹ De Coenobiorum Institutis, lib. iv, c. 43.

The vices to be overcome are classed under eight different heads by Cassian, and he says that the classification was admitted by all.² These principal or capital vices are typified by the seven peoples whom the Israelites were commanded by God to extirpate when they came into the land of promise. Egypt makes the eighth from which they had been delivered, and which, Cassian says, typifies gluttony. From this vice the monk is indeed delivered by his abandoning the world for the desert, but he may not extirpate it altogether; he should aim only at curbing its excesses. Gregory the Great adopted in substance the teaching of Cassian on the capital vices, but by making pride the queen of all the rest, and placing it in a category by itself, the other seven became the seven deadly sins which with their daughter vices were so famous in the literature of the Middle Ages, and figure in the books of morals and in the catechisms of Christian doctrine to the present day.

² Collatio v, c. 18.

To show how conservative the Catholic tradition has been even in the expression of doctrine I will give the following passage in St. Gregory’s own words:

“For when pride, the queen of the vices, has fully taken possession of the conquered heart, it immediately hands it over to the seven principal vices, as though to certain leaders of its own, to be laid waste. An army, namely, follows these leaders, because from them without doubt troublesome multitudes of vices arise. We show this better if, as far as we are able, we bring forward by enumeration the leaders themselves and their army individually. For the root of every evil is pride, concerning which, Scripture bearing witness, it is said:

“The beginning of every sin is pride (Ecclus. x. 15). Its first offspring, moreover, namely the seven principal vices, are brought forth from this poisonous root: vainglory, envy, anger, sadness, avarice, gluttony of the belly, lust. For because He grieved that we had been taken captive by these seven vices of pride, for that reason our Redeemer came to the spiritual battle of liberation full of the spirit of sevenfold grace.

“But each of these has its own army against us. For from vainglory arise disobedience, boasting, hypocrisy, contentions, obstinacies, discords, and presumptions of innovations. From envy arise hatred, whispering, detraction, exultation in a neighbor’s adversities, but affliction at his prosperity. From anger are brought forth quarrels, swelling of mind, insults, clamor, indignation, blasphemies. From sadness arise malice, rancor, faintheartedness, despair, sluggishness concerning the precepts, and wandering of the mind toward unlawful things. From avarice arise treachery, fraud, deceit, perjuries, restlessness, acts of violence, and hardenings of the heart against mercy. From gluttony of the belly are propagated foolish joy, scurrility, uncleanness, much speaking, and dullness of sense concerning understanding. From lust are generated blindness of mind, inconsideration, inconstancy, precipitation, love of self, hatred of God, attachment to the present age, but horror or despair of the future. Therefore, because the seven principal vices bring forth from themselves so great a multitude of vices, when they come to the heart, they drag with them, as it were, the bands of the army that follows. Of these seven, namely, five are spiritual and two are carnal.”¹

¹ Moralium, lib. xxxi, c. 45.

The “Conferences” of Cassian are represented by him as the teachings of celebrated abbots on various questions of the spiritual life. They are partly speculative, partly practical. There are twenty-four in all, each being divided into a greater or less number of chapters. These two works have provided an ample store of moral and ascetical doctrine for all subsequent Catholic writers on the subjects treated in them.

A large portion of moral theology is taken up with the duties arising from the positive legislation of the Church. In this legislation we have the practical application of Christian moral principles to the varying requirements of time and place, and change and variety are here conspicuous. With the establishment of the Christian religion the positive precepts of the Mosaic law ceased to be binding, but the Church received from her divine Founder authority to make new laws for the sanctification and salvation of her children. The apostles used this legislative authority, as we see from the Epistles of St. Paul, especially from those to Timothy and Titus, and within twenty years after the Ascension we find them legislating in the Council of Jerusalem on the disputed question of legal observances. The decree which we have in the Acts¹ was a true positive law imposing a new obligation on the faithful concerned, as long as the peculiar circumstances of the time rendered its observance desirable and necessary.² This council of the apostles formed the type and pattern for the ecumenical and provincial councils of the Church which were to be held in the future. Innumerable laws and regulations have been enacted by these, affecting Catholic life, discipline, and worship. The Bishops, too, as successors of the apostles have continued in all ages to exercise the legislative authority committed to them by God and the Church. The Roman Pontiffs, especially, in the exercise of their jurisdiction over the whole Church in succession to Blessed Peter, have in all ages made wise laws for the peace and prosperity of the Christian people. As instances of this action of the Popes in the early centuries may be mentioned St. Clement’s first epistle to the Corinthians in the first century, St. Victor’s decision about the observance of Easter in the second century, St. Stephen’s about the baptism of heretics in the third, and similar action on the part of Popes Liberius, Damasus, and Siricius. Subsequently papal decisions became frequent and notorious. Collections of the decisions issuing from all these sources of positive law began to be made in very early times. Of these some have survived the ravages of time. The “Didascalia of the Apostles” may in the judgment of the learned be ascribed to the first half of the third century, and the so-called “Constitutions of the Apostles” together with the “Canons of the Apostles” to the early part of the fifth century. The materials of which these collections are composed are, of course, still more ancient. At the beginning of the fourth century the decrees of the councils were collected and arranged at first in chronological order in the East. At the beginning of the sixth century systematic collections arranged under suitable titles began to appear. Of these early collections of canons the most celebrated is that of John the Scholastic. In the West, Dionysius Exiguus made his translation of Greek canons into Latin about the year 500. A copy of this collection was presented by the Pope to Charlemagne when he was in Rome, and he caused it to be received and approved by the clergy of his empire in 802 at the great Council of Aix la Chapelle. Collections of Church laws continued to grow in number and in bulk until in the twelfth century the monk Gratian issued his “Decretum” which became the most famous of them all, and still forms the first volume of the “Corpus Juris Canonici.” It contains some 4000 decisions on law and morals taken from the decrees of Popes, the canons of councils both general and particular, the opinions of the Fathers, and even from the civil law.

¹ Acts xv. 28, 29.

² It ceased to bind in the Latin Church about the ninth century.

No attempt of course can be made in this short sketch to trace the varying phases through which the innumerable positive laws of the Church have passed. It will be sufficient for our purpose to trace in outline those chief precepts which bind all Catholics and which are specially known as the precepts of the Church. They are usually reckoned six in number: the due observance of Sundays and feast-days, the days of fasting and abstinence, confession and communion, the support of pastors, and the prohibition of marriage within certain degrees of kindred and of its solemnization at certain times of the year.

The observance of the Sunday and its substitution for the Sabbath appears to be due to apostolic institution. There are traces of it in the New Testament; in the “Didaché” the faithful are bidden to come together on the Lord’s Day, as it was called even then in honor of the Resurrection, and offer the eucharistic sacrifice after confessing their sins. In the second century the custom of observing the Lord’s Day was universal throughout the Church. The chief duty to be performed on that day was to hear Mass. Very soon particular provincial laws began to be enacted urging the obligation and imposing penalties on transgressors. At the beginning of the fourth century the Council of Elliberis in Spain decreed that any one who might be absent from Mass on three successive Sundays should be deprived of communion. The Council of Agde at the beginning of the sixth century prescribed that all were to hear an entire Mass on Sunday and not leave until after the blessing of the priest on pain of a public reprehension by the Bishop.

It was natural that when Sunday became the Christian Sabbath it should be kept much in the same way as the Jews kept their Sabbath. While knowing from the teaching of Our Lord Himself that pharisaic exaggeration was to be avoided in this matter, and from St. Paul that the sabbatical rest was no longer of obligation, still St. Cæsarius of Arles in the sixth century expressly says that the Doctors of the Church decreed to transfer all the honor of the Sabbath to the Lord’s Day. The very necessity of hearing Mass on that day made a certain abstention from work also necessary. Tertullian testifies to the Christian custom of his day in this respect. Constantine prescribed that judges and artisans in towns should abstain from work on the Sunday, but that agriculture should be allowed on account of necessity. The strictness with which the Sunday repose was observed varied somewhat according to time and place in the period with which we are dealing.

Besides the Sunday other feast-days began gradually to be observed in the same manner by hearing Mass and abstaining from servile work. Easter and Pentecost were assigned to movable Sundays, but the days on which renowned martyrs suffered for the Faith, those on which churches were dedicated, Ascension Day, Christmas Day, and the Epiphany, were soon added to the list. The letter of the Church of Smyrna concerning the martyrdom of St. Polycarp in the middle of the second century expresses the intention of celebrating the anniversary of the day of martyrdom with joy, both in memory of those who had suffered and as a preparation for those who survived.¹

¹ Cf. A. Villien, Histoire des Commandements de l’Église, 1909.

As the Christian Church took over the Jewish Sabbath but changed the day on which it was observed and rejected the exaggerations of the Pharisees in its observance, so, too, it adopted the Jewish practice of fasting at stated times. As we have seen from the “Didaché” the fast of Monday and Thursday was changed into one on Wednesday and Friday. The obligation of fasting on all Wednesdays and Fridays ceased almost entirely about the tenth century, but the fixing of those days by ecclesiastical authority for fasting, and the desire to substitute a Christian observance at Rome for certain pagan rites celebrated in connection with the seasons of the year, seem to have given rise to our Ember Days. In the time of St. Leo, in the middle of the fifth century, the Ember Days were a settled institution, though the time at which they fell varied somewhat at different times and in different places.

The earliest indication that we have of the fast of Lent is contained in a short extract from Irenæus which has been preserved for us by Eusebius.² Writing to Pope Victor about the middle of the second century, St. Irenæus says that the controversy in the East was not merely about the proper time of celebrating Easter but also about the manner of fasting. “For some think,” he says, “that they ought to fast only one day, some two, some more days; some compute their day as consisting of forty hours night and day; and this diversity existing among those that observe it is not a matter that has just sprung up in our times, but long ago among those before us, who perhaps not having ruled with sufficient strictness, established the practice that arose from their simplicity and inexperience, and yet with all these maintained peace, and we have maintained peace with one another; and the very difference in our fasting establishes the unanimity of our faith.” At the time this was written the Lenten fast was obviously very short, and there was no uniformity even in its duration. Tertullian, fifty years later, refers to the Lenten observance as the fulfillment of the words of Our Lord: “But the days will come when the bridegroom shall be taken away from them—then shall they fast in those days.”

² Historia ecclesiastica, v, c. 24.

The first allusion to a period of forty days’ fast occurs in the fifth canon of the Council of Nicæa (325). In the time of St. Leo in the fifth century the period was sufficiently well established to be referred by him to apostolic institution. The period was six weeks, but omitting Sundays the actual fasting days were only thirty-six in number. The four days before the first Sunday of Lent were added sometime in the seventh century. The fasts assigned to certain vigils arose from the practice of the early Christians of assembling on the eve of a feast and spending the night in prayer, fasting, and reading the Scriptures. By degrees matins took the place of the night office, and the vigil office was moved back to the Saturday morning, as we see to this day from the morning office of Holy Saturday. The fast was thus prolonged through the Saturday till after the morning office of the feast of next day.

The fast which used to be observed on the rogation days took its rise in France at the close of the fifth century and by degrees spread to other Churches. The interrupted fast of Advent was introduced as a preparation for Christmas toward the end of the fourth century. The manner of fasting has varied greatly at different times and in different places. At first the fast seems to have been absolute and continuous. During the days of the bridegroom’s absence the faithful neither ate nor drank anything. When the period was lengthened such a total fast became impossible, but at least in the East food was restricted on fast days to one meal of bread, salt, and water, taken in the evening, or at least not before three in the afternoon. In the time of St. Gregory fish was allowed at the single meal in the West. Flesh meat was never allowed on fasting days.

The essence of fasting is still placed by theologians in the single meal, but many relaxations have crept in by degrees. The monks while listening to a Collatio of Cassian before going to bed introduced the practice of drinking an acidulated liquor called posca. By degrees fruits and lighter kinds of food in limited quantity were added, and when about the thirteenth century the full meal began to be taken at twelve midday, the evening collation became an established practice.

IN his translation of "The German War Book," Professor J. H. Morgan makes such reflections as the following: "It will be obvious that the German staff are nothing if not casuists."¹ "This represents 'The German War Book' in its most disagreeable light, and is casuistry of the worst kind."² It is taken for granted that no more severe condemnation of immoral reasoning could be uttered than to say that it is casuistical. Some justification of this opprobrious meaning attached to casuistry is furnished by the Gospel. The condemnation of the Pharisees by Our Lord could hardly be more severe, and one reason for

¹ P. 3.

² P. 85, note.

that condemnation was their casuistry. "Woe to you, blind guides, that say: Whosoever shall swear by the temple, it is nothing; but he that shall swear by the gold of the temple is a debtor. Ye foolish and blind; for whether is greater, the gold or the temple that sanctifieth the gold?... Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites; because you tithe mint and anise and cummin, and have left the weightier things of the law: judgment and mercy and faith. These things you ought to have done and not to leave those undone."¹

There have been lax casuists in the Catholic Church who deserved severe condemnation of this kind, as we learn from the decrees of Alexander VII, Innocent XI, and Alexander VIII. But the rooted dislike of non-Catholic writers to casuistry is not accounted for merely by its abuses. They seem to condemn casuistry in itself. Catholics find it difficult to understand this atti-

¹ Matt. xxiii. 16-23.

tude of non-Catholics toward casuistry. They think it obvious that very little experience of life shows that sometimes it is difficult to decide what is the right and what the wrong course of action in particular circumstances. What is more natural than for one who wishes to do right to consult some one who has made a special study of morality?

In order to understand this divergence of view we must go back to Luther and the Protestant Reformation. Luther scornfully rejected the Catholic doctrine that the Church is the divinely appointed teacher of faith and morals. He substituted the Bible for the Church, and declared that a believing Christian infallibly interpreted the Bible for himself. "They lie," he says, "who maintain that the Pope is the judge of the Scriptures. Pardon, Squire Pope, I say: he who has faith is a spiritual man, and judges of all things, and is judged by nobody. And if a simple miller's girl, nay a child nine years old, has faith and judges according to the Gospel, the Pope owes obedience and ought to throw himself at their feet, if he means to be a genuine Christian. And this is likewise the duty of all Universities, and learned men and sophists."¹ Bible, but that ideal is applied to conduct and to the particular actions of everyday life by the conscience of each one. The individual conscience is the ultimate judge of right and wrong, and it is worse than impertinent intrusion for any one else, however learned he may be, to trespass within those sacred precincts. If this be the main principle of Christian morals, there is obviously no room for the casuist and for casuistry. We see that what history has taught us was inevitable. In the Lutheran, Calvinistic, and Anglican sects casuistry survived for some time, but now it seems to have disappeared almost entirely. Non-Catholic writers on Christian ethics confine themselves to generalities and ideals without venturing to descend to the ordinary actions of everyday life. In consequence their teaching to a great extent is impractical. Politics, law, international relations, business, all lie outside the sphere of morality, and the inner life of the individual is a sanctuary where no other may intrude.

A recent writer, Otto Ritschl, says that “when the question is asked whether a lie is permissible to save a persecuted person, we still care too little for 'what the conscience of the person concerned decides and what he feels to be quite definitely his duty.' We still fail, he thinks, 'to perceive that one's own conscience is the ultimate judge of what is morally good and bad, and that the judgment of conscience frequently does not coincide with the generally received code of morality.' "²

According to Protestant principles then a believing Christian gets his ideal from the

¹ J. Verres, "Luther: An Historical Portrait," p. 120.

² Mausbach, "Catholic Moral Teaching," p. 87.

This result is intensified by the Protestant view of legalism and Christian liberty. According to Protestant principles the believer's conscience is under the immediate guidance of the Holy Spirit, and is not fettered by commandments and laws. It requires no external guidance in its moral life and it will not tolerate dictation. It instinctively repudiates any attempt to fetter, by casuistical decisions, the freedom which Christ gave us.

Another reason which makes Protestant ethical teaching hopelessly at variance with everyday morality is its refusal to recognize the Gospel distinction between counsels and precepts. Not everything in the Gospel is intended for everybody. Our Lord occasionally proposed an exalted course of moral conduct which he knew was above the moral strength of many. He said: "All men take not this word, but they to whom it is given."¹ And yet Protestants refuse to admit that there are counsels of perfection in the Gospel. They see nothing there but the preceptive will of God.

The effect of the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith alone has been to remove the stress laid by the Catholic Church on good actions. It is true that Luther taught that good works would be the result of justification by faith, just as a good tree produces good fruit. Still he knew by his own experience that this was not uniformly the case, and he considered it no small advantage of his doctrine that good and bad works were thrust into the background by his fundamental theory of justification. As long as faith remained, works, whether good or bad, were of comparatively small account. As long as a Christian man clung to his ideal, was affable and generous, his individual actions ought not to be too closely scrutinized either by himself or by others.

¹ Matt. xix. 11.

Very different from this is the Catholic attitude toward casuistry. As Professor R. M. Wenlez remarks: "Quite obviously, the two conceptions proceed from antagonistic theories of the nature of the Christian religion as a whole."¹

The Catholic has very definite ideas about moral law. He does not look upon the moral law as a collection of more or less arbitrary precepts. He sees in it the expression of the necessary relations which exist among human beings. Those relations follow from the nature of things and they will continue to exist as long as human nature exists. They could not be changed even by God Himself, because they ultimately depend on the essence of God Himself. Luther thought that an action is right because it is accepted as right by God. The Catholic holds that an action is right because it agrees with the right order which

¹ Hastings' "Encyclopaedia of Religion," s. v. Casuistry.

follows from the nature of persons and things, and which God willed when He created them. Because parents are parents and children their offspring, therefore it is right for children to honor their parents. Because human beings are what they are, it is wrong for one to kill another, to steal what belongs to him, or to lie.

Such precepts as Thou shalt not kill are general principles which are to be obeyed in ordinary circumstances. But circumstances change cases and rules. In a just war, in order to defend one's country and one's rights from unjust attack, one may kill the enemy. If it is the only means of saving one's own life one may kill an unjust aggressor in self-defense. The criminal forfeits his life by serious crime and may be put to death by public authority. Those are well recognized exceptions to the general rule, they are the outcome of altered relations which arise from altered circumstances. Right reason affirms that in a conflict of rights, the right of the innocent should prevail over the right of the guilty who provoked the conflict. There may be other cases where it is not so clear whether the right to life has been lost or not. The casuist lays down what is certain and then proceeds to discuss the doubtful cases. In doing this the ordinary casuist does not strive to reduce the moral law to a minimum, nor does he seek to throw off its yoke. There may have been some casuists who yielded to such unworthy motives. Not all doctors or scientific men are honest. But the ordinary casuist tries only to discover what is right or wrong in the nature of things and what right reason prescribes. In his investigations he questions nature and tries to get at nature's verdict, not less than the man of science.

The Catholic maintains that the moral law governs all man's activity. The safety of the race as well as of the individual depends on the right exercise of marital relations. The casuist, therefore, treats of what is right and what is wrong in those relations as in all others connected with human life. He does not wallow in such subjects as one might expect he would from the horror with which Harnack upbraids casuists for their practice. It is, at least, as much the duty of the moralist to investigate what is right and wrong in such matters as for the doctor or the scientist. The books of the casuist are not meant for innocent boys and maidens, they are technical works specially intended for the confessor and parish priest. Mr. MacCunn, in his book, ''The Making of Character," thinks that casuists err in trying to make life conform to their system, instead of making their system conform to life. But what if the casuists' system is merely the moral law, the objective standard to which all human action should conform? Is it a mistake to maintain the absolute supremacy of the moral law?

The same writer thinks that casuists attempt the impossible when they strive to solve all sorts of imaginary or real cases. The complexity of life, he thinks, baffles even the casuist. Mr. MacCunn is mistaken in thinking that this is the aim of the casuist. The casuist is well aware of the infinite complexity of human life. What the casuist has chiefly in view is the training of the student, so that he may become expert in perceiving at a glance what principles are applicable to the solution of any particular case, and so that his judgment may be relied on to apply those principles correctly.

The same writer also thinks that the casuist errs in trying to maintain his system of morals in spite of the fact that the world has outgrown the system. But what if the system of the Catholic moralist is not his own or any other human system? What if it is the will of God Himself made known to man and taught by Jesus Christ? ''Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My word shall not pass away." The world has not yet risen to the height of Christian morality, much less transcended it.

THE subject of this chapter is the moral doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas. That moral doctrine is chiefly to be found in the Second Part of the Summa Theologica of the Angelic Doctor. There he makes use of the philosophic framework provided by Aristotle, and gives an ordered and reasoned account of the traditional Christian teaching on morals. It is familiar to all instructed Catholics. Priests study it to prepare themselves to fulfil the duties of their office. Preachers have recourse to it when preparing their sermons. The Catechism which the children learn at school is a brief summary of it.

The attitude of the learned world outside the Church towards the scholastic doctrine of St Thomas has undergone a notable change during the last few years. The attitude assumed by historians of philosophy during the mid-Victorian era towards Scholasticism was one of supercilious contempt. Nowadays it is quite common to meet with a high appreciation of the acumen, depth, and logical consistency of the Scholastics, and especially of St Thomas. As an instance of this changed attitude I may mention the Bampton Lectures of 1916, published in 1920. They were delivered in London and at Oxford by Dr. Philip Wicksteed. The title under which these lectures were published is: The Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy illustrated from the Works of St Thomas Aquinas. That title is very significant; it tells us how the learned world of to-day regards the problem with which we are dealing. It is studied from the point of view of comparative Religion and Evolution. It is a question of the evolution of human thought on religion and morals.

It is assumed as scientifically proved that the whole universe is constantly changing. As Heraclitus said, everything is in a state of perpetual flux. There is nothing stable, nothing permanent. Man’s nature, his intellect, his will, and therefore his opinions, all share this constant change. Evolution and change are the condition of life. Religion and morals are subject to the same law. Christianity is no exception to the rule. From the first it began to act upon the religious thought of the period which gave it birth. But the religious thought of the period none the less began to react on Christianity. In consequence, Christianity absorbed various elements belonging to pagan religions, ethnic philosophy, and Roman law. Early instances of this reaction are the stoicism of St Ambrose, derived from Cicero, and the Neo-platonism of St Augustine, derived from Plotinus. We have another instance of the same process in St Thomas, who borrowed so largely and openly from Aristotle.

Before going further, let us try to realize how this doctrine of evolution, as commonly understood, affects the science of morals.

It does away with it altogether. If everything that happens is the necessary product of antecedent and necessary causes, there is no such thing as free will or human responsibility. Morality is merely a department of physics, chemistry, or biology. Man is part of Nature. You can describe what man does, just as you can describe what animals, or vegetables, or other forces of Nature do. As in physics you describe the actions and reactions of physical forces, in chemistry the combinations of chemical elements, in biology the development of life, so in morals you describe how man acts in different circumstances. To frame rules as to how man ought to act in different circumstances is unmeaning. You might just as well frame rules as to how oxygen and hydrogen ought to act when they combine to form water.

This is fully realized by many evolutionists. In their hands the science of morals is a merely descriptive or historical science. It describes what men have thought on human conduct; what opinions they have held on particular questions; it cannot say what they ought to think, or say, or do.

Another point is that evolution can tell us nothing about the end of human life. All that the evolutionist knows is that everything is in motion. To what goal or end the motion tends he does not and he cannot know. He cannot know and he does not profess to know the end of human life; the whole question of ends, of final causes, is to him chimerical. Efficient causes are to him the only real causes. And yet, if rules as to what men ought to do are to be formulated, we must know the end of human conduct and of human life. If you are to draw a line as a guide to action you must know in what direction to draw it.

Evolution, then, is not and cannot be a guide to conduct; on the contrary, it abolishes all permanent and authoritative rules of morality. The only rule is for each one to do as he pleases.

An example will help us to realize what I have been saying. The evolutionist holds that monogamous and indissoluble marriage is only one of many ways in which the propagation of the human race has been achieved. He will perhaps go so far as to admit that, on the whole, monogamous and indissoluble marriage gives the best results. Perhaps it would be wise to encourage it as far as possible. But it has never been universally accepted, and in modern society there are signs that monogamous and indissoluble marriage is giving way in favour of much looser relations between the sexes. This tendency without doubt is part of the evolutionary process. If it is, then, pace Huxley, we cannot resist it, because we are part of the cosmic process. That is how evolution affects the practical question of divorce. How can it possibly curb the wild impulses of our lower nature ?

The Catholic, taught by the Church and by St Thomas in her name, looks at the facts from quite a different point of view. He sees and acknowledges that we live in a changing universe, but a changing universe does not explain itself; movement and change postulate an Author who does not change. “As a vesture thou shalt change them and they shall be changed, but thou art always the selfsame and thy years shall not fail.”*

Hence the great fundamental question, which underlies all other questions, as St Thomas says,† is the question of the existence of God. Primo, quaeritur an Deus sit. First of all we ask, Is there a God? he says at the beginning of the Summa Theologica. This is especially necessary in the science of morals. God is our first Beginning and last End. He cannot possibly be ignored or left out of account in the science of duties. Our duty to him is the subject-matter of the first and greatest commandment. God is the infinite source of all Being, and he is also infinite Mind. He has a full and comprehensive knowledge of himself and in himself of all things that exist or are possible. He is thus infinite and unchanging Truth. He made us, his finite creatures, in his own image and likeness. He gave us the capacity to know the truth, not all truth, but as much as is necessary and really useful for us. By our natural reason we can know him; we can know that he is our Creator, and we can know our duties towards one another as being made by the same God, our common Father. In other words, by the exercise of right reason, we can know the fundamental precepts of the moral law which we call the ten commandments. This is the teaching of St Paul in the Epistle to the Romans (ii 14). He says that the Gentiles, who had not the positive law of God, nevertheless had its precepts written in their hearts, and that their conscience, or right reason, told them what is right in moral conduct and what is wrong.

• Ps. ci 28. † Contra Gentiles, I ix.

However, modern experience is teaching us more clearly every day that reason and conscience are not very reliable guides in conduct. Many men are dull, many more are lazy, most people are occupied with other things, and human passion is apt to warp the judgement. Under these circumstances it is inconceivable that God our Creator has left us to grope after him to see if perchance we should find him. He has not done that, he has spoken to us, he has taught us especially through his own Son, Jesus Christ.* Jesus Christ knew human nature too well to dream of basing his doctrine on human reason. He did not do that, he based it on faith. He demanded unquestioning acceptance of and firm belief in his teaching on the authority of God. He came, he said, not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it. He called the ten commandments, his commandments. He used and appealed to right reason in developing them, as when he taught that the commandment which forbids murder also forbids anger and quarrelling, which if unchecked lead to murder. He also appealed to right reason and conscience in his pitiless exposure of the unsound casuistry of the Pharisees. But he rested his teaching on the authority of God and on faith in his word.

• Heb. i 1.

There is, then, one body of truth, resting on the Being and on the Nature of God. Our minds do not make it, they only recognize its existence independent of themselves. We have two ways of attaining to that truth, natural reason and the teaching of Jesus Christ. Both right reason and the teaching of Jesus Christ come from God, they manifest to us the same truth; there can be no opposition, no contradiction between faith and right reason.

The Fathers of the Church acted upon this teaching. Tertullian, St Cyprian, St Ambrose, St Augustine, took what was true in the teaching of the pagan philosophers without scruple. St Augustine defends the practice, and says that when a Christian teacher does this, he only takes what belongs to him. All truth comes from God; it forms one harmonious whole; one truth is not opposed to another; one truth does not contradict another.

It is an axiom of Catholic theology that Christian teaching contains no new moral precepts except those which have reference to faith and the sacraments. In other words, apart from faith and the sacraments, and the new duties imposed by them, Christian moral teaching is merely the teaching of right reason and common sense. St Thomas taught nothing new; he taught traditional Christian doctrine; he taught the moral doctrine of Jesus Christ. He did this in a form borrowed from Aristotle, but the form did not change the doctrine. He proposed Christian truth in a new way, but what he proposed remained Christian truth. He faithfully adhered to the old maxim—Non nova sed nove.

These are the broad and solid foundations on which St Thomas Aquinas built the moral teaching of the Second Part of his Summa Theologica. He found much that was true in the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle; the pagan philosopher’s authority was being used against the Church; St Thomas determined to “baptize Aristotle”—i.e., to make him subservient to Christian teaching, and he succeeded admirably. He reared a monument which is not touched by modern science; it remains unshaken and unshakable, because it rests on God and on Jesus Christ.

I will now pick out a few salient points in the teaching of St Thomas and briefly indicate what he owed to Aristotle and what to Christian teaching. In general, we may say that St Thomas took the form in which his work is cast from Aristotle, and the inexorable logic with which it is developed. Much of Aristotle’s teaching with regard to particular virtues and vices St Thomas also adopted without scruple, but when Aristotle’s virtues and vices are embedded in the Christian scheme they almost change their nature.

The first task of the moralist is to lay down the fundamental principle which should guide human life and conduct. What should be the aim of all deliberate human action?

Modern utilitarians said that our aim should be the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Kant inculcated the observance of the “categorical imperative.” Idealists lay down the principle of perfection or self-realization. Aristotle and the ancients taught that the highest good or happiness is the end of human life. St Thomas goes more to the root of the matter when he asks what is the ultimate end of human life, for, as he says, human actions are a means to the end, and the means derive their moral quality from the end. That is good which conduces to the end, that is bad and wrong which turns us from our end.

Aristotle taught that man’s highest good and happiness is not to be found in pleasure, wealth, honours, knowledge, or health. It is not to be found even in virtue by itself, but it is to be found in the most perfect activity of the soul according to the most perfect virtue, in a perfect and enduring life. Aristotle limits his consideration to the present life. His ethic is of this world and purely natural.

St Thomas teaches that man’s ultimate end and happiness does not consist in wealth, glory, honour, power, pleasure, or in any created good; it is to be found only in God, in the intuitive vision of God. This, of course, is the teaching of revelation. “We see now,” says St Paul, “through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known.”* “This,” said our Lord,† “is eternal life, that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.” Man's ultimate end, then, according to St Thomas and Christian teaching, is not to be found in this life; we can only attain to it after death. It is not natural to man; man has no natural capacity of seeing God face to face, of knowing him as he knows himself. In order to be able to attain his end, which is supernatural, man must receive a supernatural gift of God, which raises him above the order of created beings and makes him a “partaker of the divine nature.” He must be endowed with a new power of vision, and his will must receive new strength. He needs the grace of God for the performing of every action of his life, for thus only can human actions become a proportionate means for the attainment of his supernatural destiny.

We are told that the philosophy of Aristotle reacted on Christian dogma, that Christianity is a synthesis, or syncretism, or a patchwork of Jewish and pagan ideas. Let us test the theory by what has been said.

• 1 Cor. xiii 12. † John xvii 3.

St Thomas followed Aristotle in beginning his exposition of Christian morals by laying down man’s final destiny, but he denied the doctrine of Aristotle on the point, and accepted the teaching of Christ, who called the vision of God life everlasting. He followed Aristotle in teaching that our ultimate end does not consist in wealth, pleasure, honour, or power. He rejected Aristotle’s teaching as to what it does consist in. It consists in nothing created, says St Thomas, the whole of creation cannot fill the void in the human heart—we were made for God and we know only unrest till we rest in God.

If Christian teaching as seen in St Thomas is a synthesis or syncretism, it certainly is not a patchwork, an amalgam of different ideas derived from different sources. It is derived from Holy Scripture and the teaching of Jesus Christ.

Aristotle’s ethical teaching is natural, that of St Thomas is supernatural. The distinction cuts deep, says Dr. Wicksteed. It cuts to the very marrow, colours every action of human life, makes the two systems of ethics wholly different, and even opposed to each other.

Aristotle tells us that as human conduct is infinitely varied, there must be a certain vagueness and indefiniteness in moral science. We cannot expect mathematical accuracy or always demand logical demonstration in the solution of moral problems. Hence young men, whether they be young in years or in character, says Aristotle drily, are not fit for the study of ethics. They have not the experience of life which is required, and they are too much under the sway of passion.

In other words, the science of ethics, as unfolded by Aristotle and other philosophers, is theoretical but hardly practical. At most it may influence a few of the nobler characters who are a law to themselves. The many (οἱ πολλοί) will pursue their pleasures and laugh at the fine-spun theories of the philosophers. Jesus Christ rested his moral teaching on faith. He knew perfectly well that if people want divorce, they can always find plenty of reasons to justify it. And so he simply said: “What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.” And he demanded unquestioning submission to his teaching; he taught as one having authority. The sanctions annexed to the violation of his moral code were terrible—‘ Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire.” Here are other fundamental differences between the ethics of St Thomas and those of Aristotle. Christian teaching is couched in clear, precise, and definite commandments, easily intelligible to the minds of children, and it is backed by sanctions which appeal to all.

The Christian conception of sin is altogether absent from Aristotle. Moral lapses are departures from the golden mean, to be deplored, and if of the baser sort, to be contemned; they are not offences of an ever present and all-holy Creator and Lord.

The pre-eminence of Aristotle as a philosopher did not save him from committing grave mistakes in his moral teaching. He taught, for example, that abortion should be practised when the population threatens to become excessive, and his doctrine concerning slavery is untenable. According to Aristotle the slave is a living instrument, to be used for his master’s benefit like any other instrument. He is a chattel, a portion of his master’s property, and his master can dispose of him as he pleases. All this is very far removed from the teaching of St Thomas and Christianity.

Even when St Thomas follows Aristotle closely, the teaching of the pagan philosopher is entirely changed by being embedded in the Christian system. As an instance of this we may take Aristotle’s famous description of the magnanimous or high-minded man. The picture is drawn with great minuteness of detail; Aristotle seems to have dwelt on it with loving care, for it is the crown of his system; the magnanimous man is his ideal of the perfect Athenian gentleman.

“The magnanimous man,” says Aristotle,* “is one who being really worthy of great things, holds himself worthy of them. For he who holds himself thus worthy beyond his real deserts is a fool, and no man possessed of any virtue whatsoever can ever be a fool or show want of understanding. He, on the other hand, who holds himself worthy of less than his merits is little-minded, no matter whether the merits which he thus underrates be great or moderate or small. The merits, then, of the high-minded man are extreme, but in his conduct he observes the proper mean. For he holds himself worthy of his exalted deserts, while others either over-estimate or underestimate their merits. And since he is not only worthy of great things, but also holds himself worthy of them—or rather, indeed, of the very greatest things —it follows that there is some one object which ought most especially to occupy him. Now this object is honour, for it is the very greatest of all external goods. But the high-minded man, since his deserts are the highest possible, must be among the best of men; for the better a man is, the higher will be his deserts, and the best man will have the highest deserts. True high-mindedness, therefore, cannot but imply virtue; or rather the criterion of high-mindedness is the conjoint perfection of all the individual virtues. High-mindedness, then, would seem to be the crown, as it were, of all the virtues; for it not only involves their existence, but it also intensifies their lustre. It is with honour, then, and with dishonour that the high-minded man is most especially concerned. And where he meets with great honour, and that from upright men, he will take pleasure in it; although his pleasure will not be excessive, inasmuch as he has obtained at the outside only what he merits, if not perhaps less—since adequate honour for perfect virtue cannot be found. He will, however, none the less receive such honour from upright men, inasmuch as they have no greater reward to offer him. But honour given by the common herd and upon unimportant occasions, he will hold in utter contempt, for it will be no measure of his deserts. Now the high-minded man justly despises his neighbours, for his estimate is always right, but the majority of men despise their fellows upon insufficient grounds. He also loves to confer a favour, but feels shame at receiving one; for the former argues superiority, the latter inferiority. The high-minded, moreover, would seem to bear those in mind to whom they have done kindnesses, but not those from whom they have received them. For he who has received a kindness stands in a position inferior to that of him who has conferred it, whereas the high-minded man desires a position of superiority. And so he hears with pleasure of the favours which he has conferred, but with dislike of those which he has received.”

• Ethics iv 3.

It is obvious that Aristotle’s magnanimity is nothing else but inordinate self-esteem and contempt of others. Truth and the teaching of Christ compel us to say that it is not a virtue at all, but pride, the pinnacle of all vice. St Thomas converted it into a virtue by making the truly magnanimous man acknowledge that all the gifts which he possesses were given him by God, that he has nothing of his own except sin, that consequently he has no reason to exalt or glorify himself, and that, as St Paul teaches, instead of despising others, he should esteem them as better than himself. Humility was unknown to Aristotle: it is the test and the foundation of all virtue in the teaching of Christ and St Thomas.

Enough, perhaps, has been said to show what St Thomas owed to Aristotle, and whether the philosophy of Aristotle reacted on the moral and Christian teaching of St Thomas so as to change it. Reaction implies change. When a bullet is discharged against a target it acts on the target, but the target reacts on the bullet, changes and destroys it. The moral teaching of St Thomas is derived from Holy Scripture —it is that of Jesus Christ. He makes the teaching of Jesus Christ the test of truth. He rejects everything that is opposed to it or that is out of harmony with it. What he adopts from Aristotle harmonizes with it completely, and only makes his exposition of Christian doctrine more orderly, more clear and more full. These being the facts, we cannot rightly talk of the Reactions of Philosophy on Dogma, as illustrated from the works of St Thomas Aquinas.

To a Jesuit of the Gallo-Belgian Province

MY REVEREND FATHER

In reply to the letter with which you did me the honor of writing to me concerning the censure of Gobat’s book by His Lordship of Arras, I shall tell you, as a friend, first, that the propositions as they are reported in the censure are not tenable, nor even excusable for the most part. Secondly, supposing it is judged appropriate in your parts to publish some writing in order to defend yourselves, it must contain nothing offensive against the Prelate; and should you address it to him himself, it cannot be too respectful. The note signed by the bookseller of Douai which you sent me appears essential to your justification. In it he declares that Gobat’s book was not reprinted in the Diocese of Arras, but at Cologne; that it was neither on the advice nor at the solicitation of the Jesuits that he entered into partnership with the German printer; that he does not believe they had knowledge of this new edition otherwise than through the distribution he made of it; and that he is ready to maintain this testimony before anyone. This shows that His Lordship of Arras was misled when he was made to understand that this book had recently been reprinted in his Diocese; and yet this fact seems to be the principal motive of his censure. If you had foreseen this new thunderbolt, I am persuaded that by such a clarification you would have prevented it from falling upon you, at least with so much éclat, and that your Bishop’s equity would not have permitted him, on the occasion of the work of a German written thirty or forty years ago, and in which you had no part, to load you with the infamous names of corrupters of morals, persecutors of Bishops, enemies who ravage the portion of the Lord’s inheritance, and above all to accuse you of preparing within his Diocese a refuge for the wicked doctrine exterminated in France, so as to make it reappear one day. Perhaps he would have exercised his zeal against the German Jesuit without attacking you; as one sees in fact that he adopts an altogether different conduct toward the French Jesuits of his Diocese from that which he adopts toward the Flemings, and that he honors the former with his good will at the very time when he gives the latter such great marks of his indignation. It is unfortunate for you that he should have allowed himself to be so badly prejudiced; but after all, this makes me think that, had he been better informed concerning this particular fact, he would have done you greater justice. What you propose to me, informing the world of the origin of the misfortune you have had of falling into this Prelate’s disfavor, might have a good effect. People would be edified to learn that it was because you had not wished to condemn this proposition of a Dominican, that absolution ought not to be refused or deferred propter relapsum praecise [solely because of relapse]. This Thesis appears Catholic to me, and the contrary opinion has with reason appeared dangerous to you. Thus, given the notion people have of the rivalry alleged to exist between the Dominicans and the Jesuits, they would be persuaded that the love of truth alone had prevented you from condemning the Thesis. The approval which the Universities of Louvain and Douai have since given it would be very favorable to you; but it would be a very delicate matter to touch this chord, and I should fear that this means of defense would bear too much the appearance of reproach and insult, which you must above all avoid. The respect owed to dignity must constitute for inferiors a weighty reason not always to make use of all their advantages; and this same reason must perhaps prevent you from descending into the detail of all the affairs that have been stirred up against you since this unfortunate Thesis. In a word, I would rather suffer everything patiently than depart in any manner from the bounds of moderation and respect. Here is an expedient that occurred to me and that some very wise persons and friends of yours have found good. It would be that, after having declared that you in no way approve the opinions contained in the censured propositions, as I know you do not in fact approve them; after having declared that you leave to the German Casuist’s compatriots the task of examining whether some of them can be defended, whether the extracts of the others are faithful, and whether what follows or precedes does not modify them; it would be, I say, that you address yourselves to His Lordship of Arras himself, not in order to refute his censure, for if you had such an object before your eyes when writing, I should fear that you would not be sufficiently masters of your resentment, but in order to offer him, in general, an Apology for the doctrine of your Society. He is your Pastor; and neither he nor anyone else can find fault with your rendering to him an account of your opinions and those of the Body to which you belong. Or, if you prefer, in this Apology you could simply explain your doctrine without addressing the Prelate. This subject would be less embarrassing for you and would exempt you from the greatest difficulty you would encounter in a work of this nature, in which it would be necessary so carefully to measure your discourse when speaking to His Lordship of Arras that there should not be one expression or one word of which he could complain. I incline more to this course for that reason; and I advise you to take it without even making any other writings on the matters of the censure, or on the intentions with which it was published, or on those who are known to have induced the Prelate to it. The sole end at which you ought to aim is to regain his good graces by your moderation and your respect. I would therefore set forth in this kind of Apology only the conduct your Society has always observed in its manner of teaching, the principles it has followed, the precautions it has taken to maintain sound doctrine in its Schools, the malicious and unjust procedure which its enemies have employed to discredit it in this matter, and the disposition in which it is, and in which it has always been, to follow in Moral Theology the rules of the Church and to condemn everything that this Mother of the faithful condemns. He has enough uprightness perhaps to relinquish his prejudices upon reading such an exposition. You act wisely in despising an infinity of writings published against you; but concerning some that may have greater effect, I have often thought that the plan of which I speak ought to be executed, and that you should make such a declaration to the public once and for all. For it is always necessary to begin again: you have obstinate adversaries who, on every occasion and upon the slightest incident, renew without wearying themselves and without fear of wearying the world all their former calumnies; and if it were necessary to answer everything, there would not be enough writers in the Society, extensive as it is, to do so. The occasion presented to you by the censure of M. of Arras, in which this Prelate treats you in so strange a manner, seems a natural one to me. Everyone will agree that you are being compelled to defend yourselves; and when it is seen that you do so without offending him himself, everyone will be edified by it. Once more, I believe that you ought to take this course. The matter is urgent, because people make a point of spreading everywhere the Censure of M. of Arras, in order to stir up against you persons who are poorly informed or already ill disposed. I am, etc.

I have greatly appreciated, Sir, the counsel you gave me, and I have followed it both in the substance of the work and in its manner. I have circulated some manuscript copies of it, and I send you one. Although I composed this writing of my own initiative, I do not believe that I shall be disavowed with respect to the doctrine it contains and the propositions I advance in it. I am, with respect and gratitude, etc.

APOLOGY
FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE JESUITS
SENT TO HIS LORDSHIP THE BISHOP OF ARRAS ON THE OCCASION OF HIS CENSURE OF THE BOOK OF A GERMAN CASUIST

The alleged lax moral teaching of the Jesuits is the most plausible means that the Innovators and their other enemies have employed to discredit them and to estrange upright persons from them. This means has often succeeded for them. Many persons, judging the sincerity of others by their own, cannot persuade themselves that anyone would wish to defame an entire Society by reproaches which, if supposed false, would be atrocious and horrible calumnies.

With this prepossession, they enter blindly into the sentiments of those who speak ill of the Jesuits, and even join themselves to them, believing that they earn merit before God by assisting a zeal whose sole aim, it seems, is to arrest the course of a pernicious doctrine, by discrediting everywhere those who pass for its authors. It is thus that the prejudgment forms and imperceptibly increases, until it passes into the minds of many as a constant truth against which the accused can no longer be admitted to justify themselves.

But if these persons, either a little better instructed or a little more attentive, wished, before pronouncing so decided a judgment in a matter of this importance, to consult the rules of prudence and charity more than they do, I believe that the scruple of a rash judgment might arise in their conscience. I am persuaded that they would at least suspend for some time the sentence which they pronounce without hesitation against an entire Society, which has perhaps rendered some services to them themselves, and which, constantly for more than a century, has served the Church in every part of the world with some success and with some advantage to Religion.

Would it then be possible, say these persons, whose intentions are often very upright, would it be possible that so many people of every rank, of every condition, and of the holiest professions should all be calumniators; or that, without knowledge of the cause, they should every day carry themselves away, in public and in private, into cruel invectives against a body that was innocent of the frightful excesses with which they reproach it? But let them permit me to ask them in turn whether they can easily persuade themselves that a Society such as that of the Jesuits is only a collection of villains and abominable persons. For there is no middle ground here; and if they are such as they are depicted in the libels published against them, they must be regarded as monsters within Christianity.

In vain do their most declared enemies, through an affected moderation, sometimes contrast the regularity of this Society with the detestable doctrine they attribute to it. They live well, says one of their most venomous adversaries, but they teach badly. This contrast is a chimera. To live well and to undertake to ruin the doctrine of the Gospel throughout the earth by a detestable Moral Theology are two things that cannot be reconciled. It has indeed been seen at various times that certain leaders of a heretical party constantly maintained, in order to gain followers, the appearance of a severe virtue. But a Society as extensive as that of the Jesuits, which preserved the integrity of morals for more than a century while applying itself to corrupting them among Christians throughout the earth, would be a prodigy without example and beyond probability.

It is in no way natural to reserve severity for oneself while teaching laxity to others. The contrary happens every day to several of those who appear most animated against this alleged corrupted Moral Theology of the Jesuits. The world is witness to it. Worldly though it is, it is scandalized by it and makes sport of it. Many upright persons groan over it. But after all, judging things by the lights of good sense, it will always be less surprising to see Rigorism preached by those who live in laxity than it would be to see laxity preached by those who practice Rigorism. It is easy to do the first, and it is very much the fashion in the time in which we live. There is no attraction in the second. One gains nothing thereby either on God’s side or on the world’s. It would be to damn oneself at great cost, without being able to reimburse oneself for anything; it would be to enter hell by the narrow gate. Such a project was never in accordance with the ideas of self-love, and, to have conceived it, the Jesuits would all have to be different from the rest of mankind.

This presumption alone appears decisive to many persons in the subject at issue; but I do not wish to avail myself of it to the point of making it the sole proof of the Jesuits’ innocence in defending them against the execrable undertaking imputed to them, of undertaking to ruin everywhere the Moral Teaching of Jesus Christ. What I intend solely is thereby to put all equitable persons who might be prejudiced in a better state to judge soundly of so important a fact, to engage them to suspend for a moment their judgment between the two parties, and to dispose them to receive, with a spirit of charity and equity, the declaration I shall make in the name of the Society of Jesus on the point of Moral Theology. It is for the same end that I am going to add some reflections on the occasion and the origin of the accusations made against it in this matter, and on the means that have been used to support them and to render them plausible to an infinity of persons to whom their atrocity alone had at first rendered them incredible.

Until the time of Baius and Jansenius, the Jesuits were in possession of the reputation of persons perfectly orthodox in matters of Faith and Moral Theology. They could produce on this subject the praises which the Sovereign Pontiffs have so many times bestowed upon their Society, and in particular upon several of their principal Doctors. The heretics of France, England, and Germany could further serve them as witnesses in this regard. According to these Protestant Doctors, to attack the doctrine of the Jesuits was to attack that of the Roman Church. At that time the reproaches of laxity and semipelagianism were common to the Society of Jesus and to the congregation of the faithful. It was a very great honor to this Society to see itself, together with the Church, the object of the calumnies and persecutions of heretics; and nothing contributed more to increasing the esteem and affection that true Catholics had for the Jesuits.

But as soon as the Theologians of this Society had risen up against the innovations of Baius, had denounced them to the Sovereign Pontiffs, and had obtained their condemnation - and much more still when the errors of Jansenius had been anathematized by the Church - then the supporters of this heresy and all the partisans of Jansenius suddenly turned against the Jesuits and began, more than ever, to take them to task.

This was a stratagem to cause the public to mistake the issue. These Innovators were continually pressed hard concerning the fact of Jansenius, over which they persisted in their revolt against the Church and against the Ordinances of the King. To be ceaselessly on the defensive was for them a disadvantageous and very inconvenient course. This, therefore, is again what determined them to attack the Jesuits and to bring suit against them concerning their alleged corrupted Moral Theology.

Then appeared that fine System of the policy of the Jesuits, who have among themselves, it was said, two sorts of Directors: severe Directors and accommodating Directors; the one sort to attract persons of virtue, the other so as not to repel sinners - an infallible means of making themselves masters of every conscience, a secret of the Society which no one until then had penetrated, and whose use turned upon the doctrine of probable opinions.

Since this was a pure counteraccusation to which all the Author’s wit, whatever efforts he might make, could give no plausibility, this idea at first amused many more persons than it persuaded. It even scandalized several who believed that raillery could not be permitted in a subject of this nature. Nevertheless they continued; and, by making various extracts from the books of the Society - some faithful, some unfaithful, some capable of shocking the ordinary run of people who do not examine matters deeply, although there was nothing in them but what was orthodox - they succeeded in giving some color to what had at first appeared a pure chimera.

They did not stop there; and those whom the condemnation of the doctrine of Jansenius had consternated, profiting from the impression that these first attempts had made against the Jesuits, took courage again. They stirred up on every side, especially in Flanders and in France, in every Town and even in the countryside, persons who began, in rivalry with one another, to cry out against the corrupted Moral Theology of the Jesuits. Nothing was seen but libels scattered everywhere, but persons who, dispersed throughout all assemblies and private companies, let themselves loose against the Jesuits. The pulpits of truth, destined to preach charity to the peoples, became in several places theaters of the most venomous calumny. Mechanisms were set in motion to bring into this plot entire bodies of Ecclesiastics from the most considerable cities of the Kingdom. The diversity and multiplicity of the Jesuits’ employments, and the blessings God bestows upon them therein, having at all times raised up many jealous rivals against them, they saw new adversaries rise against them in the Universities and in several religious orders.

One individual of their Society was perhaps the person who caused them the greatest harm in this persecution. In defiance of his Provincial, he caused a Book entitled Apology for the Casuists to appear, in which, taking his position very imprudently upon several particular cases, he drew upon himself the just censure of several Prelates. They did not fail to make all the Jesuits answerable for a work which the wisest and most learned among them were themselves the very first to detest and which was authentically disavowed. Everywhere this book and these censures were used to confirm the idea of the Jesuits’ Moral Theology which the partisans of Jansenius were spreading everywhere. The libels most filled with falsehoods and the grossest calumnies were received with applause and found credence everywhere. The Apologies of these Fathers, however solid they were, were scarcely regarded and produced hardly any other effect than to give occasion for replies even more insulting and calumnious than the first works written against them. All the censures of Rome which branded most of these libels were mocked, and no more account was made of the Decrees of the King’s Council which condemned them to the fire.

But at last the storm was calmed with time. Composure returned after this violent and impetuous fire. Wise persons for the most part soon perceived that passion and cabal had more part in this persecution than true zeal. Those who knew the Jesuits, or who until then had entrusted to them the direction of their conscience, bore witness to themselves that the Moral Theology of these Fathers was not such as it was depicted in the satires published against them. The Parish Priests of Paris and Rouen, who had made the greatest noise, came back for the most part and were sorry to have seconded, contrary to their intention, the passion of a party whose evil designs they recognized.

The greater part of the Prelates of France and Flanders have shown since that time, by the conduct they have maintained toward the Jesuits, that they did not have of their doctrine the ideas which people had endeavored to give them; and they have often borne witness that they had no persons in their Dioceses who labored for the spiritual good of the peoples with more usefulness, more edification, more disinterestedness, and more submission to their Orders.

The most distinguished persons in the Kingdom did not recognize them in the frightful portraits made of them: the intercourse they had had with them; the education that several had received from them; the conduct of those among these Fathers whom their employment obliged sometimes to appear at Court, where, whatever care one takes to dissemble, one is soon known for what one is; their constant application in their most arduous functions; their zeal for the most dangerous Missions - all these ideas, which calumny had not yet been able to efface, rendered the most violent efforts of their Adversaries almost useless.

The Lords of the Court, the Magistrates, and the Nobility of all the Provinces were seen to entrust their children, as before, to these Fathers, to raise them in Letters and in the fear of God, and to render them the honorable testimony that nowhere were the two better united. Their College of Paris, despite all contrary intrigues, did not cease to be as it were the Seminary of all the most distinguished children in the Kingdom. Several of those who were the least attached to them followed the example of the others in this regard, themselves contributing, as if in spite of themselves, to justify them by their own conduct; and everyone agreed that this was the most solid Apology that could be made in their favor against the continual and horrible satires of their enemies.

Notwithstanding all this, the agitations have recommenced for some time past more vigorously than ever; and the Jesuits were often warned that a new storm was forming against them. In fact, severe blows have been dealt them during the last few years. They have tried to parry some of them. They have done so with equal force and modesty; and they have had the consolation of seeing that equitable and well-informed persons have always rendered them justice against Adversaries who do not become discouraged, and who are as constant in the persecution they have stirred up against them as in their revolt against the Church.

Nevertheless, neither do I wish to draw advantage for the defense of this Society from this new presumption furnished me by the character of most of those who for fifty years have made so harsh a war upon it, while they secretly prepare other devices against the Church itself. The sole use I intend to make of it, as also of the first, is to prevent people from relying too readily upon witnesses who must be so suspect, and upon certain others whom they have prejudiced by their artifices and by the clamor they have deliberately raised on every side; and to obtain from those who will read this defense some attention to what I am going to say in what follows.

All Christian Moral Theology can be reduced to two articles. The first comprises what is expressly contained in Scripture, in Tradition, in the Commandments of God and of the Church, in the Councils, and in the Decisions of the Holy See. The second contains an infinity of other cases which are not evidently decided by these first Rules and concerning which, for this reason, there is division among the Doctors in the Schools. One may further include in this number the explanation sometimes given to the Commandments of God or to Scripture, on the occasion of certain particular difficulties which arise in the dealings that men have with one another and which concern the extent of their duties, whether toward God, toward their neighbor, or toward themselves.

I do not believe that the Jesuits need an Apology on the first article; and I think they will not be reproached with ever having taught that adulteries, robberies on the highways, blasphemies, and other similar sins are permitted. It is true that they have been accused of having permitted Idolatry in China; but they have always said that Idolatry was a crime, and the question was reduced to knowing whether what they permitted was actually Idolatry.

It is therefore only the second article that is at issue, that is, things which are not evidently contained in the rules of our Faith, concerning which it is claimed that they always fall into laxity. Here are some propositions whose examination will clarify the truth or falsity of this accusation.

The Jesuits, in matters of Moral Theology, have always followed, in conformity with one of their Rules, the common opinions of the Catholic Schools.

If this proposition is true, it alone suffices to place the doctrine of this Society beyond all suspicion. Now it is a fact which the Jesuits boldly advance: that what ought to be regarded as the doctrine of their Society has always been a doctrine common in the Catholic Universities.

Since this proposition is the solid foundation upon which the justification and conduct of the Jesuits in matters of doctrine must be supported, it is appropriate to apprehend it well and explain it well, so that it may not be believed that, in a proposition too general and capable of having various senses, they are preparing evasions for themselves in order to elude the reproaches their adversaries make against them.

First, this does not mean that the Society of Jesus has a determinate opinion on each point of Theology which is also the general opinion of all the Schools and all the Catholic Universities. That could not be, because upon an infinity of questions opinions are divided there. But in this very division the opposed opinions are often equally common, and it is said of both the one and the other that they are a common doctrine in the School, because the affirmative and the negative are maintained indifferently.

When, therefore, the Jesuits say that their Society has always professed to follow the doctrine commonly received in the Schools and in the Catholic Universities, this means that in each question of Theology it has always kept to the opinions which were current in the School, and which were ordinarily followed there by the Catholic Doctors.

Second, when the Jesuits advance that the doctrine of their Society has always been the common doctrine of the Schools and Catholic Universities, they do not mean that no individual member of their body has ever departed from it, nor that none of their Theologians has ever maintained any proposition worthy of being reproved and censured. They are far from either thinking it or saying it. That would be to give themselves a praise which befits only Holy Scripture and the Church inspired by the Holy Spirit. There is within Christianity neither School nor University several of whose Doctors have not been subject to these weaknesses and these wanderings of the human mind. The Body of the holy Fathers itself, the most respectable body in the Church, is not exempt from this stain. Saint Augustine, saint though he is, has propositions of lax Moral Theology; some could be shown in Saint Jerome and in several other Fathers. And the Jesuits have no difficulty in making such an admission with regard to some of their Theologians. But what they advance without fear, and of which they are ready to furnish the proof, is that the doctrine received and authorized in their Society, that which is commonly followed there, is the same as that which they found was taught in the other Catholic Schools and Universities when they entered them, and that they can no more than the others be reproached for having departed from it.

Here, then, is a means altogether suited to the purpose and a very just rule for determining the truth or falsity of the reproach of lax Moral Theology made against the Jesuits. Has anything been commonly taught in their Society other than what has been commonly taught in the Catholic Schools and Universities? If a difference can be shown in this respect between their School and the other Catholic Schools, condemnation must be pronounced against them; if it cannot be shown, from that moment they are justified.

Some particular cases may be produced in which some of their Theologians have been mistaken; the same will be produced from the other Societies, and I dare advance that a greater number will be produced. Since these mistakes of certain individuals do not take from the other bodies the quality of being orthodox in the matter of Moral Theology, what injustice would it be if they caused the Society of Jesus alone to lose it? Here, then, once again, is the fixed point upon which everything must turn in this matter.

Let the adversaries of the Jesuits attack them on this point and press them as vigorously as they can. They must necessarily make an opening in them at this point; otherwise, it will always be the most manifest injustice to wish to distinguish them from all the other Societies by the shameful character of laxity in Moral Theology.

I add some other propositions which will serve to develop further the general proposition I have just made.

When a Jesuit Theologian has adopted some particular opinion rejected as bad in the Catholic Schools, the greater part of the Theologians of the Society have been against it; and, generally speaking, this Theologian has been neither the only nor the first of the Theologians to have departed on that point. I shall later descend into some detail which may serve as proof of this proposition. The Jesuits again boldly expose it to the criticism of their most vigorous adversaries: let them only take care to apprehend it correctly. But if this fact is true, if, when it is advanced by the Jesuits, it is left without its falsity being shown, calumny is disarmed, and the truth of the fundamental proposition I made at the outset is perfectly established: that the doctrine of the Society, that is, the doctrine authorized by the common sentiment of the Jesuits, is the same as that of the other Catholic Schools; and that, consequently, it is wrong to affect to establish a kind of opposition between the doctrine of the Jesuits and that of the other Catholic Doctors.

When some opinion has been condemned by the Church or by the Holy See, by whatever authority it had previously found itself supported, there is no Society whose superiors have taken greater care than the superiors of the Jesuits have done to ensure that it was not taught in their Schools; and it has scarcely happened that any individual has done so, and has done so with impunity.