Article II: Moral Theology and the Related Sciences

In what way moral theology is distinguished from the sciences related to it is gathered without difficulty from the definition itself.

It is distinguished from Dogmatic Theology by the difference of the material object, as has been said.

It is separated from Ethics both by its end and by its formal object. For Ethics considers a hypothetical and fictive direction to a natural end; moreover, it employs its principles as evident or demonstrated by reason, whereas moral theology, even when its own principles seem materially the same as those of ethics, assumes them as revealed or confirmed by revelation. And although moral theology itself also makes much use of natural reasoning, it does this only because we know that the supernatural order is not the overthrow of the natural order, but its perfection; so that the inchoate goodness of an action considered naturally cannot be neglected by us, nor can an action naturally evil become supernaturally good.

It indeed cannot be denied that the direct use of the revealed source becomes far less in moral theology than in dogmatic theology; this is sufficiently explained by the very material object of each part of divine science. For dogmatic theology has as its end the scientific exposition of Faith; it proposes truths which, at least for the most part, are inaccessible to human reason, or concerning which definitions of the ecclesiastical magisterium are usually made; then, because it is a merely speculative science, it abstracts from the man who must believe the dogmas. On the contrary, moral theology, since it regulates human actions, can prescind neither from the agent nor from his nature. But the laws of human nature, which are not to be violated, but are fulfilled more sublimely by a more dignified subject, that is, by man elevated, are accessible to reason itself and are not, for the most part, revealed in particular. Wherefore their demonstration enters moral theology itself. Thus many precepts are materially common to the natural order and to the supernatural order. Some, indeed, are proper to the present order of elevated nature; yet these also are observed by an acting man, who, according to the fundamental laws of his nature, must obey every divine law. Wherefore, if revelation proposes new objects to our action, our action always belongs to our nature, sane but normally informed and strengthened by grace. But those objects themselves, that is, dogmas to be believed, sacraments to be administered and received, are, as it were, loaned to moral theology by dogmatic theology. Besides, when it touches an object which is revealed only accidentally, or which is known to reason, then dogmatic theology itself has many things in common with human science. Thus, in the treatise on the one God, dogmatic theology is scarcely distinguished materially from theodicy. But what rarely happens in dogmatic theology is wont to happen in moral theology.

Therefore there is no other science which makes so manifest what we were just recalling: that human nature is by no means destroyed by grace, but is elevated.

There are not a few questions common to canonists and moralists; but canon law directly regards laws, partly divine and partly human, of ecclesiastical society; and it observes human acts, at least exterior acts (of internal acts the praetor does not judge), under the respect of the external forum, or insofar as they agree with or differ from the laws of visible society. On the contrary, moral theology considers ecclesiastical laws only insofar as, by obliging conscience, they become a rule of human acts. Cf. Wernz, Ius Decretalium, I, n. 57.

We have deliberately described moral theology in such a way that it would not exclude the ascetical and mystical parts. Can a rule of morals be called complete which neglects more perfect things, and is in no way solicitous concerning the special communication of God with his creature? Indeed, can neglect of the study of the more perfect be composed with perfect honesty ¹? For this reason, in the very title of the present work, we judged that counsels must be added to moral responses. They are indeed accustomed to say that in moral theology, taken more strictly, there is defined what is licit and what is forbidden, while ascetical and mystical discipline are solicitous about perfection. We place the distinction rather in this: that ascetical and mystical discipline are not content with the notion of more perfect actions, but inquire into the ways of pursuing those more perfect things, and thus approach a certain spiritual art.

Ascetical discipline itself, insofar as it is distinguished from mystical discipline, is concerned with the ordinary means of acquiring Christian perfection, while mystical discipline investigates the more sublime and less ordinary ways by which the soul is led to special union with God.

¹ Wherefore rightly and deservedly the periodical booklet La vie spirituelle, from its first beginning, vindicated the place of ascetical science in moral theology.

Place and dignity of moral theology. The comparison made also teaches us in what place and rank moral theology is to be put among the sciences.

For it is manifest through itself that moral theology surpasses the human sciences both by its end and by its object.

As to the sacred sciences, the dogmatic part of theological science excels the moral, insofar as it regards higher truths upon which, as foundations, moral theology rests; and it has God, not only, as does every theology, as the subject of attribution (or that to which all things are referred), but also as its principal material object. Yet in a certain respect the practical part excels the speculative, on account of the greater use which it has in the very ordering to the end of eternal life.

To ascetical theology, moral theology more strictly so called is related as a subalternating science, since ascetical theology must borrow its principles from moral theology; yet the end of ascetical theology is accidentally, or by degree, more sublime, at least insofar as it is more directly solicitous about perfection.

Both by its more noble proximate end, by which it intends rectitude before God, and by the source whence it draws its chief conclusions, and by the very breadth and universality of its object, moral theology is more excellent than canon law.

Pastoral theology instructs sacred ministers concerning their duties, and forms the same ministers for rightly undertaking their offices. And because pastoral theology insists upon the very way by which the salvation of souls will be better procured, rather than upon science, it must be called an art, just as ascetical discipline itself. But ascetical discipline makes a man solicitous concerning his own perfection, while pastoral discipline makes the sacred minister solicitous concerning the salvation and perfection of others. Yet neither the duties of pastors nor the rules of prudently administering the sacraments are passed over in moral theology. Wherefore pastoral discipline enters moral theology almost as a part, especially that moral theology which adds counsels to responses, so that it seems to differ from moral theology almost only by a fuller exposition of matters.