Chapter — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

II. Obligations of Parents Toward Children

671.

What is the proper obligation of parents? - Parents are the principle of the existence of children; and children are something of the father. Therefore, besides love, parents owe providence to children, whether legitimate or illegitimate; namely, they must provide for children as to the body, as to the soul, and as to state. L. 336; S. Th. 1. 2, q. 100, a. 5 ad 4; 2. 2, q. 26, a. 9.

They owe providence as to the body; and therefore parents sin gravely if they expose children not yet brought into the light to the danger of abortion, or if they expose those already born in public places of mercy, unless they do this from a grave cause. Besides this, they must feed them, unless however they can feed themselves from another source and are not in need, whether they are legitimate or illegitimate, or spurious. C. Cum haberet 5, de Eo qui dux.; C. I. 752; C. G. 762; C. H. 139; C. A. 166; C. B. 1602, 1627, 1705, 1708. And if the matter concerns food necessary for life, they are bound to feed the son, although he has squandered the portion of goods given to him by the parents, because he is always a son. But father and mother together are bound to this from C. I.

138; C. G. 203; or the father first, as from Common Law, L. 9 C., de Patr. potest., from Canon Law, C. 2, de Convers. infid., C. A. 141, 143, 167; C. H. 155; C. B. 1627, 1634, 1709, 1739; C. L. 140. The adopting person also must feed the adoptive child, C. B. 1766, in case of necessity from C. I. 211.

But a mother is bound to nurse her offspring with her own milk. For the natural law itself demands this. Yet this obligation per se does not press under grave obligation, since otherwise grave disorder is not had. Necessity excuses from light fault, if, for example, the mother is weak; notable utility, if, for example, the mother would have to abandon another occupation by which she procures sustenance for herself and her family; custom, prevailing among noble families. But then the mother is bound under grave sin to seek a good nurse. L. 336, 949, 951; C. A. 218; C. B. 1635.

They owe providence as to the soul; therefore under grave obligation parents must teach children those things which are necessary for eternal salvation, imbue them with good morals by words and examples, keep them away from proximate occasions of sinning, correct them with due moderation, lest having been provoked to anger they become worse, and coerce them when delinquent, even imploring the office of the judge if it is necessary. C. I. 222; C. G. 377; C. H. 155, 156; C. A. 145; C. B. 1631; C. L. 143. For this reason parents sin gravely who allow children freely to associate with bad companions, to read bad books and newspapers, to frequent bad workshops and schools, unless a most grave cause excusing them is present, and the dangers of these workshops and schools are removed. Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Sapientiae christianae, 10 Jan. 1890, § Locus admonet; L. 339; C. He. 277.

The newly introduced so-called education of purity cannot be approved, which consists in this, that those things which regard venereal matters are manifested to children. For by this manifestation the danger is not averted, but is begotten and increased, since from knowledge of those hidden matters the very natural bad inclination to experience them evidently grows. S. C. Ind., 18 Jan. 1908, to the Bishop of Barcelona.

They owe providence as to state; whence parents must instruct children in some art or in letters, according to the custom of the region and condition of the family. They must take care that children who wish to enter marriage enter an honorable marriage; and if the chastity of daughters is therefore placed in danger, they must at least from charity give them a dowry. Indeed there is no lack of those who hold absolutely that a father is obligated to give a dowry to a daughter, which C. H. 1340, 1341 and C. A. 1220, 1222, 1231 prescribe, whether she contracts a worthy marriage or enters religion, and likewise that he is obligated to give patrimony to a son who wishes to receive the priesthood. L. l. 6, n. 819. The reason is that just as a father must procure for children an honorable and fitting placement, so he is bound to furnish them the means necessary for obtaining it. Yet from C. I. 147 and from C. G. 204, no action belongs to children against parents unwilling to subtract anything from their patrimony so that sons or daughters can enter marriage, or by another similar title. Cf. C. B. 1610, 1620, 1621.

If parents squander their goods and therefore leave children needy, they certainly are not free from grave sin. Nor can they be excused from sin if they do not apply at least moderate diligence to acquire goods by which the children may be fed and have an inheritance according to their state. But most especially they are bound to leave freedom to offspring as to the choice of state; and they sin gravely by compelling the unwilling to marriage or religion, or by turning them away from such a state. L. 336, 337, 339, 740; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 101, a. 2; Ferraris, v. dos, a. 2, nn. 1-5; Sanchez, de Matr., d. 26, n. 7; C. I. 138, 230; C. G. 203, 385; C. A. 139, 148; C. H. 155; C. He. 275, 276; E. M.

The print's appendix has more on this paragraph: On Moral Theology and on Liberty. (ed.)

672.

Can parents sometimes disinherit children? - R. Affirmatively; yet on account of a just and grave cause of a crime against the parents themselves, which merits such a penalty. This is clear first by natural law. For it is altogether equitable that parents be able to punish children who are gravely injurious to them by such a penalty, and to contain them in their own duty by fear of the same penalty. It is clear besides by positive law. For Roman Law recognizes this power in parents and determines several cases in which parents can disinherit children. And by reason of the same crime, children can disinherit parents, and brothers disinherit brothers. Novella 115, cap. 3, 4; Novella 22, cap. 47. The same is had from Spanish Law 848 seqq.; from Lusitanian Law 1875 seqq.; and from Austrian Law 768 seqq.

From Swiss Law 477, by a disposition by reason of death, one can be deprived of a legitimate inheritance when he has committed a grave offense against the one disposing or against a person intimately joined to him; when he has gravely contracted against his obligations of family toward the one disposing or toward a person pertaining to the same family. From German Law 1938, 2333 seqq., 2339 seqq., someone can by testament exclude a blood-relative or spouse from succession without instituting an heir. Besides this, various causes of unworthiness for succession are assigned, which causes, after succession has devolved, anyone who has an interest in the exclusion of the unworthy person can oppose. And on account of certain graver crimes, especially crimes against piety, almost the same as those which constitute unworthiness from C. I. and from C. G., someone can by testament take away from his necessary heir the portion reserved to him by law. When some descendant has been prodigal, or gravely burdened by debt, the testator can reduce the portion reserved by law for that descendant, by attributing it to other legitimate heirs as fideicommissary substitutes. He can also commit the administration to a testamentary executor, and then the descendant has a right to the whole annual revenues.

From Italian Law 725, 1081, and from French Law 727, 955, 1046, 1047, disinheritance properly so called is indeed not had, but incapacity and unworthiness of succeeding are generally established by reason of crime, and revocability of a donation itself made by reason of ingratitude, on account of certain determined offenses; namely if 1. they plotted against the life of the testator; 2. if they were guilty toward him of another crime, cruelty, or grave injuries; 3. if they denied him support; 4. if they calumniously accused him of a grave crime from Italian Law, or of a capital crime from French Law; and 5. from Italian Law, if they compelled him to make or change a testament, or impeded him from making or revoking it. L. 340, 948, 949; Ferraris, v. Exhaeredatio.

673.

Are parents bound in the forum of conscience to leave the legitimate portion to children according to the laws? - Parents, more truly and according to the common doctrine, must by civil law leave the legitimate portion after death to their children, whether male or female, natural and legitimate, indeed also natural children acknowledged and legitimated by law, and also legitimate or adoptive children, unless a grave cause is present. For the law is just, and indeed obliging in conscience. Parents by natural law owe providence to children as to the body and as to state. Therefore the positive law determining the legitimate portion in reality interprets and defines the natural law. But it does not exclude certain rarer cases of necessity, in which the good itself of the children and family may suggest that one must act otherwise; which is also confirmed by the practice of the God-fearing. L. 215, 740, 947, 950; H. A. 237; La Croix, p. 3, l. 2, n. 1173; Gousset 794.

But there is no doubt that parents can, with attention to civil laws, make manual gifts, especially remuneratory ones, to children; for if these are not prohibited for friends, neither are they prohibited for relatives or for pious causes. Besides this, they can also effect gifts of greater moment to the same persons, if they are made from mere revenues; because they are full and free masters of these, nor, by the civil laws themselves, are they bound to increase the patrimony by revenues. Finally, if a just and proportionate grave cause is present, they can also, if the legitimate portion of the children is not injured, effect a donation from those things also which constitute the patrimony. The reason is that the law determining the legitimate portion gives this faculty to parents, that they may dispose freely of the remaining goods for others. Therefore if a father can leave these things to other extraneous persons, he can also donate them to the children themselves, if a reasonable cause of acting thus is present and the legitimate portion is not injured.

But that must be noted which Lugo has, d. 23, n. 147, namely "parents, if they have donated undutifully, that is, to the prejudice of the legitimate portion of children, their donations can be revoked by the children. Nevertheless the donation is not invalid, but can be voided." And this holds also in Italian and French Law; for in both these Laws it is not said that it is void, but that it will be void, namely to be voided by reduction. C. I. 821, 1091; C. G. 920; C. He. 522; C. A. 775; C. H. 654; C. L. 1492, 1789; L. 740, 950.