Prolegomena to Moral Theology

I. What is Moral Theology? If you consider the name, it is that part of Theology which is concerned with morals; if the thing, it is that part of theological science which directs human actions to moral honesty in order to eternal life.

It is said: 1° that part of theological science, by which words the proximate genus of the definition is expressed.

It is said: 2° which directs human actions to moral honesty, which words exhibit the ultimate difference of the definition, and the object of our science, both material and formal. - a) The ultimate difference, namely from the other theological disciplines, especially from Dogmatic Theology, which treats of faith and of divine things universally, in order that it may establish and confirm rules of believing, while Moral Theology treats of virtues and vices, in order that it may establish and confirm rules of acting, especially in the internal forum. - b) The object, both material, or human actions considered in themselves; and formal, or the aspect under which the material object is considered, that is, the directibility of those human actions to honesty.

II. What are the places, or sources, of Moral Theology, from which the rules are taken according to which human actions are to be directed to honesty? They are almost the same as those of Dogmatic Theology, namely Sacred Scripture; the Holy Fathers of the Church; the Decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs; Councils; constant and firm Tradition; Law both canonical and civil; the Authority of Theologians; Reason both natural and theological. Concerning each, hold these few things - which for the greatest part I have taken from the Dissertation preliminary to the Moral Theology of St. Alphonsus, which Fr. Ant. Zacharia composed:

1° To confirm some conclusion, use the Scriptures only in the literal or mystical sense, never however in the accommodated sense, and not even in the mystical unless it is established that this is truly the mystical sense.

2° Do not think that histories in which Sacred Scripture narrates that just men performed something which either is truly evil, or has the appearance of evil, are rules for solving cases. Therefore beware lest from the deed of Noah cursing the descendants of Ham you conclude that it is lawful for parents to curse their children.

3° Do not take singular examples which are read in the Scriptures for confirming a universal law. Thus someone would prove ridiculously by this argument the true proposition: Four conditions are required in him who absolves from censures: 1) he must be a cleric; 2) he must have contentious jurisdiction; 3) he must absolve with certain knowledge; 4) he must absolve spontaneously, and not coerced: Paul, who absolved the incestuous Corinthian, had the four aforesaid conditions. For the reasoning would be similar to this: Paul, who absolved the incestuous man, was an apostle; therefore he who absolves from censures ought to be an apostle.

4° Do not take the moral precepts which are sanctioned in the Old Testament in that restriction in which they seem to be expressed in Exodus, nor according to the false interpretation of the Scribes or the popular tradition of the Hebrews, but according to that addition which either Moses or other Canonical Writers applied, and especially according to that explanation which Christ hands down in the Gospel. Thus, although the Jews thought that only external acts were prohibited by the law, and by no means thoughts, desires, etc., nevertheless it is unlawful to think thus, since Christ preaches the opposite doctrine.

5° One must see lest, incautiously, we should wish the force of preception to be present in words of Scripture by which some pious counsel is proposed.

or the ancient ecclesiastical writers from the Apostolic age to the middle of the twelfth century, whose line Bernard, the Mellifluous Abbot of Clairvaux, closes.

1° If in some question which regards morals, and which is to be defined, all the Fathers teach the same thing, it must be held as certain.

2° The authority of one or two Fathers in those things which pertain to the doctrine of morals can indeed furnish a probable argument, but not a firm one.

3° Even the authority of several Fathers, with the rest, although fewer, reclaiming, cannot avail to suffice and furnish to the Theologian those arguments against which it would be unlawful to resist.

4° Those things which are had from the homilies of the Fathers, ascetical books, and orations, and labors of that kind, do not make for the Theologian that faith which those things can make which are read in Dogmatic instructions, letters, etc. For many things in books of this kind are put forward more exaggeratively; nor is this wonderful, since this is solemn for all orators; many things also regard counsel rather than precepts.

5° It is ill-advised to select those places of the Fathers where the Fathers, treating of something altogether different, indicate a few things concerning another matter after occasion has been taken, while neglecting those places where they examine this matter professedly.

6° In investigating the sense of the Fathers, these rules especially must be observed. a) Those things which are in the context of the book or chapter must be diligently considered. b) Similar and dissimilar places of the same Father must be compared. c) The time at which that book was published by some Father must be attended to. For from the occasion of writing the book the mind of the author will easily become known; we shall also understand whether perhaps at that time that Father was occupied by some preconceived opinion, which it is probable, or even certain, that he afterward put off. d) We shall consult other Fathers synchronous with this one concerning whose mind we inquire; for what this or that word signified in this or that century, and to what the notation of this or that custom may regard, we shall more easily discover. Let this example be that of Cyprian,¹ where he permits that, the priest being absent, the sick may also make the exomologesis of their fault before a deacon. For it does not follow from this that a deacon was then the minister of Sacramental Confession; for not only this is denoted by the name exomologesis, but also the canonical reconciliation of public penance, which Tertullian² calls the discipline of casting down and humbling the man. e) It is of an imprudent man to fish out the mind of the Fathers from doubtful Works of theirs, when certain Works, received by all, of the same Fathers are at hand.

1° One must see whether the things which are cited are genuine. Hence you will accomplish nothing from the false decretals of the Pontiffs up to Siricius, which all critics explode.

2° Beware lest you draw what was merely a precept of discipline to deciding moral questions. Thus from the response of Nicholas I to the consultations of the Bulgarians, that in Lent every pleasure is to be renounced by spouses, one would now badly infer that the conjugal work is not lawful in the time of Lent.

3° In those questions in which the validity of some thing is treated, for instance of clandestine marriage, decrees of the Pontiffs are cited in vain which establish only that something is illicit.

4° A subsequent

decree which in certain special cases limits something does not derogate from a decree of a Pontiff permitting that thing universally. Innocent III,¹ for example, permits clerics to dwell together with those in whom the natural bond permits nothing of suspicion of a base crime. On the contrary, the Council of Nantes, whose constitution was inserted into the Decretals of Gregory IX, excludes even mother, aunt, and sister from the houses of clerics, namely when there is question of this or that man whose morals are depraved, and when familiarity with absolutely any woman is suspect.

5° It is not lawful to draw the words of a Pontiff permitting something to a sense repugnant to Catholic dogma, or foreign to the obvious sense of the words by which that decree was issued. Benedict XIV brings an example in the Book De Synodo Dioecesana.²

6° If a Pontiff grants something which he had previously denied, from that prior denial it is understood very well what was afterward lawful through him. Again you have an example in the same Benedict XIV.³

7° In Pontifical constitutions which command something to be done, one must note first of all whom they affect, then what reasons moved the Pontiff to command that thing. Thus what is prohibited to Latin priests is not always to be judged prohibited likewise to Greeks. Hence from the decretal of Innocent III, by which priests established at Constantinople are prohibited from conferring Confirmation, it is badly inferred that Confirmation conferred by Greek priests is invalid and illicit. For the Pope speaks expressly concerning Latin priests. - It is also badly inferred from the constitution of Nicholas I commanding that Bulgarians confirmed by them be confirmed again, that this is not lawful universally for Greek priests. For Nicholas was led to this by reasons altogether other than those which would make this prohibited to all Greek priests.⁴

8° Where the Pontiffs condemn some proposition, they are to be judged to have condemned it especially in the sense in which it was published by the Authors. Thus, for example, what Alexander VIII condemned when he struck the proposition saying that it is not lawful to follow an opinion most probable even among the probable is to be taken especially from Sinnichius, from whose book it was excerpted.

9° From the pontifical condemnation of some proposition it is not lawful to infer the condemnation of another which rests upon an altogether different reason. You have an example in Benedict XIV,⁵ which regards Confession through an internuncio.

10° If the Pontiffs have prohibited something, one must see whether by an oracle of the living voice they have so explained their mind that the prohibition is to be restricted in some part of itself. You have an example in the Treatise on Censures as regards the faculties revoked by the Constitution of Pius IX, Apostolicae Sedis. See n. 1753, q. 1°, R. 3°.

11° One must also see whether later Pontiffs have restricted a prohibition made by their predecessors.

12° Finally, that too must be noticed: whether a pontifical Constitution prohibiting something has not been received somewhere.

1° All Councils which have neither been gathered nor confirmed by the authority of the Roman Pontiff can err in the doctrine of morals, and therefore cannot make certain faith concerning those things which are to be done or avoided.

2° Councils of any kind whatever - but especially General Councils - which have been confirmed by Pontifical authority furnish a most certain rule of doctrine to the Moral Theologian.

3° From councils which indeed have not been approved by the Roman Pontiff, but neither have been condemned by him, a probable argument is taken, as for persuading dogmas of faith, so also for establishing doctrines which regard morals. Of this matter that argument is abundantly great, namely that from innumerable Councils of this kind very few are found which have declined from right doctrine.

4° Beware lest you confuse decrees of Councils which regard discipline with those which regard morals. For Canons of morals are not subject to variety; on the contrary, Canons of discipline can be changed according to the diversity of places and times. Hence an argumentation limps from the ecclesiastical discipline of some region, or of an older century, if either it was not received everywhere, or it was abrogated by a contrary law. - Likewise, something can be illicit in some diocese which may be lawful in others.

5° We shall interpret the Decrees of Councils from the sense and custom of the times in which they were established.

6° The very formulas of Councils will have to be exacted according to the style and barbarism of the age in which they were celebrated; for communion, imposition of hands, and six hundred other things of that kind did not signify the same thing in all centuries. Wherefore the Glossary of Du Cange will be able to be of the greatest use to the Moral Theologian.

7° Do not believe that all things which you will find in Councils regarding morals were precepts; but many of them proceeded from pious counsel, and savor more of exhortation than of preception. Several examples of this matter are to be found in the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore. Thus, for example, in article 149 of this Council it is said: "To them," that is, to priests, "we also vehemently commend" (which word is not of one commanding, but of one exhorting) "that they constantly wear the cassock, insofar as it can be done."

As regards the remaining places of Moral Theology, we remit the reader to those things which Dogmatic Theology teaches concerning Tradition, and also to those things which we ourselves shall hand down in the Treatises on Conscience and on Laws concerning Canonical and Civil Law, and concerning the authority of Theologians and the use of reason.

III. How is the whole of Moral Theology divided? The following order of treating the matters has seemed to us more accommodated to practice. The first disputation for us will be concerning the nature of human acts, insofar as it regards moral goodness or depravity; for this will be as it were the foundation of the other disputations. - From there we shall make a step to the twofold rule of human acts: one indeed internal, which is conscience, the other external, which is law. - Then we shall speak of human acts insofar as they agree or disagree with this twofold rule, or concerning sins and virtues. And these indeed will constitute as it were the general part of our Theology. - In the part which has begun to be called special, various laws and precepts will follow one another in order, namely those of the Decalogue and of the Church; we shall treat in a special place the disputation concerning the Seventh precept of the Decalogue, which involves the most ample question concerning Justice and Right, and also concerning Contracts. There will follow the laws by which the various states of men and the administration and reception of the Sacraments are ruled. Finally, since the observance of laws is assisted by the infliction of penalties, we shall have a discourse concerning ecclesiastical penalties, or concerning censures and irregularities, and shall conclude this whole work with an Appendix concerning Indulgences.

IV. How great is the necessity of Moral Theology? For one undertaking the office of hearing Confessions, or one who will sometime undertake it, the necessity of learning Moral Theology is as great as that of saving the soul. For "if the blind offer leadership to the blind, both fall into the pit."¹ But a blind confessor is one who, although he may excel in zeal and be strong in talent and also in practical judgment, is ignorant of the principles and practical rules by which both talent and judgment must be directed, and zeal moderated. Scavini aptly says:² "Not all," he says, "ecclesiastics ought to be great orators, illustrious doctors, erudite historians; nevertheless all of the clergy ought to be very instructed in Moral Theology." And the learned Mabillon:³ "The study of Moral Theology is to be cultivated before the others; ... to this, as long as one lives, work will altogether have to be given."

V. History of Moral Theology from Bonquillon.⁴ - Three epochs are suitably distinguished in the history of Moral Theology: the first from the beginning of the Church to the time when Scholasticism was introduced; the second from the beginnings of the School to the Council of Trent; the third from the Council of Trent down to our age.

Epoch of the Fathers. - In the first epoch moral truths had not yet been scientifically reduced into some body of doctrine, but were explained separately, without any connection among themselves: whether in apologies against the heathen (St. Justin, Athenagoras, Tertullian); or in

instructions for Christians (Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus, Stromata, etc.; St. Cyprian, de lapsis, de oratione dominica, etc.; St. Gregory of Nyssa, de perfecta Christiani forma; St. Augustine, de mendacio, etc.); or in homilies to the faithful people (Sts. J. Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory the Great); or in special admonitions to the clergy (St. J. Chrysostom, de sacerdotio; St. Ambrose, de officiis; St. Gregory the Great, de cura pastorali); or in doctrinal letters; or finally in explanations of the Sacred Letters (the two books of St. Ambrose, de Cain et Abel; the two books de Abraham; the two books de Jacob et anima beata; the book de Elia et Jejunio; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, etc.). But although during this whole time the positive method was chiefly employed, nevertheless the speculative method also was cultivated, nor was casuistry neglected, as is clear from the questions which ecclesiastical writers weigh with great study, for example, whether it is lawful to serve as a soldier in the army of heathen emperors. To this also belong the penitential canons of the Holy Fathers and Councils, which may be read in Zacharia in the cited preliminary dissertation.¹

Epoch of the Scholastics. - The complete system of moral doctrine is owed to the second epoch, under which truths were handed down not only theoretically, but also practically, now in a coherent order. Moreover, in this age, the positive part having been as it were presupposed from the work of Peter Lombard, in which especially the sentences of Sacred Scripture and of the holy Fathers were found collected, the doctors were wholly occupied in illustrating Ethics together with Dogmatics speculatively by the help of Aristotelian philosophy. In this matter Alexander of Hales, Blessed Albert the Great, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus stood out before the others by labor, diligence, and talent. But to casuistry belong the Summa de casibus poenitentialibus of St. Raymond of Pennafort; the Speculum morale of Vincent of Beauvais; the Summa major seu confessariorum of John of Freiburg; the Astesan Summa de casibus conscientiae; the Summa casuum conscientiae, called the golden and Monaldina; the Pupilla oculi of John de Burgo; the three-part little Work of John Charlier de Gerson, concerning the precepts of the Decalogue, concerning Confession, and concerning the art of dying; the Consolatorium timoratae conscientiae; the Preceptorium and book de contractibus mercatorum of John Nider; St. John Capistran's Speculum conscientiae; the Summa theologica and Summa confessionalis of St. Antoninus; the Summa Angelica, etc.

Epoch of the more recent authors. - The third epoch comprehends three periods altogether to be distinguished.

The first, which extends itself from the Council of Trent through the space of nearly one century down to Jansenism, can truly be called the golden age of Moral Theology. For then, after the question concerning probabilism had been thoroughly discussed, the fundamental principles of Ethics were explained systematically; and Ethics as a whole was also handed down accurately, not only in the most learned commentaries on St. Thomas or on the Master, but also separately from Dogmatics, both in summas and compendia by Navarro, Toletus, Sa, Busembaum, and in ampler form by Layman, Azor, Castropalao, Filiuccio, Sayrus, Bonacina, and very many others. Besides, ample treatises were published concerning individual matters, in which all questions are resolved under whatever aspect positively, speculatively, and practically; of this kind are, others being omitted, the works of L. Molina concerning right and justice, of Thomas Sanchez concerning Matrimony, of Suarez concerning laws, concerning the virtue of religion, concerning Faith, Hope, and Charity; of L. Lessius concerning right and justice; of J. De Lugo concerning Faith, concerning justice and right, concerning the Sacrament of the Eucharist, concerning Penance; of Aeg. De Coninck concerning the Sacraments.

In the second period of this epoch the lot of Moral Theology was most sad because of the very bitter controversies excited by the work of the Jansenists. For just as their dogma concerning the wounds of fallen nature, and especially concerning invincible ignorance, cannot stand with the foundation of Christian Ethics, so the consequences which those heretics deduced into practice from their principles, and which directly tended to this, that the yoke of the precepts should be rendered unendurable and the help of the Sacraments become null, are altogether opposed to the rules by which Catholic doctors directed the morals of the faithful. Meanwhile, however, sound doctrine did not lack its defenders and champions. But, as is wont to happen, some, while they wished to avoid the Charybdis of Rigorism, fell into the Scylla of Laxism.

Since these things were so, at last a new period, happier even than the golden one itself, began with

St. Alphonsus, concerning the merits and authority of whose doctrine we have already spoken, and whose influence upon Moral Theology was so great that the authors who in the last thirty or forty years have published books concerning it have either copied St. Alphonsus and reduced him into a compendium, or at least followed him as their chief master. From this it happened that the salutary doctrines of the most holy and most learned man are propagated more and more, and that the minds especially of ecclesiastical youth are imbued with them.¹