Title II: On the Competent Forum

An archbishop, if the matter of appeal is omitted, or by way of complaint, does not take cognizance of a cause concerning subjects, even with the consent of the suffragans. This is what it says as far as § “Nor.” — § 1. An archbishop cannot compel a suffragan’s subjects to undertake causes delegated by him, execute his sentences and commands, or bear testimony in causes devolved upon him, unless custom disposes otherwise. This is what it says. Dominicus. — § 2. Unless custom disposes otherwise, an archbishop is not a competent judge against the officials or prelates of his suffragans, or against their subjects, concerning the fees of advocates and procurators in causes of the archbishop’s forum. This is what it says. — § 3. An archbishop will not compel unwilling persons of other dioceses who contract in his own diocese to answer before him unless they are found there. But if, after being cited, they refuse to appear, or maliciously conceal themselves lest they be cited, he can make a placing in possession of their goods in his own diocese, or decree that one be made in another through its ordinaries. This is what it says. — § 4. An archbishop cannot send his clerics into the diocese of a suffragan so that contracts may be made before them or contracts already made approved. Nor, if they were made or approved before them, can they compel the suffragans’ subjects to litigate before themselves concerning them, or excommunicate the officials or subjects of suffragans if they refuse to litigate before him. This is what it says to the end, according to Dominicus.

Innocent IV. The Roman Church—(And below:) Neither when the matter of appeal has been passed over, nor otherwise when no appeal has been made, are the Archbishop of Reims or his official to take cognizance of causes of clerics as judges without the will of those clerics’ diocesans, even if the same clerics consent to them in fact.

§ 1. Nor are they to compel the subjects of the suffragans of the Church of Reims to undertake their delegation, execute their sentences and commands, or bear testimony in causes devolved upon them by appeal, unless by custom they obtain something else in these three matters.

§ 2. Nor, unless a contrary custom grants them something else, are they to compel the officials of those suffragans, or archdeacons, archpriests, and other inferior prelates subject to the same suffragans, or the subjects of those suffragans, to answer complainants in their presence concerning the fees of advocates and procurators in causes conducted in the curia of Reims.

§ 3. They ought not unwillingly to draw before themselves persons of other dioceses who contract concerning contracts entered into by them in the diocese of Reims unless those persons are found there. Nevertheless, if persons cited by their authority disdain to appear, they can make a placing in possession against them of the goods that they have there, even when they make themselves available elsewhere. Or if perhaps they maliciously conceal themselves lest citation reach them, they can decree that a placing in possession be made of goods that they are known to hold even in another diocese; but then the diocesan of the place will make such a placing upon their denunciation.

§ 4. Nor are they to send their clerics into the dioceses of their suffragans for contracts to be entered into or acknowledged before them, nor compel the subjects of those suffragans to stand to law before them on such an occasion. Nor can the archbishop himself exercise ecclesiastical censure against the officials and subjects of his suffragans because, although summoned by him, they refuse to answer complainants in his presence.

A secular judge who wishes to compel a cleric to pay debts, even liquidated debts, is to be compelled by the ecclesiastical judge to desist. John Andrew.

Boniface VIII. We decree that secular judges who, although no jurisdiction belongs to them in this regard, with damnable presumption compel ecclesiastical persons to pay debts concerning which letters are exhibited or other proofs introduced against them before those judges, are to be restrained from temerity of this kind by ecclesiastical censure through the ordinaries of the places.

By reason of an oath, a layman is sued before an ecclesiastical judge so that he may observe it.

The same. Since C., a layman, for whom you paid a definite amount of money in which you had bound yourself for him in the name of surety, refuses to preserve you harmless, rashly acting contrary to the oath given by him, you can by law sue him before the ecclesiastical judge, to whose forum cognizance of a cause of this kind is known to pertain by reason of the oath, so that, after admonition has first been given, the judge may compel him through ecclesiastical censure, reason going before, to preserve you harmless concerning the foregoing matters as he is bound to do.