Title — Liber Sextus

Title XI: On Oaths

English · Latin · Both

1.

Chapter I

Prelates, canons, rectors, and officials of places who swear to observe the statutes and customs of a place or church are not bound by pretext of such an oath to things unlawful, impossible, or contrary to ecclesiastical liberty, nor ought their intention to be referred to them. John Andrew.

Nicholas III. It happens that in certain churches it is observed by their custom that neither their prelates, when they first come to those churches, are admitted, nor canons, when the reception of new canons there is at issue, are otherwise received in them unless they swear inviolably to observe the written and unwritten statutes and customs of those churches. Among laymen also, in many cities, castles, and lands, the disease of custom has crept into the assumption of their podestàs, rectors, or officials, so that podestàs, rectors, and officials of this kind are by no means admitted to those podestàships, rectorships, and offices unless they have first sworn that they will observe the closed statutes of those places.

But because in the aforesaid statutes and customs some things are sometimes found that are unlawful or impossible, or contrary to ecclesiastical liberty, lest an occasion for sinning be furnished to those swearing under such a generality of oath, since an oath was not instituted to be a bond of iniquity, we, desiring by this general constitution to obstruct dangers to souls, command that oaths of this kind are in no way to be furnished by any persons who know that unlawful or impossible things, or things contrary to ecclesiastical liberty, are contained in the aforesaid customs and statutes.

We decree that such oaths made or to be made with the intention that even unlawful or impossible things, or things contrary to ecclesiastical liberty, be observed—since even with such an intention they cannot be furnished without offense to the divine majesty—are not to be observed as regards things of this kind that are unlawful, impossible, or contrary to ecclesiastical liberty. Rather, for the salvation of souls, if it happens that any persons ignorant of the aforesaid unlawful or impossible things, or things contrary to ecclesiastical liberty, swear under the aforesaid or a similar form, the intention of the persons swearing ought to be referred solely to observing things lawful, possible, and not contrary to ecclesiastical liberty. We also declare that oaths furnished or to be furnished under such a generality in any manner and under any form of words extend only to things lawful, possible, and not contrary to ecclesiastical liberty, and that those swearing are not bound to other things by furnishing an oath of this kind.

2.

Chapter II

A secular judge is compelled by the ordinary ecclesiastical judge of the place, through ecclesiastical censure, to observe canon law established for the provision of souls.

Boniface VIII. Although women who consent to alienations of dowries and gifts on account of marriage, confirming by their own oath that they will not act to the contrary, are bound by canon law to observe an oath of this kind furnished neither through force nor deceit, nevertheless, because certain secular judges hear them against the aforesaid alienations although it is lawfully established for those judges that such an oath was taken, we, wishing to meet dangers to souls, decree that those judges are to be compelled through ecclesiastical censure by the ordinaries of the places to observe this canon law.

3.

Chapter III

A person elected who, after the oath, makes positions or answers things directly contrary is repelled from confirmation as perjured unless he is reasonably excused. The same applies if his procurator did this at his command, or with his ratification, or without his revoking it. This is what it says. John Andrew.

The same. Since manifest contradiction is found in the positions given by you concerning the business of your election after the oath was furnished in the cause, or in the responses that you are known to have made to your adversary’s positions, perpetual silence ought to be imposed upon you concerning that election as upon a perjured person, unless a just and reasonable cause excuses you. The same will be done if your procurator in your name made contrary positions or responses of this kind at your express command, or with your subsequently knowing and ratifying them, or not revoking them.