The conditions of condign merit

100. Definition. Merit, considered abstractly, is that property of a human action by force of which it is worthy of reward or punishment: for a good action done in service of another is worthy of reward, but an evil action which redounds to the detriment of another is worthy of punishment. Merit, considered concretely, is a work worthy of reward or punishment. Therefore some work has the character of merit by the fact that it redounds to the good or detriment of another. Theological merit is a work which before God is worthy of reward or punishment; but more precisely that is called theological merit which, known from revelation, is referred to the supernatural end of eternal life, concerning which the words hold: for God renders to each one according to his works.¹

The moral goodness or malice of a human act, insofar as it redounds to the service or offense of God, is the cause of merit; reward or punishment is the effect of merit. In theological usage, the merit of a good act is commonly understood under the name merit, while the merit of an evil act is customarily called rather demerit.

¹ Rom. 2:6; Matt. 16:27.

101. Division. a. Merit is divided into natural and supernatural, according as it is ordered to a natural reward, which consists in goods of the natural order, or to a supernatural reward, which consists either solely or chiefly in supernatural goods. Natural reward belongs to works which are performed by the powers of nature alone; for since all morally good actions redound to the glory of God, they are worthy of retribution. But in this order of nature elevated through grace, no other merit and reward is considered except supernatural, which belongs to works that are done from grace.

b. It is divided into merit de condigno, to which wages are due from justice because its value is equal to the reward, and merit de congruo, to which wages are due only from a certain fittingness because its value is not equal to the reward. The former is also called perfect, the latter imperfect; the former is the merit of the just, the latter also belongs to sinners.

A twofold distinction intervenes between merit de condigno and merit de congruo: a. with regard to the value of the work: a work to which merit de condigno belongs is equal to the reward, not indeed with mathematical equality but with moral equality, or, as St. Thomas has it, with equality of virtue: "as the seed of a tree, in which there is the virtue unto the whole tree."¹ In merit de congruo, the reward surpasses the value of the work. b. With regard to the right to reward: in merit de condigno, on the part of the one meriting there is a right to the reward and a debt of justice on the part of the one rewarding; in merit de congruo, wages are bestowed only from a certain equity, and if the reward is owed because of a promise on the part of the one rewarding, it is owed only from fidelity.

c. As regards the infallibility of merit, it depends upon the divine promise. Now every merit de condigno, because of the divine promise joined to it, is infallible; but merit de congruo is one kind infallible, another fallible, according as a divine promise is or is not joined to it. Thus a sinner through the ultimate disposition for sanctifying grace merits this grace de congruo infallibly, but not through a remote disposition.

d. By reason of the good which is repaid in the homeland, it is divided into essential or substantial reward, which contains: a. eternal life or the beatific vision universally; b. increase of glory or greater grades of the beatific vision; and accidental reward, which contains all goods which besides the beatific vision come to the blessed in the heavenly homeland, and which are called secondary: the three aureoles (of martyrs, doctors, and virgins); familiar fellowship of the angels, the blessed, and the very queen of heaven; the vision of the humanity of Christ; joy concerning one's own body; a singular place assigned to the saints in heaven.

¹ Cf. Summa I-II, q. 114, a. 3, ad 3.

102. What the conditions of merit are. Only those special conditions which are required on the part of the one meriting for merit must be proposed more accurately here.

a. The general conditions of merit, which are required for every merit both de condigno and de congruo, are four, of which two are referred to the person meriting, but two to the meritorious work: a. the state of the way, which by the free disposition of God has its terminus in death; b. liberty from coercion and necessity; c. the moral goodness of the work; d. the supernaturality of the work.¹

b. The special condition of merit de condigno is the state of grace on the part of the person meriting. For true merit does not depend on the supernatural work alone, but also on the state and dignity of the person meriting. Therefore supernatural actions, unless sanctifying grace is added, do not have true and perfect merit; since sanctifying grace gives to works that value by which they are constituted proportioned and equal to the reward.

a. The Council of Trent attributes true and properly so-called merit, or merit de condigno, only to the works of the just;² b. Sacred Scripture declares that man cannot bear the fruit of good works unless he has remained in Christ through sanctifying grace.³ Besides this, it calls only sons heirs, that is, he does not merit the inheritance unless he is a son through sanctifying grace.⁴ c. And indeed, if one who is not in the state of grace were capable of merit, someone could be at the same time worthy of eternal life and eternal death. Besides this, the reward is the good proper to the sons of God, since it is the inheritance of the sons of God through adoption; but only through grace is man elevated to the state of sons of God. Therefore works done outside the state of grace have no proportion to the reward.

¹ The necessity of these conditions is shown by the dogmatic theologians, among whom may be compared: Schiffini, De gratia divina (Freiburg: Herder, 1901), n. 344 ff. Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, 3rd ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1900), V, n. 397 ff. Hurter, Compendium theologiae dogmaticae, 9th ed. (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1903), III, n. 225 ff.

² Sess. 6, c. 16, can. 32.

³ John 15:4.

⁴ Rom. 8:16 ff.

103. Many theologians further require that the work be done from charity: for without charity neither faith nor any other good work of whatever kind has any value before God.¹ But how the work must proceed from charity in order that it can be meritorious, not all explain in the same way.²

a. Some explain it so that only elicited acts of charity and acts commanded by charity, namely those which are ordered to God from the motive of charity actually or at least virtually, are meritorious. Therefore these require for merit an intention at least virtual by which all works are ordered to God from charity. By an argument taken from the nature of the thing they confirm this opinion in this way: for merit de condigno, which is the noblest merit, an act of the supreme and most perfect virtue, which is charity, is required. To confirm their opinion they appeal to the authority of St. Thomas,³ whom St. Alphonsus understands and follows in this sense.

b. Others explain it so that acts of charity and works which through an act of charity are habitually ordered to God are meritorious. Therefore these require for merit a habitual intention by which all works are ordered to God from charity. In order that this condition be satisfied, it is required that an act of charity precede, that it never have been retracted by a subsequent grave sin, and that it be renewed as often as the precept of charity urges. By this reason they judge all works to be habitually referred to God from the intention of charity. The patrons of this opinion also appeal to St. Thomas, whom they think must be understood in this sense.⁴

c. Finally, others explain it so that acts of charity and all works which proceed from habitual charity, or from the habit of charity, which is always conjoined with sanctifying grace, are meritorious. Therefore these require for merit no peculiar intention or preceding act of charity by which works are ordered to God from charity, but teach that for merit the state of grace suffices, which embraces charity by an indissoluble bond, and that objective or natural ordering to God which the works of a just man have of themselves and by their nature, provided that they are good in themselves and placed through the influence of supernatural grace. For through sanctifying grace man is ordered to God, the supernatural end, and becomes a son of God, whose good works by this very fact are works of a son of God; but the works of a son of God are of themselves worthy of the eternal inheritance.

¹ 1 Cor. 13:1-3.

² Cf. Schiffini, l.c., n. 364 ff.

³ Summa I-II, q. 100, a. 10, ad 2; De virtutibus, q. 2, a. 11, ad 3; II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, and ad 6.

⁴ De malo, q. 2, a. 5, ad 10; II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, and ad 6.

104. The opinion to be preferred. a. The reasons which show that this third opinion is altogether to be preferred to the others can be compared among the dogmatic theologians. The principal ones are these: a. In Sacred Scripture not only acts which in some way proceed from actual charity, but also acts of other virtues, and these named simply, are promised and attributed eternal beatitude itself.¹ b. The Council of Trent, recounting all the conditions required for merit de condigno, with no mention made of an act of charity or of another good intention, declares all good works of the just which are done through grace to be meritorious.² Nor by the words "which have been done in God" does it signify anything other than works which are done in grace and through grace. That these words must be understood in this way is clear from the words placed in the canon (32): "which are done through the grace of God"; for these are equivalent to the former. Therefore from the mind of the Council of Trent, besides the state of grace and the influence of actual grace, nothing else is required for merit. c. And indeed all good and supernatural acts which are exercised by a just man are by their nature ordered to God the supernatural end, redound to the glory of God, and by this very fact are means proportioned to the ultimate end; therefore they have everything which can be required for merit de condigno. For through the habit of charity, which necessarily follows sanctifying grace, man is ordered to God the supernatural end, and since through the same grace and charity he is constituted son and friend of God, all his works are implicitly and habitually referred to God and consecrated to Him. Therefore for merit it is not required that also on the part of the one operating they be ordered to God the supreme good.

b. The first of the other opinions brings forward a gratuitous exaggeration and in its confirmatory argument contains a begging of the question: for this very thing is asked, whether the highest merit de condigno belongs only to the noblest virtue of charity, or also to others. The charity of which St. Paul speaks (1 Cor. 13) is not actual charity but habitual charity. Therefore the Apostle does not teach that good works, even heroic ones, are of no profit unless they are done from love of God, or unless they are referred to God through a good intention (through an act of charity), but he teaches that charisms, or graces gratuitously given, are of no profit for the merit of eternal life if they are severed from habitual charity and from sanctifying grace.³ The second opinion, besides the fact that it demands for merit a condition which the Council of Trent does not require, is pressed by another difficulty not light. Let us imagine a child baptized in infancy, who, after he has come to the use of reason, does not advert to the obligation of eliciting an act of charity, and therefore for a notable time in the state of grace does good works without having elicited an act of charity; or an adult who, justified through attrition and the sacrament of penance, lives in grace without eliciting an act of charity, since the precept is not yet urging; or finally a just man who for a notable time from inadvertence omits renewing an act of charity when the precept already urges: that all these throughout this whole time can merit nothing, after the Council of Trent there will hardly be anyone who contends it.

Note. If this opinion were not certain, supernatural intentions, especially from the motive of charity, would have to be elicited frequently by a just man: for where there is question of conditions required for merit, the probability of an opinion does not help, but only the truth. But even if the truth of these opinions is not to be doubted, the faithful are to be induced by apt motives to operating from the most perfect intentions, especially of charity frequently renewed: for the more perfect the intention of the agent is, the greater is the merit of the action. Besides this, a good intention, especially a supernatural one, renewed more often, contributes much, indeed sometimes is necessary, for efficaciously strengthening the will in the purpose of resisting even more vehement temptations and of constantly fulfilling even the more difficult Christian laws.

¹ Cf. Matt. 19:16 ff.; 25:34 ff.; 1 Tim. 6:17 ff.

² Sess. 6, c. 16, these words are read: Nothing more is to be believed to be lacking to those justified themselves, by which they should be considered to have fully and truly merited by those works which have been done in God ... eternal life to be obtained in its own time, provided nevertheless that they have departed in grace. And can. 32 has these words: If anyone shall say ... that the justified man by good works which are done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, of whom he is a living member, does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life ... and also increase of glory, let him be anathema.

³ Cf. Cornely (Cursus scripturae sacrae) on this place.

In order that an action may be condignly meritorious, two conditions are required on the part of the agent, two on the part of the action, and one on the part of God.

The agent must be still on his probation in this present life; there is no meriting when man’s day is done. He must also be in the state of grace and friendship with God; the actions of one who is out of grace and who is a rebel and an enemy of God cannot deserve any reward from him.

The action itself must be morally good, not bad, as is obvious; and it must be supernatural, elicited by means of grace and from a motive which is rooted in faith. Otherwise it will be merely of the natural order, deserving indeed of a natural reward, but having no proportion to the supernatural end to which we know by faith that man is destined by God.

On the part of God there must be a promise made by him to grant such a reward to such an action. For otherwise, after doing all that we can, we must acknowledge that we are useless servants, who cannot claim anything as due to them in justice from God, their Creator and Lord. He has every claim to our service without our having a strict right to any reward in return. According to the very probable teaching of St Thomas,¹ all the deliberate actions of one who is in a state of grace are either meritorious or sinful. In order to be in a state of grace, such a one must have fulfilled all the duties which bind him under pain of grievous sin, and among these is the obligation of eliciting at the proper times an act of love of God. By such an act the just man refers himself and all he does to God, and thus his good actions are elicited by the help of grace and tend to man’s supernatural end, the beatific vision of God. In any case, if we are careful frequently to renew our intention of pleasing God, and with his grace remain free from mortal sin, we may rest in the assured hope that all our good actions are meritorious of life eternal.

¹ De Malo, q. 2, a. 5, obj. 10; in lib. 2, dist. 40, a. 5, ad 6.

Divisions.—According to the difference of the person who confers the reward, there are two kinds of merit: (a) human merit, or the claim which a person has to a reward from his neighbor, or from society, for the benefits he has conferred upon his neighbor or society; (b) divine merit, or the right a person has to receive a reward from God for the fidelity wherewith he has exercised stewardship over his acts, of which God is the Last End, or wherewith he has served society, of which God is the Supreme Ruler. Only divine merit is here considered.

According to the difference of the object of the reward, there are two kinds of merit: (a) natural merit, which makes one worthy of a reward that does not exceed the native powers or exigencies of a created being, such as success, prosperity, or other goods that do not constitute the Last End of man (see 20). Thus, we read in scripture of pagans or sinners who were blest with temporal happiness on account of their natural virtues; (b) supernatural merit, which makes one worthy of the beatitude surpassing mere created power that God has prepared for those who serve Him (see 20). It is only this kind of merit that is being considered here; for, since the Last End of man is a supernatural reward (viz, the Beatific Vision of God), it follows that the acts by which he tends to that End must be not only human and moral, but supernaturally meritorious.

There are four kinds of supernatural merit: (a) condign merit in the stricter sense, that is merit which arises from justice, and which presupposes no favor on the part of the rewarder. In this sense Christ merited, since even the grace which made His merits supernatural was due to Him as the God-Man; (b) condign merit in the less strict sense, that is merit which arises indeed from justice, but presupposes a favor on the part of the rewarder. In this way the righteous merit before God, since their works confer a right to their own reward, while the grace which enables them to perform their works is a divine favor; (c) congruous merit in the stricter sense, that is merit which arises not from justice (since there is no equality between the work and the reward), but from the fitness of things, because the person who merits is a friend of God. In this way all who are in the state of grace can merit spiritual goods for others; (d) congruous merit in the wide sense, that is merit which arises from the liberality of God, who answers a good work as if it were a prayer. In this way the good works done by sinners can be said to merit conversion for them.

The second kind of merit mentioned above—i.e., condign merit in the less strict sense—is that with which we are chiefly concerned here, since it is the kind of merit that must be found in human acts in order that they may lead man to a supernatural reward. A fuller treatment of merit is found in Dogmatic Theology in the Question on Grace.

The conditions requisite for the kind of merit now in question are: (a) that the work done be human, that is, free, morally good, and supernatural (i.e., proceeding from sanctifying grace and divine charity); (b) that the one who merits be in the wayfaring state (i.e., that he have not already passed to final reward or punishment), and that he be in the state of grace; (c) that God has promised a reward for the work done. From the statements made above, it follows that all the human and morally good works of those who are in the state of grace possess condign merit.

The objects of condign merit—i.e., the rewards promised by God for the good works done for Him in this life—are: (a) an increase of sanctifying grace; (b) the right to eternal life; (c) the attainment of eternal life, if the one who merits dies in grace; (d) an increase of glory.

The conditions for the merit of strict congruity are the same as those given above (112), except the promise made by God, which is not required. Examples of this kind of merit are the sanctity of the Blessed Virgin, which made her deserve more than others to be the Mother of God, and the conversion of St. Paul through the merits of St. Stephen.

For the merit of wide congruity it is necessary that the work done be morally good. Examples of this kind of merit are the sighs of the ancient Patriarchs, as obtaining the coming of the Messiah. The just man can merit with the merit of wide congruity the following: (a) his own conversion after a future fall; (b) his final perseverance; (c) temporal goods.

24. On the part of the person meriting, in order that an act be meritorious, the state of a wayfarer is required. - The state of the way, positively, is the state of this mortal life, which according to the common and ordinary law is spent in this world; negatively, it is the state in which one has not yet obtained the vision and fruition of God, but tends to it through faith. - For indeed Sacred Scripture plainly teaches that the time of life alone is the time of merit, and that the time of death is the time of retribution. The Fathers also teach the same. The a priori reason is the will of God alone; the reason of fittingness is that merit has the notion of the way, reward the notion of the terminus. But the present life, in which we walk by faith, is the state of the way with respect to the future life, in which we shall see God face to face, and which has the notion of terminus with respect to the former. Hence the Blessed in heaven do not merit; likewise neither do the souls being purified merit, but they only satisfy by suffering. St. Thomas, I, q. 62, a. 9; III, q. 19, a. 3; Suarez, chs. 15, 34. - The Blessed "are not in a state of acquiring according to anything of themselves; and therefore they merit neither for themselves nor for others, because what they now impetrate for us happens from this, that previously, while they were living, they merited that they should impetrate this." St. Thomas, III Sent., dist. 18, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; I, q. 62, a. 9.

29. Therefore acts which are elicited with supernatural help of grace have of themselves only suitability to some supernatural reward. But condignity is not had in them except from the very dignity of the person. Indeed the condignity of merit according to the Angelic Doctor is considered both according to the virtue of the Holy Spirit, who is the principal principle of the supernatural meritorious act, and according to the dignity of grace, by which man becomes a sharer of the divine nature, and consequently can work worthily of God. Then it plainly appears how the reward of eternal life, which is the proper inheritance of the sons of God, not of servants, is given as a condign reward not to servants, but to sons, namely to those who are endowed with sanctifying grace, through which they are constituted sons of God. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 3. Cf. here nn. 11, 35.

33. • A meritorious act is a good work, posited with grace, and worthy of a reward or retribution.

Merit is distinguished as twofold: 1. merit de condigno, to which reward is due from justice, that is, from the promise of God; 2. merit de congruo, to which reward is not due from justice, but from a certain becomingness and liberality of God.

I say 1. A just man operating through grace can truly and properly merit de condigno. - It is clear from Matt. 5. 12: Your reward is abundant in heaven; and 2 Tim. 4. 8: There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me on that day. It is also clear from Trent, session 6, ch. 15, where eternal life is declared to be a reward to be rendered, from the promise of God, to the merits of those working well.

I say 2. Man, even a sinner and unbeliever, can by acts posited with grace merit de congruo. - It is clear from various places of Sacred Scripture in which are related examples of sinners and gentiles to whom God granted abundant graces in consideration of their good works. Thus in Acts of the Apostles 10 Cornelius is said to have obtained conversion to the true Faith by his alms and prayers ¹.

¹ The example of Cornelius perhaps is less to the point. For he must not be held as an unbeliever, who in the sacred letters (Acts 10. 2) is called religious and fearing God, nor as a sinner, who (ibid., v. 22) is called just and fearing God. But he can be considered justified through charity. For before the Gospel was promulgated to him, faith in Christ was not necessary for him in order to have charity.

YOU WILL ASK 2. What can man merit de condigno?

Hence good works done from grace are of a threefold genus, namely 1. Living works, or good works done in the state of sanctifying grace. - 2. Mortified works, or good works which indeed were performed in the state of grace, but lost all merit through subsequent mortal sin, yet with sanctifying grace recovered, they revive. - 3. Dead works, which are done in the state of mortal sin. But these, although they do not have the reward of eternal life, can nevertheless be profitable for merit de congruo.

34. Questions. - YOU WILL ASK 1. What is required for merit de condigno?

I answer. It is required 1. that the act be free; for otherwise it would not be a human act; 2. that it be honest; otherwise it would not be worthy of reward; 3. that it be posited from grace; otherwise it would not have proportion to supernatural life and reward; 4. that the agent be in the state of grace, because a sinner is not a son or friend of God, to whom the promises are due.

I answer 1. He can merit an increase of sanctifying grace, and eternal glory, which follows it. - It is clear from the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 16.

I answer 2. A just man cannot de condigno merit final perseverance, nor efficacious graces, because these are gratuitous gifts which God has not promised.

YOU WILL ASK 3. What can man merit de congruo?

I answer 1. A sinner, through good works, for example, fasting, almsgiving, prayers, can merit de congruo the help of grace, so that he may avoid sin and come to justification.

I answer 2. A just man can merit de congruo 1. for himself efficacious graces and final perseverance; 2. for others first grace and helps of further grace.

YOU WILL ASK 4. Whether a work, that it be meritorious de condigno, ought to be of supererogation, or not commanded?

I answer. No. For it is clear from Trent, session 6, canon 26, that all works which are done in God merit eternal life; but works which are of precept are themselves also done in God; therefore by them also man merits eternal life.

35. • YOU WILL ASK 5. Whether for merit de condigno an act elicited from charity is required?

I answer. Although very grave authors, as Bellarmine says (On Justification, book 5, ch. 15), and among these Vasquez (on I-II, disp. 217, ch. 4, no. 38), judged that all good works of a justified man from grace are meritorious of eternal life, even with no preceding relation of the work to God from charity, for example, the good works of a man justified by force of the sacrament before he elicits an act of charity; nevertheless the more common and more probable opinion further requires that works be referred to God actually or virtually from charity. And indeed we have already seen above what suffices for that virtual relation of works to God, from the common opinion of the Doctors with St. Thomas; they require this alone, namely, that when in its time the precept of charity urges, man has at some time ordered himself and all his things to God through an act of this virtue ², although afterward while acting he thinks neither of God nor of charity. Yet St. Bonaventure (2 Dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, in the body and ad 2) seems to demand something more, and to require for merit that this ordering to God be made for each work, or at least for each series of works; and if it is lacking, God neither rewards the work nor imputes it as a fault. Hence he says (ibid., ad 6): If a work of another kind were begun, the intention would have to be renewed, in order that the work might be meritorious. Nevertheless, since (ibid.) he judges that for the merit of regular observance in a Religious the act of charity suffices by which he vowed from the beginning to carry the burden of Religion; indeed, since for merit (ibid.) he holds it enough if a just man, thinking nothing of God, only considers that the work, for example obeying, is good, he scarcely differs in reality from St. Thomas; indeed Vasquez (disp. cit., ch. 2, n. 9) does not hesitate to draw St. Bonaventure over into his own opinion, or at least into the opinion of St. Thomas.

² If you say: If St. Thomas demands this alone, why elsewhere for merit does he require that individual acts be formed, ordered, commanded by charity? For thus he says (On Truth, q. 14, art. 5, ad 13): In one having charity there cannot be any act of virtue unless it is formed by charity. For either it will be ordered to the due end, and this cannot be except through charity in one having charity; or it is not ordered to the due end, and thus it will not be an act of virtue.

I answer. These words mean nothing else than that an act of any virtue be ordered to God, or to that highest good which is the object of charity. Whence St. Thomas (3, Dist. 27, q. 1, art. 4, q. 3): That charity is the mover of all the other virtues is clear from this, that the good itself which is the object of charity under the notion of end is the end of the virtues. And then he adds:

And according to this charity is said to command their acts.

For the same reason, charity is called by St. Thomas the form of the virtues (On Virtues, q. 2, art. 3): The acts of all the other virtues are ordered to the proper end of charity, which is the highest good... And to this extent charity is called the form of all the virtues, insofar namely as all the acts of all the virtues are ordered to the loved highest good.

For the same reason, charity, according to the holy Doctor, is said to command the virtues (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5): Since charity commands all the virtues... it is necessary that whatever is ordered to the end of some virtue be ordered to the end of charity (namely, to the object of charity, which is the highest good); and since every good act is ordered to the end of some virtue, it will remain ordered to the end of charity, and thus it will be meritorious. And so eating and drinking with the mode of temperance preserved, and playing for recreation with the mode of eutrapelia preserved..., will be meritorious in him who has charity.

Nor yet is it necessary that while someone acts, he think about the ends of the virtues as to be ordered to the end of charity. Thus St. Thomas (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 3): Not only an act of charity is meritorious, but also an act of the other virtues insofar as they are informed by grace; although they cannot be meritorious except insofar as they are reduced to the end of charity. But it is not necessary that acts always be reduced to that end (of charity); but it suffices for the efficacy of meriting that they be reduced to the ends of the other virtues; for he who intends to preserve chastity, even if he thinks nothing about charity, clearly merits, if he has grace. But every act tending to some good, unless it tends to it inordinately, has for its end the good of some virtue; because the virtues sufficiently perfect concerning all things which can be good for men.

End of the Treatise on Human Acts.

199. For merit de condigno, two things are required: the state of wayfarer and the state of grace.

1. The state of wayfarer. (A) For God willed that man merit eternal life while he was dwelling on earth, or in the state of probation. (a) This is certainly proved by those texts of Scripture in which the Prophets, Christ, and the Apostles exhort the faithful that, while they live, they operate good, and thus prepare themselves for judgment, or for the coming of Christ; since, as St. Paul says,¹ "we must all be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may receive the proper things of the body," that is, those things which were done in the body, or during mortal life. For these suppose that after death there is not given a place for penance or merit. (b) This indeed is confirmed not only from the unanimous consent of the Fathers and theologians of all schools, who taught and teach this as one of the primary Christian truths; but also from the intimate persuasion of all the faithful, who therefore wish to act well in the present life or to be reconciled with God before death, because they believe that after death there is no redemption. Wherefore it can be said that this truth was implicitly defined by the ordinary and infallible magisterium of the Church.

¹ II Cor., V, 10.

(B) Reason shows that this is fitting. For it is necessary that the time of probation, through which man can merit or demerit, receive an end; but it altogether befits that this time receive its end at the point of death: for as long as the soul is joined to the corruptible body, on the one hand it is not capable of the beatific vision, and on the other it is in a state most apt for meriting, because it can use the body for acquiring perfection, and in the miseries of this life can find ampler opportunities for meriting. Therefore. Yet we admit that that argument is only an argument of fittingness, because the time of probation depends on the will of God alone.

200. Moreover, the state of sanctifying grace is required. It is certain: (a) From Scripture. For Christ says: "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it remain in the vine; so neither can you, unless you remain in Me";¹ but no one remains in Christ except through habitual grace; therefore. Likewise St. Paul:² "And if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor... but have not charity" (and consequently habitual grace), "it profits me nothing."

¹ John, XV, 4.

² I Cor., XIII, 3.

(b) From Tradition. From the decree of Trent, in which it is declared that the works of a justified man truly merit;³ for a justified man is said to be one who is adorned with habitual grace; and from the condemnation of the proposition of Baius denying that sanctifying grace is necessary for merit.⁴

³ "If anyone shall say that the good works of a justified man... do not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself... and also increase of glory; A. S." (Trent, sess. VI, can. 32).

⁴ Apud Denzinger, n. 895; cf. nn. 882, 892.

(c) From theological reason. It is certainly repugnant that someone merit de condigno with God, when otherwise he is an enemy of God and worthy of eternal punishment; but a sinner, not yet justified, is hateful to God and worthy of eternal punishment; therefore he cannot at the same time merit eternal life. - Moreover, there ought to be some proportion between work and reward; but the reward concerning which we are treating is within the order of supernatural filiation; therefore we can be heirs of eternal life insofar as we are adoptive sons of God: "if sons, also heirs";⁵ but only through habitual grace are we made adoptive sons of God; therefore only through this grace do we merit.⁶

⁵ Rom., VIII, 17.

⁶ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 3.

201. There are three: namely, the work must be free, honorable, and supernatural. 1. A meritorious work must be free, both from coercion and from necessity. It is of faith against the Jansenists.

For the following proposition was condemned as heretical: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."¹ And in reality no one is rewarded or punished unless he is master of his acts; but man is not master of his acts unless he is truly and intrinsically free. - This, however, does not prevent prescribed works from being meritorious; for God, by His goodness, has promised recompense even to prescribed works; thus, for example, love of enemies is prescribed, and yet it is a very meritorious work, according to that saying: "Love your enemies... and your reward shall be great";² indeed, a precept, other things being equal, increases merit, by adding to the work the merit of obedience.

¹ Apud Denzinger, n. 968. - The state of fallen nature is that in which man is placed after original sin; cf. De Deo Creante, n. 197-200.

² Luke, VI, 35.

202. 2. Moreover it must be honorable, or naturally good, on the part of the object, end, and circumstances; for an evil work evidently cannot be rewarded, but on the contrary is worthy of punishment; but an indifferent work, if there is any in the individual case, of itself neither merits nor demerits; therefore only a good work can be rewarded. Yet a work indifferent of itself can be made good through a supernatural intention; indeed a work materially evil can, according to the common opinion, become good and meritorious, if it is honorable in the mind of the agent: for God looks upon the heart.

203. 3. Supernatural (a) by reason of the principle, in the sense that it must be done under the influence of grace; this is admitted by all. But what grace is required? Certain theologians, ancient and modern,³ said that habitual grace suffices, without actual grace, because an act elicited under the influence of habitual grace and the infused virtues is already sufficiently supernatural by reason of the principle. - Yet the common opinion is that actual grace is required; for Christ said to the Apostles, already adorned with sanctifying grace: "Without Me you can do nothing";⁴ these words indeed are interpreted by the Fathers not only of habitual grace, but also of actual grace. Here also come all the texts brought forward in the Treatise De Gratia (n. 50-60), from which it is evident that even a just man can do nothing in the supernatural order without actual grace. Likewise Trent declares that the works of the just are not meritorious without the virtue of Christ which precedes, accompanies, and follows them; but grace preceding, accompanying, etc., is actual grace.¹ - Besides, that grace is never lacking to men of good will.

³ Thus D. Soto, De nat. et grat., l. III, c. 4; Terrien, La Grâce et la Gloire, Paris, 1897, t. II, p. 56-62.

⁴ John, XV, 5.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16.

(b) By reason of the end or motive, according to the common opinion, in the sense that it must be done not from a human motive, but with at least implicit relation to God or to eternal life, according to that saying: "Whatever you do, do from the heart, as to the Lord and not to men, knowing that from the Lord you shall receive the retribution";² all the places where it is said that we ought to act on account of God prove the same.

² Coloss., III, 23.

Indeed, according to Thomists, it is required that that work be done under the influence of charity; yet the virtual influence suffices, which remains as long as the act of charity toward God, once elicited, has not been retracted. For they argue thus:³ in order that an act of some virtue be meritorious of eternal life, it ought to proceed from habitual grace; but from grace no act proceeds except through the mediation of charity: for every movement and influence of grace tends toward God, the supernatural ultimate end; therefore no act can be meritorious of eternal life unless it is referred to God, the supernatural ultimate end, at least virtually by charity. - Yet this is denied by not a few theologians, especially Suarez and Vasquez;⁴ for, Scripture being witness, eternal life is promised not only to acts of charity, but also to other supernatural works, namely obedience, poverty, meekness, and the rest of good works in general.⁵ Besides, any supernatural work performed in the state of grace has sufficient proportion with eternal life. And this seems to be the mind of St. Thomas, who often teaches that every honorable act performed by him who is placed in the state of grace and elicits an act of charity as often as this is prescribed, is meritorious, because it is habitually and implicitly referred to God (above, n. 191).⁶ - The controversy is more in the mode of conceiving than in the matter itself; for Thomists hold that all acts elicited by him who has charity, or is in the state of grace, are done virtually under the influence of charity and are meritorious, unless this is impeded by some disordering of the act. Besides, according to all, it is better often to offer our actions to God from the motive of charity: for thus merit is greatly increased.

³ Salmanticenses, disp. IV, n. 7.

⁴ Suarez, lib. XII, c. 9-10; Vasquez, Ia IIae, disp. 127.

⁵ Mark, III, 35; Matt., V, 3-6; Rom., II, 6; I Tim., VI, 17.

⁶ St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 2, a. 5; De Carit., q. un., a. 11, ad 2.

204. In order that our works be truly meritorious, a positive ordination of God is required. For through merit de condigno we acquire a true right to reward; but a creature cannot acquire any strict right toward God unless some positive ordination of God is supposed: for all our acts are already owed to God by the manifold title of dependence, gratitude, etc.; hence, according to Trent, eternal life is "as a reward, from the promise of God Himself, to be rendered to the good works of the just."¹ Besides, our works, even supernatural ones, do not of themselves equal the reward granted to us, namely the beatific vision; and therefore our merit is not from mere justice, but partly from justice and partly from fidelity.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16.

This can indeed be illustrated by a comparison: if some worker should labor of his own accord in the field of another person, without having been hired by him, he will not have a strict right to payment; but if he has done this from a pact, he will have a strict right to reward. Thus also we, while we labor in the vineyard of the Lord, cannot have a right to supernatural reward, unless God first has sent us into His vineyard and has declared a recompense to be annexed to such labor. Nevertheless it befits God so to act, because the worker is worthy of his pay, and it is fitting that happiness follow virtue.

205. Corollary. From this it is given to understand what circumstances can increase merit: 1. the greater excellence of the act itself, which is taken both from the object formally taken; for example, an act of charity is objectively better than an act of humility; and from the quantity of the work, for example in the case of alms; and from its difficulty: thus it is more meritorious to resist a grave temptation than a light one; 2. the end, or intention of the one operating; thus he merits more who acts from the motive of charity than he who acts from the motive of hope or fear; 3. greater intensity, or fervor, consisting in this, that we act with all our powers, with a great heart and a willing soul; likewise constancy in operating, which supposes a greater and more assiduous effort; 4. more intimate conjunction with Christ; for he who keeps himself more intimately united with Him derives from Him a greater power of meriting; for He Himself is the fountain and origin of all merits; and those who are joined to Him bring forth much fruit, according to the words of Christ Himself:¹ "He who remains in Me, and I in him, he bears much fruit."

¹ John, XV, 5.

Therefore let us act freely, honorably, and meritoriously, through Christ, and with Christ, and in Christ; and our works will truly be seeds of eternal life.

139. Conditions Required for Supernatural Merit. Six conditions required for supernatural merit are customarily enumerated, namely, three on the part of the work, two on the part of the one meriting, and one on the part of God rewarding. For it is required:

1. That the work be free. This is of faith. Wherefore the third proposition of Jansenius was condemned as heretical: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature there is not required in man freedom from necessity, but freedom from coercion suffices."

2. That the work be good. It is plain of itself, since neither an evil nor an indifferent work is worthy of eternal reward. Not just any goodness suffices, but supernatural goodness is required, which, namely, proceeds from supernatural grace; indeed according to some authors, which proceeds from a motive of supernatural faith. In this sense the Angelic Doctor seems to say:¹⁰ "Faith is necessary as the principle of spiritual life." And we are said to be saved through faith.¹¹ Nevertheless there are other authors¹² who require nothing else for a supernatural act than that the act be ethically good and from grace or from a supernatural principle. For practice this controversy is of little moment, since that motive is most easily present, at least virtually, in any good work of a justified man.

3. That the work be done in homage to the one rewarding, that is, to God.¹³ It is plain of itself. For God will not give reward except for works completed in His homage; and this homage indeed is already sufficiently had if someone observes the commandments of God from filial fear or at least initial fear. For some influence of charity seems to be necessary, that works may be rendered meritorious. For this reason the Angelic Doctor¹⁴ teaches: "Eternal life consists in the fruition of God. But the motion of the human mind toward the fruition of the divine good is the proper act of charity, through which all acts of the other virtues are ordered to this end, according as the other virtues are commanded by charity. And therefore the merit of eternal life first belongs to charity, but to the other virtues secondarily, according as their acts are commanded by charity." But even the least influence suffices; hence in practice the controversy of theologians concerning the quality and degree of that influence is almost useless.¹⁵ And therefore St. Thomas says:¹⁶ "When someone orders himself to God as to the end in all things which he does on account of himself, there remains virtually the intention of the ultimate end, who is God: whence he can merit in all things, if he has charity"; and: "there cannot be any act proceeding from a deliberate will in one having grace which is not meritorious."¹⁷ Wherefore briefly and truly it can be said: Whoever, existing in the state of sanctifying grace and eliciting an act of charity at the due time, merits by any good work freely performed.

4. The state of the wayfarer. For after death man can no longer merit, God so willing, according to the words of Christ¹⁸ understood in the spiritual sense: "The night cometh [that is, death], when no man can work [namely, meritoriously]."

5. The state of sanctifying grace. This follows from the words of Christ:¹⁹ "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine; so neither can you, unless you abide in me." But man is joined with Christ through sanctifying grace, which renders him a sharer of the divine nature.²⁰ - The same is plain from condemned propositions:²¹ "The reason of merit does not consist in this, that he who works well has grace and the indwelling Holy Spirit, but only in this, that he obeys the divine law" (prop. 15 of Baius). - "It is the opinion of Pelagius: a good work done short of the grace of adoption is not meritorious of the kingdom of heaven" (prop. 12 of Baius). - The necessity of sanctifying grace for every work truly meritorious de condigno can easily be proved also by theological reasons: a) It is impossible that a man who is an enemy and hateful to God, such as a sinner is, should do works pleasing and meritorious, since God first regards the one offering rather than the gifts offered. - b) For merit de condigno there is required a certain proportional equality between the work done and the reward proposed. But there is no proportional equality between works done by a man in the state of mortal sin and sanctifying grace or eternal glory, since those works are of the natural order, while grace and glory are of the supernatural order. Therefore a man in the state of mortal sin cannot merit grace and glory.²²

6. The ordination or promise of God.²³ The reason is that through merit de condigno we acquire a true right to a supernatural wage. But a creature can acquire no right toward God unless a special promise of God is present. For man, as a creature and having his whole being and acting from God, is bound to serve God with all his powers, without having any strict right of retribution. Hence Christ²⁴ warns: "When you shall have done all the things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do." Therefore God from justice is not bound to give reward for our works, since they are owed to Him under so many titles. Therefore it is necessary that the promise of God accede to this, that a work performed by man merit a supernatural wage de condigno. For this reason it is proposed by the Council of Trent:²⁵ "Eternal life ... as a recompense to be faithfully rendered, from the promise of God Himself, to their [namely, the just] good works and merits."

¹⁰ Ibid. II-II, q. 16, a. 1 ad 1.

¹¹ Rom. 5:1.

¹² For example, Noldin, Princ. Theol. mor. n. 97. Cf. on this matter Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 396.

¹³ S. theol. I-II, q. 21, a. 4.

¹⁴ Ibid. q. 114, a. 4.

¹⁵ Cf. Billuart, Dissert. de merito a. 4; Noldin, De princ. n. 103 sq. and below n. 559, Schol. 2.

¹⁶ De caritate q. unic., a. 11 ad 2; cf. De malo q. 2, a. 5 ad 7 and ad 11.

¹⁷ 2 dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5.

¹⁸ John 9:4. - In the Catena aurea St. Thomas cites for this place the words of St. Augustine: "There will be night, where no one can work, but receive what he has worked. While you live, do if you are going to do anything: for beyond there is neither faith nor labors nor penance."

¹⁹ John 15:4.

²⁰ Cf. 2 Pet. 1:4.

²¹ Denz. n. 1012 and 1013.

²² For a fuller explanation of this condition see Billuart, Dissert. de merito iusti a. 1.

²³ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 114, a. 1 ad 3.

²⁴ Luke 17:10.

²⁵ Sess. 6, cap. 16 (Denz. n. 809).

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1, 2, 3, 4.

194. Thesis. For supernatural condign merit of eternal life itself, seven conditions are required:

A. On the part of the work or act, that it be:

1. voluntary and free, and indeed with liberty of election, that is, not only from coercion but also from intrinsic necessity (cf. condemned proposition 3 of Jansenius): for merit is a property of a moral act, which is the more moral the more voluntary and free it is. Moreover, retribution is not due to someone except because he himself gives from what is his own in service of the one rewarding; but no one properly gives from what is his own except that of which he is master; and man is not master of his act except that which he acts freely;

2. good or honorable (Mt. VI, 1 sq.) at least formally, for before God, infinitely holy, nothing is worthy of reward unless it is good and right; besides, if evil merits anything, it is not reward but punishment;

3. supernatural and therefore placed from grace; otherwise it would not be proportioned to the supernatural reward of eternal life (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16);

4. likewise done in service of God the supernatural end; otherwise there would be no reason why retribution should be expected from God Himself. But it is done in service of God because it is referred to and commanded by charity toward God. Cf. I Cor. II, 9; X, 31; Col. III, 17; Mt. X, 39-42; XIX, 29; Mk. IX, 40; Lk. IX, 48; Gal. V, 6, 14; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 4.

B. On the part of the one operating:

5. the state of the wayfarer: for one who has arrived at the term and end and possesses it can no longer move and tend toward it or approach it more closely; therefore he cannot merit it. The state of the way has its end with temporal life, as we know with certainty from revelation and from the faith of the universal Church (II Cor. V, 10; Heb. IX, 27; Mt. XXV, 1 sq.; Jn. IX, 4; Lk. XVI, 9, 22; Gal. VI, 10);

6. the state of grace (condemned propositions 12, 15, 17, 18 of Baius; Council of Orange II, can. 18; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16, can. 32): for the value and dignity of a work is principally from the dignity of the one operating (Gen. IV, 4); if therefore he himself is not worthy of eternal life through habitual grace making him pleasing, he is not suited for placing works worthy of eternal life (Jn. XV, 4).

C. On the part of God rewarding:

7. acceptance or preordination of the work unto a wage and a kind of promise, at least implicitly contained in the bestowal of grace. Not that the good work has intrinsic value or condignity from that acceptance, but because beyond the condignity which it has from grace, an ordination or promise concerning merits to be accepted and concerning the wage to be rendered is necessary, so that he who has operated well from grace may have a right to the wage and God may be obligated to render it to him from justice.

Among men no one is bound from justice to remunerate service, however worthy in price, unless he has accepted it and thus has at least tacitly taken on the obligation of repaying. But acceptance is much more required on the part of God, who of Himself is not obligated by any works of men to render a wage, both because our services are already owed to Him, since they are His, and because they confer no profit of utility, and because we have from God every power of operating and our very act; therefore in no way can God be our debtor. But, when an ordination or promise has been added, He is now a debtor of Himself, and He is bound not toward us but toward Himself, insofar as He owes it to His own wisdom, fidelity, and will to fulfill in creatures what by free will He has appointed to give them, and according to the proportion of works to bestow upon the works the reward established (Jas. I, 12; II, 5; Mt. XX; I Tim. IV, 8; Heb. X, 36; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16). Therefore condignity depends upon the internal value of the work, the acceptance of God being presupposed: this does not deny the value of the work, but brings it about that to the work, which by reason of its value is worthy of reward, this reward is now actually due from God by justice (a. 1).

Hence there does not exist justice strictly so called between God and men according to absolute equality, because our works can confer nothing upon God, since their whole goodness (being, ability, and the very operating) is conferred gratuitously by His ordination in such a way that He could claim it for Himself (a. 1). Yet, this preordination having been posited, if the meritorious value of works is considered according to the power of the Holy Spirit moving us unto eternal life and according to the dignity of grace by which man is a sharer of the divine nature and an adoptive son to whom the inheritance of eternal life is due, there is present an equality of strict justice between the work and the reward promised by God, so that the work is of the same order and of equal value with the wage of eternal life and divine like it (a. 3). Whence eternal life by comparison to the proximate cause, or the works of the just, is a wage due from justice; but by comparison to the remote cause, namely, the power of operating and grace from divine ordination, it is a gift of mercy (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16 and sess. 14, c. 8).

195. In what way meritorious works must be ordered to the service of God.

Not all declare this in the same way:

a) Some, such as Suarez, deny that a formal ordination of charity is required, saying that every act done from any supernatural motive whatever from its nature implicitly tends to the supernatural end, and therefore is equal to this in moral estimation and meritorious.

b) Better, however, with the Thomists and Bellarmine, it is said that this suffices for merit de congruo; but for merit de condigno there is required an influence from an act of charity: for through that we strictly merit the attainment of the end through which we tend to the end, the Supreme Good as such; but we do this through charity alone, by which we tend to the Supreme Good in Himself. Practically, nevertheless, this opinion does not differ so much from the preceding, because the influence of charity is always present: 1) by way of object or motive: for an act of charity, once exercised and not retracted by mortal sin, refers all the following acts of the whole life to God the supernatural end, and, if perhaps not all honorable acts, at least all which are proportioned to the supernatural end and are supernatural from motive and principle; 2) also by way of principle, because acts of the supernatural virtues do not proceed from grace except through the mediation of charity, just as they do not proceed from a power except through the command of the will, which command proceeds from charity.

c) Indeed, with very great probability several say further that by this single act of charity all honorable acts are referred to the supernatural end, and therefore are done from the motive and principle of charity and thus are supernatural and meritorious, so that in the just man exercising charity an act is either supernaturally good and meritorious, or a venial sin. This seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas, De Malo q. 2, a. 5, ad 7, and II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 5.

1. Thus also outside the Order of Preachers several hold, such as the Salmanticenses, Billot, Van Noort, Van der Meersch, Raphael of St. Joseph; to whom His Eminence Cardinal Van Roey comes close.

d) Yet for this the mere presence of the habit of charity cannot suffice, as it seemed to some, such as Ballerini, Noldin, Vermeersch, but its exercise is required, because, as St. Thomas says, II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 6, "from the fact that it is in habit no one merits, but from the fact that he actually operates."

e) Finally, some, such as St. Bonaventure and St. Alphonsus, require that the act of charity be repeated rather often, for example, daily or weekly, or even for each series of actions; and because of the probability of this opinion it is to be counseled that it be exercised more often.

196. Degrees of merit.

Salutary acts are not equally, but more or less, meritorious, according as the conditions of merit are verified more or less. Hence, other things being equal, the merit becomes greater:

1. the worthier the acting person is, according to the supernatural dignity of habitual grace making one pleasing, by which man is pleasing to God;

2. the more voluntary the work is, that is, the more it proceeds from a readier will and is performed with greater intensity; and the freer it is, that is, the more the agent gives of his own and from his proper dominion;

3. the more the work is informed by charity, namely, the more expressly, more proximately, and more actually it is referred to God; hence the practice is best of often exercising an act of charity and offering works to God in order to increase merit, and also to increase charity itself, the root of merit;

4. the better the work is according to species, excellence, and nobility of moral goodness, which nobility depends upon the object; for example, the act is better which regards a more excellent virtue, which has a higher end, which pertains to several virtues. Therefore a precept does not impede merit; indeed obedience increases merit because it adds the goodness of a new virtue;

5. and therefore the more difficult the work is in itself: namely, intrinsic difficulty, which is from the magnitude and arduousness of the work itself and from the elevation of the proper object, increases merit, because the better something is, the more it is elevated above man's powers. But extrinsic difficulty of labor, which the agent experiences in a good work and which comes from a defect of the one operating and of a ready will, does not increase but rather diminishes merit. Otherwise the more someone advanced in virtue and experienced less difficulty, the less merit he would have. Yet per accidens a special difficulty on the part of the agent can be the occasion that someone tends toward good with greater attention and with a greater effort of the will (q. 114, a. 4, ad 2), and then merit is increased not because of the difficulty but because of the intensity of the will.

197. Observation.

For congruity of merit in order to a certain supernatural retribution, the same conditions are required, excepting the state of grace, the influence of charity, and the promise of God; yet this promise, like the state of grace, is required for merit de congruo more strictly so called and infallible, which namely consists in a friendly right to some reward, without equality of the work to the reward ever being required.

justification, as in Paul and Magdalene, then justification is rightly called miraculous.]

St. Thomas, q. 114.

Merit, taken broadly, signifies the dignity of a thing on account of which it demands something; and thus it suits even inanimate things: thus it is said that an elegant painting deserves to be seen, that a fertile field deserves to be cultivated. Merit, taken properly, suits acts only, and is the property of a morally good human act denoting proportion to reward; for we speak here of merit in the good part, not in the bad, which, for distinction's sake, is called demerit.

Merit is distinguished as twofold: one de condigno, the other de congruo. Merit de condigno is an work whose value equals the value of the reward and to which the reward is rendered out of justice. Merit de congruo is an act whose value does not equal the value of the reward, and to which the reward is owed not out of justice but out of congruity only and seemliness, friendship or liberality of the rewarder.

Merit de condigno is properly and simply merit; merit de congruo only improperly and secundum quid, because it has no equality to that which is given on its account.

The example is usually placed in a generous soldier, to whom his own stipend is given de condigno, de congruo however a benefice of nobility or some donative from the king.

Merit de condigno is twofold: one of the rigor of justice, another of condignity only. The first imports such equal value to the reward as excludes every grace done to the meriting person by him who rewards, and such was the merit of Christ. The other imports indeed value equal to the reward, but with some grace supposed done to the meriting person by the rewarder; and of this merit before God there is question here principally.

§ I. — Conditions required for merit.

Six conditions are wont to be required for merit: the first, that the act be free; second, that it be good; third, that it be done in service of the rewarder; fourth, that the one operating be a wayfarer; fifth, that he be in the state of grace; sixth, that his act be ordained by God to reward.

The sixth condition is explained, concerning which there is some difficulty.

The sixth condition is the ordination or promise and pact of God ordaining the good act to reward or recompense: not that the good act have its intrinsic value or condignity from that promise; but because beyond the dignity, which it has entirely from grace, the promise of rendering recompense is necessary, in order that he who operates well from grace may have right to the recompense, and God be bound to render it to him. So commonly against Vasquez and certain others.^{1 1} Hic q. 114, a. 1, ad 3, et a. 2, c.

It is proved 1° From Scripture. Matth., XX: the father of the family, by whom God is signified, made an agreement with the laborer about the daily denarius. 2° ² Thus defined Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16. 3° ³ The same teaches Augustine, serm. 158. 4° Finally it is proved by reason. Merit imports in the meriting person right to the good of the rewarder, and in the rewarder obligation to render it. Yet, howsoever good man's act be, without the promise of God it cannot produce in man right to the good of God, nor in God obligation to render it. Therefore. — Prob. min. From good works already otherwise owed to God, man acquires no right toward God, nor is God bound to render him any reward, unless he have promised it. Yet all goods whatsoever of man are owed to God under several other titles, namely creation, supreme dominion, ultimate end, etc. Therefore. ² « To those who operate well unto the end and hope in God eternal life is to be proposed, both as grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ Jesus, and as a reward faithfully to be rendered out of the promise of God himself to their good works and merits. » ³ Olim 16 de verbis Apostoli.

[There can be added a seventh condition required for merit, namely the influx of charity. For the merit whereby the essential reward is obtained is founded in charity alone, in which the perfection of life essentially consists. Consequently merit can belong to no other virtue except through the motion and command of charity toward it. Whence I Cor., XIII, 2 et 3, it is said: If I have not charity, I am nothing, nothing profits me.]

59. Condign merit demands the fulfillment of two conditions: 1. The benefit conferred must be in no way due to the recipient; we can claim no reward from another for paying him a debt. 2. The person benefited must accept explicitly or implicitly the service rendered, or, at least, he ought to accept it. If this condition were not required, I should be obliged to pay every tradesman that might choose to send me his wares.

60. Thesis VIII. We can merit a reward from men, and from God also, though not in the same sense.