Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Second Article. On The Conditions Of Merit
102. What the conditions of merit are. Only those special conditions which are required on the part of the one meriting for merit must be proposed more accurately here.
a. The general conditions of merit, which are required for every merit both de condigno and de congruo, are four, of which two are referred to the person meriting, but two to the meritorious work: a. the state of the way, which by the free disposition of God has its terminus in death; b. liberty from coercion and necessity; c. the moral goodness of the work; d. the supernaturality of the work.1
b. The special condition of merit de condigno is the state of grace on the part of the person meriting. For true merit does not depend on the supernatural work alone, but also on the state and dignity of the person meriting. Therefore supernatural actions, unless sanctifying grace is added, do not have true and perfect merit; since sanctifying grace gives to works that value by which they are constituted proportioned and equal to the reward.
a. The Council of Trent attributes true and properly so-called merit, or merit de condigno, only to the works of the just;2 b. Sacred Scripture declares that man cannot bear the fruit of good works unless he has remained in Christ through sanctifying grace.3 Besides this, it calls only sons heirs, that is, he does not merit the inheritance unless he is a son through sanctifying grace.4 c. And indeed, if one who is not in the state of grace were capable of merit, someone could be at the same time worthy of eternal life and eternal death. Besides this, the reward is the good proper to the sons of God, since it is the inheritance of the sons of God through adoption; but only through grace is man elevated to the state of sons of God. Therefore works done outside the state of grace have no proportion to the reward.
1 The necessity of these conditions is shown by the dogmatic theologians, among whom may be compared: Schiffini, De gratia divina (Freiburg: Herder, 1901), n. 344 ff. Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, 3rd ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1900), V, n. 397 ff. Hurter, Compendium theologiae dogmaticae, 9th ed. (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1903), III, n. 225 ff.
3 John 15:4.
4 Rom. 8:16 ff.
103. Many theologians further require that the work be done from charity: for without charity neither faith nor any other good work of whatever kind has any value before God.1 But how the work must proceed from charity in order that it can be meritorious, not all explain in the same way.2
a. Some explain it so that only elicited acts of charity and acts commanded by charity, namely those which are ordered to God from the motive of charity actually or at least virtually, are meritorious. Therefore these require for merit an intention at least virtual by which all works are ordered to God from charity. By an argument taken from the nature of the thing they confirm this opinion in this way: for merit de condigno, which is the noblest merit, an act of the supreme and most perfect virtue, which is charity, is required. To confirm their opinion they appeal to the authority of St. Thomas,3 whom St. Alphonsus understands and follows in this sense.
b. Others explain it so that acts of charity and works which through an act of charity are habitually ordered to God are meritorious. Therefore these require for merit a habitual intention by which all works are ordered to God from charity. In order that this condition be satisfied, it is required that an act of charity precede, that it never have been retracted by a subsequent grave sin, and that it be renewed as often as the precept of charity urges. By this reason they judge all works to be habitually referred to God from the intention of charity. The patrons of this opinion also appeal to St. Thomas, whom they think must be understood in this sense.4
c. Finally, others explain it so that acts of charity and all works which proceed from habitual charity, or from the habit of charity, which is always conjoined with sanctifying grace, are meritorious. Therefore these require for merit no peculiar intention or preceding act of charity by which works are ordered to God from charity, but teach that for merit the state of grace suffices, which embraces charity by an indissoluble bond, and that objective or natural ordering to God which the works of a just man have of themselves and by their nature, provided that they are good in themselves and placed through the influence of supernatural grace. For through sanctifying grace man is ordered to God, the supernatural end, and becomes a son of God, whose good works by this very fact are works of a son of God; but the works of a son of God are of themselves worthy of the eternal inheritance.
2 Cf. Schiffini, l.c., n. 364 ff.
3 Summa I-II, q. 100, a. 10, ad 2; De virtutibus, q. 2, a. 11, ad 3; II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, and ad 6.
4 De malo, q. 2, a. 5, ad 10; II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, and ad 6.
104. The opinion to be preferred. a. The reasons which show that this third opinion is altogether to be preferred to the others can be compared among the dogmatic theologians. The principal ones are these: a. In Sacred Scripture not only acts which in some way proceed from actual charity, but also acts of other virtues, and these named simply, are promised and attributed eternal beatitude itself.1 b. The Council of Trent, recounting all the conditions required for merit de condigno, with no mention made of an act of charity or of another good intention, declares all good works of the just which are done through grace to be meritorious.2 Nor by the words "which have been done in God" does it signify anything other than works which are done in grace and through grace. That these words must be understood in this way is clear from the words placed in the canon (32): "which are done through the grace of God"; for these are equivalent to the former. Therefore from the mind of the Council of Trent, besides the state of grace and the influence of actual grace, nothing else is required for merit. c. And indeed all good and supernatural acts which are exercised by a just man are by their nature ordered to God the supernatural end, redound to the glory of God, and by this very fact are means proportioned to the ultimate end; therefore they have everything which can be required for merit de condigno. For through the habit of charity, which necessarily follows sanctifying grace, man is ordered to God the supernatural end, and since through the same grace and charity he is constituted son and friend of God, all his works are implicitly and habitually referred to God and consecrated to Him. Therefore for merit it is not required that also on the part of the one operating they be ordered to God the supreme good.
b. The first of the other opinions brings forward a gratuitous exaggeration and in its confirmatory argument contains a begging of the question: for this very thing is asked, whether the highest merit de condigno belongs only to the noblest virtue of charity, or also to others. The charity of which St. Paul speaks (1 Cor. 13) is not actual charity but habitual charity. Therefore the Apostle does not teach that good works, even heroic ones, are of no profit unless they are done from love of God, or unless they are referred to God through a good intention (through an act of charity), but he teaches that charisms, or graces gratuitously given, are of no profit for the merit of eternal life if they are severed from habitual charity and from sanctifying grace.3 The second opinion, besides the fact that it demands for merit a condition which the Council of Trent does not require, is pressed by another difficulty not light. Let us imagine a child baptized in infancy, who, after he has come to the use of reason, does not advert to the obligation of eliciting an act of charity, and therefore for a notable time in the state of grace does good works without having elicited an act of charity; or an adult who, justified through attrition and the sacrament of penance, lives in grace without eliciting an act of charity, since the precept is not yet urging; or finally a just man who for a notable time from inadvertence omits renewing an act of charity when the precept already urges: that all these throughout this whole time can merit nothing, after the Council of Trent there will hardly be anyone who contends it.
Note. If this opinion were not certain, supernatural intentions, especially from the motive of charity, would have to be elicited frequently by a just man: for where there is question of conditions required for merit, the probability of an opinion does not help, but only the truth. But even if the truth of these opinions is not to be doubted, the faithful are to be induced by apt motives to operating from the most perfect intentions, especially of charity frequently renewed: for the more perfect the intention of the agent is, the greater is the merit of the action. Besides this, a good intention, especially a supernatural one, renewed more often, contributes much, indeed sometimes is necessary, for efficaciously strengthening the will in the purpose of resisting even more vehement temptations and of constantly fulfilling even the more difficult Christian laws.
1 Cf. Matt. 19:16 ff.; 25:34 ff.; 1 Tim. 6:17 ff.
2 Sess. 6, c. 16, these words are read: Nothing more is to be believed to be lacking to those justified themselves, by which they should be considered to have fully and truly merited by those works which have been done in God ... eternal life to be obtained in its own time, provided nevertheless that they have departed in grace. And can. 32 has these words: If anyone shall say ... that the justified man by good works which are done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, of whom he is a living member, does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life ... and also increase of glory, let him be anathema.
3 Cf. Cornely (Cursus scripturae sacrae) on this place.