Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
What is merit, and of how many kinds? what conditions does it require?
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Merit, taken broadly, signifies the dignity of a thing on account of which it demands something; and thus it suits even inanimate things: thus it is said that an elegant painting deserves to be seen, that a fertile field deserves to be cultivated. Merit, taken properly, suits acts only, and is the property of a morally good human act denoting proportion to reward; for we speak here of merit in the good part, not in the bad, which, for distinction's sake, is called demerit.
Meritum latius sumptum significat dignitatem rei ob quam exigit aliquid, et sic convenit etiam inanimatis : sic dicitur quod elegans pictura mereatur videri, quod ager fertilis mereatur coli. Meritum proprie sumptum convenit actibus tantum, estque proprietas actus humani moraliter boni dicens proportionem ad praemium ; loquimur enim hic de merito in bonam partem, non in malam, quod distinctionis causa dicitur demeritum.
Merit is distinguished as twofold: one de condigno, the other de congruo. Merit de condigno is an work whose value equals the value of the reward and to which the reward is rendered out of justice. Merit de congruo is an act whose value does not equal the value of the reward, and to which the reward is owed not out of justice but out of congruity only and seemliness, friendship or liberality of the rewarder.
Duplex distinguitur meritum, unum de condigno, alterum de congruo. Meritum de condigno est opus cujus valor aequat valorem praemii et cui redditur praemium ex justitia. Meritum de congruo est opus cujus valor non aequat valorem praemii, et cui non debetur praemium ex justitia, sed ex congruitate tantum et decentia, amicitia seu liberalitate praemiantis.
Merit de condigno is properly and simply merit; merit de congruo only improperly and secundum quid, because it has no equality to that which is given on its account.
Meritum de condigno est proprie et simpliciter meritum, meritum de congruo improprie tantum et secundum quid, quia non habet aequalitatem ad id quod ejus intuitu datur.
The example is usually placed in a generous soldier, to whom his own stipend is given de condigno, de congruo however a benefice of nobility or some donative from the king.
Exemplum poni solet in milite generoso, cui proprium stipendium datur de condigno, de congruo autem beneficium nobilitatis aut aliquod donativum a rege.
Merit de condigno is twofold: one of the rigor of justice, another of condignity only. The first imports such equal value to the reward as excludes every grace done to the meriting person by him who rewards, and such was the merit of Christ. The other imports indeed value equal to the reward, but with some grace supposed done to the meriting person by the rewarder; and of this merit before God there is question here principally.
Meritum de condigno est duplex, unum de rigore justitiae, aliud de condignitate tantum. Primum sic importat valorem aequalem ad praemium, ut excludat omnem gratiam factam personae merenti a premiante, et tale fuit meritum Christi. Alterum importat quidem valorem aequalem ad praemium, sed supposita aliqua gratia facta personae merenti a praemiante, et de hoc merito apud Deum hic praecipue agitur.
Six conditions are wont to be required for merit: the first, that the act be free; second, that it be good; third, that it be done in service of the rewarder; fourth, that the one operating be a wayfarer; fifth, that he be in the state of grace; sixth, that his act be ordained by God to reward.
Sex conditiones requiri solent ad meritum : prima, ut opus sit liberum ; secunda, ut sit bonum ; tertia, ut fiat in obsequium praemiantis ; quarta, ut operans sit viator ; quinta, ut sit in statu gratiae ; sexta, ut ejus opus sit a Deo ordinatum in praemium.
The sixth condition is explained, concerning which there is some difficulty.
Explicatur sexta conditio, de qua est aliqua difficultas.
The sixth condition is the ordination or promise and pact of God ordaining the good act to reward or recompense: not that the good act have its intrinsic value or condignity from that promise; but because beyond the dignity, which it has entirely from grace, the promise of rendering recompense is necessary, in order that he who operates well from grace may have right to the recompense, and God be bound to render it to him. So commonly against Vasquez and certain others.1 1 Hic q. 114, a. 1, ad 3, et a. 2, c.
Sexta conditio est ordinatio seu promissio et pactum Dei ordinantis bonum opus ad praemium seu mercedem : non quod bonum opus valorem seu condignitatem suam intrinsecam habeat ab illa promissione ; sed quia ultra dignitatem, quam totam habet ex gratia, necessaria sit promissio de mercede reddenda, ad hoc ut qui ex gratia est bene operatus, habeat jus ad mercedem, et Deus obligetur illi reddere. Ita communiter contra Vasquez et quosdam alios.1 1 Hic q. 114, a. 1, ad 3, et a. 2, c.
It is proved 1° From Scripture. Matth., XX: the father of the family, by whom God is signified, made an agreement with the laborer about the daily denarius. 2° 2 Thus defined Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16. 3° 3 The same teaches Augustine, serm. 158. 4° Finally it is proved by reason. Merit imports in the meriting person right to the good of the rewarder, and in the rewarder obligation to render it. Yet, howsoever good man's act be, without the promise of God it cannot produce in man right to the good of God, nor in God obligation to render it. Therefore. — Prob. min. From good works already otherwise owed to God, man acquires no right toward God, nor is God bound to render him any reward, unless he have promised it. Yet all goods whatsoever of man are owed to God under several other titles, namely creation, supreme dominion, ultimate end, etc. Therefore. 2 « To those who operate well unto the end and hope in God eternal life is to be proposed, both as grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ Jesus, and as a reward faithfully to be rendered out of the promise of God himself to their good works and merits. » 3 Olim 16 de verbis Apostoli.
Probatur 1° ex Scriptura. Matth., XX, paterfamilias, per quem significatur Deus, conventionem fecit cum operario de denario diurno. 2°2 Ita definivit Trid., sess. VI, cap. 16. 3°3 Idem docet Augustinus, serm. 158. 4° Tandem ratione probatur. Meritum importat in merente jus ad bonum praemiantis, et in praemiante obligationem ad illud reddendum. Atqui, quantumvis sit bonum opus hominis, non potest, seclusa Dei promissione, parere in homine jus ad bonum Dei, neque in Deo obligationem ad illud reddendum. Ergo. — Prob. min. Ex bonis operibus jam aliunde debitis Deo, homo non acquirit jus erga Deum, nec Deus obligatur reddere illi aliquod praemium, nisi illud promiserit. Atqui omnia quaecumque bona hominis sunt debita Deo pluribus aliis titulis, puta creationis, supremi dominii, ultimi finis, etc. Ergo. 2 « Bene operantibus usque ad finem et in Deo sperantibus proponenda est vita aeterna, et tamquam gratia filiis Dei per Christum Jesum misericorditer promissa, et tamquam merces ex ipsius Dei promissione bonis ipsorum operibus et meritis fideliter reddenda. » 3 Olim 16 de verbis Apostoli.
[There can be added a seventh condition required for merit, namely the influx of charity. For the merit whereby the essential reward is obtained is founded in charity alone, in which the perfection of life essentially consists. Consequently merit can belong to no other virtue except through the motion and command of charity toward it. Whence I Cor., XIII, 2 et 3, it is said: If I have not charity, I am nothing, nothing profits me.]
[Addi potest septima conditio requisita ad meritum, scilicet influxus charitatis. Meritum enim quo obtinetur praemium essentiale, fundatur in sola charitate, in qua perfectio vitae essentialiter consistit. Consequenter meritum nulli alteri virtuti competere potest, nisi ex motione et imperio charitatis ad illud. Hinc I Cor., XIII, 2 et 3, dicitur : Si charitatem non habuero, nihil sum, nihil mihi prodest.]