Appendix. On the Merit of Human Acts

33. • A meritorious act is a good work, posited with grace, and worthy of a reward or retribution.

Merit is distinguished as twofold: 1. merit de condigno, to which reward is due from justice, that is, from the promise of God; 2. merit de congruo, to which reward is not due from justice, but from a certain becomingness and liberality of God.

I say 1. A just man operating through grace can truly and properly merit de condigno. - It is clear from Matt. 5. 12: Your reward is abundant in heaven; and 2 Tim. 4. 8: There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me on that day. It is also clear from Trent, session 6, ch. 15, where eternal life is declared to be a reward to be rendered, from the promise of God, to the merits of those working well.

I say 2. Man, even a sinner and unbeliever, can by acts posited with grace merit de congruo. - It is clear from various places of Sacred Scripture in which are related examples of sinners and gentiles to whom God granted abundant graces in consideration of their good works. Thus in Acts of the Apostles 10 Cornelius is said to have obtained conversion to the true Faith by his alms and prayers ¹.

¹ The example of Cornelius perhaps is less to the point. For he must not be held as an unbeliever, who in the sacred letters (Acts 10. 2) is called religious and fearing God, nor as a sinner, who (ibid., v. 22) is called just and fearing God. But he can be considered justified through charity. For before the Gospel was promulgated to him, faith in Christ was not necessary for him in order to have charity.

YOU WILL ASK 2. What can man merit de condigno?

Hence good works done from grace are of a threefold genus, namely 1. Living works, or good works done in the state of sanctifying grace. - 2. Mortified works, or good works which indeed were performed in the state of grace, but lost all merit through subsequent mortal sin, yet with sanctifying grace recovered, they revive. - 3. Dead works, which are done in the state of mortal sin. But these, although they do not have the reward of eternal life, can nevertheless be profitable for merit de congruo.

34. Questions. - YOU WILL ASK 1. What is required for merit de condigno?

I answer. It is required 1. that the act be free; for otherwise it would not be a human act; 2. that it be honest; otherwise it would not be worthy of reward; 3. that it be posited from grace; otherwise it would not have proportion to supernatural life and reward; 4. that the agent be in the state of grace, because a sinner is not a son or friend of God, to whom the promises are due.

I answer 1. He can merit an increase of sanctifying grace, and eternal glory, which follows it. - It is clear from the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 16.

I answer 2. A just man cannot de condigno merit final perseverance, nor efficacious graces, because these are gratuitous gifts which God has not promised.

YOU WILL ASK 3. What can man merit de congruo?

I answer 1. A sinner, through good works, for example, fasting, almsgiving, prayers, can merit de congruo the help of grace, so that he may avoid sin and come to justification.

I answer 2. A just man can merit de congruo 1. for himself efficacious graces and final perseverance; 2. for others first grace and helps of further grace.

YOU WILL ASK 4. Whether a work, that it be meritorious de condigno, ought to be of supererogation, or not commanded?

I answer. No. For it is clear from Trent, session 6, canon 26, that all works which are done in God merit eternal life; but works which are of precept are themselves also done in God; therefore by them also man merits eternal life.

35. • YOU WILL ASK 5. Whether for merit de condigno an act elicited from charity is required?

I answer. Although very grave authors, as Bellarmine says (On Justification, book 5, ch. 15), and among these Vasquez (on I-II, disp. 217, ch. 4, no. 38), judged that all good works of a justified man from grace are meritorious of eternal life, even with no preceding relation of the work to God from charity, for example, the good works of a man justified by force of the sacrament before he elicits an act of charity; nevertheless the more common and more probable opinion further requires that works be referred to God actually or virtually from charity. And indeed we have already seen above what suffices for that virtual relation of works to God, from the common opinion of the Doctors with St. Thomas; they require this alone, namely, that when in its time the precept of charity urges, man has at some time ordered himself and all his things to God through an act of this virtue ², although afterward while acting he thinks neither of God nor of charity. Yet St. Bonaventure (2 Dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, in the body and ad 2) seems to demand something more, and to require for merit that this ordering to God be made for each work, or at least for each series of works; and if it is lacking, God neither rewards the work nor imputes it as a fault. Hence he says (ibid., ad 6): If a work of another kind were begun, the intention would have to be renewed, in order that the work might be meritorious. Nevertheless, since (ibid.) he judges that for the merit of regular observance in a Religious the act of charity suffices by which he vowed from the beginning to carry the burden of Religion; indeed, since for merit (ibid.) he holds it enough if a just man, thinking nothing of God, only considers that the work, for example obeying, is good, he scarcely differs in reality from St. Thomas; indeed Vasquez (disp. cit., ch. 2, n. 9) does not hesitate to draw St. Bonaventure over into his own opinion, or at least into the opinion of St. Thomas.

² If you say: If St. Thomas demands this alone, why elsewhere for merit does he require that individual acts be formed, ordered, commanded by charity? For thus he says (On Truth, q. 14, art. 5, ad 13): In one having charity there cannot be any act of virtue unless it is formed by charity. For either it will be ordered to the due end, and this cannot be except through charity in one having charity; or it is not ordered to the due end, and thus it will not be an act of virtue.

I answer. These words mean nothing else than that an act of any virtue be ordered to God, or to that highest good which is the object of charity. Whence St. Thomas (3, Dist. 27, q. 1, art. 4, q. 3): That charity is the mover of all the other virtues is clear from this, that the good itself which is the object of charity under the notion of end is the end of the virtues. And then he adds:

And according to this charity is said to command their acts.

For the same reason, charity is called by St. Thomas the form of the virtues (On Virtues, q. 2, art. 3): The acts of all the other virtues are ordered to the proper end of charity, which is the highest good... And to this extent charity is called the form of all the virtues, insofar namely as all the acts of all the virtues are ordered to the loved highest good.

For the same reason, charity, according to the holy Doctor, is said to command the virtues (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5): Since charity commands all the virtues... it is necessary that whatever is ordered to the end of some virtue be ordered to the end of charity (namely, to the object of charity, which is the highest good); and since every good act is ordered to the end of some virtue, it will remain ordered to the end of charity, and thus it will be meritorious. And so eating and drinking with the mode of temperance preserved, and playing for recreation with the mode of eutrapelia preserved..., will be meritorious in him who has charity.

Nor yet is it necessary that while someone acts, he think about the ends of the virtues as to be ordered to the end of charity. Thus St. Thomas (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 3): Not only an act of charity is meritorious, but also an act of the other virtues insofar as they are informed by grace; although they cannot be meritorious except insofar as they are reduced to the end of charity. But it is not necessary that acts always be reduced to that end (of charity); but it suffices for the efficacy of meriting that they be reduced to the ends of the other virtues; for he who intends to preserve chastity, even if he thinks nothing about charity, clearly merits, if he has grace. But every act tending to some good, unless it tends to it inordinately, has for its end the good of some virtue; because the virtues sufficiently perfect concerning all things which can be good for men.

End of the Treatise on Human Acts.