Extreme, grave and common necessity

424. The right of one in need. Extreme necessity in the temporal order is that by which life is endangered.

1. He who is constituted in extreme necessity can, and of himself ought to, take from the goods of another as much as is sufficient for freeing himself from such necessity, unless the other is in the same necessity. The reason for the first is that in extreme necessity all goods are common (n. 368). The reason for the second is that each one is bound to preserve his own life if he morally can. The reason for the third is that extreme necessity gives the right of taking away another's thing; when this ceases, that right also ceases. The reason for the fourth is that in an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better; therefore it is not licit to deprive him of his own thing to whom the thing is equally necessary.

a. It makes no difference whether someone is in extreme necessity from natural causes or from the malice of men, as if robbers threaten someone with death or perpetual captivity unless he hands over a great sum of money.

b. In a fire it is not licit to seize another's ladder to save oneself if the other cannot escape danger of life without it. In shipwreck it is not licit, in order to save oneself, to seize a plank already seized by another, which he needs in order to escape.

c. What is licit in extreme necessity is also licit in quasi-extreme necessity, which commonly is equated with extreme necessity, as if someone is in moral danger of falling into a lethal disease, of losing liberty, etc.

d. Another's thing can also be taken to relieve the extreme necessity of the neighbor: for what someone can do by himself, it is also licit to do through another.

e. Even if the thing which is necessary to one in extreme need is of great value (a great sum of money), nevertheless he can take it for himself. For since in extreme necessity all things are common, he has the right of taking whatever here and now is necessary for preserving life, even if it is of great value. Nor therefore does the right of the poor man cease because the rich man is not bound to offer him a thing of great price spontaneously. For to the right of the needy man of taking the necessary thing there does not correspond an obligation of the rich man of giving it, because the obligation of assisting and the faculty of taking from created goods those things which are necessary for the preservation of life are derived from a different source: the former arises from charity, the latter from the right of preserving life from created goods. To this right of the poor man there corresponds in the rich man the obligation of not impeding him from taking the necessaries.¹ Nevertheless Lugo seems to restrict the faculty of the needy person to taking only that which pertains to the ordinary means of preserving life: for just as he does not have the obligation of preserving life by extraordinary means, so neither does he have the right of taking them against the owner's will. - But although he does not have the obligation, nevertheless he has the faculty and permission of preserving life from created goods, from which follows the power of taking those things which are necessary.

2. In grave or common necessity it is not licit to take away another's thing, because in grave necessity the matter ordinarily concerns goods which nature did not wish to be common to all; but for preserving goods of this kind nature did not wish the means to be common.² Yet if in grave or common necessity the matter concerns preserving goods which nature wished to be common to all, it is licit for a poor man to take from the goods of another, if he cannot receive them by asking, as much as is commonly accustomed to be employed for preserving them.

A poor man constituted in necessity of this kind must first ask for the thing which he needs, because the owner is reasonably unwilling if it is taken away without his knowledge. But if the owner were unwilling to give it, or if the poor man could not ask without inconvenience, he licitly takes for himself a thing not of great value, a greater one indeed if the necessity is grave, a lesser one if it is light.³ Moreover, in cases of this kind there will be necessity at least quasi-extreme.

¹ Lugo, disp. 16, n. 159.

² Proposition 36 condemned by Innocent XI has: "It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity." Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 160; Ballerini-Palmieri, III, n. 283.

³ Lugo, disp. 16, n. 156.

425. Obligation of the needy person and of the owner. a. The poor man ought to ask for the thing which he needs if this can be done, unless a just cause excuses from asking. But if he takes the thing without asking, he does not sin gravely; for since one in extreme need has a right in the thing itself, the owner can be unwilling only as to the mode of taking.¹

b. If the thing taken away is still extant when the necessity ceases, it must be restored to the owner: for the one in extreme need has the right only to the use of the thing if this alone was necessary; the thing itself remains the owner's. But if the thing taken away is no longer extant, one must distinguish. If the one in extreme need is indeed poor in fact, but has probable hope of receiving something afterward, he can take another's thing only with the burden of restitution; for it is not licit for him to take more than is necessary for preserving life. But if he is poor both in fact and in hope, he is held to nothing, even if afterward he comes to a better condition: for he who in extreme necessity takes another's thing makes it his own; but he who consumes his own thing is not bound to restore.

c. The owner, alpha. from charity, not from justice, is bound to give his own thing to one in extreme need. Therefore he who neglects to assist one in extreme need or hides his own things is not bound to restitution when the necessity has ceased. beta. From justice he is bound not to impede the poor man from occupying the thing and not to take away the thing occupied.

¹ Cf. Lessius, l. 2, c. 12, n. 66.

Except in the case of extreme necessity, which in ordinary circumstances is rare, there is no obligation to give alms out of what is necessary either for the support of life or position. Charity, as we have seen, begins at home, and it rather forbids us to prefer the needs of outsiders to our own and to the needs of our family. We are, as a general rule, only bound to give alms out of our superfluity, ‘“‘’That which remaineth give alms.¹ Some theologians maintain that this precept imposes an obligation of giving all one’s superfluous wealth to the poor; but others hold that this is only of counsel, that the precept is a general one directed to all the rich, and that it will be fulfilled if each gives something of his superfluity so that the necessities of the poor may be relieved by the common contributions of all. How much must be given according to this opinion depends upon circumstances, and is better left to the judgement of a prudent man after due consideration of all the circumstances of the case.

¹ Luke xi 41.

When our neighbour is in extreme or almost extreme necessity we are under a grave obligation of helping him even out of what is necessary to support our position in life, provided that it can be done without impoverishing ourselves or being compelled to give up our reasonable and justly acquired style of living. We are not obliged to pay large sums of money to ransom a captive from the hands of bandits, or to send a sick pauper to the Riviera for the winter; we should not be obliged to take such extraordinary means even to preserve our own life.

We are also under a grave obligation, according to the common teaching of divines, of helping the poor who are in grave necessity out of our superfluity. It is difficult to reconcile the words of Holy Scripture with any more lenient doctrine on this point.¹ However, we should be slow to decide that in any particular case a rich man has sinned mortally by refusing to help one in grave necessity. For although there be a grave obligation occasionally to help the poor in serious want, it cannot be concluded that a grave obligation binds any one particular person to assist all such; that would be an impossible burden. Furthermore, in practice it is frequently difficult to decide when a man is in grave necessity, and whether he will not be more conveniently helped by someone else. Besides, there are not wanting theologians who teach a more lenient doctrine as to the gravity of the obligation of assisting those who are in grave need.

A rich man cannot be excused from sin who makes it a practice never to give anything in alms on the plea that the poor can go to the workhouse, and that he pays his poor rates. For cases of grave and sometimes of extreme necessity arise where it is practically impossible to seek relief in the workhouse; and wherever there is a case of true necessity there is an obligation to help as far as one can.

¹ Matt. xxv 41; 1 John iii 17.

The rich are also under an obligation of sometimes helping those who are in common necessity, for the texts of Holy Scripture seem to refer to cases of ordinary need such as are commonly met with, and if no one ever helped the poor, their lot would soon become desperate. A man, therefore, who makes it a rule never to give alms to ordinary beggars certainly commits sin; he is not obliged to help all who apply, but out of his superfluity he must help some. It is a disputed point among theologians whether this obligation binds under pain of mortal or venial sin only. The severer view is the more common, but the milder is defended by many approved authors, on the ground that the necessity of the common beggar is tolerable, and is not so irksome as to impose on others a grave obligation of helping him.

As to need, we may distinguish three classes of persons:

(a) Those in apparent need are such as pretend poverty, sickness, or misfortune, in order to get sympathy and financial aid (e.g., professional beggars). Alms should not be given persons of this kind, since they take what would be given to the really poor and needy. Rather they should be exposed and punished.

(b) Those in real need through choice should not be helped, if they take to begging because they are too lazy to work, or find it profitable to live off others; for they have no right to beg, being able to help themselves, and it would be wrong to encourage them in idleness and an imposition on others (II Thess., iii. 10). But those who are voluntarily poor for Christ’s sake, whether they belong to a religious order or not, are worthy of respect and it is meritorious to assist them.

(c) Those who are in real need against their will, should be assisted; for, even though they became destitute through their own fault, they are in fact unable to help themselves now.

Regarding money obtained under the false pretense of poverty and the duty of restitution, the following rules may be given: (a) If a person obtains considerable alms by pretending to be blind, disabled, in great want, etc., and he is not afflicted or in need, he should give back the money to the donors or, if this is impossible, to the poor, since the donors wished to help the poor, not to encourage idlers. (b) If one obtains only a small amount under a false pretense of poverty, some moralists say there is no duty of restitution, since the donor may be presumed to give unconditionally in the case of minute sums; likewise, if a beggar is really poor but exaggerates his need, it does not seem that he is bound to restitution, for those who give alms expect a certain amount of romancing from tramps and other professional beggars.

What is one’s duty in cases of doubtful need? (a) Minute inquiries are inexpedient, since the really deserving are often unwilling to publish their needs; (b) refusal of alms except in cases where one is certain of the need, is not a good general rule to follow, since it is a less evil that an unworthy person be helped than that a worthy one be refused.

There are three degrees of corporal need (cfr. 1165). (a) A person is said to be in extreme need, when he is in manifest danger of losing his life, if help is not given him at once. This does not mean, however, that a person is not in extreme need until he is breathing his last breath; for at that moment he is beyond the reach of human aid. (b) A person is in grave need, when he is in probable danger of death, or is in manifest danger of some very serious misfortune, such as severe sickness, amputation of some member, long and bitter imprisonment, insanity, loss of good name, reduction from wealth to poverty, destruction of home by fire, etc. (c) A person is in common need, when he suffers the inconvenience of poverty, such as being obliged to beg, to deprive himself of many things, to wear poor clothes or to eat ordinary victuals, but is not in danger of any serious loss.

Rules on Giving Alms from the Superfluities of One’s State.—(a) To those who are in extreme or grave necessity alms must be given in each individual case, for these cases are rare, and the persons in need have a personal claim on one’s charity when this is the sole means of saving them from death or other great evil. Example: Last year Titus saved a mother from death and her child from disease by giving his money and services free of charge. This would not exempt him from the duty of doing a like charity, if a like necessity presents itself now.

(b) To those who are in common necessity alms must be given from time to time—now to one, now to another, as prudence dictates—but there is no obligation for an individual case. Even the richest man could not give to all who are in common need, and their want is not so pressing that any one of them can be said to have an individual claim.

Gravity of the Obligations to Give Alms.—(a) For cases of extreme and grave necessity, the obligation of almsgiving is grave. There is general agreement among theologians on this point, since the loss suffered by the neighbor is serious and the withholding of help indicates a lack of charity (I John, iii. 17). Example: The priest and the levite who passed by the wounded man on the road to Jericho were guilty, from the nature of their act, of mortal sin.

(b) For cases of common necessity, the obligation of almsgiving, as it appears, is also grave; for it seldom happens that one is called on to assist those who are in extreme or grave necessity, whereas almsgiving is inculcated as an ordinary duty, and the reasons given by our Lord in Matt., xxv. 41-46, for exclusion from heaven seem to be neglect of alms in common necessity. But some theologians hold that the obligation is only light, since the need is light; and, since these authorities are numerous and of repute, a confessor could not refuse absolution to a rich man who refused on principle to give anything to those in common necessity. Such a one should be advised, rather than reproved, on this point.

From what was said above, the following conclusions may be drawn about the gravity of the sin of refusing alms: (a) It is certainly a mortal sin to refuse alms to one in extreme or grave need, and probably also a grave sin to refuse ever to give alms to those in common need, (b) It is not a mortal sin to refuse an alms in a particular case, if one is not sure of the obligation (e.g., if there is doubt about one’s ability to give the alms or the other’s need), or if it seems that others will give assistance, or that the need will disappear, or that one will suffer some serious inconvenience by giving, etc.

Note: "When several know the extreme necessity of neighbor, all are bound to help by equal parts; if the others are unwilling, all will be bound in solidum, and all knowing and omitting will sin mortally. If one wishes to furnish the whole by himself, the others will be freed. But if, after the others have been warned about contributing and have refused, one has furnished the whole, he will be able by right to exact from the others their rated parts, or to compensate." Sporer, in 4 Pr., c. 6, n. 50.

In extreme necessity, neighbor must be helped even from goods in some way necessary to one's state. Goods necessary to one's state are those which we need in order to live honorably or decently according to our state. But these are the things which are required, according to one's proper condition, for supporting servants, receiving guests, honorable gifts, banquets customarily to be furnished, moderate pomp, the limits of honorable liberality being observed, common events also being considered, future necessity, and attention also being paid to the improvement of an inferior state and honorable ascent to a higher one. Those things which are necessary to one's state do not consist in something indivisible, but have great breadth, and greater breadth for a greater state. In some way, because if you ought to fall out of your state, you are not bound. - Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians; 2. because the order of charity requires this. For the life of neighbor ought to prevail over a good of ours far inferior. But the extreme necessity of neighbor is regularly driven away without notable inconvenience of the giver. - La-Croix 201; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 42, 47; S. Th. 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 1, q. 4; a. 4, q. 1; 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 5, 6; L. 31.

In grave necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous to life and state; indeed also, probably, from goods necessary to state, yet with very slight detriment to one's state. Proof of the first part. For the order of charity demands that we will and procure the good of neighbor when on the one hand neighbor is constituted in grave necessity, and on the other hand either no inconvenience results to us, or only a small one. "That which remains, give alms." Luke 11:41. Proof of the second part, by the same reason, but less validly; for simply a slight inconvenience is not really had in the case, but one fairly grave, since the matter is not about extreme necessity, but about grave necessity, which, attention being paid to the conditions of persons, often cannot be driven away without notable inconvenience of the giver. Hence St. Thomas says that it falls not under precept, but under counsel. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 6. But if that grave necessity of neighbor is graver, and almost extreme, then an obligation is present of making alms almost as in extreme necessity, from which it is little distant. - L. 31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 6; 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 1, q. 4, a. 4, q. 1, 4 ad 4; Struggl, q. 4, n. 45.

Resolves: Both in extreme and in grave necessity, as much must be given as suffices here and now for relieving this necessity, unless there are others who wish to help him. If therefore neighbor needs only the use of a thing, it is enough to lend it, e.g., if you lend clothing to one stripped by enemies, or a horse to one wounded, until he returns home. Nevertheless no one is bound to spend a great sum of money for freeing a poor man from danger of death, or for procuring extraordinary and costly remedies for him. For no one, attention being paid to the condition of his state, is bound even for his own life to spend as much in procuring extraordinary medicine for himself. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5; L. 31; La-Croix 215; Struggl, q. 4, n. 48; Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 16, nn. 167, 168.

In common necessity, he who has goods superfluous to life and state is sometimes bound to give alms. - Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians. Proof 2. both because each one is bound to love neighbor as himself, and because otherwise those poor persons would fall into grave necessity. Proof 3. For the Lord "commands all superfluous things to be shown to the poor, according to that of Luke 11:41: That which remains, give alms." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 87, a. 1 ad 4; Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter of 15 May 1891, on the condition of workers. - This indeed is a positive and general precept; and therefore then certainly it urges when "right reason requires," S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5, that is, that we assist the necessity of neighbor. S. Th. ibid. Therefore the obligation is not of giving everything superfluous to the poor who are in common necessity. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 40, 41, 43; L. 32; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66, aa. 2, 7; Quodl. 8, a. 12; E. M. 405.

Note: "Nevertheless there is not present (for laypersons) an obligation of furnishing the whole superfluity; but it suffices if a fiftieth part of annual revenues which remain be given... and if the revenues are richer, less than a fiftieth part." But this precept does not oblige all in solidum, but commonly all the rich. And if individuals sometimes give something, the common necessities of all are sufficiently helped. L. 32; H. A. tr. 4, n. 19; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 6, 10.

228. Questions. - Q. 1º Does the precept of alms oblige under grave obligation?

Resp. 1º Affirm., in extreme necessity. - Thus all.

Resp. 2º Also affirm., in grave necessity which could soon turn into extreme. Otherwise, concerning grave sin, it is not clear, since the matter is subjected to controversy among the Doctors. But the precept of alms is in itself grave, and indeed also regards common necessity, since cases of grave necessity rarely occur. - Thus commonly with St. Lig. n. 32. ⁵, against Busemb. and many others.

⁵ St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 32.), as is plain, adheres to the opinion which stands for a grave obligation as if to the more common. But indeed, while he alleges thirteen authors for it, against the opposite, which admits either no obligation or only a light one in this, he himself enumerates seventeen, to whom others could also easily be added. Moreover, since from those thirteen whom he cites for himself, you have ten, namely Palaus (Tr. 6. Disp. 2. Punct. 2. n. 15.), the Salmanticenses (Tract. 21. Cap. 7. n. 17.), and eight others brought forward by them, who indeed fight for some obligation, but nowhere hand down that this is to be called grave; thence it is to be concluded that this opinion is not common, but that of certain few against the common.

Hence the same St. Alphonsus (l. c.) does not reject the opinion of Laymann, namely that a Confessor ought not easily to deny absolution to a rich man who wishes to give no alms in common necessities, since about this obligation, what sort it is, the doctors do not agree. And Sanchez, who otherwise (Consil. Lib. 1. Cap. 5. Dub. 5. n. 37.) stands for grave obligation, at length (ibid. n. 41.) concludes that someone is not easily to be condemned, reporting these things from Medina: Because it is too difficult to judge to whom, and how much under mortal obligation we are bound to give; because it is uncertain by what necessary things can be distinguished from superfluous things; and what and how great necessity is required in the poor person; also how much is necessary to each one for nature and state; and whether the necessity of the poor person is true or simulated; and whether there are other rich persons who are willing to succor them; and many other things are uncertain, by ignorance of which they are not easily to be condemned. Compare Diana (Tom. 4. Tr. 7. Res. 8.), where, for the sake of a Confessor who was pressed by great straits in hearing the confessions of the rich, he excellently notes many things.

** Against this Note, VV. opposed not one or another, but altogether twenty columns (Pag. 152-161.). But to what end, it is scarcely possible to divine. For as to the hinge of the question, VV. could not deny those things which are contained in the Note, namely 1º that in St. Alphonsus himself are numbered seventeen (indeed in reality there are numbered twenty) who teach the contrary, and 2º that of thirteen brought forward for himself by St. Alphonsus, ten have not a word about the gravity of this obligation. Now is not even that one thing more than enough for establishing that the gravity of the obligation is not clear, and therefore from the common and certain canon it is not lawful for the Confessor to impose or intimate it? And although on account of the authority of St. Alphonsus we may wish to attribute probability to his opinion; but has not St. Alphonsus a hundred times inculcated that for imposing grave obligations a probable opinion is not sufficient?

But VV. are moved because in the Note it is said that St. Alphonsus's opinion should rather be called that of a few against the common opinion. We shall add some things about this also, which will be enough. And first of all, let it not be omitted what is to be judged about those three who remain from the thirteen alleged by St. Alphonsus for himself, and they are Holzmann, Collet, and Viva. Now 1º Holzmann (De Virt. Th. Tr. 1. §. 4. n. 177.) writes that the conclusion cannot be called simply certain. Therefore from here we have a mere probability of obligation. 2º Collet hands down things so enormous that even St. Alph. rejects them. For, considering the context, he indicates eternal punishment for one denying alms to a common poor person, unless by giving more to others you compensate what you denied to others (De Charit. art. 3.). 3º Finally Viva (Ad prop. XII. Innoc. XI. n. 10.) strengthens his thesis by four citations, of which three are certainly false, and perhaps even the fourth. Do authorities of this kind add weight to the thesis?

Let us come to the things which VV. oppose. And 1º they contend that those also are to be understood of a grave obligation who establish an obligation in any way, although they do not call it grave. The reason is that charity is a precept grave from its genus; and therefore only lightness of matter excuses from gravity of fault. - Resp. Perhaps these things could have force if authors had assigned no case of grave obligation concerning the same matter. But when, with various hypotheses made, some Author has already expressly established where grave obligation presses, and then moves a question about another hypothesis not against those who admit a light obligation, but against those who admit none (as in our case), and indeed asserts obligation, but, otherwise than he had previously been accustomed carefully to do, adds nothing about gravity, it is false that he is to be understood of a grave one; for he would not have omitted to note this also.

2º They note that in recounting those who teach the opinion of St. Alphonsus, St. Thomas was omitted, to whom they join Cajetan. - Resp. Let them produce, I ask, some words of St. Thomas or Cajetan where they assert a grave obligation in the common necessity of the poor. This surely they will never furnish.

3º Next they allege Suarez, Mastrius, Sporer, the Writers of the Society of Jesus as witness Croix, Reuter, Voit, Elbel, Charmes, Concina, Palaus, the Salmanticenses, Cajetan apud Gonet, Bannez, Peter de Ledesma, Tapia, Martinez, and finally Sanchez. - Resp. From all these, only five mention some grave obligation, namely Suarez, Sporer, Reuter, Voit, and Elbel; but the rest say that some obligation is present, by no means that it is grave. Moreover Suarez limits, unless someone should prefer to aid some grave necessity. Sporer (n. 66.) adds: The Doctors rightly warn with Laymann that a Confessor ought not easily or scarcely ever deny absolution to the rich who refuse to make alms in common necessity. Voit transcribes from Babenstuber, whom he alleges: but he omits that Babenstuber, no otherwise than Sporer, presently adopts the aforesaid warning of Laymann. Therefore altogether two remain, Elbel and Reuter, of whom the latter uses this magnificent (!) argument for his matter, that unless we are obliged under grave obligation in the common necessity of the poor, someone can easily slip from common necessity into grave necessity!

4º But, say VV., Sanchez alleges twenty Authors; Concina truly thirty-six; and finally Croix (n. 202.) confesses that the opinion of St. Alphonsus was commonly taught by the Writers of the Society of Jesus. - Resp. Sanchez (Cons. Lib. 1. c. 5. dub. 5. n. 36.) expressly says that the opposite opinion is quite probable; but the thesis for which (ibid. n. 37.) he alleges twenty Authors is this: The second, more probable opinion teaches that one is bound in common necessities: where there is nothing about a grave obligation. Likewise the thesis for which Concina (In Dec. diss. 6. c. 13. n. 6.) brings forward thirty-six Authors is of this kind: The rich are bound under precept to distribute superfluous things, both of nature and of person or state, among the poor: and here likewise you have not a word about the gravity of obligation. Finally, concerning the Authors of the Society of Jesus, Croix has these things (Lib. 2. n. 202.): Although the Authors of the Society commonly teach that the rich are bound in common necessity to give alms, etc., and again it is lawful to ask here: where in these is there a trace of grave obligation? Therefore let us conclude that from all that apparatus of twenty columns, which VV. elaborated with great zeal, scarcely two or three authors exist who can in any way be joined to the testimonies brought forward by St. Alphonsus, which are less firm of themselves.

5º Finally it pleased VV. to bring forward the things which Concina wrote on this argument against Antoninus Diana. - Resp. It is of no concern to us to dwell on these. For recently we saw that the thesis of Concina does not look to the gravity of obligation, but to some obligation or other. Therefore that dispute does not pertain to the present question.

Q. 2º What goods are judged necessary to one's state?

Resp. They are those which are required for sustaining servants, receiving guests, for honorable donations, for holding banquets according to custom, for moderate pomp according to condition, etc. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig. ibid. Q. 3º What quantity of goods is to be given to the poor?

Resp. 1º In extreme necessity, or necessity so grave that it can easily become extreme, as much must be given here and now as suffices for relieving this necessity, unless there are others who are willing to succor him. Yet no one is bound to pay out a great sum of money to free a poor man from danger of death, or to procure for him extraordinary and very expensive remedies ⁶. - St. Lig. n. 31.

⁶ Thence Palaus rightly says after others (Tr. 6. Disp. 2. Punct. 2. n. 6.) that although in extreme necessity of the neighbor you are bound to succor even from goods necessary to one's state, nevertheless you are not bound so far that you ought to fall from your state.

Resp. 2º In common necessity, a determinate quantity cannot be assigned. Yet more probably it seems to suffice to bestow the fiftieth part of those things which are superfluous to one's state. - Thus more commonly. - St. Lig. n. 32 and in Hom. apost. n. 19. ⁷. Yet certain persons contend that the twentieth or even the tenth part must be bestowed upon the poor. Thus Concina, etc.

⁷ Some, such as Roncaglia, Mazzotta, etc. apud St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 32.), express this measure as if the fiftieth part of annual revenues must be bestowed upon the poor; which rule, since it does not distinguish superfluous things from non-superfluous things, plainly sounds like something absurd. More clearly St. Alphonsus (Hom. Apost. Tr. 4. n. 19.) has it thus: Nevertheless there is not an obligation of furnishing the whole superfluous, but it suffices if the fiftieth part of annual revenues, WHICH REMAIN OVER, be given...; and if the revenues are richer... less than the fiftieth part. And the mind of the Doctors is plainly evident from the comparison of laymen with clerics, while they obligate the latter to bestow the whole superfluous from beneficial fruits, but laymen only to some portion.

Q. 4º Who ought, or are able, to make alms?

Resp. 1º Generally, only those who are true owners and administrators of their goods ⁸.

⁸ ** Yet alms can be made from another's goods when the neighbor is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, and cannot be succored otherwise. Thus with Busembaum St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 33.), who adds: But if you could have bestowed your own thing, and you gave another's, it seems that you are bound to restitution. Thus Croix (Lib. 3. p. 2. n. 434.) with Sporer. But in truth Sporer writes a little otherwise concerning this matter thus (In 4. Dec. Praec. Cap. 6. n. 50.): When several persons know the extreme necessity of the neighbor, all are bound to succor by equal parts: if the others are unwilling, all will be bound in solidum, and all knowing and omitting will sin mortally. If one should wish to furnish the whole by himself, the others will be freed. But if, after the others have been warned about contributing and refuse, one has furnished the whole, he will be able by right to exact proportionate parts from the others, or to compensate. Moreover, if at any time alms are made from another's goods in extreme necessity, one must beware 1º that these be superfluous to the life of the other; 2º that it not be that quantity which no one is bound to bestow even in the extreme necessity of another.

Resp. 2º Yet a wife can make ordinary and very common alms, according to the custom of her condition; but not extraordinary ones, without the consent of her husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which, namely, she has both ownership and administration and receives the fruits. - St. Lig. n. 33.

Resp. 3º Children can give nothing, except in very slight matters. Except unless they have their own goods, or goods permitted to their liberty from the consent of the father or by another title. But servants can give nothing without the express, or tacit, or prudently presumed consent of their masters. - St. Lig. ibid.

Necessity is one kind extreme, another grave, and another common. That is called extreme in which life itself is endangered, or a most grave evil is imminent; but grave necessity is that in which life is led with great hardship; common necessity is that in which begging poor persons are commonly found.

616. • Principles. I. Man can in extreme necessity use another's goods, as much as is enough for freeing himself from such necessity. The reason is that the division of goods, however it has come about, cannot derogate from natural right, which belongs to each one, that he provide for himself when he labors under extreme necessity. Therefore in such a case all things become common; and therefore he who accepts another's thing for helping himself accepts a truly common thing, which he makes his own, just as happened before the division of goods. Therefore he does not commit theft. - St. Thom., 2. 2, q. 66, art. 7. - St. Lig., n. 520.

II. In order that someone can steal another's goods, grave necessity does not suffice, nor a fortiori common necessity; for in these circumstances owners are reasonably unwilling, and otherwise an easy approach would lie open to plunderings ¹.

¹ Some confirm this doctrine by the condemnation of proposition 36 among those proscribed by Innocent XI: It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity. But it is not sufficiently certain that the reason of the condemnation looks here. For since to steal signifies of itself an unjust taking away, this surely is not lawful even in extreme necessity, although then it is lawful to provide for oneself from another's goods.

Although indeed Dominic Viva (ad h. Prop., n. 1) says that he does not subscribe to those contending that in this proposition theft formally taken is condemned, nevertheless, among others, John de Cardenas (Dissert. 23, cap. 1, art. 1) went into the plainly opposite sentence. For, he says (n. 4), the Pontiff chiefly intends to condemn that which is more shameful in the proposition: but in this proposition 36 it is more shameful to say that theft is lawful in some case than to say that in grave necessity it is lawful to take away superfluous goods from a rich man, while at the same time asserting that one has a right to them, and therefore that it is not theft... Therefore the principal intention of the condemnation is to condemn that assertion, that in some case theft is lawful.

But this very thing he confirms thus (n. 6) from history. For, as Fagnanus reports in lib. 1 Decret., in c. Ne innitaris, De Constit., n. 339, the Bishop of Ghent in the year 1657, on the fourth day of May, consulted the Doctors of Louvain so that they might bring forth their censure concerning this same proposition: It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity. But they set forth their judgment in these words: To steal is permitted in no case, because it is intrinsically evil; that is, it is not only not lawful to steal in grave necessity, but not even in extreme. But afterwards those Doctors of Louvain denounced this same proposition among several others to His Holiness Lord Innocent XI, that he might brand it with the censure of which it was worthy, as is evident from the petition which they offered to the Roman Pontiff, of which I have a transcribed copy with me. Since, therefore, the Pontiff condemned the proposition in the same way in which the Louvain Doctors proposed it, it must be held as certain that this was the intention of the Roman Pontiff, namely of condemning in this sense, that not even in extreme necessity is it lawful to steal.

Then indeed as regards the present question concerning grave necessity he thus concludes (n. 7): From what has been said it is inferred that this proposition, It is permitted to steal in grave necessity, remains condemned; and this even if the opinion teaching that in grave necessity it is lawful to take secretly from a rich man the things necessary for alleviating it were probable: because according to this condemnation it must never be conceded that in some case theft is lawful; and although it were probable that then it is lawful to take secretly, nevertheless it would not then be probable that it would be lawful to steal, on account of what has been said.

Nor did Duarte think otherwise in the Exposition of the Condemned Propositions, dedicated to Cardinal Paolucci the Major Penitentiary and published at Rome in the year 1712. For thus he says briefly (n. 289): The decree of Innocent XI condemning proposition 36 chiefly intends to condemn that in some case it is lawful to steal, because it is intrinsically evil. Nevertheless it must be admitted that in extreme necessity it is lawful to take secretly from a rich man the necessities for alleviating it, whether manifestly or secretly, nor does this have the character of theft or robbery.

Thus also Peter Catalani (Th. Mor., part 2, q. 19, cap. 3, n. 2), after he establishes that he who, placed in extreme necessity, steals as much as suffices, etc., does not sin, then adds: Nor from the common sentence brought forward is it inferred that theft is lawful in extreme necessity, since theft from its intrinsic character is incapable of being made honorable, as is a lie...; but only it is asserted that to steal another's thing in extreme necessity is not theft. And therefore Innocent XI rightly condemned that 36th proposition asserting: It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave; since theft cannot be committed in extreme necessity, not only in grave.

And let these things be enough, so that it may be plain that the opinion which in grave necessity attributes leave of providing for oneself from another's goods can indeed be attacked by other reasons; but the argument which is sought for that end from the condemnation of proposition 36 cannot be held as altogether efficacious.

617. • Resolutions. 1. It is not lawful for a poor man placed in extreme necessity to take away more than is necessary for himself. Whence if the mere use of the thing suffices, for example of a horse, once the necessity ceases, the obligation of restoring remains. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., n. 15.

2. If one extremely in need has elsewhere, in reality or in probable hope, whence he can pay, he cannot take away another's thing except with the burden of restitution; because necessity does not demand that the property of the thing accede, when he can be sufficiently relieved by the thing accepted as a loan or lent for use. - Hom. apost., n. 19.

3. But he who in extreme want has consumed another's thing is held to nothing after the use of the thing, if he had no probable hope that he would ever be able to restore, even if afterward he should come to a better condition. - Hom. apost., ibid.

4. The things which are said of extreme necessity can also be said of necessity quasi-extreme or most grave. But such necessity is judged to be present when someone is in probable danger of incurring death, of losing some principal member, of falling into perpetual captivity, or of undergoing the penalty of the galleys, or a most grave or perpetual disease. For in these cases extreme necessity is already morally present ². - Hom. apost., n. 15.

² Some called a necessity of this sort grave; against whom others less cautiously hurled proposition 36 condemned by Innocent XI. Less cautiously, I say: both because it is not sufficiently evident that by that condemnation the doctrine is struck which says that the taking away of another's thing is lawful in grave necessity, as was noted in the preceding note; and because grave necessity among those writers, as Viva also notes (ad Prop. XXXVI. Innoc. XI, n. 2), signifies the same as almost extreme necessity among others; wherefore they dissent from others not in sentence, but only in diversity of words.

5. A rich man hiding his goods, or using another device so as not to aid a poor man, once the necessity of the poor man ceases, is not held to restitution, because necessity, even extreme, confers on the poor man a right to the use of another's thing only so long as the necessity itself urges ³. - Hom. apost., n. 20.

³ The truer reason why in the case the rich man is not held to restitution seems rather to be this: that he sins merely against charity, but in no way against justice. But the reason brought by the Author would then be valid if the rich man by force had impeded the poor man from taking some thing for himself. In which case he would indeed have sinned against justice; but when the necessity ceased, and therefore the right of the poor man, the burden of restitution would also have ceased. See Lugo, De Iust., disp. 16, n. 143.

618. • Questions. Q. 1. Whether someone can steal another's thing not only for helping his own necessity, but also another's?

Resp. Affirmatively, with St. Thom., 2. 2, q. 66, art. 7, and others commonly. The reason is that then he in some way performs the role of the needy person, and shows that he loves his neighbor as himself ⁴.

⁴ Nay indeed charity can oblige to this, unless someone would have to undergo grave inconveniences for that reason. And since one extremely in need can provide for himself from the goods of anyone whatever (unless perhaps charity counsels that someone laboring under want should be spared), since in those circumstances all goods become common, therefore he who assumes and performs the role of that man can do the very same; nor does the law of charity seem to demand that he rather burden himself in order to spare others.

619. • Q. 2. Whether he can be said to be in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity who is to be killed by robbers unless he hands over such a sum of money, or he to whom perpetual or most grave captivity would threaten, or another similar misfortune ⁵?

⁵ The state and solution of the controversy will become clearer if the question is made, not indeed whether in these circumstances a man is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, for by force of the definition the matter plainly has itself thus, but whether then it is lawful to take a very precious thing or a huge amount of money when this is absolutely necessary for preserving life. Thus certainly the Author's response is easily understood.

Resp. It is disputed. Not a few affirm with St. Lig., n. 520, Lugo, disp. 16, n. 146. The reason is that that necessity consists in the most grave or extreme danger which threatens when someone has been reduced to the greatest misery, or is already about to die, not only from lack of food, but from any other cause whatever. But others deny, asserting that then only do goods become common when someone is found in extreme necessity from natural causes ⁶, but not from the wickedness of men. - Thus Concina, de Eleem., c. 9, q. 4.

⁶ As though indeed even necessity induced by natural causes could not be of such a kind that enormous expenses are required for warding it off!

The first sentence is the more common, and seems also the more probable. Hence in these cases it is lawful to provide for oneself from another's goods, at least through means not refined nor extraordinary ⁷; because since these necessities are not frequent, by that very fact abuse in them is not easy, such as can commonly be feared in the other cases.

⁷ By these words the Author, the first sentence in reality having been left behind, descends to the tempered doctrine of Lugo, which can also be called common. And St. Alphonsus indeed judged that by Lugo's vote there was supported the opinion which grants to a man in that necessity that he may usurp for his own uses even four thousand gold coins, because namely Lugo (De Iust., disp. 16, n. 146) adds only two conditions to the general doctrine: 1. that the thing be necessary to the needy person; 2. that it not be necessary to the owner of the thing himself. But indeed in the following passages Lugo circumscribes that doctrine. And although he concedes (ibid., n. 159) that in extreme necessity it can happen that someone extremely in need can, against the owner's will, take for himself that which the owner was not held from charity to give, nevertheless he immediately adds these limits: When namely this is from means not refined and extraordinary, but ordinary and common, by which that necessity is commonly accustomed to be avoided. But the reason is (as Lugo himself excellently disputes), because in order that a right be produced of taking another's goods for oneself, not only must the thing be necessary for alleviating necessity, but besides it must be necessary that this necessity be aided. But we all hold that someone is not obligated to extraordinary means, for example, to preserve life, especially if this would yield to the grave damage of his own family. A fortiori, therefore, this must be said concerning the goods of another, who for that reason would be reasonably unwilling.

But what means Lugo judged common and ordinary is plain from the following (ibid., n. 154): If someone, he says, in order to flee pursuing enemies, from whom he fears only captivity and the loss of liberty, needs another's horse, it appears very harsh and altogether incredible that he cannot use it without the owner's knowledge, even if he can never afterward restore either the horse or its price to the owner. Wherefore the same seems to have to be said if the horse were necessary to him for fleeing a most grave positive infamy, since this is sometimes esteemed no less than captivity. And the same will be true concerning a perpetual or long-lasting disease and other similar evils, on account of the same reason. After this reason has been set forth, he adds: Although nature did not wish refined and extraordinary means to be common to all, nevertheless it seems to have wished common and ordinary means, by which these goods are commonly preserved, to be common to all for the common preservation of those goods. For to that use it produced horses, for example, so that by them man could flee enemies and grave dangers, and to that end it produced common garments and medicines, so that by these we could commonly protect ourselves against grave dangers of this sort.

592. Rule 2. A neighbor living in extreme necessity is to be assisted 1. from goods simply superfluous; 2. also from goods necessary for the decency of status, provided that this can be done without great inconvenience.

The first part of this rule is evident of itself and is admitted by all. But as to the other part, authors indeed disagree as to the mode of speaking, but in the thing itself they agree.⁶⁰ The order of charity requires that we indeed love the life of neighbor more than our temporal goods, which are not absolutely necessary for living life; but, just as we are not bound to preserve our life by extraordinary means or with great inconvenience, so a fortiori there exists no strict obligation of giving a great sum of money for saving the life of neighbor. Hence a rich man is not bound to give, e.g., 1000 francs so that a sick poor man, shortly to die in his homeland, can go into the more healthful air of a distant region.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Thus, e.g., Billuart (De carit. diss. 5, a. 2, dico 2) asserts: "From things superfluous to nature, even if necessary to status, we are bound under mortal sin to make almsgiving to one suffering extreme necessity." But Noldin (De praec. n. 91) says: "Although alms ought to be given to a neighbor in extreme necessity from goods necessary only for the decency of status, nevertheless an obligation of giving also from goods necessary for preserving status itself cannot be demonstrated, so that someone would be bound to fall from his own status. For neither is someone bound to preserve his own life with the loss of his status, or by extraordinary means." Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I 762; Gopfert, Moraltheol. II 28, and others, have similar things.

⁶¹ Cf. Billuart l. c. in fine.

593. Rule 3. A neighbor constituted in grave necessity is to be assisted from goods superfluous to status. Thus the opinion today is common.⁶²

It is proved from Sacred Scripture: "He who has the substance of this world and sees his brother have necessity, and closes his heart against him, how does the charity of God remain in him?"⁶³ It is altogether improbable that the holy Apostle speaks only of extreme necessity, which in practice is very rare. This opinion is confirmed from the proposition (12) condemned by Innocent XI: "Scarcely among seculars will you find, even among kings, what is superfluous to status. And thus scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to status."⁶⁴ - But the intrinsic reason is that it seems to be a grave disorder if a man loves his own superfluous goods more than the alleviation of neighbor living in truly grave necessity. - Certain theologians wish that neighbor in grave necessity is to be assisted even from goods in some way necessary to status, or with moderate detriment to one's status. In reality there is scarcely any disagreement between the two opinions. For the decency of status admits some latitude, so that "by many things added a man does not exceed the condition of his status; by many things also subtracted the condition of his status is decently preserved."⁶⁵ Accordingly those authors who say that almsgiving is to be given in the grave necessity of neighbor even from things necessary for status are to be understood of goods in some way, but not wholly, necessary for the decency of status. Today no one teaches that a neighbor constituted in grave necessity is to be assisted even with the loss of one's own status. - Certain older authors, such as St. Antoninus,⁶⁶ Ioannes Medina,⁶⁷ not rightly understanding St. Thomas in this matter, thought that to give alms to a neighbor existing in grave necessity was not of precept, but only of counsel. This opinion today is obsolete.⁶⁸

⁶² Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 31.

⁶³ 1 Jo. 3, 17.

⁶⁴ Denz. n. 1103.

⁶⁵ S. Thom., 4, dist. 15, q. 2, a. 4.

⁶⁶ S. theol. pars 2, tit. 1, q. 24 (ed. Veronae II 334).

⁶⁷ Tract. 5 de eleem. q. 3, dub. 2, concl. 2.

⁶⁸ Cajetan, his most faithful Commentator, excellently explains the mind of St. Thomas in the little work "On the precept of almsgiving according to the mind of St. Thomas."

928. From natural and divine law there is given a precept of doing corporal alms, which is grave from its genus. - It is proved:

1. Christ, in Mt. XXV, 41, says: "Go, accursed ones, into eternal fire...: for I was hungry and you did not give me to eat"; but no one is damned on account of the omission of something which is not commanded, and indeed under grave obligation; therefore to give alms is in precept, and indeed a grave one.

2. Since dilection of neighbor is in precept, all those things are precepts without which this dilection is not had. But dilection of neighbor demands not only that we will good to him but also that we procure it for him; for this it is required that we assist his necessity through almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is in precept. The minor is proved: The law of nature demands that we assist neighbor in necessity, just as we will that he should assist us in our necessity; whence I Jn. III, 18: "Let us not love in word and tongue, but in deed and truth" (Deut. XV, 11; Prov. XXV, 21; Is. LVIII, 7; Ezek. XVIII, 7; Lk. III, 9 sq.; I Tim. VI, 17 sq.; Jas. II, 15 sq.; I Jn. III, 17).

929. The precept of almsgiving arises from a twofold head: a) if there is present a moral faculty, or superfluity, on the part of the one giving; b) if there is present true necessity on the part of the one in need. For a fuller understanding of these things, in the order of charity, not only must the threefold temporal necessity be distinguished with respect to the one in need, concerning which it was said above, n. 905; but also the threefold genus of temporal goods with respect to him who is about to give alms:

The first genus is of goods which are necessary for sustaining the life of oneself and one's own, of whom one has care (parents, wife, children, etc.): food, clothing, and dwelling; and these are called necessary (absolutely) to nature or life.

The second genus is of goods which are necessary (conditionally) to one's state, namely, for preserving the decent state of oneself and one's own, regard being had not indeed to all things which can happen, but to those which can prudently be feared and expected. Whence theologians in this genus include those things which are required for feeding servants, or for the necessities probably occurring from the increase of a family, the dowries of children, illnesses, old age, wars, etc.; indeed, banquets and honorable gifts and moderate liberalities, according to one's state, but not those exaggerated by ostentation and pomp. "The terminus of the necessary of this kind," says St. Thomas, q. 32, a. 6, "is not constituted in an indivisible point, but, many things being added, it cannot be judged to be beyond such necessity; and, many things being subtracted, there still remains that whereby someone can conveniently pass his life according to his own state." Therefore this admits a latitude from things strictly necessary to one's state, without which the state is lost, up to becoming things without which one would not act so fittingly. Things necessary to one's state are superfluous to life.

The third genus is of goods which are superfluous to one's state.

930. Principles. From which goods alms must be given. - In this matter the following rules hold:1

A. In extreme necessity: 1. Alms are not to be given from things necessary to life, because our life and that of our own is to be preferred to the life of another, unless there were question of a person necessary to the commonwealth, because the common good is to be preferred to one's own.

2. There is a grave obligation of giving from things superfluous to life and from things necessary to one's state, even with great inconvenience, as much as is necessary for removing the necessity: the order of charity demands that we love the life of neighbor more than the decency of our own state, which is a far inferior good.2

3. Nevertheless no one is bound to do this with the greatest inconvenience, or to use extraordinary and choice means which men commonly are not accustomed to use, for example, with the greatest expenses for buying a very precious medicine, procuring an extraordinary surgical operation, sending to a distant region, redeeming from a proximate danger of death; because we are not bound to use those means for preserving our own life. Nor therefore is someone bound to fall from his state or to suffer great diminution in it, which otherwise is regarded as a most grave evil.

B. In grave necessity: There is a grave obligation of giving from things superfluous to one's state, insofar as is necessary for removing the necessity (prop. 12 condemned by Innocent XI), indeed even from things necessary to one's state, when this can be done without grave inconvenience; because the order of charity demands that with slight inconvenience we relieve the great inconvenience of neighbor; indeed with great inconvenience, if there is question of a great necessity of the commonwealth.

C. In common necessity: 1. There is an obligation, from things superfluous to one's state, of sometimes during life giving something (Eccli. XIV, 13) to some poor persons, because we ought to love the decency of the state of neighbor more than our superfluity.

2. Nevertheless there is not an obligation of giving to all, nor precisely to this one or that one, nor of removing the necessity totally, because all the rich are obliged; and if all give something from their superfluity, enough assistance is given to necessities.3

3. Nor is there an obligation of seeking out the poor, unless there is a wholly grave doubt concerning extreme necessity, or unless someone is bound to this from office, as a parish priest: for this would be a grave burden, and otherwise it pertains to him who suffers necessity to expose the necessity.

1. The fundamental principles are stated by St. Thomas; but they are enunciated quite generally, so that among more recent scholastics they are found more determinately applied.

2. Goods are primarily ordered to the necessity of men, whence the private right of dominion cannot impede this primary end. - In the case all are bound in solidum; whence 1. someone can indicate extreme necessity, and then others also are bound; 2. if one gives assistance, the others are exempted; otherwise all not giving sin; 3. but if others do not give, each one alone is bound.

3. In the case not all are bound in solidum.

931. The obligation of almsgiving is grave from its genus; whence certainly it obliges under mortal sin in grave matter, namely, in grave necessity, of which at least Scripture speaks (Mt. XXV), and a fortiori in extreme necessity. Indeed also probably in common necessity, both because the expressions of Scripture and of the Fathers, indiscriminately and without restriction, inculcate a grave obligation of assisting the poor, which they suppose is often violated, although grave necessity is rather rare; - and because, if they were not helped, some would fall into grave necessity, and otherwise the slight necessities of the poor, aggregated, constitute a grave evil for society, to which a remedy must be furnished.

But how much is to be given depends on various circumstances, for necessities are not always the same. In ordinary circumstances, according to St. Alphonsus, it suffices to give the fiftieth part, or 2%, of income, if that part is superfluous, and a proportionally smaller part if the income is enormous; although that estimation can be regarded as rather benign. Therefore he who would determine to give no alms in common necessity, or would be notably negligent in them, seems to sin mortally; but if he did not give a small quantity owed, he would sin only venially from lightness of matter.

But although someone has strictly satisfied the precept of almsgiving toward the poor, there nevertheless always remains to him the obligation of using the remaining superfluous goods well and usefully; which pertains to the virtues of liberality and magnificence, or even to legal justice in view of the common good.

S. Th. II-II, q. 66, a. 7.

410. Notions. - From the treatise on charity (I, n. 905) let us recall that a threefold necessity is distinguished in temporal things:

1. Extreme necessity is that in which the necessaries of life are lacking, or there is certain imminent danger of perpetually losing a good equal to life which nature wills to be common to all, for example, health, the use of reason, liberty, integrity of members, a bodily sense. To this is morally equated quasi-extreme necessity, which is in a very probable and almost certain danger of losing the aforesaid goods, because it brings a proximate danger of falling into extreme necessity, for example, a lethal disease. As St. Thomas says, it is an evident and urgent necessity.

2. Grave necessity is present in a double case: a) as to external goods, when a notable loss of goods is imminent, such as loss of state, office, dignity, or reputation, in one word of goods which nature did not will to be common to all, and for preserving which therefore it did not will the means to be common; b) as to life and personal goods morally equivalent, when the danger is not imminent, but only probable, which namely cannot be avoided without great difficulty.

3. Common necessity is that in which ordinary begging poor persons are placed, who, unless they are helped, lead a troublesome life, but nevertheless are able to provide necessary things for themselves.

411. Principles. I. He who is placed in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity can, and of itself ought, from another's goods, even while the owner is unwilling, take as much as is necessary for him to escape this necessity; unless however the owner is placed in the same necessity.

For according to the order of the Creator and natural law, temporal things were instituted by the primary intention of nature for assisting the necessities of all men; by a secondary intention, so that they be divided into private possessions and thus be managed better, more orderly, and peacefully. But the secondary law of nature cannot derogate from the primary right, and those things which are of secondary intention cannot harm the primary intention. Therefore the division of possessions cannot impede assistance being given to men's necessities. Now if a man in extreme necessity could not take from others' things as much as is required for escaping necessity, the order of the Creator in the primary intention would be frustrated and a human deed executing the secondary intention would prevail over the primary end. Therefore.

And indeed a) the right to life, bodily integrity, the use of reason, or liberty, prevails over the right of property which is ordered to preserving those things;

b) hence in extreme necessity all goods are said to be common, not indeed absolutely all, but necessary goods, nor always as to dominion, but at least as to use, insofar as namely they are required for preserving life or health or integrity;

c) whence an owner cannot impede urgent necessities being assisted from his goods, and if he attempts this by force, he is an unjust aggressor;

d) unless however the owner himself is in the same necessity or by the taking away of the thing would fall into the same, because in an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better, and therefore the right of the owner prevails. Whence in a fire it is unlawful to snatch away another's ladder to save oneself, if he himself is about to perish without it; in a shipwreck, to snatch away a plank already seized by another which he himself needs.

Hence 1) in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, it is not lawful to take away more than is necessary: for since urgent necessity bestows the right of taking, when this ceases that right ceases; whence if the use of the thing suffices, for example, of a horse for fleeing, of a gun for defending oneself, when the necessity has passed the thing itself, insofar as it still exists, is to be restored to the owner. And if by another way one can obtain the thing, for example, by borrowing or by seeking alms, regularly he cannot take it.

2. In a case of necessity if the consumption itself of the thing was necessary, nevertheless when necessity has ceased, the thing is to be restored in equivalent by him who possesses other goods or has hope or proximate power of possessing them, because only the loan of the thing, not dominion, was necessary to him; - on the contrary not by him who is needy both in thing and in hope, at least if the thing is not very notable.

3. When a poor man is existing in extreme necessity, another also can take away another's thing for relieving the necessity, provided he is not bound to assist the poor man from his own things: for what someone could do through himself can also be done through another, who then acts in the place of the needy man; whence a mother not having nourishment can take milk for a child about to perish from hunger. - The custodian of things is excepted, who can take away the owner's things only if the owner is bound to give.

4. In a case of necessity, it is lawful even to steal a thing of the greatest value, provided it is apt for removing the necessity and, as far as possible, as soon as morally can be done, is restored. Nevertheless in no way, not even from charity, is the owner bound to hand over such a thing; because no one is bound to assist another, just as neither to preserve his own life, with the greatest expenses or by extraordinary and exquisite means.

For the reasons which hold for extreme necessity are not present:

a) not for guarding external goods, because nature does not confer an absolute right except to the necessaries of life and integrity;

b) not for preserving life or personal goods equivalent to it, because their danger can strictly be avoided, although with great difficulty;

c) not by reason of the common good, but on the contrary the common good demands that others' things not be taken away in grave necessity, because abuses against the common good would easily arise. For since cases of this kind are frequent, if in them others' things were lawfully taken, the way would lie open to innumerable thefts, quarrels, and fights, leisure, inertia, and dissipation of goods would be fostered, and public tranquility itself would be disturbed.

But so that you may apply this doctrine practically, attention must be given to the following rules:

Rule I. In extreme necessity one's neighbor must be succored even and only from goods necessary to one's state; even indeed, because the right order of charity requires that the life of one's neighbor prevail over our good that is far inferior; but only, because our life is nearer to us than the life of one's neighbor.

Rule II. In grave necessity which approaches extreme necessity, one's neighbor must be succored from goods in some way necessary to one's state, or with moderate detriment to one's state. But in that necessity which is not so great, it is enough that he be succored from goods which are superfluous to state or decency. - Cf. Viva, on proposition 12 condemned by Innocent XI, n. 8. - St. Alphonsus, n. 31.

Rule III. In common necessity, although there is no obligation of giving alms to this or that person in particular, nevertheless, by the common opinion of the Doctors, he cannot be excused from sin who, having goods even superfluous to his state, would never wish to bestow any alms. - Cf. Suarez, disp. 7, sect. 3, n. 7.

Question 2. What quantity of goods must be given to the poor?

Response. In extreme necessity, or one so grave that it can easily become extreme, as much must be given as suffices here and now for relieving this necessity, unless there are others who are willing to assist him. Yet no one is bound to dispense a great sum of money to free a poor man from danger of death, or to procure extraordinary and costly remedies for him. But in common necessity a determined quantity cannot be assigned, but it seems more probable that it is enough to dispense the fiftieth part of those things which remain over one's state. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 31 and 32; and Hom. Ap., n. 19.

I. In time of need the precept of almsgiving presses. The Theologians distinguish three degrees of necessity: extreme, grave, and common. Extreme necessity is when a poor man is in proximate or probable danger of his life; the last extremity of want is not to be awaited, because then perhaps the needy man will not receive the help. To extreme necessity belongs the danger of perpetual imprisonment, of mutilation, and of incurable disease. Grave need is when a grave harm threatens a man in his honor, his life, his state, or his household affairs. Common need is that by which those poor are pressed who beg alms from door to door. To the threefold necessity three kinds of goods are set over against each other. Some goods are necessary for sustaining our own life and the life of those whose care rests upon us. Others regard our state and condition, inasmuch as without such goods a man cannot sustain the grade of his own condition, nobility, and dignity. These goods are of two kinds. Some are so necessary that without them a man would fall away from his state; others pertain to what is becoming and seemly. The last goods, finally, are superfluous either to life, or to state, or to both at once.

II. Question I. Are the rich bound to succor one laboring under extreme necessity not only out of their superfluities, but even out of what is necessary to their state? Answer. That those laboring under extreme necessity are to be succored by force of the precept out of what is superfluous to their state, all affirm. The common opinion is also true, that with some detriment to one's own state the necessity of the poor man must be relieved.

XIII. The Angelic Doctor establishes two principles from which the precept of almsgiving proceeds. The one is extreme or grave necessity. The other is the superfluity of goods, both to nature and to state. The precept therefore presses both by reason of superfluity, and by reason of extreme, or grave and urgent, necessity. When extreme or grave necessity occurs, then alms must be given to this determinate needy poor man. When the rich do not meet with poor men pressed by such necessity, then they must distribute what is superfluous to nature and to state upon pious uses, according as shall seem good to them in the Lord.

( D. Thom. quaest. 32. art. 5.

I explained extreme necessity above. Grave is that which deprives one of the necessaries for his state. Ordinary, however, is that which the poor have in common.

The first opinion is negative, and is followed by Gerson p. 2. Alphab. 52. litt. E.; Alensis 4. p. quaest. 113. membr. 1.; Panormitanus in cap. si vero, extra de Iureiurando; Turrecremata in cap. sicut hi, dist. 47; Antoninus 1. p. tit. 1. cap. 24; Summa Rosella, and Pisana verbo Eleemosyna; Gabriel in 4. dist. 26. quaest. 1. Durandus 4. dist. 15. quaest. 6 leans that way; Ioan. Med. quaest. 5; and it seems to be that of D. Thomas art. 5. in fine corporis; Fernandez in suo Exam. Theol. p. 4. cap. 20. §. 2; Victorellus in the notes to Navarrus cap. 23. num 74; Turtianus 2. 2. disp. 82. dub. 2; Vasquez opusc. de eleem. cap. 1. dub. 3. num. 21; Malderus 2. 2. quaest. 27. art. 6. dub. 4; Peter Navarrus lib. 3. cap. 1. num. 358; Couarruvias lib. 3. var. cap. 14 — whom Diana cites and follows Tom. 1. tract. 15. resol. 32. et tom. 5. tract. 8. resol. 17, adding Hurtado disp. 159. sect. 4. §. 131. Nor is Granado absent Contr. 3. tract. 11. disp. 2. sect 4, saying that to withhold is only venial. Barlaeus inclines to it v. Eleem. num. 5. in praxi, and others.

The second opinion is that one is absolutely held. So D. Thom. hic, art. 7, where Cajetan, and Bannes, and the other Thomists; Paludanus 4. dist. 15. quaest. 3. art. 2; Richardus quaest. 2. art. 2; Abulensis in cap. 6. Matth. quaest. 34; Lyra in cap. 3. prima Ioan; Caesarius in eundem locum; Adrian in 4. de restit; Navarrus in manual. cap. 24; Valencia disp. 3. quaest. 9. p. 4, where he says it is already received in the schools; Becanus 2. 2. cap. 21; Bellarmine lib. de Eleemos. cap. 7; Beia in resolut. casuum, p. 2. casu in Sabb. die 19. Octob; and others, whom Tanner cites and follows disp. 2. quaest. 5. dub. 2. num. 12. It is also clearly the opinion of D. Bonaventure in the places to be alleged in the arguments.

Caspensis, walking in a certain middle way tract. 17. disp. 5. sect. 2, indeed denies such a precept universally. But he adds that one is at times held, in such a way that he who should have the purpose, even virtual, of not giving alms except in grave necessity, would sin mortally. He alleges Suarez disp. 7 sect. 3; Castro Palao: de Lorcam disp. 39. sect. 3. membr. 3; Tanner disp. 2. quaest. 5. dub. 2. num. 12; and others; but unwillingly he returns to our opinion; for he gives the reason why the rich are not universally held, because they prudently believe that the common necessities of the poor are to be driven off by others. A droll reason indeed. So therefore this good man is either never held in good faith, or always held; because they ought not believe this of other rich men; or if this is given universally as the rule, all will believe it of the others, and no one will be held to succor, nor will he succor.

I assert that the rich are held in common necessities to give alms from their superfluities.

It is proved first from D. Bonaventure ad 11. Lucae, at those words: Verumtamen, quod superest, date eleemosynam: et ecce omnia munda sunt vobis — Nevertheless, what remains, give alms: and behold, all things are clean to you. Now he explains this as being about alms owed to our own necessity, certainly necessary for penance, that we may be cleansed. Then about true alms from superfluities. And from the effects he shows its necessity. For the reasoning of Christ is: Et ecce omnia munda sunt vobis, that is, since you are full of iniquity, he teaches you to cleanse yourselves, as Valencia and Tanner also note.

For first, by alms the soul is cleansed; for it is disposed to grace, prima Timot. 4: Pietas ad omnia utilis est, promissionem habens vitae, quae nunc est, et futurae — Piety is useful for all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that to come. Eccles. 3: Eleemosyna enim Patris non erit in oblivione: et sicut in sereno glacies, solventur peccata tua — For the alms of the Father shall not be forgotten: and as ice in clear weather, your sins shall melt away.

Secondly, it frees from eternal punishment, Tobiae 4: Eleemosyna ab omni peccato, et a morte liberat, et non patietur, animam ire in tenebras — Alms frees from all sin, and from death, and shall not suffer the soul to go into darkness.

Thirdly, it defends from transitory punishment, Dan. 4: Peccata tua eleemosynis redime — Rede your sins with alms.

Fourthly, it mitigates the tinder of concupiscence, Ecclesiast. 3: Ignem ardentem extinguit aqua, et eleemosyna resistit peccatis — Water extinguishes a burning fire, and alms resists sins.

Fifthly, it gives victory over the enemy, Ecclesiastici 29: Conclude eleemosynam in corde pauperis, et haec pro te exorabit ab omni malo. Super Scutum potentis, et super Lanceam, adversus inimicum tuum pugnabit — Shut up alms in the heart of the poor man, and it shall pray for you against all evil. It shall fight for you as a shield of the mighty, and as a lance, against your enemy.

Sixthly, it preserves grace, Eccles. 17: Eleemosyna viri, quasi signaculum cum ipso, gratiam hominis quasi pupillam conservabit — The alms of a man, as a signet with him, shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye.

Seventhly, it gives confidence of arriving at glory, Tob. 4: Fiducia magna erit coram summo Deo eleemosyna facientibus eam — Great shall be the confidence before the most high God for those who give alms. And he adds, that these things are judged in the Judgment, Matth. 25: namely, that those who have given alms are called to life; and those who omitted them are cast into eternal fire.

That he speaks of common necessities is clear; for the inquiry is made universally about the works of mercy toward all the needy.

Moreover, he gives the conditions of these: The first is simplicity of heart, Matth. 6: Te autem faciente eleemosynam, nesciat sinistra tua, quid faciat dextera tua — But when you make alms, let not your left hand know what your right hand does. The second, discretion, Eccles. 12: Si benefeceris, scito cui benefeceris — If you have done well, know to whom you have done it. The third, compassion, Isa. 58: Cum effuderis esurienti animam tuam — When you shall pour out your soul to the hungry. And Iob. 30: Flebam quondam super eo, qui afflictus erat, et compatiebatur anima mea pauperi — I once wept for him that was afflicted, and my soul had compassion on the poor. The fourth, sweetness in speech, Eccles. 18: Nonne ardorem refrigerabit ros? Sic et verbum melius quam datum — Does not the dew refresh the heat? So also a word better than a gift. The fifth, cheerfulness in face, Eccles. 35: In omni dato hilarem fac vultum tuum — In every gift make a cheerful face. The sixth, due quantity, Tob. 4: Quomodo poteris; ita esto misericors. Si multum tibi fuerit, etc. — As you are able, so be merciful. If you have much, etc. — and he speaks of common necessities. The seventh, speed, Proverb. 3: Ne dicas amico tuo: vade, et revertere — Say not to your friend: Go, and come again,

He infers therefore D. Bonaventure from that text the argument of Christ: Since you Pharisees are full of uncleanness and iniquity, I teach you the necessary mode of cleansing yourselves, namely true penance, and alms from superfluities. For so you will make fruits worthy of penance.

Similar is the passage Lucae tertio, where John, questioned by the crowds about how they could make fruits worthy of penance — about which he had said: Omnis arbor, quae non facit fructum bonum, excidetur, et in ignem mittetur — Every tree that does not make good fruit shall be cut down and cast into the fire — answered: Qui habet duas tunicas, det non habenti, et qui escas habet, similiter faciat — He who has two coats, let him give to him who has none; and he who has food, let him do likewise. The force of whose sentence D. Jerome rightly interprets, epist. ad Hedibiam, quaest. 1, as being that it is necessary to spend superfluities on the needy, as S. Doctor notes on that place of Luke. Therefore (says S. Doctor), since they had heard that it was necessary to make fruits worthy of penance, they ask; and he also brings forward Lucae 11, alleged above. But he admonishes most beautifully, with Bede and Gregory, homil. 20. in Evangelia, that a precept is given about dividing two coats, because one is superfluous; not about dividing one, if he does not have another; for so neither would be clothed — although that would be an eminent work, such as that of the most glorious Martin at the gate of Amiens, when he divided his cloak. Behold, S. Bonaventure plainly notes, with the Holy Fathers, that it is a precept. Therefore it is the same precept, Lucae 3. et 11. Quod superest, date — What remains, give. Where the particle superest does not signify what we call "for the rest," but what supplies or super-exists, as is had in the Greek, and Valencia observes, with the same Bede and D. Bonaventure, who reads: De eo, quod superest, or "from what super-exists," from the Greek idiom, of which S. Doctor was most skilled, as they know who read his works through. Moreover, here and in the places to be alleged, they observe that the precept is taken from mere superfluity.

It is proved thirdly from D. Bonaventure in Diaeta, tit. 2. ad finem, from that 1. Timot. cap. 6. Divitibus huius saeculi praecipe facile tribuere, communicare, thesaurizare sibi fundamentum bonum in futurum — Charge the rich of this world to give easily, to communicate, to lay up for themselves a good foundation for the future. But S. Doctor notes that this is a precept given to the rich, not with respect to poor men in grave need, but precisely insofar as those riches of the rich, since they are superfluous to them, are owed to the Lord as tribute, or as a debt out of justice. And as Princes take away even the capital from those who defraud them of tributes; so also the Lord, from those who deny alms and retain their superfluities, takes away not only grace, but also, and often, temporal goods. Which must be gravely admonished; and of this he interprets Matth. 25. Tollite ab eo talentum, et date ei, qui decem talenta habet — Take away the talent from him, and give it to him who has ten talents; for from the avaricious man temporal substance is to be taken and given to him who, pitying the poor, fulfills the commands of the Lord and trades those riches so that he may receive a hundredfold in this life, and then life eternal. Hence I shall infer the reason.

Then S. Doctor considers the motives with which one ought to be led to give alms generously. The first motive is that Christ declares alms made to himself, Matth. 25. Therefore he imposes on all who wish for the eternal kingdom that they make alms. Hence it is no great thing that rich men who wish for the kingdom from God buy it with a morsel of bread; and they ought to fear hearing: Ite maledicti — Go, you cursed — according to Proverb 21. Qui obturat aures suas ad clamorem pauperis, clamabit ipse, et non audietur — He who stops his ears at the cry of the poor shall himself cry, and shall not be heard. Therefore the first motive is: Quis postulet? — Who asks? — namely, God in the poor man. The second motive is: Quid petatur? — What is asked? — because God in the poor asks what is his own: Wherefore (says S. Doctor) David said, Psal. 29. Tua sunt Domine omnia, et quae de manu tua recepimus, dedimus tibi — All things are yours, O Lord, and what we have received from your hand we have given to you.

The third motive is: Ad quid petis Deus? — For what do you ask, God? — namely that he repay as at usury: Centuplum accipiet, et vitam aeternam possidebit — He shall receive a hundredfold, and shall possess life eternal. S. Doctor uses these arguments, mingled with so many ornaments of Scripture, most useful also for sermons.

It is proved thirdly from D. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 30. quaest. 5, from that Proverb. 25. Si esurierit inimicus tuus, ciba illum; et si sitierit, potum da illi — If your enemy hunger, feed him; and if he thirst, give him drink. And Exodi 23. Si occurreris bovi inimici tui, aut asino erranti, reduc ad eum. Si videris asinum odientis te iacere sub onere, non pertransibis, sed sublevabis cum eo — If you meet the ox of your enemy, or his ass going astray, bring it back to him. If you see the ass of him who hates you lying under its burden, you shall not pass by, but shall lift it up with him. This indeed is not a ceremonial law or judicial precept, but the Natural and Divine Law, on account of which, Matth. 25, all shall be examined in judgment.

It is proved fourthly from D. Bonaventure ad 18. Lucae with those words: Facilius est, camelum per foramen acus transire, quam divitem intrare in regnum caelorum — It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. But Christ said this to him who wished to give his riches in some part to the poor — against whom it is said, Eccles. 7. Noli esse pusillanimis in animo tuo: exorare, et facere eleemosynam ne despicias — Be not fainthearted in your mind: to pray, and to make alms, do not despise — as S. Doctor observes with Theophylactus.

Therefore clinging men are not saved, he says, because, as it is said prima Timot. 6. Incidunt in laqueum Diaboli, et desideria, quae mergunt homines — They fall into the snare of the Devil, and into desires which drown men. Where note that this is not said of the rich who are unwilling to give up everything and vow poverty; for that is the counsel which Christ gave to that young man; but seeing him bitter, resisting any alms whatsoever from superfluities, he said: Quam difficile est, etc. Facilius est, etc. ut supra ad 18. Lucae — How difficult it is, etc. It is easier, etc., as above at 18. Luke.

It is proved fifthly from S. Doctor ex illo Lucae 16, where that rich man Sepultus est in inferno — was buried in hell — doubtless because of his lack of mercy toward Lazarus.

It is proved sixthly from S. Doctor ex illo Lucae 12, where that rich man, whose field had yielded abundant fruits, said: Destruam horrea mea, et faciam maiora: et illuc congregabo omnia, quae nata sunt mihi, et bona mea — I will destroy my barns and make greater ones, and there I will gather all things that are born to me and my goods — but by night he heard: Stulte, hac nocte animam tuam repetent a te; quae autem parasti, cuius erunt? Sic est (inquit Christus) qui sibi thesaurizat, et non est in Deum dives — Fool, this night your soul shall be required of you; whose then shall those things be which you have provided? So is he (says Christ) who lays up treasure for himself, and is not rich toward God — where he admonishes that which he had taught Matth. 6, where alms is enjoined, and the simple manner handed down: Cum facis eleemosynam noli tuba canere — When you make alms, do not sound a trumpet. He adds: Thesaurizate vobis thesauros in caelo, etc. Nolite thesaurizare vobis thesauros in terra — Lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, etc. Do not lay up for yourselves treasures on earth. As if to say: Everyone who lays up treasure on earth, retaining his superfluities, loses the treasures of heaven, destitute of Divine grace. Tanner also uses these means.

Hence Basil, on that passage: Destruam, etc. — I will destroy, etc. — says: Cur tu abundas; ille vero mendicat, nisi ut tu bona dispensationis merita consequaris; ille vero patientia braviis decoretur. Est panis famelici, quem tu tenes; tunica, quam in conclavi conservas; discalceati calceus, qui penes te marcescit; indigentis argentum, quod possides infossum. Quocirca tot iniuriaris, quot dare valens es — Why do you abound, while that man begs, unless that you may obtain the merits of dispensation of goods, and that he be adorned with the prizes of patience? The bread of the hungry is that which you hold; the coat, which you keep in your closet; the shoe of the barefoot, which withers in your keeping; the silver of the needy, which you possess buried. Wherefore you commit as many injuries as you are able to give.

Crying out SIMILAR things is S. Gregory of Nyssa, and he concludes, in the oration on loving the poor: O pauperum inimici! an nescitis horum causa commemorari in Evangelio exempla horrenda, et terribilia? — O enemies of the poor! Do you not know that for their sake horrible and terrible examples are recounted in the Gospel? And he adds the two examples of the twin rich men alleged above Lucae 12. et 16.

And D. Ambrose lib. de Nabuthe, cap. 11 has the same, and serm. 81: Quis tam iniustus, tam avidus, quam, qui multorum alimenta suum non usum, sed abundantiam, et delicias facit? Neque enim maius est crimen habenti tollere, quam cum possides, et abundas, indigentibus denegare. Esurientium panis est, quem tu detines — Who is so unjust, so greedy, as he who makes the food of many his own abundance and delights, not his use? For no greater crime is it to take from one who has, than, when you possess and abound, to deny the needy. The bread of the hungry is that which you detain.

D. HIERONYMUS in regula, cap. 6, as cited by Gratian, says: Aliena rapere convincitur, qui ultra necessaria sibi retinere probatur — He is convicted of seizing what belongs to others who is proved to retain for himself beyond the necessaries.

D. AUGUST. in Psal. 147: Caetera, quae superflua iacent, aliorum sunt necessaria: superflua igitur necessaria sunt pauperum; res aliena possidetur, cum superflua retinentur — The rest, which lie superfluous, are the necessaries of others: therefore superfluities are the necessaries of the poor; another's property is possessed, when superfluities are retained. The same he asserts in serm. 119, where he concludes: Quidquid enim Deus nobis, plusquam opus est dederit, non nobis specialiter dedit, sed per nos aliis erogandum transmisit: quod si non dederimus, res alienas invasimus — For whatever God has given us more than is needed, he gave not specially to us, but transmitted through us to be spent on others: and if we do not give, we have invaded the goods of others. Beda has similar things in cap. 11. Lucae.

It is CONFIRMED by D. Bonaventure lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 49, from that Lucae 16. Matth. 6: Facite vobis amicos de mamona iniquitatis — Make for yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity — where D. Gregory: Si caelestis patrimonium eleemosynis emitur, pauperes non sunt audiendi, ut egeni; sed ut patroni exorandi — If the heavenly patrimony is bought with alms, the poor are not to be heard as needy, but to be entreated as patrons — thus homil. 40. in Evang. near the end. But S. Doctor notes in connection with that passage that Mammon is called the mammon of iniquity, not because the goods were acquired by rapine and iniquity; but because riches mostly lead to iniquity, as is said Eccles. 11: Si dives fueris, non eris immunis a peccato — If you shall be rich, you shall not be free from sin. But it is understood (says D. Bonaventure) that it ought to be given from riches which are possessed by a just title, and yet beget iniquity unless they are distributed, according to that Eccles. 10: Nihil est iniquius, quam amare pecuniam — Nothing is more iniquitous than to love money. For he who does so has even his soul for sale. Of these riches, I say, friends ought to be made to you through the bestowal of alms, which manifest the affection of piety; for it is said prima Ioan. 3: Qui habuerit substantiam huius mundi, et viderit fratrem suum necessitatem habere, et clauserit viscera sua ab eo: quomodo charitas Dei manet in eo — He who shall have the substance of this world, and shall see his brother have need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how does the charity of God remain in him? And Eccles. 29: Perde pecuniam propter fidem, et amicum, et ne abscondas illam sub lapidem in perditionem — Lose your money for faith and a friend, and hide it not under a stone to perish. And Proverb. 11: Qui abscondit frumenta maledicetur in populis — He who hides up grain shall be cursed among the peoples. Thus far S. Doctor at 16. Lucae.

AGAIN in the Pharetra the same confirms it, from that Matth. 25, where he adds D. Gregory homil. 40: Ad tribuendum pigri cur estis, quando hoc, quod iacetis in terra porrigitis, sedenti in caelo datis? Dominus ait: Quidquid fecistis uni de his fratribus meis minimis, mihi fecistis — Why are you slothful in bestowing, when you give to him who sits in heaven what you extend lying on the earth? The Lord says: What you have done to one of these my least brethren, you have done to me.

These authorities, indeed, speak not of grave necessities only, but of ordinary ones, as is evident to the reader. Nor is this precept only at certain times, but it is taken from the very nature of superfluous riches, and binds by the very fact that superfluous riches are present.

It is PROVED also by the reason indicated in argument 2, from D. Bonav. in Diaeta, tit. 2, which is taken from the Holy Fathers — Basil, Ambrose, August., Nyssenus, and others above — and which D. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 7, Valencia here, and others use. The division of things made by the law of nations was just, when before all things were common. But if it is just, it ought to have constituted a human mode of living from things before common by the law of nature: Yet what would be an equal distribution, if some washed their robes in wine, swam in butter, abounding in all riches, flowing with all commodities; while others had not even bread enough; and yet the most opulent were not held to furnish necessaries to these poor men? Surely this is the pedagogy reserved to God, that if the rich have redundancies, they give to the needy something at least for necessity. This indeed would be iniquitous, to leave the greater part of men in misery, when by the law of nature they were equally owners before.

THAT that distribution was just is proved; for in it all the peoples consented unanimously, by the dictate of natural reason; otherwise the Laws of the law of nations would have to be rescinded, which are nevertheless everywhere held in the highest esteem.

THEREFORE God, from nature, preserved this in that law of nature: that superfluities be distributed to the poor. Hence Ambrose, serm. 81: Numquid iniquus est Deus, ut nobis non aequaliter distribuat vitae subsidia? ut tu quidem esses affluens, et abundans, aliis vero deesset, et egerent? — Is God iniquitous, that he does not distribute the helps of life equally to us? so that you indeed should be affluent and abounding, while others lack and are needy? Behold the reason of D. Bonaventure assigned above.

You OBJECT first with Diana, and others collected by him: If all superfluities were to be given to the poor, it would be necessary to condemn all rich men who have superfluities, and all their Confessors. Vasquez presses it num. 14: Laity can retain from patrimonial goods for their own state, or that of their blood relations, to be increased; but then it will never be superfluous. Hence you will scarcely find superfluities among seculars and Kings. These things indeed are plausible to the Confessors of the rich.

Valencia ANSWERS, from the doctrine of D. Bonaventure above in the arguments, that the precept of spending alms on the needy arises not from grave, but from ordinary necessity, not from the force of necessity; but from the force of superfluity, which indeed is to be prudently estimated, so that he is not held to spend to every needy man, but to those whom he shall see, with a prudent proportion, to pertain to him, the things to be retained being retained, for his state and the preservation of that state; indeed, and with some cautious augmentation, as men of a scrupulous conscience are wont. Yet the avarice of that rich man, Lucae 12, who wished to enlarge his barns so as to change his state, is to be shunned, for this mode is reprobated by God. Hence that rich man is called a fool by God. Therefore the rich ought to distribute a part to the needy from their superfluities, with regard had to place, time, and other circumstances. And so in our opinion the rich, or their Confessors, are not condemned so headlong; but avarice and cupidity are condemned, which if any Confessors foster (Valencia says) they will be blind, giving leadership to the blind, and both will fall into the pit, as is said Matth. 15.

You OBJECT secondly. If he is held to give his superfluities, and cannot retain them: Therefore neither can he acquire them.