§ 2. On Alms

89. Notion. Alms strictly so called is defined: a bodily work which from commiseration is exhibited to one in need in order to relieve his want; most strictly: a thing which is bestowed upon a poor man from commiseration in order to relieve his want.

Therefore three things are essentially required to constitute alms in the strictest sense: a. that something be given or donated, that is, that the ownership of the thing offered be transferred to the poor man; b. that it be given to one in need; c. that it be given from compassion in order to relieve his want.

90. On the precept of alms. 1. From the divine precept, both natural and positive, and indeed one grave of itself, we are bound to give alms.

The first is clear both from the general principle of charity of doing to another what we would want done to us (were we placed in the same condition), and from the nature of private dominion. For although man has a true right over his goods, nevertheless this right, as secondary, is connected with the obligation of contributing from his goods to those who by their own labor cannot obtain for themselves the necessities of life.¹ The second is clear from many testimonies of Scripture: I command you that you open your hand to your needy and poor brother who dwells with you in the land.² Break your bread for the hungry, and bring the needy and wandering into your house; when you see the naked, cover him, and do not despise your own flesh.³ He who has the substance of this world and sees his brother have necessity and shuts his bowels from him, how does the charity of God remain in him?⁴ The third is clear from this, that Christ announces that on the day of judgment eternal damnation is to be inflicted upon the impious because of the sole defect of alms: Depart from Me, cursed ones, into eternal fire ... for I was hungry and you did not give Me to eat, I was thirsty and you did not give Me drink.⁵

2. In order that this precept of alms oblige, two things are required: on the part of the neighbor, necessity; on the part of the giver, possibility or superfluous goods.

a. Necessity according to degree we divided above (n. 75); but according to origin necessity is distinguished as involuntary both in itself and in its cause, and this is misfortune; voluntary both in itself and in its cause, and this is virtue; involuntary in itself and voluntary in its cause, for example, in weariness of labor, and this is vice. But one in need must be succored not only from misfortune, but also from virtue: for he suffers true necessity, and that from an excellent cause.

b. It must be declared in how many ways goods are called necessary and superfluous.

a. Goods necessary for life are those without which one's own life and that of one's dependents cannot be preserved, so that if these were taken away, someone would cast himself or his dependents into extreme necessity. Therefore goods necessary for life are also those which are required for feeding and educating children, or for sustaining a maidservant who is necessary to the family. Therefore goods superfluous for life are goods without which someone can sustain himself and his dependents.

b. Goods necessary to the state itself are those without which the state of life cannot be preserved, so that if they were taken away, someone would fall from his state.

c. Goods necessary to the decency of state are those without which someone cannot live suitably to his condition, so that if they were taken away, he could not preserve his state decently. Therefore those goods also are called necessary to the decency of state which are required for the honorable support of himself and of his household servants, for the suitable education and dowry of children, for suitable donations, for honorable customary banquets, for receiving guests, etc.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 5 and ad 2.

² Deut. 15:11.

³ Isa. 58:7.

⁴ 1 John 3:17. Cf. Matt. 25:34-45; 1 Tim. 6:17-18.

⁵ Matt. 25:41-42.

91. More accurate determination of the precept. 1. The neighbor constituted in extreme necessity must be succored from goods necessary to the decency of state: for a neighbor constituted in such great necessity must be aided even with great inconvenience.

a. Although alms must be given to the neighbor in extreme necessity from goods necessary only to the decency of state, nevertheless the obligation of giving even from goods necessary to preserve the state itself cannot be demonstrated, so that one would be bound to fall from his proper state: for no one is bound to preserve his own life with the loss of his state, or through extraordinary means.

b. We are not bound to take care that a sick person, who would soon die in his own country, be sent into the more healthful air of a distant region. A physician is not bound to perform an extraordinary surgical operation for preserving the life of a poor man. No one is bound to spend a large sum of money to redeem the neighbor from danger of death or of harsh and perpetual captivity.

c. In extreme necessity only so much must be given to the neighbor as is required to relieve his necessity here and now, unless it is an extraordinary matter; and indeed, if he is absolutely poor, it must be given to him gratuitously; but if he needs only the use of the thing, it is sufficient to lend it.

2. The neighbor constituted in grave necessity must be succored from goods simply superfluous: for ordered charity demands that we succor the neighbor in grave necessity if we easily can. Nevertheless this precept does not oblige the rich to give to all who come, but to some; nor to provide for their want entirely, but in part: for ordinarily they can presume that there are others who also are willing to aid.

Therefore physicians, advocates, etc., are bound to spend their work on the poor gratuitously, if these are found in grave necessity and cannot be helped by others. In time of famine the rich are bound to succor the poor suffering hunger, insofar as they can do so without grave inconvenience.

3. Those constituted in common necessity must be succored here and there from goods simply superfluous. There is no obligation of succoring some determinate poor person, nor generally all the poor; but there is an obligation of sometimes aiding, according to one's means, some indeterminate persons among the poor constituted in common necessity: for if individual persons give something, the common necessity is sufficiently relieved.

How great an alms is to be distributed by the rich in common necessity cannot be accurately determined. According to the mind of St. Alphonsus (n. 32), the rich who distribute a fiftieth part (two percent) of their incomes which are truly superfluous satisfy the precept of alms. Although this determination of several authors seems to lack a solid foundation, so that the rich who have goods simply superfluous are bound to more abundant alms where a greater want of the poor exists, nevertheless from it this is gathered, that the rich who spend some goods on superfluous uses or set them aside for increasing riches are not to be accused of sin.

92. Gravity of the obligation. The neighbor constituted in extreme or grave necessity must be succored under grave obligation; but a grave obligation of giving alms to a neighbor constituted in common necessity cannot be demonstrated.

a. No one denies the grave obligation of succoring a neighbor suffering extreme necessity: for if the precept of alms is grave of itself, certainly in the extreme necessity of the neighbor it obliges under grave obligation.

b. The gravity of this obligation depends especially upon the necessity of the neighbor; hence in the grave necessity of the neighbor a grave obligation of succoring urges.

a. With regard to the neighbor constituted in grave necessity, a grave obligation seems to be established with St. Alphonsus (n. 31) and most others: for from Sacred Scripture many are excluded from the kingdom of heaven because of the sole defect of alms; but if the grave obligation were restricted to the rare case of extreme necessity, many could not be excluded. Moreover, for the holy Fathers the obligation of giving alms is grave, as their testimonies everywhere among authors attest; but it is incredible that those texts are to be understood only of extreme necessity. Finally, authors agree in establishing a grave obligation of averting from the neighbor, if it can conveniently be done, a grave evil, for example, of extinguishing a fire set to a house, of restraining grave defamation; therefore also in this matter a grave obligation must be established.

b. If some rich man who possesses superfluous goods has the intention of never giving alms except in extreme necessity, of itself this intention is gravely sinful; nevertheless in particular cases a rich man of this kind who sends the poor away without alms will not easily sin gravely, both because of the difficulty of judging concerning the superfluity of goods and concerning the necessity of the poor, and because of the presumption that others are willing to succor, and because perhaps he assists the needy in another way, for example, by providing them an occasion of earning something by labor, and finally because he can fear grave inconvenience for himself from giving.

c. Authors dispute whether the obligation of giving alms in the common necessity of neighbors is grave or light; nevertheless, since the opinion affirming a grave obligation is not certain, but only probable, it cannot be established.

Those who, with St. Antoninus¹ and St. Thomas,² deny a grave obligation, argue thus: the obligation of succoring is as great as the necessity and want of the poor man; therefore, since the necessity is not grave, neither can the obligation of aiding be grave.

Yet there are those who establish a twofold title of grave obligation, not only the necessity of the neighbor, but also superfluous goods, so that the superfluous goods themselves induce a grave obligation of giving alms in common necessity. But since the grave obligation arising from this head is not evident, it is not to be established.³

¹ Summa theologica, p. 2, tit. 1, c. 24, § 5.

² Summa, II-II, q. 32, a. 5.

³ Cf. Laymann, bk. 2, tr. 3, c. 6, n. 4 ff.

93. On the care to be expended upon the poor (Armenpflege). 1. In the present order of things the distinction between rich and poor, as having arisen from the natural diversity of the powers of soul and body and from the different care of Christian virtue, will never be eliminated: For the poor you have always with you.¹ To soften this distinction and to reconcile the poor with the rich, the precept of alms contributes very much, and the care of the poor through works of mercy which has its origin from it, provided it is exercised fittingly. In order that alms may attain this end, first it must be bestowed spontaneously, not by compulsion, and then in such a way that spiritual misery is cared for while bodily misery is warded off. For since poverty often arises from vices, alms together with want ought also to remedy moral defects. But if someone is in need without fault, alms bestowed should render the poor man content with his lot.

2. The poor are called those who neither have the means of sustaining life themselves nor can obtain them for themselves by their own labor.

Those who by their own fault have come into a state of poverty are not to be excluded from the number of the poor, provided they cannot obtain for themselves the necessities of life; but those are not counted poor to whom the necessities of life are lacking because of their idleness and weariness of labor; concerning these are the words of the Apostle: If anyone does not wish to work, neither let him eat.²

3. The care of the poor is committed in the first place to private men and to the Church.

a. The common good indeed demands the support of the poor, but public power ought not to take care of everything which is necessary or useful for the common good, if in the community there are others to whom the care of that thing has been committed, and who therefore can provide better and more efficaciously for the necessary good.

b. For the precept of love of neighbor (He commanded each one concerning his neighbor) especially demands this, that we succor the needy, which Christ the Lord effectively commended by teaching that what someone has done to "the least" he has done to Him. The Church teaches by word and example the precepts of Christ and imbues the faithful with that spirit of charity and humility by which works of mercy are exhibited to the poor.

4. Since the circumstances of the time are such that neither private persons nor the Church can provide sufficiently for the poor, public power also ought to take their care upon itself and to assist the provisions for the poor made by both private persons and the Church.

5. Therefore care of the poor is either private or public; public care is either ecclesiastical or civil. In the present order of things the care of the poor pertains to the duties of the state; nevertheless private and ecclesiastical care will never be able to cease at any time. For civil care of the poor by itself alone cannot sufficiently meet the necessities of the poor, but necessarily needs the help both of private care and especially of ecclesiastical care. For this reason it belongs to the state to assist the Church in relieving the poor, but in no way can it arrogate the whole care of the poor to itself. Civil care of the poor, as it is ordinarily exercised, labors under several defects which prevent it from fully attaining its end. And indeed:

a. The offerings of individuals are not spontaneous but compelled. Hence it happens that for the rich they have the character of a tax, while the poor consider them owed to themselves by right. Hence in the rich Christian mercy toward the poor is lacking, and in the poor the spirit of gratitude toward their benefactors.

b. In distributing alms: a. temporal want is almost exclusively regarded, but moral defects are less cared for; b. Christian charity and mercy are neglected, whence it happens that the poor do not cease to envy the rich and to bear their lot with difficulty.

6. Since public power, both in communities (Gemeinden) and in the state (Staat), takes the means of aiding the poor from taxes which are paid by citizens either for the common good universally or specifically for the poor, the question has arisen whether those paying the tax (of the poor) satisfy their obligation of giving alms. a. These taxes have the character of true alms: for the civil law by which they are imposed is considered to oblige the rich civilly to fulfill the obligation toward the poor which rests upon them from the law of nature. b. By the payment of this tax the obligation of giving alms is certainly diminished, because the necessity of the poor who are helped from those taxes is diminished; nevertheless the obligation does not entirely cease, just as the necessity of the poor is not extinguished by the help received from taxes. Therefore private men are bound to aid those whom they know to be in extreme or grave necessity.³

One feigning himself poor does not become owner of the alms: for the giving of alms is essentially a donation whose motive cause is the want of the recipient; therefore when made to a fictitious poor man it is a donation whose motive cause is lacking, and therefore an invalid donation. Wherefore the recipient is bound to restore it to the owner, or to the poor according to the reasonably presumed will of the owner.

Nevertheless alms which are of minimal value need not necessarily be restored to those who gave them, according to the presumed will of the givers: for it is rightly supposed that the primary motive of the donation in alms of this kind was not so much the want of the poor man as love of God and neighbor.

¹ John 12:8.

² 2 Thess. 3:10.

³ Cf. Kirchenlexikon, 2nd ed., "Armenpflege"; Krieg, Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung, Freiburg: Herder, 1904, § 321: "Die kirchliche Armenpflege"; Ratzinger, Geschichte der christlichen Armenpflege, 2nd ed., Freiburg: Herder, 1884; Ehrle, Beitrage zur Geschichte und Reform der Armenpflege, Freiburg: Herder, 1881; Forstl, Das Almosen, Paderborn: Schoningh, 1909.