Article II: On the Order Between Us and Neighbor

S. Th. II-II, q. 26, aa. 4 and 5.

905. Notions. - It must be noted beforehand: a) that there is a threefold genus of goods, distinct in the order of charity: 1. spiritual and eternal goods, whether supernatural or natural, which of themselves and directly regard the soul and salvation, that is, the moral perfection of man, "honorableness," are to be esteemed more; - 2. then come natural temporal goods (whether of soul or of body) intrinsic to man, which of themselves and directly constitute the physical perfection of man, such as life, integrity and health of the body, doctrine, natural dispositions of soul, liberty, etc.; - 3. finally, natural goods extrinsic to man, among which nevertheless reputation and honor, as being something moral, excel riches. But note that the common good is greater than a private good, because the good of the whole, as more universal, excels the good of the part.

It must be noted beforehand: b) that in goods both spiritual and eternal and temporal, a threefold necessity is distinguished in the order of charity: 1. extreme, when danger of damnation, or of death, or of another equivalent evil, morally certainly threatens, and cannot morally be avoided without the help of another;¹ but an evil equivalent to death is perpetual privation of a great good which is equated with life and which nature willed to be common to all, such as health, reason, liberty, integrity of members, for example, an incurable disease, perpetual loss of the use of reason, and perhaps loss of a principal member, or servitude or perpetual imprisonment, especially if it is harsh; - 2. grave, when the aforesaid evils threaten only probably and man cannot avoid them without great difficulty, or when the evil certainly threatening is only grave, such as unjust captivity, notable infamy, grave illness, grave loss of goods by which it happens that someone supports himself with difficulty, loss of state, etc.; - 3. common, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty: in the spiritual order ordinary sinners are in this, and in the temporal order the poor begging at the door, whether publicly or secretly.

¹ Danger is estimated not strictly but morally, so that also a proximate danger of shortly falling into extreme necessity is understood, which by some is called quasi-extreme necessity. Hence the definition has been made so that it includes quasi-extreme necessity.

906. General principle. In the order of charity, other things being equal, man ought to love himself more than neighbor. - The order between us and neighbor is that, in equal goods and equal necessity and condition, each one simply loves himself more than neighbor. It is proved:

a) From Mt. XXII, 39: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Lev. XIX, 18), in which words dilection of oneself is handed down as the rule and exemplar of dilection of neighbor; but a rule is more powerful than the thing ruled; therefore we ought to love ourselves more than neighbor. Hence the word "as" does not signify that man loves neighbor equally to himself, but only similarly to himself (q. 44, a. 7).

b) Man through charity loves himself as a participant of beatitude, but neighbor only as an associate in this participation. But, says St. Thomas, participation is more powerful than association, as unity is more powerful than union. Therefore man ought to love himself more than neighbor.

c) Man naturally is more inclined to love of himself than to love of neighbor. This natural inclination, as instilled by the author of nature, cannot be disordered.

907. Comparing only spiritual and eternal goods, the principle is this: each one is bound to love himself more as regards the soul or salvation than neighbor. Whence:

a) It is never permitted, for the salvation of neighbor, to sin even most lightly.

b) Nor is it permitted to expose oneself to proximate danger of sinning, because this is to sin (props. 62 and 63, condemned by Innocent XI); but it is permitted to expose oneself to danger if it is remote, - and even, for a grave cause, if, suitable remedies having been employed, so that there is founded hope of not falling, the proximate danger can be rendered remote, - indeed sometimes it is necessary so to act that help may be given to neighbor in extreme spiritual necessity.

c) Charity always inclines to desiring grace and glory more for ourselves, and indeed greater grace and glory, than for neighbor, nor is it ever permitted to desire a lesser grace and glory for oneself.

d) Charity of itself always inclines us to more perfect things; nevertheless, if these are not strictly necessary, we can and sometimes must leave them on account of the spiritual or even temporal good of neighbor, for example, a priest leaving prayer in order to hear confessions, a son leaving entrance into religion in order to support parents. Yet in this case the good, if it is left from charity because thus it pleases God more, is compensated through charity.

908. Comparing the spiritual and eternal goods of neighbor with our temporal goods, the general principle is that each one is bound to love neighbor as regards the soul and salvation more than his own body. The reason is because we ought to love the soul of neighbor as associated in the full participation of beatitude, but our body as participant of beatitude by redundancy; but association in full beatitude is a greater reason for loving than participation by redundancy. Therefore.

Specifically: a) In the extreme spiritual necessity of neighbor, each one is bound, under grave sin, to aid him with certain danger of life (for example, an infant dying without Baptism, or a sinner about to undergo death who is not thinking of it or cannot elicit perfect contrition), provided that the necessity is not from his own malice (as it is in duellists and in unjust attackers of life), there is probable hope of helping him, there is no other who may bring help, nor is a graver evil feared, as if thereby the salvation of several others would be endangered (Jn. XV, 12; I Jn. III, 16).

b) In grave spiritual necessity,² neighbor must be aided, under grave sin, with some detriment in temporal goods of reputation, honor, fortune, to be morally estimated by the judgment of the prudent. Yet not with danger of life, although charity advises this; unless 1) someone is bound from justice by reason of office, as a physician, or a pastor who is bound with danger of life or of temporal goods to minister the sacrament of Penance to parishioners infected with plague (Jn. X, 11); or 2) unless there is public necessity: for this is always joined with the extreme necessity of many, and otherwise the common good excels the private; whence if someone spreads depraved doctrine among the people and there is no one who may impede him, there is an obligation to impede him with danger of life; and in a time of plague (or persecution) a priest not having care of souls is bound to assist the dying, if there is no other.

² Grave necessity of soul is that from which, although neighbor can liberate himself absolutely, nevertheless he cannot do so except with difficulty, either on account of the vehemence of passion, or on account of inveterate custom and obstinacy in evil, or on account of ignorance or another cause.

c) In common spiritual necessity, neighbor must be aided without bodily detriment, but not with even light detriment (cf. p. 3, q. 3, a. 2).

909. Comparing only temporal goods, the general principle is that each one in itself is bound to love his own life and temporal goods more than the life and temporal goods of neighbor, - but neighbor more as regards bodily goods than himself as regards external goods.

Specifically: a) In extreme temporal necessity, neighbor must be aided, under grave sin, with notable proper temporal detriment; but not by extraordinary means (for to this not even man himself is bound as regards his own life), nor with loss of life or of a good almost equivalent, unless there is question of the extreme necessity of the commonwealth. Nevertheless, if someone does not distrust his state of grace, nor is there a necessity of family or of others, charity often permits and advises him to expose his life (a fortiori temporal goods) on account of a motive of virtue, for example, on account of friendship, gratitude, the honor of God, the common good, not by loving the life of neighbor equivalently to his own, but by loving the good of virtue more than his own life, because the good of virtue, which is spiritual, excels bodily life. Thus with danger of life they laudably serve those infected with plague, cast themselves into waters to rescue others, die for a person very necessary to the commonwealth or family.³

³ "To hand oneself over to death on account of a friend is the most perfect act of virtue; whence the virtuous man desires this act more than his own bodily life. Hence that someone lays down his own bodily life on account of a friend does not happen from this, that someone loves the friend more than himself, but because in himself he loves the good of virtue more than bodily good." III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3.

b) In grave temporal necessity a private person must be aided, under grave sin, with only moderate inconvenience, and a community even with grave inconvenience.

c) In common temporal necessity, neighbor must be aided if this can be done without inconvenience (cf. p. 3, q. 3, a. 1).

910. Corollaries. - 1. From the aforesaid it follows that the principle, "Charity does not oblige with great inconvenience," holds in common and grave necessity, and indeed only generally, but it does not hold in extreme necessity, in which charity obliges even with the greatest inconvenience.

2. In all the aforesaid rules this is understood: if there is hope of fruit, and if another more bound has not provided it.