Point I. On Alms

227. • I say: There is truly a precept of bestowing alms upon the needy. This is clear 1º from the natural law, namely from the general law of Charity, by which we are obliged to love the neighbor, and consequently to bring help to him in necessity. Recall above concerning Charity, n. 221. - It is clear 2º from Sacred Scripture. For thus Eccli. 4.1: Do not defraud the poor man of alms; and Matt. 25.42: Depart from me, accursed, into eternal fire... for I was hungry and you did not give me to eat; I was thirsty, and you did not give me drink.

Rules ¹. - In extreme necessity, the neighbor must be succored even from goods necessary to one's state ²; for thus the right order of Charity requires, since the life of the neighbor ought to prevail over our good, far inferior.

¹ St. Thomas hands down the general rule (2. 2. q. 32. art. 5.), that something be considered on the part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient of alms. On the part of the giver (he says) it must be considered that what is to be spent on alms be superfluous to him.... But on the part of the recipient it is required that he have necessity; otherwise there would be no reason why alms should be given to him.

² Things necessary to one's state or becomingness are to be distinguished from those things which are necessary to life. Thus St. Thomas (4. Dist. 15. q. 2. art. 4. q. 1.): Something is called necessary to us in two ways. In one way, that without which someone cannot be or live. In another way something is called necessary to us which we need for living honorably or decently according to our state, for example, in the manner of nobles.

And this distinction has place both with regard to oneself and with regard to those whose care is incumbent upon someone. Thus St. Thom. (l. c.): But in each of the said ways something can be necessary to someone in two ways, either by reason of himself..., or by reason of those whose care he ought to bear. Therefore some are beside the point when they refer to the necessity of mere becomingness those things which are necessary for feeding and educating children; indeed also the support of a maidservant who either guards infants or watches over the sick would wrongly be referred to mere becomingness.

Now since superfluous is said of what is not necessary, therefore superfluous also is said in two ways: in one way, what is superfluous to one's state, namely that by the removal of which nothing is lost to the becomingness of one's state; in another way, what is not necessary to life, although it seems necessary to the becomingness of one's state. And from this superfluous there presses the obligation of succoring the neighbor in extreme necessity, but not from things necessary to life. For as St. Thomas has (l. c.): That without which someone, either he himself or those whose care he has, cannot be or live, ought not to be spent in alms.

II. In grave necessity, according to some, on account of the same reason, the neighbor must be succored from goods in some way necessary to one's state, or with moderate detriment to one's state. But according to others, probably, he must be succored only from goods which are superfluous to one's state or becomingness ³.

³ In reality there was scarcely any disagreement about this among the doctors. For they were proposing the question whether in grave necessity alms were to be bestowed with detriment to one's own state. Now 1º some, such as, for example, Valentia (Tom. 3. Disp. 9. punct. 4.) and Bannez (In 2. 2. q. 32. art. 6. dub. 4.), therefore affirmed, because they were discoursing about a necessity of this kind which in reality could be aided without the loss of one's own state. For as they reasoned, since the becomingness of one's own state according to St. Thomas (4. Dist. 15. q. 2. art. 4. q. 1.) admits latitude, so that by many things added a man does not exceed the condition of his state, and by many things also removed the condition of his state is decently preserved; for this reason alms bring either no detriment or hardly any appreciable detriment (as Laymann says, lib. 2. Tr. 3. Cap. 6. n. 4.) to one's own state. Others, on the contrary, therefore denied, because they were speaking about that necessity for driving away which it would have been necessary to lose or certainly diminish one's own state; but they rightly contended that no one is bound to the loss of his own state. 2º Those who affirmed were discoursing about a necessity so grave that it approached extreme, or was to be equated with it; but those denying understood grave necessity insofar as it is broadly distinguished from extreme. Wherefore by the best right Viva (at Prop. XII from those condemned by Innocent XI, n. VIII.) according to this diverse acceptance of grave necessity calls each opinion both the more common and to be followed. Yet Viva's doctrine as to some part must be rightly understood.

For another head of controversy occurs here, concerning which you have the Doctors' opinions in reality especially discrepant: namely, whether the reason of grave necessity which otherwise does not tend toward extreme necessity induces an obligation, and indeed a grave one, of succoring a needy person certainly determined from superfluous things.

St. Alphonsus embraces the affirmative opinion (Lib. 2. n. 31.), and adds that it is clearly inferred from Prop. XII among those condemned by Innocent XI: Scarcely among secular persons will you find, even among kings, what is superfluous to one's state. And so scarcely anyone is bound to alms, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to one's state. But a proposition of this kind is too vague for that conclusion to be able to be inferred from it; and from whatever side it is considered, it plainly permits also the opposite opinion, which obliges one who has things superfluous to his state or becomingness indeed to distribute alms even outside the occasion of extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, yet does not impose the burden of succoring this or that particular person suffering necessity even grave. Whence Duarte rightly (Brev. Exposit. Propp. damnatt. V. Eleemosyna n. 222.) denies that this latter opinion is wounded in any way by the force of that condemnation.

Moreover if you inquire about the weight of authority, many say that the first opinion is commonly handed down by the Doctors. But if you yourself consult those Doctors, here and there you will find examples of necessity proposed which exhibit quasi-extreme necessity.

But if you inspect the force of the reasons, it must not be denied that each opinion is pressed by rather strong difficulties, so that at length it is lawful to conclude that this question is very obscure and most intricate. Concerning this matter, go to Vasquez (Opusc. De Eleemosyna Cap. 1. Dub. III.), who certainly ought to seem less suspect for this reason, that, inclining into the stricter doctrine, he does not hesitate to defend a grave obligation of alms in grave necessity of the neighbor even from things necessary to one's state, although the Jansenian treachery of Montaltius or Pascal did not hesitate to traduce him as the author of the aforesaid condemned thesis.

Therefore from these things you will infer that in this question that canon is finally to be summoned, that a certain obligation in so obscure and controverted a matter (see Sanchez, Consil. Lib. 1. Cap. 5. Dub. 5. n. 39. 40.) can by no means be urged, all the more because St. Thomas also stands for the opposite opinion, as is plain also from the following Note, and Vasquez himself too (l. c. Dub. IV.), although against himself, is finally forced to confess.

III. In common necessity, although there is no obligation of giving alms to this or that person in particular, nevertheless, from the common opinion of the Doctors, he could not be excused from sin who, having goods even superfluous to his state, would never be willing to give any alms ⁴.

⁴ This is established against the opinion which in common necessity admits no obligation of giving even from things superfluous to one's state or becomingness; which opinion Bannez (In 2. 2. q. 32. art. 6. dub. 2.) attributes to Alensis, Gabriel, St. Antoninus, Turrecremata, and other Summists, and on account of their authority (ibid. Concl. 3.) calls it not improbable; but Peter Ledesma (Summ. Part. 2. Tr. 4. Cap. 3. Concl. 13.) calls it absolutely probable.

But what A. has here concerning common necessity, the same can be concluded concerning grave necessity with St. Thomas (Quodlib. 8. art. 12.): Supposing (he says) that someone has from the superfluous..., which he is bound to bestow upon the poor, either he sees in the poor person asking evident signs of extreme necessity, or not. If he sees them, it is certain that he is bound to give, and sins by not giving: for Ambrose speaks in this case: Feed the one dying from hunger; if you have not fed him, you have killed him. But if they do not appear, then he is not bound to give to the poor man asking: because although he is bound to give the superfluous to the poor, nevertheless he is not bound to give to all, nor to give to this one, but he is bound to distribute according as it shall seem opportune to himself. In these words it is plain that the obligation of giving alms on the part of the poor person is asserted only then, if his necessity appears extreme. But the superfluous from which the obligation of bestowing some alms generally is here drawn, must be understood of what is superfluous even to the becomingness of one's state, as St. Thomas clearly hands down both often elsewhere and in this place (In 4. Dist. 15. q. 2. art. 1. q. 2. ad 4.): The time to which the precept about making alms obliges is taken on the part of the recipient and on the part of the giver. But on the part of the recipient, because probable signs appear of extreme necessity to come, unless aid is given to him... But on the part of the giver, when a man has many things which he does not need either for the sustenance of his life and of his own, or for the decent preservation of his state, although the poor of extreme necessity do not appear.

228. Questions. - Q. 1º Does the precept of alms oblige under grave obligation?

Resp. 1º Affirm., in extreme necessity. - Thus all.

Resp. 2º Also affirm., in grave necessity which could soon turn into extreme. Otherwise, concerning grave sin, it is not clear, since the matter is subjected to controversy among the Doctors. But the precept of alms is in itself grave, and indeed also regards common necessity, since cases of grave necessity rarely occur. - Thus commonly with St. Lig. n. 32. ⁵, against Busemb. and many others.

⁵ St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 32.), as is plain, adheres to the opinion which stands for a grave obligation as if to the more common. But indeed, while he alleges thirteen authors for it, against the opposite, which admits either no obligation or only a light one in this, he himself enumerates seventeen, to whom others could also easily be added. Moreover, since from those thirteen whom he cites for himself, you have ten, namely Palaus (Tr. 6. Disp. 2. Punct. 2. n. 15.), the Salmanticenses (Tract. 21. Cap. 7. n. 17.), and eight others brought forward by them, who indeed fight for some obligation, but nowhere hand down that this is to be called grave; thence it is to be concluded that this opinion is not common, but that of certain few against the common.

Hence the same St. Alphonsus (l. c.) does not reject the opinion of Laymann, namely that a Confessor ought not easily to deny absolution to a rich man who wishes to give no alms in common necessities, since about this obligation, what sort it is, the doctors do not agree. And Sanchez, who otherwise (Consil. Lib. 1. Cap. 5. Dub. 5. n. 37.) stands for grave obligation, at length (ibid. n. 41.) concludes that someone is not easily to be condemned, reporting these things from Medina: Because it is too difficult to judge to whom, and how much under mortal obligation we are bound to give; because it is uncertain by what necessary things can be distinguished from superfluous things; and what and how great necessity is required in the poor person; also how much is necessary to each one for nature and state; and whether the necessity of the poor person is true or simulated; and whether there are other rich persons who are willing to succor them; and many other things are uncertain, by ignorance of which they are not easily to be condemned. Compare Diana (Tom. 4. Tr. 7. Res. 8.), where, for the sake of a Confessor who was pressed by great straits in hearing the confessions of the rich, he excellently notes many things.

** Against this Note, VV. opposed not one or another, but altogether twenty columns (Pag. 152-161.). But to what end, it is scarcely possible to divine. For as to the hinge of the question, VV. could not deny those things which are contained in the Note, namely 1º that in St. Alphonsus himself are numbered seventeen (indeed in reality there are numbered twenty) who teach the contrary, and 2º that of thirteen brought forward for himself by St. Alphonsus, ten have not a word about the gravity of this obligation. Now is not even that one thing more than enough for establishing that the gravity of the obligation is not clear, and therefore from the common and certain canon it is not lawful for the Confessor to impose or intimate it? And although on account of the authority of St. Alphonsus we may wish to attribute probability to his opinion; but has not St. Alphonsus a hundred times inculcated that for imposing grave obligations a probable opinion is not sufficient?

But VV. are moved because in the Note it is said that St. Alphonsus's opinion should rather be called that of a few against the common opinion. We shall add some things about this also, which will be enough. And first of all, let it not be omitted what is to be judged about those three who remain from the thirteen alleged by St. Alphonsus for himself, and they are Holzmann, Collet, and Viva. Now 1º Holzmann (De Virt. Th. Tr. 1. §. 4. n. 177.) writes that the conclusion cannot be called simply certain. Therefore from here we have a mere probability of obligation. 2º Collet hands down things so enormous that even St. Alph. rejects them. For, considering the context, he indicates eternal punishment for one denying alms to a common poor person, unless by giving more to others you compensate what you denied to others (De Charit. art. 3.). 3º Finally Viva (Ad prop. XII. Innoc. XI. n. 10.) strengthens his thesis by four citations, of which three are certainly false, and perhaps even the fourth. Do authorities of this kind add weight to the thesis?

Let us come to the things which VV. oppose. And 1º they contend that those also are to be understood of a grave obligation who establish an obligation in any way, although they do not call it grave. The reason is that charity is a precept grave from its genus; and therefore only lightness of matter excuses from gravity of fault. - Resp. Perhaps these things could have force if authors had assigned no case of grave obligation concerning the same matter. But when, with various hypotheses made, some Author has already expressly established where grave obligation presses, and then moves a question about another hypothesis not against those who admit a light obligation, but against those who admit none (as in our case), and indeed asserts obligation, but, otherwise than he had previously been accustomed carefully to do, adds nothing about gravity, it is false that he is to be understood of a grave one; for he would not have omitted to note this also.

2º They note that in recounting those who teach the opinion of St. Alphonsus, St. Thomas was omitted, to whom they join Cajetan. - Resp. Let them produce, I ask, some words of St. Thomas or Cajetan where they assert a grave obligation in the common necessity of the poor. This surely they will never furnish.

3º Next they allege Suarez, Mastrius, Sporer, the Writers of the Society of Jesus as witness Croix, Reuter, Voit, Elbel, Charmes, Concina, Palaus, the Salmanticenses, Cajetan apud Gonet, Bannez, Peter de Ledesma, Tapia, Martinez, and finally Sanchez. - Resp. From all these, only five mention some grave obligation, namely Suarez, Sporer, Reuter, Voit, and Elbel; but the rest say that some obligation is present, by no means that it is grave. Moreover Suarez limits, unless someone should prefer to aid some grave necessity. Sporer (n. 66.) adds: The Doctors rightly warn with Laymann that a Confessor ought not easily or scarcely ever deny absolution to the rich who refuse to make alms in common necessity. Voit transcribes from Babenstuber, whom he alleges: but he omits that Babenstuber, no otherwise than Sporer, presently adopts the aforesaid warning of Laymann. Therefore altogether two remain, Elbel and Reuter, of whom the latter uses this magnificent (!) argument for his matter, that unless we are obliged under grave obligation in the common necessity of the poor, someone can easily slip from common necessity into grave necessity!

4º But, say VV., Sanchez alleges twenty Authors; Concina truly thirty-six; and finally Croix (n. 202.) confesses that the opinion of St. Alphonsus was commonly taught by the Writers of the Society of Jesus. - Resp. Sanchez (Cons. Lib. 1. c. 5. dub. 5. n. 36.) expressly says that the opposite opinion is quite probable; but the thesis for which (ibid. n. 37.) he alleges twenty Authors is this: The second, more probable opinion teaches that one is bound in common necessities: where there is nothing about a grave obligation. Likewise the thesis for which Concina (In Dec. diss. 6. c. 13. n. 6.) brings forward thirty-six Authors is of this kind: The rich are bound under precept to distribute superfluous things, both of nature and of person or state, among the poor: and here likewise you have not a word about the gravity of obligation. Finally, concerning the Authors of the Society of Jesus, Croix has these things (Lib. 2. n. 202.): Although the Authors of the Society commonly teach that the rich are bound in common necessity to give alms, etc., and again it is lawful to ask here: where in these is there a trace of grave obligation? Therefore let us conclude that from all that apparatus of twenty columns, which VV. elaborated with great zeal, scarcely two or three authors exist who can in any way be joined to the testimonies brought forward by St. Alphonsus, which are less firm of themselves.

5º Finally it pleased VV. to bring forward the things which Concina wrote on this argument against Antoninus Diana. - Resp. It is of no concern to us to dwell on these. For recently we saw that the thesis of Concina does not look to the gravity of obligation, but to some obligation or other. Therefore that dispute does not pertain to the present question.

Q. 2º What goods are judged necessary to one's state?

Resp. They are those which are required for sustaining servants, receiving guests, for honorable donations, for holding banquets according to custom, for moderate pomp according to condition, etc. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig. ibid. Q. 3º What quantity of goods is to be given to the poor?

Resp. 1º In extreme necessity, or necessity so grave that it can easily become extreme, as much must be given here and now as suffices for relieving this necessity, unless there are others who are willing to succor him. Yet no one is bound to pay out a great sum of money to free a poor man from danger of death, or to procure for him extraordinary and very expensive remedies ⁶. - St. Lig. n. 31.

⁶ Thence Palaus rightly says after others (Tr. 6. Disp. 2. Punct. 2. n. 6.) that although in extreme necessity of the neighbor you are bound to succor even from goods necessary to one's state, nevertheless you are not bound so far that you ought to fall from your state.

Resp. 2º In common necessity, a determinate quantity cannot be assigned. Yet more probably it seems to suffice to bestow the fiftieth part of those things which are superfluous to one's state. - Thus more commonly. - St. Lig. n. 32 and in Hom. apost. n. 19. ⁷. Yet certain persons contend that the twentieth or even the tenth part must be bestowed upon the poor. Thus Concina, etc.

⁷ Some, such as Roncaglia, Mazzotta, etc. apud St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 32.), express this measure as if the fiftieth part of annual revenues must be bestowed upon the poor; which rule, since it does not distinguish superfluous things from non-superfluous things, plainly sounds like something absurd. More clearly St. Alphonsus (Hom. Apost. Tr. 4. n. 19.) has it thus: Nevertheless there is not an obligation of furnishing the whole superfluous, but it suffices if the fiftieth part of annual revenues, WHICH REMAIN OVER, be given...; and if the revenues are richer... less than the fiftieth part. And the mind of the Doctors is plainly evident from the comparison of laymen with clerics, while they obligate the latter to bestow the whole superfluous from beneficial fruits, but laymen only to some portion.

Q. 4º Who ought, or are able, to make alms?

Resp. 1º Generally, only those who are true owners and administrators of their goods ⁸.

⁸ ** Yet alms can be made from another's goods when the neighbor is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, and cannot be succored otherwise. Thus with Busembaum St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 33.), who adds: But if you could have bestowed your own thing, and you gave another's, it seems that you are bound to restitution. Thus Croix (Lib. 3. p. 2. n. 434.) with Sporer. But in truth Sporer writes a little otherwise concerning this matter thus (In 4. Dec. Praec. Cap. 6. n. 50.): When several persons know the extreme necessity of the neighbor, all are bound to succor by equal parts: if the others are unwilling, all will be bound in solidum, and all knowing and omitting will sin mortally. If one should wish to furnish the whole by himself, the others will be freed. But if, after the others have been warned about contributing and refuse, one has furnished the whole, he will be able by right to exact proportionate parts from the others, or to compensate. Moreover, if at any time alms are made from another's goods in extreme necessity, one must beware 1º that these be superfluous to the life of the other; 2º that it not be that quantity which no one is bound to bestow even in the extreme necessity of another.

Resp. 2º Yet a wife can make ordinary and very common alms, according to the custom of her condition; but not extraordinary ones, without the consent of her husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which, namely, she has both ownership and administration and receives the fruits. - St. Lig. n. 33.

Resp. 3º Children can give nothing, except in very slight matters. Except unless they have their own goods, or goods permitted to their liberty from the consent of the father or by another title. But servants can give nothing without the express, or tacit, or prudently presumed consent of their masters. - St. Lig. ibid.

229. Resolves. - 1º The rich sin who always harshly repel the poor from themselves, and reserve all superfluous things for acquiring a higher state. For otherwise so moderate an alms, which has been mentioned above, cannot impede an honorable ascent to a higher state.

2º Foreigners or infidels who are in necessity are not to be excluded from alms, provided nevertheless the right order of Charity is preserved, and unless for a just cause a custom or statute has obtained somewhere of keeping traveling poor away from cities, so that namely they may be supported by their own citizens.

3º Yet there is no obligation of making alms to poor persons unwilling to labor, because they are not truly poor; indeed this would be illicit, as harmful to them.

4º Physicians, advocates, etc., are bound to devote their work to the poor gratis, because they are in true necessity, nor can they be helped by others. - St. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 71. art. 1.

5º Those who live in cities where begging for alms is prohibited are not exempt from the precept of alms, because other means of satisfying the precept are not lacking, for example, by bestowing money upon collectors in Churches, etc., or upon Pastors or others placed over the care of the needy ⁹. But where the precept of succoring the neighbor in extreme necessity presses, the petition of the poor person is not to be awaited.

⁹ Where begging for alms is forbidden, the poor are accustomed to be supported by public stipends; and therefore whoever pays tributes has already contributed something to that end, which can more or less contribute to fulfilling the precept of alms.