Section 1. Extreme Necessity

424. The right of one in need. Extreme necessity in the temporal order is that by which life is endangered.

1. He who is constituted in extreme necessity can, and of himself ought to, take from the goods of another as much as is sufficient for freeing himself from such necessity, unless the other is in the same necessity. The reason for the first is that in extreme necessity all goods are common (n. 368). The reason for the second is that each one is bound to preserve his own life if he morally can. The reason for the third is that extreme necessity gives the right of taking away another's thing; when this ceases, that right also ceases. The reason for the fourth is that in an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better; therefore it is not licit to deprive him of his own thing to whom the thing is equally necessary.

a. It makes no difference whether someone is in extreme necessity from natural causes or from the malice of men, as if robbers threaten someone with death or perpetual captivity unless he hands over a great sum of money.

b. In a fire it is not licit to seize another's ladder to save oneself if the other cannot escape danger of life without it. In shipwreck it is not licit, in order to save oneself, to seize a plank already seized by another, which he needs in order to escape.

c. What is licit in extreme necessity is also licit in quasi-extreme necessity, which commonly is equated with extreme necessity, as if someone is in moral danger of falling into a lethal disease, of losing liberty, etc.

d. Another's thing can also be taken to relieve the extreme necessity of the neighbor: for what someone can do by himself, it is also licit to do through another.

e. Even if the thing which is necessary to one in extreme need is of great value (a great sum of money), nevertheless he can take it for himself. For since in extreme necessity all things are common, he has the right of taking whatever here and now is necessary for preserving life, even if it is of great value. Nor therefore does the right of the poor man cease because the rich man is not bound to offer him a thing of great price spontaneously. For to the right of the needy man of taking the necessary thing there does not correspond an obligation of the rich man of giving it, because the obligation of assisting and the faculty of taking from created goods those things which are necessary for the preservation of life are derived from a different source: the former arises from charity, the latter from the right of preserving life from created goods. To this right of the poor man there corresponds in the rich man the obligation of not impeding him from taking the necessaries.¹ Nevertheless Lugo seems to restrict the faculty of the needy person to taking only that which pertains to the ordinary means of preserving life: for just as he does not have the obligation of preserving life by extraordinary means, so neither does he have the right of taking them against the owner's will. - But although he does not have the obligation, nevertheless he has the faculty and permission of preserving life from created goods, from which follows the power of taking those things which are necessary.

2. In grave or common necessity it is not licit to take away another's thing, because in grave necessity the matter ordinarily concerns goods which nature did not wish to be common to all; but for preserving goods of this kind nature did not wish the means to be common.² Yet if in grave or common necessity the matter concerns preserving goods which nature wished to be common to all, it is licit for a poor man to take from the goods of another, if he cannot receive them by asking, as much as is commonly accustomed to be employed for preserving them.

A poor man constituted in necessity of this kind must first ask for the thing which he needs, because the owner is reasonably unwilling if it is taken away without his knowledge. But if the owner were unwilling to give it, or if the poor man could not ask without inconvenience, he licitly takes for himself a thing not of great value, a greater one indeed if the necessity is grave, a lesser one if it is light.³ Moreover, in cases of this kind there will be necessity at least quasi-extreme.

¹ Lugo, disp. 16, n. 159.

² Proposition 36 condemned by Innocent XI has: "It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity." Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 160; Ballerini-Palmieri, III, n. 283.

³ Lugo, disp. 16, n. 156.

425. Obligation of the needy person and of the owner. a. The poor man ought to ask for the thing which he needs if this can be done, unless a just cause excuses from asking. But if he takes the thing without asking, he does not sin gravely; for since one in extreme need has a right in the thing itself, the owner can be unwilling only as to the mode of taking.¹

b. If the thing taken away is still extant when the necessity ceases, it must be restored to the owner: for the one in extreme need has the right only to the use of the thing if this alone was necessary; the thing itself remains the owner's. But if the thing taken away is no longer extant, one must distinguish. If the one in extreme need is indeed poor in fact, but has probable hope of receiving something afterward, he can take another's thing only with the burden of restitution; for it is not licit for him to take more than is necessary for preserving life. But if he is poor both in fact and in hope, he is held to nothing, even if afterward he comes to a better condition: for he who in extreme necessity takes another's thing makes it his own; but he who consumes his own thing is not bound to restore.

c. The owner, alpha. from charity, not from justice, is bound to give his own thing to one in extreme need. Therefore he who neglects to assist one in extreme need or hides his own things is not bound to restitution when the necessity has ceased. beta. From justice he is bound not to impede the poor man from occupying the thing and not to take away the thing occupied.

¹ Cf. Lessius, l. 2, c. 12, n. 66.