Article I: On Urgent Necessity

S. Th. II-II, q. 66, a. 7.

410. Notions. - From the treatise on charity (I, n. 905) let us recall that a threefold necessity is distinguished in temporal things:

1. Extreme necessity is that in which the necessaries of life are lacking, or there is certain imminent danger of perpetually losing a good equal to life which nature wills to be common to all, for example, health, the use of reason, liberty, integrity of members, a bodily sense. To this is morally equated quasi-extreme necessity, which is in a very probable and almost certain danger of losing the aforesaid goods, because it brings a proximate danger of falling into extreme necessity, for example, a lethal disease. As St. Thomas says, it is an evident and urgent necessity.

2. Grave necessity is present in a double case: a) as to external goods, when a notable loss of goods is imminent, such as loss of state, office, dignity, or reputation, in one word of goods which nature did not will to be common to all, and for preserving which therefore it did not will the means to be common; b) as to life and personal goods morally equivalent, when the danger is not imminent, but only probable, which namely cannot be avoided without great difficulty.

3. Common necessity is that in which ordinary begging poor persons are placed, who, unless they are helped, lead a troublesome life, but nevertheless are able to provide necessary things for themselves.

411. Principles. I. He who is placed in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity can, and of itself ought, from another's goods, even while the owner is unwilling, take as much as is necessary for him to escape this necessity; unless however the owner is placed in the same necessity.

For according to the order of the Creator and natural law, temporal things were instituted by the primary intention of nature for assisting the necessities of all men; by a secondary intention, so that they be divided into private possessions and thus be managed better, more orderly, and peacefully. But the secondary law of nature cannot derogate from the primary right, and those things which are of secondary intention cannot harm the primary intention. Therefore the division of possessions cannot impede assistance being given to men's necessities. Now if a man in extreme necessity could not take from others' things as much as is required for escaping necessity, the order of the Creator in the primary intention would be frustrated and a human deed executing the secondary intention would prevail over the primary end. Therefore.

And indeed a) the right to life, bodily integrity, the use of reason, or liberty, prevails over the right of property which is ordered to preserving those things;

b) hence in extreme necessity all goods are said to be common, not indeed absolutely all, but necessary goods, nor always as to dominion, but at least as to use, insofar as namely they are required for preserving life or health or integrity;

c) whence an owner cannot impede urgent necessities being assisted from his goods, and if he attempts this by force, he is an unjust aggressor;

d) unless however the owner himself is in the same necessity or by the taking away of the thing would fall into the same, because in an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better, and therefore the right of the owner prevails. Whence in a fire it is unlawful to snatch away another's ladder to save oneself, if he himself is about to perish without it; in a shipwreck, to snatch away a plank already seized by another which he himself needs.

Hence 1) in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, it is not lawful to take away more than is necessary: for since urgent necessity bestows the right of taking, when this ceases that right ceases; whence if the use of the thing suffices, for example, of a horse for fleeing, of a gun for defending oneself, when the necessity has passed the thing itself, insofar as it still exists, is to be restored to the owner. And if by another way one can obtain the thing, for example, by borrowing or by seeking alms, regularly he cannot take it.

2. In a case of necessity if the consumption itself of the thing was necessary, nevertheless when necessity has ceased, the thing is to be restored in equivalent by him who possesses other goods or has hope or proximate power of possessing them, because only the loan of the thing, not dominion, was necessary to him; - on the contrary not by him who is needy both in thing and in hope, at least if the thing is not very notable.

3. When a poor man is existing in extreme necessity, another also can take away another's thing for relieving the necessity, provided he is not bound to assist the poor man from his own things: for what someone could do through himself can also be done through another, who then acts in the place of the needy man; whence a mother not having nourishment can take milk for a child about to perish from hunger. - The custodian of things is excepted, who can take away the owner's things only if the owner is bound to give.

4. In a case of necessity, it is lawful even to steal a thing of the greatest value, provided it is apt for removing the necessity and, as far as possible, as soon as morally can be done, is restored. Nevertheless in no way, not even from charity, is the owner bound to hand over such a thing; because no one is bound to assist another, just as neither to preserve his own life, with the greatest expenses or by extraordinary and exquisite means.

For the reasons which hold for extreme necessity are not present:

a) not for guarding external goods, because nature does not confer an absolute right except to the necessaries of life and integrity;

b) not for preserving life or personal goods equivalent to it, because their danger can strictly be avoided, although with great difficulty;

c) not by reason of the common good, but on the contrary the common good demands that others' things not be taken away in grave necessity, because abuses against the common good would easily arise. For since cases of this kind are frequent, if in them others' things were lawfully taken, the way would lie open to innumerable thefts, quarrels, and fights, leisure, inertia, and dissipation of goods would be fostered, and public tranquility itself would be disturbed.

d) Whence Innocent XI condemned proposition 36: "It is permitted to steal, not only in extreme necessity but also in grave."

Hence 1) they err who in grave necessity easily seize from others' goods, unless from special circumstances the consent of the owner can be presumed;

2. although grave necessity does not excuse from theft, nevertheless it lessens its gravity; whence it excuses from so much, not from the whole;

3. nevertheless grave necessity can be a sufficient reason for delaying restitution;

4. in practice, before the fact one must act more severely, lest the faithful unduly extend cases of necessity and imprudently expose themselves to the danger of committing grave spoliations and injustices; after the fact of secret taking, more benignly, by asking whether there were not excusing circumstances, good faith, or also the owner's consent or condonation. Nor should the obligation of restoring be imposed unless it is certain.

412. Remarks. - 1. Poor persons who can escape their necessity by asking, unless the necessity is truly extreme and instant, are regularly bound to ask necessary things for themselves, because one who by asking can sustain his life is not judged to be in extreme necessity. St. Alphonsus excepts an honest man who would rather die than beg. But if a poor man by asking does not obtain the necessary thing, or if here and now he needs some special thing which the owner is altogether bound to give, he does not sin by seizing the thing.

2. Poor persons in grave necessity are to be assisted from charity, or also from legal justice by reason of the common good, but not from commutative justice. And the same seems to be said in extreme necessity, because this necessity does not make the poor man the owner of another's thing but only bestows the right to occupy it for himself; whence from commutative justice the owner is bound only not to impede the poor man from taking necessary things for himself. Hence he who neglects to assist one in extreme need sins only against charity or also legal justice, not against commutative justice; but if by force or threats he impedes the poor man from taking a thing necessary to himself, he also wounds commutative justice, and is bound concerning the damages that followed.

3. From what has been said it is easily understood that the rule proposed by some is false: that for one constituted in necessity it is lawful without injury to take away those things which the owner is bound from charity to give generously to him. For we have seen that sometimes those things can be taken away which the owner ought not to give generously; and conversely, certainly not all those things can be taken away which the owner is bound to give generously from charity, since the precept of almsgiving obliges even in grave necessity, indeed also in common necessity.