IV. On Alms

What is alms? Alms, generally, is an act of charity and mercy by which the necessity of neighbor is relieved. One kind is spiritual, another corporal, according as that necessity is spiritual or corporal. We treat here only of corporal alms. The principal question is concerning its precept, which is explained in the following paragraphs. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32. Alms strictly taken, about which the speech is properly here, is the largess of those things which are necessary for the sustenance of life. But taken more broadly, it embraces any help whatever for freeing neighbor from bodily evil. Seven works of corporal mercy are listed: to give food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to lodge travelers, to visit the sick, to visit those detained in prison, to bury the dead.

A true precept of alms is given. - Proof 1. Ecclus. 4:1: Defraud not the poor man of alms; Matt. 25:41, 42: Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire... for I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat; I was thirsty, and you gave me not to drink. 2. Because charity commands loving neighbor, and therefore bringing help to him in necessity. Struggl, q. 4, n. 40; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5; E. M. 397.

No one is bound to give alms from goods necessary to himself for life, unless the necessity were of such a person upon whom the safety of the republic depended. Goods necessary for life are called those without which someone, and those whose care he has, cannot be or live. Therefore goods necessary for life are also those which are necessary for feeding and educating children, for supporting a maidservant who watches over infants or attends the sick. - Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians. "That without which," says S. Thomas, "someone cannot be or live, either himself, or those whose care he has, ought not to be spent in alms," 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 4, q. 1. - 2. Because the right order of charity demands this. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 41, 42; Suarez, d. 7, s. 4, n. 6; Valentia, t. 3, d. 3, q. 9, p. 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 6.

Alms is to be made only from one's own goods, and those of which one has free administration. - For charity must keep justice uninjured. Nevertheless it can be done from the goods of another when neighbor is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, and cannot be helped from elsewhere. Then all things are common. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 7; L. 33.

Note: "When several know the extreme necessity of neighbor, all are bound to help by equal parts; if the others are unwilling, all will be bound in solidum, and all knowing and omitting will sin mortally. If one wishes to furnish the whole by himself, the others will be freed. But if, after the others have been warned about contributing and have refused, one has furnished the whole, he will be able by right to exact from the others their rated parts, or to compensate." Sporer, in 4 Pr., c. 6, n. 50.

Resolves: It is not licit to give alms from goods liable to restitution, e.g., things taken by theft; nevertheless it is licit from things acquired by an illicit work, but not with injustice, e.g., from meretricious gain. It is not licit for children, children of a family, servants, maidservants, to give alms except slight alms, in which namely the will of parents and masters is presumed. For this same reason a wife can make ordinary and common alms according to the custom of her condition; but not extraordinary ones without the consent of her husband, unless from goods altogether her own, of which namely she has both ownership and administration, and receives the fruits. Tutors and curators, who have care of others' goods, can make modest alms from the goods which they administer, such namely as those whose goods they are ought themselves to make; for they act in their place, yet moderately, since they must render an account of expenses. L. 33; l. 3, n. 540; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 7, 8; Struggl, q. 4, n. 49.

In extreme necessity, neighbor must be helped even from goods in some way necessary to one's state. Goods necessary to one's state are those which we need in order to live honorably or decently according to our state. But these are the things which are required, according to one's proper condition, for supporting servants, receiving guests, honorable gifts, banquets customarily to be furnished, moderate pomp, the limits of honorable liberality being observed, common events also being considered, future necessity, and attention also being paid to the improvement of an inferior state and honorable ascent to a higher one. Those things which are necessary to one's state do not consist in something indivisible, but have great breadth, and greater breadth for a greater state. In some way, because if you ought to fall out of your state, you are not bound. - Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians; 2. because the order of charity requires this. For the life of neighbor ought to prevail over a good of ours far inferior. But the extreme necessity of neighbor is regularly driven away without notable inconvenience of the giver. - La-Croix 201; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 42, 47; S. Th. 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 1, q. 4; a. 4, q. 1; 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 5, 6; L. 31.

In grave necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous to life and state; indeed also, probably, from goods necessary to state, yet with very slight detriment to one's state. Proof of the first part. For the order of charity demands that we will and procure the good of neighbor when on the one hand neighbor is constituted in grave necessity, and on the other hand either no inconvenience results to us, or only a small one. "That which remains, give alms." Luke 11:41. Proof of the second part, by the same reason, but less validly; for simply a slight inconvenience is not really had in the case, but one fairly grave, since the matter is not about extreme necessity, but about grave necessity, which, attention being paid to the conditions of persons, often cannot be driven away without notable inconvenience of the giver. Hence St. Thomas says that it falls not under precept, but under counsel. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 6. But if that grave necessity of neighbor is graver, and almost extreme, then an obligation is present of making alms almost as in extreme necessity, from which it is little distant. - L. 31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 6; 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 1, q. 4, a. 4, q. 1, 4 ad 4; Struggl, q. 4, n. 45.

Resolves: Both in extreme and in grave necessity, as much must be given as suffices here and now for relieving this necessity, unless there are others who wish to help him. If therefore neighbor needs only the use of a thing, it is enough to lend it, e.g., if you lend clothing to one stripped by enemies, or a horse to one wounded, until he returns home. Nevertheless no one is bound to spend a great sum of money for freeing a poor man from danger of death, or for procuring extraordinary and costly remedies for him. For no one, attention being paid to the condition of his state, is bound even for his own life to spend as much in procuring extraordinary medicine for himself. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5; L. 31; La-Croix 215; Struggl, q. 4, n. 48; Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 16, nn. 167, 168.

In common necessity, he who has goods superfluous to life and state is sometimes bound to give alms. - Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians. Proof 2. both because each one is bound to love neighbor as himself, and because otherwise those poor persons would fall into grave necessity. Proof 3. For the Lord "commands all superfluous things to be shown to the poor, according to that of Luke 11:41: That which remains, give alms." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 87, a. 1 ad 4; Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter of 15 May 1891, on the condition of workers. - This indeed is a positive and general precept; and therefore then certainly it urges when "right reason requires," S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5, that is, that we assist the necessity of neighbor. S. Th. ibid. Therefore the obligation is not of giving everything superfluous to the poor who are in common necessity. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 40, 41, 43; L. 32; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66, aa. 2, 7; Quodl. 8, a. 12; E. M. 405.

Note: "Nevertheless there is not present (for laypersons) an obligation of furnishing the whole superfluity; but it suffices if a fiftieth part of annual revenues which remain be given... and if the revenues are richer, less than a fiftieth part." But this precept does not oblige all in solidum, but commonly all the rich. And if individuals sometimes give something, the common necessities of all are sufficiently helped. L. 32; H. A. tr. 4, n. 19; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 6, 10.

Does the precept of alms oblige under grave sin? - R. Affirmatively, in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity. Thus all. For then certainly a grave precept of charity urges. But in grave necessity, some probably and commonly affirm it, because since in Scripture men are frequently condemned for neglected works of mercy, these are not to be restricted to extreme and rare necessity. But others deny it, and this opinion seems to many at least extrinsically not improbable. Indeed S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 5, 6, in which he treats expressly of the precept of alms, requires on the part of the giver superfluity according to his proper condition and state, and on the part of the recipient extreme necessity. "Since one person cannot help all those having necessity, not every necessity obliges to precept, but that alone without which he who suffers necessity cannot be sustained.... Thus therefore to give alms from the superfluous is in precept, and to give alms to him who is in extreme necessity." These things in a. 5 c. And ibid. ad 3 the Holy Doctor repeats the same: "It must be said that there is some time in which one sins mortally if he omits to give alms: on the part indeed of the recipient, when an evident and urgent necessity appears... but on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous things according to the present state."

But in common necessity, others also probably and commonly affirm it, as is gathered from the sentence which Christ is about to pronounce on the last day through those words: I was hungry, thirsty, etc. For Christ would not allege hardness toward the poor as a reason for condemning the wicked unless this vice were common and frequent among men, which it would not be if there were no obligation from superfluous things to spend alms on the poor who occur. Confirmation from 1 Tim. 6:17, 18: Command the rich of this world... to give easily, to communicate..., where those words, command and easily, seem to indicate a precept even outside grave necessity. And Luke 11:41: That which remains, give alms. But others hold either that there is no obligation, or that the obligation at least is not grave, but only light; nor is this opinion without all probability. For the obligation of alms does not arise from the sole superfluity of goods, on the part of the giver, but also simultaneously from necessity on the part of the recipient, which in poor persons commonly occurring is very small: their condition is sufficiently tolerable for them. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 43, 45-47; Suarez, d. 7, s. 3, nn. 7, 10; L. 31, 32; S. Th. Quodl. 8, a. 12; 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5; q. 71, a. 1; E. M. 407.

The general precept of alms from what is superfluous to life and state, according as it shall have seemed opportune to each one, can be confirmed by the natural order of things itself. For "those things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right or divine right. But according to the natural order, instituted from divine Providence, lower things are ordered to this, that from them human necessity may be helped. And therefore by the division and appropriation of things proceeding from human right, it is not impeded that human necessity must be helped from things of this sort. And therefore the things which some have superabundantly are owed by natural right for the support of the poor.... But because there are many suffering necessity, and all cannot be helped from the same thing, the dispensation of one's own things is committed to the judgment of each one, so that from them he may help those suffering necessity." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66, a. 7 c.; Quodl. 8, a. 12; L. 32.

From the superfluous. The obligation of giving alms is not had from superfluity if necessity is lacking, nor evidently from necessity if superfluity is lacking; but from the superfluity of the giver and at the same time from the necessity of the recipient. For on the part of the giver "first it is necessary that each one provide for himself and for those whose care is incumbent upon him, and afterward from the residue help the necessities of others.... But on the part of the recipient it is required that he have necessity, otherwise THERE WOULD BE NO REASON why alms should be given to him." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5. Whence it is evidently clear that the obligation of giving the whole superfluity precisely by reason of the superfluity itself is not present. 1 John 3:17.

From the superfluous. Those rich persons who do not retain their goods idle, but spend them in completing pious or profane works, whether for private or public utility, which consequently also supply necessary support and even profit to many workers, already from those things which they have superabundantly help the necessity of others, and much better, as is clear, than if they distributed them once among the poor.

Resolves: If someone rich and abundant, without any reasonable cause, were to repel all poor persons from himself, he is truly in a bad state. Nevertheless absolution is not easily to be denied to anyone, however rich, who repels all the poor without alms, both because of the disagreement of authors concerning this obligation, and because of the difficulty of judging concerning the superfluity of goods and the necessity of the poor, and because of the presumption that others wish to help, and also because in the present payment of taxes someone also concurs in relieving the poor, for whom public hospices are appointed, and other works of public beneficence are exercised for them. Laym., n. 5; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 44, 50, 51; Diana, t. 4, tr. 7, rr. 8, 42; L. 32; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 71, a. 1.

What has been said about alms must likewise be said about all other works of mercy. Hence physicians, advocates, etc., are bound, generally and speaking per se, to devote labor to the poor gratis, because they are in true necessity and cannot be helped by others. If some evil is imminent to neighbor which can be averted without grave inconvenience, it must be averted, e.g., by removing the cause of damage, for instance fire from buildings, by denouncing the author of damage to be inflicted, by opportunely forewarning him to whom damage is imminent.