What excuses from a full confession

An intrinsic inconvenience does not excuse, as, for example, shame (t. I, n. 169). Concerning extraordinary shame, confer n. 327. The following excuse:

n. 325.

I. Ignorance of the law and forgetfulness of sin, provided it is here and now inculpable or at most lightly culpable, for instance when someone after an examination made without grave negligence does not remember some sin. I said "without grave negligence," because light negligence can be combined with ordinary diligence.

n. 326.

II. Physical inability. 1. The dying and the sick who, even if helped by the confessor, cannot confess integrally at all or can do so only with great difficulty, are excused.

The mute and the deaf, who are bound to confess integrally insofar as they can morally do that by words or signs. It is disputed whether the mute are bound to use writing if otherwise they cannot satisfy the precept. Moreover, most more recent authors deny this. But with St. Thomas (In 4, distinction 17, question 3, article 4, solution 3, ad 2) and St. Alphonsus (VI, 479), it seems this must be affirmed. For only a grave inconvenience, or one extraordinary or unusual with respect to the penitent, excuses from a grave divine precept. But the use of writing neither involves grave inconvenience nor is judged an extraordinary or unusual means of communicating with others with respect to the mute.

Objection. No one is bound to use a means which introduces danger of revelation. But writing is of this kind, since by some accident it can come into the hands of others.

Response. No one is bound to use a means which brings with it danger of revelation worthy of note, I concede; otherwise I deny. But in the case, the danger of revelation attached to writing is not worthy of note, so that not even the burden of undergoing it deserves to be noted. Therefore it does not excuse from fulfilling a grave precept.

A somewhat deaf person should be led into a remote place, unless it is to be feared that bystanders would suspect that he sinned gravely. But this does not take place if deafness is noticed at the beginning of confession; otherwise, for the most part, if it is noticed in the course of confession (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 16, n. 35).

Those ignorant of the language of the confessor are excused if another confessor cannot be had shortly and conveniently. If the confessor does not know only the dialect of the penitent, so that, at least after asking for explanation, he understands several or even many things, it is licit for a lesser cause to hear the confession of the penitent. For the rest, the penitent is not bound to use an interpreter (canon 903), and this holds even if he can easily declare one or another sin through an interpreter, for instance a sin which is already known to the interpreter from elsewhere (St. Alphonsus, VI, 479).
Those lacking opportunity of time, for instance when battle or shipwreck is imminent. The same can happen in a hospital, if all, because of the multitude of the dying, cannot confess integrally in time. Likewise the penitent is excused if it is to be feared that the confessor may die or that something grave may happen to him before confession has been integrally completed, and another cannot be approached conveniently and shortly.

A great concourse of penitents does not excuse, as follows from proposition 59 condemned by Innocent XI:¹ "It is licit sacramentally to absolve those who have confessed only by half, by reason of a great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can happen on the day of some great feast or indulgence."

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1209.

n. 327.

III. Moral inability, which is had when the penitent cannot confess integrally without probable damage, whether spiritual or temporal, extrinsic to confession and proportionate to the gravity of the precept. It is said without probable damage; certain damage is not required, because it is already a grave inconvenience to expose oneself to grave danger. Here are referred:

Danger of infamy, for instance if a sick person, for example in a hospital, cannot confess sins without others hearing them; or if someone cannot omit or defer Holy Communion or Mass without notice or scandal, and has committed so many sins that he cannot confess integrally without others suspecting his evil state. Outside this case a lengthy confession rarely brings with it danger of infamy, because all know that confession is often prolonged not at all because of many grave sins to be confessed, but in order to seek counsels, etc.
Danger that the confessor will violate the seal; likewise if the penitent by confessing integrally would violate the seal. These will scarcely take place.
Danger of a fall arising from diligent examination and recollection of sins.
Danger of damage to be feared for a scrupulous person from integral confession (St. Alphonsus, VI, 484-488).

Question. Whether extraordinary shame excuses.

Response. All concede: 1. that those who are more ashamed than others are not excused; 2. that shame which arises from a circumstance commonly occurring does not excuse. But some judge that shame arising from an extraordinary circumstance excuses, for instance if someone had to confess a very disgraceful sin to his nephew. But this opinion seems wholly to be rejected, according to what was said on p. 135.

n. 328.

IV. Damage of the confessor or of a third party to be prevented, for instance if the penitent is infected with plague, and integral confession would expose the confessor to danger of contagion; or if the penitent fears that by confessing integrally he would create danger of a fall for a confessor inclined to lust (St. Alphonsus, VI, 479; 484-488).

Question. Whether there is an obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be manifested without infamy of the accomplice or of any third party.

Response 1. It must be affirmed if the penitent, independently of the precept of integrity, enjoys the right of bringing infamy on the accomplice or third party, for instance if the accomplice, as regards the crime of which there is question, has been condemned by a judge. The reason is that in the case the natural law of preserving reputation is not opposed to the precept of integrity.

Response 2. Outside the hypothesis posited, it is disputed. Some deny. Others not only deny, but also teach that under light obligation¹ it is illicit to confess a sin of this kind, because the natural law of preserving the reputation of one's neighbor prevails over the law of integrity. Others, whose opinion we embrace, affirm, and judge that the law of integrity, according to the mind of Christ, prevails. For: 1. if the opinion of the adversaries is admitted, provision often would not be made for the prudent ministration of the sacrament. For prudent ministration commonly, as is clear from Trent,² requires the manifestation of all sins according to species, number, and circumstances changing the species. 2. If that opinion is admitted, the law of integrity would not rarely become illusory, since especially in smaller places the confessor can easily suspect who the accomplice is, and another confessor cannot conveniently be approached. Add that in antiquity there was the custom, and of itself the obligation, of confessing to the parish priest, who was accustomed to know his subjects and their circumstances. 3. Authors both more numerous and more outstanding in authority adhere to the stricter opinion, for example St. Thomas (in 4, distinction 16, question 3, article 2), St. Alphonsus (VI, 489), St. Bernard,³ St. Antoninus,⁴ St. Bonaventure,⁵ Cajetan,⁶ Suarez,⁷ Lugo.⁸

Nevertheless, the penitent is bound under light obligation,⁹ if it can be done conveniently, to approach a confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown. But a just cause excuses from this obligation, as if otherwise the penitent would remain for some time in the state of mortal sin, or would have to abstain from Communion or celebration which he was accustomed to institute daily; if this confessor would be especially useful to the penitent, for instance by affording him greater quiet or consolation; if the penitent would confess with more difficulty to another than to his usual confessor, etc. (St. Alphonsus, VI, 490). Besides, in practice the confessor can commonly permit penitents to expose sins, and ask them about occasions and circumstances to be confessed, even if from that accidentally he comes to knowledge of the accomplice. Nevertheless, let him generally take care that penitents expose their own sins rather than the sins of others, for example of husband or wife.

Corollary I. In order that it be licit, because of the excusing causes explained above, not to confess integrally, it is required:

That there be some necessity or at least a moderate cause of confessing, for instance the precept of annual Communion or confession, or if someone could not omit Communion without notice; likewise the inconvenience of remaining, for instance for a day, in sin, or of omitting Communion which he was accustomed to receive daily (St. Alphonsus, VI, 487).
That another confessor cannot be had without grave inconvenience, to whom integral confession can be made without the inconvenience which the penitent intends to avoid.

Corollary II. It is clear: 1. that only that sin can be kept back to the declaring of which the excusing inconvenience is attached;¹⁰ 2. that sins kept back are afterward to be declared if the excusing inconvenience has ceased.

¹ Under light obligation only, because the manifestation of a sin to one man who will keep the secret is light, unless it concerns an enormous crime; or unless the sin is manifested to one from whom it is especially in the sinner's interest that it be hidden, for example to his superior.

² Session 14, chapter 5.

³ Varia et brevia documenta, n. 1.

⁴ Part 3, title 14, chapter 19, § 11.

⁵ In 4, distinction 21, part 2, article 1, question 3.

⁶ Summa, word Confessio, condition 3.

⁷ Disputation 34, section 2, assertion 2.

⁸ Disputation 16, section 7, n. 394.

⁹ Under light obligation, because infamy before one trustworthy man is of itself venially evil.

¹⁰ But it is disputed whether the whole sin or only the circumstance can be kept back if the inconvenience is attached only to the circumstance to be declared. Some teach that only the circumstance can be kept back; others judge that in the case the whole sin can be kept back when afterward the circumstance to be kept back cannot be supplied without the whole sin being exposed. Otherwise, they say, there would be an obligation of confessing the same thing twice. But the controversy is of little practical importance.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 4 passages

Vol. III, On Penance, V. On the Integrity of Confession

n. 718.

Are there sometimes causes excusing from the integrity of Confession? - Resp. In the affirmative, because sometimes that integrity is physically or morally impossible.

In order that someone be judged excused from the integrity of Confession by reason of moral impotence, although sins occur to the mind, these conditions are to be observed: 1. That only those sins be omitted which cannot be declared, or from whose manifestation there would follow a most grave extrinsic inconvenience, whether spiritual or temporal, either to the penitent, or to the confessor, or to some third person. 2. That another confessor cannot be found to whom an integral Confession may be made without such inconvenience. 3. That Confession is here and now necessary. From the common opinion of the doctors, this necessity is judged to be present if the precept of annual Confession or Communion must be fulfilled; if the reception of the Eucharist or the celebration of Mass cannot be omitted without disgrace or scandal; if otherwise someone must long lack the benefit of the sacraments; indeed, as Suarez adds, de Poenit., d. 23, s. 2, n. 7, if someone otherwise would be deprived of the great utility which the sacrament of itself brings. Wherefore the penitent's fear suffices lest he remain in the state of mortal sin for one or another day.

But a difficulty intrinsic to Confession never excuses, however grave it may be. The reason is that Confession from its own nature is essentially laborious; and therefore, if a grave difficulty, e.g., great repugnance or shame or the loss of one's own reputation before the confessor, excused from integrity, the faithful would for the most part be excused from accusing mortal sins, and therefore the institution of the sacrament of penance would collapse for the greatest part. Besides, the Church could not reserve atrocious crimes, because it creates no light inconvenience for penitents.

When the cause excusing from material integrity ceases, the divine precept of confessing all omitted mortal sins urges again; for when an impediment occurs, the obligation of Confession does not cease simply, but is only suspended. Therefore, when the excusing cause ceases, the obligation of the law revives integrally; and since the precept of confession is not fixed to a time or to a circumstance, but affects the whole life, therefore sins not yet accused are afterward, if it can be done, necessarily to be accused. This is established besides from proposition 11 condemned by Alexander VII. - L. 487, 490; Lugo, d. 16, s. 13.

n. 719.

Resolutions: The following chiefly excuse from the integrity of Confession: 1. Extreme infirmity, i.e., when a dying person can express only one or another sin, or, already deprived of the use of the tongue, shows penance and asks absolution only by some sign. - 2. Defect of speech and hearing; thus mutes and deaf persons who cannot confess integrally by signs are exempted from integrity; likewise foreigners wholly or almost wholly ignorant of the language of the region in which they confess. - 3.

Defect of time, e.g., if soldiers must immediately proceed to battle. But the mere multitude of penitents does not excuse. - 4. Danger to the life of the penitent, confessor, or a third person, e.g., if enemies arrive, if many are in danger of shipwreck or contagion. - 5. Danger to reputation, e.g., if a priest soon about to celebrate, and needing general Confession, could not confess integrally without the bystanders suspecting the matter. - 6. Danger of revelation or violation of the seal, e.g., if a confessor cannot confess integrally without manifesting sins heard in Confession, or if the penitent, from a grave cause, fears that the confessor will break the law of the seal. - 7. Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor, e.g., if a woman certainly knew the very great frailty of the confessor. - 8. Another grave extrinsic harm, whether one's own or another's, whether spiritual or temporal, deservedly feared, e.g., in a scrupulous person who is perpetually distressed about forgotten sins. - L. 479, 488-494.

n. 720.

Is there an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which cannot be explained without manifestation of the accomplice? - "For explaining a venial sin, or a mortal sin otherwise confessed, it is not lawful to manifest the grave crime of another. But the penitent is bound, when he can conveniently do so, to seek another confessor to whom the person of the accomplice is unknown, so that his reputation may be preserved; nor does the opinion seem sufficiently probable... that this is only of counsel; for commonly they say that this is of precept." L. 489. - Therefore the proposed question regards only the case in which it is a question of necessary matter, and someone cannot conveniently go to another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown. And for this case there are two opinions: one affirming that he is bound to confess the sin; the other affirming that he is bound to keep it silent until another confessor is found.

The reason of the second opinion, which Ballerinius apud Gury, 499, holds, is that the natural precept of preserving the neighbor's reputation must be preferred to the precept of preserving the integrity of Confession. The reason of the first opinion, which St. Alphonsus follows in the cited place, is "because the precept of confessing integrally must be observed whenever it can be observed licitly; but it can be observed sufficiently licitly in our case, since the manifestation of another's crime is not illicit when it is made from a reasonable cause, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2. Therefore it must be observed. And thus answer is made to the opposite reason of the contrary opinion." L., l. c.; Suarez, d. 34, ss. 1, 2; Lugo, d. 16, s. 7.

n. 721.

What are the causes excusing from seeking another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown? - 1. If danger of death urges, or the precept of annual Confession; 2. if it is grave for the penitent to omit Confession or Communion; 3. if someone would open his conscience to another confessor only with difficulty; 4. if someone otherwise would have to remain in sin even for one day; 5. if someone otherwise would be deprived of the benefit of some extraordinary indulgence; 6. if, by going to the confessor to whom the accomplice is known, better direction and notably greater consolation would be had. - Hence by reason of seeking counsel, of lessening sorrow, etc., mothers and wives are often excused when they manifest to a confessor the sins of sons or husbands, although he knows them. For it would be too hard for those women to be bound to seek another confessor. But generally there is not held to be a grave obligation of going to another confessor for the purpose of hiding the accomplice, unless perhaps it is a question of a very grave crime. L. 490.

Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 10 passages

125. Causes Excusing from the Integrity of Confession

n. 1.

"Sigismund, a parish priest, bringing the sacred Viaticum to Barbara, who is dying, with a great crowd accompanying him, asks her according to custom, secretly, whether anything gnaws at her conscience. She confesses that for forty years she has confessed sacrilegiously; but the parish priest, fearing lest the assistants wonder if he prolongs conversation with the sick woman too long, after hearing one or another sin, absolves her and refreshes her with the sacred Eucharist.

Claudinus, a boy, when for the first time he was approaching the sacred table, with many companions crowding around, seized with fear of a sacrilegious Communion, resolved to declare a grave sin committed several years before and until now concealed in confession. The ordinary confessor being absent, he approaches the first priest who meets him and opens the matter to him in one word. This priest, because of the shortness of time and the danger of infamy, at once absolves the boy, ordering him to approach the sacred Synaxis, afterward to complete the confession by reason of integrity.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Sigismund proceeded rightly, nor could he prudently have acted in another way; for in such narrow circumstances the precept of the integrity of confession does not urge, because of the danger of reputation which the dying woman would have incurred. Therefore, in that Case, the principal sins having been heard, the woman had to be absolved. Then the confessor had to return to the sick woman as soon as possible, to obtain greater integrity of confession, insofar as, considering the circumstances, this could be done. Lig. 484; Gousset 433.

Claudinus could be absolved and receive the Eucharist with an imperfect confession. For the reason is the same as in the preceding case, namely because there urged a grave danger of infamy, excusing here and now from the divine precept of the integrity of confession. Therefore the confessor acted rightly toward Claudinus. Gousset 432." G. 436, 437; I. M. 718, 719.

Aegidius, observing that his sister was pregnant by Caius, her lover, driven into rage, struck her gravely, and thus procured her abortion. Repenting of the deed, he indeed confesses the grave striking of his sister, but keeps silent about the circumstance of her pregnancy and of the death of the fetus, lest he reveal her crime to the confessor by whom both he himself and the whole family are perfectly known.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. "The matter is not without difficulty. On the one hand, it does not appear that he can declare his sin in species without manifesting the aforesaid circumstances. Yet according to several he would be able to confess each sin separately, namely the grave striking of his sister, and the procured abortion of a woman. Nor say that thus he would omit the specific circumstance of consanguinity as to the fetus killed; for, probably, the ill-treatment of relatives does not induce a new species of sin, unless there is question of blood relatives in the direct line in the first and second degree, as was said above n. 457. Moreover the infant killed is in the third degree of consanguinity of the collateral line, and therefore toward him the virtue of piety is not specifically wounded. Lugo d. 16, n. 258 seqq.; Salmant., etc. Therefore, if instead of his sister Aegidius had struck his widowed mother, made pregnant through crime, he could not extricate himself from the difficulty, and he would have to declare all the circumstances." Thus Fr. Gury 465.

Moreover, it must be noted here that, as the same Fr. Gury has at 462, 463, Aegidius indeed could accuse the sin, although it could not be declared without the infamy of his sister, who was the occasion and object of the sin. I. M. 720. Besides, what is said, that ill-treatment of relatives does not induce a new species of sin unless there is question of blood relatives of the direct line in the first and second degree, is not true. For even ill-treatment of relatives in a nearer degree of the collateral line induces a specific malice against piety, as the same Fr. Gury has in the place cited by himself, namely n. 457. For in this number 457 the doctrine of n. 456 is continued. There, speaking about imprecations, hatred, and the desire of revenge, he says: "Those grave injuries are to be declared in confession, at least when there is question of nearer kinship, because there is an altogether special defect of piety, since it is opposed to the reciprocal love which those proximately joined owe to one another. Hence the aforesaid injuries must be declared: 1.º as to parents and children, indeed as to grandparents and grandchildren, in the direct line; 2.º as to affines in the first degree of the quasi-direct line; 3.º likewise as to godparents and godchildren, or spiritual fathers and children, because there is present there quasi-paternity and quasi-filiation; 4.º as to spouses, because, since they are one flesh, they ought to be one heart and one soul; 5.º as to brothers or affines in the first degree of the collateral line, because they are united by an altogether special conjunction... Grave injuries also among other blood relatives and affines more probably do not contract a special malice, although they are found in degrees prohibited for marriage. The reason is that, since the conjunction is more remote, such great love is not owed to them beyond other outsiders, that injuries inflicted on them should constitute a different species of malice."

Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Ch. II, Art. II, § I, Point I. On the Necessity of Integrity in General · Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Ch. II, Art. II, § II, Point I. On Causes Excusing from Integrity in General

Besides, it is altogether an error that it is asserted that the infant killed, or the son of the sister, is in the third degree of consanguinity of the collateral line. The son of a sister, or nephew, in relation to his maternal uncle, is consanguineous with him in the second degree of the collateral line. And thus Fr. Gury himself in the Compendium n. 801 sets down this example: "Bertha will be consanguineous in the second degree with her paternal uncle, or the brother of her father, because she is distant by two degrees from the common stock, namely from her grandfather, although the paternal uncle himself is separated by one degree from the same stock, since he is the son of the stock, or the brother of Bertha's father." Moreover what is said of the paternal uncle holds of the maternal uncle; for the paternal uncle is a collateral on the father's side, and the maternal uncle is a collateral on the mother's side, the same degree remaining, because the paternal uncle is the brother of the father, and the maternal uncle is the brother of the mother.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 36 passages

Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Ch. II, Art. II, § I, Point I. On the Necessity of Integrity in General

n. 470.

II. Material integrity is not always necessary for the validity and fruit of confession; for sometimes it is morally impossible, whether from inculpable forgetfulness or from other causes; but God does not command impossibilities. Therefore, etc. This is evident also from the Council of Trent, loc. cit., in these words: But the remaining sins which do not occur to one thinking diligently are understood to be included universally in the same confession; for these we faithfully say with the Prophet: FROM MY HIDDEN SINS CLEANSE ME.

n. 470.

III. For the integrity of confession, a diligent examination, according to the capacity of the penitent, is prerequired concerning sins committed since the last valid confession; for he who is bound to the end is also bound to the necessary means. - See the Appendix on the examination of conscience, below, no. 507.

Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Ch. II, Art. II, § II, Point I. On Causes Excusing from Integrity in General

Principles. - I. Causes are sometimes given which excuse from the material integrity of confession, because sometimes that integrity is physically or morally impossible.

II. In order that someone may be judged excused from the material integrity of confession by reason of moral inability, although the sins occur to his mind, these conditions must be observed: 1. that only those sins be omitted which cannot be declared, or from the manifestation of which would follow a most grave extrinsic inconvenience, whether spiritual or temporal, to the penitent, the Confessor, or some third person; 2. that another Confessor cannot be found to whom an integral confession may be made without such inconvenience; 3. that confession be necessary here and now ¹. - St. Lig., no. 487.

¹ From the common opinion of the Doctors, this necessity is judged to be present: 1. if the precept of annual confession or Communion must be fulfilled; 2. if reception of the Eucharist or celebration of Mass cannot be omitted without reproach or scandal; 3. if otherwise someone must long be deprived of the benefit of the sacraments; 4. indeed, as Suarez adds (De Poenit., disp. 23, sect. 2, no. 7), if otherwise someone would be deprived of the great utility which the sacrament of itself brings.

III. A difficulty intrinsic to confession itself never excuses, however grave it may be. The reason is that confession by its nature is essentially laborious, and therefore, if a grave difficulty, for example, great repugnance or shame or the loss of one's own reputation before the Confessor, excused from integrity, the faithful would generally be excused from accusing mortal sins, and consequently the institution of the Sacrament of Penance would in great part collapse. Moreover, the Church could not reserve atrocious crimes, because that creates no slight inconvenience for penitents.

IV. When the cause excusing from material integrity ceases, the divine precept of confessing all omitted mortal sins again urges; for when an impediment occurs, the obligation of confession does not cease simply, but is only suspended. Therefore, when the excusing cause ceases, the obligation of the law fully revives; and since the precept of confession is not affixed to a time or circumstance but concerns the whole of life, sins not yet accused must afterward, if it can be done, necessarily be accused. This is established moreover from Proposition 11 condemned by Alexander VII, which is as follows: We are not bound in the following confession to express sins omitted or forgotten in confession because of an imminent danger of death or because of another cause.

Resolutions. - The following chiefly excuse from the material integrity of confession:

Extreme sickness, that is, when a dying person can express only one or another sin, or, already deprived of the use of speech, shows penitence by some sign only and asks for absolution.

A defect of speech; thus the mute are exempted from integrity when they cannot confess integrally either in writing ² or by signs; likewise travelers wholly or almost wholly ignorant of the language of the region in which they confess.

² The Author himself (below, no. 503, q. 7), with most of the Doctors, denies that there is ever an obligation of confessing in writing.

A lack of time, for example, if soldiers must proceed immediately to battle. The mere multitude of penitents does not excuse, however, as was said above.

Danger to the life of the penitent, the Confessor, or a third person; for example, if enemies arrive, or if many are in danger of shipwreck or contagion. Indeed, sometimes, in the extreme danger of many, all can be absolved by one pronouncement of the form, I absolve you, etc., after some general sign of contrition and confession has been exhibited.

Danger to reputation, for example, if a Priest about to celebrate at once, and needing a general confession, could not confess integrally because those present would suspect the matter.

Danger of revelation or violation of the seal; for example, if a Confessor cannot confess integrally without revealing sins heard in confession, etc.; or if a penitent for a grave cause fears that the Confessor may violate the law of the seal. But this latter case, if indeed it should ever be said to occur, is exceedingly rare.

Danger of scandal or a fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the Confessor; for example, if a woman knew with certainty the very great frailty of the Confessor, etc. - St. Lig., no. 479 and following.

n. 499.

Questions. - QUESTION 1. Is there an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which cannot be explained without disclosing the accomplice?

n. 499.

Reply. More probably, affirmative, with the more common opinion. The reason is: 1. because no legitimate excuse is given by which the precept of integrity may be derogated from; for it cannot be said that the positive precept is restricted by the natural precept of not defaming one's neighbor, since the precept of charity ³ prohibits only that the crime of another be manifested without cause; but here there is a cause, and indeed a grave one, namely, procuring the integrity of confession and the direction of conscience; 2. the accomplice, by committing the sin, loses every right to reputation which he could have before the Confessor in relation to the confession of this sin, and he himself implicitly and freely consents to this injury to his reputation when he sins ⁴. - St. Lig., no. 489, with many others.

³ The obligation that the reputation of another not be injured through the revelation of a hidden crime seems to be derived from the virtue of justice rather than charity.

⁴ Cardinal De Lugo, after showing (De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 395) that the reason for this opinion, namely, that to be defamed before one Confessor is not a grave harm, is less firm - which, he says, supposes another false opinion which I attacked in the Treatise on Justice and Right - judges the same concerning this very thing and the reasons adduced by the Author (ibid., no. 397). Others, he says, prove it because the penitent uses his own right in confessing his own sin, and the accomplice exposed himself to this danger of disclosure, since he knew the obligation which everyone has of confessing his sin integrally. But all these and similar things contain a begging of the question and suppose what is to be proved. For the question concerns this very thing, whether the penitent has a right to defame the accomplice, and consequently whether, in doing so, he uses his own right. Hence it is falsely supposed that the accomplice exposed himself to this harm. For if the penitent does not have the right, or if this is not proved from elsewhere, he did not expose himself to any such danger.

Nor does the argument which Lugo, after rejecting the foregoing, endeavored to make sufficient (loc. cit., no. 398) seem any firmer, namely, that since the good of an integral confession is of such a kind and so great that on account of it Christ obliges the penitent to manifest his own crimes and to undergo infamy, it follows that for the sake of that same good He permitted the manifestation of another's crime. For the case of one's own reputation and that of another's reputation is so disparate that, according to the opinion of all and therefore even according to his opinion, I am bound, if I can, to seek another Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, but I am by no means bound to seek a Confessor to whom I myself am unknown.

There is added the fact that the weight of extrinsic Authority, considering both the number and the eminent name of the Doctors (see the same Lugo, loc. cit., no. 393), appears no lighter in favor of the opposite opinion, which expressly denies the obligation of an integral confession from which the accomplice would be disclosed. Therefore, a sufficient reason by which someone may be compelled to confess a circumstance of this kind seems wholly lacking.

But although equal probability may seem to favor each of these two opinions, the case of each is nevertheless not equal. For the mere probability of the opinion which exacts integrity even with the disclosure of the accomplice is, by the general canon, unequal to inducing a certain obligation. But no reason other than this very obligation is present which could excuse from preserving the accomplice's reputation. Therefore, other inconveniences being excluded, the integral obligation of keeping that circumstance silent seems to remain whenever infamy to another would follow from its confession.

I said, other inconveniences being excluded; for, as the Author also intimates, if the penitent for a special cause needs direction and the counsel of a Confessor, because, for example, he has in the accomplice a proximate occasion of sinning, but no other Confessor is present either to whom the person of the accomplice is unknown or who, because the circumstances of the penitent are unknown to him, is qualified to furnish suitable counsels, he certainly will not be bound to undergo some grave danger to his own soul in order to protect the reputation of another. Nevertheless, it will certainly rarely happen that direction of this kind is so necessary and so urgent that no delay can be interposed while counsel is sought.

n. 499.

Nevertheless, not a few others probably deny it, teaching that another Confessor who does not know the accomplice is to be sought ⁵; and if one cannot be had, the circumstance from which the accomplice would be discovered can, indeed must, be omitted until another Confessor is found. - Thus Busembaum, Diana, Navarre, Mazzotta, Medina, Elbel, etc.

⁵ The obligation of seeking another Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, when this can conveniently be done, is maintained most commonly even by those Doctors whose opinion the Author reports in the first place; and only a few have affirmed that this is merely a counsel, whose opinion is rejected by all, as may be seen in St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 489) and Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 392). Therefore, the controversy among the Doctors does not concern whether it is lawful to confess a sin with injury to the reputation of the accomplice when this inconvenience can easily be avoided by employing another Confessor, but rather whether, when another Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown is lacking, the circumstance which would disclose the accomplice is to be passed over in silence, as is evident from what was said in the preceding note.

n. 500.

- QUESTION 2. What causes excuse from seeking another Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, as the patrons of the second opinion require ⁶?

⁶ According to the mind of the Doctors, as we said in the preceding notes, the question ought rather to be proposed thus: What causes excuse from seeking a Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, according, namely, to those who deny that the circumstance of the accomplice can ever be kept silent? For this is the difference between the two opinions: although each obliges the penitent, for preserving the reputation of the accomplice, to seek a Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, nevertheless, if such a Confessor is lacking, some say that the circumstance by which the reputation of the neighbor would be injured must be kept silent, while others contend that it must be expressed so that the integrity of confession may be preserved. These latter are the ones who judge that, because of the causes here mentioned by the Author, the reputation of the accomplice can be set aside; for the others admit those same causes as sufficient, not indeed that the crime of the neighbor may lawfully be revealed, but insofar as in those circumstances it is lawful to approach the Sacrament of Penance even without the integrity of confession being preserved, namely, reserving the circumstance of the accomplice for a confession in which there is no danger of injuring the reputation of another. - See St. Alph., no. 490.

n. 500.

Reply. 1. If danger of death or the precept of annual confession urges; 2. if it would be grave for the penitent to omit confession or Communion; 3. if someone would disclose his conscience to another Confessor only with difficulty; 4. if someone otherwise would have to remain in sin even for one day; 5. if someone otherwise would be deprived of the benefit of some extraordinary indulgence; 6. if by approaching a Confessor to whom the accomplice is known, better direction or notably greater consolation would be obtained.

n. 500.

Hence, by reason of seeking counsel, alleviating sorrow, etc., mothers and wives who manifest to a Confessor the sins of their sons or husbands ⁷ are often excused, even though he knows them. For it would be too hard that they should be bound to seek another Confessor. Therefore, in general there is not held to be a grave obligation of approaching another Confessor for the sake of concealing the accomplice, unless perhaps there is question of a very grave crime. - St. Lig., no. 490, etc.

⁷ The present question is by no means customarily raised concerning causes of this kind, which are judged of the lightest moment. For these things generally occur in families and, besides, are not usually secret. Suppose rather a wife who must confess adultery committed with her husband's brother, and one indeed initiated into holy orders.

n. 501.

- QUESTION 3. Is it lawful for the Confessor himself to ask the name of the accomplice, for example, for correction, etc.?

n. 501.

Reply. Negative, at least generally speaking, because this both induces one to detract from one's neighbor without a just cause ⁸ and renders the Sacrament of Penance odious. This is established from the Bull Ubi primum of Benedict XIV, in which the Pontiff, speaking of Confessors who demand the name of the accomplice under the penalty of denying absolution, declares that they sin gravely and incur suspension from hearing confessions, but only ferendae sententiae ⁹.

⁸ If, according to the common opinion of the Doctors, a penitent is bound to seek another Confessor lest he betray the accomplice in the sin, indeed, according to the judgment of several, is excused for this reason from confessing a circumstance otherwise necessarily to be expressed, it is plainly evident that it is much less lawful for Confessors spontaneously to ask the penitent for the name of the accomplice.

⁹ Four Constitutions of Benedict XIV exist concerning this matter. The first was given on July 7, 1745, to the Bishops of the Portuguese dominion, in which he designates and condemns the practice of asking the name of the accomplice. It begins: Suprema omnium Ecclesiarum sollicitudo. - The second was given on June 2, 1746; in it he confirms the former, establishes penalties against delinquents, and determines the order of proceeding in cases of this kind. It begins: Ubi primum. - The third was given on September 28 of the same year, 1746; in this he extends to the whole Church, or rather declares to be extended and in force, those things which he had decreed for the Portuguese dominion. It begins: Ad eradicandum pravum zizanii semen. - The fourth, finally, was given on December 9, 1749, in which he adds certain things to the second concerning the manner of proceeding in cases of this kind.

The condemned practice is designated thus in the first Constitution: It has come... to our ears that certain... confessors, allowing themselves to be seduced by a false appearance of zeal, but straying far from zeal according to knowledge, have begun to maintain and introduce a certain perverse and pernicious practice in hearing... confessions...; namely, that if perhaps they should encounter penitents having a companion in crime, they would indiscriminately ask those penitents for the name of such a companion or accomplice; and they would not merely endeavor by persuasion to induce them to reveal it to them, but, what is more detestable, having also announced the denial of sacramental absolution unless they revealed it, they would utterly force and compel them; indeed, they would also demand that not only the name of that same accomplice, but in addition the place of residence, be designated to them. They did not hesitate both to color this intolerable imprudence with the specious pretext of procuring the correction of the accomplice and gathering other goods, and to defend it by certain borrowed opinions of the Doctors; although in reality, by following false and erroneous opinions of this kind, OR BY APPLYING TRUE AND SOUND ONES BADLY, they were bringing ruin upon their own souls and those of their penitents, and furthermore were rendering themselves guilty before God... of several grave harms which they ought to have foreseen would easily follow therefrom. And indeed, it is known by unhappy experience that many harms of this kind have already followed; nor could it happen otherwise than that on this account disparaging talk and scandals, and hatred not only of the Ministers but even of the sacred Ministry itself, and an immense disturbance of minds among the faithful people, should arise.

But the penalties according to the Constitution Ubi primum are: 1. the penalty of excommunication incurred by the fact itself and reserved to the Roman Pontiff against anyone who in the future should dare to teach that a practice of this kind, as it is set forth and reproved in the related Brief, is lawful, or should presume to write or speak in defense of the same condemned practice, or rashly to attack or twist into other meanings or interpret those things which are decreed against the same practice in the said Brief. - 2. But against those who, in conformity with the aforesaid reprobated practice, should presume to question penitents who confess to them in the tribunal of penance some sin or crime in which they had a companion or companions, concerning the name of the companion or accomplice, the place of residence, or other adjuncts or circumstances of this kind concerning a more express and more individual disclosure of the same accomplice, denying sacramental absolution to that penitent if he refused to disclose it, it is decreed that, beyond the incurring of mortal sin, they are to be subjected to suspension from the office of hearing confessions and also to other graver penalties; these, as is evident, are ferendae sententiae. But these penalties remain in their force even after the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, in which the excommunication imposed by Benedict XIV is confirmed.

Since, however, in the same Constitution this case is committed to the tribunal of the Holy Office, these things are added concerning the obligation of denouncing delinquents: But whoever shall have known that any other person has transgressed in any of the aforesaid ways shall be bound to denounce him to the same Holy Office within the term of days customarily fixed in the Edicts of the Holy Office for an inquisition of this kind (in the edict a month is fixed); otherwise they shall incur the penalties customarily inflicted by the same edicts upon those who do not denounce (this penalty was a reserved excommunication, now removed by the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis).

Nevertheless, the penitent who is involved in the case is exempted from this obligation of denouncing in the following manner: Nevertheless, for just causes, we will and do exempt from an obligation of this kind to denounce the very person of the penitent alone in his own case, that is, in the case in which, while confessing his own sin, he is compelled by the Confessor to manifest to him the name of the accomplice in the same sin....

But the case is then said to pertain to the tribunal of the Holy Office only when an evil persuasion concerning the condemned doctrine is added; for otherwise it will pertain to the Ordinary. But if, he says, it should happen that the act of a confessor wrongly asking the name of the accomplice and denying absolution unless it be disclosed to him is of such a kind that, although imprudent and evil, it was nevertheless a simple and bare act, that is, destitute of those circumstances which render him suspect of an evil belief or of an evil adherence to the practice... reproved in the said Brief as lawful, then a delict of this kind... shall not be subject to the cognizance... of the Holy Office; but to take cognizance of it and to punish the delinquent confessor by suspension from hearing confessions or by other canonical and legitimate penalties according to the character of the delict shall pertain wholly to the Ordinaries of the places in their respective Dioceses.

Finally, since in the second Constitution it was prescribed that a denunciation was to be made to the tribunal of the Holy Office only when there was an underlying suspicion of evil doctrine, in the fourth Constitution it is defined that this is always to be observed, whether the priest is thought to have transgressed because of adherence to the reprobated practice or suspicion of an erroneous opinion, or merely through imprudence without the aforesaid circumstances; namely, that in the tribunal of the Holy Office itself an examination concerning the pertinence of the case should be made and sentence passed, whether the case is to be left to the Holy Office or the accused is to be judged by the Bishop.

Moreover, concerning this fourth Constitution a doubt troubled some, namely, whether it was issued for the dominion of Portugal alone, or also for other places. For: 1. the Synopsis of the Bull has thus: To the Holy Inquisition in the kingdoms of Portugal and the Algarves is adjudged cognizance of the pertinence of cases against Confessors, etc. And in fact it treats there only (see secs. 1, 2) of controversies stirred up in Portugal and of the Bishops of that region, so that the Pontiff seems to have wished entirely to provide for them. - 2. In the Constitution itself mention is indeed made of two Constitutions which had been issued for those kingdoms; but no mention is made of the third, by which it was declared that the condemnation both of the evil practice and of the doctrine pertained to the whole Church. - 3. Since in the third there is prescribed that manner of promulgation which is proper to Decrees pertaining to all provinces, namely, that copies be affixed publicly at Rome to the doors of the Basilicas, etc., in this fourth, as also in the first and second, there is no mention of this promulgation. - But on the other side the reason for issuing the Constitution seems to make against this, and it appears to have force also for other places. For it is of this kind (sec. 6): Since the same delict was established to be referred in certain circumstances to the tribunal of the Holy Office, but in others to the Ordinary, certain persons zealous for ecclesiastical peace suggested that in the execution of a method of this kind an approach to new disturbances would be opened, because there would be no one who could pronounce judgment in a case of disagreement; whence it came about that, the fear of a denunciation to be made to the same Office of the Inquisition having been removed in some circumstances, that could certainly be said to have been taken away which especially restrained men from so pernicious a... delict.

- QUESTION 4. Is it so forbidden by the aforesaid letters of Benedict XIV to ask the name of the accomplice that in no case is this lawful?

Reply. Negative. 1. Because Benedict XIV himself supposes cases in which this is lawful according to true, as he says, and sound opinions; 2. because sometimes the penitent must necessarily reveal the accomplice, and yet can accomplish this only through the Confessor. - See Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 17, nos. 427-432 ¹⁰.

¹⁰ To the true and sound opinions which Benedict XIV affirms certain men were accustomed to abuse in the Constitution Suprema pertains that which Cardinal De Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 432) establishes thus: The Confessor can see that, from concealment of the accomplice, most grave harms are imminent, which the penitent is altogether bound to prevent; again he sees that the penitent cannot accomplish this by himself immediately, nor has another through whom he can do it, other than

the Confessor himself; in which case it is certain that the penitent is bound to choose that sole means; but if he is unwilling, he is no longer fit to receive absolution. See in the same Lugo (ibid., no. 433) the example of a Regular Prelate who can sometimes for this reason oblige a subject to reveal an accomplice.

St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 491), from the opinion of Fr. Philip de Carboneano (in the note or appendix to Antoine, De Poenit., ch. 1, art. 2, q. 6), adds that Confessors certainly can and are bound, for preserving the integrity of confession, to inquire into necessary circumstances, namely, those which either change the species or must be inquired into so that provision may be made for the penitent's conscience; for example, if the Confessor asks whether the person of the accomplice is in the first or second degree, whether bound by a vow, whether she is a maidservant, whether she lives in the same house, even though he thereby comes to know the accomplice. These things can certainly be admitted insofar as something must necessarily be known so that provision may be made for the salvation of the penitent; although even in this it seems necessary to take care lest inquiry descend further than is necessary into particular adjuncts, for example, whether she is a maidservant. But as regards knowing the species of the sin - to omit for the moment that the degree of relationship in incest more probably does not change the species, while the circumstance of a vow is too unusual to require inquiry, especially since, if present, it is usually disclosed spontaneously - it is useful to remember the obligation by which, according to all, a penitent is bound to seek another Confessor lest he betray his accomplice in sin, and that for the same reason, according to the opinion of the gravest Doctors (see the notes above at nos. 495 and 500), those circumstances can lawfully be kept silent at that time. Therefore, if the questions, as is supposed in the case, would easily lead to betraying the accomplice, it can hardly be admitted that the Confessor must, or even can, employ them.

QUESTION 5. Is there an obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be declared without defaming another who was the occasion of the sin, for example, if someone killed his sister who was pregnant through a crime?

Reply. It is controverted, as in the nearly similar case discussed above in the first question. Lugo with others affirms it. Suarez with several others denies it. Therefore, equal probability stands on each side ¹¹.

¹¹ If it is probable that a circumstance of this kind can be kept silent, we have already said (above, in the note at no. 500) that the right of another to preserve his reputation prevails.

- QUESTION 6. Are those who are both deaf and mute bound to confess, and if so, how?

Reply. The mute and deaf are bound to confess in some manner, at least by signs, unless they are so ignorant and dull that nothing can be elicited from them. The reason is that the precept of confession regards all the faithful who can manifest their sins in some manner.

Hence: 1. Mute persons sufficiently instructed are bound to confess integrally, at least by signs, if these are understood by the Confessor; but if they are less instructed or can be understood by the Confessor only with difficulty, it will suffice for them to manifest only one or another sin, or to signify in general that they are sinners and wish to avoid sin.

Deaf persons who have the use of speech are bound on their part to confess the sins which occur to their memory; but the Confessor is not bound to question them in order to procure the integrity of confession, because of the excessive difficulty of questioning ¹². in doubt greater provision must always be made for the sacramental seal than for integrity; and therefore the Confessor should ask neither about the number nor about circumstances, etc., and in imposing satisfaction should enjoin something light, lest a suspicion of grave fault be introduced. Nor perhaps is it expedient to summon women at untimely hours, when no one else is in the church, both because an accidental danger of revelation is not absent and because it is altogether better to provide for propriety.

¹² Add also the danger of revelation. The same must also be said concerning the hard of hearing; if their confession must be heard in a church, as is generally necessary with women,

QUESTION 7. Are mute persons who know how to write bound to confess in writing in order to procure the integrity of confession?

Reply. The more common opinion denies it, both because of the danger of revelation, because writing is an extraordinary means which has never been regarded in the Church as prescribed, and also because, as Diana says, such a manner of confession is of itself public, since writing is of itself public. - Diana, tom. 4, tract 3, resol. 72, no. 2 ¹³. It can nevertheless be permitted; but care must be taken that the writing is immediately destroyed.

¹³ ** The VV. lament (p. 936, no. 115, with the Note) that Gury has, The more common opinion denies it, etc., when St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 479) wrote to the contrary: The more common opinion affirms it.

Reply 1. First it would have to be examined whether certain Authors are rightly alleged for one opinion or the other. Thus, for example, for the affirmative you may see Toletus cited, who nevertheless writes in express words (bk. 3, ch. 6, no. 5): Fourth, it can be made in writing, so that the penitent writes and the Confessor reads, which could occur in the case of a mute person or another impeded person; and it is a true confession, although the penitent is not bound to this, because it is of itself public. For that which is committed to writing is of itself permanent. In the same way, certain Authors can be seen cited by some for the affirmative and by others for the negative.

2. Since a sufficiently long series of Authors can easily be brought forward for each opinion, it is not surprising that some have called the affirmative opinion more common, while others called the negative more common, according as these Authors rather than those came before their eyes.

3. But what is most important: since those who hold the affirmative opinion defend it only as more probable, and generally do not deny the probability of the opposite, as regards practice, namely, imposing an obligation of confession through writing, it is scarcely, or not even scarcely, lawful to attribute any weight to the affirmative opinion.

4. This ought to have all the more force if you consider what the Authors who hold the affirmative suggest so that it may be done rightly. Suarez, for example, after saying (De Poenit., disp. 36, sect. 6, no. 7) that this opinion seemed more probable to him, adds these ways of carrying it out: Cajetan employs the method that the penitent can write all the species of sins on one sheet and the various numbers on another, and afterward in confession indicate by a sign the sin and the number. Peter Soto employs another, that he not write beforehand, but in the presence of the Priest, and immediately tear it up. For what Dominic Soto says, that the priest could snatch the paper from his hands and publish it, is of no moment; for he could also disclose a confession made by voice, etc. This observation of Suarez perhaps will not be approved by all; for it is one thing that the priest can reveal something in words, and another that by producing the writing of the penitent he can prove the things said. Moreover, who could affirm that obligations of this kind, and merely probable ones indeed, can be imposed?

The VV. add (loc. cit.) that a most valid reason stands for the affirmative. - Reply. Others will rightly doubt concerning this most valid reason, which the VV. leave unstated. For it is established by fact that no one until now has perceived such a reason which settles the controversy. The reason commonly brought forward is that he who is bound to the end is bound to the means. But, they say, for many writing remains the sole means of fulfilling the precept. Therefore. But, omitting now the common reply, namely, that no one is bound to extraordinary means of this kind, an answer ad hominem may be given. Why, I ask, do they not oblige a man of failing memory to use writing, lest he fulfill the precept of confession only by halves? Why does this not hold here also: he who is bound to the end is bound also to the means?

- QUESTION 8. Are those ignorant of the language of the place in which they wish to confess bound to confess, and if so, how?

Reply. Those ignorant of the language of the place in which they are staying, and lacking a Confessor by whom they can be understood, are bound, when the precept of annual confession urges and at the point of death, to confess in some manner, at least by general signs. The reason is that the divine and ecclesiastical precept urges. For although they cannot confess materially and integrally, they are nevertheless bound to that which they can do. - St. Lig., no. 479, etc.

QUESTION 9. Are those ignorant of the language bound to confess through an interpreter if they can?

Reply. Negative, because to confess through an interpreter is a most grave burden and exposed to many dangers, for example, revelation, mockery, etc. Except if, in danger of death, a penitent ignorant of the language doubts concerning perfect contrition, because in that case confession would be a means altogether necessary for salvation ¹⁴. - St. Lig., ibid.

¹⁴ It was not St. Alphonsus, but Busembaum, who had written that no one is bound to confess through an interpreter, unless perhaps in danger of death, in which it suffices to confess some lesser sins. To this St. Alphonsus adds (no. 479): But even at the time of death it is probable that he is not bound. He then adds from Viva: Unless the sick man is doubtful concerning contrition, as Viva, q. 4, art. 3, no. 10. It nevertheless suffices then to state one venial sin, Salmanticenses... and Viva. But this exception of Viva pertains to the now antiquated opinion which holds the validity of the sacrament doubtful even at the point of death unless some specific sin is subjected to the keys; especially since the necessity of an interpreter seems altogether excluded by those words of the Lateran Council (ch. Omnis utriusque, 12, De Poenit. et Remiss.): Let him alone confess his sins..., etc.; likewise by the words of the Council of Trent (sess. 14, ch. 5) concerning the manner of confessing secretly to the Priest alone; to which is added the Response of the Sacred Congregation of February 28, 1633 (in Scavini, tract 10, disp. 1, ch. 2, art. 2), declaring that a penitent who does not wish to use an interpreter can and must be absolved. And indeed, immediately afterward the Author establishes from the common opinion that all things required for the sacrament and for formally integral Confession are present even if the penitent asks for absolution only by some sign.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 17 passages

Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Moral Part — Chapter I: On the Duties of the Penitent

n. 295.

§ III. On the Causes Excusing from Material Integrity

General principle: Physical or moral impotence excuses from the material integrity of confession as long as it perseveres. It is certain.

² Suarez, disp. XXIII; Lugo, disp. XVII; Salmantic., cap. 8, n. 115-137; Lacroix, n. 1140-1164; Billuart, diss. VII, a. 2, § 1-2; Kenrick, n. 61; Marc, n. 1697-1702; Muller, § 122; Konings, n. 1367-1369; Sabetti, n. 750-751; Scavini, n. 306-307; Lehmkuhl, n. 327-340; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 349-449; Haine, q. 47-52; Genicot, n. 292-297; Noldin, n. 271-276.

It is proved. For the law concerning the integrity of confession is indeed divine, but positive; but a positive law, even a divine one, does not oblige to that which is impossible or even very difficult, according to that saying: no one is held to the impossible.

It is explained. But impossibility, whether physical or moral, must be true, and indeed not only with respect to one, but also with respect to any confessor who without grave inconvenience can be approached. - Besides, no inconvenience intrinsically annexed to confession excuses from material integrity; such is, for example, even the greatest shame, fear of rebuke, loss of reputation with the confessor, etc. For Christ, in instituting confession, willed to impose upon the penitent all those inconveniences which are intrinsic to confession and necessarily connected with it. Whence only those great inconveniences excuse from integrity which are extrinsic to confession itself, and are not necessarily connected with it.

n. 296.

This impotence excuses only as long as it perseveres, so that, when the impotence ceases, the obligation of declaring the sins in the next confession is now in force. For sins omitted on account of a legitimate cause are indeed remitted indirectly, but not directly; but every sin not yet directly remitted must be subjected to the power of the keys. - Hence proposition 11 was condemned by Alexander VII (September 24, 1665): "Sins omitted or forgotten in confession, on account of instant danger of life, or on account of another cause, we are not bound to express in the following confession."¹ Therefore penitents who cannot make an integral confession are to be admonished concerning this obligation.

¹ Apud Denzing., n. 982. - Cf. Viva, Damnat. Theses, on this proposition; Vacant, Dict. de Theol., t. I, col. 736.

But this obligation does not press immediately, but only at the time of the next confession, unless perhaps the excusing cause still perseveres; but when it has ceased, sacrilege would be committed if a sin not yet directly remitted were knowingly and willingly kept silent.

Since the cause excusing from material integrity is twofold, namely impotence both physical and moral, each must be spoken of separately.

n. 297.

1° From lack of strength or time, namely (a) if a sick person fails after confession has been begun, or is in danger of failing before the confession is finished, or a fortiori if he is already destitute of his senses; (b) if the priest himself will probably die before he is able to hear the whole confession; (c) when shipwreck, fire, or battle is imminent, so that all upon whom death threatens cannot be heard. In this case a brief confession of some less infamous sin can suffice, or even the mere request for absolution with contrition manifested by some sensible sign, for example, by raising the hands or striking the breast; then all can be absolved at the same time by a general formula: I absolve you from all your censures and your sins. - Yet if soldiers could be heard individually, for example, on the day or night before battle, that would certainly be better, even if they could not confess all sins, because they could prepare themselves better for absolution.

For the rest, in all the aforesaid cases, more care must be taken to excite contrition, which is altogether essential, than for material integrity, which in these circumstances is not absolutely required.

But a great concourse of penitents on some more solemn feast day by no means excuses; for if this reason were admitted, many would approach the sacred tribunal by design at a time of great concourse, and there would be danger of absolving the unworthy; besides, penitents whose confession cannot be heard can be deferred to another day.

For practice, in regions where there is a great concourse of penitents either every Saturday or on the eve of Feasts, as often happens in the great cities of the United States, it is most expedient that confessors choose other days for hearing the confessions of the pious.¹

¹ Therefore rightly the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 291: "We earnestly exhort and beseech pastors of souls that they be ready at the confessionals to hear penitents every Saturday, and on the vigils of Feasts, at least in the evening time, and on Sundays and feast days in the morning before first Mass. For at these hours penitents will not be lacking, provided the confessor himself is not lacking to his office. But if the number of the faithful is greater than that all who approach can be heard in one day, let him also choose other times, other days, which he may devote to this so necessary work. For it would be a most grave crime if by the negligence or idleness of the pastor even one from the flock of the faithful were defrauded of this sacrament. Nor will those who once and again have found that this ministry is unwelcome and troublesome to the priest easily bring their soul to return to confess."

n. 298.

2° From defect of knowledge, namely (a) when someone, after a serious examination has been made, does not remember some mortal sin, from forgetfulness, from inadvertence not gravely culpable, which does not arise from negligence, or from infirmity of nature. Nor is he who is endowed with a weak memory bound to write his sins so that he may accuse them more diligently: for this is an extraordinary means to which no one is obliged; (b) if someone, from ignorance not gravely culpable, thinks that a mortal sin which he committed is either venial, or is not here and now to be accused; but when ignorance of this kind ceases, the precept of declaring it now presses.

n. 299.

3° From defect of speech, if namely someone is mute, or ignorant of the language of the region in which he lives: - (a) if someone is mute and not sufficiently instructed so that he can confess integrally by signs, he is bound to manifest his sins by nods, insofar as can be done; indeed, according to many,¹ he must write them. Yet this obligation of manifesting sins in writing is not to be urged; for it is denied with probability by others,² because it seems to be an extraordinary means, and not sufficiently consistent with the secrecy of confession. Hence if the confession is written, let the confessor take care that the writing be destroyed at once, lest perhaps it come into the hands of others. - For the same reason the confessor generally will rightly abstain from making questions in writing, unless however the mute person himself asks this, for the sake of greater consolation and utility.

¹ Thus Lugo, disp. XV, n. 87; St. Alphonsus, n. 479; Lacroix, n. 1194.

² Thus Toletus, lib. V, ch. 6, n. 3; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 391; Lehmkuhl, n. 328.

n. 300.

(b) If someone is ignorant of the confessor's language, and cannot approach another confessor by whom he may be understood, let him confess his sins in the best way that can be done, by words or signs. It is indeed permitted, but not necessary, to use an interpreter, on account of the danger of revelation; and if no sin can be manifested in species, for absolution it suffices to manifest sin in general, as is clear from the response of the Holy Office, February 28, 1633.³

³ "Whether in distant regions a Catholic, unconfessed for many years, asking absolution only by signs, on account of defect of language, can be absolved without the help of an interpreter? - R. There is no need of an interpreter in the proposed case, just as also absolution of sins can and must be imparted to one exhibiting the signs which he can... provided they suffice for expressing some sin in species. But in the case in which someone tries as much as he can to exhibit signs of sins in species, but they cannot be understood at all, he can be absolved by the sole manifestation of sins in general." Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, apud Bucceroni, Enchiridion, n. 504. You will find another decree of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide apud Collectanea, n. 951.

Yet, in the article of death, it is safer to declare at least one venial sin through an interpreter, if the penitent doubts concerning his perfect contrition: indeed St. Alphonsus (n. 479) thinks that this is prescribed by charity toward oneself, which demands that safer means be employed if they are probably necessary for salvation: yet this is rejected by many, as resting upon an antiquated opinion which regarded the value of the sacrament as doubtful, even in danger of death, when no special sin is subjected to the keys. Whence, in practice, a practice of this kind is indeed to be counseled, but not urged.

For the rest, if confession is made through an interpreter, he should be admonished concerning the obligation of preserving secrecy; and, so that the interpreter himself may not know the sins of the penitent, one can proceed thus: let the interpreter turn his face away from the penitent, and recite to him in his own language the general questions proposed by the confessor concerning the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church; meanwhile let the penitent at each question signify to the confessor by a conventional sign, for example, by compression of the fingers, whether he has sinned or not, and how often, insofar as can be done.¹

¹ Cf. Haine, q. 49.

n. 301.

II. On Moral Impotence

Notion and conditions. This is present as often as integral confession cannot be made without grave spiritual or temporal harm extrinsic to confession itself. Concerning this, however, these things must be noted:

(a) The danger of such harm is not easily to be imagined, but must rest upon a solid foundation. (b) When such danger exists, the penitent is bound to seek another confessor to whom he can confess integrally without harm; this, at least in cities, is generally altogether easy. (c) If confession can conveniently be deferred, with hope of making it integral without grave harm, the penitent is bound to defer it; but there is sufficient reason for not deferring it if the precept of annual confession presses, or the moral necessity of communicating or celebrating, or if otherwise the penitent would be compelled to remain for a long time (beyond three days, according to some; for one day, according to others²) in the state of mortal sin. (d) Only those sins should be kept silent which it is necessary to conceal in order to avert the harm; all the others should be candidly declared.

² Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 487; Noldin, n. 273.

It must likewise be noted that to explain in preaching to the faithful the various causes of moral impotence is generally not expedient, lest perhaps, deceiving themselves, they be exposed to the danger of keeping many things silent: these things are necessary to be known by the confessor, not by the faithful.

n. 302.

2° Principal causes. With these things set down, grave harm, sufficient for keeping some sin silent, can arise from a threefold cause: on the part of the penitent, of the confessor, or of a third party.

(A) On the part of the penitent, when it is reasonably feared lest, from integral confession, the penitent be gravely defamed, not indeed with the confessor (for this is intrinsic to confession), but with others: (a) if the penitent confesses in those circumstances in which bystanders, who cannot be removed, will hear the sins, for example, in a hospital, when another sick person lies near the one confessing. This is verified also in the case of a deaf or somewhat deaf person, whose deafness the confessor notices only in the course of confession, and indeed in such circumstances in which this person could not be led to the sacristy without a suspicion arising that he had committed grave sin; for then the confessor must abstain from questions and impose a light penance,¹ lest otherwise the bystanders understand that grave sins had been committed by the penitent. But when deafness is noticed before the beginning of confession, the penitent is regularly to be led to the sacristy or to another place, where he can be questioned without danger of revelation, unless custom or prudent reason is an obstacle.

¹ Often the confessor can impose a penance which is not noticed by the bystanders, for example, by showing the penitent a rosary or a chaplet.

n. 303.

(b) If confession, in order to be integral, must be very long, and indeed in those circumstances in which bystanders would very probably be able to infer from that length that the penitent is guilty of many and grave sins; for example, if a sick person, who has already confessed and is about to receive viaticum, recognizes that he is guilty of sacrilege and has several confessions to repeat, it suffices for the time to hear a few mortal sins, lest otherwise the bystanders be able to suspect the matter; likewise a priest about to celebrate immediately and needing a lengthy confession, which would excite the wonder and suspicions of the people; or also a boy who before first communion, with the faithful already gathered in the church, would have to repeat his confessions on account of sacrilege committed. In these or similar cases, it suffices to declare a few mortal sins, and to accuse the rest in the next confession.

(c) If for a grave reason the penitent fears lest the confessor break the law of the seal, either directly (which happens most rarely), or indirectly, for example, by raising his voice higher when mortal sins are accused, so that bystanders can hear him; or lest, from the indiscretion of the confessor, the penitent undergo privation of office or of support.

(d) If he seriously fears that, by recalling sins minutely, especially shameful ones, he may indulge in morose delectation; or lest certain sins

by declaring them, he may be solicited by the confessor to shameful things, because, for example, he knows that this has already happened to himself or to others. These things, however, happen very rarely.

(e) If there is question of a scrupulous person, who, by insisting upon material integrity, will experience greater anxieties.

n. 304.

(B) On the part of the confessor: (a) if, in hearing an integral confession, death or a lethal disease threatens the confessor, for example, in time of plague, fire, shipwreck, or because enemies are pursuing; (b) if the confessor, on account of his own frailty, fears very probably that by questioning more diligently he may scandalize the penitent or himself; (c) if the penitent himself seriously fears lest, by an integral confession, the confessor whose frailty he has clearly known be induced into sin; this certainly will occur most rarely.

n. 305.

(C) On the part of a third party: (a) if there is grave danger lest the confessor use knowledge acquired through confession to the temporal or spiritual harm of the neighbor, for example, by casting out of his house a maidservant with whom the penitent sinned; (b) or if the confessor could not confess his own sin without manifesting sins heard in confession, for example, if, immediately after hearing confession, he were to say that he had sinned gravely by asking the name of the accomplice: for thus it would be manifested that the penitent had committed some mortal sin with an accomplice.

n. 306.

3° Disputed question. It is controverted whether there is an obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be explained integrally without the defamation of an accomplice or of a third person before the confessor. This can happen with sins committed between spouses, parents and children, blood relatives or relatives by affinity, or partners in the same affairs. - The question is also extended to the case in which a sin cannot be declared integrally without manifestation of the person against whom the sin was committed, for example, if someone struck his sister, pregnant from sin, and so procured an abortion.

Now all grant that then the penitent is bound to approach another confessor, to whom the accomplice is unknown, if this can conveniently be done. Yet necessity or great utility excuses from this obligation, for example, if danger of death presses, or the precept of annual confession, - if there is a special utility of receiving holy communion soon, - if otherwise someone would be compelled to remain in mortal sin through the whole day, - or if the penitent could open his conscience to another confessor only with reluctance, - or would be deprived of the special consolation which he finds with his ordinary confessor. - All likewise say that the penitent neither can nor is bound to declare a sin which is not necessary matter of confession (because it has either already been accused, or is only venial), if by confessing it the grave sin of the accomplice is manifested. Outside these cases, the matter is controverted.

n. 307.

(A) Not a few hold, with Navarro, Valentia, Medina, Ballerini, and others,¹ that the circumstance from which the accomplice would be detected can and must be kept silent, for example, the circumstance of incest in a sin of lust; for the natural precept of preserving the reputation of the neighbor is to be preferred to the positive law of the integrity of confession, especially since the observance of this law is only deferred for a time.

¹ The older authors who follow this opinion are reviewed by Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 393; cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 442-444.

n. 308.

(B) Yet the more common and truer opinion, with St. Thomas, Lugo, St. Alphonsus, and most moderns,² teaches that an integral confession is required in this case. For the precept of charity forbids only that the reputation of another be injured without a legitimate cause; but here there is a legitimate cause; for on the one hand the injury to reputation is done before the confessor alone, who is bound to keep the matter entirely secret under the most secret seal, and therefore it cannot be regarded as a grave inconvenience; besides, grave inconveniences follow if sins committed with a known accomplice are kept silent; for since there are many sins of this kind (between spouses, between parents and children, between blood relatives and relatives by affinity), occasion would often be given to anxieties and doubts which the penitent himself would have to solve; penitents would be deprived of those benefits which arise from integral confession, particular counsels, exhortations, etc.; those who have a lax conscience would keep silent about many sins under the pretext that the accomplice could become known to the confessor, and so little by little the law of integrity would be weakened.

² St. Thomas, In 4, dist. 16, q. 3, a. 2, quaestiunc. 5, ad 5; Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 394; Suarez, disp. XXXIV, sect. 2, n. 3; St. Alphonsus, n. 409.

Besides, in practice, the faithful, ignorant of these distinctions, for the most part declare sins of this kind without hesitation, and if they keep them silent, they are often in bad faith and think that they have confessed sacrilegiously. - If, however, some ask explicitly about this matter and very much resist manifesting those circumstances from which the accomplice would become known, the obligation of confessing them is not to be urged, because the former opinion does not lack probability.

From this it also follows that mothers and wives are often excused when in confession they manifest the sins of sons and husbands, in order to ask counsel or lessen sorrow; yet they should not be permitted to do this except insofar as it truly contributes to their spiritual good.

n. 309.

4° Scholion. On this occasion it is asked whether it is licit for the confessor to inquire the name of the accomplice.

(A) He sins mortally who inquires the name of the accomplice under penalty of denial of absolution, and even in any way whatever, unless for a most grave cause. Thus Benedict XIV in various Constitutions, the Brief Suprema, July 7, 1745,¹ the Constitution Ubi primum, June 2, 1746, the Constitution Ad eradicandum, September 28, 1746; indeed he established suspension ferendae sententiae against delinquents in these words: "Confessors requiring the name of the accomplice under penalty of denial of absolution sin gravely and incur suspension from hearing confessions, but only ferendae sententiae."² - If the confessor requires the name of the accomplice without threat of denial of absolution, he also sins mortally, unless there is a grave excusing cause, yet without incurring the canonical penalty. - The reason for this prohibition is that a practice of this kind renders the sacrament hateful, and without cause induces penitents to defame the accomplice.

¹ Apud Denzing., n. 1323. - The two former documents are directed to the bishops of Lusitania; but the latter to the universal Church.

² Constit. Ad eradicandum.

n. 310.

Yet the confessor is not prohibited from making those questions which seem necessary for the integrity of confession, or for detecting the nature of the proximate occasion, even if per accidens the accomplice becomes known from this: for example, whether the accomplice remains in the same house, whether he is bound by vow, related by blood or by affinity; for these and similar things the confessor must know for the good of the penitent, and from what was said above (n. 197) this is licit.³

³ That this was not reproved by Benedict XIV is clear from the words in which the Pontiff describes the abuse which he condemns: "If perhaps they had fallen upon penitents having an associate in crime, from the same penitents they would commonly inquire the name of such an associate or accomplice... indeed they would require that not only the name of the same accomplice, but in addition the place of habitation, be designated to them." Apud Denzing., n. 1323. Hence the same Pontiff (De Syn. dioeces., lib. VI, ch. 11, n. 1) acknowledges that sometimes, although rarely, it is licit to inquire the name of the accomplice: "Yet it is certain that it can rarely happen that it is licit for the confessor to ask the penitent for the name of the accomplice, much less to oblige the same to disclose it to him."

The confessor must also, for a most grave cause, for example, lest a member of some community or college corrupt his companions, oblige the penitent to denounce the accomplice to superiors, for example, to father, master, teacher, etc. Yet it is not expedient that the confessor offer himself for making this denunciation, nor, if asked, should he assume this duty, unless however the penitent does not wish to manifest the matter to another; in which case let him ask the penitent to speak to him about this outside confession. The reason is that otherwise confession becomes hateful, at least to others who hear of this matter. - Hence, if the confessor is at the same time the superior who alone can effectively meet the threatening evil, he can require that outside confession the name of the accomplice be manifested to him.

n. 311.

(B) Moreover, in the Bull Apostolicae Sedis, promulgated by Pius IX on October 12, 1869, an excommunication latae sententiae, simply reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, is brought against those "teaching or defending as licit the practice of inquiring from the penitent the name of the accomplice, insofar as it was condemned by Benedict XIV." Hence three things are required for incurring this excommunication: (a) to teach that this practice is licit: therefore those who in fact inquire the name of the accomplice, yet without teaching that this is licit, do not incur the censure; (b) to teach that it is licit under penalty of denial of absolution, for these words are found in the Constitution of Benedict XIV; (c) to teach this rashly, i.e., knowingly and willingly, so that fear or ignorance excuses from the censure, even crass and supine ignorance, provided that it is not affected.

Besides, those who have known that someone has offended in this doctrine, or in practice which introduces suspicion of depraved doctrine, are bound, with the exception of penitents in their own cause, to denounce the guilty person within a month to the Holy Office or to the Bishop.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 5 passages

Vol. III, Pt. II, Tr. V, Ch. II, Art. II, § 2, 2. Causes Excusing from Material Integrity

n. 378.

378. Excusing causes can be reduced to two heads, for they are either physical or moral inability. It must be noted, however, that those sins which because of physical or moral inability were not accused in confession must be manifested, not indeed as soon as possible, but in the following confession, if the inability has ceased. The reason is that, although those sins were indirectly remitted, nevertheless the divine precept of explicitly confessing all mortal sins not yet directly remitted still remains.²²⁰ But if the inability perseveres, confession does not oblige.

²²⁰ Cf. proposition 11 condemned by Alexander VII, cited below under n. 4.

n. 379.

379. Physical inability is judged to be present in the following or similar cases, namely, if there exists:

Extreme illness.

Namely, if a man is so infirm and near death that he can no longer speak or think sufficiently. Since contrition is much more necessary than materially complete confession, the confessor approaching a very weak sick person should strive more to elicit with him acts of true contrition than to inquire concerning the material integrity of the confession.²²¹

Defect of speech.

Hence there are excused: a) mute persons who cannot confess by signs or writings all sins and specific circumstances; b) those ignorant of the language when the obligation of confession urges and access to another confessor knowing the language is not open. In this case confession through an interpreter is indeed to be counseled, but not imposed (cf. above, n. 365, 8).

Lack of time because of imminent danger of death.

For example, when shipwreck or battle is imminent, those in danger of shipwreck or soldiers can be absolved even though they have not confessed all their sins. In other cases, however, lack of time never excuses from material integrity. Hence even amid the greatest concourse of penitents the confessor cannot licitly dispense with the integrity of confession, even if the penitents must then wait longer or even depart without confession. Therefore Innocent XI condemned proposition 56: "It is lawful sacramentally to absolve those only half-confessed because of a great concourse of penitents, such as can occur, for example, on the day of some great feast or indulgence."²²²

Invincible ignorance or forgetfulness.

Therefore a penitent who cannot remember some sin committed is validly and licitly absolved. It is evident of itself, however, that such a penitent is bound to employ serious diligence in order to remember all the sins committed, and must accuse himself of them if afterward the sins again come to mind. Therefore Alexander VII condemned proposition 11: "We are not bound in the following confession to declare sins omitted or forgotten in confession because of imminent danger of life or because of another cause."²²³

Many authors²²⁴ teach that a grave sin omitted through forgetfulness but afterward coming to mind must be submitted to the keys of the Church before Communion, because according to the Council of Trent²²⁵ no one conscious of mortal sin can approach the Most Holy Eucharist. But such a man is still conscious of mortal sin. This doctrine is assuredly to be commended if it can be put into execution without inconvenience; but if repeated confession cannot be made without inconvenience, it suffices and is required that this omitted sin be declared at least in the following confession. This opinion rightly seems to St. Alphonsus²²⁶ altogether consonant with reason, because such a sin omitted through forgetfulness was certainly remitted and the penitent is in the state of sanctifying grace.

There is no strict obligation of committing sins to writing lest they slip from memory. For this is judged by several authors to be an extraordinary means; cf., however, below, n. 384.

²²¹ Cf. above, n. 326.

²²² Denz., n. 1209.

²²³ Denz., n. 1111.

²²⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 257.

²²⁵ Sess. 13, c. 7, On the Eucharist (Denz., n. 880).

²²⁶ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 257.

n. 380.

380. Moral inability is present if the material integrity of confession cannot be had without a great moral inconvenience which is external to the confession itself and joined with it per accidens here and now. It is very necessary to observe, however, that not every inconvenience internal to confession excuses from its material integrity, for example, great repugnance and shame, loss of one's own reputation with the confessor, and so forth. Therefore the conditions required for this moral inability are the following: 1. that from particular and external circumstances of the confession there arise a grave inconvenience, corporal or spiritual, either to the penitent, the confessor, or a third person; 2. that this confession cannot be deferred without grave inconvenience, for example, because the necessity of communicating or celebrating urges; 3. that this confession cannot be made without grave inconvenience before another confessor with whom the same difficulties do not arise. Examples of such moral inability are:

Excessive scrupulosity of the penitent. Cf. above, I, n. 323, concerning the so-called privileges of the scrupulous.
Danger to the life of the penitent, the confessor, or a third person.

For example, if during a plague the confessor fears contagion; if during a persecution the penitent gravely fears agents sent against him.

Danger of scandal or a fall, either on the part of the penitent or on the part of the confessor.

For example, a woman cannot confess except before a priest whom she knows with certainty to be very prone to lust. If this woman were now to manifest her own lustful desires toward the priest, he would very probably sin. In this case the woman must conceal these sinful desires. In practice such a case is exceedingly rare. According to certain authors this excuse also exists if a venerable pastor falls into a shameful sin against chastity which he must confess to a young vicar fragile in virtue. For perhaps the pastor could persuade himself that the vicar, hearing that a sin of this kind had been perpetrated by a respected priest, would imitate the evil example heard or would altogether lose heart.²²⁷

Danger of violating the seal.

For example, a confessor cannot confess his own sin without manifesting the sins of some person heard in confession; or if a somewhat deaf person confesses while others are standing nearby; or if the confessor speaks too loudly in the confessional; or if a gravely ill person who cannot be left by his attendants confesses; or if the penitent fears that the confessor will indirectly violate the seal, which case can indeed be supposed only very rarely. According to certain authors, such an excuse exists if a vicar living with the pastor falls into a very great sin of lust and cannot confess except before the pastor, concerning whom he justly fears that he will use the knowledge had from confession and will treat him badly.²²⁸

Danger to the reputation either of the penitent himself before other persons or of a third person.

The reputation of the penitent which is endangered before the confessor alone does not excuse from material integrity, as was already said above; but the reputation of the penitent which is endangered before other persons does, for example, if he cannot confess without others standing nearby hearing his sins, or without something sinister being suspected concerning him because of the altogether unusual length or circumstance of the confession. The reputation of a third person is endangered especially if the sin committed cannot be perfectly declared without the confessor recognizing the person of the accomplice.

Authors do not agree whether it is lawful to omit a grave sin in confession in order to avoid the defamation of an accomplice before the confessor. The reason for doubting is this: on the one hand, natural law commands that the reputation of one's neighbor not be injured without a grave cause; but on the other hand, the divine precept commands the integrity of confession. The following things seem to be established:

²²⁷ Cf. Génicot, Theol. mor. II, 193, 4, and Cas. consc. II, 214.

²²⁸ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Cas. consc. II, n. 157.

n. 381.

381. a) The name of the accomplice is to be concealed whenever this can be done without grave inconvenience. Hence it is not lawful to manifest the name of the accomplice in order to declare a venial sin or even a mortal sin already directly remitted elsewhere. Likewise, the penitent is bound to confess a sin of this kind before a confessor who does not know the accomplice, if this can be done without grave inconvenience.

b) It is certain that a confessor objectively sins gravely if he directly inquires into the name of the accomplice, although he does this for a good end, for example, in order to amend the accomplice. For thus Benedict XIV repeatedly established.²²⁹ The Code of Canon Law, c. 888, § 2, commands: "Let the confessor beware altogether lest he inquire into the name of the accomplice." The sole exception is a most grave cause of the common good or of a third person. Hence, for example, if a boy living in a college accuses himself of a grave sin of lust committed with a fellow student, he must be obliged in confession to denounce that fellow student, not indeed to the confessor himself but to the competent superior, if otherwise a grave and imminent danger of the perversion of other boys cannot be averted. It is evident, however, that manifestation of the accomplice is not lawful if the danger can be forestalled in another way.²³⁰ Confessors unjustly requiring the name of an accomplice under penalty of denying absolution not only sin gravely, but can also be suspended by the bishop from hearing confessions.

c) The confessor can licitly inquire into circumstances of sins which must necessarily be declared and into an existing proximate occasion, and so forth, although he then indirectly obtains knowledge of the accomplice. The reason is that the obligation of procuring according to his strength the integrity of confession rests upon the confessor.

d) Since it is lawful from a just and proportionate cause to manifest a true offense of one's neighbor, theologians commonly teach that the penitent can confess his own sin completely, even though his neighbor and the neighbor's offense thereby become known indirectly to the confessor, provided that a sufficient cause is present. The following are regarded as sufficient causes: a) if danger of death or the precept of annual confession urges; b) if it is grave for the penitent to omit confession or Communion; c) if someone opens his conscience to another confessor only with difficulty; d) if someone must otherwise remain in mortal sin and this is grave for him; e) if much better spiritual direction is had before the confessor to whom the accomplice is known.²³¹

e) The penitent not only can but also must confess his own sin completely, although the name of the accomplice thereby becomes known indirectly to the confessor. St. Alphonsus²³² calls this opinion common and himself follows it with Gonet, Palao, Concina, Juénin, the Salmanticenses, St. Bonaventure, St. Antoninus, Cajetan, Suarez, Lugo, and others. St. Thomas²³³ also defends this opinion, saying: "If the penitent ... cannot express the species of the sin except by expressing the person with whom he sinned, for example, if he lay with his sister, it is necessary that in expressing the species of the sin he express the person. But if it can be done, he must seek such a confessor as does not know the person of his sister at all." And St. Bernard²³⁴ teaches the same: "Speak sinisterly of no one ... except in confession ... where you cannot otherwise manifest your sin." The reason for this doctrine is that the penitent ought not to have greater care for the reputation of another than for his own reputation. But he is bound to confess his sin even though his own reputation is injured. Therefore the same must be said even if the reputation of another is diminished by the confession. Moreover, this injury to reputation must implicitly be permitted by the accomplice, since he could well have foreseen this obligation of confession when he freely consented to the sin. Finally, this injury to reputation is not so harmful to the accomplice, since the confessor is most strictly bound to the sacramental seal. Nevertheless, the opposite opinion, which in this case exempts from the integrity of confession, is not without at least extrinsic probability,²³⁵ and therefore if someone wishes to follow it, he is not to be disturbed. But the intrinsic reason adduced for this opinion seems weak. For they say: The natural law of not injuring another's reputation prevails over the positive law of confessing completely. But it is easily answered: natural law prohibits only the unjust injury of another's reputation, but it by no means forbids that, from a just and proportionate cause, such as the precept of confessing completely, the offense of another person become known. Since these things are so, the penitent should indeed preserve according to his strength the reputation of the accomplice unharmed, especially if there is question of manifesting a shameful crime; but he is not to be disturbed if from a reasonable cause he confesses his sins before a confessor who thereby indirectly learns the name of the accomplice.

²²⁹ Brief of July 7, 1745; Constitution Ubi primum of June 2, 1746; Constitution Ad eradicandum of September 28, 1746.

²³⁰ Cf. concerning the order to be observed in fraternal correction above, I, n. 602, and S. theol. 2, 2, q. 33, a. 7.

²³¹ Cf. Noldin-Schmitt, De sacr.¹⁷, n. 287.

²³² Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 480.

²³³ Opusc. 12, Ad lectorem Bisuntinum, q. 6, near the end.

²³⁴ Among the spurious works of St. Bernard, in Migne, Patr. lat. 184, 1173.

²³⁵ Cf. Busembaum in St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 488.

n. 382.

382. Admonition of St. Alphonsus.²³⁶ "No one doubts that a penitent is sometimes bound to manifest an accomplice in order to prevent some grave harm. But in view of so rigorous a prohibition of the Pontiff [Benedict XIV], for the purpose of avoiding the infamy of one's neighbor, injury to the sacrament, violation of the seal, scandal, and so forth, it is not lawful for the confessor to inquire into the name of the accomplice for the purpose of making a correction. Hence, in a case in which the penitent is truly bound to disclose the accomplice, the confessor will be able only to impose upon the penitent in general that he reveal the accomplice to someone who can prevent the scandal; but it will never be lawful for the confessor to say: Reveal him to me. But if the penitent of himself and of his own accord were to ask the confessor to correct the accomplice, then the confessor has need of great prudence; for, ordinarily speaking, it is not expedient that he involve himself in a matter of this kind. For it rests upon him only to take care of the harm of his own penitent, not that of another, and only within confession, not outside it; and on the other hand, the confessor will with difficulty undertake this office of correcting without danger of scandal and of offense to the sacred ministry."

²³⁶ L.c., n. 492.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 8 passages

Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. II, Ch. II, Art. II, § 2. On Formal Integrity

n. ¶1697.

FORMAL integrity, as was said (n. 1660), consists in this: that the penitent confess all sins which, in view of the circumstances, he can morally confess. This, as is evident, does not fulfill the whole law, but the part of the law possible here and now, with the burden of supplying the defect once the impediment has been removed.³ The following things will make the matter clear.

Principles. I. Formal integrity suffices whenever the penitent is in PHYSICAL inability of furnishing material integrity. The reason is that no one is bound to the impossible (recall what was said at n. 221 sqq.). - Moreover, ON ACCOUNT OF PHYSICAL INABILITY, besides those who are ignorant of sins or have forgotten them, the following are excused:

The dying, or others placed in danger of death, on account of defect of time or failure of mind.⁴ We shall treat of these in particular below (n. 1720, 2, and n. 1854, 5).
Mutes, on account of defect of speech. Therefore these, having signified by nods one or another sin, can be absolved both at the time of death and at the time of the paschal precept. Yet if by writing or signs they are able to reveal all sins, they are bound to this, provided danger of manifestation or another grave inconvenience is absent, as was already said (n. 1687).
The deaf, who cannot respond to the confessor, nor know how to declare all their sins. - But otherwise the hard of hearing; for these must be led into some remote place, yet with due cautions used as to time and place, if women are at issue.
Those ignorant of the language of the region in which they are, and who do not have the availability of a confessor by whom they can be understood. These, if they manifest sorrow for their sins by signs, can, like mutes, be absolved in the time of precept or of another necessity. Nor are they bound to use an interpreter, as was shown above⁵ (n. 1688).

n. ¶1698.

II. Formal integrity likewise suffices if the penitent is in MORAL inability of making a materially integral confession. The reason is that the precept of confession, since it is positive, does not oblige with grave inconvenience extrinsic to confession (cf. n. 223). - We say extrinsic; for no difficulty intrinsic to confession itself, however grave, ever excuses, because confession is by its own nature laborious. Hence, if intrinsic difficulty excused, its precept would vanish.

Moreover, MORAL INABILITY is then judged to be had when two conditions are verified. The first is when the necessity of confessing presses: for example because the paschal precept must be satisfied, or because the reception of the Eucharist or the celebration of Mass cannot be omitted without note of infamy or scandal; or even because otherwise the penitent would have to remain in mortal sin, even if only through one day. The other is if, from the declaration of all mortal sins to this priest, grave spiritual or temporal damage would threaten the penitent, or the confessor, or some third person.⁶ Therefore, in the aforesaid necessity, the following EXCUSES:

Danger to the life of the penitent, confessor, or third person; for example if in time of plague the priest himself prudently fears infection, and therefore does not allow the penitent to confess integrally; if enemies arrive, for example immediately before battle, in which case all, after exhibiting some general sign of contrition and confession, could be absolved by this single form of absolution: I absolve you [plural], etc.⁷
Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor; for example if a woman certainly knew the very great frailty of the confessor, etc.
Danger of revelation, or violation of the seal; for example if the confessor cannot confess integrally without manifesting the sins of some person heard in confession; - likewise if one who is hard of hearing confesses while others stand by; or if a gravely wounded man or a woman giving birth confesses, who cannot be left by those serving them; or if the penitent from grave cause fears that the confessor may break the law of the seal. But this case, if it must ever be said to happen, is very rare.
Danger to reputation; for example if a priest about to celebrate immediately, and needing general confession, could not confess integrally without those standing by suspecting the matter. Say the same of a sick person who has confessed before the carrying of the Most Holy Sacrament, and is now just about to be refreshed through Holy Communion, if he then, because the past confessions were invalid, had to make a more lengthy confession. In this case, the confessor, having heard some sin, should absolve the sick person, give him Communion, and afterward return to receive the integral confession.⁸
Danger for the scrupulous person of grave detriment, both in spiritual progress and in health of body and mind (cf. n. 28 and 1835).
Reservation of sin or censure, according to those things which are found at n. 1551 and n. 1775, note 2. But:

The multitude of affairs does not excuse. For the 59th proposition, which sounds thus, was condemned by Innocent XI: "It is licit sacramentally to absolve those who have confessed only by halves, by reason of a great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can happen on the day of some great festivity or indulgence."⁹ Nor can an exception be admitted if, on account of the prolixity of confession, others would easily suspect that the penitent is burdened by many faults.¹⁰ But whether danger of manifesting an accomplice excuses will be weighed below (n. 1702).

n. ¶1699.

III. When the excusing cause ceases, the penitent is bound to SUPPLY the defect of confession, not immediately, but when he will again be obliged or will wish to confess.¹¹ The reason is that an actual impediment does not simply remove the obligation of integral confession, but only suspends it. Hence, when the impediment has been removed, the divine precept revives in whole. It is otherwise clear from the 11th proposition condemned by Alexander VII, which said: "Sins omitted or forgotten in confession, on account of imminent danger of life or on account of another cause, we are not bound to express in the following confession."

It was said, 1. not immediately; for the obligation must be accepted morally, especially because sins inculpably omitted have already been destroyed, and because delay brings the soul into no danger. Thus commonly.

It was said, 2. but when he will be obliged or will wish. For: - 1. The obligation of supplying is not affixed of itself to a time or circumstances, and therefore does not of itself press, except when the precept of confessing again presses, for example at the time of annual confession (cf. n. 1548). - 2. When the impediment ceases, it is not licit to keep silent sins forgotten or omitted in the confession which first follows. For the Doctors more commonly interpret thus the sense of the proposition condemned by Alexander VII;¹² and the reason is that it pertains to the integrity of the subsequent confession to declare all mortal sins of which consciousness is had, as Trent speaks.¹³

n. ¶1700.

It is asked: To what are those bound who in GOOD FAITH have made confessions lacking integrity?

Resp. They are not indeed bound to repeat them integrally, "because for such confessions all things essentially required were already present. - Yet they are bound to explain the species and number omitted, so that they may at least make the present confession integral." Thus commonly.¹⁴

But let it be noted: 1. He who held a uniform manner of living and inculpably omitted declaring the number of sins satisfies the law of integrity if "at the beginning of confession he has revealed to the present confessor that in past years he has always confessed badly by omitting number, and the confessor, by receiving the confession of that year from the beginning, at the same time forms a judgment concerning past years." Likewise, if, after the confession has been received, the confessor has distinct knowledge of the sins of the present year, "he will indeed be able, without the prior confessions being repeated, at the same time to form for himself a distinct judgment concerning past years." 2. Otherwise it must be said "if from the present confession he has only confused knowledge of the faults confessed, as often happens in longer and involved confessions; in that case, as Lugo well says,¹⁵ he is bound to take distinct knowledge of the species and number omitted in past confessions."¹⁶

Scholium

n. ¶2.

On The Manifestation Of An Accomplice

n. ¶1701.

It is certain, 1. That an accomplice must be concealed as often as confession can be materially integral without his manifestation. Therefore it is not licit, for declaring a venial sin or a mortal sin already confessed, to reveal the grave sin of another.¹⁷

It is certain, 2. That a penitent guilty of mortal sin not yet confessed is bound to go to a confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, if he can go to him

without temporal or spiritual inconvenience. - For then the precept of guarding the reputation of the neighbor presses, especially if a more infamous crime is at issue.

It is certain, 3. That, generally, it is not licit for the confessor to inquire for the name of the accomplice, even for a good end, for example for correction; for this is opposed to charity and renders the Sacrament of Penance odious. - This is clear from the Bull of Benedict XIV Ubi primum, in which the Pontiff, speaking of confessors who under penalty of denying absolution require the name of the accomplice, declares: 1. that they sin gravely and incur suspension from hearing confessions, but only of ferendae sententiae; 2. that they are to be denounced within a month, not indeed by the penitent himself, but by another who knows them, if nevertheless on account of this they denied absolution and did not act from simplicity; 3. that those teaching this detestable practice to be licit incur by the fact itself excommunication reserved to the Supreme Pontiff,¹ which same thing Pius IX sanctioned in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis (cf. n. 1328). These things having been premised, let the following be:

n. ¶1702.

Questions. Q. 1. Whether there is an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which CANNOT be explained without manifestation of the accomplice?

Resp. Yes, when another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown cannot conveniently be had. Thus the common opinion against some who say that the natural precept of preserving the reputation of the neighbor must be preferred to the positive precept of preserving the integrity of confession. But the reason for the affirmative opinion is "because the divine precept of confessing integrally must be observed whenever it can licitly be observed; and it can be observed sufficiently licitly in our case, since the manifestation of another's crime is not illicit when it is done from a reasonable cause"; and therefore the natural precept then ceases (cf. n. 1198). - Add that "the accomplice, by consenting to the sin, has already lost the right to his reputation in order to the confession of that sin."²

Q. 2. What are the CAUSES EXCUSING from seeking another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown?

Resp. According to the opinion of very many, they are the following: - 1. If danger of death or the precept of annual confession presses. - 2. If it is grave for the penitent to omit confession or Communion. - 3. If he would open his conscience with difficulty to another than his accustomed confessor. - 4. If otherwise he would be deprived of the benefits of some extraordinary indulgence. - 5. If otherwise he would have to remain in sin even for one day. - 6. If, by going to a confessor to whom the accomplice is known, he will have better direction or will receive notably greater consolation. - 7. If it is believed that the accomplice has yielded the right to his reputation, as if a brother sinned with a sister whom he knows cannot be separated from the company of the mother in order to go to another confessor. Hence, mothers and wives are often excused who manifest the sins of husbands and sons to a confessor who knows them, by reason of seeking counsel, alleviating sorrow, etc.; for it would be too hard for them if they were bound to seek another confessor.³ - Yet the advantage of direction must be compared with the infamy.⁴

Q. 3. Whether it is EVER licit for the confessor to INQUIRE for the name or knowledge of the accomplice?

Resp. 1. The confessor can, indeed must, although from this he comes into knowledge of the accomplice, inquire about circumstances which change the species of sins, or which are necessary for better consulting the conscience of the penitent; for example, whether the accomplice in a shameful sin is in the first or second degree of consanguinity or affinity, whether he is bound by a vow of chastity, whether he lives in the same house, etc.

Resp. 2. A penitent who would not wish to reveal the accomplice cannot be absolved when this is necessary for averting or repairing public damage. Therefore in a case of this sort, the confessor will be able to impose on the penitent in general that he reveal the accomplice to him who can avert the damage or scandal. But while the prohibition of Benedict XIV stands, that is, as often as revelation can usefully be made to another,⁵ it will never be licit for the confessor to say: Reveal him to me. But if the penitent of himself and by his own will asks the confessor that he himself take these parts upon himself and reveal the accomplice voluntarily, the confessor does not sin, and can certainly use that knowledge for applying a remedy; but for the most part this is not expedient on account of the danger of scandal and offense of the sacred ministry.⁶

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 6 passages

Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, Ch. II, Art. II, § II, And Especially As Regards The Dying

Point I. On Causes Excusing From Integrity In General.

n. ¶1367.

1367. Principles. - I. Causes are sometimes given which excuse from the material integrity of Confession, because sometimes that integrity is physically or morally impossible.

II. In order that someone be judged excused from the material integrity of Confession by reason of moral impotence, although the sins occur to mind, these conditions must be observed: 1° that only those sins be omitted which cannot be declared, or from the manifestation of which grave harm would follow, whether spiritual or temporal, either to the penitent, or to the confessor, or to some third person; 2° that another confessor cannot be found to whom an integral Confession may be made without such harm; 3° that Confession be necessary here and now, as it is judged to be, a) if the precept of annual Confession or Communion must be fulfilled; b) if the reception of the Eucharist or the celebration of Mass cannot be omitted without notice or scandal; c) if otherwise someone would have to be deprived for a long time of the benefit of the Sacraments; d) if someone otherwise would have to remain in mortal sin, even for only one day.

III. Difficulty intrinsic to Confession itself, however grave it may be, never excuses. The reason is that Confession from its nature is essentially laborious, and therefore, if grave difficulty - e.g. great repugnance, or shame, or the loss of one's own reputation before the confessor - excused from integrity, the faithful would for the most part be excused from accusing mortal sins, and therefore the institution of the Sacrament of Penance would fall in greatest part. Moreover the Church could not reserve atrocious crimes, because this creates no light inconvenience for penitents.

IV. When the cause excusing from material integrity ceases, the divine precept of confessing all omitted mortal sins urges again; for when an impediment occurs, the obligation of Confession does not simply cease, but is only suspended; therefore, when the excusing cause ceases, the obligation of the whole law revives: and since the precept of Confession is not affixed to a time or circumstance, but affects the whole life, therefore sins not yet accused must afterward necessarily be accused, if this can be done. This is clear also from the 11th proposition condemned by Alexander VII. See p. XIII.

n. ¶1368.

1368. Resolves. - The following chiefly excuse from the material integrity of Confession:

1° Grave infirmity, namely that in which integral Confession would bring great fatigue, or the proximate danger of it or of some other grave inconvenience, as for example often happens to women in childbirth when laborious delivery is imminent. Concerning the dying, n. 1370.

2° Defect of speech; thus from integrity are exempt the mute, who cannot confess integrally either by signs, or by writing, without danger of manifestation or without grave extraordinary inconvenience or great labor; likewise travelers wholly or almost wholly ignorant of the language of the region in which they confess. Hence, if there is question of a confessor who does not know sufficiently the language of the penitent, Kenrick learnedly teaches these things: once diligence has been applied to perceiving everything, "it is not necessary that one be more solicitous who has a less perfect knowledge of the language, provided there is a fair cause for exercising the sacred office, with another lacking who may execute it. Missionaries for this reason are not to be distressed in mind for the most part if, not knowing very well the language of the faithful, they do not fully understand Confessions; for necessity very often compels that they administer the Sacrament of Penance."

3° Defect of time, e.g. if soldiers must go immediately to battle. But the mere multitude of penitents does not excuse, as was said above, n. 1361. 5°.

4° Danger of life of the penitent, confessor, or a third person: e.g. if enemies arrive; if many are in danger of shipwreck or contagion; if in a contagious disease there is probable danger that the confessor be infected. Indeed sometimes in the highest danger of several persons, all, after some general sign of contrition and Confession has been shown, can be absolved by one utterance of the form thus: I absolve you, etc.

5° Danger of reputation, e.g. if a priest about to celebrate immediately, and needing general Confession, could not confess integrally without those standing by suspecting the matter. Say the same if there were question of a sick man confessed before the carrying of the Most Holy Sacrament and now on the very point of being refreshed by Holy Communion, who, because past Confessions were invalid, asks again for Confession, which, since it would be rather lengthy, would expose the sick man to danger of infamy. Likewise concerning a boy prepared now to receive First Communion, and concerning one to be ordained prepared now to receive Orders, if they declare to the confessor that they have hitherto confessed sacrilegiously.

6° Danger of revelation, or violation of the seal, e.g. if the confessor could not confess integrally without manifesting sins heard in Confession, etc.; or if the penitent from a grave cause fears that the confessor may break the law of the seal. But this latter case, if indeed it should ever be said to occur, is most rare.

7° Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor, e.g. if a woman certainly knew the very great frailty of the confessor, etc. The case of the scrupulous person in n. 44 is related.

n. ¶1369.

1369. Questions. - Query 1° Is there an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which cannot be explained without the manifestation of an accomplice?

Resp. Affirm. more probably, with the common opinion, which we follow, says St. Alphonsus, provided that there is question of a mortal sin, and one not yet, or not yet rightly, confessed. The reason is, 1° because no legitimate excuse is given by which derogation would be made from the precept of integrity: for it cannot be said that a positive precept is restricted by the natural precept of not defaming one's neighbor; for this precept only prohibits that the crime of another be manifested without cause; but here there is a cause, and indeed a grave one, namely the procuring of the integrity of Confession, and the direction of conscience; 2° the accomplice, by committing the sin, loses every right to reputation which he could have had before the confessor, in order to the Confession of this sin; and he himself implicitly consents of his own accord to this harm to reputation, when he sins.

But the penitent is held, if he conveniently can, to approach another confessor to whom the person of the accomplice is unknown.

Query 2° What are the causes excusing from seeking another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown?

Resp. 1° If danger of death urges, or the precept of annual Confession or Communion; 2° if it would be grave for the penitent to omit Confession or Communion; 3° if someone would with difficulty open his conscience to another confessor; 4° if someone otherwise would have to remain in mortal sin, even for one day; 5° if someone otherwise would be deprived of the benefit of some extraordinary indulgence; 6° if by approaching the confessor to whom the accomplice is known, there would be better direction, notably greater consolation, etc.

Hence by reason of seeking counsel, of relieving sorrow, etc., mothers and wives are often excused when they manifest to the confessor the sins of sons or husbands, even though he may know them. For it would be exceedingly hard that they should be held to seek another confessor. Therefore, generally, there is no grave obligation of approaching another confessor for the sake of concealing the accomplice, unless perhaps there is question of a very grave and extraordinary crime.

Query 3° Is it lawful for the confessor himself to ask the name of the accomplice, e.g. for correction, etc.?

Resp. Neg., at least speaking generally, because this both induces one without just cause to detract from the neighbor, and makes the Sacrament of Penance odious. This is clear from Benedict XIV: C. Suprema omnium ecclesiarum, 7 July 1745, and Ubi primum, 2 July 1746, both of which were given for the kingdoms of Portugal and the Algarves, but which afterward through C. Ad eradicandum, 28 Sept. 1746, he extended to the whole world, and in which the Pontiff, speaking of confessors who under penalty of denying absolution require the name of the accomplice, declares that they sin gravely, and incur suspension from hearing Confessions, but only ferendae sententiae.

Query 4° Through the aforesaid letters of Benedict XIV has asking the name of the accomplice been so forbidden that in no case is it lawful?

Resp. Neg., 1° because Benedict XIV himself supposes cases in which this is lawful according to true, as he says, and sound opinions; 2° because sometimes the penitent must necessarily reveal the accomplice, and nevertheless cannot furnish this except through the confessor.

Query 5° Is there an obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be declared without the defamation of another, who was the occasion of the sin, e.g. if someone killed his own sister pregnant from a crime?

Resp. Affirm., according to the opinion set forth above in this number, q. 1°.

Query 6° Are the deaf and mute at the same time held to confess, and how?

Resp. The mute and deaf are held in some way to confess, at least by signs, unless they are so ignorant and dull that nothing can be drawn out from them. The reason is that the precept of Confession regards all the faithful who can manifest their sins by some means. - It will be best that the confessor inquire from the relatives of such mute persons to what vices they are given, and what mode is to be held so that he may be understood by them and he himself may understand them.

Hence: 1° Mute persons sufficiently instructed are held to confess integrally, at least by signs, if these are understood by the confessor; but if they are less instructed, or could with difficulty be understood by the confessor, it will suffice for them to manifest only one or another sin, or to signify in general that they are sinners and wish to avoid sin; but these, unless there is present a certain moral certitude concerning their disposition, are to be absolved conditionally.

2° The deaf, having the use of speech, are held on their own part to confess the sins which occur to memory; but the confessor is scarcely, or hardly at all, held to question them for procuring the integrity of Confession, on account of the excessive difficulty of questioning; which reason of excessive difficulty would not exist where they could easily be questioned in writing. - But the partially deaf, or those who are not wholly deaf, should either confess with an acoustic horn employed, or be led to a remote place, whether at once or at another suitable time. But if this cannot be done without danger of the seal, because the deafness became known not at the beginning but only in the progress of Confession, after a light penance has been imposed, those certainly disposed are to be absolved absolutely, those doubtfully disposed conditionally.

Query 7° Are mute persons who know how to write held to confess by writing for procuring the integrity of Confession?

Resp. See n. 1368. 2°.

Query 8° Are those ignorant of the language of the place in which they wish to confess held to confess, and how?

Resp. Those ignorant of the language of the place in which they are staying, and lacking a confessor by whom they can be understood, are held, when the precept of annual Confession urges and in the article of death, to confess in some way, at least by general signs. The reason is that the divine and ecclesiastical precept urges. For although they cannot confess materially integrally, nevertheless they are held to that which they can do.

Query 9° Are those ignorant of the language held to confess through an interpreter, if they can?

Resp. Neg., because to confess through an interpreter is a very grave burden and subject to many dangers, e.g. of revelation, mockery, etc. Except if in danger of death the penitent ignorant of the language doubts concerning perfect contrition, because in that case Confession would be a means altogether necessary for salvation; but then it will suffice to confess one venial sin, so that in this way the other sins may be indirectly remitted.

n. ¶1370.

1370. - I. Any dying person who in some way, by voice or sign, confesses, or asks for absolution, can and must be absolved, and indeed absolutely. The reason is that all requisites are present for the Sacrament and for Confession formally integral.

II. Any dying person in whom attrition and Confession can be presumed in some way, however slightly probable, can and must be absolved, but conditionally; because in a case of extreme necessity, even in the administration of the Sacraments, it is lawful to use even a slightly founded opinion. - St. Alphonsus and others more commonly against others.

III. A dying person who altogether refuses the Sacrament of Penance, or who can in no way be presumed attrite or to have wished or to wish Confession, can in no way be absolved. The reason is most plainly clear.

n. ¶1371.

1371. Resolves. - 1° All dying persons not yet deprived of the senses and consenting to absolution, and obeying the commands of the confessor, are to be absolved: absolutely indeed, if they spontaneously ask for Confession, or if with a willing mind they propose to confess; but conditionally, if with difficulty they are scarcely induced to some Confession, or if there is prudent doubt concerning their sufficient disposition. - Thus commonly.

2° All dying persons deprived of the senses, who before the deprivation of the senses expressly showed a desire of Confession, e.g. by ordering a priest to be called, etc., are to be absolved, but more safely conditionally. The reason is that in the case Confession becomes known sufficiently sensibly to the confessor through the testimony of another, even of one person or mediately. This is clear from Councils and from the Roman Ritual.

3° All dying persons wholly destitute of the senses, who lived as Christians, are to be absolved under condition, even if at that time they gave no sign either of sorrow or of desire for Confession. The reason is that in these persons sorrow and the desire of absolution can be presumed through sensible signs, e.g. through sighs, motions of the body, anxious breathing, which were manifested although not perceived by the confessor.

4° For the same reason other dying persons destitute of the senses, who lived little as Christians, are also to be absolved conditionally.

5° For the same reason, sufficiently probably, a Catholic dying person, destitute of the senses in the very act of sin, e.g. in a duel, adultery, theft, etc., can and must be absolved under condition.

6° "Those who, although they have never professed the Catholic faith, have shown a will inclined toward it, can in that crisis," i.e. if they are dying and destitute of the senses, "be absolved under condition, ... if they have already been baptized in their sects" (but in doubt concerning the value of this Baptism, after Baptism has been repeated under condition); "for there is some reason for conjecturing that they wish to finish life in the communion of the Church. But if no indication of his will has been given, they are not to be absolved, even if they give signs of sorrow": because such persons can never prudently be presumed to give those signs in order to Confession, from which they greatly abhor.

Note. - Absolution is usefully conferred several times on a sick person still enjoying his senses after a brief Confession; for thus he is rendered more secure concerning the state of grace, he receives an increase of grace, and purgatorial punishments are diminished for him. - But to one destitute of the senses and giving no sign of sorrow and of desire for absolution, "it is not expedient to impart absolution very often within the same day," i.e. more often than every three or four hours, even if only conditionally; for the grave and urgent cause which is required in order that a Sacrament be administered under condition does not exist per se for this kind of absolution "repeated very often within the same day."

I say: per se; for it could be given more frequently to a dying person habituated in evil thoughts, or entangled in some passion of hatred or impure love, or not bearing a very bitter infirmity with a willing mind, or also now on the very point of dying. - "Moreover, it will not be beside the matter to warn the sick man, while he is in possession of mind, that" when "he will not be able to speak," he should "give some determinate sign," or one agreed upon with him, "when he seeks absolution, or when the priest wishes" to confer it "upon him," e.g. to close or open the eyes, lift the hand, incline the head, and the like. Thus St. Alphonsus in Praxis Conf., where he treats the matter more explicitly than in Theol. Mor. or in Hom. Apost.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 38 passages

Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Third Part: On the Parts o…, Ch. II, Question Three: On the End…, Article II: On the Integrity of Confession

525. Principle III. From the material integrity required for confession, a just cause, whether of ignorance, or of physical or moral impossibility, can excuse, so that then formal integrity alone suffices. - For no one is held to the impossible; indeed, a positive law does not oblige with grave extrinsic inconvenience. The cause, namely, can be not only physical, but also moral, or a great difficulty; not indeed that difficulty which is intrinsic to confession and of itself joined to it, however grave it may be, such as great repugnance or shame, fear of reproof, loss of reputation before the confessor, as if a religious must confess a grave sin to a secular priest, a parish priest to his own vicar and nephew, a pious and known penitent to his own confessor, etc.; but an extrinsic inconvenience which accidentally renders confession very difficult.

This cause excuses as long as it exists. Hence 1) the cause must truly exist not only with respect to one confessor, but also with respect to any confessor who can be approached without grave inconvenience; - 2) the obligation remains of confessing the omitted sins, so that they may be directly remitted, and therefore, when the excusing cause ceases, they must now be declared in confession; - 3) nevertheless they are not to be accused as soon as possible in such a way that confession must be made immediately, but only in the next following confession, as is evident from proposition 11 condemned by Alexander VII.1

The excusing causes are reduced to three, which are ignorance or forgetfulness - physical impossibility - moral impossibility.

A. Ignorance or forgetfulness excuses from integrity 1) if the penitent, after a diligent examination has been made, does not remember some mortal sin; - 2) if he remembers it in the examination, but omits it in confession through inadvertence; - 3) if from ignorance or error not gravely culpable he judges that the sin committed was venial and does not confess it. This is true even if the ignorance proceeds from preceding grave fault, e.g., by delaying confession beyond a year, provided the ignorance itself is not gravely culpable.

But it should be noted, for avoiding forgetfulness, that one who is furnished with a weak memory is not bound to write down his sins: for this is an exquisite diligence and an extraordinary means to which no one is obliged, and it easily includes a certain danger of manifestation; whence it is not the common practice nor the usage among the timorous and diligent.

B. Physical or absolute impossibility can arise from defect of strength, from defect of time, and from defect of speech.

From defect of strength: a) if strength so fails that the penitent is not able sufficiently to speak or think, e.g., if a sick person faints after confession has been begun, or if he is in danger of fainting before the confession is finished, or, a fortiori, if he is already deprived of his senses; b) if the priest himself is probably going to die before he is able to hear the whole confession.

From defect of time, namely when shipwreck, fire, or battle is imminent, so that all upon whom death threatens cannot be heard; this also holds if those infected by plague in a public hospital cannot all be heard because of the narrowness of time. In which case a brief confession of some less infamous sin can suffice, or all together by some sign can confess themselves to be sinners and to be sorry for sin (e.g., by raising the hands or striking the breast), and then be absolved with one form: I absolve you from all censures and sins.

Yet a great crowd of penitents on a more solemn feast does not excuse, for if this reason were admitted, many would purposely approach the sacrament at such a time and there would be danger of absolving the unworthy. Besides, penitents whose confession cannot be heard can be deferred to another day, which inconvenience is not sufficiently great to excuse from the integrity of confession. Hence Innocent XI also proscribed the contrary practice (prop. 59). Hence the confessions of pious persons, or of those who confess at greater length, are usefully sent to other days, if this can be done.

From defect of speech: a) a mute: if he has not been sufficiently educated so that he can confess integrally by signs, he is bound to write, or if he cannot even do this, to manifest his sins by nods insofar as can be done; but if the confession is written, the confessor must see to it that the writing is immediately torn up; - b) one ignorant of the confessor's language, if he cannot approach another confessor by whom he may be understood: he should confess his sins in the best way he can, by words or signs, which suffice at least for expressing some sin in species, or, if this is impossible, for the manifestation of sins in general.

Yet he is not bound to use an interpreter (Holy Office, Feb. 28, 1533), both because of the danger of revelation and because it is a heavier burden to confess to a layman.2 Nevertheless confession can be made through an interpreter, if this is pleasing, provided abuses and scandal are guarded against, and the interpreter is warned of the obligation of keeping the secret (S. C. de P. F., July 16, 1638; can. 903 and 889, § 2). "This can be done in this way (Haine, Th. M. III, q. 49): a) let the interpreter turn his face away from the penitent; b) let him recite to him in his own language the general questions, made in a loud voice by the confessor, concerning the precepts of the decalogue and of the Church; c) meanwhile let the penitent, at each question, signify to the confessor by a nod whether he has sinned or not, and at the same time express the number of sins with his fingers, as far as can be done. - Moreover, a missionary who is ignorant of the language of the region will be able rather conveniently to receive confessions if he says the names of the principal and more frequent sins from the language of the region, and pronounces them before the penitent, who by a nod of the head will signify that he has offended, where there will be need."3

C. Moral impossibility generally excuses those who cannot confess integrally without grave inconvenience extrinsic to confession, whether of themselves, or of the confessor, or of a third person, whether it be temporal or spiritual. Hence these three conditions are required for it at the same time: a) that another confessor cannot be found before whom confession can be made without grave inconvenience; b) that confession here and now be necessary and cannot conveniently be deferred; nevertheless there is a sufficient reason for not deferring if the precept of annual confession or of Easter communion urges, if there is a moral necessity of communicating or celebrating so that it cannot be omitted without scandal or infamy, or if otherwise the penitent would be forced to remain for a long time (i.e., beyond three days, indeed for one day according to others), with danger of death or of eternal salvation, in the state of mortal sin; c) that only those sins or circumstances be omitted which cannot be declared without grave inconvenience, e.g., internal sins of lust even with the lowest species and the occasion of internal sin must be accused, if the external genus cannot be accused in species.

The grave harm of the penitent, of the confessor, or of a third person, which excuses, can be:

Danger of life, if in time of plague the confessor fears contagion, or in time of persecution the penitent gravely fears agents sent against him: for then, after one or another sin has been heard, the priest can absolve.

Danger of reputation, when it is reasonably feared that, from an integral confession, the penitent would be gravely defamed, not indeed before the confessor, but before others:

a) If the penitent cannot confess except while others are hearing, who cannot be removed; this can happen in hospitals when another sick person lies near the one confessing or in the same bed; with the wounded when the physician must be present or others who care for them; with women giving birth when the physician or midwife must be present. - This is also verified in the case of a deaf or somewhat deaf person whose deafness the confessor notices only in the progress of confession, in circumstances in which he could not be led to the sacristy without suspicion arising that he had committed a grave sin: for then the confessor should abstain from questions, nor command in a loud voice that he return at another time, and he should impose a light penance, lest otherwise those standing around understand that grave sins had been committed by the penitent. But when deafness is noticed before the beginning of confession, the penitent is regularly to be led to the sacristy or another place where he can be questioned without danger of revelation, unless, however, a prudent reason prevents it.

b) If confession, in order to be integral, must be very lengthy, in those circumstances in which those standing by would very probably infer from its length that the penitent was guilty of many and grave sins; as if a priest soon to celebrate, or a dying man who had already before confessed sacrilegiously and was going to receive viaticum, or a child about to approach first communion, or one to be ordained already prepared to receive orders, needed a general or more lengthy confession and could not confess integrally without those standing by suspecting him guilty. Yet this excuse is not always present whenever a lengthy confession must be made, for in ordinary circumstances no notable danger of infamy arises from this, since certain penitents are accustomed for various reasons to draw out a long delay with confessors.4

Danger of violation of the seal: a) if for a grave reason the penitent fears that the confessor will break the law of the seal and reveal the confession, whether directly (which surely is very rare), or indirectly, e.g., by raising his voice higher when mortal sins are accused, so that those standing by can hear him; or lest from the indiscretion of the confessor the penitent undergo deprivation of office or support; b) if the confessor himself could not confess his own sin without manifesting sins heard in confession, e.g., if, immediately after hearing a confession, he were to say that he had sinned gravely by asking the name of an accomplice, or by absolving a simoniac badly: for thus it would be manifested that the penitent had committed some mortal sin.

Danger of scandal, which would be feared as arising from confession either to the penitent or to the confessor or to both: a) if the penitent, because of his frailty known and experienced by himself, fears that by recalling base sins longer or minutely he may consent to them again; b) if he seriously fears that, by confessing certain carnal sins, he will be solicited to base things by the confessor, because, e.g., he knows this has happened to himself or to others; c) if he seriously fears that, by an integral confession, the confessor, whose frailty he has discovered, would be led into sin, e.g., by accusing depraved desires of sinning with him; d) if the confessor, because of his own frailty or that of the penitent, very probably fears that, by questioning more diligently, he will scandalize himself or the penitent; these surely very rarely occur.

Danger of spiritual or temporal harm: a) if the penitent is morose and excessively scrupulous in accusing and explaining sins: for since there is there great difficulty of confession and harm to the penitent is feared, and lest confession be made hateful, a prudent confessor, when he has judged it necessary for the good of the penitent, can interrupt the confession and absolve; b) if for a grave reason the penitent fears that from the manifestation of a sin he may incur the hatred of the confessor, unjust persecution, deprivation of office or support, or that the confessor may use the knowledge acquired to the harm of the neighbor, e.g., by dismissing the maidservant with whom the penitent sinned.

But it should be noted that these various causes are not to be explained to the faithful in preaching, lest by deceiving themselves they invent new excuses and be exposed to the danger of withholding many things: these things are necessary for the confessor to know, not for the faithful.

"Sins omitted or forgotten in confession because of imminent danger of life or because of another cause, we are not bound to express in the following confession."

Nor does the saying of St. Thomas, q. 9, a. 3, ad 2, stand in the way: when we cannot confess in one mode, we ought to confess according as we can; for this is understood within the breadth of the precept.

Also useful can be the schema elaborated by d'Herbigny, The Prudent Confessor of Sixteen Languages Even Without Any Knowledge of Languages.

Therefore it is required, notes Vermeersch, Th. M., III, n. 542, c, that "a lengthy confession would be as it were a certain argument of many sins." Hence, says Noldin, Th. M., III, n. 286, 1, "this nevertheless does not hold except in those circumstances in which those standing by must necessarily conclude from a lengthy confession to a great quantity of sins... But in ordinary circumstances it is not lawful to conclude from a lengthy confession to a multitude of sins except by some vague suspicion, because there are several other reasons on account of which penitents remain longer with the confessor (cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, V, n. 249); but the danger of a vague suspicion is not a reason excusing from the integrity of confession."

526. Whether there is an obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be explained without danger of defaming a third person or even of revealing the accomplice himself? - Theologians ask this on occasion of the integrity of confession: for there can be danger of defaming a third person who was the occasion or object of sin, e.g., a pregnant sister who was beaten, a pregnant widow who was killed; or even of revealing the accomplice, as can often happen concerning sins which are committed between spouses, parents and children, blood-relatives or relatives by marriage, or partners in the same affairs. Now:

The penitent is bound to hide another's crime as much as he can, and therefore a) certainly he is bound to approach another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, if this can be done without inconvenience and a just and proportionate cause does not excuse; b) likewise the penitent cannot and is not bound to declare a sin which is not necessary matter of confession (namely, a remitted mortal sin, or a venial sin), lest by confessing it the grave sin of another be manifested: because a proportionate and sufficient reason is lacking.

Outside these cases the penitent can, indeed more probably ought, to confess integrally, even with danger of manifesting the grave sin of another. For it is licit to reveal the crime of another for a just and legitimate reason, especially since the revelation is not harmful when there is no danger of further divulgation, because the confessor is strictly bound to secrecy.³ Besides, an accomplice committing sin and knowing that the other must confess seems to yield his right and implicitly to permit that revelation. And this is the common practice of the faithful, nor do they doubt concerning its liceity or obligation, although nevertheless, because some think otherwise, they cannot be strictly obliged to the manifestation of another's sin.

³ Thus St. Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 5 ad 5; opusc. ad lect. Bisunt. Likewise St. Raymond, St. Bonaventure, St. Antoninus, Cajetan, Sylvester, Medina, Billuart, Suarez, Lugo; and St. Alphonsus, who holds this as more probable. Cano, P. de Soto, Ledesma, Navarrus, Valentia, Bonacina, Diana deny it.

But a sufficient reason for manifesting is necessity or great utility, e.g., a) if the danger of death or the precept of annual confession or Easter communion urges, b) if a special utility is present, namely of receiving communion soon, c) if it is grave for the penitent to omit confession or communion, d) if otherwise he would be deprived of the benefit of an extraordinary indulgence, e) if otherwise he would be forced to remain for the whole day in mortal sin and this would be hard for him, f) if the penitent could open his conscience to another confessor only with reluctance, or would be deprived of the special consolation which he finds with his ordinary confessor.

The confessor can never oblige the penitent to reveal to him, as confessor, the name of the accomplice under penalty of absolution being denied (which Benedict XIV severely prohibited, in 1745 and 1746, under penalty of suspension ferendae sententiae; cf. can. 888, § 2); indeed regularly he cannot even inquire directly. And it would be a mortal sin from its genus, because this practice renders the sacrament hateful and without cause induces the penitent to defame the accomplice. Nevertheless, for a proportionate reason, the confessor can either inquire by an indirect means, or impose the denunciation of the accomplice to be made outside confession.

a) Hence he is not prohibited from making questions about the qualities of the accomplice which seem necessary for the integrity of confession or for detecting the nature of the proximate occasion, even if from this the accomplice is indirectly known, e.g., whether he remains in the same house, is bound by a vow, is a blood-relative, a relative by marriage, etc., in one word: not who he is, but of what quality he is.

b) Indeed, for a most grave cause, on account of the common good (e.g., for avoiding the corruption of others), he can oblige the penitent, even under penalty of absolution being denied, to denounce the accomplice outside confession to a superior, e.g., to a father, master, teacher, etc., indeed also to himself if he is at the same time the superior.

c) And he himself can licitly receive the name of the accomplice if the penitent wishes to denounce him rather indirectly through the confessor than directly to the superior; in which case let him ask that the denunciation be received outside confession, lest confession be made hateful to those who perhaps will hear about this matter. Generally, however, denunciation through the confessor is not expedient, unless the penitent does not wish to manifest the matter to another.

527. Corollaries. - From what has been said above it is understood:

That a specific and distinct accusation is required of itself for necessary matter, namely for mortal sins not yet duly subjected, nor does a generic accusation suffice for validity; unless in a case of necessity.

On the contrary, in free matter, a specific and distinct accusation is not of itself required, but a generic one suffices for validity, because on the one hand there is always the same essence of the sacrament, and on the other hand there is no necessity of confessing free matter; unless perhaps the whole matter were declared altogether generally, and no sin more determinately. - But for liceity, certainly an altogether vague and general confession does not suffice of itself, both because the universal custom of the Church requires a confession distinct in some way (just as it also requires a vocal one), and because of itself and in ordinary circumstances, outside a case of necessity, judgment requires matter determined in some way in species. Hence if someone confesses only venial sins or sins already remitted, it does not suffice to say: I accuse myself of sins, or I confess my venial sins, or formerly I sinned gravely; but he must at least indicate the genus of sin, or against what virtue or precept it was.

We said: of itself; unless perhaps... For an altogether general confession can be invalid indirectly and accidentally from grave illicitness, as is evident from what has been declared.⁴

⁴ Hence this is more true speculatively than practically, as Suarez notes, disp. 23, sect. 1, n. 10: "Perhaps, speaking speculatively only, this can be defended... Nevertheless, practically it must be denied because of the uncertainty of the matter. I say therefore, although a man is not absolutely held to confess the species of venial sins, nevertheless, supposing that he wishes to confess, he is held to exhibit matter altogether certain, if he can, and therefore he ought at his own judgment to confess some venial sin in its particular; but with the necessity or impossibility added of saying anything else, without doubt that matter will be sufficient."

Diss. I, Chapter I — Propositions condemned by the Holy See · Diss. II, Chapter VII — On the causes excusing from the material integrity of confession. On a dying man destitute of his senses, and on confessions to be repeated. Lax opinions are refuted

Doubtful matter or mere imperfections are not sufficient matter. Hence in such a case let the penitent add at least a venial sin; and if he does not do this, let the confessor question about sins which are more commonly committed (e.g., against charity, patience, truthfulness, the duties of one's state, etc.), and if he obtains nothing certain, let him ask about a sin of past life. But as to imperfections, there often lies hidden in them some venial sin of an inordinate motive or of a bad intention, namely when they are not done from a reasonable motive; hence if frequent imperfections are accused, venial sins are mixed in with them, but penitents are to be exhorted rather to say from what motive or inordinate affection they placed these acts.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 12 passages

Vol. II, Tr. XV, Pt. II, Ch. II, Art. II, § II. On Causes Excusing from Integrity

n. 750.

Point I. On Causes Excusing from Integrity in General

I say. A difficulty intrinsic to confession itself, however grave it may be, never excuses from the integrity of confession; but a grave extrinsic difficulty excuses, or rather suspends the obligation, namely some moral inability, and a fortiori physical inability. The reason for the first is that, since confession by its nature and essentially is laborious, if any difficulty intrinsic to it, for example, great repugnance or shame, excused from integrity, for the most part the faithful would be excused from accusing mortal sins, and consequently the institution of the sacrament of Penance would collapse in great part. But the reason for the second is taken from the general principle that those things which are from positive institution do not oblige with a most grave inconvenience, as often as that inconvenience is extrinsic and is joined to them per accidens. - Yet it is required 1°. that only those sins be omitted which cannot be declared; 2°. that another confessor cannot be found, with whom present that extrinsic inconvenience would cease; 3°. that confession be necessary here and now, for example, because of Easter communion or the necessity of celebrating, or if someone living in the state of mortal sin would have to wait for another confessor for several days or even for one day. The reason for these conditions is that otherwise true moral inability would not be present. - Yet I said excuses, or rather suspends the obligation, because, when that most grave inconvenience ceases, the whole obligation of integrity again revives and presses. The reason is that the precept of confession is not fixed to some determinate time, but affects the whole life. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 487; and Hom. Ap. tract. 16, n. 39. - Baller. note (a) p. 381. De Augustinis, part. 2, Thes. 21, p. 266. Viva, on prop. 11 condemned by Alexander VII.

n. 751.

Questions

Question 1. What are the chief examples of inability, whether physical or moral? Resp. They are the following: 1°. Extreme infirmity, that is, when a dying person can express only one or another sin, or, already deprived of the use of the tongue, shows penance and asks absolution only by some sign. 2°. Defect of speech, as happens in the mute, who cannot confess integrally even by signs; or in foreigners, who are entirely or almost entirely ignorant of the language of the region in which they confess. 3°. Defect of time, for example, if soldiers must immediately go to battle. But the multitude of penitents alone does not excuse; for prop. 59 was condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "It is lawful to absolve sacramentally those only half-confessed, by reason of the great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can happen on the day of some great festivity or indulgence." 4°. Danger to the life of the penitent, the confessor, or a third person; for example, if enemies arrive, if many are in danger of shipwreck or contagion. Indeed sometimes in the supreme danger of many persons, all, after exhibiting some general sign of contrition and confession, can be absolved thus by one utterance of the form: I absolve you all, etc. The Sacred Penitentiary responded on 6 Feb. 1915:

"Nothing prevents those thus absolved in the aforesaid circumstances from being admitted to receiving the sacred Eucharist. But let the chaplains of soldiers not omit, when opportunity is given, to teach them that absolution thus to be imparted will not profit unless they have been rightly disposed, and that the obligation remains for the same persons to make an integral confession in its own time, if they escape the danger."

5°. Danger to reputation, for example, if a priest about to celebrate soon, and needing a general confession, could not confess integrally without those standing by suspecting the matter. 6°. Danger of revelation or violation of the seal; for example, if a confessor cannot confess integrally without manifesting sins heard in confession, etc.; or if a penitent from a grave cause fears that the confessor may infringe the law of the seal. But this latter case, if nevertheless it should ever be said to happen, is very rare. 7°. Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor; for example, if a woman certainly knew the greatest fragility of the confessor, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 479 and seq.

n. 751, Q. 2.

Question 2. Whether there is an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which cannot be explained without manifestation of the accomplice? Resp. Affirmatively, more probably, and the reason is that no legitimate excuse is given by which derogation may be made from the precept of integrity: for a positive precept cannot be said to be restricted by the natural precept of not defaming one's neighbor; for justice and charity prohibit only that another's crime be manifested without a reasonable cause; but here a cause is had, and indeed a grave one, namely the procuring of the integrity of confession and the direction of conscience. Besides, the accomplice, by committing sin, loses every right to reputation which he could have with the confessor in order to the confession of this sin; and he implicitly consents of his own accord to this detriment of reputation when he sins. Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 489, with many others. Yet other Doctors probably deny it, teaching that the circumstance from which the accomplice would be detected can, indeed according to some must, be omitted until another confessor is found; nor are they moved by the reasons of the prior opinion, which they say are a begging of the question. - But the patrons of both opinions agree in affirming the obligation of seeking another confessor. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 395. Baller. note (b) pp. 382 and seq. Lehmkuhl, nn. 333 and seq.

n. 751, Q. 3.

Question 3. What are the causes excusing from the obligation of seeking another confessor, to whom the accomplice is unknown? Resp. They are the following: 1°. if danger of death or the precept of annual confession presses; 2°. if it would be grave for the penitent to omit confession or communion; 3°. if someone would open his conscience to another confessor with difficulty; 4°. if someone otherwise would have to remain in sin even for one day; 5°. if someone otherwise would be deprived of the benefit of some extraordinary indulgence; 6°. if by approaching the confessor to whom the accomplice is known there would be had better direction or notably greater consolation. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 490. - Baller. note (b) p. 383.

n. 751, Q. 4.

Question 4. Whether it is lawful for the confessor to ask the name of the accomplice, for example, for correction, etc.?

Resp. Negatively, at least generally speaking, both because this without a just cause induces one to detract from one's neighbor, and because it renders the sacrament of Penance odious. Thus the Code: Let him beware altogether lest he inquire into the name of the accomplice ... Can. 888, §2. It is further clear from Benedict XIV, Const. Suprema Omnium, Const. Ubi primum, Const. Ad eradicandam.

n. 751, Q. 5.

Question 5. Whether by the aforesaid declarations of Benedict XIV it is so forbidden to seek the name of the accomplice that in no case is this lawful? Resp. Negatively, both because Benedict XIV himself supposes cases in which this is lawful according to true, as he says, and sound opinions; and because sometimes the penitent must necessarily reveal the accomplice, and nevertheless cannot do this except through the confessor. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 424 and seq. Baller. note (a) p. 386.

n. 751, Q. 6.

Question 6. Whether and in what way the mute and the deaf are bound to confess? Resp. The mute are certainly bound to confess in some way, at least by signs, unless they are so ignorant and dull that nothing can be drawn from them. The reason is that the precept of confession regards all the faithful who can manifest their sins in some manner. Hence the sufficiently instructed mute are bound to confess integrally, at least by signs, if these are understood by the confessor; but if they are less instructed or can be understood by the confessor only with difficulty, it will suffice for them to manifest only one or another sin, or to signify in general that they are sinners and wish to avoid sin. But the deaf, having the use of the tongue, are bound on their part to confess the sins which occur to memory; but the confessor is not bound to question them for procuring the integrity of confession, on account of excessive difficulty of questioning and danger of revelation.

n. 751, Q. 7.

Question 7. Whether mute persons who know how to write are bound to confess by writing for procuring the integrity of confession? Resp. No one doubts that this can be permitted; but theologians warn that then care must be taken that the writing be destroyed. But if there is question of obligation, not a few very probably deny it, both on account of the danger of revelation, and because writing is an extraordinary means which has never been held in the Church as prescribed, and also because such a mode of confession is of itself public, since writing is of itself public. - Cf. Baller. note (a) p. 388.

n. 751, Q. 8.

Question 8. Whether and in what way those ignorant of the language of the place in which they wish to confess are bound to confess? Resp. Those ignorant of the language of the place in which they are living, and lacking a confessor by whom they can be understood, are bound, when the precept of annual confession presses and in the article of death, to confess in some way, at least by general signs; because although materially they cannot confess integrally, nevertheless they are bound to that which they can do. - But they are not bound to confess through an interpreter, because this is a most grave burden and liable to many dangers, for example, of revelation, ridicule, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 479. - Baller. note (a) p. 389.

n. 751, Q. 9.

Question 9. Whether it is lawful for those who cannot confess otherwise to confess through an interpreter? Resp. Those who cannot confess otherwise are not prohibited, if they wish, from confessing through an interpreter, with abuses and scandals being guarded against, the prescription of can. 889, §2 remaining firm (Can. 903).

n. 752.

Point II. On the Confession and Absolution of the Dying

I say. Although in no way can a dying person be absolved who altogether refuses the sacrament of Penance, or who can in no way be presumed attrite; nevertheless any other dying person can and must be absolved, either absolutely or conditionally; absolutely indeed if in some way by voice or sign he confesses; conditionally, however, if attrition and confession can be presumed on some foundation, however slightly probable. The reason for the first is that otherwise the form of the sacrament would be placed without the dispositions essentially required. The reason for the second is that then confession would be formally integral. Finally, the reason for the third is that in extreme necessity it is lawful to administer a sacrament conditionally with an opinion even slightly probable. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 480 and seq.

n. 753.

You Will Resolve. 1°. All dying persons not yet deprived of the senses and consenting to absolution, and obeying the commands of the confessor, are to be absolved: absolutely indeed if they ask for confession of their own accord or if with a willing soul they propose to confess; but conditionally, if they are with difficulty and scarcely induced to some confession, or if there is prudent doubt concerning their sufficient disposition.

2°. At least conditionally, all dying persons deprived of the senses are to be absolved who before the privation of the senses expressly showed a desire for confession, for example, by ordering a priest to be called, etc. The reason is that they are judged truly to confess through the testimony of those standing by; for then it seems to be done as if a confession through an interpreter. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 481.

3°. Under condition all dying persons altogether deprived of the senses who have lived as Christians are to be absolved, even if then they gave no sign either of sorrow or of desire for confession. The reason is that these can always be presumed to have or to have had some lucid interval, in which by truly sensible signs, such as sighs, motion of the body, etc., they sought absolution. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 482. - Lacroix, n. 1162. - Elbel, n. 208.

4°. Other dying persons deprived of the senses who have lived little as Christians are also to be absolved conditionally; because in them too penance and a desire for confession, which they may have signified outwardly, can still be presumed in some way. - Cf. Lacroix, ibid. - Baller. note (b) p. 390.

5°. A dying person deprived of the senses in the very act of sin, for example, in a duel, adultery, theft, etc., can probably be absolved under condition. The reason is that even he can be sufficiently disposed. This especially has place for one who perhaps was led to the sin by fear, human respect, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 483. Elbel, n. 211.

6°. Indeed, probably and under condition, those can be absolved who up to the privation of the senses rejected the ministry of the priest. For these sometimes even in that state can know those standing by, indeed even perceive the things which are said, and wish sighs, etc., to be taken as signs of a petition for absolution because of their evil will changed through divine help. More strictly, Bucceroni, n. 754bis.

7°. It is also lawful to give absolution to a dying schismatic existing in good faith, scandal being removed; for thus the Holy Office responded to a certain case. A schismatic woman made a confession in a Church before a priest who found that she was not of the body of the Church, but was very well instructed in the principal truths of faith, and evidently existing in good faith. Fearing lest further inquiry would be harmful to her, he absolved her as confessed and contrite. To the question: "Whether material schismatics, who are in good faith, can ever be absolved?" the response was: "When scandal cannot be avoided, Negatively, except in the article of death; and then with scandal effectively removed." 20 July 1898. Gennari, Consultazioni, v. 1, p. 563.

8°. Conditional absolution can be given to a material heretic deprived of the senses. Thus altogether many. Gury, Cas. n. 488. "Because it can be presumed in some measure that here and now, recognizing the truth, he wishes to die in the Catholic religion, and consequently to confess and to be absolved. For this can happen absolutely. ..." "Then, in a case of necessity," says Bucceroni with Gury, "it is lawful to use even a slightly probable opinion in favor of one in danger." Bucceroni, Casus 2, n. 127. 5. Lehmkuhl, n. 651. Gennari, ibid.

9°. With a heretic not deprived of the senses a zealous priest can act thus, according to Lacroix:

"If a Catholic priest understands that a non-Catholic man has been brought to extremes, he acts prudently, unless something else prevents, if he approaches him ... he can elicit with him acts of faith, hope, and charity, and of perfect contrition for sins. But if the circumstances allow, he can afterward ask whether, if he knew that he was not in the true faith, he would not wish to embrace another, and to do all things necessary for salvation, whether he would not wish to confess and be absolved, if this were necessary for salvation. If he assents to this ... he can be absolved under condition." Lacroix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1866. - Cf. Bucceroni, Cas. 2, n. 127, 6. - Lehmkuhl, 11th ed. n. 651. - Gennari, Consultazioni, v. 1, 260. - Varceno, Com. Theol. Mor. De Poen. art. v. - Ball.-Palm. Op. Mor. v. 5, n. 394, 4°.

Let Saint Augustine be heard, "de Conj. adult." lib. 1, chap. 26, n. 33 (M. 40, c. 469): "Therefore for catechumens placed at the end of this life, if by illness or some accident they are so oppressed that, although still alive, nevertheless they cannot ask Baptism for themselves or respond to the questions, let the fact that their will is already known in the Christian faith profit them, so that they may be baptized in the same way in which infants are baptized, whose will has not yet appeared at all. Yet not on that account ought we to condemn those who act more timidly than it would seem to us ought to be done. ... But not only is it incredible that a catechumen should not wish to be baptized at the end of this life; but also if his will is uncertain, it is far better to give to one unwilling than to deny to one willing, where whether he wishes or does not wish is not apparent, yet in such a way that it is more credible that he, if he could, would say that he would rather receive those Sacraments without which he already believed he ought not to go out from the body." And chap. 28, 35: - "I think that not only other catechumens, but even those themselves who, being joined to living spouses, retain adulterous unions, although when sound in body we do not admit them to Baptism; nevertheless, if they lie desperate and cannot respond for themselves, must be baptized, so that even this sin may be washed away by the laver of regeneration. For who knows whether perhaps they had determined to be detained by the enticement of adulterous flesh up to Baptism? But if, having recovered from that desperation, they are able to live, either they will do what they determined, or, having been taught, they will obey, or there will be done concerning them as contemners what ought to be done concerning such baptized persons. But the same reason which belongs to Baptism belongs also to reconciliation, if perhaps the danger of ending life has overtaken one doing penance. For Mother Church ought not to wish even these to go out from this life without the pledge of their peace."

And these principles of solutions can indeed be most useful in this tremendous moment of death. Think of a priest called to a dying man who lives with a concubine, he himself now separated by divorce from his true wife: he repents of the deed; he promises separation, which now becomes impossible; the priest has before him one disposed. But if he can obtain the assistance of witnesses so that his repentance may be publicly established, so much the better. But if he cannot obtain even this, let him absolve the dying man, visit him frequently, and strengthen his dispositions. - Cf. "Nouvelle Rev. Theolog." v. 46, n. 415.

Concina, Compendium

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 17 passages

Diss. I, Chapter I — Propositions condemned by the Holy See

n. 11.

11. Sins omitted or forgotten in confession on account of an instant danger of life, or on account of some other cause, we are not bound to express in the following confession.

n. XI.

XI. Fr. Dominic Viva in his Treatise on Proposition 15 of Alexander VIII, no. 10: “Nor would the law of grace excel the ancient or Mosaic or natural law, in which contrition without sacramental confession sufficed; whence THE YOKE OF CHRIST COULD NOT BE CALLED SWEET AND THE BURDEN LIGHT. … Therefore it must be said that contrition is not prerequired to the sacrament, but that mere attrition conceived from the mere fear of punishments suffices.”

n. XI.

XI. Merbesius: If a penitent should fall frequently into mortal sins, he could be proved for two months, or for a whole three months; at whose expiry, if a true amendment were foreseen, proceeding from his entire fidelity and from the force by which he endeavoured to tear out from his soul sins implanted by long custom, he could be absolved. Page 141, column 1.

Diss. II, Chapter VII — On the causes excusing from the material integrity of confession. On a dying man destitute of his senses, and on confessions to be repeated. Lax opinions are refuted

n. I.

I. QUESTION I. What are the causes excusing from the material integrity of confession? ANSWER. The following. 1. Physical impotence, by force of which are excused, first, those who labour under invincible ignorance; second, the dumb; third, those who during confession suffer a fainting; fourth, those ignorant of the confessor's idiom, if other ministers be lacking; fifth, those who, war, fire, or shipwreck being imminent, are destitute of time for confessing wholly; sixth, as often as there is grave danger in delay, suppose in a shipwreck. In this case, if there be several penitents, let the priest say: I absolve you, and so forth.

n. II.

II. Moral impotence also excuses from material integrity: first, when a priest cannot without breaking the seal lay open some sin; second, a sick man infected with a contagious disease, whose confession cannot be heard even from afar; third, when from a whole confession a sick man would be gravely oppressed; fourth, when from a whole manifestation of sins a most grave detriment would threaten the confessor or the penitent.

n. III.

III. QUESTION II. What is to be said of the opinion asserting that a great frequency of penitents by reason of a solemnity excuses from material integrity? ANSWER. These things Fr. George Gobat teaches, tract 6, no. 479: “Fr. Coninck, Book 6, no. 98, denies that the opinion is probable of those who think that, when there is present so great a multitude of persons wishing to confess for some celebrated feast that the priest cannot satisfy all by hearing all wholly, he can say to each that they lay open only the graver of their mortal sins and defer the rest to another time. I think, subject to a better judgment, that that opinion can probably be sustained, in the case in which many came from far off for the sake of obtaining some great indulgence which requires confession and communion.”

n. IV.

IV. This opinion Innocent XI condemned in this 59th thesis: It is lawful sacramentally to absolve those who have confessed only by halves, by reason of a great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can happen on the day of some great solemnity or indulgence.

n. V.

V. A man hindered from approaching a superior is not excused from material integrity, so that he can be absolved by an inferior priest from the remaining sins with the burden of afterwards approaching the superior. Nor can he manifest to the superior the reserved sins alone and be absolved from them, and confess the remaining sins to an inferior priest. The opposite opinion authors commonly disapprove.

n. VI.

VI. QUESTION III. Ought the person of an accomplice to be manifested in confession? ANSWER. Never without necessity. Wherefore when the circumstance of an accomplice is to be manifested, a penitent ought, while he can, to seek out a confessor to whom the person of the accomplice is unknown. If he cannot find such a confessor, he ought to manifest the accomplice. This has always been the discipline of the Church, as Morinus, Book 2, chapter 11 and following, lays open. For the accomplice by sinning ceded his own right. So St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 73, art. 2. Besides, a penitent, either for his own or for his accomplice's benefit, can manifest the accomplice himself to the confessor.

n. VII.

VII. QUESTION IV. Can a dying man destitute of his senses be absolved, when he asked for confession before the priest's arrival? ANSWER. All commonly affirm it. Even if he did not expressly ask, if nevertheless he beat his breast, or give signs of confession, he is to be absolved.

n. VIII.

VIII. QUESTION V. Is a dying man suddenly destitute of his senses, who neither asked nor gave signs of confession, to be absolved, if nevertheless he lived piously and in Christian fashion? ANSWER. Very many and grave theologians affirm it; and John Morinus above the rest illustrated this affirmative opinion, Book 10, chapter 10. Very many others on the contrary deny it. The arguments of each opinion I have given in Vol. IX, dissertation 4, chapter 10.

n. IX.

IX. In few words I now touch upon the matter. The opinion denying seems to me the more probable; since Christ instituted this sacrament after the manner of a sensible and human judgment. When God wills the salvation of someone, he wills by the same will also the means which he himself prescribes. Therefore when he wills the salvation of someone, he grants him time in which he may exhibit such signs that he can by right be absolved. The matter of the sacrament is the acts of the penitent. If these be lacking, the matter is lacking. And just as, water being lacking, Baptism cannot be administered, so, the acts of the penitent being taken away, the sacrament of Penance cannot be performed. The testimony of St. Augustine which is produced for the affirmative opinion speaks of a catechumen, or of a penitent who by voice or by works had asked for absolution.

n. X.

X. QUESTION VI. What is to be said of the opinion of Fr. Gormaz? ANSWER. I judge probable the opinion of those who defend that Christians destitute of their senses, whose excellent life is established, are to be absolved. But Fr. John Baptist Gormaz goes further, who, disputation 5, section 1, § 1, page 775 and following, teaches this: “It follows sixthly that he also is to be absolved concerning whom it is not established whether he foresaw the peril of life, whether he lived well or ill, if he is found destitute of his senses and near to death. … Wherefore even if perchance someone, while ACTUALLY SINNING, be suddenly deprived of his senses, he is REGULARLY not to be dismissed without absolution, since it most rarely happens that a man near to death should not wish to consult his own salvation at least by attrition, which it is not established that he inwardly lacks, although externally he be deprived of sense: for by the condition an injury to the sacrament is avoided, and so forth. So Bonagratia cited above. See Gobat, tract 7, nos. 577 to 625.”

n. XI.

XI. Are wicked and outrageous Christians therefore regularly to be absolved who, ACTUALLY SINNING, are destitute of their senses in a duel, in fornication, in adultery, in blasphemy, and wearied in the way of iniquity? Does a sinner actually fornicating wish to consult his own salvation at least by attrition? But even the laxer casuists teach that the precept of contrition presses in the article of death. Besides, is not attrition a supernatural gift of God? And will God give this gift to a sinner actually committing adultery? If God permitted him to fall into sin, how can it be presumed that in that same moment God wills regularly to impart to him such a gift?

n. XII.

XII. QUESTION VII. What is to be said of the opinion of Fr. Gobat, by which he eludes the decree of his own Society forbidding the absolution of a dying man destitute of his senses? ANSWER. Fr. Gormaz cites Fr. Gobat; Fr. Gobat cites, tract 7, no. 601, the decree of his own illustrious Society in these words: “Sixthly, the superiors of our Society have most recently and deservedly inhibited their own from teaching hereafter this proposition: A dying man, even if he give or have given no sign of contrition, so that the priest neither knows nor can prudently think that some sensible confession preceded, can be absolved.” Two things Fr. Gobat devised, that he might elude this prudent decree. Behold his words in the place cited, no. 604: “Moreover, concerning that ordination of our Order of which we have spoken in the preceding number, two things are to be noted. First, that it speaks of a case in which it cannot prudently be presumed that he gave a sign. … The other, that the ordination EXPRESSLY only forbids that that opinion BE TAUGHT, not expressly that it BE NOT PRACTISED.” Do you wish for prettier things? What? If even the decrees of his own Society are eluded with witty figments, what obedience can extraneous decrees expect? I pass over in deep silence the corollaries which hence proceed of their own accord. Will they say that the text of Fr. Gobat has been less sincerely produced? I beg all to read in the fount Gobat, and Gormaz, and La Croix, and Viva, and all whom I cite in this work.

n. XIII.

XIII. QUESTION VIII. Is there given a valid but formless confession? ANSWER. They call that sacrament valid but formless which has all the parts essential to validity, but on account of the indisposition of the subject does not confer the effect of grace. Very many theologians defend that there is given a valid but formless confession; very many deny it. The question is merely speculative.

n. XIV.

XIV. QUESTION IX. In what case is confession to be repeated? ANSWER. In very many cases. 1. If sufficient grief was lacking. 2. If a penitent knowingly keep silence about some sin. 3. If through mortally culpable negligence some mortal sin was omitted. 4. If a man confess for a depraved end. 5. If a man gravely lied in confession. 6. If, being conscious of an excommunication, whether greater or lesser, he conceal it. 7. Those who solicitously seek out half-learned or too kindly confessors, that they may obtain absolution from the sins into which they frequently relapse, most certainly make sacrilegious confessions. If a confessor from a frequency of confessions and communions sees no reformation of morals, nor amendment of outrages, but the same crimes perpetrated thereabouts, let him not doubt, but judge the confessions to be sacrilegious.

Slater, Cases II

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 9 passages

Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 13. A Pair of Penitents