point — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Point III. On the Causes Excusing from Material Integrity
I. Ignorance of the law and forgetfulness of sin, provided it is here and now inculpable or at most lightly culpable, for instance when someone after an examination made without grave negligence does not remember some sin. I said "without grave negligence," because light negligence can be combined with ordinary diligence.
II. Physical inability. 1. The dying and the sick who, even if helped by the confessor, cannot confess integrally at all or can do so only with great difficulty, are excused.
- The mute and the deaf, who are bound to confess integrally insofar as they can morally do that by words or signs. It is disputed whether the mute are bound to use writing if otherwise they cannot satisfy the precept. Moreover, most more recent authors deny this. But with St. Thomas (In 4, distinction 17, question 3, article 4, solution 3, ad 2) and St. Alphonsus (VI, 479), it seems this must be affirmed. For only a grave inconvenience, or one extraordinary or unusual with respect to the penitent, excuses from a grave divine precept. But the use of writing neither involves grave inconvenience nor is judged an extraordinary or unusual means of communicating with others with respect to the mute.
Objection. No one is bound to use a means which introduces danger of revelation. But writing is of this kind, since by some accident it can come into the hands of others.
Response. No one is bound to use a means which brings with it danger of revelation worthy of note, I concede; otherwise I deny. But in the case, the danger of revelation attached to writing is not worthy of note, so that not even the burden of undergoing it deserves to be noted. Therefore it does not excuse from fulfilling a grave precept.
A somewhat deaf person should be led into a remote place, unless it is to be feared that bystanders would suspect that he sinned gravely. But this does not take place if deafness is noticed at the beginning of confession; otherwise, for the most part, if it is noticed in the course of confession (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 16, n. 35).
Those ignorant of the language of the confessor are excused if another confessor cannot be had shortly and conveniently. If the confessor does not know only the dialect of the penitent, so that, at least after asking for explanation, he understands several or even many things, it is licit for a lesser cause to hear the confession of the penitent. For the rest, the penitent is not bound to use an interpreter (canon 903), and this holds even if he can easily declare one or another sin through an interpreter, for instance a sin which is already known to the interpreter from elsewhere (St. Alphonsus, VI, 479).
Those lacking opportunity of time, for instance when battle or shipwreck is imminent. The same can happen in a hospital, if all, because of the multitude of the dying, cannot confess integrally in time. Likewise the penitent is excused if it is to be feared that the confessor may die or that something grave may happen to him before confession has been integrally completed, and another cannot be approached conveniently and shortly.
A great concourse of penitents does not excuse, as follows from proposition 59 condemned by Innocent XI:1 "It is licit sacramentally to absolve those who have confessed only by half, by reason of a great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can happen on the day of some great feast or indulgence."
1 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1209.
III. Moral inability, which is had when the penitent cannot confess integrally without probable damage, whether spiritual or temporal, extrinsic to confession and proportionate to the gravity of the precept. It is said without probable damage; certain damage is not required, because it is already a grave inconvenience to expose oneself to grave danger. Here are referred:
Danger of infamy, for instance if a sick person, for example in a hospital, cannot confess sins without others hearing them; or if someone cannot omit or defer Holy Communion or Mass without notice or scandal, and has committed so many sins that he cannot confess integrally without others suspecting his evil state. Outside this case a lengthy confession rarely brings with it danger of infamy, because all know that confession is often prolonged not at all because of many grave sins to be confessed, but in order to seek counsels, etc.
Danger that the confessor will violate the seal; likewise if the penitent by confessing integrally would violate the seal. These will scarcely take place.
Danger of a fall arising from diligent examination and recollection of sins.
Danger of damage to be feared for a scrupulous person from integral confession (St. Alphonsus, VI, 484-488).
Question. Whether extraordinary shame excuses.
Response. All concede: 1. that those who are more ashamed than others are not excused; 2. that shame which arises from a circumstance commonly occurring does not excuse. But some judge that shame arising from an extraordinary circumstance excuses, for instance if someone had to confess a very disgraceful sin to his nephew. But this opinion seems wholly to be rejected, according to what was said on p. 135.
IV. Damage of the confessor or of a third party to be prevented, for instance if the penitent is infected with plague, and integral confession would expose the confessor to danger of contagion; or if the penitent fears that by confessing integrally he would create danger of a fall for a confessor inclined to lust (St. Alphonsus, VI, 479; 484-488).
Question. Whether there is an obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be manifested without infamy of the accomplice or of any third party.
Response 1. It must be affirmed if the penitent, independently of the precept of integrity, enjoys the right of bringing infamy on the accomplice or third party, for instance if the accomplice, as regards the crime of which there is question, has been condemned by a judge. The reason is that in the case the natural law of preserving reputation is not opposed to the precept of integrity.
Response 2. Outside the hypothesis posited, it is disputed. Some deny. Others not only deny, but also teach that under light obligation1 it is illicit to confess a sin of this kind, because the natural law of preserving the reputation of one's neighbor prevails over the law of integrity. Others, whose opinion we embrace, affirm, and judge that the law of integrity, according to the mind of Christ, prevails. For: 1. if the opinion of the adversaries is admitted, provision often would not be made for the prudent ministration of the sacrament. For prudent ministration commonly, as is clear from Trent,2 requires the manifestation of all sins according to species, number, and circumstances changing the species. 2. If that opinion is admitted, the law of integrity would not rarely become illusory, since especially in smaller places the confessor can easily suspect who the accomplice is, and another confessor cannot conveniently be approached. Add that in antiquity there was the custom, and of itself the obligation, of confessing to the parish priest, who was accustomed to know his subjects and their circumstances. 3. Authors both more numerous and more outstanding in authority adhere to the stricter opinion, for example St. Thomas (in 4, distinction 16, question 3, article 2), St. Alphonsus (VI, 489), St. Bernard,3 St. Antoninus,4 St. Bonaventure,5 Cajetan,6 Suarez,7 Lugo.8
Nevertheless, the penitent is bound under light obligation,9 if it can be done conveniently, to approach a confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown. But a just cause excuses from this obligation, as if otherwise the penitent would remain for some time in the state of mortal sin, or would have to abstain from Communion or celebration which he was accustomed to institute daily; if this confessor would be especially useful to the penitent, for instance by affording him greater quiet or consolation; if the penitent would confess with more difficulty to another than to his usual confessor, etc. (St. Alphonsus, VI, 490). Besides, in practice the confessor can commonly permit penitents to expose sins, and ask them about occasions and circumstances to be confessed, even if from that accidentally he comes to knowledge of the accomplice. Nevertheless, let him generally take care that penitents expose their own sins rather than the sins of others, for example of husband or wife.
Corollary I. In order that it be licit, because of the excusing causes explained above, not to confess integrally, it is required:
That there be some necessity or at least a moderate cause of confessing, for instance the precept of annual Communion or confession, or if someone could not omit Communion without notice; likewise the inconvenience of remaining, for instance for a day, in sin, or of omitting Communion which he was accustomed to receive daily (St. Alphonsus, VI, 487).
That another confessor cannot be had without grave inconvenience, to whom integral confession can be made without the inconvenience which the penitent intends to avoid.
Corollary II. It is clear: 1. that only that sin can be kept back to the declaring of which the excusing inconvenience is attached;10 2. that sins kept back are afterward to be declared if the excusing inconvenience has ceased.
1 Under light obligation only, because the manifestation of a sin to one man who will keep the secret is light, unless it concerns an enormous crime; or unless the sin is manifested to one from whom it is especially in the sinner's interest that it be hidden, for example to his superior.
3 Varia et brevia documenta, n. 1.
4 Part 3, title 14, chapter 19, § 11.
5 In 4, distinction 21, part 2, article 1, question 3.
6 Summa, word Confessio, condition 3.
7 Disputation 34, section 2, assertion 2.
8 Disputation 16, section 7, n. 394.
9 Under light obligation, because infamy before one trustworthy man is of itself venially evil.
10 But it is disputed whether the whole sin or only the circumstance can be kept back if the inconvenience is attached only to the circumstance to be declared. Some teach that only the circumstance can be kept back; others judge that in the case the whole sin can be kept back when afterward the circumstance to be kept back cannot be supplied without the whole sin being exposed. Otherwise, they say, there would be an obligation of confessing the same thing twice. But the controversy is of little practical importance.