§ II. On Causes Excusing from Integrity

I say. A difficulty intrinsic to confession itself, however grave it may be, never excuses from the integrity of confession; but a grave extrinsic difficulty excuses, or rather suspends the obligation, namely some moral inability, and a fortiori physical inability. The reason for the first is that, since confession by its nature and essentially is laborious, if any difficulty intrinsic to it, for example, great repugnance or shame, excused from integrity, for the most part the faithful would be excused from accusing mortal sins, and consequently the institution of the sacrament of Penance would collapse in great part. But the reason for the second is taken from the general principle that those things which are from positive institution do not oblige with a most grave inconvenience, as often as that inconvenience is extrinsic and is joined to them per accidens. - Yet it is required 1°. that only those sins be omitted which cannot be declared; 2°. that another confessor cannot be found, with whom present that extrinsic inconvenience would cease; 3°. that confession be necessary here and now, for example, because of Easter communion or the necessity of celebrating, or if someone living in the state of mortal sin would have to wait for another confessor for several days or even for one day. The reason for these conditions is that otherwise true moral inability would not be present. - Yet I said excuses, or rather suspends the obligation, because, when that most grave inconvenience ceases, the whole obligation of integrity again revives and presses. The reason is that the precept of confession is not fixed to some determinate time, but affects the whole life. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 487; and Hom. Ap. tract. 16, n. 39. - Baller. note (a) p. 381. De Augustinis, part. 2, Thes. 21, p. 266. Viva, on prop. 11 condemned by Alexander VII.

Question 1. What are the chief examples of inability, whether physical or moral? Resp. They are the following: 1°. Extreme infirmity, that is, when a dying person can express only one or another sin, or, already deprived of the use of the tongue, shows penance and asks absolution only by some sign. 2°. Defect of speech, as happens in the mute, who cannot confess integrally even by signs; or in foreigners, who are entirely or almost entirely ignorant of the language of the region in which they confess. 3°. Defect of time, for example, if soldiers must immediately go to battle. But the multitude of penitents alone does not excuse; for prop. 59 was condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "It is lawful to absolve sacramentally those only half-confessed, by reason of the great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can happen on the day of some great festivity or indulgence." 4°. Danger to the life of the penitent, the confessor, or a third person; for example, if enemies arrive, if many are in danger of shipwreck or contagion. Indeed sometimes in the supreme danger of many persons, all, after exhibiting some general sign of contrition and confession, can be absolved thus by one utterance of the form: I absolve you all, etc. The Sacred Penitentiary responded on 6 Feb. 1915:

"Nothing prevents those thus absolved in the aforesaid circumstances from being admitted to receiving the sacred Eucharist. But let the chaplains of soldiers not omit, when opportunity is given, to teach them that absolution thus to be imparted will not profit unless they have been rightly disposed, and that the obligation remains for the same persons to make an integral confession in its own time, if they escape the danger."

5°. Danger to reputation, for example, if a priest about to celebrate soon, and needing a general confession, could not confess integrally without those standing by suspecting the matter. 6°. Danger of revelation or violation of the seal; for example, if a confessor cannot confess integrally without manifesting sins heard in confession, etc.; or if a penitent from a grave cause fears that the confessor may infringe the law of the seal. But this latter case, if nevertheless it should ever be said to happen, is very rare. 7°. Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor; for example, if a woman certainly knew the greatest fragility of the confessor, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 479 and seq.

Question 2. Whether there is an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which cannot be explained without manifestation of the accomplice? Resp. Affirmatively, more probably, and the reason is that no legitimate excuse is given by which derogation may be made from the precept of integrity: for a positive precept cannot be said to be restricted by the natural precept of not defaming one's neighbor; for justice and charity prohibit only that another's crime be manifested without a reasonable cause; but here a cause is had, and indeed a grave one, namely the procuring of the integrity of confession and the direction of conscience. Besides, the accomplice, by committing sin, loses every right to reputation which he could have with the confessor in order to the confession of this sin; and he implicitly consents of his own accord to this detriment of reputation when he sins. Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 489, with many others. Yet other Doctors probably deny it, teaching that the circumstance from which the accomplice would be detected can, indeed according to some must, be omitted until another confessor is found; nor are they moved by the reasons of the prior opinion, which they say are a begging of the question. - But the patrons of both opinions agree in affirming the obligation of seeking another confessor. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 395. Baller. note (b) pp. 382 and seq. Lehmkuhl, nn. 333 and seq.

Question 3. What are the causes excusing from the obligation of seeking another confessor, to whom the accomplice is unknown? Resp. They are the following: 1°. if danger of death or the precept of annual confession presses; 2°. if it would be grave for the penitent to omit confession or communion; 3°. if someone would open his conscience to another confessor with difficulty; 4°. if someone otherwise would have to remain in sin even for one day; 5°. if someone otherwise would be deprived of the benefit of some extraordinary indulgence; 6°. if by approaching the confessor to whom the accomplice is known there would be had better direction or notably greater consolation. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 490. - Baller. note (b) p. 383.

Question 4. Whether it is lawful for the confessor to ask the name of the accomplice, for example, for correction, etc.?

Resp. Negatively, at least generally speaking, both because this without a just cause induces one to detract from one's neighbor, and because it renders the sacrament of Penance odious. Thus the Code: Let him beware altogether lest he inquire into the name of the accomplice ... Can. 888, §2. It is further clear from Benedict XIV, Const. Suprema Omnium, Const. Ubi primum, Const. Ad eradicandam.

Question 5. Whether by the aforesaid declarations of Benedict XIV it is so forbidden to seek the name of the accomplice that in no case is this lawful? Resp. Negatively, both because Benedict XIV himself supposes cases in which this is lawful according to true, as he says, and sound opinions; and because sometimes the penitent must necessarily reveal the accomplice, and nevertheless cannot do this except through the confessor. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 424 and seq. Baller. note (a) p. 386.

Question 6. Whether and in what way the mute and the deaf are bound to confess? Resp. The mute are certainly bound to confess in some way, at least by signs, unless they are so ignorant and dull that nothing can be drawn from them. The reason is that the precept of confession regards all the faithful who can manifest their sins in some manner. Hence the sufficiently instructed mute are bound to confess integrally, at least by signs, if these are understood by the confessor; but if they are less instructed or can be understood by the confessor only with difficulty, it will suffice for them to manifest only one or another sin, or to signify in general that they are sinners and wish to avoid sin. But the deaf, having the use of the tongue, are bound on their part to confess the sins which occur to memory; but the confessor is not bound to question them for procuring the integrity of confession, on account of excessive difficulty of questioning and danger of revelation.

Question 7. Whether mute persons who know how to write are bound to confess by writing for procuring the integrity of confession? Resp. No one doubts that this can be permitted; but theologians warn that then care must be taken that the writing be destroyed. But if there is question of obligation, not a few very probably deny it, both on account of the danger of revelation, and because writing is an extraordinary means which has never been held in the Church as prescribed, and also because such a mode of confession is of itself public, since writing is of itself public. - Cf. Baller. note (a) p. 388.

Question 8. Whether and in what way those ignorant of the language of the place in which they wish to confess are bound to confess? Resp. Those ignorant of the language of the place in which they are living, and lacking a confessor by whom they can be understood, are bound, when the precept of annual confession presses and in the article of death, to confess in some way, at least by general signs; because although materially they cannot confess integrally, nevertheless they are bound to that which they can do. - But they are not bound to confess through an interpreter, because this is a most grave burden and liable to many dangers, for example, of revelation, ridicule, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 479. - Baller. note (a) p. 389.

Question 9. Whether it is lawful for those who cannot confess otherwise to confess through an interpreter? Resp. Those who cannot confess otherwise are not prohibited, if they wish, from confessing through an interpreter, with abuses and scandals being guarded against, the prescription of can. 889, §2 remaining firm (Can. 903).

I say. Although in no way can a dying person be absolved who altogether refuses the sacrament of Penance, or who can in no way be presumed attrite; nevertheless any other dying person can and must be absolved, either absolutely or conditionally; absolutely indeed if in some way by voice or sign he confesses; conditionally, however, if attrition and confession can be presumed on some foundation, however slightly probable. The reason for the first is that otherwise the form of the sacrament would be placed without the dispositions essentially required. The reason for the second is that then confession would be formally integral. Finally, the reason for the third is that in extreme necessity it is lawful to administer a sacrament conditionally with an opinion even slightly probable. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 480 and seq.

You Will Resolve. 1°. All dying persons not yet deprived of the senses and consenting to absolution, and obeying the commands of the confessor, are to be absolved: absolutely indeed if they ask for confession of their own accord or if with a willing soul they propose to confess; but conditionally, if they are with difficulty and scarcely induced to some confession, or if there is prudent doubt concerning their sufficient disposition.

2°. At least conditionally, all dying persons deprived of the senses are to be absolved who before the privation of the senses expressly showed a desire for confession, for example, by ordering a priest to be called, etc. The reason is that they are judged truly to confess through the testimony of those standing by; for then it seems to be done as if a confession through an interpreter. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 481.

3°. Under condition all dying persons altogether deprived of the senses who have lived as Christians are to be absolved, even if then they gave no sign either of sorrow or of desire for confession. The reason is that these can always be presumed to have or to have had some lucid interval, in which by truly sensible signs, such as sighs, motion of the body, etc., they sought absolution. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 482. - Lacroix, n. 1162. - Elbel, n. 208.

4°. Other dying persons deprived of the senses who have lived little as Christians are also to be absolved conditionally; because in them too penance and a desire for confession, which they may have signified outwardly, can still be presumed in some way. - Cf. Lacroix, ibid. - Baller. note (b) p. 390.

5°. A dying person deprived of the senses in the very act of sin, for example, in a duel, adultery, theft, etc., can probably be absolved under condition. The reason is that even he can be sufficiently disposed. This especially has place for one who perhaps was led to the sin by fear, human respect, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 483. Elbel, n. 211.

6°. Indeed, probably and under condition, those can be absolved who up to the privation of the senses rejected the ministry of the priest. For these sometimes even in that state can know those standing by, indeed even perceive the things which are said, and wish sighs, etc., to be taken as signs of a petition for absolution because of their evil will changed through divine help. More strictly, Bucceroni, n. 754bis.

7°. It is also lawful to give absolution to a dying schismatic existing in good faith, scandal being removed; for thus the Holy Office responded to a certain case. A schismatic woman made a confession in a Church before a priest who found that she was not of the body of the Church, but was very well instructed in the principal truths of faith, and evidently existing in good faith. Fearing lest further inquiry would be harmful to her, he absolved her as confessed and contrite. To the question: "Whether material schismatics, who are in good faith, can ever be absolved?" the response was: "When scandal cannot be avoided, Negatively, except in the article of death; and then with scandal effectively removed." 20 July 1898. Gennari, Consultazioni, v. 1, p. 563.

8°. Conditional absolution can be given to a material heretic deprived of the senses. Thus altogether many. Gury, Cas. n. 488. "Because it can be presumed in some measure that here and now, recognizing the truth, he wishes to die in the Catholic religion, and consequently to confess and to be absolved. For this can happen absolutely. ..." "Then, in a case of necessity," says Bucceroni with Gury, "it is lawful to use even a slightly probable opinion in favor of one in danger." Bucceroni, Casus 2, n. 127. 5. Lehmkuhl, n. 651. Gennari, ibid.

9°. With a heretic not deprived of the senses a zealous priest can act thus, according to Lacroix:

"If a Catholic priest understands that a non-Catholic man has been brought to extremes, he acts prudently, unless something else prevents, if he approaches him ... he can elicit with him acts of faith, hope, and charity, and of perfect contrition for sins. But if the circumstances allow, he can afterward ask whether, if he knew that he was not in the true faith, he would not wish to embrace another, and to do all things necessary for salvation, whether he would not wish to confess and be absolved, if this were necessary for salvation. If he assents to this ... he can be absolved under condition." Lacroix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1866. - Cf. Bucceroni, Cas. 2, n. 127, 6. - Lehmkuhl, 11th ed. n. 651. - Gennari, Consultazioni, v. 1, 260. - Varceno, Com. Theol. Mor. De Poen. art. v. - Ball.-Palm. Op. Mor. v. 5, n. 394, 4°.

Let Saint Augustine be heard, "de Conj. adult." lib. 1, chap. 26, n. 33 (M. 40, c. 469): "Therefore for catechumens placed at the end of this life, if by illness or some accident they are so oppressed that, although still alive, nevertheless they cannot ask Baptism for themselves or respond to the questions, let the fact that their will is already known in the Christian faith profit them, so that they may be baptized in the same way in which infants are baptized, whose will has not yet appeared at all. Yet not on that account ought we to condemn those who act more timidly than it would seem to us ought to be done. ... But not only is it incredible that a catechumen should not wish to be baptized at the end of this life; but also if his will is uncertain, it is far better to give to one unwilling than to deny to one willing, where whether he wishes or does not wish is not apparent, yet in such a way that it is more credible that he, if he could, would say that he would rather receive those Sacraments without which he already believed he ought not to go out from the body." And chap. 28, 35: - "I think that not only other catechumens, but even those themselves who, being joined to living spouses, retain adulterous unions, although when sound in body we do not admit them to Baptism; nevertheless, if they lie desperate and cannot respond for themselves, must be baptized, so that even this sin may be washed away by the laver of regeneration. For who knows whether perhaps they had determined to be detained by the enticement of adulterous flesh up to Baptism? But if, having recovered from that desperation, they are able to live, either they will do what they determined, or, having been taught, they will obey, or there will be done concerning them as contemners what ought to be done concerning such baptized persons. But the same reason which belongs to Baptism belongs also to reconciliation, if perhaps the danger of ending life has overtaken one doing penance. For Mother Church ought not to wish even these to go out from this life without the pledge of their peace."

And these principles of solutions can indeed be most useful in this tremendous moment of death. Think of a priest called to a dying man who lives with a concubine, he himself now separated by divorce from his true wife: he repents of the deed; he promises separation, which now becomes impossible; the priest has before him one disposed. But if he can obtain the assistance of witnesses so that his repentance may be publicly established, so much the better. But if he cannot obtain even this, let him absolve the dying man, visit him frequently, and strengthen his dispositions. - Cf. "Nouvelle Rev. Theolog." v. 46, n. 415.