2. Causes Excusing from Material Integrity

378. Excusing causes can be reduced to two heads, for they are either physical or moral inability. It must be noted, however, that those sins which because of physical or moral inability were not accused in confession must be manifested, not indeed as soon as possible, but in the following confession, if the inability has ceased. The reason is that, although those sins were indirectly remitted, nevertheless the divine precept of explicitly confessing all mortal sins not yet directly remitted still remains.²²⁰ But if the inability perseveres, confession does not oblige.

²²⁰ Cf. proposition 11 condemned by Alexander VII, cited below under n. 4.

379. Physical inability is judged to be present in the following or similar cases, namely, if there exists:

1. Extreme illness.

Namely, if a man is so infirm and near death that he can no longer speak or think sufficiently. Since contrition is much more necessary than materially complete confession, the confessor approaching a very weak sick person should strive more to elicit with him acts of true contrition than to inquire concerning the material integrity of the confession.²²¹

2. Defect of speech.

Hence there are excused: a) mute persons who cannot confess by signs or writings all sins and specific circumstances; b) those ignorant of the language when the obligation of confession urges and access to another confessor knowing the language is not open. In this case confession through an interpreter is indeed to be counseled, but not imposed (cf. above, n. 365, 8).

3. Lack of time because of imminent danger of death.

For example, when shipwreck or battle is imminent, those in danger of shipwreck or soldiers can be absolved even though they have not confessed all their sins. In other cases, however, lack of time never excuses from material integrity. Hence even amid the greatest concourse of penitents the confessor cannot licitly dispense with the integrity of confession, even if the penitents must then wait longer or even depart without confession. Therefore Innocent XI condemned proposition 56: "It is lawful sacramentally to absolve those only half-confessed because of a great concourse of penitents, such as can occur, for example, on the day of some great feast or indulgence."²²²

4. Invincible ignorance or forgetfulness.

Therefore a penitent who cannot remember some sin committed is validly and licitly absolved. It is evident of itself, however, that such a penitent is bound to employ serious diligence in order to remember all the sins committed, and must accuse himself of them if afterward the sins again come to mind. Therefore Alexander VII condemned proposition 11: "We are not bound in the following confession to declare sins omitted or forgotten in confession because of imminent danger of life or because of another cause."²²³

Many authors²²⁴ teach that a grave sin omitted through forgetfulness but afterward coming to mind must be submitted to the keys of the Church before Communion, because according to the Council of Trent²²⁵ no one conscious of mortal sin can approach the Most Holy Eucharist. But such a man is still conscious of mortal sin. This doctrine is assuredly to be commended if it can be put into execution without inconvenience; but if repeated confession cannot be made without inconvenience, it suffices and is required that this omitted sin be declared at least in the following confession. This opinion rightly seems to St. Alphonsus²²⁶ altogether consonant with reason, because such a sin omitted through forgetfulness was certainly remitted and the penitent is in the state of sanctifying grace.

There is no strict obligation of committing sins to writing lest they slip from memory. For this is judged by several authors to be an extraordinary means; cf., however, below, n. 384.

²²¹ Cf. above, n. 326.

²²² Denz., n. 1209.

²²³ Denz., n. 1111.

²²⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 257.

²²⁵ Sess. 13, c. 7, On the Eucharist (Denz., n. 880).

²²⁶ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 257.

380. Moral inability is present if the material integrity of confession cannot be had without a great moral inconvenience which is external to the confession itself and joined with it per accidens here and now. It is very necessary to observe, however, that not every inconvenience internal to confession excuses from its material integrity, for example, great repugnance and shame, loss of one's own reputation with the confessor, and so forth. Therefore the conditions required for this moral inability are the following: 1. that from particular and external circumstances of the confession there arise a grave inconvenience, corporal or spiritual, either to the penitent, the confessor, or a third person; 2. that this confession cannot be deferred without grave inconvenience, for example, because the necessity of communicating or celebrating urges; 3. that this confession cannot be made without grave inconvenience before another confessor with whom the same difficulties do not arise. Examples of such moral inability are:

1. Excessive scrupulosity of the penitent. Cf. above, I, n. 323, concerning the so-called privileges of the scrupulous.

2. Danger to the life of the penitent, the confessor, or a third person.

For example, if during a plague the confessor fears contagion; if during a persecution the penitent gravely fears agents sent against him.

3. Danger of scandal or a fall, either on the part of the penitent or on the part of the confessor.

For example, a woman cannot confess except before a priest whom she knows with certainty to be very prone to lust. If this woman were now to manifest her own lustful desires toward the priest, he would very probably sin. In this case the woman must conceal these sinful desires. In practice such a case is exceedingly rare. According to certain authors this excuse also exists if a venerable pastor falls into a shameful sin against chastity which he must confess to a young vicar fragile in virtue. For perhaps the pastor could persuade himself that the vicar, hearing that a sin of this kind had been perpetrated by a respected priest, would imitate the evil example heard or would altogether lose heart.²²⁷

4. Danger of violating the seal.

For example, a confessor cannot confess his own sin without manifesting the sins of some person heard in confession; or if a somewhat deaf person confesses while others are standing nearby; or if the confessor speaks too loudly in the confessional; or if a gravely ill person who cannot be left by his attendants confesses; or if the penitent fears that the confessor will indirectly violate the seal, which case can indeed be supposed only very rarely. According to certain authors, such an excuse exists if a vicar living with the pastor falls into a very great sin of lust and cannot confess except before the pastor, concerning whom he justly fears that he will use the knowledge had from confession and will treat him badly.²²⁸

5. Danger to the reputation either of the penitent himself before other persons or of a third person.

The reputation of the penitent which is endangered before the confessor alone does not excuse from material integrity, as was already said above; but the reputation of the penitent which is endangered before other persons does, for example, if he cannot confess without others standing nearby hearing his sins, or without something sinister being suspected concerning him because of the altogether unusual length or circumstance of the confession. The reputation of a third person is endangered especially if the sin committed cannot be perfectly declared without the confessor recognizing the person of the accomplice.

Authors do not agree whether it is lawful to omit a grave sin in confession in order to avoid the defamation of an accomplice before the confessor. The reason for doubting is this: on the one hand, natural law commands that the reputation of one's neighbor not be injured without a grave cause; but on the other hand, the divine precept commands the integrity of confession. The following things seem to be established:

²²⁷ Cf. Génicot, Theol. mor. II, 193, 4, and Cas. consc. II, 214.

²²⁸ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Cas. consc. II, n. 157.

381. a) The name of the accomplice is to be concealed whenever this can be done without grave inconvenience. Hence it is not lawful to manifest the name of the accomplice in order to declare a venial sin or even a mortal sin already directly remitted elsewhere. Likewise, the penitent is bound to confess a sin of this kind before a confessor who does not know the accomplice, if this can be done without grave inconvenience.

b) It is certain that a confessor objectively sins gravely if he directly inquires into the name of the accomplice, although he does this for a good end, for example, in order to amend the accomplice. For thus Benedict XIV repeatedly established.²²⁹ The Code of Canon Law, c. 888, § 2, commands: "Let the confessor beware altogether lest he inquire into the name of the accomplice." The sole exception is a most grave cause of the common good or of a third person. Hence, for example, if a boy living in a college accuses himself of a grave sin of lust committed with a fellow student, he must be obliged in confession to denounce that fellow student, not indeed to the confessor himself but to the competent superior, if otherwise a grave and imminent danger of the perversion of other boys cannot be averted. It is evident, however, that manifestation of the accomplice is not lawful if the danger can be forestalled in another way.²³⁰ Confessors unjustly requiring the name of an accomplice under penalty of denying absolution not only sin gravely, but can also be suspended by the bishop from hearing confessions.

c) The confessor can licitly inquire into circumstances of sins which must necessarily be declared and into an existing proximate occasion, and so forth, although he then indirectly obtains knowledge of the accomplice. The reason is that the obligation of procuring according to his strength the integrity of confession rests upon the confessor.

d) Since it is lawful from a just and proportionate cause to manifest a true offense of one's neighbor, theologians commonly teach that the penitent can confess his own sin completely, even though his neighbor and the neighbor's offense thereby become known indirectly to the confessor, provided that a sufficient cause is present. The following are regarded as sufficient causes: a) if danger of death or the precept of annual confession urges; b) if it is grave for the penitent to omit confession or Communion; c) if someone opens his conscience to another confessor only with difficulty; d) if someone must otherwise remain in mortal sin and this is grave for him; e) if much better spiritual direction is had before the confessor to whom the accomplice is known.²³¹

e) The penitent not only can but also must confess his own sin completely, although the name of the accomplice thereby becomes known indirectly to the confessor. St. Alphonsus²³² calls this opinion common and himself follows it with Gonet, Palao, Concina, Juénin, the Salmanticenses, St. Bonaventure, St. Antoninus, Cajetan, Suarez, Lugo, and others. St. Thomas²³³ also defends this opinion, saying: "If the penitent ... cannot express the species of the sin except by expressing the person with whom he sinned, for example, if he lay with his sister, it is necessary that in expressing the species of the sin he express the person. But if it can be done, he must seek such a confessor as does not know the person of his sister at all." And St. Bernard²³⁴ teaches the same: "Speak sinisterly of no one ... except in confession ... where you cannot otherwise manifest your sin." The reason for this doctrine is that the penitent ought not to have greater care for the reputation of another than for his own reputation. But he is bound to confess his sin even though his own reputation is injured. Therefore the same must be said even if the reputation of another is diminished by the confession. Moreover, this injury to reputation must implicitly be permitted by the accomplice, since he could well have foreseen this obligation of confession when he freely consented to the sin. Finally, this injury to reputation is not so harmful to the accomplice, since the confessor is most strictly bound to the sacramental seal. Nevertheless, the opposite opinion, which in this case exempts from the integrity of confession, is not without at least extrinsic probability,²³⁵ and therefore if someone wishes to follow it, he is not to be disturbed. But the intrinsic reason adduced for this opinion seems weak. For they say: The natural law of not injuring another's reputation prevails over the positive law of confessing completely. But it is easily answered: natural law prohibits only the unjust injury of another's reputation, but it by no means forbids that, from a just and proportionate cause, such as the precept of confessing completely, the offense of another person become known. Since these things are so, the penitent should indeed preserve according to his strength the reputation of the accomplice unharmed, especially if there is question of manifesting a shameful crime; but he is not to be disturbed if from a reasonable cause he confesses his sins before a confessor who thereby indirectly learns the name of the accomplice.

²²⁹ Brief of July 7, 1745; Constitution Ubi primum of June 2, 1746; Constitution Ad eradicandum of September 28, 1746.

²³⁰ Cf. concerning the order to be observed in fraternal correction above, I, n. 602, and S. theol. 2, 2, q. 33, a. 7.

²³¹ Cf. Noldin-Schmitt, De sacr.¹⁷, n. 287.

²³² Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 480.

²³³ Opusc. 12, Ad lectorem Bisuntinum, q. 6, near the end.

²³⁴ Among the spurious works of St. Bernard, in Migne, Patr. lat. 184, 1173.

²³⁵ Cf. Busembaum in St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 488.

382. Admonition of St. Alphonsus.²³⁶ "No one doubts that a penitent is sometimes bound to manifest an accomplice in order to prevent some grave harm. But in view of so rigorous a prohibition of the Pontiff [Benedict XIV], for the purpose of avoiding the infamy of one's neighbor, injury to the sacrament, violation of the seal, scandal, and so forth, it is not lawful for the confessor to inquire into the name of the accomplice for the purpose of making a correction. Hence, in a case in which the penitent is truly bound to disclose the accomplice, the confessor will be able only to impose upon the penitent in general that he reveal the accomplice to someone who can prevent the scandal; but it will never be lawful for the confessor to say: Reveal him to me. But if the penitent of himself and of his own accord were to ask the confessor to correct the accomplice, then the confessor has need of great prudence; for, ordinarily speaking, it is not expedient that he involve himself in a matter of this kind. For it rests upon him only to take care of the harm of his own penitent, not that of another, and only within confession, not outside it; and on the other hand, the confessor will with difficulty undertake this office of correcting without danger of scandal and of offense to the sacred ministry."

²³⁶ L.c., n. 492.