Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article III. On Causes Excusing from Integrity.
282. Besides physical causes, moral causes also must be admitted which excuse from the material integrity of confession, so that therefore the sacrament of penance can be validly and licitly received, even though the sins which are not declared could absolutely be declared. Yet difficulty internal to confession itself never excuses from the integrity of confession, however grave it may be, such as great repugnance or shame, fear of rebuke, loss of one's own reputation before the confessor; but a great external inconvenience excuses, which by accident renders confession very difficult. Therefore the causes excusing from the material integrity of confession are reduced to these two: a. to physical impotence; b. to moral impotence.
Concerning sins licitly omitted in confession and therefore remitted only indirectly, these things must be noted:
a. The obligation remains of confessing sins licitly omitted; therefore if the cause excusing from integrity should cease, those sins must be declared in confession: for by the divine precept all mortal sins committed after baptism, if it can be done, must be subjected to the keys in themselves and directly remitted.
b. But no obligation exists to confess these sins as soon as possible; therefore their confession can be deferred until the following confession, which is instituted either from devotion or from precept. Nevertheless in the next confession they must absolutely be declared, unless a cause excusing from integrity is again present: for those sins constitute necessary matter of confession; if, therefore, sins previously licitly omitted are not declared in the next confession, this will be sacrilegious from defect of integrity, unless again there is a cause legitimately excusing.
283. Physical impotence: for no precept obliges to that which is impossible. Examples of physical impotence are:
Extreme illness. Therefore the dying who cannot confess integrally, whether because they plainly cannot manifest their sins, or because, after one or another sin has been said, they fail, or because there is grave danger that they will fail, can be validly and licitly absolved, even if their confession is not entire; nevertheless, if afterward they receive strength, they must supply the omissions.
Defect of speech excuses from the integrity of confession mutes, the deaf, and those ignorant of the confessor's language.
a. Mutes, who cannot confess integrally by signs, must express what they can; and when the precept of confession urges, if they can do nothing else, they must at least show by a sign that they have sinned, so that absolution can be given to them.
b. The deaf (and the same must be said of the hard of hearing), who have the use of speech, are bound on their part to confess the sins which occur to memory; but the confessor is not bound to interrogate them in order to procure the integrity of confession, on account of the too great difficulty of interrogation and the danger of revelation.
c. One ignorant of the language, since he is not bound to confess through an interpreter, when the precept of annual confession urges and in danger of death, is bound only to confess in that manner in which he can, namely he is bound to manifest at least by signs or nods that he is a sinner.1
The hard of hearing, who can converse with the confessor in a louder voice, are to be led to a more remote place, in which they may confess integrally without danger of revelation. Nevertheless, because of grave inconvenience, this can licitly be omitted, as if the penitent only with difficulty goes to such a place. If the confessor finally notices the penitent's deafness in the course of confession, let him beware lest he enjoin him in a loud voice to return at another time, because in this way bystanders could judge that the penitent is guilty of graver sin.2 But those seem too anxious who think that the same suspicion is suggested to bystanders when the confessor, noticing deafness, immediately leads the penitent to the place destined for the confession of the deaf: for in this case the bystanders judge nothing else than that the penitent is deaf.3
Defect of time. If soldiers, with battle imminent, or those sailing, in shipwreck, or those infected by plague in a public hospital, cannot all be heard because the narrowness of time does not permit it, all together can confess that they are sinners and grieve concerning their sins, and then be absolved by one form: I absolve you, etc.
Inculpable ignorance or forgetfulness. If not all sins come into mind, even though diligent examination of conscience is instituted, or if sins known in the examination slip from the mind in the act of confession, this inculpable ignorance excuses from the observance of the law.
a. Therefore he who, after a diligent examination has been made, is ignorant in confession of some sin which he really committed, or, while he confesses, does not remember some sin, is validly and licitly absolved. b. He who from light negligence is ignorant of sins in the examination and omits them in confession is validly absolved: for venial fault impedes neither the validity nor the fruit of the sacrament. c. Finally, if the ignorance here and now is indeed inculpable, but arises from grave fault previously committed, the confession is likewise valid: he, for example, who too long delayed confession even with transgression of the ecclesiastical precept, and for that reason can no longer remember several sins, confesses formally integrally if he accuses those things which occur after diligent examination.
1 Cf. the decree of the Holy Office, 28 Feb. 1633, which establishes that a penitent who does not wish to use an interpreter can and must be absolved, even if by signs he manifests sins only in general.
2 St. Alphonsus, n. 644.
3 Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. II, n. 328 (n. 433); Genicot, Theol. mor. inst. II, n. 292.
284. Moral impossibility: namely where, without grave spiritual or temporal harm to oneself or to the neighbor, an entire confession cannot be made. Yet in order that sins can be licitly omitted in confession on account of moral impotence, these conditions are required: a. that another confessor cannot be found before whom the sins can be manifested without any inconvenience; b. that confession here and now is necessary and cannot conveniently be deferred to another time; c. that only those sins be omitted which cannot be declared without grave inconvenience. But by the common opinion of authors, confession is judged necessary on account of Easter communion or annual confession, on account of the necessity of celebrating or communicating, on account of danger of scandal or infamy, if otherwise someone would have to remain longer (beyond three days, indeed through one day) in the state of sin with danger of death and eternal salvation. Examples of moral impotence are:
- Danger to the reputation of the penitent himself.
This can happen in a twofold case: a. if the penitent confesses in those circumstances in which others also will hear the sins, as if other penitents are standing near the confessional and cannot be removed, or if in a hospital another sick person lies nearer to one confessing, who will hear his confession. b. If the confession is very long, from which others must suspect many and grave sins. Yet this has force only in those circumstances in which the bystanders must necessarily conclude, from a long confession, to a great multitude of sins, as if confession is instituted while the necessity of communicating or celebrating urges. But in ordinary circumstances it is not licit to conclude to a multitude of sins except by some vague suspicion from a long confession, because there are several other reasons on account of which penitents remain longer with the confessor;1 but the danger of vague suspicion is not a reason excusing from the integrity of confession.
a. Hence a priest about to celebrate at once and needing a longer confession is excused from integrity if he can neither defer nor omit the holy sacrifice without suffering detriment to his reputation before the bystanders.
b. If a priest carrying viaticum to a sick man discovers that this man has confessed sacrilegiously for a long time, he can and must, after one or another sin has been heard, absolve him meanwhile, and afterward, returning to him, complete the confession, lest suspicion of this matter arise among the bystanders from a longer confession.2
c. Likewise, if the confessor discovers that a longer confession is necessary for the penitent, but the penitent can neither institute a longer confession because of defect of time nor abstain from communion because of danger to his reputation, after hearing the sins which he can accuse without danger to reputation, the confessor can meanwhile absolve the penitent and supply the confession another time.3
Danger of violation of the seal. This can happen if the confessor cannot confess integrally without manifesting sins heard in confession. If the penitent deservedly fears that a sin will be revealed by the confessor, e.g., because in the confessional he speaks in too high a voice, so that bystanders could hear him.
Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor.
a. If the penitent, on account of the known very great fragility of the confessor, fears danger of sin from the manifested sin, he can omit it. b. If the penitent, on account of his own fragility known to himself, fears lest by thinking long in examination about certain sins he may fall, he can examine himself only in passing, even though by defect of examination certain things are omitted. c. The same holds of the confessor who, by interrogating about shameful matters, fears danger of sinning for himself or for the penitent.
- Grave spiritual or temporal harm, whether one's own or another's.
If the penitent from the manifestation of a sin reasonably fears unjust persecution, deprivation of office or support, he can be silent about that sin meanwhile. The scrupulous are rightly prohibited from repeating past confessions, even if they had omitted some sins through forgetfulness; likewise they are prohibited from examining themselves longer, even if there is danger of failing in integrity: for lest they suffer grave harm from their anxieties, they can neglect the integrity of confession.
And these causes indeed excusing from the integrity of confession are admitted by all; two others remain, concerning which the opinion of doctors was not always the same.
1 Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 249.
2 St. Alphonsus, n. 484.
3 Cf. Bucceroni, Casus conscient. 5, n. 125.
285. On a sin which cannot be explained without manifestation of the accomplice. This question is whether there is an obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be explained without manifestation of the accomplice, or whether danger of defaming another before the confessor excuses from the integrity of confession in the same way as the danger which the penitent himself incurs of losing his reputation before others excuses.
a. The penitent is certainly bound, if he conveniently can, to seek another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, so that he may confess integrally and at the same time preserve the reputation of the accomplice, even if he must defer confession. Therefore he sins against justice who confesses to a confessor to whom the accomplice is known, when he can have another confessor without great inconvenience, before whom the unknown accomplice is not defamed.
The causes excusing from the obligation of seeking another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown are almost the following: a. if danger of death or the precept of annual confession urges; b. if it is grave for the penitent to omit confession or communion; c. if someone with difficulty opens his conscience to another confessor; d. if someone otherwise must remain in sin even for one day, and this is grave for him; e. if someone otherwise is deprived of the benefit of an extraordinary indulgence; f. if before the confessor to whom the accomplice is known, there is had better direction or notably greater consolation.1
b. It is not licit to confess a sin which is not necessary matter of confession if it cannot be accused without defamation of the accomplice. Much less is it licit to name the accomplice in confession of those sins which can be sufficiently accused without manifestation of the accomplice; hence if the confessor notices that the penitent wishes to name the accomplice where there is no necessity of naming, he must prohibit it.
Therefore, if the penitent cannot confess a venial sin without manifesting the accomplice, for example light touches admitted by a brother, he must omit it. But if the penitent either without just cause confessed before a confessor to whom the accomplice is known, or without necessity manifested the accomplice in confession, he would scarcely sin gravely: for to reveal the crime of another to one prudent man ordinarily is not grave defamation.
c. Now if another confessor, to whom the accomplice is unknown, cannot be approached without inconvenience, and confession cannot conveniently be deferred, the opinion of those who with St. Alphonsus (n. 489) teach that danger to reputation, which the accomplice suffers before the confessor, does not excuse the penitent from the obligation of confessing integrally seems altogether to be preferred; accordingly he must accuse the sin even with the defamation of the accomplice.
And just as the penitent can and must manifest his sin even with the defamation of the accomplice, so also the confessor can freely and licitly interrogate the penitent about those things which are necessary for him to know, as about circumstances which change the species (whether the accomplice in a base sin is married, whether he is bound by vow), or about the proximate occasion of sinning (whether he lives in the same house, etc.), although from the responses he comes to knowledge of the accomplice.
And indeed the opinion which in this case excuses from the integrity of confession, so that the reputation of the accomplice may be spared, is founded on this single argument: the natural law of not injuring the reputation of the neighbor is to be preferred to the positive law of confessing integrally. But: a. the natural law forbids only that the reputation of the neighbor be injured without just cause; but the precept of confessing integrally seems to be a sufficiently just and grave cause permitting this injury, especially since the injury can scarcely be called grave. b. There is added the common practice both of penitents, who everywhere accuse circumstances of this kind, and also of confessors, who freely interrogate penitents about circumstances from which they can come to knowledge of the accomplice.
If the penitent cannot confess a sin without manifestation of the accomplice, several teach that it is not licit for the penitent to omit that sin entirely, but only the circumstance which he cannot manifest without detriment. If, for example, incest cannot be manifested, fornication, or at least a sin against chastity, must be declared. Nevertheless de Lugo judges that the whole sin can be omitted: for since the confessor ordinarily will immediately ask about those things which are necessary for knowing the lowest species of the sin, the detriment which the penitent fears will scarcely be able to be avoided in that way.2 This doctrine seems all the more to be approved, because no one is bound to confess the same sin twice; but the penitent, in order to complete the integrity of confession, would have to confess the same sin twice.
d. Nevertheless, since the opposite opinion, which teaches that a sin which cannot be manifested without harm to the accomplice must be kept silent, does not lack at least external probability, the confessor can follow it in practice; and a penitent who has knowledge of this opinion and of its probability, and wishes to institute his confession according to it, cannot be compelled to open the sin with harm to the accomplice.
1 Gury, Theol. mor. II, n. 500.
2 Cf. De poenit., disp. 16, n. 528.
286. On the multitude of penitents. There were those who taught that a multitude of penitents excuses from the integrity of confession, namely when on the day of a great feast a multitude of penitents come together, several of whom could not be heard if all had to confess integrally. Nevertheless it must be said that, according to the mind of the Church, the multitude of penitents alone never excuses from the integrity of confession, even if they have come from afar and would have to lack communion or indulgence.1
Besides the fact that this spiritual harm is not judged to be so great that on account of it the obligation of confessing integrally ceases, the great danger which would follow if this excusing cause were admitted must also be noted: for confessors would too easily, on account of a gathering of people, absolve penitents after only part of their sins had been declared, and penitents would choose days of gathering in order to confess, lest they have to confess integrally. Wherefore in a case of this kind either the penitent who needs a longer confession must be dismissed, or, if he cannot defer confession and omit communion without scandal or infamy, it must be permitted that several of the faithful on that day lack the holy sacraments and the indulgence.
1 This proposition (59) was condemned by Innocent IX: It is licit to absolve sacramentally those only half-confessed on account of the great gathering of penitents, such as can happen, for example, on the day of some great feast or indulgence.
287. On asking the name of the accomplice. a. The confessor inquires after the name of the accomplice formally when he intends to know the accomplice himself, and he inquires materially when he intends to know the sin or state of conscience of the penitent, even if by accident at the same time he also knows the accomplice.
b. The name of the accomplice is inquired after formally not only by him who expressly asks the name of the accomplice, but also by him who rashly and without just cause asks about circumstances which designate the person of the accomplice.
- Formal inquiry after the accomplice is of itself prohibited under grave obligation, whether it is instituted from curiosity or from a good end, for example, to correct the accomplice; but material inquiry is not prohibited, indeed sometimes it must be instituted, namely where the circumstances from which the accomplice is known by accident are necessary to know either for procuring the integrity of confession or for directing the conscience of the penitent by suitable remedies.
a. Concerning this matter there exist three constitutions of Benedict XIV,1 which the holy pontiff issued both to protect the right which others have in their own reputation and to preserve the sanctity of the sacrament; Pius IX confirmed them in the constitution Apostolicae sedis.
b. He who inquires after the name of the accomplice commits grave sin, not indeed because without just cause he induces another to detract, but because he renders the sacrament of penance odious and acts against the severe prohibition of the Church.2
- It can happen that the confessor rightly demands, even under penalty of absolution to be denied, that the accomplice be manifested to himself or to a superior by the penitent or by another. Namely, if the common good requires denunciation of the accomplice, the confessor must compel the penitent to make the denunciation to the superior of the community. But if the penitent should wish to manifest the name of the accomplice to the confessor rather than to the superior, without doubt the confessor can licitly receive this name. In this case, however, it is expedient that the denunciation be made and received outside confession.
1 Constitution Suprema (1745) to the bishops of Lusitania; constitution Ubi primum (1746); constitution Ad eradicandum (1746).
2 Cn. 838, 2.