Point I. On Causes Excusing from Integrity in General

497. Principles. - I. Causes are sometimes given which excuse from the material integrity of confession, because sometimes that integrity is physically or morally impossible.

II. In order that someone may be judged excused from the material integrity of confession by reason of moral inability, although the sins occur to his mind, these conditions must be observed: 1. that only those sins be omitted which cannot be declared, or from the manifestation of which would follow a most grave extrinsic inconvenience, whether spiritual or temporal, to the penitent, the Confessor, or some third person; 2. that another Confessor cannot be found to whom an integral confession may be made without such inconvenience; 3. that confession be necessary here and now ¹. - St. Lig., no. 487.

¹ From the common opinion of the Doctors, this necessity is judged to be present: 1. if the precept of annual confession or Communion must be fulfilled; 2. if reception of the Eucharist or celebration of Mass cannot be omitted without reproach or scandal; 3. if otherwise someone must long be deprived of the benefit of the sacraments; 4. indeed, as Suarez adds (De Poenit., disp. 23, sect. 2, no. 7), if otherwise someone would be deprived of the great utility which the sacrament of itself brings.

III. A difficulty intrinsic to confession itself never excuses, however grave it may be. The reason is that confession by its nature is essentially laborious, and therefore, if a grave difficulty, for example, great repugnance or shame or the loss of one's own reputation before the Confessor, excused from integrity, the faithful would generally be excused from accusing mortal sins, and consequently the institution of the Sacrament of Penance would in great part collapse. Moreover, the Church could not reserve atrocious crimes, because that creates no slight inconvenience for penitents.

IV. When the cause excusing from material integrity ceases, the divine precept of confessing all omitted mortal sins again urges; for when an impediment occurs, the obligation of confession does not cease simply, but is only suspended. Therefore, when the excusing cause ceases, the obligation of the law fully revives; and since the precept of confession is not affixed to a time or circumstance but concerns the whole of life, sins not yet accused must afterward, if it can be done, necessarily be accused. This is established moreover from Proposition 11 condemned by Alexander VII, which is as follows: We are not bound in the following confession to express sins omitted or forgotten in confession because of an imminent danger of death or because of another cause.

498. Resolutions. - The following chiefly excuse from the material integrity of confession:

1. Extreme sickness, that is, when a dying person can express only one or another sin, or, already deprived of the use of speech, shows penitence by some sign only and asks for absolution.

2. A defect of speech; thus the mute are exempted from integrity when they cannot confess integrally either in writing ² or by signs; likewise travelers wholly or almost wholly ignorant of the language of the region in which they confess.

² The Author himself (below, no. 503, q. 7), with most of the Doctors, denies that there is ever an obligation of confessing in writing.

3. A lack of time, for example, if soldiers must proceed immediately to battle. The mere multitude of penitents does not excuse, however, as was said above.

4. Danger to the life of the penitent, the Confessor, or a third person; for example, if enemies arrive, or if many are in danger of shipwreck or contagion. Indeed, sometimes, in the extreme danger of many, all can be absolved by one pronouncement of the form, I absolve you, etc., after some general sign of contrition and confession has been exhibited.

5. Danger to reputation, for example, if a Priest about to celebrate at once, and needing a general confession, could not confess integrally because those present would suspect the matter.

6. Danger of revelation or violation of the seal; for example, if a Confessor cannot confess integrally without revealing sins heard in confession, etc.; or if a penitent for a grave cause fears that the Confessor may violate the law of the seal. But this latter case, if indeed it should ever be said to occur, is exceedingly rare.

7. Danger of scandal or a fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the Confessor; for example, if a woman knew with certainty the very great frailty of the Confessor, etc. - St. Lig., no. 479 and following.

499. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Is there an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which cannot be explained without disclosing the accomplice?

Reply. More probably, affirmative, with the more common opinion. The reason is: 1. because no legitimate excuse is given by which the precept of integrity may be derogated from; for it cannot be said that the positive precept is restricted by the natural precept of not defaming one's neighbor, since the precept of charity ³ prohibits only that the crime of another be manifested without cause; but here there is a cause, and indeed a grave one, namely, procuring the integrity of confession and the direction of conscience; 2. the accomplice, by committing the sin, loses every right to reputation which he could have before the Confessor in relation to the confession of this sin, and he himself implicitly and freely consents to this injury to his reputation when he sins ⁴. - St. Lig., no. 489, with many others.

³ The obligation that the reputation of another not be injured through the revelation of a hidden crime seems to be derived from the virtue of justice rather than charity.

⁴ Cardinal De Lugo, after showing (De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 395) that the reason for this opinion, namely, that to be defamed before one Confessor is not a grave harm, is less firm - which, he says, supposes another false opinion which I attacked in the Treatise on Justice and Right - judges the same concerning this very thing and the reasons adduced by the Author (ibid., no. 397). Others, he says, prove it because the penitent uses his own right in confessing his own sin, and the accomplice exposed himself to this danger of disclosure, since he knew the obligation which everyone has of confessing his sin integrally. But all these and similar things contain a begging of the question and suppose what is to be proved. For the question concerns this very thing, whether the penitent has a right to defame the accomplice, and consequently whether, in doing so, he uses his own right. Hence it is falsely supposed that the accomplice exposed himself to this harm. For if the penitent does not have the right, or if this is not proved from elsewhere, he did not expose himself to any such danger.

Nor does the argument which Lugo, after rejecting the foregoing, endeavored to make sufficient (loc. cit., no. 398) seem any firmer, namely, that since the good of an integral confession is of such a kind and so great that on account of it Christ obliges the penitent to manifest his own crimes and to undergo infamy, it follows that for the sake of that same good He permitted the manifestation of another's crime. For the case of one's own reputation and that of another's reputation is so disparate that, according to the opinion of all and therefore even according to his opinion, I am bound, if I can, to seek another Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, but I am by no means bound to seek a Confessor to whom I myself am unknown.

There is added the fact that the weight of extrinsic Authority, considering both the number and the eminent name of the Doctors (see the same Lugo, loc. cit., no. 393), appears no lighter in favor of the opposite opinion, which expressly denies the obligation of an integral confession from which the accomplice would be disclosed. Therefore, a sufficient reason by which someone may be compelled to confess a circumstance of this kind seems wholly lacking.

But although equal probability may seem to favor each of these two opinions, the case of each is nevertheless not equal. For the mere probability of the opinion which exacts integrity even with the disclosure of the accomplice is, by the general canon, unequal to inducing a certain obligation. But no reason other than this very obligation is present which could excuse from preserving the accomplice's reputation. Therefore, other inconveniences being excluded, the integral obligation of keeping that circumstance silent seems to remain whenever infamy to another would follow from its confession.

I said, other inconveniences being excluded; for, as the Author also intimates, if the penitent for a special cause needs direction and the counsel of a Confessor, because, for example, he has in the accomplice a proximate occasion of sinning, but no other Confessor is present either to whom the person of the accomplice is unknown or who, because the circumstances of the penitent are unknown to him, is qualified to furnish suitable counsels, he certainly will not be bound to undergo some grave danger to his own soul in order to protect the reputation of another. Nevertheless, it will certainly rarely happen that direction of this kind is so necessary and so urgent that no delay can be interposed while counsel is sought.

Nevertheless, not a few others probably deny it, teaching that another Confessor who does not know the accomplice is to be sought ⁵; and if one cannot be had, the circumstance from which the accomplice would be discovered can, indeed must, be omitted until another Confessor is found. - Thus Busembaum, Diana, Navarre, Mazzotta, Medina, Elbel, etc.

⁵ The obligation of seeking another Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, when this can conveniently be done, is maintained most commonly even by those Doctors whose opinion the Author reports in the first place; and only a few have affirmed that this is merely a counsel, whose opinion is rejected by all, as may be seen in St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 489) and Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 392). Therefore, the controversy among the Doctors does not concern whether it is lawful to confess a sin with injury to the reputation of the accomplice when this inconvenience can easily be avoided by employing another Confessor, but rather whether, when another Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown is lacking, the circumstance which would disclose the accomplice is to be passed over in silence, as is evident from what was said in the preceding note.

500. • QUESTION 2. What causes excuse from seeking another Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, as the patrons of the second opinion require ⁶?

⁶ According to the mind of the Doctors, as we said in the preceding notes, the question ought rather to be proposed thus: What causes excuse from seeking a Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, according, namely, to those who deny that the circumstance of the accomplice can ever be kept silent? For this is the difference between the two opinions: although each obliges the penitent, for preserving the reputation of the accomplice, to seek a Confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, nevertheless, if such a Confessor is lacking, some say that the circumstance by which the reputation of the neighbor would be injured must be kept silent, while others contend that it must be expressed so that the integrity of confession may be preserved. These latter are the ones who judge that, because of the causes here mentioned by the Author, the reputation of the accomplice can be set aside; for the others admit those same causes as sufficient, not indeed that the crime of the neighbor may lawfully be revealed, but insofar as in those circumstances it is lawful to approach the Sacrament of Penance even without the integrity of confession being preserved, namely, reserving the circumstance of the accomplice for a confession in which there is no danger of injuring the reputation of another. - See St. Alph., no. 490.

Reply. 1. If danger of death or the precept of annual confession urges; 2. if it would be grave for the penitent to omit confession or Communion; 3. if someone would disclose his conscience to another Confessor only with difficulty; 4. if someone otherwise would have to remain in sin even for one day; 5. if someone otherwise would be deprived of the benefit of some extraordinary indulgence; 6. if by approaching a Confessor to whom the accomplice is known, better direction or notably greater consolation would be obtained.

Hence, by reason of seeking counsel, alleviating sorrow, etc., mothers and wives who manifest to a Confessor the sins of their sons or husbands ⁷ are often excused, even though he knows them. For it would be too hard that they should be bound to seek another Confessor. Therefore, in general there is not held to be a grave obligation of approaching another Confessor for the sake of concealing the accomplice, unless perhaps there is question of a very grave crime. - St. Lig., no. 490, etc.

⁷ The present question is by no means customarily raised concerning causes of this kind, which are judged of the lightest moment. For these things generally occur in families and, besides, are not usually secret. Suppose rather a wife who must confess adultery committed with her husband's brother, and one indeed initiated into holy orders.

501. • QUESTION 3. Is it lawful for the Confessor himself to ask the name of the accomplice, for example, for correction, etc.?

Reply. Negative, at least generally speaking, because this both induces one to detract from one's neighbor without a just cause ⁸ and renders the Sacrament of Penance odious. This is established from the Bull Ubi primum of Benedict XIV, in which the Pontiff, speaking of Confessors who demand the name of the accomplice under the penalty of denying absolution, declares that they sin gravely and incur suspension from hearing confessions, but only ferendae sententiae ⁹.

⁸ If, according to the common opinion of the Doctors, a penitent is bound to seek another Confessor lest he betray the accomplice in the sin, indeed, according to the judgment of several, is excused for this reason from confessing a circumstance otherwise necessarily to be expressed, it is plainly evident that it is much less lawful for Confessors spontaneously to ask the penitent for the name of the accomplice.

⁹ Four Constitutions of Benedict XIV exist concerning this matter. The first was given on July 7, 1745, to the Bishops of the Portuguese dominion, in which he designates and condemns the practice of asking the name of the accomplice. It begins: Suprema omnium Ecclesiarum sollicitudo. - The second was given on June 2, 1746; in it he confirms the former, establishes penalties against delinquents, and determines the order of proceeding in cases of this kind. It begins: Ubi primum. - The third was given on September 28 of the same year, 1746; in this he extends to the whole Church, or rather declares to be extended and in force, those things which he had decreed for the Portuguese dominion. It begins: Ad eradicandum pravum zizanii semen. - The fourth, finally, was given on December 9, 1749, in which he adds certain things to the second concerning the manner of proceeding in cases of this kind.

The condemned practice is designated thus in the first Constitution: It has come... to our ears that certain... confessors, allowing themselves to be seduced by a false appearance of zeal, but straying far from zeal according to knowledge, have begun to maintain and introduce a certain perverse and pernicious practice in hearing... confessions...; namely, that if perhaps they should encounter penitents having a companion in crime, they would indiscriminately ask those penitents for the name of such a companion or accomplice; and they would not merely endeavor by persuasion to induce them to reveal it to them, but, what is more detestable, having also announced the denial of sacramental absolution unless they revealed it, they would utterly force and compel them; indeed, they would also demand that not only the name of that same accomplice, but in addition the place of residence, be designated to them. They did not hesitate both to color this intolerable imprudence with the specious pretext of procuring the correction of the accomplice and gathering other goods, and to defend it by certain borrowed opinions of the Doctors; although in reality, by following false and erroneous opinions of this kind, OR BY APPLYING TRUE AND SOUND ONES BADLY, they were bringing ruin upon their own souls and those of their penitents, and furthermore were rendering themselves guilty before God... of several grave harms which they ought to have foreseen would easily follow therefrom. And indeed, it is known by unhappy experience that many harms of this kind have already followed; nor could it happen otherwise than that on this account disparaging talk and scandals, and hatred not only of the Ministers but even of the sacred Ministry itself, and an immense disturbance of minds among the faithful people, should arise.

But the penalties according to the Constitution Ubi primum are: 1. the penalty of excommunication incurred by the fact itself and reserved to the Roman Pontiff against anyone who in the future should dare to teach that a practice of this kind, as it is set forth and reproved in the related Brief, is lawful, or should presume to write or speak in defense of the same condemned practice, or rashly to attack or twist into other meanings or interpret those things which are decreed against the same practice in the said Brief. - 2. But against those who, in conformity with the aforesaid reprobated practice, should presume to question penitents who confess to them in the tribunal of penance some sin or crime in which they had a companion or companions, concerning the name of the companion or accomplice, the place of residence, or other adjuncts or circumstances of this kind concerning a more express and more individual disclosure of the same accomplice, denying sacramental absolution to that penitent if he refused to disclose it, it is decreed that, beyond the incurring of mortal sin, they are to be subjected to suspension from the office of hearing confessions and also to other graver penalties; these, as is evident, are ferendae sententiae. But these penalties remain in their force even after the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, in which the excommunication imposed by Benedict XIV is confirmed.

Since, however, in the same Constitution this case is committed to the tribunal of the Holy Office, these things are added concerning the obligation of denouncing delinquents: But whoever shall have known that any other person has transgressed in any of the aforesaid ways shall be bound to denounce him to the same Holy Office within the term of days customarily fixed in the Edicts of the Holy Office for an inquisition of this kind (in the edict a month is fixed); otherwise they shall incur the penalties customarily inflicted by the same edicts upon those who do not denounce (this penalty was a reserved excommunication, now removed by the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis).

Nevertheless, the penitent who is involved in the case is exempted from this obligation of denouncing in the following manner: Nevertheless, for just causes, we will and do exempt from an obligation of this kind to denounce the very person of the penitent alone in his own case, that is, in the case in which, while confessing his own sin, he is compelled by the Confessor to manifest to him the name of the accomplice in the same sin....

But the case is then said to pertain to the tribunal of the Holy Office only when an evil persuasion concerning the condemned doctrine is added; for otherwise it will pertain to the Ordinary. But if, he says, it should happen that the act of a confessor wrongly asking the name of the accomplice and denying absolution unless it be disclosed to him is of such a kind that, although imprudent and evil, it was nevertheless a simple and bare act, that is, destitute of those circumstances which render him suspect of an evil belief or of an evil adherence to the practice... reproved in the said Brief as lawful, then a delict of this kind... shall not be subject to the cognizance... of the Holy Office; but to take cognizance of it and to punish the delinquent confessor by suspension from hearing confessions or by other canonical and legitimate penalties according to the character of the delict shall pertain wholly to the Ordinaries of the places in their respective Dioceses.

Finally, since in the second Constitution it was prescribed that a denunciation was to be made to the tribunal of the Holy Office only when there was an underlying suspicion of evil doctrine, in the fourth Constitution it is defined that this is always to be observed, whether the priest is thought to have transgressed because of adherence to the reprobated practice or suspicion of an erroneous opinion, or merely through imprudence without the aforesaid circumstances; namely, that in the tribunal of the Holy Office itself an examination concerning the pertinence of the case should be made and sentence passed, whether the case is to be left to the Holy Office or the accused is to be judged by the Bishop.

Moreover, concerning this fourth Constitution a doubt troubled some, namely, whether it was issued for the dominion of Portugal alone, or also for other places. For: 1. the Synopsis of the Bull has thus: To the Holy Inquisition in the kingdoms of Portugal and the Algarves is adjudged cognizance of the pertinence of cases against Confessors, etc. And in fact it treats there only (see secs. 1, 2) of controversies stirred up in Portugal and of the Bishops of that region, so that the Pontiff seems to have wished entirely to provide for them. - 2. In the Constitution itself mention is indeed made of two Constitutions which had been issued for those kingdoms; but no mention is made of the third, by which it was declared that the condemnation both of the evil practice and of the doctrine pertained to the whole Church. - 3. Since in the third there is prescribed that manner of promulgation which is proper to Decrees pertaining to all provinces, namely, that copies be affixed publicly at Rome to the doors of the Basilicas, etc., in this fourth, as also in the first and second, there is no mention of this promulgation. - But on the other side the reason for issuing the Constitution seems to make against this, and it appears to have force also for other places. For it is of this kind (sec. 6): Since the same delict was established to be referred in certain circumstances to the tribunal of the Holy Office, but in others to the Ordinary, certain persons zealous for ecclesiastical peace suggested that in the execution of a method of this kind an approach to new disturbances would be opened, because there would be no one who could pronounce judgment in a case of disagreement; whence it came about that, the fear of a denunciation to be made to the same Office of the Inquisition having been removed in some circumstances, that could certainly be said to have been taken away which especially restrained men from so pernicious a... delict.

502. • QUESTION 4. Is it so forbidden by the aforesaid letters of Benedict XIV to ask the name of the accomplice that in no case is this lawful?

Reply. Negative. 1. Because Benedict XIV himself supposes cases in which this is lawful according to true, as he says, and sound opinions; 2. because sometimes the penitent must necessarily reveal the accomplice, and yet can accomplish this only through the Confessor. - See Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 17, nos. 427-432 ¹⁰.

¹⁰ To the true and sound opinions which Benedict XIV affirms certain men were accustomed to abuse in the Constitution Suprema pertains that which Cardinal De Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 432) establishes thus: The Confessor can see that, from concealment of the accomplice, most grave harms are imminent, which the penitent is altogether bound to prevent; again he sees that the penitent cannot accomplish this by himself immediately, nor has another through whom he can do it, other than

the Confessor himself; in which case it is certain that the penitent is bound to choose that sole means; but if he is unwilling, he is no longer fit to receive absolution. See in the same Lugo (ibid., no. 433) the example of a Regular Prelate who can sometimes for this reason oblige a subject to reveal an accomplice.

St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 491), from the opinion of Fr. Philip de Carboneano (in the note or appendix to Antoine, De Poenit., ch. 1, art. 2, q. 6), adds that Confessors certainly can and are bound, for preserving the integrity of confession, to inquire into necessary circumstances, namely, those which either change the species or must be inquired into so that provision may be made for the penitent's conscience; for example, if the Confessor asks whether the person of the accomplice is in the first or second degree, whether bound by a vow, whether she is a maidservant, whether she lives in the same house, even though he thereby comes to know the accomplice. These things can certainly be admitted insofar as something must necessarily be known so that provision may be made for the salvation of the penitent; although even in this it seems necessary to take care lest inquiry descend further than is necessary into particular adjuncts, for example, whether she is a maidservant. But as regards knowing the species of the sin - to omit for the moment that the degree of relationship in incest more probably does not change the species, while the circumstance of a vow is too unusual to require inquiry, especially since, if present, it is usually disclosed spontaneously - it is useful to remember the obligation by which, according to all, a penitent is bound to seek another Confessor lest he betray his accomplice in sin, and that for the same reason, according to the opinion of the gravest Doctors (see the notes above at nos. 495 and 500), those circumstances can lawfully be kept silent at that time. Therefore, if the questions, as is supposed in the case, would easily lead to betraying the accomplice, it can hardly be admitted that the Confessor must, or even can, employ them.

QUESTION 5. Is there an obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be declared without defaming another who was the occasion of the sin, for example, if someone killed his sister who was pregnant through a crime?

Reply. It is controverted, as in the nearly similar case discussed above in the first question. Lugo with others affirms it. Suarez with several others denies it. Therefore, equal probability stands on each side ¹¹.

¹¹ If it is probable that a circumstance of this kind can be kept silent, we have already said (above, in the note at no. 500) that the right of another to preserve his reputation prevails.

503. • QUESTION 6. Are those who are both deaf and mute bound to confess, and if so, how?

Reply. The mute and deaf are bound to confess in some manner, at least by signs, unless they are so ignorant and dull that nothing can be elicited from them. The reason is that the precept of confession regards all the faithful who can manifest their sins in some manner.

Hence: 1. Mute persons sufficiently instructed are bound to confess integrally, at least by signs, if these are understood by the Confessor; but if they are less instructed or can be understood by the Confessor only with difficulty, it will suffice for them to manifest only one or another sin, or to signify in general that they are sinners and wish to avoid sin.

2. Deaf persons who have the use of speech are bound on their part to confess the sins which occur to their memory; but the Confessor is not bound to question them in order to procure the integrity of confession, because of the excessive difficulty of questioning ¹². in doubt greater provision must always be made for the sacramental seal than for integrity; and therefore the Confessor should ask neither about the number nor about circumstances, etc., and in imposing satisfaction should enjoin something light, lest a suspicion of grave fault be introduced. Nor perhaps is it expedient to summon women at untimely hours, when no one else is in the church, both because an accidental danger of revelation is not absent and because it is altogether better to provide for propriety.

¹² Add also the danger of revelation. The same must also be said concerning the hard of hearing; if their confession must be heard in a church, as is generally necessary with women,

QUESTION 7. Are mute persons who know how to write bound to confess in writing in order to procure the integrity of confession?

Reply. The more common opinion denies it, both because of the danger of revelation, because writing is an extraordinary means which has never been regarded in the Church as prescribed, and also because, as Diana says, such a manner of confession is of itself public, since writing is of itself public. - Diana, tom. 4, tract 3, resol. 72, no. 2 ¹³. It can nevertheless be permitted; but care must be taken that the writing is immediately destroyed.

¹³ ** The VV. lament (p. 936, no. 115, with the Note) that Gury has, The more common opinion denies it, etc., when St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 479) wrote to the contrary: The more common opinion affirms it.

Reply 1. First it would have to be examined whether certain Authors are rightly alleged for one opinion or the other. Thus, for example, for the affirmative you may see Toletus cited, who nevertheless writes in express words (bk. 3, ch. 6, no. 5): Fourth, it can be made in writing, so that the penitent writes and the Confessor reads, which could occur in the case of a mute person or another impeded person; and it is a true confession, although the penitent is not bound to this, because it is of itself public. For that which is committed to writing is of itself permanent. In the same way, certain Authors can be seen cited by some for the affirmative and by others for the negative.

2. Since a sufficiently long series of Authors can easily be brought forward for each opinion, it is not surprising that some have called the affirmative opinion more common, while others called the negative more common, according as these Authors rather than those came before their eyes.

3. But what is most important: since those who hold the affirmative opinion defend it only as more probable, and generally do not deny the probability of the opposite, as regards practice, namely, imposing an obligation of confession through writing, it is scarcely, or not even scarcely, lawful to attribute any weight to the affirmative opinion.

4. This ought to have all the more force if you consider what the Authors who hold the affirmative suggest so that it may be done rightly. Suarez, for example, after saying (De Poenit., disp. 36, sect. 6, no. 7) that this opinion seemed more probable to him, adds these ways of carrying it out: Cajetan employs the method that the penitent can write all the species of sins on one sheet and the various numbers on another, and afterward in confession indicate by a sign the sin and the number. Peter Soto employs another, that he not write beforehand, but in the presence of the Priest, and immediately tear it up. For what Dominic Soto says, that the priest could snatch the paper from his hands and publish it, is of no moment; for he could also disclose a confession made by voice, etc. This observation of Suarez perhaps will not be approved by all; for it is one thing that the priest can reveal something in words, and another that by producing the writing of the penitent he can prove the things said. Moreover, who could affirm that obligations of this kind, and merely probable ones indeed, can be imposed?

The VV. add (loc. cit.) that a most valid reason stands for the affirmative. - Reply. Others will rightly doubt concerning this most valid reason, which the VV. leave unstated. For it is established by fact that no one until now has perceived such a reason which settles the controversy. The reason commonly brought forward is that he who is bound to the end is bound to the means. But, they say, for many writing remains the sole means of fulfilling the precept. Therefore. But, omitting now the common reply, namely, that no one is bound to extraordinary means of this kind, an answer ad hominem may be given. Why, I ask, do they not oblige a man of failing memory to use writing, lest he fulfill the precept of confession only by halves? Why does this not hold here also: he who is bound to the end is bound also to the means?

504. • QUESTION 8. Are those ignorant of the language of the place in which they wish to confess bound to confess, and if so, how?

Reply. Those ignorant of the language of the place in which they are staying, and lacking a Confessor by whom they can be understood, are bound, when the precept of annual confession urges and at the point of death, to confess in some manner, at least by general signs. The reason is that the divine and ecclesiastical precept urges. For although they cannot confess materially and integrally, they are nevertheless bound to that which they can do. - St. Lig., no. 479, etc.

QUESTION 9. Are those ignorant of the language bound to confess through an interpreter if they can?

Reply. Negative, because to confess through an interpreter is a most grave burden and exposed to many dangers, for example, revelation, mockery, etc. Except if, in danger of death, a penitent ignorant of the language doubts concerning perfect contrition, because in that case confession would be a means altogether necessary for salvation ¹⁴. - St. Lig., ibid.

¹⁴ It was not St. Alphonsus, but Busembaum, who had written that no one is bound to confess through an interpreter, unless perhaps in danger of death, in which it suffices to confess some lesser sins. To this St. Alphonsus adds (no. 479): But even at the time of death it is probable that he is not bound. He then adds from Viva: Unless the sick man is doubtful concerning contrition, as Viva, q. 4, art. 3, no. 10. It nevertheless suffices then to state one venial sin, Salmanticenses... and Viva. But this exception of Viva pertains to the now antiquated opinion which holds the validity of the sacrament doubtful even at the point of death unless some specific sin is subjected to the keys; especially since the necessity of an interpreter seems altogether excluded by those words of the Lateran Council (ch. Omnis utriusque, 12, De Poenit. et Remiss.): Let him alone confess his sins..., etc.; likewise by the words of the Council of Trent (sess. 14, ch. 5) concerning the manner of confessing secretly to the Priest alone; to which is added the Response of the Sacred Congregation of February 28, 1633 (in Scavini, tract 10, disp. 1, ch. 2, art. 2), declaring that a penitent who does not wish to use an interpreter can and must be absolved. And indeed, immediately afterward the Author establishes from the common opinion that all things required for the sacrament and for formally integral Confession are present even if the penitent asks for absolution only by some sign.