Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 2. On Formal Integrity
- FORMAL integrity, as was said (n. 1660), consists in this: that the penitent confess all sins which, in view of the circumstances, he can morally confess. This, as is evident, does not fulfill the whole law, but the part of the law possible here and now, with the burden of supplying the defect once the impediment has been removed.3 The following things will make the matter clear.
Principles. I. Formal integrity suffices whenever the penitent is in PHYSICAL inability of furnishing material integrity. The reason is that no one is bound to the impossible (recall what was said at n. 221 sqq.). - Moreover, ON ACCOUNT OF PHYSICAL INABILITY, besides those who are ignorant of sins or have forgotten them, the following are excused:
The dying, or others placed in danger of death, on account of defect of time or failure of mind.4 We shall treat of these in particular below (n. 1720, 2, and n. 1854, 5).
Mutes, on account of defect of speech. Therefore these, having signified by nods one or another sin, can be absolved both at the time of death and at the time of the paschal precept. Yet if by writing or signs they are able to reveal all sins, they are bound to this, provided danger of manifestation or another grave inconvenience is absent, as was already said (n. 1687).
The deaf, who cannot respond to the confessor, nor know how to declare all their sins. - But otherwise the hard of hearing; for these must be led into some remote place, yet with due cautions used as to time and place, if women are at issue.
Those ignorant of the language of the region in which they are, and who do not have the availability of a confessor by whom they can be understood. These, if they manifest sorrow for their sins by signs, can, like mutes, be absolved in the time of precept or of another necessity. Nor are they bound to use an interpreter, as was shown above5 (n. 1688).
(3) H. A., XVI, 35. (4) Book VI, 487; H. A., ibid., 39. (5) Book VI, 479; H. A., XVI, 35.
- II. Formal integrity likewise suffices if the penitent is in MORAL inability of making a materially integral confession. The reason is that the precept of confession, since it is positive, does not oblige with grave inconvenience extrinsic to confession (cf. n. 223). - We say extrinsic; for no difficulty intrinsic to confession itself, however grave, ever excuses, because confession is by its own nature laborious. Hence, if intrinsic difficulty excused, its precept would vanish.
Moreover, MORAL INABILITY is then judged to be had when two conditions are verified. The first is when the necessity of confessing presses: for example because the paschal precept must be satisfied, or because the reception of the Eucharist or the celebration of Mass cannot be omitted without note of infamy or scandal; or even because otherwise the penitent would have to remain in mortal sin, even if only through one day. The other is if, from the declaration of all mortal sins to this priest, grave spiritual or temporal damage would threaten the penitent, or the confessor, or some third person.6 Therefore, in the aforesaid necessity, the following EXCUSES:
Danger to the life of the penitent, confessor, or third person; for example if in time of plague the priest himself prudently fears infection, and therefore does not allow the penitent to confess integrally; if enemies arrive, for example immediately before battle, in which case all, after exhibiting some general sign of contrition and confession, could be absolved by this single form of absolution: I absolve you [plural], etc.7
Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor; for example if a woman certainly knew the very great frailty of the confessor, etc.
Danger of revelation, or violation of the seal; for example if the confessor cannot confess integrally without manifesting the sins of some person heard in confession; - likewise if one who is hard of hearing confesses while others stand by; or if a gravely wounded man or a woman giving birth confesses, who cannot be left by those serving them; or if the penitent from grave cause fears that the confessor may break the law of the seal. But this case, if it must ever be said to happen, is very rare.
Danger to reputation; for example if a priest about to celebrate immediately, and needing general confession, could not confess integrally without those standing by suspecting the matter. Say the same of a sick person who has confessed before the carrying of the Most Holy Sacrament, and is now just about to be refreshed through Holy Communion, if he then, because the past confessions were invalid, had to make a more lengthy confession. In this case, the confessor, having heard some sin, should absolve the sick person, give him Communion, and afterward return to receive the integral confession.8
Danger for the scrupulous person of grave detriment, both in spiritual progress and in health of body and mind (cf. n. 28 and 1835).
Reservation of sin or censure, according to those things which are found at n. 1551 and n. 1775, note 2. But:
The multitude of affairs does not excuse. For the 59th proposition, which sounds thus, was condemned by Innocent XI: "It is licit sacramentally to absolve those who have confessed only by halves, by reason of a great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can happen on the day of some great festivity or indulgence."9 Nor can an exception be admitted if, on account of the prolixity of confession, others would easily suspect that the penitent is burdened by many faults.10 But whether danger of manifesting an accomplice excuses will be weighed below (n. 1702).
(6) Book VI, 487; H. A., XVI, 39. (7) Book VI, 485, 486. (8) Book VI, 484, 485. (9) Ibid., 595. (10) Ibid., 485, end.
- III. When the excusing cause ceases, the penitent is bound to SUPPLY the defect of confession, not immediately, but when he will again be obliged or will wish to confess.11 The reason is that an actual impediment does not simply remove the obligation of integral confession, but only suspends it. Hence, when the impediment has been removed, the divine precept revives in whole. It is otherwise clear from the 11th proposition condemned by Alexander VII, which said: "Sins omitted or forgotten in confession, on account of imminent danger of life or on account of another cause, we are not bound to express in the following confession."
It was said, 1. not immediately; for the obligation must be accepted morally, especially because sins inculpably omitted have already been destroyed, and because delay brings the soul into no danger. Thus commonly.
It was said, 2. but when he will be obliged or will wish. For: - 1. The obligation of supplying is not affixed of itself to a time or circumstances, and therefore does not of itself press, except when the precept of confessing again presses, for example at the time of annual confession (cf. n. 1548). - 2. When the impediment ceases, it is not licit to keep silent sins forgotten or omitted in the confession which first follows. For the Doctors more commonly interpret thus the sense of the proposition condemned by Alexander VII;12 and the reason is that it pertains to the integrity of the subsequent confession to declare all mortal sins of which consciousness is had, as Trent speaks.13
(11) Ibid., 479. (12) Cf. Viva, Thes. damn., proposition 11 condemned by Alexander VII. (13) Sess. 14, cap. 5.
- It is asked: To what are those bound who in GOOD FAITH have made confessions lacking integrity?
Resp. They are not indeed bound to repeat them integrally, "because for such confessions all things essentially required were already present. - Yet they are bound to explain the species and number omitted, so that they may at least make the present confession integral." Thus commonly.14
But let it be noted: 1. He who held a uniform manner of living and inculpably omitted declaring the number of sins satisfies the law of integrity if "at the beginning of confession he has revealed to the present confessor that in past years he has always confessed badly by omitting number, and the confessor, by receiving the confession of that year from the beginning, at the same time forms a judgment concerning past years." Likewise, if, after the confession has been received, the confessor has distinct knowledge of the sins of the present year, "he will indeed be able, without the prior confessions being repeated, at the same time to form for himself a distinct judgment concerning past years." 2. Otherwise it must be said "if from the present confession he has only confused knowledge of the faults confessed, as often happens in longer and involved confessions; in that case, as Lugo well says,15 he is bound to take distinct knowledge of the species and number omitted in past confessions."16
(14) Book VI, 504. (15) De Poenit., d. 16, n. 640. (16) Book VI, 504, dic. 3.
Scholium
On The Manifestation Of An Accomplice
- It is certain, 1. That an accomplice must be concealed as often as confession can be materially integral without his manifestation. Therefore it is not licit, for declaring a venial sin or a mortal sin already confessed, to reveal the grave sin of another.17
It is certain, 2. That a penitent guilty of mortal sin not yet confessed is bound to go to a confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, if he can go to him
without temporal or spiritual inconvenience. - For then the precept of guarding the reputation of the neighbor presses, especially if a more infamous crime is at issue.
It is certain, 3. That, generally, it is not licit for the confessor to inquire for the name of the accomplice, even for a good end, for example for correction; for this is opposed to charity and renders the Sacrament of Penance odious. - This is clear from the Bull of Benedict XIV Ubi primum, in which the Pontiff, speaking of confessors who under penalty of denying absolution require the name of the accomplice, declares: 1. that they sin gravely and incur suspension from hearing confessions, but only of ferendae sententiae; 2. that they are to be denounced within a month, not indeed by the penitent himself, but by another who knows them, if nevertheless on account of this they denied absolution and did not act from simplicity; 3. that those teaching this detestable practice to be licit incur by the fact itself excommunication reserved to the Supreme Pontiff,1 which same thing Pius IX sanctioned in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis (cf. n. 1328). These things having been premised, let the following be:
(17) Ibid., 489. (1) Book VI, 491; H. A., XVI, 40-41.
- Questions. Q. 1. Whether there is an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which CANNOT be explained without manifestation of the accomplice?
Resp. Yes, when another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown cannot conveniently be had. Thus the common opinion against some who say that the natural precept of preserving the reputation of the neighbor must be preferred to the positive precept of preserving the integrity of confession. But the reason for the affirmative opinion is "because the divine precept of confessing integrally must be observed whenever it can licitly be observed; and it can be observed sufficiently licitly in our case, since the manifestation of another's crime is not illicit when it is done from a reasonable cause"; and therefore the natural precept then ceases (cf. n. 1198). - Add that "the accomplice, by consenting to the sin, has already lost the right to his reputation in order to the confession of that sin."2
Q. 2. What are the CAUSES EXCUSING from seeking another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown?
Resp. According to the opinion of very many, they are the following: - 1. If danger of death or the precept of annual confession presses. - 2. If it is grave for the penitent to omit confession or Communion. - 3. If he would open his conscience with difficulty to another than his accustomed confessor. - 4. If otherwise he would be deprived of the benefits of some extraordinary indulgence. - 5. If otherwise he would have to remain in sin even for one day. - 6. If, by going to a confessor to whom the accomplice is known, he will have better direction or will receive notably greater consolation. - 7. If it is believed that the accomplice has yielded the right to his reputation, as if a brother sinned with a sister whom he knows cannot be separated from the company of the mother in order to go to another confessor. Hence, mothers and wives are often excused who manifest the sins of husbands and sons to a confessor who knows them, by reason of seeking counsel, alleviating sorrow, etc.; for it would be too hard for them if they were bound to seek another confessor.3 - Yet the advantage of direction must be compared with the infamy.4
Q. 3. Whether it is EVER licit for the confessor to INQUIRE for the name or knowledge of the accomplice?
Resp. 1. The confessor can, indeed must, although from this he comes into knowledge of the accomplice, inquire about circumstances which change the species of sins, or which are necessary for better consulting the conscience of the penitent; for example, whether the accomplice in a shameful sin is in the first or second degree of consanguinity or affinity, whether he is bound by a vow of chastity, whether he lives in the same house, etc.
Resp. 2. A penitent who would not wish to reveal the accomplice cannot be absolved when this is necessary for averting or repairing public damage. Therefore in a case of this sort, the confessor will be able to impose on the penitent in general that he reveal the accomplice to him who can avert the damage or scandal. But while the prohibition of Benedict XIV stands, that is, as often as revelation can usefully be made to another,5 it will never be licit for the confessor to say: Reveal him to me. But if the penitent of himself and by his own will asks the confessor that he himself take these parts upon himself and reveal the accomplice voluntarily, the confessor does not sin, and can certainly use that knowledge for applying a remedy; but for the most part this is not expedient on account of the danger of scandal and offense of the sacred ministry.6
(2) Book VI, 489. (3) Book VI, 490. (4) Ibid., 488, 6. (5) Cf. De Synodo, book 6, cap. 11, n. 1. (6) Book VI, 491-492.