Grave matter in theft

Theologians are agreed that we must distinguish between the absolute sum, the taking of which is as a general rule 1 x Cor. vi 10. necessary and sufficient in all cases to constitute grave matter, and the relative sum, which will be sufficient for grave matter, regard being had to the loss of the owner. The general principle on which the quantity required for grave sins depends is the damage caused by the theft. For it is a grave sin to cause grave damage without a just reason; but in the case of very rich persons or companies we must consider not only the personal and particular damage done to them by theft of what belongs to them, but also the harm done to society. It may well be that a rich millionaire would not be appreciably worse off for the loss of a hundred pounds or of ten times that sum. The damage done to him by a thief taking a hundred pounds would be relatively less than if sixpence were taken from a day labourer. However, we must also consider the harm done by theft to the community and to the security of property. The malice of sin is not measured merely by the harm done to the individual; the harm done to society and other considerations also enter into the estimate. We must, then, besides considering the damage done to the owner of stolen money, weigh also the harm which theft does to society, And if grave harm is caused to society by stealing a certain sum of money, if the security of property would be seriously imperilled unless the theft of a certain sum were forbidden under pain of mortal sin, that sum will be the absolute quantity required for a mortal sin of theft, What the precise sum is must be left to the judgement of experts, who will consider all the circumstances of time and place, for, as values are perpetually changing, the sum required for a mortal sin of theft will also change. Under present circumstances, in civilized countries where similar conditions of commerce prevail, the common opinion of theologians fixes one pound sterling as the absolute sum required for a grave sin of theft. This will serve, therefore, as a measure of the gravity of theft from very rich people, or from companies with large resources.

However, a mortal sin of theft may be committed by stealing a much less sum than one pound if the theft cause great harm to the owner of what is stolen. The loss of a day’s wage or of a sum which is sufficient for the support of a labourer and his family for a day, is a serious loss for a workman, and so, as the common opinion holds, the theft of such a sum from a labouring man is a grave sin. Something between this and the absolute sum will be grave matter if stolen from persons whose wealth is between the two extremes.

Matter which in itself is grave may become light on account of special circumstances. Thus although grave necessity does not excuse theft, yet it may lessen the sin and cause to be venial what would otherwise be mortal. In the same way, less unwillingness on the part of the owner may lessen the sin. A father is less unwilling as a rule that a little of his money should be taken by a member of his family, especially if it is for a good purpose, than by a common thief. On this ground some divines say that in thefts from parents a double quantity is required for grave matter. Also when a number of small thefts are committed, which in the aggregate amount to grave matter, a larger sum is required for a mortal sin than when it is all taken at once. For the loss is not felt so keenly, and so the owner is not so unwilling.

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 8 passages

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 4. The Vices Opposed …, Theft and Robbery

n. 1901.

What is grave matter in theft of sacred objects? (a) If these objects have a value that may be measured by money (e.g., the gold or jewels that enter into a reliquary), grave matter is estimated by the material value, just as in profane objects. (b) If these objects have no monetary value (e.g., sacred relics), grave matter is judged from the dignity or rarity of the object. Thus, it would be a serious sin to steal even the smallest splinter from the True Cross.

n. 1903.

The Common Opinion on Domestic Thefts and Grave Matter

The Common Opinion on Domestic Thefts and Grave Matter.—(a) In theft from one’s parents about double the usual quantity is required. But in an individual case the parents may be just as unwilling, and with good reason, to be despoiled by members of the family as by outsiders, and in such a case the rule would not apply. Hence, in considering thefts by children one must bear in mind the ability of the family to suffer the loss, the number of the children, the uses to which the stolen goods are put, the liberality or thrift of the parents, the affection or dislike which the parents have for the child who steals, etc. Thus, if poor parents are denying themselves in every way in order to rear and educate a large family, thefts from them are a serious matter.

(b) In theft from one’s husband even a greater amount is required. But there are exceptions, as when the husband is especially unwilling to have his property stolen by his wife, for example, when the money she takes is devoted, not to the benefit of the family or other useful purposes, but to vanity or sin, or to the great detriment of the husband or family (see 1799).

n. 1904.

Theft from One’s Wife or Minor Child

Theft from One’s Wife or Minor Child.—(a) According to the law in the United States, a wife cannot steal from her husband nor the husband from the wife, but this principle has reference to the common property of which husband and wife are joint tenants (Robinson, Elementary Law, Sec. 563). Both husband and wife may have also their own separate property, and in that case either of them is guilty of injustice if he or she damages or takes without leave the goods of the other.

(b) According to American law, the father has the right to the earnings of his minor children who live with him and receive their maintenance from him; but the law gives the father no right over the separate real or personal estate of these children. Hence, a parent would be guilty of theft if he unlawfully took or used the individual property of his child.

n. 1905.

The Common Opinion on Thefts Committed by Employees

The Common Opinion on Thefts Committed by Employees.—(a) If the things stolen are small articles which the employer customarily supplies for his help (e.g., food and drink for domestic servants, pencils and paper for his clerks), the theft is not serious as a rule. But there are exceptions, as when the employee gives or sells to others these articles, or when he uses or wastes them to such a degree that the employer suffers a considerable loss. And one should also consider such circumstances as the great or small value of the services given by the employee, his good or bad standing with the employer, etc.

(b) If the thing stolen is not meant for consumption (e.g., furnishings of the home or office, merchandise of the store, tools or machinery of the factory) or is of a very precious kind (e.g., rare wines or expensive brands of tobacco), grave matter is of the same amount as when an outside person does the stealing. In fact, the guilt of the employee is more serious on account of his abuse of confidence or violation of contract. The property of employers would be subject to constant risk, if employees were permitted greater liberties than outsiders.

n. 1906.

Theft of Things about Whose Loss the Owner Is Less Concerned

Theft of Things about Whose Loss the Owner Is Less Concerned.—(a) Vegetation that Belongs to the Public and Is Left Unprotected.—If these things are of minor importance (e.g., wild fruits or berries, broken twigs, branches, etc., in public lands), it seems that it is not theft to take them, at least when one is poor and a member of the community; for laws against such acts are generally regarded as penal. But one sins, and may even sin gravely, when extensive damage is done to public property (e.g., by cutting down trees, carrying away flowers and plants, injuring shrubs, etc.).

(b) Vegetation that Belongs to Private Parties and Is Left Unprotected.—If only a small quantity is taken (e.g., an apple or a bunch of grapes hanging over a public highway taken by a passerby), it seems no theft is done, unless the owner or law expressly forbids. But it seems to be a venial sin to take more (e.g., as much as a hungry person can eat), and a mortal sin to take a quantity whose market value is equal to grave matter.

n. 1907.

Travelling Without Paying Fare

Travelling Without Paying Fare.—Is it theft to ride in public conveyances without paying the fare?

(a) If one rides without payment or ticket, it seems that theft is committed, unless the company is willing to give a free ride. It may be said that the company suffers no loss on account of one passenger who has not paid for his transportation, since the same number of cars and the same expenses would be required even without that passenger. But since the owners are unwilling to furnish their service gratis, he who takes it without pay is guilty of theft.

(b) If one rides without payment, but uses the ticket of another, there is no injustice if the rules of the company permit this (e.g., A buys a round-trip ticket, but gives the return ticket to B), but there is fraud if the rules of the company and the agreement of the purchaser make the ticket non-transferable (e.g., B uses the half-rate ticket which A had received as a personal privilege from the railroad company).

n. 1917.

Theft from Joint Owners

Theft from Joint Owners.—Is it a grave sin to steal a considerable amount of property that belongs to joint owners? (a) If the amount taken is absolutely grave, the sin is serious for the reasons given in 1898 sqq.; (b) if the amount taken is relatively grave (e.g., because a community is very poor, or because the owners are only two or three and the individual loss is heavy), the sin is serious; (c) if the amount taken is not relatively grave, as happens when an organization is not poor and has many members or when the loss will be so distributed among the joint owners as to be little felt by them individually, the sin is not serious.

n. 1919.

Cases of Doubt

Cases of Doubt.—(a) Doubts of Law.—The rules given by moralists on grave matter in thefts are not to be regarded as certain and authentic, since they are only the opinions of theologians, and have no obligatory sanction from the Church. They are reasonable and well founded, indeed, but in spite of them there will occur cases wherein it is doubtful whether a theft is mortal or venial (see 1896). It is no disgrace to be ignorant in such difficult cases, for St. Augustine himself admitted that he did not always know where to draw the line. Hence, confessors should not feel obliged to decide with finality in every instance whether the sin committed was in itself grave or light; on the contrary, it will sometimes be necessary to avoid a definite answer, while calling attention to the sinfulness of all theft and the duty of restitution. But the obligation of restitution should not be imposed as certain, where the doctors disagree.

(b) Doubts of Fact.—The application of the rules for grave matter will also be at times very difficult on account of uncertainties about circumstances of time, person, etc. In such cases one must have recourse to the systems for decision in the presence of a doubtful conscience. If a thief does not know from whom he stole, it may be doubtful whether the matter is relatively grave or only light; but the presumption then will be that the loser was a person of average means. Again, when there is a strong likelihood that an owner was not greatly unwilling, one must insist that the thefts cease for the future, but one cannot always impose restitution. If a petty thief does not know how much he stole, or whether all the thefts were from the same person, or whether the intervals between the thefts were great or small, or whether he had the intention from the outset to take a large sum, the confessor will have to form an opinion by questioning the penitent on the time of his last confession, the amounts he generally took, the general frequency of the thefts, etc.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 12 passages

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion, Appendix, Second Commentary: On Grave Matter in Theft

n. 1.

The reason for doubting in this matter is that in the present day it seems necessary to exceed the limits predefined both by the older Theologians and also by St. Alphonsus, book 3, nn. 527, 528, because from their age down to ours no slight difference is perceived concerning the value of money. For all now complain that the prices of things have increased notably in comparison with past times, or, what comes to the same thing, that the value of money has decreased. Whence grave matter in theft must now reach a greater quantity of money. But on the contrary it seems that one must not depart either from the opinion of the old theologians, which is always to be held in the greatest account in a moral matter, or, and much less, from the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, which has had special approval from the Holy See. Moreover, although it must be conceded that according to the variety of times a variety has also been introduced in the value of money, nevertheless, if a proportion of this sort had to be observed, since now the prices of things have increased immensely, the grave quantity in theft would also have to be increased immensely, which would cede to evident damage of Society. To resolve this question we inquire into three things: 1st. How many kinds of grave matter are to be distinguished in theft? 2nd. What in our age is to be judged in theft matter both relatively and absolutely grave? 3rd. What must be judged concerning the proposed reasons for doubting?

n. 2.

As to the first question it is enough to note that, properly speaking, grave matter in theft is always relative, nor can it be absolute. The reason is that, as the Angelic Doctor says, 2.2, q. 73, a. 3, "sins which are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed in themselves according to the harms which are brought upon the neighbor, because from this they have the nature of fault. But the harm is so much the greater as the good taken away is greater." This notwithstanding, theologians commonly distinguish in theft absolute grave matter and relative grave matter. Relative grave matter is that which is grave, attention having been paid to the conditions of the person in particular, to whom in fact grave harm is brought. This is altogether consonant with the doctrine of St. Thomas just set forth, l.c., and q. 66, a. 6, ad 3. But as regards absolute grave matter, Scavini, Milan ed. 1874, book 2, n. 697, says: "the theft will be absolutely grave when, independently of the damage which the owner suffers, in the judgment of men it is considered of itself to suffice for constituting mortal sin." This definition is either inexact, as being incomplete, or in reality says and explains nothing; because, if precision and abstraction are made from the neighbor's damage, no judgment of grave matter can be formed. And if the common sense of men judges this or that matter grave, it judges so because in this or that matter it considers grave harm to the neighbor. Otherwise that judgment of common sense would be a judgment without foundation and sense. Absolute grave matter, according to the common doctrine of Theologians, ians, is matter which is grave with respect to all, of whatever condition they themselves may be, whether they are poor or rich; whether they are individual or moral persons, as that which in any conditions of status always brings grave harm to the neighbor, for such a place or time. It is said, for such a place or time, because the same thing in this place or time, on account of abundance, is valued little, and consequently its taking away inflicts slight damage; but in another place or time, on account of rarity and necessity, it is valued more highly, and consequently the taking away of the same thing brings grave damage. Hence that also is inexact which the same Scavini adds, l.c.: "But it is plain that the determination of matter absolute and in itself, for judging concerning the gravity of sin, ought then only to have place when the state and condition of the damaged person is unknown." And he asserts this absolutely grave matter to be about five or six libellae.

Lugo aptly says, De Iust. et Iur., D. 16, S. 2, n. 23: "And indeed it cannot be denied that the malice of theft is respective, nor has anyone denied this. For although they say that there can be some grave matter of theft that is absolute, and another respective..., nevertheless they do not will that it be grave without any respect to damage to the neighbor; but they only signify that there is some matter of such a sort through which grave damage is inflicted upon all, and therefore, such matter standing, there is no need to examine and weigh the condition of the person suffering the damage, since it is established that every person, of whatever condition he may be, suffers grave damage from a theft of this sort. Nor can it be denied that there is some matter which is not grave with respect to all, but with respect to one person is slight, and with respect to others is grave.... For the gravity of malice is taken from the gravity of the damage inflicted; but the gravity of damage proceeds from the greater need by which the neighbor needs that thing. Wherefore, since not all equally need the thing which is taken away, it follows that they do not suffer an equally grave injury either, and therefore one person will be able to suffer a slight injury, another a grave injury, through the theft of an equal sum."

n. 4.

As regards the second question, there is a twofold criterion or rule for judging and determining matter relatively grave. For one criterion is intrinsic, the other extrinsic. Let us speak first of the intrinsic. That which reasonably and, speaking in itself, brings grave displeasure to our neighbor is a grave sin against charity; and if justice enters into it, it is a grave sin against justice, which obliges more strictly than charity. The Angelic Doctor uses nearly this reasoning, 2.2, q. 66, a. 6, to prove that theft in itself is a mortal sin. "Mortal sin," he says, "is that which is opposed to charity, according as it is the spiritual life of the soul. But charity consists principally indeed in the love of God, and secondarily in the love of neighbor, to which it pertains that we will and work good for the neighbor. But through theft a man inflicts harm upon his neighbor in his goods, and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish. Whence theft, as contrary to charity, is a mortal sin." Moreover, to deprive some person and his family of daily sustenance, necessary according to his own condition, reasonably brings grave displeasure to our neighbor, who sees himself and his own deprived of the things necessary for life according to his own state. Whence it evidently appears that the harm is grave, counting in sustenance not only food, but also clothing and habitation. "Commonly the Doctors say," says St. Alphonsus, book 3, n. 527, "that in theft that is grave matter which would suffice someone according to his condition in a day for the sustenance of himself and his family; in which, as La-Croix well observes, n. 985, with Sporer, Gomez, and others, not only food is computed, but also clothing and habitation." And here it must be noticed that in sustenance of this sort, speaking in itself, there ought also to be comprehended honorable pleasures and lawful recreations fitting to one's own condition, without which human life neither can be, nor in fact is, and of which also someone would be deprived with altogether reasonable displeasure. For man does not live only on bread and meat, water and wine, in a strict measure, nor does he live solitary; but physically he also lives by other things, and by a measure conveniently good and considered together, if not always superabundant; but morally he lives in his own family and in society; and therefore expenses of pleasure, for the sake of honorable and suitable recreation and also of due honor, must at least sometimes be sustained. Theologians seem implicitly to understand this in that sustenance of the family which they call congruous and suitable to one's state.

n. 5.

But as regards grave sin, although deprivation of sustenance in the sense explained is certainly and among all grave, nevertheless a smaller quantity still suffices for grave sin, according to the principle established. For if someone were deprived of daily sustenance necessary only for his own individual life, and not also for the life of his own family, he would certainly experience grave and reasonable displeasure. Indeed, for constituting grave sin from the principle already established it is not necessary that someone be deprived of that whole which is necessary for the daily sustenance of his own individual life, as this sustenance has just been explained, but it suffices that he be deprived only of a notable part of it. For indeed, would not someone feel grave and rational displeasure if even for one day he were deprived of necessary food, or clothing, or habitation, or for that reason could not fulfill the offices of his own status and condition?

n. 6.

Wherefore considering, 1st, what at present and as regards Italy is spent for the sustenance of life by the poor, by workers, by various persons of civil and noble condition, what is spent daily in Colleges and Seminaries, in religious Communities, in families which live decently and suitably, but also with due economy; considering, 2nd, the stipends of workers, doctors, advocates, public officials, and the profits of merchants, the pensions of students in Colleges and Seminaries, the dowries of Nuns, the incomes of ordinarily rich persons; it seems possible to establish at present and as regards Italy, and perhaps also, at least more or less, for other regions of Europe, the following matter relatively grave: 1st, for the poor, 1 libella, and less, according to the degree of their poverty. 2nd, for workers and artisans, 1 libella, 2, 3, according to the various crafts and arts, more or less lucrative. 3rd, for persons of civil and ordinary condition, who live from incomes, or from the exercise of merchandising and commerce, or of a liberal profession, 4 libellae, 5-6, 7, according to the various degree of convenience of life. 4th, for ordinary rich persons, 8, 9-11, 12 libellae, and for ordinary moral Bodies, 10-20 libellae, according to the degree of riches. 5th, finally, for extraordinarily rich persons, such as reigning and non-reigning Princes, Nobles and Merchants and very rich Businessmen, moral Bodies and Societies possessing exorbitant Capitals, relatively grave matter cannot be designated; recourse must be had to absolutely grave matter. And indeed, when a private Prince, for example, possesses 50 and 100 millions, and daily spends 30 libellae and more for letters and telegrams alone, it is an evident thing that the theft of 10, 20, 30 libellae certainly will not deprive him in any way of suitable sustenance. Therefore to assert that matter of this sort is relatively grave for them is merely arbitrary, and in no way confirmed by the enunciated intrinsic criterion and rule for judging concerning relative gravity.

n. 7.

But let us make a step to the extrinsic criterion and rule. Since here there is question of a moral judgment in a moral matter, such criterion and rule is contained in the authority of Theologians. "Moreover," says St. Alphonsus, l.c., "for making a just measurement of this gravity, the Salmanticenses rightly say, De Rest., c. 5, n. 12, that the judgments of the wise contribute greatly, whose greater authority in this point seems to me to constitute greater probability. Wherefore I have taken care diligently to gather here the diverse opinions of Doctors," etc. But recent theologians, with few exceptions and a slight difference of which account cannot be taken in moral matters, agree altogether in the matter assigned. For in this they agree, that for the regions of Europe, matter relatively grave at present is almost twice greater than that which St. Alphonsus established for his own time. Moreover, the Holy Doctor, book 3, n. 528, no distinction having been made between the lowest, middle, and highest degree of riches, assigns: 1st, for the poor, 1 iulius, 54 centesimi; 2nd, for workers, 2 iulii, 1 libella, 8 centesimi; 3rd, for artisans, 2 1/2 iulii, 1 libella, 35 centesimi; 4th, for those moderately rich, 4 iulii, 2 libellae, 16 centesimi; 5th, for those absolutely rich and for very wealthy merchants, 6 iulii, 3 libellae, 24 centesimi; 6th, for the very richest magnates, 1 aureus, 5 libellae, 38 centesimi; 7th, for a very wealthy Community, 1 1/2 aurei, 8 libellae, 17 centesimi; 8th, for Kings, 2 aurei, 10 libellae, 76 centesimi. But the Holy Doctor adds, l.c., n. 527, that very many doctors extend this quantity up to 3 aurei, 16 libellae, 14 centesimi. And this quantity, as is plain, is, as it were, half the quantity assigned. For a iulius is worth 54 centesimi of a libella. But an aureus is worth 5 libellae, 58 centesimi. Cf. Finardi, Prontuario del Commerciante, etc., Rome 1862. That we may pass over others, for the sake of brevity, the most learned Joseph D'Annibale has these things in Summula Theolog. Moral., Part 2, n. 201, 2nd ed., Milan 1882: "Let me have St. Alphonsus before my eyes, the price of things having almost doubled from that time in which he lived. And so, for the present value of coins, I would say that the damage which does not reach about one libella is always slight in itself, even if to a beggar; on the contrary I would say that damage which exceeds about 30 libellae is grave in itself, even if inflicted upon the very richest person, or upon a King. Between these the damage must be measured relatively, that is, from the persons: therefore I judge it grave, 1st, for the poor, that is, for a beggar, or worker, or artisan, damage of 1 libella or 2 1/2; 2nd, for merchants, according to each one's fortune, whether lowest, middle, or highest, 2 1/2, or 4, or 8; 3rd, for the rich, according as nothing, or little, or much, or very much remains to them from their own revenue, expenses deducted, 3 and perhaps less, or 4, or 7, or 10. Finally as regards moral persons which have the body of a College, damage is grave which is reckoned at 10, or, if they shall have been wealthy, at 20." This question was debated in the present year 1887, on the day 24 Jan., in the Conference of Cases of Conscience at S. Apollinaris before the Most Eminent Cardinal Vicar of the City, and the same opinion was defended by the Resolver and approved by the Censors present; and the Censor who at the end, according to custom, made the recapitulation, set forth the whole doctrine which is explained in this Commentary.

n. 8.

Let us come to absolute matter. As for relative matter the damage of individuals is attended to, with all particular circumstances considered, so for absolute matter the damage of Society itself ought especially to be considered. And, this once admitted, then it is easily understood how absolutely grave matter is always grave, namely grave for all, without distinction, although there is question of extraordinarily and exorbitantly rich persons. This principle being established, absolutely grave matter seems to be that which exceeds thirty libellae, the quantity designated by the praised Joseph D'Annibale. But someone will object: how can thirty libellae more or less bring grave damage to Society, if they do not bring grave damage even to an extraordinarily rich individual, such as are great bankers or merchants of monies in Europe, to whom the loss of 30 and even 300 libellae and more in their commercial operations is scarcely perceptible and is immediately compensated by so many and so great other profits? It is responded that it is common doctrine with relation to fornication that it is prohibited in all cases by natural law itself on account of the uncertain education of offspring. Although in some particular case, which is not very difficult to be verified, both the father and the mother, otherwise very rich, agree between themselves that the offspring be educated in due manner; indeed even that they themselves immediately undertake the care of a suitable education, and therefore with sincere and efficacious will promise a marriage to be entered at once, fornication would always remain prohibited by natural law; because if it were lawful and permitted in some particular case, the gravest danger would always be present of disordered license with immense damage to the offspring. In like manner, although a determined quantity, already sufficiently great in itself, does not bring grave harm to some individual in particular, nor even for the same individual is there at least danger of further grave harm, nevertheless it is itself sufficient for constituting a grave and most grave danger for Society itself, and, speaking in itself, also for individuals themselves. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, it will always be grave matter in any case. For if the grave damage of the individual and of society is considered, there is need to take account not only of expenses necessary for the sustenance and decorum of one's own state, but also of slight thefts, which are sufficiently frequent not only in thieves by profession, but also in the very persons of one's own family, community, society; but especially in persons to whom the administration of others' goods has been entrusted, especially of public dominion and utility. "Namely," says the most distinguished D'Annibale, l.c., n. 257, note 20, "it is very difficult for the things of owners to be administered by others so faithfully that something does not adhere to the hands of those handling them." Therefore, such danger being posited, not only is it evident that the designated quantity is sufficient for constituting absolutely grave matter; but also perhaps that quantity can, not without reason, seem excessive and to be restricted to narrower limits. For where the gravity of sin does not deter, and the hope of a greater, sufficiently notable profit invites and incites to a new theft, many men, and commonly by far more, would commit it, and our fortunes would be most gravely injured, unless they were deterred by fear of graver sin. Hence it is plain why, although the excess of the faculty of the most wealthy King over the faculties of an ordinary rich man, or even of a Marquis or Count, is far greater, beyond any proportion, than the excess of the rich man over the faculties of a citizen or common man, nevertheless there is not required so great a proportionate excess in a grave theft made against a King over a theft made against a rich man as in this latter with respect to a theft made against a common man. And this doctrine seems conformable to the doctrine just related of the Angelic Doctor concerning the gravity of theft, which he declares absolutely, saying: "But through theft a man inflicts harm upon his neighbor in his goods, and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish." But cf. also Lugo, l.c., n. 29 ff.

n. 9.

Nor indeed should the authority of Cardinal de Lugo be objected, as asserting, l.c., n. 21, that a quantity absolutely grave cannot be constituted in theft. For Lugo, l.c., does not assert this, but a very different thing, namely "that it cannot be defined what are the borders of each matter, namely slight and grave, so that short of such a sum it is slight, and beyond that it is grave." It is surely one thing that this quantity cannot be mathematically defined, another that absolutely grave matter cannot even be determined morally, with a certain moral latitude, namely a little more or a little less; and this is what Cardinal de Lugo himself attempts to effect in the following paragraphs. Cf. n. 29 ff., where he designates the universal reason of the malice of grave theft, namely absolutely grave. Cf. also n. 35.

n. 10.

Nor likewise should it be objected that from the discourse made it would follow that any theft whatever is grave, since from any slight theft whatever a most grave detriment of Society and of individuals could be feared. For men are not so allured to these smaller thefts, from which they take little profit, as they are allured to those other greater ones, in which profit appears not contemptible, if they could be done without grave sin, as the same Lugo has, l.c., n. 33. But the assigned quantity of thirty libellae, more or less, surely brings profit not contemptible, more than enough alluring to steal.

n. 11.

Finally, the authority of Lugo is still objected against the assigned quantity of 30 libellae as absolutely grave. For Lugo asserts this quantity to be 100 aurei, l.c., n. 21. If therefore in the time of Lugo this was the absolutely grave quantity, in our time certainly it ought to be greater still. It is responded that the assertion is altogether false. For Lugo does not say that for his own time that was the absolutely grave quantity, but that that was a quantity evidently and certainly grave, which is very different; and he asserts this indeed by a kind of near exaggeration. For in that same number he does not speak of matter to be determined absolutely, so that he determines it, but he speaks only of the difficulty of determining that grave matter and much more of defining the limits of that grave and slight matter, on account of the difficulty itself of finding in this matter some rational principle and some fixed rule. Hence in the following numbers 22-29 he relates various opinions of Theologians, and various rules assigned by them, which he weighs, and shows to be insufficient. But before he brings forth in n. 29 his own rule and rational principle, so that the malice of grave theft, namely absolutely grave, may be understood, he openly declares that in reality he does not depart from the opinion of others, attention also having been paid to the decrease of money at that time; and he says at the end of n. 28: "Wherefore I shall not reluctantly agree with the aforesaid in the matter itself, that in order with respect to Kings and wealthy Magnates a theft of one aureus be required; with respect to the rich, six or seven argentei; with respect to artisans, four; with respect to the poor, the value of daily food, or the average wage which in a time midway between winter and summer is given to a digger." An argenteus is the same for Lugo as a iulius or regalis, nn. 22-26; but an ordinary regalis is worth 26 centesimi of a libella. But since he takes an argenteus for a iulius or regalis, and says in n. 26 that one Ducat contains eleven reales or iulii, by regalis he understands not the ordinary regalis, of bronze, real de vellon, but the silver regalis, real de plata, of about twice greater value and about equivalent to a iulius. And in n. 31 he establishes still more definitively that the theft of one aureus is absolutely grave, on account of the danger of grave detriment which is in it: "for," he says, "from several thefts of one aureus made to you by diverse persons, your family affairs would truly suffer most grave detriment." Likewise in n. 32 he affirms the same thing altogether clearly, extending that absolutely grave matter not to 100 aurei, but to one or two aurei. Finally, in n. 35, discoursing again concerning the difficulty of defining precisely the limits of grave and slight matter, although he speaks hypothetically and only for the sake of example, he certainly brings into the midst not 90 or 80 aurei but 6 iulii. This can also be confirmed by the authority of St. Alphonsus, who in n. 527 counts Lugo among authors who "with respect to the very richest Magnates... say that one aureus suffices for grave matter." But from the opinion of Lugo, n. 29, with respect to these very rich persons, relatively grave matter is not to be required, but absolutely grave, which he then establishes according to this rule and principle; namely, "some things are prohibited not on account of precisely the damage which they bring when they are done once, but on account of the damage which they would bring if, being repeated more often, they were lawful.... Thus therefore in the present matter it seems to be said that although the theft of one aureus or half made only once would not bring great detriment, especially to a rich man, and therefore considered according to itself would not seem sufficient for inducing eternal damnation; nevertheless consequently it would bring great detriment, because if such theft were slight and could be done without grave sin, thefts of this sort would be multiplied, from the frequency of which the greatest detriment would follow even for the rich and princes." And from these things it is more than sufficiently plain how false it is to assert that matter absolutely grave from Lugo is the sum of 100 aurei, namely greater than 500 libellae, since an aureus is equivalent to 5 libellae, 38 centesimi.

n. 12.

Let us come to the third question. The reason adduced, that one depart from the limits designated by ancient Theologians and by St. Alphonsus, is excellent. For since the value of money has changed, and has been diminished, and notably diminished, the damage at present brought upon the neighbor in equal circumstances is much less than that which it was before. And in the matter of theft it is precisely this damage, grave or slight, which renders the matter grave or slight. St. Alphonsus himself, l.c., n. 527, says that the gravity of the matter of theft "is to be measured respectively according to the circumstances of person, thing, place, and time." Lugo has the same, l.c., nn. 24, 25. But what is asserted against this, that it is not lawful to depart from the doctrine of the ancient theologians and of St. Alphonsus, whose works received special approval from the Apostolic See, truly has no place in our case. For we do not depart from their doctrine and principles even by the breadth of a nail, although the conclusion is different, because the circumstances are different, as the same St. Alphonsus and Lugo teach that they ought to be. Finally, what is added, namely that grave matter in theft would assume nearly enormous proportions if attention had to be paid to the changed value of money and the price of things, is most false. A certain recent theologian, indeed, relying upon a certain catalogue of prices which is found in a certain Ordinance of the Police of the City of Bourges in France, in the year 1598, from a comparison of the aforesaid prices with the prices of the same city in the year 1883, found the proportion to be one to thirteen. And hence he deduced that grave matter for a king is at least 150 libellae. This assertion is a very true exaggeration, and without any solid foundation. It does not suffice to compare the price of a few wares and the stipend of some workers which are found in that Ordinance of the City of Bourges. But in order that we may come to a seriously deduced and founded conclusion, it is necessary to examine and weigh the whole present State of Society in relation to public and private riches, in relation to the value of money and all necessities of life. And first indeed, the poor, who live from the goods of the rich, are in the present day as many as before and perhaps more and much more than before. If money is more abundant, taxes also and revenues are greater, at least in an equal if not greater proportion. The stipend of public officials has increased, but certainly it has not increased thirteen times nor ten times, nor much less relatively to the stipend of the time immediately past. But the necessities of life in the present day have increased; and money, if, attention being paid to commerce and present industry, it is more fruitful than before, certainly the increase is not thirteen times greater, but scarcely by a third or half. Cultivation of fields, on the contrary, in many places is much less fruitful, and in some almost abandoned. But attention being paid to the evolution of Commerce, the loss of Capitals on account of cessions of goods, fires, shipwrecks, etc., is much greater than before. And although there is now greater activity, circulation, and quasi-motion of riches, notwithstanding this, those who now are extraordinarily and exorbitantly rich do not seem truly to be richer than those who were extraordinarily rich in past times, as can easily be deduced from their great works and foundations of beneficence, of most splendid buildings, Monasteries, Hospitals, etc., which they erected and founded. Finally, if according to that Ordinance of the City of Bourges a pound of beef and a hen today is of thirteen times greater price than before, a proportion of this sort is not true for all cities and towns of Europe, indeed not even of the same France, as is established from catalogues of prices which are published in public Journals. And thus, for example, in the City of Bourges the best hen of all is bought for 3 libellae and 90 centesimi; at Turin it is bought for 2 libellae and 40 centesimi. Cardinal Lugo himself observed this for his own time; for he says, l.c., n. 24: "I saw at Madrid that the common price of one hen was eight argentei, while nevertheless at Salamanca, while I was studying there, it was commonly bought for two argentei." Besides, how many other things there are which previously were bought at a much dearer price, but today are had at a cheap price, as it is easy to discern in the transmission of letters, in the carriage of goods, in journeys, in things made by machine art, in fuels necessary for illuminating and burning, etc. Therefore the excess of grave matter in theft in the present day can by no means be enormous. All things well weighed, perhaps it scarcely reaches double, as can also be confirmed from the stipend of Masses, which either by custom or by diocesan Statutes has increased about twofold. And thus in the time of St. Alphonsus and Benedict XIV, the stipend of manual Masses was 10 solidi; but that of founded Masses was 26 or 27 solidi, cf. Benedict XIV, Instr. 56, n. 19 ff.; but today it is 1 1/2 or 2 libellae for various places. Nearly the same must be said concerning the stipend of soldiers, doctors, etc. In the year 1856 the Sacred Congregation, for the furnishing of support, decreed the sum of 6 ducats monthly, about 30 libellae, etc. Cf. Bizzarri, Collect., etc. Moreover, in the time of Molina, who died in 1600, the variation of money was from 1 to 6. De Iust. et Iure, tr. 2, D. 685, n. 2. In the time of Lugo, who died in 1660, the variation of money was from 1 to 3. De Iust. et Iur., D. 16, n. 25. St. Alphonsus also affirms a variation from 1 to 2, book 3, n. 383. Nor indeed did these Doctors increase grave matter of theft for their own time in this proportion. Therefore that the grave matter of theft must be increased according to the reasoning of the change in the value of money, in the same proportion, is proved neither by reason nor by authority.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 2 passages

Vol. II, Appendix, On Grave Matter in Theft

n. ¶1.

To n. 1297 ff. ON GRAVE MATTER IN THEFT

The reason for doubting in this matter is that it seems necessary at present to exceed the limits fixed beforehand both by the older Theologians and also by St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 527, 528, because from their age up to our own no slight difference is detected concerning the value of money. For all now complain that the prices of things have grown notably in comparison with past times, or, what comes back to the same thing, that the value of money has decreased. Whence it is necessary that grave matter in theft now reach a greater quantity of money. But on the contrary it seems that one must not depart either from the opinion of the older theologians, which is always to be held in the greatest account in a moral matter, nor, and much less, from the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, which had special approval from the Holy See. Moreover, although it must be conceded that, according to the variety of times, variety has also been introduced in the value of money, nevertheless if a proportion of this sort were to be preserved, since now the prices of things have grown immensely, the grave quantity in theft would also have to be increased immensely, which would yield to the evident harm of Society. To resolve this question we inquire into three things: 1. How many kinds of grave matter are to be distinguished in theft?
What in our age is to be judged matter both relatively and absolutely grave in theft?
What is to be judged concerning the proposed reasons for doubting?

As regards the first question it is enough to note that, properly speaking, grave matter in theft is always relative, nor can it be absolute. The reason is because, as the Angelic Doctor says, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 3, "sins which are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed per se according to the harms which are inflicted on the neighbor, because from this they have the notion of fault. But the harm is so much the greater, as a greater good is taken away." Notwithstanding this, theologians commonly distinguish in theft absolutely grave matter and relatively grave matter. Relatively grave matter is that which is grave with attention to the conditions of the person in particular, to whom a grave harm is in reality brought. This is altogether consonant with the doctrine of St. Thomas just set forth, l. c. and q. 66, a. 6 ad 3. But as regards absolutely grave matter, Scavini, Milan ed. 1874, book 2, n. 697, says: "theft will be absolutely grave when, independently of the damage which the owner suffers, in the sense of men it is judged per se to suffice for constituting a lethal sin." This definition is either inexact, as incomplete, or in reality says and explains nothing; because, if precision and abstraction is made from the harm of the neighbor, no judgment of grave matter can be formed. And if the common sense of men judges such or such matter grave, it judges so because in such or such matter it considers grave harm of the neighbor. Otherwise that judgment of common sense would be a judgment without foundation and sense. Absolutely grave matter, according to the common doctrine of Theologians, is matter which is grave with respect to all, of whatever condition they may be, whether they are poor or rich; whether they are individual persons or moral persons; as that which in any conditions of state whatever always brings grave harm to the neighbor, for such a place or time. It is said for such a place or time, because the same thing in this place or time, on account of abundance, is esteemed little, and consequently its taking away inflicts light damage; but in another place or time, on account of rarity and necessity, it becomes of greater value, and consequently the taking away of the same thing brings grave damage. Hence what the same Scavini adds, l. c., is also inexact: "But it is clear that the determination of absolute matter, and matter in itself, for judging concerning the gravity of sin, ought to have place only then when the state and condition of the damaged person is unknown." And he asserts this absolutely grave matter to be about five or six lire.
Aptly Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., D. 16, S. 2, n. 23: "And indeed it cannot be denied that the malice of theft is respective, nor has anyone denied this. For although they say that some matter of theft can be given which is grave absolutely, and another respective..., nevertheless they do not will that it be grave without any respect to the damage of the neighbor; but they only signify that there is some matter of such a kind through which grave damage is inflicted on all, and therefore, with such matter standing, there is no need to examine and weigh the condition of the person suffering damage, since it is established that every person, of whatever condition he may be, suffers grave damage from theft of this sort. Nor can it be denied that some matter exists which is not grave with respect to all, but is light with respect to one and grave with respect to others.... For the gravity of the malice is taken from the gravity of the damage inflicted; but the gravity of the damage comes from the greater need by which the neighbor needs that thing. Wherefore, since not all equally need the thing which is taken away, it follows that they do not suffer an equally grave injury, and therefore one person can suffer a light injury, another a grave injury, through theft of an equal sum."
As regards the second question, there is a twofold criterion or rule for judging and determining matter relatively grave. For one criterion is intrinsic, the other extrinsic. Let us speak first of the intrinsic. That which reasonably and, speaking per se, brings grave displeasure to our neighbor is a grave sin against charity; and if justice enters into it, it is a grave sin against justice, which obliges more strictly than charity. The Angelic Doctor, 2. 2, q. 66, a. 6, uses nearly this reasoning to prove that theft per se is a mortal sin. "Mortal sin," he says, "is that which is contrary to charity, insofar as it is the spiritual life of the soul. But charity consists principally indeed in the love of God, secondarily in the love of neighbor, to which it pertains that we will and work good for the neighbor. But by theft man inflicts harm on the neighbor in his goods; and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish. Whence theft, as contrary to charity, is a mortal sin." Now to deprive some person and his family of daily sustenance, necessary according to his own condition, reasonably brings grave displeasure to our neighbor, who sees himself and his own deprived of the things necessary for life according to their proper state. Whence it evidently appears that the harm is grave, by computing in sustenance not only food, but also clothing and habitation. "Commonly the Doctors say," says St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 527, "that in theft that is grave matter which would suffice someone according to his condition for the sustenance of himself and his family for one day; in which, as La-Croix rightly notes, n. 985, with Sporer, Gobat, and others, not only food is computed, but also clothing and habitation." And here it must be noted that by sustenance of this sort, speaking per se, honorable pleasures and lawful recreations must also be comprehended, those fitting to one's proper condition, and of which someone would also be deprived with altogether reasonable displeasure. For man does not live only by bread and flesh, water and wine, in a strict measure, nor does he live solitarily, but he lives physically also by other things, and in a fittingly good and gathered measure, if not always overflowing; but morally he lives in his own family and in society; and therefore expenses of pleasure, for the sake of honorable and fitting recreation and also of due honor, must at least sometimes be sustained. Theologians seem to understand this implicitly by that sustenance of the family which they call congruous and fitting to one's state.
But as regards grave sin, although deprivation of sustenance in the sense set forth is certainly and among all grave, nevertheless a still lesser quantity suffices for grave sin, according to the principle established. For if someone were deprived of daily sustenance necessary only for his own individual life, and not also for the life of his own family, he certainly would experience grave and reasonable displeasure. Indeed, to constitute grave sin from the principle already established, it is not necessary that someone be deprived of all that which is necessary for the daily sustenance of his own individual life, as this sustenance has just been explained, but it suffices that he be deprived only of a notable part of it. Truly, would someone not perceive a grave and rational displeasure if even for one day he were deprived of necessary food, or clothing, or habitation, or therefore could not fulfill the offices of his own state and condition?
Wherefore, considering 1. what at present, and as regards Italy, is expended for the sustenance of life by the poor, by workers, by various persons of civil and noble condition; what is expended daily in Colleges and Seminaries, in Religious Communities, in families which live decently and fittingly, but also with due economy; considering 2. the wages of workers, physicians, advocates, public officials, and the profits of merchants, the pensions of students in Colleges and Seminaries, the dowries of Nuns, the ordinary revenues of the rich; it seems possible to establish at present as regards Italy, and perhaps also, at least more or less, for other European regions, the following relatively grave matter: 1. for the poor, 1 lira, and somewhat less or more according to the degree of their poverty; 2. for workers and craftsmen, 1 lira, 2, 3, according to the various trades and arts, more or less lucrative; 3. for persons of civil and ordinary condition, who live by revenues, or by the exercise of trade and commerce, or of a liberal profession, 5, 6, 7 lire, according to the various degree of comfort of life; 4. for ordinary rich persons, 10, 11, 12 lire, and for ordinary moral Bodies and for the more opulent rich, 10-20 lire, according to the degree of riches; 5. finally for persons extraordinarily rich, such as reigning and non-reigning Princes, Nobles and very wealthy Merchants and Businessmen, Moral Bodies and Societies possessing exorbitant Capital, relatively grave matter cannot be designated; recourse must be had to absolutely grave matter. And indeed, when a private Prince, for example, possesses 50 and 100 millions, who daily for letters alone and telegrams expends 5, 10, 15 lire and more, it is evident that theft of 10, 20 lire certainly will not deprive him in any way of fitting sustenance. Therefore to assert that matter of this sort is relatively grave for them is merely arbitrary, and is in no way confirmed by the enunciated intrinsic criterion and rule for judging concerning relative gravity.
But let us make a step to the extrinsic criterion and rule. Since here the matter concerns a moral judgment in a moral matter, such criterion and rule is contained in the authority of Theologians. "Besides," says St. Alphonsus, l. c., "to make a just measurement of this gravity, the Salmanticenses rightly say, de Rest., c. 5, n. 12, that the judgments of the wise contribute greatly; and their greater authority on this point seems to me to constitute greater probability. Wherefore I have taken care diligently to gather here the diverse opinions of the Doctors," etc. But more recent theologians, with few excepted, by a slight difference, of which account cannot be taken in moral matters, agree altogether in the matter assigned. For they agree in this, that for European regions relatively grave matter at present is almost twice as great as that which St. Alphonsus established for his own time. Now the holy Doctor, l. 3, n. 528, with no distinction made between the lowest, middle, and highest grade of riches, assigns: 1. for the poor, 1 julian, 54 centesimi; 2. for workers, 2 julians, 1 lira, 8 centesimi; 3. for craftsmen, 2 and a half julians, 1 lira, 35 centesimi; 4. for the moderately rich,

n. ¶2.

4 julians, 2 lire, 16 centesimi; 5. for the absolutely rich and for very opulent merchants, 6 julians, 3 lire, 24 centesimi; 6. for the very wealthy magnates, 1 gold coin, 5 lire, 38 centesimi; 7. for a very opulent Community, one and a half gold coins, 8 lire, 7 centesimi; 8. for Kings, 2 gold coins, 10 lire, 76 centesimi. But the holy Doctor adds, l. c. n. 527, that very many doctors extend this quantity up to 3 gold coins, 16 lire, 14 centesimi. And this quantity, as is clear, reaches fairly nearly half the quantity assigned. For a julian is worth 54 centesimi of a lira. But a gold coin is worth 5 lire, 38 centesimi. Cf. Finardi, Prontuario del Commerciante, etc., Rome 1862. To omit others for the sake of brevity, the most learned Joseph D'Annibale has these things in Summula Theolog. Moral., Part 2, n. 201, ed. 2, Milan, 1882: "I should have St. Alphonsus before my eyes, with the price of things almost doubled since the time in which he lived. Therefore for the present value of coins I would say that damage which does not reach about one lira is always light per se, even if to a beggar; on the contrary I would say that damage which exceeds about 30 lire is grave per se, even if it were inflicted on the very richest person, or on a King. Between these the damage ought to be measured relatively, that is, from persons: therefore I judge grave 1. for the poor, that is, for a beggar, or a worker, or a craftsman, damage of 1 lira or 2 or 2 1/2; 2. for merchants, according to each one's fortune, whether lowest, middle, or highest, 2 1/2, or 4, or 8; 3. for the rich, insofar as from their own income, expenses having been deducted, nothing remains over, or little, or much, or very much, 3 and perhaps less, or 4 or 7 or 10. Finally, as regards moral persons which have the body of a College, damage is grave which is valued at 10, or, if they are opulent, at 20." This quantity also is not very remote from the matter assigned. And meanwhile the abundance of money and the facility of procuring it legitimately for oneself has grown much.

Let us come to absolute matter. As for relative matter the damage of individuals is attended to, all particular circumstances having been considered, so for absolute matter the damage of Society itself must especially be considered. And once this has been admitted, it is then easily understood how absolutely grave matter is always grave, namely grave for all without distinction, although the matter concerns those extraordinarily and exorbitantly rich. With this principle established, absolutely grave matter seems to be that which exceeds forty or thirty lire, the quantity designated by D'Annibale. But someone will object: how can forty or thirty lire bring grave damage to Society, if they do not bring grave damage even to an extraordinarily rich individual, such as are great bankers, or money merchants in Europe, to whom the loss of 30 and even 300 lire and more in their commercial operations is scarcely sensible, and is immediately compensated by so many and so great other profits? It is answered that the common doctrine relative to fornication is that it is prohibited in all cases by natural right itself, on account of the uncertain education of the offspring. Although in some particular case, which is not very difficult to be verified, both father and mother, otherwise very rich, agree between themselves that the offspring be educated in due mode; indeed even that they themselves immediately undertake care of a fitting education, and therefore by a sincere and efficacious will promise that marriage is immediately to be entered, fornication would always remain prohibited by natural right; because if it were lawful and permitted in some particular case, there would always be the most grave danger of disordered license with immense harm to the offspring. In a similar way, although a determinate quantity, already quite large in itself, does not bring grave harm to some individual in particular, nor even for the same individual is there danger at least of further grave harm: nevertheless it is sufficient for constituting a grave and most grave danger for Society itself, and, speaking per se, even for the individuals themselves. Wherefore it will always be, absolutely speaking, grave matter in any case. For if the grave damage of the individual and of society is considered, it is necessary to take account not only of expenses necessary for the sustenance and decorum of one's own state, but also of light thefts, which are frequent enough not only among thieves by profession, but even among persons of one's own family, community, society; especially, however, among persons to whom the administration of the goods of others is entrusted, especially of public dominion and utility. "Namely," says the renowned D'Annibale, l. c. n. 257, note 20, "it is very difficult for the things of masters to be administered so faithfully by others that something not adhere to the hands of those handling them." Therefore with such danger posited, not only is it evident that the designated quantity is sufficient for constituting absolutely grave matter; but perhaps that quantity can even seem, not without reason, excessive and to be restricted to narrower limits. For where the gravity of sin does not deter, and a rather notable hope of greater profit invites and incites to new theft, several men, and commonly far more, would commit it, and our fortunes would be most gravely injured, unless they were deterred by fear of graver sin. Hence it is clear why, although the excess of the wealth of a most opulent King above the wealth of an ordinary rich man, or even of a Marquis or Count, is far greater, without any proportion, than the excess of a rich man above the wealth of a citizen, or common man, nevertheless not so great a proportionate excess is required in grave theft done to a King above theft done to a rich man, as in this latter with respect to theft done to a common man. And this doctrine seems conformable to the doctrine just reported of the Angelic Doctor concerning the gravity of theft, who declares it absolutely, saying: "But by theft man inflicts harm on the neighbor in his things, and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish." Cf. also Lug. l. c. n. 29 ff.
Nor indeed should the authority of Cardinal De Lugo be objected, as asserting, l. c. n. 21, that a quantity absolutely grave in theft cannot be established. For Lugo l. c. does not assert this, but a well diverse matter, namely "that it cannot be defined what are the borders of each matter" - namely light and grave - "so that below such a sum it is light, and above it it is grave." Certainly one thing is that this quantity cannot be mathematically defined, another that absolutely grave matter cannot even be determined morally, with a certain moral latitude, namely a little more or a little less; and this is what Cardinal De Lugo himself attempts to effect in the following paragraphs. Cf. n. 29 ff., where he designates the universal reason of the malice of grave theft, namely absolutely grave theft. Cf. also n. 35.
Nor likewise should it be objected that from the discourse made it would follow that any theft is grave, since from any light theft the most grave detriment of Society and individuals could be feared. For men are not so enticed to these lesser thefts, from which they take little profit, as they are enticed to those other greater thefts in which profit not contemptible appears, if they could be done without grave sin, as the same Lugo has it, l. c. n. 33. But the assigned quantity of forty or thirty lire certainly brings profit not contemptible, more than sufficiently enticing to stealing.
Finally, the authority of Lugo is still objected against the assigned quantity of 30, 40 lire as absolutely grave. For Lugo asserts this quantity to be 100 gold coins, l. c. n. 21. Therefore, if in the time of Lugo this was the absolutely grave quantity, in our time it ought certainly to be still greater. It is answered that the assertion is altogether false. For Lugo does not say that for his own time that was the absolutely grave quantity, but that it was a quantity evidently and certainly grave; which is well diverse; and he asserts this indeed by a certain almost exaggeration. For in that same number he is not speaking of matter to be determined absolutely, so that he determines it, but he is speaking only of the difficulty of determining that grave matter, and much more of defining the limits of that grave and light matter, on account of the very difficulty of finding in this matter some rational principle and some fixed rule. Hence in the following numbers, 22-29, he reports various opinions of Theologians and various rules assigned by them, which he weighs and shows to be insufficient. But before he sets forth in n. 29 his rule and rational principle, so that the malice of grave theft, namely absolutely grave theft, may be understood, he openly declares that he in reality does not depart from the opinion of others, with attention also to the decrease of money at that time; and he says at the end of n. 28: "Wherefore I will not unwillingly consent in reality with the aforesaid, that in order to Kings and wealthy Magnates the theft of one gold coin is required; for the rich, six or seven silver coins; for craftsmen, four; for the poor, the value of daily food, or the average wage which in the middle time between winter and summer is given to a digger." A silver coin is the same to Lugo as a julian or royal, n. 22-26; but an ordinary royal is worth 26 centesimi of a lira. But since he takes a silver coin for a julian or royal, and says in n. 26 that one Ducat contains eleven royals or Julians, by royal he understands not an ordinary copper royal, real de vellon, but a silver royal, real de plata, of value about twice as great, and about equivalent to a julian. And in n. 31 he still more definitively establishes that theft of one gold coin is absolutely grave, on account of the danger of grave detriment which is in it: "for," he says, "from several thefts of one gold coin, done to you by diverse persons, your family goods would truly undergo a most grave detriment." Likewise in n. 32 he affirms the same altogether clearly, extending that absolutely grave matter not to 100 gold coins, but to one or two gold coins. Finally in n. 35, again discoursing on the difficulty of precisely defining the limits of grave and light matter, although he speaks hypothetically and only by way of example, he certainly brings into the middle not 90 or 80 gold coins, but 6 julians. This can also be confirmed by the authority of St. Alphonsus, who in n. 527 lists Lugo among the authors who, "with respect to the very wealthiest Magnates ... say that one gold coin suffices for grave matter." But from the opinion of Lugo, n. 29, with respect to these very wealthy persons, matter relatively grave is not to be required, but absolutely grave, which he then establishes according to this rule and principle: namely "that some things are prohibited not precisely on account of the damage which they bring when they are done once, but on account of the damage which they would bring, repeated more often, if they were lawful.... Thus therefore in the present matter it seems that it must be said that although theft of one gold coin, or of half, done only once, would not bring great detriment, especially to a rich man; and therefore considered according to itself would not seem sufficient for inducing eternal damnation; nevertheless consequently it would bring great detriment, because if such a theft were light and could be done without grave sin, thefts of this sort would be multiplied, from the frequency of which the greatest detriment would follow even for rich men and princes." And from these things it is more than sufficiently clear how false it is to assert that absolutely grave matter according to Lugo is the sum of 100 gold coins, namely more than 500 lire, since a gold coin is equivalent to 5 lire and 38 centesimi.
Let us come to the third question. The reason brought forward, that one should depart from the limits designated by the ancient Theologians and by St. Alphonsus, is excellent. For since the value of money has changed and has been lessened, and notably lessened, the damage brought at present to the neighbor in equal circumstances is much less than what it formerly was. And in the matter of theft it is precisely this damage, grave or light, which renders the matter grave or light. St. Alphonsus himself, l. c. n. 527, says that the gravity of the matter of theft "is to be measured respectively according to the circumstances of the person, thing, place, and time." Lugo has the same, l. c. n. 24, 25. But that which is asserted on the contrary, that it is not lawful to depart from the doctrine of the ancient theologians and of St. Alphonsus, whose works received special approval from the Apostolic See, truly has no place in our case. For we do not depart even by a nail's breadth from their doctrine and principles, although the conclusion is diverse, because the circumstances are diverse, as St. Alphonsus himself and Lugo teach that they ought to be. Finally, what is added, namely that grave matter in theft would assume almost enormous proportions if attention had to be given to the changed value of money and price of things, is most false. Certainly a certain more recent theologian, relying on a certain catalogue of prices which is found in a certain Police Ordinance of the City of Bourges in France in the year 1598, from a comparison of the aforesaid prices with the prices of the same city in the year 1883, finds the proportion to be one to thirteen. And hence he deduces that grave matter for a king is at least 150 lire. This assertion is a very true exaggeration, and without any solid foundation. It is not enough to compare the price of a few goods and the wage of some workers, which are found in that Ordinance of the City of Bourges. But in order that we may come to a conclusion seriously deduced and founded, it is necessary to examine and weigh the whole present State of Society relative to public and private riches, relative to the value of money and all necessities of life. And first indeed, the poor, who live from the goods of the rich, are at present as many as before and perhaps more, and much more, than before. If money is more abundant, taxes and revenues are also greater, in an equal proportion at least, if not greater. The wage of public officials has been increased, but certainly it has not been increased thirteenfold, nor tenfold, nor much less in relation to the wage of the time immediately past. But the necessities of life at present have been increased; and money, if, with attention to actual commerce, it is more fruitful by the force of industry than before, the increase certainly is not thirteen times greater, but scarcely by a third or a half. On the contrary, the cultivation of fields in several places is far less fruitful, and in some almost abandoned. But with attention to the evolution of commerce, the loss of Capitals on account of cessions of goods, fires, shipwrecks, etc., is far greater than before. And although there is now a greater activity, course, and, as it were, motion of riches, notwithstanding this, those who now are extraordinarily and exorbitantly rich do not seem in reality to be richer than those who were extraordinarily rich in past times, as can easily be deduced from their great works and foundations of beneficence, of most splendid buildings, Monasteries, Hospitals, etc., which they erected and founded. Finally, if according to that Ordinance of the City of Bourges a pound of beef and a hen today is of thirteen times greater price than before, a proportion of this sort is not true for all cities and towns of Europe, indeed not even of the same France, as is established from the Catalogues of prices which are published in public Newspapers. And thus, for example, in the City of Bourges the best hen of all is bought for 3 lire and 90 centesimi; at Turin it is bought for 2 lire and 40 centesimi. Cardinal Lugo himself observed this for his own time; for he says, l. c. n. 24: "I saw at Madrid that the common price of one hen was eight silver coins, while nevertheless at Salamanca, when I was studying there, it was commonly bought for two silver coins." Besides, how many other things there are which formerly were bought at a much dearer price, but today are had at a cheap price, as is easy to perceive in the transmission of letters, in the transport of merchandise, in journeys, in things made by machines, in combustibles necessary for lighting and for burning, etc. Therefore the excess of grave matter in theft at present can in no way be enormous. All things well weighed, it scarcely perhaps reaches the double, as can also be confirmed from the stipend of Masses, which whether from custom or from diocesan Statutes has been increased about double. And thus in the time of St. Alphonsus and Benedict XIV, the stipend of manual Masses was 10 solidi; but that of founded Masses was 26, 27 solidi, cf. Benedict XIV, Instr. 56, n. 19 ff.; but today it is 1 1/2, 2 lire for various places. Nearly the same must be said concerning the wage of soldiers, physicians, etc. In the year 1856 the Sacred Congregation, for the furnishing of alimony, decreed the sum of 6 ducats monthly, about 30 lire, etc. Cf. Bizzarri, Collect., etc. Moreover, in the time of Molina, who died in 1600, the variation of money was from 1 to 6. De Iust. et Iure, Tr. 2, D. 685, n. 2. In the time of Lugo, who died in 1660, the variation of money was from 1 to 3. De Iust. et Iur., D. 16, n. 25. St. Alphonsus also affirms variation from 1 to 2, l. 3, n. 383. Nor indeed did these doctors increase grave matter of theft for their own time by this proportion. Therefore that grave matter of theft is to be increased according to the ratio of the change of the value of money, by the same proportion, is proved neither by reason nor by authority.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 42 passages

Vol. I, Treatise on Justice and Ri…, Second Part. On the Violat…, Ch. II, Article I. On the Nature of Theft

- Definition. Theft is the hidden taking away ¹ of another's thing, when the owner is reasonably unwilling.

¹ When it is said taking away, theft is distinguished from mere damaging. Wrongly, therefore, do some find an example of grave theft if someone steals from a tailor a needle without which he cannot work. For it will be grave damaging, but not grave theft.

Division. Theft is thus distinguished:

Theft simply, if it is done secretly. - 2. Robbery, if it is done openly with violence inflicted on the owner ². - 3. Sacrilege, if it is done concerning a sacred thing.

² If theft is a hidden taking away, but robbery an open taking away with violence, then robbery ought not to be called a species of theft, but of unjust taking away.

Principles. I. Theft, by whatever name it is called, is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it is gravely opposed to the natural law, as is plain both from reason and from Sacred Scripture, in which it is numbered among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven. For thus says the Apostle, 1 Cor. 6:10: Neither thieves..., nor robbers shall possess the kingdom of God.

II. Sacrilegious theft and robbery constitute a species of diverse malice: the former because besides justice it violates religion; the latter because to the unjust taking away of another's thing it adds injury inflicted on the person. But other modes, or other objects of theft, do not change the species, because by these the nature of damage is not changed.

n. 606.

- Questions. Q. 1. What matter is judged grave in theft?

n. 606.

Resp. 1. It cannot be rigorously determined ³. According to the common sentence, which seems altogether to be held, this matter is not to be considered absolutely in itself, but relatively to the various conditions and necessities of men, so that graver matter is to be required for grave sin in theft against a rich man than against a poor man ⁴. The reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, especially depends on the greater or lesser deprivation, sorrow, and reluctance of will which he from whom it is stolen suffers; but now no one does not see that the same matter causes sorrow now light, now grave, according as the owner from whom it is taken is rich or poor. Nevertheless one must attend to the reluctance of the will as it is commonly and reasonably had among men, not with respect to men drawn by a greater or lesser love of money. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., n. 526, against Billuart and some others, who contend that matter, whether grave or light, must be considered absolutely in itself, and that it consists in that which is required for the daily sustenance of an honest or moderately rich man.

³ Nearly all the Doctors (says Lugo, De Iust., disp. 16, n. 21), after a long inquiry and great study in order to determine some matter of grave theft, ingenuously confess that no fixed rule can be established, but that this whole thing depends on a moral judgment, so that God knows when here and now the matter is grave; but we in doubt ought to abstain. For although we can determine with certainty some matter which is light, for example one obol or one as; and another which is certainly grave, for example one hundred gold coins; nevertheless between those two extremes we cannot define what the boundaries of each matter are, so that short of such a sum it is light, and beyond it it is grave. But they try to assign some moral rules for discerning at least confusedly each matter, some of which according to the genius and character of each one are too strict, others too lax.

Nevertheless, as Lugo himself adds (ibid., n. 35), the law of nature itself demands that some certain quantity of grave theft be determined, short of which a quantity a little smaller, for example by one or two obols, can be taken without grave sin. For otherwise we shall fall into that very great inconvenience, that either all thefts, even the most minute, have grave guilt, or no theft, even the gravest, can be called gravely prohibited. For unless sometimes the transition is made from light to grave matter by the slightest distance, and conversely, from certainly light matter by the smallest increments we shall never arrive at grave matter, and on the contrary from certainly grave matter by slight decrements we shall never come down to light.

These two things certainly, namely both the plainly uncertain boundaries between grave and light matter, and the necessity of some certain term between grave and light matter, make the condition of this treatment, as is plain, exceedingly rough.

⁴ The common distinction is that the matter of theft is called grave, one kind absolutely, another relatively. The former is judged grave with respect to all and always; but the latter is grave with respect to certain persons, although with respect to others it can be held light, since it (as Lugo says, De Iust., disp. 16, n. 27) is taken from the quantity of the thing taken away with proportion to the goods of the one suffering the injury. Nor indeed does the Author reject this distinction in this place; but he seems to have attacked certain persons who perhaps admitted only the absolute gravity of matter, but not the relative.

n. 606.

Nevertheless, some absolute matter must be determined which it would never be lawful to go beyond without grave fault; for otherwise, if an all-mannered proportion had to be observed among all conditions, certainly the greatest quantity would be required for grave matter where someone steals from a very rich prince; but this would surely yield to the damage of society.

n. 607.

- Resp. 2. But for grave matter considered relatively (attention being paid to the principal places of Europe and to the circumstances of our times), there seem to be required: 1. approximately the value of one franc, or 20 asses, relatively to the poor, and sometimes less for a greater degree of necessity; 2. approximately two or three francs, or 40 or 60 asses, relatively to workmen who procure food for themselves by long labor; 3. approximately four or five francs relatively to men moderately rich; 4. approximately six or seven francs relatively to ordinary rich men.

n. 607.

But as regards matter absolutely grave, the more common sentence in St. Alphonsus ⁵ is that two or three gold coins are judged grave matter. But a gold coin is equivalent to about five francs. Yet you should wish to call to mind that money at that time, as being more rare, was also more precious ⁶.

⁵ St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 527) enumerates at least 20 authors who, as regards the very rich, require two or even three gold coins for grave matter. Indeed he attributes to very many the sentence that three gold coins are required; and he testifies that this sentence is called common by Laymann. But the common gold coin is equivalent to the Roman scudo. And from this it is plain that in the judgment of these Doctors, absolutely grave matter, namely that which can never be judged light fault, ought to have reached at least the sum of three gold coins.

⁶ The inconstancy of the value of money brings it about that several Doctors thought that the measure of grave matter should by no means be taken from a certain quantity of money. Thus Molina (De Iust., tr. II, disp. 685, n. 2): First of all, I judge that this matter must not be defined by the quantity of money. For as was shown in disp. 406, with money least changed..., its value increases and decreases by its multitude or scarcity... Whence it happens that for defining the sum which is sufficient so that theft is a lethal fault by comparison with all places and times, it is not an apt fixed rule to say that it is a certain quantity of money, such as two, three, or four silver reales. For where they are worth less because of the greatest abundance of money, less wounding and lesser injury is done to the neighbor in theft of the value of the sum of that money than where they are worth more; and where they are worth more because of a great scarcity of money, greater wounding and greater injury is done to the neighbor in theft of that value of the sum of money than where they are worth less. And Cardinal De Lugo (De Iust., disp. 16, n. 25): Nor can the value reduced to so much money for grave matter be designated; because the very value of money, or its estimability, is not equal in every place and time. Therefore it pertains to the Confessor to have before his eyes the circumstances of places. For the daily labor of a workman, for example, will bring three francs somewhere, while elsewhere the same labor will scarcely bring one franc.

Nor is a lesser variety in the value of money found according to the variety of times. And indeed this diversity must be considered even more attentively, so that the mind of the Doctors on this matter may be accurately known. For Molina, who died in the year 1600, already in his own age noted this variety that had been introduced thus (De Iust. et Iur., tract. 2, disp. 685, n. 2): Things which eighty years before were bought or hired for one are not bought or hired today for five or even six. But indeed after half a century Cardinal Lugo, who died in the year 1660, thus notes that the value of money had diminished still more (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 16, n. 25): We also know that among ourselves the estimation of money has so decreased..., that those for whom formerly 50 gold coins sufficed for living, today 150 do not suffice. But what has happened to the value of money from that age up to ours, no one is ignorant. For if St. Alphonsus too (lib. 3, n. 383) notes a great difference in this matter between his own age and that of La-Croix (but La-Croix existed a little at the same time as Lugo), it is easily plain what must be thought in our days, when all are astonished and complain that the prices of things have grown immensely in a short interval of time, or, what comes back to the same thing, that the value of money has decreased immensely.

Hence, moreover, it follows of itself that the measure of grave matter in theft (especially if speech is of matter absolutely grave) is not aptly taken from the older writers in such a way that the limits prescribed by them then ought also now to be judged defined from their authority. Thus since you have (in St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 527) Sylvester, Angelus, Soto, Corduba, Arragonius, Rodericus, etc., who are older than Ludovicus Molina; but these require for matter absolutely grave three gold coins, namely at least three scudi, whose sentence otherwise Laymann, contemporary with Molina, calls common (in St. Alphonsus, l.c.); certainly whoever wishes to define the matter by the judgment of those Doctors must be wholly required to have regard for the change which the value of money has undergone from that age up to us.

n. 608.

- Q. 2. What matter is required so that thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

n. 608.

Resp. 1. It is certain among all that in thefts of a wife and children more is required for constituting grave matter than in thefts of strangers, because the father of a family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as to the mode (that it is taken secretly) than as to the substance. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., n. 32. But they add that more probably there is required for these a sum twice greater than for strangers; but no general rule can be assigned, for the matter will generally have to be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions ⁷.

⁷ As to what the Author reports concerning a double quantity for sinning gravely against the substance, understand it when the father is reasonably unwilling also as to the substance. Moreover, the sentences of the Doctors which St. Alphonsus (Hom. apost., tract. 10, n. 32) reports, on account of the circumstances which the Author also mentions generally, extend that quantity of matter much more broadly.

n. 608.

Resp. 2. For servants it depends also on the greater liberality or tenacity of masters, on the quality or situation of the thing stolen, for example, whether it is edible or not, guarded or open..., etc. According to many, through minute thefts made by servants in foods and eatables which are not customarily carefully kept, generally one does not come to mortal sin, provided these things are not sold or carried out of the house, or are not of extraordinary price. But if servants steal money ⁸ or things carefully guarded, a greater quantity is not required for grave sin, because then masters are not less unwilling toward them than toward others. Indeed thefts of this sort are punished more severely by civil law on account of the defect of fidelity which intervenes in them. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., n. 34.

⁸ This exception nevertheless does not seem to be extended to the very slight subtractions of some obol or half-obol, not infrequent among maidservants or servants, while they are accustomed to buy daily food for their masters.

n. 609.

- Q. 3. Whether minute thefts can coalesce for constituting grave matter?

n. 609.

Resp. 1. Altogether affirmatively, if it is a matter of thefts committed against the same person, because united they can easily bring grave damage on the owner. This is evident also from this proposition 38 condemned by Innocent XI: No one is held under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken away through small thefts, however great the total sum may be. - Therefore a grave obligation is given of restoring a grave sum taken away through minute thefts, and therefore minute thefts coalesce.

n. 609.

Resp. 2. Affirmatively, with the common sentence, even if it is a matter of minute thefts committed to the damage of diverse persons. The reason is that the precept not to steal obliges not only lest grave damage be brought on the neighbor, but also lest someone grow rich from another's thing ⁹. Indeed such a thief, if not to individuals taken singly, certainly brings grave damage on the community. And indeed, unless thefts of this sort were prohibited under grave obligation, not a few men would easily wish to grow rich from thefts, since they could do this without the loss of eternal salvation; therefore great disorder in society would follow. Therefore these thefts had to be prohibited under grave obligation by natural right. - St. Lig., n. 534. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 37.

⁹ This reason (says Lugo, De Iust., disp. 16, n. 49) does not seem sufficient; because the precept not to steal does not intend to avoid one's own profit, but the damage of the neighbor... If therefore the neighbor is not gravely injured, that action cannot be gravely prohibited. These are Lugo's words, not as though rejecting the common doctrine concerning the gravity of fault in these thefts, for he soon (ibid., n. 50) defends it with solid reasons; but wishing to suggest the less firm strength of that reason. And indeed by right of finding, alluvion, and prescription a man lawfully grows rich from another's thing.

- Q. 4. Whether minute thefts still coalesce if a great interval is placed between them?

Resp. Negatively, according to the more common sentence. The reason is that when a great interval is posited, little thefts from the common estimation of men are not judged to be morally united, nor therefore do they constitute one object in the genus of morals. Besides, then grave damage inflicted on the owner does not appear, since he can scarcely perceive it; and therefore he is not judged gravely unwilling. - St. Lig., n. 530. - Vogler, n. 133.

Q. 5. When is an interval judged great?

Resp. More probably it must be held that thefts no longer coalesce beyond the space of two months, even if they would approach matter as it were grave. - St. Lig., ibid.

Yet some require an interval of one year so that little thefts cease to coalesce; but others contend that it suffices if one month intervenes, or even a shorter time if it is a matter of very minute little thefts. But the former seem to decline into rigor, and the latter perhaps into some laxity ¹⁰.

¹⁰ In this matter the disagreement itself of the Doctors shows that some certain norm can scarcely be handed down. It can be added that this judgment should not be taken from the space of time alone interposed between individual thefts, but also from a comparison of the mind of him who steals, and from other circumstances, from the diversity of which the diverse estimation of men concerning this matter for diverse cases must be derived. Thus, for example, those who, through fields, by rather light thefts often steal and devour grapes, figs, beans, apples, etc., are indeed reprehended; but you will scarcely find one who fears the note of laxity if, even after several years of this custom, he does not inject into them a scruple of grave theft on account of coalescing matter.

Moreover, minute thefts, with whatever interval having been posited, coalesce according to the sentence of all whenever they were committed with the intention of arriving at a notable sum; because through this intention they are truly united among themselves. - St. Lig., n. 530. - Billuart, etc.

- Q. 6. When does matter become grave in minute thefts?

Resp. 1. If minute thefts are made against the same person on diverse occasions, the matter will be grave when it exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - Thus commonly ¹¹.

¹¹ All admit with Cardenas that for grave matter then more is required, for example twice more than would suffice if it were taken away at the same time. Thus La Croix, lib. 3, part 1, n. 1011. But the sentence reported by the Author is the opinion which St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 530) attributes to Benjamin Elbel.

Resp. 2. If minute thefts are made against diverse persons, matter per se will be judged grave when it is twice greater than the sum commonly required for grave theft ¹². - St. Lig., lib. 3, n. 530, and many others.

¹² St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 530) also reports this opinion as if from Elbel. But in reality Elbel (De Restit., conf. 10, n. 290) does not speak of minute thefts which are made to diverse persons at diverse times, but of thefts perpetrated at the same time, which therefore are called minute because the damage brought to each individual is light, for example if you should once steal from a mass common to several.

Moreover, whether you adhere to this opinion, or with others prefer to require something more on account of thefts perpetrated on diverse occasions, it must be noted that the common measure of grave theft cannot here be taken from relative gravity; for the damage is not inflicted on one person, but on several, to none of whom nevertheless we suppose relatively grave damage to have been inflicted. Therefore the common measure of grave theft, which henceforth must be computed at least doubly in the case, ought to be taken not from relative but from absolute gravity, which namely is used when thefts yield to the damage of a community.

Q. 7. Whether retraction of the will impedes subsequent little thefts from being united with preceding ones?

Resp. 1. Affirmatively, if the retraction was efficacious, that is, if the things previously taken away have in fact been restored, because once separated they now here and now no longer exist. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2. Again affirmatively, if the subsequent theft were made from some particular motive; for then it would not seem efficaciously to destroy the preceding will of restoring; or even if the thief expressly and seriously again at the same time proposes to restore the things previously stolen ¹³. Yet this can scarcely be admitted in practice, since he who seriously proposes restitution here and now does not repeat thefts. - Nevertheless it is denied where this will seems in some way to be revoked through a new theft; for in this case nothing prevents a notable sum from being retained, and the thefts from coalescing into one.

¹³ Thus Lugo (De Iust., disp. 16, n. 40) with Molina, Sanchez, Rebello, Granado, Diana, etc. But the reason (says Lugo) is clear; because to steal with the intention of restoring at once or soon does not seem to be a grave sin, speaking of itself, since that brief detention brings little detriment to the owner, unless by accident in some rare case. Therefore, if you intend quickly to restore the former things, so that for a brief time you retain with yourself the debt of a grave sum, there is not whence that theft would receive grave malice. These things indeed seem valid if the thief intends soon to restore not indeed the things previously taken away, but only those which he steals here and now.

n. 612.

- Q. 8. Whether he sins gravely who, after grave matter has been completed, still steals some light thing?

n. 612.

Resp. It is disputed. The first opinion, which seems more probable, denies, the intention of arriving at a new grave sum being excluded. The reason is that that little theft does not seem to be referred to the grave sum already completed, but rather to a new one, which the thief then begins and pursues. - Thus St. Lig., n. 538. - Lessius, c. 12, n. 44. - The Salmanticenses, de Restitutione.

n. 612.

The second opinion affirms, because in this new little theft the thief renews the intention of retaining the grave sum already stolen. - Thus Lacroix, n. 1007, and Lugo, d. 16, n. 43, who nevertheless denies that the sin is multiplied, but says that the same sin is terminated also to the later theft together with the preceding sum ¹⁴, etc. According to others, it must be distinguished thus: that man sins gravely if he does not have a true purpose of restoring the grave sum already possessed; but otherwise, if he has such a purpose. - Thus Billuart, diss. 11, art. 4.

¹⁴ Therefore La Croix alleges Lugo for his opinion without reason, since Lugo rather seems to agree with the opinion of Billuart.

n. 613.

- Q. 9. Whether he sins gravely who by a light theft completes grave matter begun by others with the same person?

n. 613.

Resp. 1. Negatively, if he did not know that little thefts had been committed by others, because he is not conscious of the grave damage inflicted on the owner. - Thus all.

n. 613.

Resp. 2. Negatively, at least more probably, even if he knew that almost grave damage had been perpetrated by others, yet with the case of conspiracy excluded. The reason is that this man, taking a very small thing, is neither of himself the cause of grave harm, nor is he in the cause that others took other things; therefore by no way ought the grave damage which the owner suffers to be imputed to him. - Nor should you say that such a thief sins as gravely as a murderer bringing death by a light blow to a man already struck by innumerable light wounds by others; for death is owed to this last wound, which otherwise would not have followed. But the matter has itself otherwise in the case of theft; for on account of the last little theft no notable calamity or damage accedes. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 53 and following. - Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 2, n. 52, and others commonly, against Bonacina and others.

- Q. 10. Whether, if several persons without common counsel but by example commit light thefts, so that the total damage is grave, each sins gravely?

Resp. More probably negatively by reason of justice, although they can sin against charity. The reason is that example is not a positive cause flowing into another's damage ¹⁵. - Thus St. Lig., n. 537. - Lessius, ibid., n. 52, and others more commonly, against some.

¹⁵ If it is a matter of the guilt which someone incurs because by his example he provokes others to evil, in the case not all individuals, but only those who thus moved others to inflict damage, will be held by guilt of this sort.

Q. 11. When on the part of the thief does the taking away of a light thing become a grave sin?

Resp. It happens in a threefold way, namely: 1. through the intention of arriving at grave matter; 2. through multiplication, if minute thefts arrive at a grave sum; 3. through conspiracy, where several conspire among themselves, and the little thefts of the individuals collected constitute grave matter.

n. 615.

- Resolutions. 1. If a thief, intending to arrive by little thefts at a grave sum, renews this intention as often as he steals, he sins gravely each time. Yet if from the beginning he intends to steal some determinate sum through minute thefts, for example so that he may not be detected, more probably he admits one sin, because it is one moral act; for all the particular acts tend determinately to effecting one thing ¹⁶. - Recall what was said in the Treatise on Sins, n. 163.

¹⁶ In reality it scarcely appears how this case differs from the preceding one. For in both there is a multiple external act with the purpose of the same wicked end; nor does it change the substance of the matter that in the other the thief gradually steals for this reason, lest he be detected. But perhaps for this reason the resolution of each is diverse: because, since the opinions of the Doctors vary in a question of this sort, one and the same case is resolved now from the opposite opinion of these, now from that of those. See what was said above concerning this question (p. 144, note a).

n. 615.

He who takes away from an owner a small thing very dear to him, for example, a rare and singular flower, the first fruits from a tree destined for honoring some distinguished man, and at the same time foresees that the owner will be gravely afflicted from such a loss, sins gravely against charity; but against justice lightly, unless perhaps grave damage seems about to follow from it.

…and 2 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 4 passages

Vol. III, Contracts, and the Obligat…, On the Virtue of Justice (…, Part I — Chapter II: On Injury, or the Violation of Right

n. 436.

III. What Matter Is Grave in Theft?

Matter can be grave in a twofold way: (a) in itself and absolutely, with respect to all, even the rich; (b) relatively to the condition or disposition of the owner, from whom the thing is taken away.

In itself and absolutely a grave quantity must be admitted which suffices for mortal sin; for, as was said above (n. 285), injury is to be held as grave, not only when it gravely harms individuals, but also when it inflicts grave harm upon society; now, unless matter absolutely grave were present, the public good would often be gravely injured, even when the good of some private person would suffer only light damage; for, as Lugo rightly says (n. 29), even if the theft of one gold coin would not bring great detriment to a very rich man, nevertheless it would cause great damage to society, because, if such a theft were not prohibited under grave sin, thefts of this kind would be multiplied, from whose frequency the greatest detriment would be brought upon the rich in general and upon the whole of society; and this danger cannot be avoided unless individual thefts of some moment are gravely prohibited.

But what that absolutely grave matter may be cannot be determined except by the moral estimation of the prudent, according to the various circumstances of times and places: for the value of money is diversified according to various regions and various times. Now today in most regions of Europe, a sum of about sixty francs is commonly reputed absolutely grave matter; in the United States of America, seven or eight dollars. - And this indeed is established for confessors; but in sermons to the people it is not expedient to define the matter thus, lest perhaps this be twisted into a depraved sense.

n. 437.

1. There is also relatively grave matter, namely that which brings grave harm given the condition of the owner; for in order to constitute theft, it is required that the owner be reasonably unwilling; now the owner, given the same sum of money, will be more or less reasonably unwilling, according as he more or less needs the money taken away, or is more or less poor. - But the commonly received principle is that in theft that matter is judged relatively grave which corresponds to the daily wage, or to the money which suffices for one day for a father of a family for the support of himself and his family, indeed for a worker for his own daily support. And deservedly; for he suffers grave harm who is unjustly deprived of the sum required for daily food.

Hence with respect to a worker, in Europe, ten, fifteen, or twenty francs constitute relatively grave matter, according to diverse places; in America three or four dollars; - with respect to the poor, in Europe, two francs, or, if they are very poor, twenty asses can be grave matter.

Likewise he who steals from a worker an instrument without which he cannot work inflicts grave damage and sins gravely, even if the instrument in itself is of modest price, at least when another instrument cannot be procured in useful time: for then he is deprived of a means necessary for earning support.

n. 438.

1. In order to judge concerning the gravity of theft, attention must also be paid to the disposition of the injured person; for since one of the conditions necessary for theft is that the owner be unwilling, theft will be graver or lighter according as the owner is more or less unwilling.

(a) Now generally a spouse in relation to a spouse is judged less unwilling than in relation to others, on account of the mutual love by which they accompany one another, and especially on account of a certain community of goods which exists between them; and therefore the matter required for mortal sin is greater for spouses than for strangers; according to St. Alphonsus,¹ a doubly greater amount is required. Indeed it can happen that the takings of wives are not thefts, if the license of the husband can deservedly be presumed.

¹ Homo Apostolicus, Tr. X, n. 32.

(b) The same is said of children of the family in relation to parents, on account of a similar reason. Yet for practice it must be noted that sometimes younger children sin gravely, even in small thefts, on account of erroneous conscience, because they falsely judge these to be grave sins.

n. 439.

(c) In relation to servants, a distinction must be made: if they appropriate for themselves common foods, which are not carefully guarded, the sin is not mortal, provided these are eaten by the servants themselves, and therefore are neither sold nor carried out of the house; the reason is that the masters are not judged gravely unwilling. - But if they steal things carefully guarded, money, garments, generous wine, etc., the quantity which suffices for mortal sin for strangers will be grave matter also for servants, because in relation to all these things the master is not less unwilling for these than for strangers; indeed, according to common estimation and civil laws, theft of this kind is reputed graver, as an abuse of confidence (abus de confiance).

Therefore servants should be seriously warned about this matter, especially if they are Catholics employed by non-Catholics, lest by such a manner of acting they bring disgrace upon the Catholic religion.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 7 passages

Vol. V, Pt. I, Ch. V, Section 9: Sins Against the Property of Others

n. ¶22.

c) What is the sum required for a grave sin of theft? This is a question which cannot be answered in mathematical terms, but must be gauged by the moral law. Broadly speaking, that is a notable sum of money which is required to supply a man and his family with the necessaries of life for one day. But the amount of one’s possessions and the sum needed for his daily support, are not the only measure for the magnitude of a theft. There must be a certain objective limit beyond which every theft or robbery is a mortal sin, regardless of the wealth of the victim, for the property of the rich, too, needs to be protected against unjust violation. Therefore, in the case of the very wealthy, materia gravis is a sum large enough, on the one hand, to constitute an incitement to theft, and, on the other, to expose the fortune of the victim to considerable danger if it were frequently repeated.

n. ¶23.

The casuists have long ago endeavored to determine just when the matter of a theft becomes sufficient to constitute a mortal sin. “Since about the time of De Lugo (+ 1660),” says Fr. Slater, “it has been a common opinion among theologians that it is a grave sin of theft to rob a workingman of a sum which is sufficient to support him and his family for a day. The reason for this doctrine is obvious and satisfactory. For that quantity will be sufficient for a mortal sin, whose theft causes a notable injury to the owner, an injury which ordinary men of prudence and sense consider serious, and which is sufficient to upset them considerably. This is the test which is applied in other matters where there is question of the grave breach of a moral law which admits of parvity of matter. . . . In the same way, when we wish to know what sum is sufficient for a grave sin of theft, we consider how important it is for maintaining peace among men that property should be secure; what quantity of money or commodities is looked upon as considerable with a view to the use that can be made of them; and what quantity will, with reason, cause the owner serious concern and chagrin if he is unjustly deprived of it. Now, to a workman, or indeed to any one who has to earn his living, the loss of what will support him and his family for a day is a serious matter; it practically means that he has worked a whole day for nothing, and such a loss causes most men, with reason, to be seriously put out.”

n. ¶24.

But what about rich men, wealthy companies, governments, etc.? “In such cases we must have recourse to other considerations in order to find what quantity will constitute a grave sin of injustice when stolen. Here we consider, not so much the loss caused to the owner of the property, as the wrong done to public order and to the security of property. . . . The public weal requires that theft of a considerable sum must be forbidden in all cases, as a grave violation of justice, by the natural law. A prohibition, under pain of venial sin, not to steal a considerable sum of money, would not be sufficient to safeguard the right of property. In other words, theft of what is commonly at a certain time and place considered a notable sum of money, will be sufficient to constitute a mortal sin of theft, even when the owner of the property stolen is not sensibly the worse off.”

n. ¶25.

After reviewing the opinions of recent moralists as to the quantity which public interest requires for a grave sin of theft, Fr. Slater, making due allowance for the depreciation of money, the higher standards of comfort, and, in consequence, the relatively less value attached to money by the working classes throughout the civilized world, independently of its purchasing power, sees “no reason for increasing the quantity which the greater number of modern theologians assign as the absolute sum required for a mortal sin of theft. That quantity is about twenty shillings, and if we attach much importance, as we should do, to the opinions of such classical moralists as Lugo about such a question, the sum will rather be below than above twenty shillings.”¹⁵

¹⁵ Slater, Questions of Moral Theology, pp. 99–115.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 527 (ed. Gaudé, II, 37).—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 593: “Grave matter in theft cannot be rigorously determined. According to the common opinion, which seems altogether to be held, this matter is to be regarded not absolutely in itself, but relatively to the various conditions and necessities of men, so that graver matter is required for a grave sin in theft against a rich man than against a poor man. The reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, depends chiefly on the greater or lesser deprivation, distress, and resistance of will suffered by the one against whom the theft is committed; indeed, everyone sees that the same matter causes now slight, now grave distress according as the owner from whom it is taken is rich or poor. Nevertheless, regard must be had to the resistance of will as it is commonly and reasonably found among men, not in relation to men attracted by a greater or lesser love of money. . . . Yet some absolute matter must be determined that can never be exceeded without grave fault; otherwise, if a complete proportion had to be observed among all conditions, a very great quantity would certainly be required as grave matter in a theft committed against a very rich man, which everyone sees would result in harm to society.”

n. ¶26.

The Compendium Theologiae Moralis of Sabetti-Barrett, S. J., which is, we believe, used in most of our ecclesiastical seminaries, following Palmieri, Gury-Ballerini, Ojetti, and others, gives about thirty-five dollars as the absolute sum required for a mortal sin of theft.¹⁶ This is a probable opinion and may be safely followed.

¹⁶ Comp. Theol. Mor., 29th ed., p. 369.

n. ¶27.

d) The object of a theft may be materia gravis not only in itself, but also per accidens, namely, if a number of petty sums are stolen from one and the same person on different occasions, or from several persons. Innocent XI expressly condemned the proposition that “A man is not obliged under pain of mortal sin to make restitution of that which he has stolen in small sums, even though the total amount be considerable.”¹⁷

¹⁷ Prop. damnat. sub. Innoc. XI, n. 38: “No one is bound under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken by a few thefts, however great the total sum may be.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1188).—Cfr. Gury, Vol. I, n. 596 sq.—In determining when there is objective coalescence of small thefts, so that ultimately what is called gravis materia is stolen, theologians seek some connecting link that will bind together the petty pilferings and give them unity; for without such a bond of union they will remain isolated thefts, and will, in consequence, have merely an objective malice against justice, which corresponds to them as individual unjust acts. The intention with which the small thefts are accomplished is pointed out as one means of bringing them into moral connection with one another. When a thief intends from the beginning to arrive at a considerable amount, but, for convenience sake, takes the large sum little by little, then, no matter what length of time intervenes between the different acts of robbery, and no matter whether the objects already stolen are attained or not, there is objective coalescence, and an externally grave sin against justice has been committed. Dr. Harty says on this subject: “It seems to me to be necessary to limit this teaching in some way. Is the intention of which theologians speak a subjective intention, an internal act of the will? If so, the question arises at once: How can an internal intention bring about an objective union between different acts? A mere subjective element cannot create an objective bond of union, cannot unite a number of petty injuries so as to make them one grave injustice. Just as, accord- ing to the opinion which seems the more common in the schools, an internal intention does not directly change the objective justice or injustice of an act, so too, it would seem, an internal intention cannot of itself provide an objective change in the relations of two or more acts of theft to one another; at most it regulates the subjective responsibility of the agent. A suggested solution of this difficulty is that the intention of which theologians speak is not a mere internal intention, but rather an intention which is externated by the different acts which follow from it; but I doubt if this solution, taken by itself, is sufficient to overcome the difficulty of the case, because each individual act of theft externates only an intention which corresponds to itself; nor does the whole series of acts, of necessity, externate any internal connecting intention, as can be seen from two examples, in one of which a certain number of acts of theft are performed without any initial intention of doing so, and in the other of which the same number of thefts are committed at equally long intervals in execution of an initially arranged determination. The difference between the two cases is purely internal. Perhaps the intention, which serves as an objective link between the various small thefts, is an intention which has a separate externation—separate in the sense that it must be distinct from that obtained by the mere repeated acts of stealing. This will frequently be expressly made, and frequently, too, it will be implicitly contained in the modus agendi of the agent. Such an externated intention would supply an objective bond which neither an internal intention nor an intention externated merely by repeated acts can give.” (Irish Theological Quarterly, Vol. II, n. 7).

n. ¶28.

Besides the objective and material value of the stolen object, there must be taken into consideration such subjective circumstances as the heartlessness or incorrigibility of the thief. He who intends to steal an object of considerable value, but succeeds in stealing only a petty one, commits a mortal sin. So does he who successively steals small sums in order gradually to obtain a large one, and he who co-operates with others in committing grand larceny, no matter how small his personal share in the booty may be.¹⁸

¹⁸ Gury, Vol. I, n. 598: “On the part of the thief, the taking of a slight thing becomes a grave sin in three ways, namely: 1. Through the intention of arriving at grave matter; 2. Through multiplication, if petty thefts amount to a grave sum; 3. Through conspiracy, when several conspire among themselves and the petty thefts of the individuals, taken together, constitute grave matter.” —Ibid., n. 599: “If a thief intending to arrive at a grave sum through petty thefts renews this intention each time he steals, he sins gravely each time. But if from the beginning he intends to steal some determinate sum through petty thefts, v. g., so that he may not be detected, more probably he commits a single sin, because there is a single moral act; for all the particular acts tend determinately toward effecting one thing.”

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 4 passages

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. I, Q. III, Ch. II, Article I. On The Nature And Gravity Of Theft In General

n. 78.

78. Definition. Theft is the hidden taking or taking away of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling.⁸

It Is Explained. It is said, first: hidden, because if it were an open taking away, there would be rapine.

It is said, second: taking, which includes unjust detention; for "to detain that which is owed to another has the same ratio of harm as an unjust taking."⁹ Therefore to theft are reduced: not paying debts, stealing something by fraud or deceit, not restoring to the owner a thing found, etc. - The taking away or detention is understood to have been done with the intention of retaining the thing for oneself and of using and enjoying it; for if the taking away was done from another intention, for example of lending the thing, or of soon returning it, or of destroying it, it is not theft strictly so called.

It is said, third: while the owner is reasonably unwilling. Theft strictly so called¹⁰ is not present if the owner either consents to the taking away, or if he is unwilling not so much concerning the taking away itself as concerning the mode of taking away (for example, if a wife secretly takes away certain lesser goods, the husband is not unwilling concerning the very taking away of the thing, since it is of lesser moment, but concerning the mode of taking away, namely concerning the wife's furtive mode of acting), or if he is unreasonably unwilling. But the owner is unreasonably unwilling if from justice or from piety or from another just cause he is bound to permit the taking away of the thing. Hence a wife does not steal if she takes away from her husband money which he would squander in games or drinking; likewise if in necessity she secretly takes from him things necessary for suitable sustenance. Nor can the husband reasonably be unwilling against such a mode of acting by the wife. Similarly a rich man is unreasonably unwilling that a poor man living in extreme necessity should take from the goods of the rich man the things necessary for life, or that a maidservant should give to the poor fragments of foods which otherwise would perish.

⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 66, a. 3.

⁹ Ib. ad 2.

¹⁰ Sometimes theft is taken in a broader sense, and then it is the deceitful taking away of any thing whatever (even one's own) deposited with another (cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 5 ad 3); or it also includes the unjust damaging of another's thing.

n. 79.

79. Malice Of Theft. Theft from its genus is a mortal sin.

This is clear from the things said above concerning injustice. For theft is injustice, which is a mortal sin from its genus. Besides, thieves are excluded from the kingdom of heaven, as is clear from the text cited above, n. 74. Moreover no one is excluded from the kingdom of heaven except on account of mortal sin. But by Christ the precept of not stealing is reckoned among the commandments which one must observe if he wishes to enter into life.¹¹ - But let no one say that from these texts it follows that theft is not only a mortal sin from its genus, but also from its whole genus, because it always excludes from the kingdom of heaven. For it would hardly be fitting to divine mercy if, for example, a boy stealing an apple were on that account thrust down into hell for all eternity. Therefore the texts of Sacred Scripture must not be understood concerning those very small thefts, which scarcely deserve the name of theft, but concerning greater thefts, which before God and men are acknowledged as shameful.

¹¹ Cf. Matt. 19, 18.

n. 80.

80. Gravity Of Matter In Theft. There are few matters in the whole of Moral Theology in which there exists so great a variety of opinions as in determining the gravity of theft. Nevertheless, it seems that here there is question not so much of the gravity of the sin of theft - which depends much on the lax or scrupulous conscience of the agent - as rather of the grave obligation of restitution arising from the taking away of another's thing. Certainly it is arbitrary enough if some moralist should wish to determine, for example, that he who took away 10 francs goes to hell; he who stole 9 francs goes to purgatory. On the contrary, moral theologians rather reasonably - while the Church is silent, indeed even consenting - try to determine the cases in which after the fact of theft there is a grave obligation of restitution. For restitution repairs the injured social order. As a rule in determining the grave obligation of restitution, above all there must be attended to the damage which has been caused by the unjust taking away. For theft is against the virtue of justice, and in sins committed against justice the gravity must be taken not so much from the affection with which the owner is borne toward the thing taken away, nor from the indignation or sadness with which he is affected from it, as from the damage inflicted. Whence, for example, he who unjustly takes away some little bird much loved perhaps sins gravely against charity, because he has saddened the mistress of the little bird most vehemently, but he does not sin gravely against justice, because he has not inflicted grave material damage. But grave material damage is judged to be present when either the injured person himself or the legitimate guardian of the social order is reasonably and gravely unwilling on account of that damage.

Most commonly modern theologians assign grave matter in theft, one kind absolutely, another relatively.¹²

Absolutely grave matter is taken from the value alone of the thing taken away, without any relation being had to the condition of the person from whom the thing has been taken. And therefore absolutely grave matter always and everywhere constitutes a grave obligation of restitution. But concerning what is absolutely grave matter authors do not agree. Tanquerey¹³ thinks it to be in the regions of Europe 20-30 francs; but in the States of North America 7-8 dollars; Noldin¹⁴ opines it to be 30 marks; Lehmkuhl¹⁵ teaches the same; but Waffelaert¹⁶ says it is about 40 francs. Since today the value of money has been enormously diminished, I think that there is always a grave obligation of restitution if someone altogether unjustly and without any excuse has taken away another's things at a price of about 100 francs (of gold value). The reason is that in our times the common persuasion of the people holds the unjust taking away of 100 francs to be a grave matter and to be punished severely on account of the injured public order. But I say: altogether unjustly and without any excuse; for if the thief has some excuse, or if the owner is not so unwilling, then a greater sum is necessary for inducing a grave obligation of restitution. Whence, for example, I would indeed admonish, but I would not strictly oblige to restitution, a son who took away 150 francs from his very rich father.

Relatively grave matter is that which brings grave harm to the owner, his condition being considered. Some authors assign the quantity by which a head of household needs for his daily sustenance with his family;¹⁷ others better define a certain fixed amount in about this way:

a) with relation to the poor and wretched, about 2 francs;

b) with relation to men of middling fortune, about 10-12 francs;

c) with relation to the rich, about 30-50 francs;

d) with relation to the very rich, about 100 francs, or the same quantity which is judged as absolutely grave.

Note concerning these fixed amounts: 1. They are not wholly certain rules, because no authentic sanction of them is found anywhere. They are nothing other than a reasonable and sufficiently founded opinion. 2. In them there is not attended to damage which perhaps can follow by accident from the theft: for example, if someone takes away from a workman an instrument of the price of 1 franc, ordinarily he does not sin mortally; nevertheless if the workman, because that instrument is lacking, cannot work for a notable time, then the thief foreseeing this omission of labor sins mortally, not indeed on account of the taking away of the instrument, but on account of the unjust damaging caused. 3. When it is unknown upon whom damage has been inflicted, it is permitted to presume that it has been inflicted upon one moderately rich. Wherefore if the value of the thing does not exceed 10 francs, there is not a grave obligation of restitution.

¹² But Billuart teaches that more probably the gravity of matter in theft is not to be estimated relatively, but absolutely (De iure et iust. diss. 11, a. 3).

¹³ Synopsis theol. mor. de virt. iust. n. 436.

¹⁴ De praeceptis n. 416.

¹⁵ Theol. mor. I, n. 1114.

¹⁶ De iust. II, n. 215.

¹⁷ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 527, calls this rule confused and obscure.

n. 81.

81. Scholion. On The Gravity Of Theft To Be Cautiously Weighed. In weighing the quantity absolutely or relatively grave, the circumstances of times and places must be attended to. Whence, for example, the quantity assigned by authors of past centuries is too small in our times, since the value of money is now greatly diminished. Similarly the value of money is much less in great industrial cities than in distant rural regions.¹⁸ But let the confessor always be mindful of what St. Augustine said concerning the distinction between venial and mortal sin: "It is most difficult to discover, most dangerous to define." Whence Billuart wisely warns:¹⁹ "Therefore let directors of souls not presume to resolve individual and singular cases with certainty: this is mortal, this is venial, unless this is openly evident.... And when they are questioned by penitents about that matter, let them prudently decline an absolute response, and let them instill in them horror of all sins, even venial ones."

¹⁸ Cf. Waffelaert, De iust. II, n. 215, where there is a long computation of the difference of value according to diverse times.

¹⁹ De iure et iust. diss. 9, a. 3.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 4 passages

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. VII, Diss. II, Ch. I, ARTICLE I: On the Nature and Gravity of Theft in General

n. ¶903.

Definition. Theft is: the carrying away of another's thing, while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

It is said 1. Carrying away of another's thing, namely with the mind of having it as one's own. Hence he does not commit theft who takes away a thing by jest, or on account of the good or advantage of the owner; for example wine lest he become drunk, a heretical book lest he read it. - 2. Owner, under which name comes he to whom any strict right whatever belongs, for example the right of usufruct, of deposit. - 3. Reasonably unwilling, for if the owner is presumed to consent, or if he cannot, by force of right, dissent (for example when a thing is taken away by title of necessity or compensation), the carrying away of another's thing is not theft.

n. ¶904.

Principles. I. Theft is from its genus a mortal sin. This is certain from 1 Cor., 6, 10: Neither thieves ... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God. The reason is that by theft commutative justice is injured, which of itself obliges under grave matter. Add that, if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish, as the Angelic Doctor observes (l.c., a. 6). - Theft nevertheless admits smallness of matter.

n. ¶905.

II. Grave matter of theft must be determined from the gravity of the damage that through it is inflicted upon one's neighbor. Thus commonly, from the Rule of the Angelic Doctor (2. 2, q. 73, a. 3): "Sins that are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed of themselves according to the harms that are inflicted upon one's neighbor; because from this they have the character of fault" (cf. n. 337, II).

Hence: a) The matter must be measured relatively, namely so that attention is given to the various conditions of men, places, and times, and to the varied value of money; for the end of the right of property for a private person (namely that he enjoy life in peace) can be more or less impeded and injured. - b) Some absolutely grave matter must also be determined, that is, matter that never, without grave fault, can be stolen even from the very richest; this is required by the end of the right of property as regards society: otherwise the greed of thieves would grow excessively, and society itself would certainly suffer grave damage. For the crowd scarcely attends to venial sins.

n. ¶906.

On this account the following Rules are established:

Rule 1. Matter is judged relatively grave when it would suffice for the injured person according to his condition for daily sustenance of himself and his family.

Therefore, with consideration given to the present value of money (which is at least twice lower than in the time of St. Alphonsus), and with attention given to the common estimate of more recent theologians (whose opinions here become intrinsically more probable), we judge that the following grades can be established, as a general norm in the principal places of Europe:

a) With respect to beggars, grave matter would be the value of one franc, or 20 asses; and less, if some poor person gains less by his daily begging. - b) With respect to ditch-diggers and similar workers, about 2-5 francs. - c) But with respect to craftsmen and merchants of slender fortune, 4-8 francs. - d) With respect to the moderately rich, or those who live from their own revenues, 8-10 francs. - e) But with respect to the absolutely rich, for example with respect to merchants sufficiently wealthy, 10-20 francs. - f) With respect to magnates, 30 francs and above.

In doubt, for example if you do not know to whom the damage was done, theft of 8-10 francs is reputed grave; because the damage is presumed to have been inflicted on one moderately rich. - Thus today commonly. Cf. Gousset, Theol. mor., I, 980; Crolly, III, n. 272; Konings, n. 695; Aertnys, l. III, n. 285.

Rule 2. Absolutely grave matter is that which, of itself and independently from the damage that the owner suffers, is commonly reputed to have notable utility or value.

Hence St. Alphonsus (III, 528) assigned as grave, with respect to kings, a sum exceeding 2 aurei, or about 10 francs. But today, with circumstances changed, 30-40 francs seem to be assigned, or even more, in places where the value of money is lower. Thus for England 1 1/2-2 golden pounds, in North America 7-10 dollars, can be named absolutely grave matter.

Note. 1. The relatively grave matter indicated above regards of itself theft that is committed by one action against one and the same person. As regards little thefts that inflict damage either upon one person by diverse actions, or upon diverse persons at one time, see n. 908.

In sacrilegious theft, if the thing, as regards physical species, is estimable by price, conclude in the same mode as for a profane thing; if otherwise (for example in sacred relics), consider its dignity, rarity, or attend to the special prohibition of the Church (cf. n. 583, 1342).
Theft with respect to a community (for example a commercial society), that it may be grave, ordinarily must reach the matter indicated for the absolutely rich. Others require absolutely grave matter. Except if the community is poor or small. - Say the same if a religious community is injured. Cf. St. Alphonsus, III, n. 528; IV, n. 25, with the notes added beneath.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 11 passages

Vol. I, TREATISE ON RIGHT AND JUST…, SECOND PART: ON VIOLATION …, Ch. II, OR ON SINS AGAINST JUSTICE, ARTICLE I: ON THE NATURE OF THEFT

n. ¶693.

Definition. - Theft, taken generically, is the taking away of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

Division. - Theft is thus distinguished:

1° Theft simply, if it is done secretly. - 2° Robbery, if it is done while the owner is positively resisting (morally or physically). - 3° Sacrilege, if it is done concerning a sacred thing.

n. ¶694.

Principles. - I. Theft, by whatever name it is called, is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it is gravely opposed both to charity and to justice, and in Sacred Scripture it is numbered among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven. For thus the Apostle Paul says:¹ Neither thieves, ... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God.

II. Sacrilegious theft and robbery constitute a species of malice diverse from theft: the former because besides justice it violates religion; the latter because to the unjust taking away of another's thing it adds injury inflicted upon the person. But the other modes, or the other objects of theft, do not change the species, because through them the nature of the damaging is not changed.

n. ¶695.

Questions. - A. Concerning theft grave of itself. - Query 1° What matter is judged grave in thefts of outsiders?

Resp. 1° According to the common opinion, this matter is not to be looked at absolutely in itself, but relatively to the various conditions and necessities of men, so that a graver matter is required for grave sin in theft against a rich man than against a poor man. The reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, depends especially upon the greater or lesser privation, pain, and reluctance of the will which he from whom it is stolen suffers; but now no one fails to see that the same matter causes sadness now light, now grave, according as the owner from whom it is taken is rich or poor. - Thus commonly with S. Alph.² against some, who contend that matter, whether grave or light, must be looked at absolutely in itself, and that it consists in that which is required for the daily support of an honorable man or of one moderately rich.

Yet some absolute matter must be determined, which it is never licit to pass beyond without grave fault; otherwise, if complete proportion had to be preserved among all conditions, surely the greatest quantity would be required for grave matter when someone steals from a very rich man. But this would certainly yield to the harm of society. - Hence:

Resp. 2° According to S. Alph.,¹ and with attention to the circumstances of this region and of our times, it will be grave approximately - relatively 1) to beggars, $0.50, and less if some poor man would not collect so much daily; 2) to diggers and similar laborers, $1.00; to artisans and merchants of slender fortune, $1.25; 3) to those moderately rich or living from their own incomes, $2.00, but less if from their own they live wretchedly; but relatively to the absolutely rich, for example merchants sufficiently wealthy, $2.50 or $3.00; 4) to a wealthy community, $5.00, or even, if it is very wealthy, $7.50; 5) to the very rich, $10.00, which sum indeed can be judged absolutely grave.

In practical doubt, generally that which does not reach $2.50 or $3.00 is not to be reputed grave.

Resp. 3° The value of a sacred thing, as to the physical species estimable by price, for example of a chalice, is the same as that of a profane thing; otherwise, as in Relics, its dignity and rarity must be considered,² or the special prohibition of the Church (n. 1730).

n. ¶696.

- Query 2° What matter is required, so that thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

Resp. 1° It is certain that in thefts of a wife and of children more is required than in thefts of outsiders; because the father of the family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling, in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as to the mode (that it is taken secretly) than as to the substance;³ but no general rule can be assigned. For the matter must generally be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions. Thus S. Alph.⁴ with others resolves that a son does not sin gravely who steals two or three scuta from a rich father (today and among us, I think, he would say $10 or 15).

Resp. 2° For servants it depends also upon the greater or lesser liberality of the masters, upon the quality or situation of the thing stolen, for example if it is edible or not, guarded or open, etc. According to the common opinion, through small thefts committed by servants in foods and edible things which are not usually kept carefully, generally one does not arrive at mortal sin, provided these things are not sold or carried out of the house, or taken in extraordinary quantity, or are of extraordinary price.¹ But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, a greater quantity is not required for grave sin, because masters then are not less unwilling toward them than toward others.

Query 3° Must the circumstance be explained by a son, that he stole from his father?

Resp. Negatively, because theft regularly is not directly and gravely opposed to piety, as for example hatred is. I say: regularly; for it is otherwise if the father would suffer much from it concerning his state. Scav.²

n. ¶697.

Questions. - B. Concerning theft grave by accident. - Query 4° In how many ways does theft of matter light of itself become grave by accident?

Resp. 1° By the intention of arriving at grave matter (n. 703. 2°); 2° by conspiracy, where many conspire among themselves and the little thefts of individuals gathered together constitute grave matter (n. 701. 702); 3° on account of grave damage coming to the owner from a light theft (n. 703. 3°); 4° by multiplication, concerning which in the questions n. 697-700.

Query 5° Do multiplied small thefts suffice to constitute grave matter?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively - whether it is a question of thefts committed against the same person, because united they can easily bring grave damage upon the owner; or it is a question of thefts committed to the damage of diverse persons, because, if not to individuals taken singly, certainly they bring grave damage to the community. Cf. prop. 38 condemned by Pius V.

Resp. 2° By multiplication they coalesce into grave matter either physically or morally. Physically, if they are conserved and the heap becomes grave; for then another's property is retained in a notable quantity. Morally, if indeed they are consumed, but between them there intervenes an interval which is morally or proportionately estimated as brief. - S. Alph.,³ Lugo.⁴

n. ¶698.

- Query 6° Do small thefts also coalesce if a great interval is placed between them?

Resp. Negatively, according to the more common opinion. The reason is that, when a great interval has been posited, small thefts are not judged to be morally united by the common estimation of men, nor therefore do they constitute one object in the genus of morals. Moreover, then grave damage inflicted upon the owner does not appear, since he can scarcely perceive it; and thus he is not judged gravely unwilling.²

Query 7° When is the interval judged great?

Resp. To S. Alphonsus³ the opinion teaching that thefts no longer coalesce beyond the space of two months is more pleasing, even if they were approaching matter as it were grave. But if it is a question of little thefts whose matter each time is very small, he considers a month or even a fortnight as a great interval. - Except, as I said above n. 697. q. 4° and 5°, if an accumulation is made or there is the intention of arriving at a grave sum.⁴

n. ¶699.

- Query 8° When does matter become grave in small thefts?

Resp. 1° If small thefts are made from the same person at diverse times, or by diverse persons at the same time, the matter will be grave when this exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° If small thefts are made from diverse persons, and discontinuously, grave matter of itself will be judged present when it is double the sum commonly required for grave theft.⁴

Query 9° Does retraction of the will prevent following little thefts from being united with preceding ones?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if the retraction was efficacious, that is, if in fact the things previously taken have been restored, because once separated they now no longer exist here and now. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° Again affirmatively, if the subsequent theft were done from some particular motive; for then it would not seem efficaciously to destroy the preceding will of restoring. Or even if the thief expressly and seriously proposes again at the same time to restore the things previously stolen; which, nevertheless, can scarcely be admitted in practice, since one who seriously proposes restitution does not here and now repeat thefts. - Negatively, however, where this will seems in some way to be revoked by a new theft; for in this case nothing prevents a notable sum from being retained, and the thefts coalescing into one.

n. ¶700.

- Query 10° Does he sin gravely who, after grave matter has been completed, still steals some light thing?

Resp. It is disputed. An opinion, very probable, denies it, the intention of arriving at a new grave sum being set aside. The reason is that that little theft does not seem to be referred to the grave sum already completed, but rather to a new one, which the thief then begins and pursues. - Thus S. Alph.¹

n. ¶701.

- Query 11° Does he sin gravely who by a light theft completes grave matter begun by others with the same person?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if he did not know that little thefts had been committed by others, because he is not conscious of grave damage inflicted upon the owner. - Thus all.

Resp. 2° Negatively, at least more probably, even if he knew that nearly grave damage had been perpetrated by others, nevertheless with the case of conspiracy set aside. The reason is that this man taking a little thing neither is per se the cause of grave harm, nor is he the cause that the others accepted other things. Therefore the grave damage which the owner suffers ought in no way to be imputed to him. - Nor say that such a thief sins as gravely as a murderer inflicting death by a light blow upon a man already struck by others with innumerable light wounds; for death is owed to this last wound, which otherwise would not have followed. But the matter is otherwise in the case of theft; for by the last little theft no notable calamity or damaging is added. - Lugo,² and others commonly, against Bonacina and others.

n. ¶702.

- Query 12° If many, without common counsel but by example, commit light thefts, so that the total damage is grave, do individuals sin gravely?

Resp. More probably negatively by reason of justice, although they can sin against charity. The reason is that example is not a per se cause, but only an occasional cause, of the damage. - Thus S. Alph.³ and others more commonly against some.

n. ¶703.

Resolutions. - 1° "Probably," says S. Alphonsus,¹ "those who would eat fruits in others' vineyards" or orchards, "provided they are not rare and of great price, can be excused at least from grave sin, if they do not carry them out in great quantity; for in this kind of things, which are too exposed, a greater quantity is required for constituting grave matter."

2° If a thief, intending to arrive by little thefts at a grave sum, renews this intention as often as he steals, as often as he steals he sins gravely. The reason is that the external act derives its malice from the internal act, which is gravely sinful.² Say the same of him who steals a small quantity with the intention of taking a notable quantity. Recall what was said n. 225. 8°. a).

3° He who takes from an owner a trifling thing very dear to him, for example a rare and singular flower, the first fruits from a tree destined to honor some special man, and foresees at the same time that the owner is to be gravely afflicted by such a loss, sins gravely against charity; but against justice lightly, unless perhaps grave damage seems likely to follow from it.

4° Merchants using false weights sin gravely, although each time they defraud in small matter; because they intend to arrive at grave matter, or certainly know that they will arrive at it.

5° Tailors and their servants sin lethally against justice, when by retaining for themselves or selling fragments of cloth which remain over, otherwise still useful to the owners, they have arrived at grave matter. Except unless in some place a custom prevails that less be paid and the fragments remain to the tailors; or unless it is established that wealthy owners do not wish the fragments to be restored to them, or care little about them.

6° They must be accused of theft who by deceitful beggary (not those who truly beg with exaggeration), or by going about with fabricated reasons, draw money from citizens. Yet those are not to be condemned who have a certain modest amount of money placed in a savings bank, in order to provide for old age and infirmity, lest they be forced to withdraw into a public poorhouse, or so that funeral expenses may be paid, meanwhile collecting alms from private persons whoever they may be, or from pious societies.

collecting alms, so that provision may be made for daily necessities. Indeed, that little money which they keep saved would shortly be spent, and they themselves would be a burden either to pious societies or to hospices. It must be said otherwise if they have money which is sufficient for the support of life. These things likewise can be understood of those who deposit a modest sum of money with a friend, when they betake themselves to a hospice, so that, if afterward it happens that they leave it, they may not lack every aid, or, if they die, their bodies may be committed to burial.¹

7° Concerning youths educated gratis in seminaries, or at the expense of private persons, with that hope that they will serve the ecclesiastical ministry, it must be held that they commit fraud if they enter seminaries without the intention of dedicating themselves to sacred duties, and with this purpose only, that they may be imbued with letters or indulge leisure; and therefore that they are bound to repair the damage. It is not necessary, however, that they be altogether certain of their vocation; for holy leisure is conceded to them for this reason, that they may have more mature counsel concerning so great an undertaking. But they ought neither rashly to enter nor to remain in sacred buildings after they have cast off hope and purpose. But if by their own fault they bring it about that they are held unworthy, they do not seem for that reason bound to make restitution, whenever the mind of defrauding was lacking; for donors are not to be judged to have placed the condition of restitution on account of sluggishness or other customary faults.²

8° Those who dig out coals are prohibited from carrying them away for their own use, unless a certain price has been paid; nevertheless, from the convenience of the thing, it easily happens that each one takes the coals necessary for his family. That custom indeed must be reprehended, but restitution does not seem to be exacted, since there is so great an abundance of coals there, and the owners are scarcely to be judged altogether unwilling; for they do not use solicitude to detect thieves. Those who carry away some coals for their own use from the banks of canals and rivers, where coals are deposited from boats, sin, and indeed gravely if they take a great abundance; not so if a few, especially those which lie scattered here and there. Moreover those who have been accustomed through the whole winter, or another long time, thus to take coals for themselves are guilty of grave theft, and ought to make satisfaction according to an equitable estimation of the damage. But often it is very difficult to send the price safely to the owners. The same must be said concerning those collecting wood which another cut for his own use, or carrying away what another procured for himself; for it is a grave fault of theirs to take an abundance for themselves without the owner's permission.¹

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 23 passages

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Third Part: Concerning Com…, Section B: On Justice and …, Ch. III, Question Two: On Theft

405. Principle II. Theft per se grave is constituted by that quantity or value whose taking, of itself gravely harmful, is done while the owner is reasonably and gravely unwilling, or which of itself is apt to cause grave sorrow of soul or indignation, and to which therefore society also is gravely unwilling, because it is apt to harm public peace.

Matter grave of itself, or from intrinsic damage, is not to be estimated only from the value or quantity of the thing taken away, so that the quantity required for grave matter is the same whether it is taken away from a rich man or from one not rich, as Bannez, Maldonatus, Dicastillo, Billuart, Carriere, Gousset, and others said, establishing it as that which morally equals the daily wage of an honest worker, or at least that which is necessary for the support of one day for an honest man. But according to the opinion which St. Alphonsus already calls common, the gravity of matter is probably to be determined from the value of the thing together with the condition and circumstances of the person from whom it is taken.

The reason is that theft essentially consists in the taking of another's thing, considered not as it were in the abstract, but in the concrete, insofar as it harms the owner and is joined with the reasonable dissent of the owner. Therefore the matter of theft and its gravity must be taken partly by order to the thing taken away, partly to the reasonable will of him from whom it is taken. "Sins," says St. Thomas, a. 3, "which are committed against one's neighbor, are to be weighed in themselves indeed according to the harms which are brought upon the neighbor; because from this they have the nature of fault." But the taking away of a thing which gravely harms one man is not therefore gravely harmful generally and to all. Whence the condition of the person is not extrinsic to theft considered under the aspect of damage, and the right in a good possessed by a poor man, according to utility and necessity, is worth more to the one having it. Therefore although theft may be materially equal, it is not so formally.

Hence a double grave matter is distinguished by modern authors: absolutely grave, from the value alone of the thing taken away, no account being taken of the condition of the person, and relatively grave, taken from the value of the thing and from the condition of the owner. For the gravity of matter, they say, is to be determined from the gravity of the detriment which by theft is brought against the end on account of which dominion of things ought to be preserved. But this end is twofold: the good of individuals, to whom this dominion is pleasing, useful, and necessary; and the good of the whole society, in which without private dominion of things public peace and security and the due incentive of labor cannot be had. Whence theft is distinguished as relatively and absolutely grave, according as grave detriment is directly brought either upon the possessor himself or upon the good of society.

a) A relatively grave quantity, according to the varied fortune and necessity of the person, is damage notable of itself, although the thing is not very notable; namely, that which, given the condition of the owner, of itself brings grave harm. This is generally judged to be that which suffices someone for one day for the support of himself or also of his own; whence for a worker it is a value somewhat less than a daily wage, and for a true poor man still a little less. Therefore it differs much for various nations and diverse conditions of men, for great cities and remote rural regions.

b) An absolutely grave quantity is a thing notable in itself which of itself procures a great advantage, even if its taking from someone, for example from a very rich man, is not gravely harmful, as are an ox, a horse, a sheep, a hundred gold coins. For although such theft does not much harm the owner, nevertheless it gravely harms society, public tranquility and security, because if these thefts were not prohibited under grave obligation, they would become most frequent and thus the greatest detriment to all and a disturbance of peace and security would threaten the whole society. Whence public power and the whole community are deservedly gravely unwilling that such things be committed in its territory; and therefore the owner himself is reasonably very unwilling in such a theft, even if he himself does not directly undergo grave damage from it.

Grave matter, expressed in money, depends upon the relative value of money, upon the greater or lesser abundance of money and things, and upon common estimation. Thus, for example, in America and England grave matter is not unless the sum is greater than in Belgium, because of the lesser value of money and greater abundance. Hence:

As the value of money decreases, the sum required for grave matter also increases.

Nevertheless it does not always increase in the same proportionate ratio: for the thing depends also upon other factors, such as more difficult economic circumstances, relative need, and common estimation. Nor does adaptation in minds and morals to the new value of money happen suddenly. And even when money decreases, those thefts will be grave which, in the given circumstances, are apt to have repercussion upon common security, because then there is grave harm to society.

With all these things considered, in Belgium before the European war of the year 1914-18, absolute grave matter was judged by authors to be 25-30 francs or somewhat more.¹ But after the war, the value of money being greatly diminished, it seemed to many that it could be extended to 150-200 or even more. In the uncertain economic circumstances prevailing after the second universal war of the year 1940-45, one should rather abstain provisionally from computation, because no definitive one can be established.

¹ Bulot says 25-30 fr.; Tanquerey 20 or 30 fr., in the Federated States of America 7-8 dollars; Noldin 30 fr.; but these in present circumstances are to be increased somewhat. Whence Ferreres, who for various regions places it between 30 and 40 fr., now permits this to be doubled; Arregui, however, establishes it between 40 and 50 fr.; Vermeersch 50 fr., but in a region where money has been made extraordinary from use, up to 150-200 fr. Before the war Palmieri for richer regions held a probable computation to be 100 fr.; but Garriepy, an American, thinks this too benign and places it at 8-10 dollars. One must abstain from laxer estimations, such as that which Arendt proposed in N. Th. 1926.

Let these things be an aid to confessors in ministry; but they are not to be proposed ex professo to penitents, nor a fortiori to the faithful in a sermon: for they would easily be badly understood and become a stimulus to stealing.²

² Tanquerey noted this, o. c., n. 436, and Vermeersch, Th. M. II, n. 639.

In practice, the matter is not of such great moment. For a) true thieves also steal, or intend or are ready to steal, more than matter strictly grave; b) subjectively, grave matter is that which the thief thought to be grave; and objectively, that which in the region is generally judged a mortal sin by good faithful. Nor is such a common opinion, if it is sufficiently strict, to be reformed; because this would be to stimulate thefts and thus would harm the common good. Therefore c) before the fact, one must speak more rigorously, so that the faithful may be turned away from theft, for example, by asking: would you not be gravely unwilling? or by saying that it is imprudent to expose oneself to acts which perhaps are grave injustice; - after the fact, lest an obligation of restoring under grave obligation be imposed, unless it is certain. d) In this matter, however, ordinarily attention will have to be given to relatively grave matter.

406. Principle III. Theft light of itself can by accident be grave on account of a great extrinsic harm; and on the contrary theft grave of itself can by accident be light on account of the disposition of the owner, if he is not very unwilling.

Just as absolutely grave matter is given, so there is an absolutely light quantity, namely, that which morally is less than daily support; and nevertheless, by reason of a special circumstance, theft of absolutely light matter can be a grave sin, or on the contrary theft of matter grave of itself can be only a light sin; for:

Theft of absolutely light matter, which brings upon another grave sadness or annoyance or notable damage, is by accident a grave sin against charity toward one's neighbor, or also against justice. Thus if someone takes away a thing of slight value which is very dear to the owner; or an instrument, for example, a needle from a tailor, while another cannot be had, so that he is deprived of a means necessary for support or for making gain; or a small coin from one who needs it lest he be reduced to extreme necessity. But in these cases the grave sin is not under the aspect of theft, but under the aspect of offense or injury or damage.

Theft of matter grave of itself can by accident be light, if the owner is not gravely unwilling. For since the opposition of the owner is an essential condition of injustice, one must attend to the disposition of the injured person in determining the gravity of theft, which will be graver or lighter according as the owner is reasonably more or less unwilling. Hence thefts grave of themselves but committed among domestics, or among near kinsmen or very close friends, can easily be light, if the owner is or reasonably ought to be not very unwilling. In particular:

a. Thefts of spouses. On account of mutual union and a certain community of goods, at least in use, a spouse is judged to be less unwilling toward a spouse than toward others; whence the matter required for grave theft is greater for spouses than for strangers, greater for common goods than for proper goods: thus according to the prudent estimation of St. Alphonsus, which many follow, a quantity twice as great is required, and sometimes more. Indeed it can happen that secret takings by the wife are not thefts, if the permission of the husband can deservedly be presumed; not however always, as if she expends notable money in buying ornaments wholly superfluous.

b. Thefts of children from the goods of parents. On account of the intimate union and common destination of goods, parents are rightly judged to be less unwilling; and according to the estimation of St. Alphonsus, for grave matter a quantity twice as great is required as that which otherwise would be required in similar conditions. In practice, for food or tobacco, parents are not unwilling except concerning the clandestine manner in which they are taken, unless it concerned things altogether precious; for money they are unwilling concerning the manner, namely, that it is done secretly, and concerning the end, namely, that it is consumed in play and pleasures, unless the sums were greater.

c. Thefts of religious from the goods of the community. It is said by many that religious are to be considered as sons, and therefore a quantity twice as great is required for grave theft, unless however great detriment were brought to a poor monastery. But this rightly seems too lax to others, since the condition is disparate, both because a religious is not, as a son is, a necessary heir of goods, and because religious superiors are much more unwilling than parents, on account of the spiritual detriment of subjects. Nevertheless a greater quantity is required than in other thefts. But in those sins there is always malice against religion, on account of violation of the vow of poverty.

d. Thefts of servants from certain goods of masters. For common food or things of lesser moment which are not cautiously kept, provided they are not sold or handed over to others or carried out of the house, but consumed by the servants themselves, masters are not very unwilling or are unwilling only as to the manner. But for things carefully kept, for choice and very precious foods or extraordinary things or things of great value, for money not small, the quantity sufficient for grave theft seems to be the same as for strangers, because masters are not accustomed to be less unwilling; especially for things specially committed to the custody of servants, which also can be reputed graver as an abuse of faith or denial of due fidelity.

e. Thefts of workers in the workshops of the master. These are to be judged by analogy as for the little thefts of servants; but special attention seems to have to be given to the damage really caused and perhaps to the customs existing in the workshop. For if the master knows the custom in some way and does not strongly contradict it, he is certainly to be judged less unwilling; unless however he would not dare to contradict it from fear of a greater evil.

f. Thefts of domestics generally can be estimated according to the aforesaid rules, unless something else is established. In practice the matter also depends on the fortune and personal disposition of the possessor and on the custom of places or families. Thus a rich man, one liberal, indulgent, a friend, is presumed to be less unwilling than a poor man, one avaricious, severe, or little loving; less also as to foods than as to other things; less if they take something moderate and rarely, than if something great and frequently; less if by simply taking secretly than by breaking in or by contracting debts in his name; less if domestics steal for their own uses, than if for giving or selling to others; less if a domestic is very useful, industrious, than if negligent, idle; less if one is a son, than if there are several or many.

Tr. I, Disputation XXVII: On Thef…, Question IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in theft · Tr. I, Disputation XXVII: On Thef…, Q. IV, Sole Doubt: What quantity is grave in thefts by sons, wives, and religious

Nevertheless all, whoever they are, are carefully to be deterred from the aforesaid little thefts, because they are repugnant to natural honesty, and because they easily introduce the proximate danger of gravely evil injustice.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 4 passages

Vol. I, Tr. VIII, Pt. II, Chapter I. On the Nature and Malice of Theft

n. 404.

Questions

Question 1. What matter is to be considered grave in theft, considering the circumstances of this our region?

Before response is made, certain things must be premised:

I. It is very difficult to determine this matter rigorously, as is clear both from the acknowledgment itself of the Doctors and from the lack of some measure. But it is altogether necessary that what appears more equitable be determined, lest the salvation of souls and the existence of property be brought into danger. Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 21 and seq. - Baller., note (a), p. 527.

II. According to the common opinion, which seems altogether to have to be held, this matter is to be regarded both absolutely and relatively. Matter absolutely grave is that which it is never licit to touch without grave fault, since its taking away is always considered gravely injurious with respect to all. The reason is that if complete proportion had always to be preserved among all conditions, certainly a very great quantity would be required for grave theft where someone stole something from a very rich man: but this would surely turn to the damage of society. Yet it is necessary that the matter of theft be considered also relatively, and the reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, depends especially upon the greater or lesser privation, pain, and reluctance of will which he suffers against whom the theft is committed. Yet attention must be paid to reluctance of will as it is commonly and reasonably had among men, but not with respect to men drawn by a greater or lesser love of money. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 526. - Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 28 and 29. - Baller., note (b), p. 527. - Slater, Questions on Moral Theology, pp. 144 and seq.

These things having been noted beforehand, now to the question:

Response. With respect to this matter absolutely grave, authors vary much, so that it is most difficult to determine the matter definitively. But these things seem certain to us: first, that the same or almost the same sum is not to be assigned as had been assigned by ancient authors; second, that the value of money is in no way immutable; that in various regions that value varies: that the matter is to be determined from the quantity of money existing in some region; from its commutative force; from the price of labor; from the moral estimation of men. These things are clear to us from the rather usual manner of acting of some persons, e.g., many European workers come to us, here support themselves by their own labor and send no small sums of money to their own, or carry them with themselves to Europe; but others, otherwise not poor, who now receive a half pension for an office now resigned on account of age or illness, betake themselves to foreign nations, where they can live comfortably, because they receive food, etc., at a cheaper price. The distinguished author Palmieri says: "I have heard other learned men who, on account of the price of money very much diminished day by day, would now wish absolutely grave matter to be that which equals more or less one hundred francs, to whom we assent without difficulty." - Gury-Ballerini, Edit. a. 1898. - "They do not seem to depart from the true who at least below 100 lire do not acknowledge matter of theft absolutely grave." Thus Ojetti, Synopsis, under the word Furtum. This opinion pleases us; indeed, since the value of money among us is different from that among foreign nations, it seems that one does not err who assigns the sum of about 35 dollars for our region.

But relatively grave matter seems to be established thus: a fourth part of a dollar or thirty cents for the needy who beg; one dollar for ordinary laborers; two for mechanics; and three for ordinary rich persons. The reason is that the taking away of such matter seems respectively to involve grave damage.

n. 404, Q. 2.

Question 2. What matter is required so that the thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

Response 1st. As regards wives, a case of grave matter in theft is held with difficulty, both because, as was said elsewhere, among us they make one person with husbands as regards common goods, and because these are not ordinarily considered reasonably unwilling regarding donations and other expenses, even secret ones, which are not altogether prodigal. But if a wife uses common riches prodigally, that quantity is required for the gravity of theft which suffices for inflicting grave damage upon the husband, which must be judged from the circumstances. But then it is more commonly taught that she is held to restitution either from paraphernal goods or by working more diligently or by taking care of the family estate. Cf. Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 169.

Response 2nd. It is certain among all that in thefts of children more is required for constituting grave matter than in thefts of strangers; because the father of the family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as regards the manner, namely that it be taken secretly, than as regards the substance. Wherefore many theologians say that for them a sum twice greater than for strangers is required; but no general rule can be assigned, for the matter will generally have to be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 32.

Response 3rd. For servants it also depends upon the greater liberality or stinginess of masters, upon the quality or situation of the thing stolen, e.g., whether it is edible or not, guarded or exposed, etc. According to many, by small thefts committed by servants in foods and eatables which are not usually carefully kept, generally one does not arrive at mortal sin, provided these are not sold or taken out of the house or are of extraordinary value. But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, no greater quantity is required for grave sin, because the masters then are not less unwilling toward them than toward others. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 34. - Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 168.

n. 404, Q. 3.

Question 3. Do small thefts coalesce for constituting grave matter?

Response. Affirmatively, whether they have been committed against the same person or against several, provided nevertheless that a great interval is not placed between them. For in the former case those little thefts, easily united by reason of time, certainly inflict grave damage: besides, proposition 38, which reads thus, was condemned by Innocent XI: "One is not held under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken away through a few thefts, however great the total sum may be." - But in the other case there would be grave damage inflicted upon society, whose order would be disturbed if those little thefts committed against different persons, and repeated with a brief interval, were not prohibited under grave sin. Cardinal de Lugo adds another reason, namely that each owner in particular is then gravely damaged, not indeed formally, but radically. - I said provided that a great interval is not placed between them; for little thefts which would be committed rarely bring no grave harm either to society or to private persons. But according to the truer opinion a great interval is computed as the space of two months. Yet except the case in which from the beginning there is the intention of arriving at a notable sum, because then the little thefts always coalesce, however long the interval may be by which they are separated from one another. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 530 and seq. - Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 37 and seq. - Vogler, n. 133.

n. 404, Q. 4.

Question 4. How is the gravity of matter in small thefts to be computed?

Response. It seems that it must be said more equitably and more commonly that if the little thefts are committed against the same person, whether physically or morally one, for instance some railway company, and at the same time discontinuously, namely more often than every two months, but not on one day or on the same occasion; or if they are committed against diverse persons indeed, but at the same time, namely on one day, on one and the same occasion or under the same circumstances, then the matter is considered grave when it exceeds by one half the sum required for grave theft. - But if both concur, that is, if the little thefts are committed against persons altogether diverse, and at the same time not on one and the same day or occasion, then the matter will be judged grave when it is twice greater. Yet observe that since these little thefts are committed against persons altogether diverse, the common measure of grave theft in each aforesaid case must not be taken from relative but from absolute gravity; for the damage then is brought not upon one, but upon several individuals or particular societies without grave injury to each one, as is supposed. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 530. - Baller., note (c), p. 531.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 74 passages

Tr. I, Disputation XXVII: On Thef…, Question IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in theft

n. 1.

Deservedly one may cite here the saying: As many heads, so many opinions, which Diana reports p. 1. Tract. 17. resolut. 57. and Tract. de paupertate religiosa, resol. 36.

n. 2.

The first opinion is that of Navarro in Manuali, cap. 17.: one and a half regales is a notable quantity of money that constitutes mortal theft; or two, or at most two and a half. Thus also Tolet. l. 5. cap. 16. assigns two Iulii; for among the Italians the Iulius is the same as the Regalis among the Spaniards, as Fagundez says l. 7. cap. 1. num. 15.

The second opinion is that of Corduba in summa, quaest. 109. and Salonii 2. 2. tom. 1. quaest. 66. art. 6. controu. 1. who say absolutely that one silver coin is grave matter, that is, four or five regales stolen from the rich; but one or two from the poor.

n. 4.

Third, Bartholomaeus Medina prima secundae, quaest. 88. art. 8. with many others says that it is not mortal theft unless it rises to the sum of two silver coins.

n. 5.

Fourth, Gregorius de Valentia Tom. 3. disp. 6. quaest. 19. punct. 16. Rebellius p. 1. l. 3. quaest. 15. sect. 2. num. 22. assert that it is absolutely lethal to steal three silver coins.

n. 6.

Fifth, Vega in summa tract. 1. cap. 129. casu 12. teaches that four or five regales constitute notable matter of theft.

n. 7.

Sixth, Molina de Iust. t. 3. disp. 685. says that as much value as the money given in one day to a digger of earth is seen to be mortal in regard to those who are not very rich.

n. 8.

Seventh, Bartholomaeus a S. Fausto in speculo disp. 2. quaest. 18. num. 26. and Sayrus l. 9. cap. 15. define the sum of three Iulii as grave even if taken from a most wealthy man; but two Iulii from one of moderate means; and finally, one silver coin or one Iulius taken from a poor man constitutes grave matter. Thus also Sanctes noster in cap. 6. Regulae, lays upon us poor wretches one single Iulius.

n. 9.

Eighth, Bonacina de contract. disp. 2. quaest. 8. p. 1. num. 7. distinguishes, saying that theft is grave according to the variety of persons from whom the thing is taken. For if the person is illustrious, opulent, splendid, a gold coin will be grave matter; but if he is an ordinary rich man, living on his revenues, four regales; if the person supports himself by a craft, two regales; fourth, ¶ if he is poor, one regale.

n. 10.

This opinion, which Nauarrus de restit. l. 3. cap. 1. num. 39. and Reginaldus in praxi, T. 2. l. 22. cap. 1. quaest. 4. num. 19. also hold, Diana says is more probable than the others, saying that a notable quantity, with respect to the rich, is about one gold coin, or sixty asses; but with respect to common persons, about 20 asses; and with respect to a poor man, about 7 asses.

n. 11.

The ninth opinion is that of Rodriquez in summa t. 5. cap. 118. num. 27. and 29.: that is a notable quantity which exceeds two gold coins; and Angel. v. Furtum, num. 34. and Syluester on the same word, quaest. 2. hold this opinion with regard to the wealthy. But whether Sotus l. 5. de iust. quaest. 3. art. 3. ad 3. teaches this opinion, Vasquez opusc. de restit. cap. 5. §. 1. dub. 5. num. 30. denies; but Turrianus, Bartholomaeus a S. Fausto supra, and Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 6. causa 10. Lessius, ubi infra, assert it, and the Doctors generally; and concerning this whole question see Megalam 2. 2. l. 2. cap. 1. quaest. 3. Rebellium de oblig. iust. p. 1. l. 3. quaest. 15. sect 1. Graffium p. 1. l. 2. decif. cap. 97. n. 27. Bannem 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 6. who posits a quite lax opinion. Malderum 2. 2. tract. 4. cap. 1. disp. 3. Lessium l. 2. cap. 12. dub. 6. num. 29. Azorium p. 3. l. 5. cap. 15. quaest. 2. Medinam C. de restit. quaest. 10. Tolet. summa, l. 5. cap. 16. Tutrianum l. 2. T. 2. disp. 33. dub. 2. Sanchez Tom. 2. l. 7. cap. 20. Cenedum de pauperie et relig. dub. 13. Conradum in resp. p. 1. cap. 166. Sayrum l. 9. cap. 15. qui num. 11. reports the opinion of Bannis 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 6. who says: if some steward of the King were to steal 200 gold coins, it would not be grave matter.

n. 12.

Stephanus Fagundez num. cit. says that this matter is better left to the judgment of the prudent, considering persons less or more wealthy, and places, etc. Thus also Couar. l. 1. variar. cap. 3. num. 11. Syluest. verb. Furtum, quaest. 2. Ioan. Medina de contract. quaest. 10. Caspensis tract. 18. disp. 5. sect. 4. Indeed Sanchez 1. 2. decal. l. 7. cap. 20. num. 5. asserts that generally in Spain, because the region is richer, four silver coins are the mortal quantity. The same is the judgment of Suarez Tom. 3. de Relig. l. 8. cap. 6. num. 10. To such a judgment Bassaeus v. Furtum 1. num. 4. subscribes.

n. 13.

Fagundez therefore asserts, first, with respect to Kings, Princes, and most wealthy Prelates, and most rich men, that the sum of two or three ducats is mortal from its object. He alleges, Rodriquez in summa, cap. 149. Sotum, Rebellium, Lessium, Couarruviam, Syluestrum supra, Petrum Nauarrum l. 3. de restit. cap. 1. num. 35. Suarium vero loc. cit. et Maiorem 4. dist. 15. quaest. 25. who, he says, probably assign with respect to these persons the quantity of one gold coin.

n. 14.

He asserts, second, that with respect to men of moderate wealth four silver coins constitute the mortal quantity, or at most, with a half added. Thus also Sanchez 1. 2. Decal. l. 7. cap. 20. num. 5. Suarez loco citato.

n. 15.

He asserts, third, that with respect to the poor the quantity of one hundred dipondii, or at most with 20 added, is deadly. He adduces Rodriquez, and Aragonium, ac Nauarrum.

n. 16.

Finally he says: If we attend to places and cities more or less wealthy in money, and where things are sold more cheaply or more dearly, it is probable that in Lisbon, Seville, Paris, Venice, London, Lyons, Rome, and other places very rich in money and opulent, the quantity of four or five regales, or denarii, is mortal in theft, even with respect to men of moderate wealth. But in Brazil, or in the West Indies, where money abounds and things are sold at a high price, the quantity of 15 Iulii will be mortal, against Lopes p. 1. cap. 92. who says that the sum of two regales in India is deadly.

n. 17.

But if four or five quadrantes are deducted from the prescribed quantity, he concludes that it is still mortal, because things that differ but little seem not to differ at all. Moreover these quantities are not to be taken Mathematically, but morally, as Lessius l. 2. cap. 11. disp. 6. num. 32. well teaches.

n. 18.

In D. Bonav. I do not find any quantity prefixed; only in speculo animae, cap. 2. he says: Yet it must be noted that a thing might be so small, or of so little value, that it would not have the character of mortal, unless perhaps there were a will to take more, if the opportunity were present, or in that small thing there were notable damage to another; for a poor man is at any time damaged more in a small thing than a rich man in a great one. Thus also other ancient Theologians remit the whole business to the judgment of the prudent, as Sayrus l. 9. cap. 15. num. 9. notes, establishing nothing special.

n. 19.

They think, therefore, that grave matter must be judged according to the gravity of the damage. Hence it agrees with the last opinion, that according to the variety of persons, places, etc. the gravity of the thing taken must be computed. He warns, however, that a thing light in its genus can become grave from the damage. They bring the example: if you take from someone an instrument of his craft by which he earns notably, even if it be a needle, and he has no other like it. They agree with Suarez loc. cit. num. 16. Tolet. l. 5. cap. 6. Petrus Nauar. l. 3. de restit. cap. 1. num. 33. Lessius l. 2. cap. 12. dub. 12. num. 33. Nauar. Summa, cap. 17. num. 3. Sanchez T. 2. l. 7. cap. 20. Fagundez l. 7. cap. 2. num. 2. The reason is, because grave damage is against justice gravely, and obliges to restitution, C. si culpa tua, de iniuriis, et damno datis. Thus also Tannet. disp. 4. quaest 8. dub. 6. reporting Aragonium, Bannem quaest. 66. art. 2. Bartholomeum Medinam quaest. 86. art. 2. Valentiam quaest. 10. p. 5. Rebellium l. 3. de iust. quaest. 15. sect. 2. and 3. Azor. t. 3. l. 5. cap. 13. quaestio 1. Lessium lib. 2. cap. 12. dub. 6.

n. 20.

MANY say that the same follows if someone steals a small thing on account of which you know the Lord in his anger will break out in grave blows against another. Fagundez reports them, num. 5.

n. 21.

HERE arises the doubt, whether to steal in a Church a thing that is not sacred is sacrilege, by reason of the circumstance of the Sacred place and the injury inflicted upon it.

n. 22.

The SENTENCE formerly common was that, absolutely, theft by reason of the circumstance of the Sacred place becomes sacrilege, and most of the Recentiores also hold it, as Fagundez reports l. 7. cap. 2. and Diana p. 1. tract. de circumstantiis aggravantibus, resol. 27. Paulus Layman defends it l. 4. tract. 10. cap. 7. num. 18, Suarez de Relig. Tom. 1. l. 3. cap. 4. num. 7. where he says it is the common sentence.

n. 23.

It is PROVED from the words of Pope John in cap. Quisquis, dist. 17. quaest. 4.: Sacrilege is committed by taking a sacred thing from a sacred place; or a non-sacred thing from a sacred place; or a sacred thing from a non-sacred place. Therefore, since the Law does not distinguish whether that non-sacred thing is in custody, or deposit, or the possession of the Church, it does not seem it should be distinguished, as many distinguish; for thus the rule of the Law is had, de pretio, ff. de publican. unless another law or reason compels. There follow Raphaël de la Torre t. 2. t. 2. quaest. 99. art. 1. disp. 7. Rebellius p. 1. l. 3. quaest. 15. num. 25. with Reginaldus T. 2. l. 23. cap. 1. num. 12. Menoch. de arbitrar. l. 2. cent. 4. casu 389. num. 14. and Petrus Ledesma Summ. Tract. de poenit. cap. 10. This is the sentence of D. Bonau. in 3. dist. 37. dub. 7. litterali.

n. 24.

COMMONLY, however, they distinguish, as was intimated above, and say: if that thing is in deposit, or in the church, or the like, it is sacrilege; but not otherwise, if it is the purse of the one who is in the Church. Thus Sotus in 4. dist. 18. quaest. 2. art. 4. Ioan. de Cruz p. 2. direct. de Sacramento Poenit. quaest. 3. disp. 6. Fagundez lib. 7. in septimum praeceptum decal. cap. 2. num. 10. Henriquez l. 2. cap. 6. num. 5. and Diana judges it probable, and Raphaël de la Torre, and Lessius lib. 2. cap. 45. dub. 3. num. 14. Zerola praxi de poenit. cap. 12. quaest. 17. The same is defended by Cano 5. p. relectionis, §. Multa hic, Caietanus tomo 1. opusc. 31. resp. 12. dub. 2. Lopez Instruct. p. 1. cap. 31. §. At vero.

n. 25.

I indeed follow the sentence of D. Bonaventura, who posits three species of sacrilege. The first is to steal a sacred thing, e.g. a consecrated Chalice from a sacred place. The second, a sacred thing from a non-sacred place, as a consecrated chalice from the house of a craftsman. The third, a non-sacred thing from a sacred place, e.g. a purse in the Church; thus, besides those alleged, Sà distinguishes, v. Sacrilegium, Sylvest. there, §. 2. Rosella in the same place, Nauar. Manual. Lat. cap. 6. num. 4. and cap. 17. num. 95.

n. 26.

FOR we have from Canon Law the declaration of Pope John, nor ought we to stand on the civil law, which, that an action of sacrilege be given against the thief, requires that the thing be made and taken away from the sacred place, as Iulius Clarus reports l. 5. sent. §. Sacrilegium.

n. 27.

Nor does Fagundez, who cites that Canon, answer anything, except that the Canon intimates our sentence: but he plainly asserts it, as we saw, and Diana confesses it, who does not answer him a word in his own defense.

n. 28.

They OBJECT that it is per accidens that the thing exists in the Church.

n. 29.

D. Bonaventure ANSWERS that that place, even if physically it adds only an accident, morally nevertheless adds a species. For it is great irreverence of the place, and that thing is entrusted in faith to the Church; while those who are intent on religion ought therefore to have in safety what they have in it; and to steal is to wound the consecrated place; just as to commit other shameful things in the temple is to profane it itself.

Tr. I, Disputation XXVII: On Thef…, Q. IV, Sole Doubt: What quantity is grave in thefts by sons, wives, and religious

n. 1.

It must NOT be judged so severely of what a son takes away or steals from his father, or a wife from her husband, as of what he takes from a stranger, as Fagundez admonishes in 7. praeceptum, l. 7. cap. 3. from D. Bonau. in 4. dist. 15. p. 2. art. 2. quaest. 1. But the S. Doctor treats of all these things in speculo animae, capite 2.

n. 2.

One must, however, distinguish many kinds of goods in a household, of which a Son may take something.